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[[India]] and the [[United States]] established diplomatic relations in 1947 following the independence of India from the [[United Kingdom]]. Over the decades, the relationship has evolved into a broad-based strategic partnership grounded in shared democratic values, commitment to individual freedoms, and respect for the rule of law. As of 2025, [[India]]–[[United States]] relations encompass close cooperation across defense, technology, trade, education, and people-to-people ties, reflecting converging interests in promoting stability, prosperity, and a rules-based international order, even as differences persist on specific trade and energy issues. | [[India]] and the [[United States]] established diplomatic relations in 1947 following the independence of India from the [[United Kingdom]]. Over the decades, the relationship has evolved into a broad-based strategic partnership grounded in shared democratic values, commitment to individual freedoms, and respect for the rule of law. As of 2025, [[India]]–[[United States]] relations encompass close cooperation across defense, technology, trade, education, and people-to-people ties, reflecting converging interests in promoting stability, prosperity, and a rules-based international order, even as differences persist on specific trade and energy issues. | ||
In early 2026, energy policy emerged as a point of discussion within [[India]]–[[United States]] relations, as analysts assessed whether India could shift a portion of its crude oil imports from [[Russia]] to [[Venezuela]] amid political pressure from the [[United States]]. | In early 2026, energy policy emerged as a point of discussion within [[India]]–[[United States]] relations, as analysts assessed whether India could shift a portion of its crude oil imports from [[Russia]] to [[Venezuela]] amid political pressure from the [[United States]].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Sharma |first=Yashraj |title=Can India switch from Russian to Venezuelan oil, as Trump wants? |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2026/2/4/can-india-switch-from-russian-to-venezuelan-oil-as-trump-wants |access-date=2026-02-04 |website=Al Jazeera |language=en}}</ref><ref name=":14">{{Cite news |last=Choudhary |first=Sanjeev |date=2026-02-03 |title=India-US trade deal: India will drop Russian oil, pivot to US, Venezuela, says Trump |url=https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy/oil-gas/india-us-trade-deal-india-will-drop-russian-oil-pivot-to-us-venezuela-says-trump/articleshow/127870223.cms??from=mdr |access-date=2026-02-04 |work=The Economic Times |issn=0013-0389}}</ref> Experts noted that such a transition would face logistical, economic, and contractual challenges, and that India had not formally committed to altering its existing oil procurement strategy.<ref name=":15">{{Cite web |title=India-US trade deal: White House says New Delhi to end Russian oil purchases, buy more from US |url=https://www.moneycontrol.com/world/india-us-trade-deal-white-house-says-new-delhi-to-end-russian-oil-purchases-buy-more-from-us-article-13809476.html |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20260204110649/https://www.moneycontrol.com/world/india-us-trade-deal-white-house-says-new-delhi-to-end-russian-oil-purchases-buy-more-from-us-article-13809476.html |archive-date=2026-02-04 |access-date=2026-02-04 |website=Moneycontrol |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Mishra |first=Neerja |date=2026-02-03 |title=How Did Venezuelan Oil Become a 'Trade Bargaining Chip' in the India–US Trade Deal & Tariff Reset? |url=https://sundayguardianlive.com/world/how-did-venezuelan-oil-become-a-trade-bargaining-chip-in-the-indiaus-trade-deal-tariff-reset-168117/ |access-date=2026-02-04 |website=The Sunday Guardian |language=en}}</ref> The United States and India announced a comprehensive trade agreement under which President [[Donald Trump]] stated that India agreed to halt purchases of [[Petroleum industry in Russia|Russian oil]] and to increase imports of U.S. and potentially Venezuelan crude, alongside broad tariff reductions on Indian goods.<ref>{{Cite news |title=US to cut tariffs on India to 18% as Modi agrees to stop buying Russian oil |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2026/2/2/trump-to-slash-us-tariffs-on-india-from-50-percent-to-18-percent |access-date=2026-02-05 |work=Al Jazeera}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |title=U.S. and India seal trade deal after months of diplomatic tensions |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/02/02/india-us-trump-trade-deal/ |access-date=2026-02-05 |work=The Washington Post}}</ref> Indian officials said energy security and diversification remained key priorities, with Indian refiners requiring a wind-down period to complete previously booked Russian oil shipments and with no immediate directive to abruptly cease all Russian oil purchases.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Indian refiners await government advice on Russian oil import halt, sources say |url=https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/indian-refiners-need-wind-down-period-russian-oil-sources-say-2026-02-02/ |access-date=2026-02-05 |website=Reuters}}</ref> Data showed a significant decline in India’s Russian oil imports amid ongoing negotiations and Indian energy officials indicated a broadened sourcing strategy that included crude from other regions, reflecting a shift toward diversification without an immediate full withdrawal from Russian supplies.<ref>{{Cite web |title=India's Russian oil imports down in January amid trade talks with US |url=https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/indias-russian-oil-imports-down-9-jandec-amid-us-india-trade-talks-2026-02-04/ |access-date=2026-02-05 |website=Reuters}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |title=Kremlin says it sees nothing new in India's plan to diversify its oil supplies |url=https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/kremlin-says-it-sees-nothing-new-indias-plan-diversify-its-oil-supplies-2026-02-04/ |access-date=2026-02-05 |work=Reuters}}</ref> | ||
==Background== | ==Background== | ||
===Early engagement and Cold War context=== | ===Early engagement and Cold War context=== | ||
India and the United States began engaging with one another soon after India’s independence in 1947, with early cooperation in areas such as food security, education, and institution-building. However, the broader geopolitical dynamics of the Cold War shaped the trajectory of the relationship. In 1955, Pakistan joined the [[Baghdad Pact]], later renamed the [[Central Treaty Organization]] (CENTO), in which the United States held observer status, resulting in a limited strategic alignment between Washington and Islamabad. | India and the United States began engaging with one another soon after India’s independence in 1947, with early cooperation in areas such as food security, education, and institution-building. However, the broader geopolitical dynamics of the Cold War shaped the trajectory of the relationship. In 1955, Pakistan joined the [[Baghdad Pact]], later renamed the [[Central Treaty Organization]] (CENTO), in which the United States held observer status, resulting in a limited strategic alignment between Washington and Islamabad.<ref>{{Cite web |last=US Department of State |title=The Baghdad Pact (1955) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) |date=January 7, 2008 |url=https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/lw/98683.htm}}</ref> | ||
India, prioritizing strategic autonomy and decolonization-era sovereignty, pursued an independent foreign policy and was a founding member of the [[Non-Aligned Movement]] in 1961, seeking to avoid formal alignment with either bloc during the Cold War. | India, prioritizing strategic autonomy and decolonization-era sovereignty, pursued an independent foreign policy and was a founding member of the [[Non-Aligned Movement]] in 1961, seeking to avoid formal alignment with either bloc during the Cold War.<ref>{{Cite web |date=May 12, 2023 |title=Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) {{!}} Definition, Mission, & Facts {{!}} Britannica |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/Non-Aligned-Movement |access-date=May 21, 2023 |website=www.britannica.com |language=en}}</ref> While India also developed close ties with the Soviet Union during this period, engagement with the United States continued in parallel through diplomacy, development assistance, and people-to-people exchanges. Differences over regional security, including U.S. support for Pakistan during the [[Indo-Pakistani War of 1971]], led to periods of strain, but did not sever bilateral ties. | ||
The end of the Cold War and the [[dissolution of the Soviet Union]] in 1991 marked a turning point. India’s economic liberalization and the emergence of a [[unipolar world]] created new opportunities for convergence, leading both countries to reassess the relationship in light of shared democratic values and complementary interests. | The end of the Cold War and the [[dissolution of the Soviet Union]] in 1991 marked a turning point. India’s economic liberalization and the emergence of a [[unipolar world]] created new opportunities for convergence, leading both countries to reassess the relationship in light of shared democratic values and complementary interests.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Grare |first=Frederic |date=July 27, 2019 |title=Looking Back at Three Decades of India-U.S. Relationship |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2019/07/looking-back-at-three-decades-of-india-us-relationship?lang=en |website=[[Carnegie Endowment for International Peace]]}}</ref> | ||
===Expansion into a comprehensive partnership=== | ===Expansion into a comprehensive partnership=== | ||
In the twenty-first century, India’s foreign policy has emphasized strategic autonomy while actively engaging major global powers to advance national development and regional stability. | In the twenty-first century, India’s foreign policy has emphasized strategic autonomy while actively engaging major global powers to advance national development and regional stability.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.indianembassy.org/archives_details.php?nid=1743|title=Welcome to Embassy of India, Washington D C, USA |access-date=April 2, 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160326092058/https://www.indianembassy.org/archives_details.php?nid=1743|archive-date=March 26, 2016|url-status=dead}}</ref> This approach aligned with growing U.S. recognition of India as a key partner in Asia and beyond. | ||
Under the administrations of Presidents [[George W. Bush]] and [[Barack Obama]], bilateral relations deepened substantially, with Washington acknowledging India’s core interests and supporting its rise as a responsible global power. | Under the administrations of Presidents [[George W. Bush]] and [[Barack Obama]], bilateral relations deepened substantially, with Washington acknowledging India’s core interests and supporting its rise as a responsible global power.<ref>{{cite news|title=One year of Modi Government: Us versus them|url=http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/one-year-of-narendra-modi-government-us-versus-them/|work=Indian Express |date=May 25, 2015}}</ref> Landmark developments included the expansion of bilateral [[trade]] and [[investment]], enhanced cooperation on counterterrorism and global security, and U.S. support for India’s greater role in global governance institutions. India’s admission into major multilateral export control regimes, along with U.S. backing for its entry into the [[Nuclear Suppliers Group]], further underscored growing trust and strategic alignment.<ref>{{cite news|title=Indo-US joint statement after Obama-Modi talks|url=https://www.thehindu.com/news/resources/indous-joint-statement-after-us-president-barack-obama-and-prime-minister-narendra-modi-talks/article6821279.ece|work=The Hindu |date=January 25, 2015}}</ref> | ||
Since 2014, strategic cooperation has accelerated across defense, technology, and regional security. | Since 2014, strategic cooperation has accelerated across defense, technology, and regional security.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Šumit |first=Ganguly |date=2022 |title=Obama, Trump and Indian foreign policy under Modi |journal=Nature Public Health Emergency Collection |volume=59 |issue=1 |pages=9–23|doi=10.1057/s41311-021-00294-4 |pmid=40477437 |pmc=7980102}}</ref> The United States designated India a "Major Defense Partner," reflecting a high degree of confidence and long-term commitment in defense collaboration.<ref name="India US Defence">{{cite web|title=India, US finalise Major Defence Partner agreement|url=http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-us-major-defence-partner-agreement-manohar-parrikar-ashton-carter-4418019/|work=[[The Indian Express]] |access-date=December 9, 2016 |date=December 9, 2016}}</ref> Cooperation has also expanded within multilateral and minilateral frameworks such as the [[Quadrilateral Security Dialogue|Quad]] and the [[I2U2 Group]], reflecting shared interests in a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific and in addressing global challenges through partnership.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Michael |first1=Kugelman |date=July 14, 2022 |title=Another Quad Rises |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/14/i2u2-quad-india-israel-uae-us-south-asia/ |publisher=Foreign policy}}</ref> | ||
== History == | == History == | ||
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=== Age of Exploration === | === Age of Exploration === | ||
The term "Indian", which has been used as an alternative for the [[Indigenous peoples of the Americas]], originated with [[Christopher Columbus]], who, in his search for [[India]], thought that he had arrived in the [[East Indies]]. This historical misnomer has persisted over the centuries, shaping cultural perceptions and narratives surrounding Native American identity. | The term "Indian", which has been used as an alternative for the [[Indigenous peoples of the Americas]], originated with [[Christopher Columbus]], who, in his search for [[India]], thought that he had arrived in the [[East Indies]]. This historical misnomer has persisted over the centuries, shaping cultural perceptions and narratives surrounding Native American identity.<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=cp0r3aa8EM8C&q=indian+%22in+dios%22+wilton&pg=PA163|title=Word myths: debunking linguistic urban legends|first=David|last=Wilton|page=163|publisher=Oxford University Press, USA|isbn=978-0-19-517284-3|date=December 2, 2004 |access-date=July 3, 2011}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.straightdope.com/columns/read/1966/does-indian-derive-from-columbuss-description-of-native-americans-as-una-gente-in-dios|title=Does "Indian" derive from Columbus's description of Native Americans as "una gente in Dios"? |date=October 25, 2001 |first=Cecil|last=Adams|author-link=Cecil Adams|website=[[The Straight Dope]] |access-date=July 3, 2011 |archive-date=June 28, 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110628192914/http://www.straightdope.com/columns/read/1966/does-indian-derive-from-columbuss-description-of-native-americans-as-una-gente-in-dios|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=The Biggest Misnomer of All Time?|url=http://www.visualthesaurus.com/cm/wordroutes/2015/ |date=October 12, 2009 |first=Ben|last=Zimmer|author-link=Ben Zimmer|publisher=VisualThesaurus |access-date=July 3, 2011 |archive-date=April 19, 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120419005109/http://www.visualthesaurus.com/cm/wordroutes/2015/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Hoxie |first=Frederick E. |title=Encyclopedia of North American Indians |year=1996 |publisher=Houghton Mifflin Harcourt |isbn=978-0-395-66921-1 |page=[https://archive.org/details/encyclopediaofno00hoxi/page/568 568] |url=https://archive.org/details/encyclopediaofno00hoxi/page/568}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Herbst|first=Philip|title=The Color of Words: An Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Ethnic Bias in the United States|year=1997|publisher=Intercultural Press|isbn=978-1-877864-97-1|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=UiZQH5gHuggC&pg=PA116|page=116}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|title=Discourse Analysis as Sociocriticism : The Spanish Golden Age|first=Antonio|last=Gómez-Moriana|chapter=The Emerging of a Discursive Instance:Columbus and the invention of the "Indian"|pages=[https://archive.org/details/discourseanalysi0000gome/page/124 124–32]|publisher=University of Minnesota Press|date=May 12, 1993|isbn=978-0-8166-2073-9 |access-date=July 4, 2011 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_BCpLZfypTIC&q=columbus+indios+indian&pg=PA124|url=https://archive.org/details/discourseanalysi0000gome/page/124}}</ref> | ||
=== American Revolution, the East India Company, and early America context === | === American Revolution, the East India Company, and early America context === | ||
Prior to the 1770s, Americans admired the expansion of the [[British Empire]], feeling proud to be part of an expansion of British influence around the world. | Prior to the 1770s, Americans admired the expansion of the [[British Empire]], feeling proud to be part of an expansion of British influence around the world.<ref name="LT">{{Cite web |title=The Last Time the US and India Were This Aligned? 1780 |url=https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/the-last-time-the-us-and-india-were-this-aligned-1780/ |access-date=February 20, 2025 |website=thediplomat.com |language=en-US}}</ref> Some Indians (from places such as [[Mumbai|Bombay]] and [[Bengal]]) were sent to the latter for [[Slavery in the colonial history of the United States#East Indian slaves|slavery or indentured servitude]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://nedhector.com/east-indians-enslaved-in-america/|title=East-Indians Enslaved in Early America – Edward "Ned" Hector – Black Revolutionary War Hero [email protected] / 610-352-4372}}</ref> Today, descendants of such East Indian slaves may have a small percent of DNA from Asian ancestors but it likely falls below the detectable levels for today's DNA tests.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://nativeheritageproject.com/2012/07/03/east-india-indians-in-early-colonial-records/ | title=East India Indians in Early Colonial Records | date=July 3, 2012 }}</ref> | ||
The American [[Founding Fathers of the United States|Founding Fathers]] maintained awareness and admiration of affairs in Mysore in its resistance to London. | The American [[Founding Fathers of the United States|Founding Fathers]] maintained awareness and admiration of affairs in Mysore in its resistance to London.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Ahmed |first=Ameen |date=August 17, 2020 |title=How Tipu Sultan and Haidar Ali inspired America's founding fathers in their quest for freedom |url=https://scroll.in/global/970265/how-tipu-sultan-and-haidar-ali-inspired-americas-founding-fathers-in-their-quest-for-freedom |access-date=February 20, 2025 |website=Scroll.in |language=en}}</ref> The American [[Continental Congress]], unable to send a full expedition to the subcontinent, instead encouraged its pirate navy to attack East India Company ships.<ref name="LT" /> | ||
The flag of the [[East India Company]] is said to have inspired the [[Continental Union Flag]] of 1775, ultimately inspiring the current [[flag of the United States]], as both flags were of the same design. | The flag of the [[East India Company]] is said to have inspired the [[Continental Union Flag]] of 1775, ultimately inspiring the current [[flag of the United States]], as both flags were of the same design.<ref name="fawcett">{{cite journal|first=Sir Charles |last=Fawcett |title=The Striped Flag of the East India Company, and its connexion with the American 'Stars and Stripes' |journal=The Mariner's Mirror |volume=23 |issue=4 |pages=449–476 |doi=10.1080/00253359.1937.10657258 |year=1937 }}{{Subscription required}}</ref> [[Mysorean rockets]] were also used in the [[Battle of Baltimore]], and are mentioned in "[[The Star-Spangled Banner]]", the national anthem of the United States: ''And the rockets' red glare, the bombs bursting in air''.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.bandyheritagecenter.org/sites/www/Uploads/History%20Nook/The%20Congreve%20Rockets%20in%20the%20War%20of%201812.pdf|title=The Congreve Rockets in the War of 1812|author=Eugene Van Sickle|publisher=[[Dalton State College]]|access-date=December 9, 2014|archive-date=December 25, 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141225170628/http://www.bandyheritagecenter.org/sites/www/Uploads/History%20Nook/The%20Congreve%20Rockets%20in%20the%20War%20of%201812.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref> | ||
=== Under British Raj (1858–1947) === | === Under British Raj (1858–1947) === | ||
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[[File:Swami Vivekananda at Parliament of Religions.jpg|thumb|[[Swami Vivekananda]] at the Parliament of Religions with [[Virchand Gandhi]], Hewivitarne Dharmapala, and [[Gaston Bonet-Maury|A. G. Bonet-Maury]] in September 1893]] | [[File:Swami Vivekananda at Parliament of Religions.jpg|thumb|[[Swami Vivekananda]] at the Parliament of Religions with [[Virchand Gandhi]], Hewivitarne Dharmapala, and [[Gaston Bonet-Maury|A. G. Bonet-Maury]] in September 1893]] | ||
[[File:Margaret Woodrow Wilson 1912 2.jpg|thumb|120px|[[Margaret Woodrow Wilson]], daughter of [[Woodrow Wilson]], left to India for her later life]] | [[File:Margaret Woodrow Wilson 1912 2.jpg|thumb|120px|[[Margaret Woodrow Wilson]], daughter of [[Woodrow Wilson]], left to India for her later life]] | ||
The relationships between India in the days of the [[British Raj]] and the [[United States]] were thick. | The relationships between India in the days of the [[British Raj]] and the [[United States]] were thick.<ref>Holden Furber, "Historical and Cultural Aspects of Indo-American Relations," ''Journal of the University of Bombay'' (1965), Vol. 34 Issue 67/68, pp 95-116.</ref> [[Swami Vivekananda]] promoted [[Yoga]] and [[Vedanta]] in the United States at the [[Parliament of the World's Religions|World's Parliament of Religions]] in [[Chicago]], during the [[World Columbian Exposition|World's Fair]] in 1893. [[Mark Twain]] visited India in 1896<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.twainquotes.com/SpeechIndex.html |title=Chronology of Known Mark Twain Speeches, Public Readings, and Lectures |first=Barbara |last=Schmidt |publisher=marktwainquotes.com |access-date=January 1, 2013}}</ref> and described it in his travelogue ''[[Following the Equator]]'' with both revulsion and attraction before concluding that India was the only foreign land he dreamed about or longed to see again.<ref name="Global Perspectives">{{cite book |last1=Gupta |first1=Vipin |last2=Saran |first2=Pankaj |title=Global Perspectives on the United States: A Nation by Nation Survey |volume=1 |year=2007 |publisher=Berkshire Publishing Group |location=Great Barrington, MA |isbn=978-1-933782-06-5 |pages=[https://archive.org/details/globalperspectiv0000unse_j6p5/page/294 294–300] |editor-first1=David |editor-last1=Leninson |editor-first2=Karen |editor-last2=Christensen |url=https://archive.org/details/globalperspectiv0000unse_j6p5/page/294 }}</ref> Regarding India, Americans learned more from English writer [[Rudyard Kipling]].<ref>Isaacs, ''Scratches on Our Minds: American Views of China and India'' (1980) p 241</ref> [[Mahatma Gandhi]] had an important influence on the philosophy of non-violence promoted by American [[civil rights movement]] leader [[Martin Luther King Jr.]] in the 1950s.<ref>{{Cite web |last1=University |first1=© Stanford |last2=Stanford |last3=California 94305 |date=April 25, 2017 |title=Gandhi, Mohandas K. |url=https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/gandhi-mohandas-k |access-date=June 26, 2023 |website=The Martin Luther King, Jr., Research and Education Institute |language=en}}</ref> | ||
==== President Franklin D. Roosevelt ==== | ==== President Franklin D. Roosevelt ==== | ||
In the 1930s and early-1940s, US President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] voiced strong support to the [[Indian independence movement]] despite being allies with Britain. | In the 1930s and early-1940s, US President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] voiced strong support to the [[Indian independence movement]] despite being allies with Britain.<ref>Foster Rhea Dulles, and Gerald E. Ridinger. "The Anti-Colonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt." ''Political Science Quarterly'' (1955): 1–18. {{JSTOR|2145412}}</ref><ref>Kenton J. Clymer, ''Quest for Freedom: The United States and India's Independence'' (2013).</ref> The first significant immigration from India [[Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965|before 1965]] involved Sikh farmers going to [[California]] in the early-twentieth century.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Gonzales |first1=Juan L. Jr. |year=1986 |title=Asian Indian Immigration Patterns: The Origins of the Sikh Community in California |journal=International Migration Review |volume=20 |issue=1|pages=40–54 |jstor=2545683|doi=10.1177/019791838602000103 |s2cid=145124856 }}</ref> | ||
==== Case of Bhagat Singh Thind ==== | ==== Case of Bhagat Singh Thind ==== | ||
{{Main|United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind}} | {{Main|United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind}} | ||
United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind was a landmark legal case in the United States that reverberated through issues of immigration, citizenship, and race. In 1920, Bhagat Singh Thind, an Indian Sikh man, applied for naturalization under the [[Naturalization Act of 1906]], which permitted naturalization only for "free white persons" and "persons of African nativity or descent." Thind contended that his high-caste Indian heritage aligned with the scientific definition of "Caucasian," thereby qualifying him for citizenship." | United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind was a landmark legal case in the United States that reverberated through issues of immigration, citizenship, and race. In 1920, Bhagat Singh Thind, an Indian Sikh man, applied for naturalization under the [[Naturalization Act of 1906]], which permitted naturalization only for "free white persons" and "persons of African nativity or descent." Thind contended that his high-caste Indian heritage aligned with the scientific definition of "Caucasian," thereby qualifying him for citizenship."<!--This is in the very bottom of page 341.--><ref name="Chi, S. 2012 pp. 341">Chi, S. & Robinson, E.M. (2012). Voices of the Asian American and Pacific Islander Experience (vol. 1). pp. 341. USA: Greenwood. {{ISBN|978-1-59884-354-5}}</ref> | ||
The case reached the Supreme Court of the United States in 1923. However, the Court unanimously ruled against Thind, asserting that while he might indeed meet the scientific classification of "Caucasian," the term "white person" in the naturalization laws was construed to apply exclusively to individuals of European descent. This pivotal decision had far-reaching implications, not only for Thind but for countless other South Asians aspiring for US citizenship. It set a legal precedent that explicitly excluded South Asians from being considered "white" for naturalization purposes, effectively prohibiting their path to citizenship. | The case reached the Supreme Court of the United States in 1923. However, the Court unanimously ruled against Thind, asserting that while he might indeed meet the scientific classification of "Caucasian," the term "white person" in the naturalization laws was construed to apply exclusively to individuals of European descent. This pivotal decision had far-reaching implications, not only for Thind but for countless other South Asians aspiring for US citizenship. It set a legal precedent that explicitly excluded South Asians from being considered "white" for naturalization purposes, effectively prohibiting their path to citizenship.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5076/#:~:text=In%20its%20decision%20in%20the,whites%20to%20become%20naturalized%20citizens.|title=Not All Caucasians Are White: The Supreme Court Rejects Citizenship for Asian Indians}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3111&context=jour_mlr#:~:text=Thind's%20case%20is%20unknown%20to,%E2%80%94the%20non%2Dwhite%20Caucasian.|title=Stories from the Negative Spaces: United States v. Thind and the Narrative of (Non)Whiteness }}</ref> | ||
=== During World War II === | === During World War II === | ||
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{{see also|Indian Ocean in World War II}} | {{see also|Indian Ocean in World War II}} | ||
[[File:Shops in Calcutta in 1945.jpg|thumb|American [[G.I.]]s at a market in Calcutta in present-day [[Kolkata]] in 1945]] | [[File:Shops in Calcutta in 1945.jpg|thumb|American [[G.I.]]s at a market in Calcutta in present-day [[Kolkata]] in 1945]] | ||
During World War II, 1941–1945, India became the main base for the American [[China Burma India Theater]] (CBI) in the war against Japan. Tens of thousands of American servicemen arrived, bringing all sorts of advanced technology, and currency; they left in 1945. Serious tension erupted over American demands, led by US President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]], that India be given independence, a proposition [[Winston Churchill|Churchill]] vehemently rejected. For years, Roosevelt encouraged British disengagement from India. The American position was based on an opposition to Europeans having colonies and a practical concern for the outcome of the war, and the expectation of a large American role in a post-independence era. Churchill threatened to resign if Roosevelt continued to push his case, causing Roosevelt to back down. | During World War II, 1941–1945, India became the main base for the American [[China Burma India Theater]] (CBI) in the war against Japan. Tens of thousands of American servicemen arrived, bringing all sorts of advanced technology, and currency; they left in 1945. Serious tension erupted over American demands, led by US President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]], that India be given independence, a proposition [[Winston Churchill|Churchill]] vehemently rejected. For years, Roosevelt encouraged British disengagement from India. The American position was based on an opposition to Europeans having colonies and a practical concern for the outcome of the war, and the expectation of a large American role in a post-independence era. Churchill threatened to resign if Roosevelt continued to push his case, causing Roosevelt to back down.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Rubin |first1=Eric S. |year=2011 |title=America, Britain, and Swaraj: Anglo-American Relations and Indian Independence, 1939–1945 |journal=India Review |volume=10 |issue=1|pages=40–80 |doi=10.1080/14736489.2011.548245|s2cid=154301992 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |first=Arthur |last=Herman |title=Gandhi & Churchill: The Epic Rivalry That Destroyed an Empire and Forged Our Age |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=hdPmzLtU5G4C |year=2008 |publisher=Random House Digital, Inc. |pages=472–539 |isbn=978-0-553-80463-8}}</ref> Meanwhile, India became the main American staging base to fly aid to China. During [[World War II]], the [[Air Force Station Arjan Singh|Panagarh Airport]] in [[Bengal Presidency|Bengal Province]] of India was used as a supply transport airfield from 1942 to 1945 by the [[United States Army Air Forces]] [[Tenth Air Force]] and as a repair and maintenance depot for [[B-24 Liberator]] heavy bombers by [[Air Technical Service Command]].<ref>{{Air Force Historical Research Agency}}</ref><ref>Maurer, Maurer (1983). Air Force Combat Units of World War II. Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Office of Air Force History. {{ISBN|0-89201-092-4}}.</ref> | ||
=== After Independence (1947–1997) === | === After Independence (1947–1997) === | ||
| Line 70: | Line 70: | ||
=== Nehru era === | === Nehru era === | ||
The United States under the [[Truman administration]] leaned towards favouring India in the late-1940s as a consequence of most US planners seeing India more valuable diplomatically than neighboring Pakistan. | The United States under the [[Truman administration]] leaned towards favouring India in the late-1940s as a consequence of most US planners seeing India more valuable diplomatically than neighboring Pakistan.<ref>{{cite book|first=Robert J.|last=McMahon|title=The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Deq32J9P4ZMC |date=June 1, 2010 |publisher=Columbia University Press|isbn=978-0-231-51467-5|page=11|quote=Despite keen attention to Pakistan's potential strategic significance, most US planners rated India as far the more valuable diplomatic prize. American policy towards the subcontinent consequently leaned in favour of India throughout the late-1940s. The opening of bilateral relations with New Delhi and [[Karachi]] and the reasons for the initial Truman administration tilt toward the former will be explored in the next chapter.}}</ref> However, during the [[Cold War]], [[Jawaharlal Nehru|Jawaharlal Nehru's]] policy of neutrality was cumbersome to many American observers. American Ambassador [[Henry F. Grady]] told the [[United States Department of State|State Department]] in December 1947 that he had informed Nehru "that this is a question that cannot be straddled and that India should get on the democratic side immediately".<ref name="Robert McMahon">{{cite book|last1=McMahon|first1=Robert J.|title=The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan |date=August 13, 2013 |publisher=Columbia University Press|page=40|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Deq32J9P4ZMC |access-date=November 28, 2015 |isbn=9780231514675}}</ref> In 1948, Nehru rejected American suggestions for resolving the Kashmir crisis via third party mediation.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=St. John |first=Anthony Wanis |date=1997 |title=The Mediating Role in the Kashmir Dispute Between India and Pakistan |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/45288985 |journal=The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs |volume=21 |issue=1 |pages=173–195 |jstor=45288985 |issn=1046-1868}}</ref> | ||
Nehru chose United States as the first country to visit abroad as Prime Minister. However, this 1949 tour of the United States was "an undiplomatic disaster" that left bad feelings on both sides. | Nehru chose United States as the first country to visit abroad as Prime Minister. However, this 1949 tour of the United States was "an undiplomatic disaster" that left bad feelings on both sides.<ref>H.W. Brands, ''Inside the Cold War'' (1991) p 202–05, quote p 204</ref> Nehru and his top aide [[V. K. Krishna Menon]] discussed whether India should "align with United States 'somewhat' and build up our economic and military strength."<ref>Sarvepalli Gopal, ''Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography. 1947-1956. Volume Two'' (1979) 2: 59.</ref> The Truman administration was quite favorable and indicated it would give Nehru anything he asked for. Nehru refused, and thereby forfeited the chance for a gift of one million tons of wheat.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=McMahon |first=Robert J. |date=1987 |title=Food as a Diplomatic Weapon: The India Wheat Loan of 1951 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/3638663 |journal=Pacific Historical Review |volume=56 |issue=3 |pages=349–377 |doi=10.2307/3638663 |jstor=3638663 |issn=0030-8684|url-access=subscription }}</ref> The American Secretary of State [[Dean Acheson]] recognized Nehru's potential world role but added that he was "one of the most difficult men with whom I have ever had to deal."<ref>Gopal, ''Nehru'' 2:60.</ref> The American visit had some benefits in that Nehru gained widespread understanding and support for his nation, and he himself gained a much deeper understanding of the American outlook.<ref>Rudra Chaudhuri, ''Forged in crisis: India and the United States since 1947'' (2014) pp 25-47.</ref> | ||
India rejected the American advice that it should not recognize the Communist conquest of China, but it did back the US when it supported the [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 82|1950 United Nations resolution]] condemning North Korea's aggression in the Korean War. India tried to act as a mediator to help end the war, and served as a conduit for diplomatic messages between the US and China. Although no Indian troops took part in the war, India did send a Medical Corps of 346 army doctors to help the UN side. | India rejected the American advice that it should not recognize the Communist conquest of China, but it did back the US when it supported the [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 82|1950 United Nations resolution]] condemning North Korea's aggression in the Korean War. India tried to act as a mediator to help end the war, and served as a conduit for diplomatic messages between the US and China. Although no Indian troops took part in the war, India did send a Medical Corps of 346 army doctors to help the UN side.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/open-page/the-doctor-heroes-of-war/article17529390.ece|title=The doctor-heroes of war|first=D. p|last=Ramachandran|newspaper=The Hindu |date=March 19, 2017|via=www.thehindu.com}}</ref> Meanwhile, poor harvests forced India to ask for American aid for its food security, which was given [[Food for Peace#Public Law 480 (1954)|starting in 1950]].<ref>Brands, ''Inside the Cold War'' (1991) pp 212–24, 229</ref> In the first dozen years of Indian independence (1947–59), the US provided $1.700,000,000 in aid; including $931,000,000 in food. The Soviet Union provided about half as much in monetary terms, however made much larger contributions in kind, taking the form of infrastructural aid; soft loans; technical knowledge transfer; economic planning and skills involved in the areas of [[Bokaro Steel Plant|steel]] [[Steel mill|mills]]; [[HMT (company)|machine building]]; hydroelectric power; and other heavy industries, especially [[Bhabha Atomic Research Centre|nuclear energy]] and [[ISRO|space research]].<ref>Richard P. Stebbins, ''The United States in World Affairs: 1959'' (1960) p 297</ref> In 1961, the US pledged $1,000,000,000 in development loans, in addition to $1,300,000,000 of free food.<ref>Richard P. Stebbins, ''The United States in World Affairs: 1961'' (1962) p 208</ref> President [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] sent [[John Sherman Cooper]] as ambassador in 1956–57, who got along very well with Nehru.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Franklin |first=Douglas A. |date=1984 |title=The Politician as Diplomat: Kentucky's John Sherman Cooper in India, 1955-1956 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/23381056 |journal=The Register of the Kentucky Historical Society |volume=82 |issue=1 |pages=28–59 |jstor=23381056 |issn=0023-0243 }}</ref> | ||
In terms of rhetoric, Nehru—as both prime minister and foreign minister (1947–64)—promoted a moralistic rhetoric attacking both the Soviet bloc and the US and its bloc. Nehru tried to build a nonaligned movement, paying special attention to the many new nations in the [[Third World]] released from European colonial status at this time. President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State [[John Foster Dulles]] themselves used moralistic rhetoric to attack the evils of Communism. | In terms of rhetoric, Nehru—as both prime minister and foreign minister (1947–64)—promoted a moralistic rhetoric attacking both the Soviet bloc and the US and its bloc. Nehru tried to build a nonaligned movement, paying special attention to the many new nations in the [[Third World]] released from European colonial status at this time. President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State [[John Foster Dulles]] themselves used moralistic rhetoric to attack the evils of Communism.<ref>Sarah Ellen Graham, "The Eisenhower Administration and Public Diplomacy in India: An Ambivalent Engagement, 1953–1960." Diplomacy & Statecraft 25.2 (2014): 260-284.</ref> | ||
In 1959, Eisenhower became the first US president to visit India to strengthen the staggering ties between the two nations. He was so supportive that the ''[[New York Times]]'' remarked, "It did not seem to matter much whether Nehru had actually requested or been given a guarantee that the US would help India to meet further Chinese Communist aggression. What mattered was the obvious strengthening of Indian–American friendship to a point where no such guarantee was necessary." | In 1959, Eisenhower became the first US president to visit India to strengthen the staggering ties between the two nations. He was so supportive that the ''[[New York Times]]'' remarked, "It did not seem to matter much whether Nehru had actually requested or been given a guarantee that the US would help India to meet further Chinese Communist aggression. What mattered was the obvious strengthening of Indian–American friendship to a point where no such guarantee was necessary."<ref>{{cite news|url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/Its-been-love-hate-across-presidents/articleshow/4009093.cms |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130512154629/http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2009-01-21/us/28006522_1_strategic-counter-nuclear-fuel-supply-visit |url-status=live |archive-date=May 12, 2013 |title=Strategic Counter Nuclear Fuel Supply Visit |date=January 21, 2009 |work=[[The Times of India]] |access-date=December 17, 2013}}</ref> | ||
During [[Presidency of John F. Kennedy|John F. Kennedy's presidency]] from 1961 to 1963, India was considered a strategic partner and counterweight to the rise of Communist China. Kennedy said: | During [[Presidency of John F. Kennedy|John F. Kennedy's presidency]] from 1961 to 1963, India was considered a strategic partner and counterweight to the rise of Communist China. Kennedy said:<ref>{{Cite book |last=Paddock |first=Carl |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ZNmokBSwPJsC&dq=Chinese+Communists+have+been+moving+ahead+the+last+10+years.+India+has+been+making+some+progress,+but+if+India+does+not+succeed+with+her+450+million+people,+if+she+can't+make+freedom+work,+then+people+around+the+world+are+going+to+determine,+particularly+in+the+underdeveloped+world,+that+the+only+way+they+can+develop+their+resources+is+through+the+Communist+system&pg=PA36 |title=India-US Nuclear Deal: Prospects and Implications |date=2009 |publisher=Epitome Books |isbn=978-93-80297-00-2 |language=en}}</ref> | ||
{{blockquote|"Chinese Communists have been moving ahead the last 10 years. India has been making some progress, but if India does not succeed with her 450 million people, if she can't make freedom work, then people around the world are going to determine, particularly in the underdeveloped world, that the only way they can develop their resources is through the Communist system."}} | {{blockquote|"Chinese Communists have been moving ahead the last 10 years. India has been making some progress, but if India does not succeed with her 450 million people, if she can't make freedom work, then people around the world are going to determine, particularly in the underdeveloped world, that the only way they can develop their resources is through the Communist system."}} | ||
Relations took a nosedive when India [[Annexation of Goa|annexed the Portuguese colony of Goa]] in 1961. The [[Kennedy administration]] condemned the armed action of the Indian government and demanded that all Indian forces be unconditionally withdrawn from Goan soil, at the same time, cutting foreign aid appropriations to India by 25 percent. | Relations took a nosedive when India [[Annexation of Goa|annexed the Portuguese colony of Goa]] in 1961. The [[Kennedy administration]] condemned the armed action of the Indian government and demanded that all Indian forces be unconditionally withdrawn from Goan soil, at the same time, cutting foreign aid appropriations to India by 25 percent.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Changing Perceptions of India in the U.S. Congress|url=http://sga.myweb.uga.edu/readings/changing_perceptions_of_india.htm |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091210050251/http://sga.myweb.uga.edu/readings/changing_perceptions_of_india.htm |archive-date=December 10, 2009 |access-date=November 9, 2009 |publisher=Sga.myweb.uga.edu}}</ref> In response, [[V. K. Krishna Menon|Menon]], now the [[Minister of Defence (India)|Minister of Defence]], lectured Kennedy on the importance of US-Soviet compromise and dismissed the admonishments of the Kennedy administration as "vestige(s) of Western imperialism".<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Singhal |first=D. P. |date=1962 |title=Goa—End of an Epoch |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/20633766 |journal=The Australian Quarterly |volume=34 |issue=1 |pages=77–89 |doi=10.2307/20633766 |jstor=20633766 |issn=0005-0091|url-access=subscription }}</ref> The Kennedy administration openly supported India during the [[1962 Sino-Indian war]] and considered the Chinese action as "blatant Chinese Communist aggression against India".<ref>{{cite news|title=India used US spy planes to map Chinese incursion in Sino-Indian war|url=http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/Americas/India-used-US-spy-planes-to-map-Chinese-incursion-in-1962-war/Article1-1108481.aspx|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130816111143/http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/Americas/India-used-US-spy-planes-to-map-Chinese-incursion-in-1962-war/Article1-1108481.aspx|url-status=dead |archive-date=August 16, 2013 |access-date=August 16, 2013 |newspaper=Hindustan Times |date=August 16, 2013}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=Nehru permitted CIA spy planes to use Indian air base|url=http://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/nehru-permitted-cia-spy-planes-to-use-indian-air-base-113081600225_1.html |access-date=August 16, 2013 |newspaper=Business Standard |date=August 16, 2013}}</ref> The [[United States Air Force]] flew in arms, ammunition and clothing supplies to the Indian troops and the [[United States Navy]] sent the [[USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63)|USS ''Kitty Hawk'']] [[aircraft carrier]] from the [[Pacific Ocean]] to India, though it was recalled before it reached the [[Bay of Bengal]] since the crisis had passed.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.rediff.com/news/special/the-untold-story-how-the-us-came-to-indias-aid-in-1962/20121204.htm |title=The Untold Story- How the US came to India's aid |work=Rediff.com |date=December 4, 2012 |access-date=December 17, 2013}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last=Sukumaran |first=R. |url=http://www.idsa.in/system/files/strategicanalysis_sukumaran_0903.pdf |title=The 1962 India-China War and Kargil 1999: Restrictions on the Use of Air Power |date=July–September 2003 |volume=27 |journal=Strategic Analysis |access-date=December 17, 2013 |issue=3 |pages=332–356 |doi=10.1080/09700160308450094 |s2cid=154278010 |archive-date=April 22, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230422145041/https://www.idsa.in/system/files/strategicanalysis_sukumaran_0903.pdf |url-status=dead}}</ref> Kennedy insisted that Washington defend India as it would any ally, saying, "We ''should'' defend India, and therefore we ''will'' defend India."<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2005/08/27/2003269368|title=JFK, aides considered nuclear arms in China-India clash|date=August 27, 2005 |access-date=September 27, 2014}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Welcome to IACFPA.ORG |url=http://www.iacfpa.org/p_news/nit/iacpa-archieve/2005/09/02/diplo3-02092005.shtml |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070927074755/http://www.iacfpa.org/p_news/nit/iacpa-archieve/2005/09/02/diplo3-02092005.shtml |archive-date=September 27, 2007 |access-date=September 27, 2014}}</ref> | ||
=== Indira-Rajiv era === | === Indira-Rajiv era === | ||
Following the [[assassination of John F. Kennedy|assassination of Kennedy in 1963]], India–US relations deteriorated gradually. While Kennedy's successor [[Lyndon B. Johnson]] sought to maintain relations with India to counter Communist China, he also sought to strengthen ties with Pakistan with the hopes of easing tensions with China and weakening India's growing military buildup as well. | Following the [[assassination of John F. Kennedy|assassination of Kennedy in 1963]], India–US relations deteriorated gradually. While Kennedy's successor [[Lyndon B. Johnson]] sought to maintain relations with India to counter Communist China, he also sought to strengthen ties with Pakistan with the hopes of easing tensions with China and weakening India's growing military buildup as well.<ref name="upppav">{{cite web |title=Lyndon Johnson and India |date=May 11, 2001 |url=https://frontline.thehindu.com/other/article30250554.ece |access-date=December 30, 2015 |publisher=Frontline.in}}</ref> Relations then hit an all-time low under the [[Nixon administration]] in the early 1970s. [[Richard Nixon|Nixon]] shifted away from the neutral stance which his predecessors had taken towards India-Pakistan hostilities. He established a very close relationship with Pakistan, aiding it militarily and economically, as India, now under the leadership of [[Indira Gandhi]], was leaning towards Soviet Union. He considered Pakistan as a very important ally to counter Soviet influence in the Indian subcontinent and establish ties with China, with whom Pakistan was very close.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Bhattacherjee |first=Kallol |date=November 30, 2023 |title=Kissinger, Nixon 'helped' Pakistan in 1971, documents from U.S. Archive reveal |language=en-IN |work=The Hindu |url=https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/kissinger-nixon-broke-us-rule-to-help-pakistan-sent-aircraft-from-third-countries-as-they-feared-india-was-about-to-attack-west-pakistan/article67591823.ece |access-date=December 5, 2023 |issn=0971-751X}}</ref> During the [[1971 Indo-Pakistani War]], the US openly supported Pakistan and deployed its aircraft carrier [[USS Enterprise (CVN-65)|USS ''Enterprise'']] towards the Bay of Bengal, which was seen as a show of force by the US in support of the [[West Pakistan]]i forces.<ref>{{Cite web |title=The Tilt: The U.S. and the South Asian Crisis of 1971 |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/ |access-date=June 25, 2023 |website=nsarchive2.gwu.edu}}</ref> Later in 1974, India conducted its first nuclear test, [[Smiling Buddha]], which was opposed by the US, however it also concluded that the test did not violate any agreement.<ref>{{cite book|last=Perkovich|first=George|title=India's nuclear bomb: the impact on global proliferation|year=2002|publisher=University of California Press|isbn=978-0-520-23210-5}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=Ripples in the nuclear pond|url=https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=x6ZSAAAAIBAJ&pg=7191%2C5606996 |access-date=September 5, 2011 |newspaper=The Deseret News |date=May 22, 1974}}</ref> | ||
In the late 1970s, with the [[Janata Party]] leader [[Morarji Desai]] becoming the prime minister, India improved its relations with the US, led by [[Jimmy Carter]], despite the latter signing an order in 1978 barring nuclear material from being exported to India due to India's non-proliferation record. | In the late 1970s, with the [[Janata Party]] leader [[Morarji Desai]] becoming the prime minister, India improved its relations with the US, led by [[Jimmy Carter]], despite the latter signing an order in 1978 barring nuclear material from being exported to India due to India's non-proliferation record.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=30713 |title=Executive Order 12055 – Export of Special Nuclear Material to India |work=The American Presidency Project |publisher=Ucsb.edu |access-date=December 17, 2013 |archive-date=December 17, 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131217224733/http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=30713 |url-status=dead}}</ref> | ||
Despite the return of Indira Gandhi to power in 1980, the relations between the two countries continued to improve gradually, although India did not support the United States in its role in the [[Soviet–Afghan War|Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan]]. Indian Foreign Minister [[P. V. Narasimha Rao]] expressed "grave concern" over the United States's decision to "rearm" Pakistan; the two countries were working closely together to counter the Soviets in Afghanistan. | Despite the return of Indira Gandhi to power in 1980, the relations between the two countries continued to improve gradually, although India did not support the United States in its role in the [[Soviet–Afghan War|Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan]]. Indian Foreign Minister [[P. V. Narasimha Rao]] expressed "grave concern" over the United States's decision to "rearm" Pakistan; the two countries were working closely together to counter the Soviets in Afghanistan.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/carterbrezhnev/docs_intervention_in_afghanistan_and_the_fall_of_detente/fall_of_detente_chron.pdf|title=The Intervention in Afghanistan and the Fall of Detente}}</ref> The [[Reagan administration]] provided limited assistance to India. India sounded out Washington on the purchase of a range of US defence technology. In 1984, Washington approved the supply of selected technology to India, including gas turbines for naval frigates and engines for prototypes for India's light combat aircraft. There were also unpublicized transfers of technology, including the engagement of a US company, [[Continental Electronics]], to design and build a new VLF communications station, which was commissioned in the late 1980s.<ref>{{cite book|first=David|last=Brewster|url=https://www.academia.edu/7698761 |title=India's Ocean: the Story of India's Bid for Regional Leadership |access-date=August 30, 2014}}</ref> | ||
== Contemporary relations == | == Contemporary relations == | ||
=== Post-liberalization era === | === Post-liberalization era === | ||
Under [[Foreign policy of the Bill Clinton administration|Bill Clinton]] (President 1993–2001) and [[P. V. Narasimha Rao]] (Prime Minister 1991–1996) both sides mishandled relations, according to Arthur G. Rubinoff. Clinton simultaneously pressured India to liberalize its economy while criticizing New Delhi on human rights and nuclear issues. In the face of criticism from Washington and opposition at home, Indian leaders lost their enthusiasm for rapprochement and reverted to formalistic protocol over substantive diplomacy. The Brown Amendment that restored American aid to Pakistan in 1995 was an irritant. In returning to a Cold War style rhetoric, Indian parliamentarians and American congressmen demonstrated their unwillingness to establish a new relationship. | Under [[Foreign policy of the Bill Clinton administration|Bill Clinton]] (President 1993–2001) and [[P. V. Narasimha Rao]] (Prime Minister 1991–1996) both sides mishandled relations, according to Arthur G. Rubinoff. Clinton simultaneously pressured India to liberalize its economy while criticizing New Delhi on human rights and nuclear issues. In the face of criticism from Washington and opposition at home, Indian leaders lost their enthusiasm for rapprochement and reverted to formalistic protocol over substantive diplomacy. The Brown Amendment that restored American aid to Pakistan in 1995 was an irritant. In returning to a Cold War style rhetoric, Indian parliamentarians and American congressmen demonstrated their unwillingness to establish a new relationship.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Rubinoff |first=Arthur G. |date=1996 |title=Missed Opportunities and Contradictory Policies: Indo-American Relations in the Clinton-Rao Years |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2761184 |journal=Pacific Affairs |volume=69 |issue=4 |pages=499–517 |doi=10.2307/2761184 |jstor=2761184 |issn=0030-851X|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Strobe Talbott |url=http://archive.org/details/engagingindiadip00talb |title=Engaging India |date=2004 |publisher=Brookings Institution Press |others=Internet Archive |isbn=978-0-8157-8300-8}}</ref> | ||
=== NDA I and II governments (1998–2004) === | === NDA I and II governments (1998–2004) === | ||
[[File:President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee shake hands after signing a vision statement, Hyderabad House, New Delhi.jpg|thumb|Indian Prime Minister [[Atal Bihari Vajpayee]] with US President [[Bill Clinton]] in [[New Delhi]] in March 2000]] | [[File:President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee shake hands after signing a vision statement, Hyderabad House, New Delhi.jpg|thumb|Indian Prime Minister [[Atal Bihari Vajpayee]] with US President [[Bill Clinton]] in [[New Delhi]] in March 2000]] | ||
[[File:President George W. Bush talks with Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee.jpg|thumb|Indian Prime Minister [[Atal Bihari Vajpayee]] with US President [[George W. Bush]] in [[New York City]] in September 2003]] | [[File:President George W. Bush talks with Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee.jpg|thumb|Indian Prime Minister [[Atal Bihari Vajpayee]] with US President [[George W. Bush]] in [[New York City]] in September 2003]] | ||
Soon after [[Atal Bihari Vajpayee]] became Indian prime minister, he authorized [[Pokhran-II|nuclear weapons testing]] at [[Pokhran]]. The United States strongly condemned this testing, promised sanctions, and voted in favor of a [[United Nations Security Council]] resolution condemning the tests. President Clinton imposed economic sanctions on India, including cutting off all military and economic aid; freezing loans by American banks to state-owned Indian companies; prohibiting loans to the Indian government for all except food purchases; prohibiting American aerospace technology and uranium exports to India; and requiring the US to oppose all loan requests by India to international lending agencies. | Soon after [[Atal Bihari Vajpayee]] became Indian prime minister, he authorized [[Pokhran-II|nuclear weapons testing]] at [[Pokhran]]. The United States strongly condemned this testing, promised sanctions, and voted in favor of a [[United Nations Security Council]] resolution condemning the tests. President Clinton imposed economic sanctions on India, including cutting off all military and economic aid; freezing loans by American banks to state-owned Indian companies; prohibiting loans to the Indian government for all except food purchases; prohibiting American aerospace technology and uranium exports to India; and requiring the US to oppose all loan requests by India to international lending agencies.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/clinton-imposes-full-sanctionsindia/22222/ |title=Clinton Imposes Full Sanctions On India |work=Business Standard |date=May 14, 1998 |access-date=December 17, 2013}}</ref> However, these sanctions proved ineffective—India was experiencing strong economic growth, and its trade with the US only constituted a small portion of its [[gross domestic product|GDP]]. Only [[Japan]] joined the US in imposing direct sanctions, while most other nations continued to trade with India. The sanctions were soon lifted. Afterward, the [[Clinton administration]] and Prime Minister Vajpayee exchanged representatives to help rebuild relations.<ref name="IC">{{Cite journal |last=Hathaway |first=Robert |date=2002 |title=The US–India courtship: from Clinton to Bush |url=http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390412331302855 |journal=Journal of Strategic Studies |language=en |volume=25 |issue=4 |pages=6–31 |doi=10.1080/01402390412331302855 |s2cid=153681638 |issn=0140-2390|url-access=subscription }}</ref> In March 2000, Clinton visited India, undertaking bilateral and economic discussions with Vajpayee. This would mark the first US presidential trip to India since 1978.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/2/24/timeline-of-us-presidential-visits-to-india|title=Timeline of US presidential visits to India|first=Bilal|last=Kuckay|publisher=Al Jazeera|date=February 24, 2020|access-date=April 12, 2023}}</ref> During the visit, the [[Indo-US Science & Technology Forum]] was established.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Neureiter|first1=Norman|first2=Michael|last2=Cheetham|title=The Indo-U.S. Science and Technology Forum as a Model for Bilateral Cooperation|journal=Science & Diplomacy|date=December 16, 2013|volume=2|issue=4|url=http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/editorial/2013/indo-us-science-and-technology-forum-model-for-bilateral-cooperation}}</ref> | ||
Over the course of improved diplomatic relations with the [[Presidency of George W. Bush|Bush administration]], India agreed to allow close international monitoring of its nuclear weapons development, although it refused to give up its current nuclear arsenal. | Over the course of improved diplomatic relations with the [[Presidency of George W. Bush|Bush administration]], India agreed to allow close international monitoring of its nuclear weapons development, although it refused to give up its current nuclear arsenal.<ref>{{cite web |last=Limaye |first=Satu P. |url=http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0104qus_india.pdf |title=U.S.-India Relations: Visible to the Naked Eye |publisher=Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies |access-date=December 17, 2013 |archive-date=May 18, 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130518031351/http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0104qus_india.pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref> In 2004, the US decided to grant [[major non-NATO ally]] (MNNA) status to Pakistan. The US extended the MNNA strategic working relationship to India but the offer was turned down.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/US-mulls-India-as-non-Nato-ally/articleshow/576446.cms|title=US mulls India as non-Nato ally|work=The Times of India|date=March 23, 2004 |access-date=April 2, 2016}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/In-US-India-strategic-tango-its-passion-vs-caution/articleshow/14101814.cms|title=In US-India strategic tango, it's passion vs caution|work=The Times of India|date=June 13, 2012 |access-date=April 2, 2016}}</ref> After the [[September 11 attacks]] against the US in 2001, President [[George W. Bush]] collaborated closely with India in controlling and policing the strategically critical [[Indian Ocean]] sea lanes from the [[Suez Canal]] to [[Singapore]].<ref name="IC" /> | ||
=== UPA I and II governments (2004–2014) === | === UPA I and II governments (2004–2014) === | ||
[[File:Bush meets Pranab Mukherjee.jpg|thumb|Indian Minister of External Affairs [[Pranab Mukherjee]] in the [[Oval Office]] with US President [[George W. Bush]] in March 2008]] | [[File:Bush meets Pranab Mukherjee.jpg|thumb|Indian Minister of External Affairs [[Pranab Mukherjee]] in the [[Oval Office]] with US President [[George W. Bush]] in March 2008]] | ||
During the [[Presidency of George W. Bush|George W. Bush administration]], relations between India and the United States improved greatly, primarily over common concerns regarding growing [[Islamic extremism]], energy security, and climate change. | During the [[Presidency of George W. Bush|George W. Bush administration]], relations between India and the United States improved greatly, primarily over common concerns regarding growing [[Islamic extremism]], energy security, and climate change.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Ejaz |first=Ahmad |url=https://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/studies/PDF-FILES/4%20-%20Ahmad%20Ejaz%20Artical-2_v13No1.pdf |title=United States-India Relations: An expanding strategic partnership |journal=Pakistan Vision |volume=13 |access-date=December 17, 2013 |issue=1}}</ref> [[George W. Bush]] commented: "India is a great example of democracy. It is very devout, has diverse religious heads, but everyone is comfortable about their religion. The world needs India".<ref>{{Cite web |date=March 3, 2006 |title=The world needs India: Bush |url=https://www.rediff.com/money/2006/mar/03bush2.htm |access-date= |website=www.rediff.com}}</ref> Journalist [[Fareed Zakaria]], in his book ''[[The Post-American World]]'', described Bush as "being the most pro-Indian president in American history."<ref>Zakaria, Fareed, The Post-American World, 2008 Cahapter VII, pp. 225-226</ref> According to [[Rejaul Karim Laskar]], a scholar of Indian foreign policy and ideologue of the [[Indian National Congress]], the ruling [[United Progressive Alliance|UPA coalition]] saw a "transformation in bilateral ties with the US", as a result of which the relations now covers "a wide range of issues, including high technology, space, education, agriculture, trade, clean energy, counter- terrorism, etc".<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Laskar|first1=Rejaul|title=Promoting National Interest Through Diplomacy|journal=Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist|date=December 2013|volume=1|issue=9|page=60}}</ref> | ||
After the [[2004 tsunami|December 2004 tsunami]], the US and Indian navies cooperated in search and rescue operations and in the reconstruction of affected areas. | After the [[2004 tsunami|December 2004 tsunami]], the US and Indian navies cooperated in search and rescue operations and in the reconstruction of affected areas.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Indian Naval Diplomacy: Post Tsunami {{!}} IPCS|url=http://www.ipcs.org/focusthemsel.php?articleNo=1640|access-date=April 24, 2021|website=www.ipcs.org}}</ref> Since 2004, Washington and New Delhi pursued a "strategic partnership" based on shared values and generally convergent geopolitical interests. Numerous economic, security, and global initiatives, including plans for civilian nuclear cooperation, are underway. First launched in 2005, cooperation on nuclear weapons reversed three decades of American non-proliferation policy. Also in 2005, United States and India signed a ten-year defense framework agreement, with the goal of expanding bilateral security cooperation. The two countries engaged in numerous and unprecedented combined military exercises, and major US arms sales to India were concluded.<ref>{{Cite journal |title=U.S.-India Bilateral Agreements in 2005 |url=https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20050908_RL33072_bd0df1a29a3c0bf5945c84086bf1603b7b111ba1.pdf |journal=CRS Report for Congress}}</ref> After [[Hurricane Katrina]], India donated $5 million to the [[American Red Cross]] and sent two planeloads of relief supplies and materials to help.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://ia.rediff.com/news/2005/sep/03katrina.htm |title=India pledges 5 million dollars for Katrina relief |publisher=Ia.rediff.com |date=September 3, 2005 |access-date=December 17, 2013}}</ref> The value of all bilateral trade tripled from 2004 to 2008 and continued to grow, while two-way investment also increased.<ref>{{Cite journal |title=ndia: Domestic Issues, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Relations |url=https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20110901_RL33529_9822b6d90682986b02c0f0caca16037669d0d4cf.pdf |journal=CRS Report for Congress}}</ref> In November 2010, President [[Barack Obama]] visited India and addressed a joint session of the [[Parliament of India|Indian Parliament]],<ref>{{Cite news |date=November 8, 2010 |title=Obama backs India on terror, U.N. reform |language=en-IN |work=The Hindu |url=https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Obama-backs-India-on-terror-U.N.-reform/article15679544.ece |access-date=June 25, 2023 |issn=0971-751X}}</ref> where he backed [[Reform of the United Nations Security Council|India's bid for a permanent seat]] on the [[United Nations Security Council]].<ref>{{cite news|agency=AP |url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/obama-supports-india-on-un-security-council-2128544.html |title=Obama supports India on UN Security Council |work=The Independent |date=November 8, 2010 |access-date=December 17, 2013 |location=London}}</ref> | ||
==== Strategic and military determinants ==== | ==== Strategic and military determinants ==== | ||
{{See also|Quadrilateral Security Dialogue}} | {{See also|Quadrilateral Security Dialogue}} | ||
In March 2009, the [[Obama administration]] cleared the US$2.1 billion sale of eight [[P-8 Poseidon]]s to India. | In March 2009, the [[Obama administration]] cleared the US$2.1 billion sale of eight [[P-8 Poseidon]]s to India.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE52F6X520090316|title=U.S. OKs record $2.1 billion arms sale to India |date=March 16, 2009 |publisher=Reuters |access-date=April 2, 2016}}</ref> This deal, and the $5 billion agreement to provide [[Boeing C-17 Globemaster III|Boeing C-17]] [[military transport aircraft]] and [[General Electric F414]] engines announced during Obama's November 2010 visit, made the US one of the top three military suppliers to India (after Israel and Russia).<ref>{{cite web|last=Cohen|first=Stephen and Sanil Dasgupta|title=Arms Sales for India|url=http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2011/03_india_cohen_dasgupta.aspx|publisher=Brookings Institution |access-date=March 18, 2011 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110309074634/http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2011/03_india_cohen_dasgupta.aspx|archive-date=March 9, 2011}}</ref> | ||
====US spying incidents==== | ====US spying incidents==== | ||
{{Main|CIA activities in India}} | {{Main|CIA activities in India}} | ||
In July and November 2013, India demanded that the US respond to allegations that the Indian UN mission in [[New York City]] and the Indian Embassy in [[Washington, D.C.]] had been targeted for spying. | In July and November 2013, India demanded that the US respond to allegations that the Indian UN mission in [[New York City]] and the Indian Embassy in [[Washington, D.C.]] had been targeted for spying.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/terrorism-security/2014/0702/India-recoils-at-reported-NSA-spying-on-its-Hindu-nationalist-party|title=India recoils at reported NSA spying on its Hindu nationalist party |work=Christian Science Monitor |date=July 3, 2014}}</ref> A 2010 document leaked by [[Edward Snowden]] and published by ''[[The Washington Post]]'' revealed that US intelligence agencies had been authorized to spy on [[Narendra Modi]] (who was then the [[Chief Minister of Gujarat|Chief Minister of the Indian state of Gujarat]]).<ref>{{cite news|url=http://in.reuters.com/article/india-usa-idINKBN0F70J820140702|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160117182735/http://in.reuters.com/article/india-usa-idINKBN0F70J820140702|url-status=dead|archive-date=January 17, 2016|title=India seeks assurances from U.S. over spying reports |publisher=Reuters India |date=July 3, 2014}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-02/india-demands-u-s-explanation-after-report-modi-party-spied-on.html|title=India Demands U.S. Explanation After Modi Party Spied On |publisher=Bloomberg |date=July 3, 2014}}</ref> | ||
[[WikiLeaks]] revelations that Western intelligence agencies used foreign aid workers and staff at non-governmental organizations as [[non-official cover]] prompted India to increase monitoring of [[satellite phone]]s and movement of personnel working for humanitarian relief organizations and development aid agencies in the vicinity of sensitive locations. | [[WikiLeaks]] revelations that Western intelligence agencies used foreign aid workers and staff at non-governmental organizations as [[non-official cover]] prompted India to increase monitoring of [[satellite phone]]s and movement of personnel working for humanitarian relief organizations and development aid agencies in the vicinity of sensitive locations.<ref>{{cite news|title=Narendra Modi govt cracks down on NGOs, prepares hitlist|url=http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/modi-govt-prepares-ngo-hitlist/article1-1310127.aspx|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150124193153/http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/modi-govt-prepares-ngo-hitlist/article1-1310127.aspx|url-status=dead|archive-date=January 24, 2015|work=Hindustan Times |date=January 24, 2014}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=The foreign threat|url=http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/the-foreign-threat/|work=The Indian Express |date=May 15, 2015}}</ref> | ||
==== Foreign policy issues during the early 2010s ==== | ==== Foreign policy issues during the early 2010s ==== | ||
[[File:President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and the Indian Delegation Pose for a Photo (4693387967).jpg|thumb|President [[Barack Obama]], US [[United States Secretary of State|Secretary of State]] [[Hillary Clinton]], and the Indian delegation at the US-India Strategic Dialogue reception at the US [[United States Department of State|Department of State]] in [[Washington, D.C.]] in June 2010]] | [[File:President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and the Indian Delegation Pose for a Photo (4693387967).jpg|thumb|President [[Barack Obama]], US [[United States Secretary of State|Secretary of State]] [[Hillary Clinton]], and the Indian delegation at the US-India Strategic Dialogue reception at the US [[United States Department of State|Department of State]] in [[Washington, D.C.]] in June 2010]] | ||
According to some analysts,{{Who|date=June 2023}} India–US relations were strained over the approach of the [[Obama administration]] to Pakistan and the handling of the [[Taliban insurgency]] in Afghanistan. | According to some analysts,{{Who|date=June 2023}} India–US relations were strained over the approach of the [[Obama administration]] to Pakistan and the handling of the [[Taliban insurgency]] in Afghanistan.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.asiaone.com/News/Latest%2BNews/Asia/Story/A1Story20081111-99718.html|title=No call from Obama seen as slight to India |access-date=September 27, 2014}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Rafique |first=Najam |date=2011 |title=Rethinking Pakistan–U.S. relations |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/48527652 |journal=Strategic Studies |volume=31 |issue=3 |pages=124–152 |jstor=48527652 |issn=1029-0990}}</ref> India's [[National Security Advisor (India)|National Security Adviser]] [[M. K. Narayanan]] criticized the Obama administration for linking the [[Kashmir dispute]] to the instability in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and said that by doing so, President Obama was "barking up the wrong tree."<ref>{{cite news |url=http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2009-02-05/news/28438459_1_wrong-tree-narayanan-pakistan-and-india |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130512120235/http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2009-02-05/news/28438459_1_wrong-tree-narayanan-pakistan-and-india |url-status=dead |archive-date=May 12, 2013 |work=The Times Of India |title=Narayanan has barked up the wrong tree now |date=February 5, 2009}}</ref> ''[[Foreign Policy]]'' in February 2009 also criticized Obama's approach to [[South Asia]], saying that "India can be a part of the solution rather than part of the problem" in South Asia. It suggested that India take a more proactive role in rebuilding [[Afghanistan]], irrespective of the attitude of the Obama administration.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/02/20/india-needs-a-lot-more-love-from-obama/ |title=India needs a lot more love from Obama |date=February 20, 2009 |website=Foreign Policy|access-date=March 25, 2018}}</ref> ''[[Bloomberg L.P.|Bloomberg]]'' reported that, since the [[2008 Mumbai attacks]], the public mood in India has been to pressure Pakistan more aggressively to take actions against the culprits behind the terrorist attack, and predicted that this might be reflected in the [[2009 Indian general election|Indian general elections in May 2009]]. Consequently, the Obama administration may have found itself at odds with India's rigid stance against terrorism.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601091&sid=a2us2qcyo9nw&refer=india|archive-url=https://archive.today/20120721094634/http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601091&sid=a2us2qcyo9nw&refer=india|archive-date=July 21, 2012|title=India's Terror Stance Vexes Obama Amid Voter Ire at Pakistan |website=Bloomberg.com|access-date=March 25, 2018|url-status=dead}}</ref> | ||
In the early 2010s, India and US governments have differed on a variety of regional issues ranging from America's [[Pakistan–United States military relations|military relations with Pakistan]] and India's [[India–Russia relations#Military relationship|military relations with Russia]] to foreign policy disagreements relating to Iran, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Myanmar and Bangladesh. | In the early 2010s, India and US governments have differed on a variety of regional issues ranging from America's [[Pakistan–United States military relations|military relations with Pakistan]] and India's [[India–Russia relations#Military relationship|military relations with Russia]] to foreign policy disagreements relating to Iran, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Myanmar and Bangladesh.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Harris |first=Gardiner |date=April 1, 2014 |title=Years After Obama Hailed Warming Ties With India, the Temperature Has Fallen |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/01/world/asia/years-after-obama-hailed-warming-ties-with-india-the-temperature-has-fallen.html |access-date=February 8, 2024 |work=The New York Times |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref><ref>{{Citation |last1=Colley |first1=Christopher K. |title=The Obama administration and India |date=February 28, 2020 |work=The United States in the Indo-Pacific |pages=44–62 |url=https://www.manchesterhive.com/display/9781526135025/9781526135025.00010.xml |access-date=February 8, 2024 |publisher=Manchester University Press |language=en-US |isbn=978-1-5261-3502-5 |last2=Gunguly |first2=Sumit}}</ref> | ||
India criticized the Obama administration's decision to limit [[H-1B visa|H-1B (temporary) visas]], and India's then External Affairs Minister [[Pranab Mukherjee]] (later, the [[president of India]] until 2017) said that India would oppose US "[[protectionism]]" at various international forums. | India criticized the Obama administration's decision to limit [[H-1B visa|H-1B (temporary) visas]], and India's then External Affairs Minister [[Pranab Mukherjee]] (later, the [[president of India]] until 2017) said that India would oppose US "[[protectionism]]" at various international forums.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/02/20/india.us.protectionism/index.html|title=India says it will oppose U.S. 'protectionism' |access-date=April 2, 2016}}</ref> India's Commerce Minister [[Kamal Nath]] said that India may move against Obama's outsourcing policies at the [[World Trade Organization]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/StoryPage.aspx?sectionName=HomePage&id=8500ec49-8326-4a88-b41d-fdd74fd2aad3&MatchID1=4934&TeamID1=3&TeamID2=1&MatchType1=1&SeriesID1=1248&MatchID2=4925&TeamID3=4&TeamID4=2&MatchType2=1&SeriesID2=1244&PrimaryID=4934&Headline=India+may+contest+Obama%27s+move+against+outsourcing+in+WTO|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20090501202358/http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/StoryPage.aspx?sectionName=HomePage&id=8500ec49-8326-4a88-b41d-fdd74fd2aad3&MatchID1=4934&TeamID1=3&TeamID2=1&MatchType1=1&SeriesID1=1248&MatchID2=4925&TeamID3=4&TeamID4=2&MatchType2=1&SeriesID2=1244&PrimaryID=4934&Headline=India+may+contest+Obama%27s+move+against+outsourcing+in+WTO|url-status=dead|title=India may contest Obama's move against outsourcing in WTO|archivedate=May 1, 2009}}</ref> In May 2009, Obama reiterated his anti-outsourcing views and criticized the current US tax policy "that says you should pay lower taxes if you create a job in Bangalore, India, than if you create one in Buffalo, New York."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=3924|title=U.S.-India Relations Strained under Obama |access-date=April 2, 2016 |archive-date=July 4, 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090704014351/http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/Article.aspx?id=3924|url-status=dead}}</ref> However, during the US India Business Council meeting in June 2009, US [[U.S. Secretary of State|Secretary of State]] [[Hillary Clinton]] advocated for stronger economic ties between India and the United States.<ref name="Clinton">{{Cite web|url=http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/06/125033.htm|title=Remarks at U.S.-India Business Council's 34th Anniversary "Synergies Summit"|work=U.S. Department of State |date=June 22, 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090622012521/http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/06/125033.htm |archive-date=June 22, 2009 }}</ref> | ||
In June 2010, the United States and India formally re-engaged the US-India Strategic Dialogue initiated under President Bush when a large delegation of high-ranking Indian officials, led by External Affairs Minister [[S. M. Krishna]], visited [[Washington, D.C.]] As leader of the US delegation, Secretary of State Clinton lauded India as "an indispensable partner and a trusted friend". | In June 2010, the United States and India formally re-engaged the US-India Strategic Dialogue initiated under President Bush when a large delegation of high-ranking Indian officials, led by External Affairs Minister [[S. M. Krishna]], visited [[Washington, D.C.]] As leader of the US delegation, Secretary of State Clinton lauded India as "an indispensable partner and a trusted friend".<ref>{{cite report |url=https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33529.pdf |title=India: Domestic Issues, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Relations |last1=Kronstadt |first1=K. Alan |last2=Kerr |first2=Paul K. |last3=Martin |first3=Michael F. |last4=Vaughn |first4=Bruce |date=September 1, 2011 |work=[[Congressional Research Service]]}}</ref> President Obama appeared briefly at a [[United States Department of State]] reception to declare his firm belief that America's relationship with India "will be one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century."<ref>{{cite web |url=https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/08/remarks-president-joint-session-indian-parliament-new-delhi-india |title=Remarks by the President to the Joint Session of the Indian Parliament in New Delhi, India |access-date=September 27, 2014 |via=[[NARA|National Archives]] |work=[[whitehouse.gov]] |date=November 8, 2010}}</ref> The Strategic Dialogue produced a joint statement in which the two countries pledged to "deepen people-to-people, business-to-business, and government-to-government linkages{{nbsp}}... for the mutual benefit of both countries and for the promotion of global peace, stability, economic growth and prosperity."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://hyderabad.usconsulate.gov/clintonvisit0711.html|title=U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue |website=Consulate General of the United States Hyderabad, India |access-date=September 27, 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130216221924/http://hyderabad.usconsulate.gov/clintonvisit0711.html|archive-date=February 16, 2013|url-status=dead}}</ref> It outlined extensive bilateral initiatives in ten key areas, covering a wide range of security-related, economic, and societal topics.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/07/168745.htm|title=U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue Joint Statement|work=U.S. Department of State |access-date=September 27, 2014}}</ref> | ||
In November 2010, Obama became the second US president (after [[Richard Nixon]] in 1969) to undertake a visit to India in his first term in office. On November 8, Obama also became the second US president (after Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1959) to ever address a [[joint session]] of the [[Parliament of India]]. In a major policy shift, Obama declared US support for India's [[United Nations Security Council#Permanent members|permanent membership]] on the UN Security Council. | In November 2010, Obama became the second US president (after [[Richard Nixon]] in 1969) to undertake a visit to India in his first term in office. On November 8, Obama also became the second US president (after Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1959) to ever address a [[joint session]] of the [[Parliament of India]]. In a major policy shift, Obama declared US support for India's [[United Nations Security Council#Permanent members|permanent membership]] on the UN Security Council.<ref name="nyt20101108">{{Cite web|url=https://www.tribuneindia.com/2010/20100131/spectrum/main1.htm|title=Richard Nixon visited India in 1969 after becoming the president|website=www.tribuneindia.com}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/world/asia/09prexy.html |title=Obama Backs India for Seat on Security Council |last=Stolberg |first=Sheryl |date=November 8, 2010 |work=[[The New York Times]] |access-date=November 8, 2010 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110511143448/http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/world/asia/09prexy.html |archive-date=May 11, 2011}}</ref> He also announced the removal of export control restrictions on several Indian companies, and concluded trade deals worth $10 billion, which are expected to create and/or support 50,000 jobs in the US.<ref name="bbc20101108x">{{cite news|url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11712268|title=Obama confirms U.S. strategic shift towards India|last=Reynolds|first=Paul |date=November 8, 2010 |work=[[BBC]] |access-date=November 8, 2010}}</ref> | ||
==== Devyani Khobragade incident ==== | ==== Devyani Khobragade incident ==== | ||
{{Main|Devyani Khobragade incident}} | {{Main|Devyani Khobragade incident}} | ||
In December 2013, [[Devyani Khobragade]], the Deputy Consul General of [[India]] in New York, was arrested and accused by US federal prosecutors of submitting false work visa documents and paying her housekeeper "far less than the [[Minimum wage in the United States|minimum legal wage]]." | In December 2013, [[Devyani Khobragade]], the Deputy Consul General of [[India]] in New York, was arrested and accused by US federal prosecutors of submitting false work visa documents and paying her housekeeper "far less than the [[Minimum wage in the United States|minimum legal wage]]."<ref name="Harris">{{cite news|first=Gardiner|last=Harris|title=Outrage in India, and Retaliation, Over a Female Diplomat's Arrest in New York|date=December 17, 2013|location=Bangalore|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/18/world/asia/outrage-in-india-over-female-diplomats-arrest-in-new-york.html|work=The New York Times}}</ref> The ensuing incident saw protests from the Indian government and a rift in relations, with outrage expressed that Khobragade was [[Strip search|strip-searched]] and held in the general inmate population.<ref name="Harris" /> Former Prime Minister [[Manmohan Singh]] said that Khobragade's treatment was "deplorable".<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.ibtimes.com/devyani-khobragade-us-india-row-escalates-after-diplomat-complains-about-strip-search-after-arrest|title=Devyani Khobragade: US-India Row Escalates After Diplomat Complains About Strip-Search After Arrest On Visa Fraud|last=Gayathri|first=Amrutha|work=[[International Business Times]] |access-date=September 27, 2014 |date=December 18, 2013}}</ref> | ||
India demanded an apology from the US over her alleged "humiliation" and called for the charges to be dropped, which the US declined to do. | India demanded an apology from the US over her alleged "humiliation" and called for the charges to be dropped, which the US declined to do.<ref>{{cite news| url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-25459805|title=Devyani Khobragade row: US refuses to drop charges |work=BBC News |date=December 20, 2013}}</ref> The Indian government retaliated for what it viewed as the mistreatment of its consular official by revoking the ID cards and other privileges of US consular personnel and their families in India and removing security barriers in front of the [[US Embassy in New Delhi]].<ref>{{cite news|title=India removes US Embassy security barriers in spat|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-india-diplomat-idUSBRE9BG1A820131218|access-date=December 29, 2013|work=Reuters|date=December 18, 2013|last1=Asokan|first1=Shyamantha|last2=Francescani|first2=Chris|location=New Delhi/New York}}</ref> Nancy J. Powell, the US ambassador to India, resigned following the incident, which was widely seen by India "as fallout from the imbroglio."<ref name="BarryTires">{{cite news |first1=Ellen |last1=Barry |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/21/world/asia/india-tires-of-diplomatic-rift-over-arrest.html |title=India Tires of Diplomatic Rift Over Arrest of Devyani Khobragade |work=The New York Times |date=December 20, 2014 |location=New Delhi}}</ref> Within a year of the incident, US–India relations were warming again, as President Obama visited India in January 2015.<ref name="BarryTires" /> | ||
=== Modi government (2014–present) === | === Modi government (2014–present) === | ||
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==== Modi–Obama relationship (2014–2017) ==== | ==== Modi–Obama relationship (2014–2017) ==== | ||
[[File:The Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi with the US President, Mr. Barack Obama, at Hyderabad House, in New Delhi on January 25, 2015 (5).jpg|thumb|Indian Prime Minister [[Narendra Modi]] with US President [[Barack Obama]] in [[New Delhi]], January 2015.]] | [[File:The Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi with the US President, Mr. Barack Obama, at Hyderabad House, in New Delhi on January 25, 2015 (5).jpg|thumb|Indian Prime Minister [[Narendra Modi]] with US President [[Barack Obama]] in [[New Delhi]], January 2015.]] | ||
By 2016, India–United States relations improved significantly during the [[Premiership of Narendra Modi]] which began in 2014. | By 2016, India–United States relations improved significantly during the [[Premiership of Narendra Modi]] which began in 2014.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/05/10/how-modi-changed-the-india-us-relationship/ |title=How Modi changed the India–US relationship |date=May 10, 2016}}</ref> India and the US share an extensive and expanding cultural, strategic, military, and economic relationship<ref>Teresita C. Schaffer, ''India and the United States in the 21st Century: Reinventing Partnership'' (2010)</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34161.pdf|title=India-U.S. Economic and Trade Relations|publisher=Federation of American Scientists|access-date=March 25, 2018}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=Indo-U.S. Relations: Moving Beyond the Plateau|url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/30/indo-u-s-relations-moving-beyond-the-plateau/|work=Foreign Policy |date=July 30, 2015}}</ref> which is in the phase of implementing ''[[Confidence and security-building measures|confidence building measures]]'' (CBM) to overcome the legacy of trust deficit—brought about by adversarial US foreign policies<ref>{{cite news|title=Beyond the immediate present|url=http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/beyond-the-immediate-present/article6821491.ece|work=The Hindu |date=January 26, 2015}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=Nixon's dislike of 'witch' Indira|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4633263.stm|publisher=BBC World Service |date=June 29, 2005}}</ref> and multiple instances of technology denial<ref>{{cite news|title=India overcame US sanctions to develop cryogenic engine|url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-overcame-US-sanctions-to-develop-cryogenic-engine/articleshow/28449360.cms?referral=PM|work=[[The Times of India]] |date=January 6, 2014}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=How Kargil spurred India to design own GPS|url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/science/How-Kargil-spurred-India-to-design-own-GPS/articleshow/33254691.cms|work=[[The Times of India]] |date=April 5, 2014}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=Indian scientists thwart Western embargo on manufacture of carbon composites |url=http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/content/4374/indian-scientists-thwart-western-embargo-on-manufacture-of-carbon-composites/ |publisher=Centre for Science and Environment |date=August 30, 1992 |archive-date=August 1, 2022 |access-date=September 28, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220801132827/http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/content/4374/indian-scientists-thwart-western-embargo-on-manufacture-of-carbon-composites/ |url-status=dead }}</ref>—which have plagued the relationship over several decades.<ref>{{cite news|title=The geopolitical context of India-US ties|url=https://zeenews.india.com/exclusive/the-geopolitical-context-of-india-us-ties_1474021.html|publisher=Zee News|date=September 23, 2015}}</ref> | ||
Key developments included the rapid growth of India's economy; closer ties between the Indian and American industries, especially in the Information and communications technology (ICT), engineering and medical sectors; an informal ''[[Entente (type of alliance)|entente]]'' to [[China threat theory|manage]] an increasingly assertive [[China]]; robust cooperation on counter-terrorism; the deterioration of [[U.S.-Pakistan relations|US-Pakistan relations]]; easing of export controls over dual-use goods & | Key developments included the rapid growth of India's economy; closer ties between the Indian and American industries, especially in the Information and communications technology (ICT), engineering and medical sectors; an informal ''[[Entente (type of alliance)|entente]]'' to [[China threat theory|manage]] an increasingly assertive [[China]]; robust cooperation on counter-terrorism; the deterioration of [[U.S.-Pakistan relations|US-Pakistan relations]]; easing of export controls over dual-use goods & technologies (99% of licenses applied were, as of 2016, approved);<ref>{{cite news |url=https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/54830169.cms |title=US rules out treaty alliance with India, says that era is over |date=October 13, 2016 |website=India Times |access-date=October 14, 2016}}</ref> and reversal of long-standing American opposition to India's strategic program. | ||
Income creation in the US through knowledge-based employment by Asian Indians has outpaced every other ethnic group according to US Census data. | Income creation in the US through knowledge-based employment by Asian Indians has outpaced every other ethnic group according to US Census data.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://ibnlive.in.com/news/usas-best-indian-americans-top-community/85882-2.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090222001100/http://ibnlive.in.com/news/usas-best-indian-americans-top-community/85882-2.html |url-status=dead |archive-date=February 22, 2009 |title=USA�s best: Indian Americans top community – World – IBNLive |publisher=Ibnlive.in.com |date=February 20, 2009 |access-date=February 7, 2013}}</ref> Growing financial and political clout of the affluent [[Indian American|Asian Indian diaspora]] is noteworthy. Indian American households are the most prosperous in the US, with a median revenue of US$100,000, and are followed by Chinese Americans at US$65,000. The average household revenue in the USA is US$63,000.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2019/acs/acsbr18-01.pdf|title=Household Income: 2018 American Community Survey Briefs}}</ref> The political influence of the large Indian-American community is reflected in the largest country-specific caucus in the [[United States Congress]],<ref>{{Cite news |date=February 7, 2004 |title=Indian Americans excel in Bush Administration |url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/indian-americans-excel-in-bush-administration/articleshow/481197.cms |access-date=June 26, 2023 |work=The Times of India |issn=0971-8257}}</ref> while between 2009 and 2010 more than 100,000 Indian students attended American colleges and universities.<ref>{{cite web |date=October 6, 2011 |title=Commerce Trade Official to Lead Education Trade Mission to India |url=http://trade.gov/press/press-releases/2011/commerce-trade-official-to-lead-education-trade-mission-to-india-100711.asp |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121017060809/http://www.trade.gov/press/press%2Dreleases/2011/commerce-trade-official-to-lead-education-trade-mission-to-india-100711.asp |archive-date=October 17, 2012 |access-date=December 17, 2013 |publisher=International Trade Administration}}</ref> | ||
The 2014 State Department's annual [[Trafficking in Persons Report|Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report]] appeared to classify the Khobragade incident as an example of human trafficking, stating: "An Indian consular officer at the New York consulate was indicted in December 2013 for visa fraud related to her alleged exploitation of an Indian domestic worker." | The 2014 State Department's annual [[Trafficking in Persons Report|Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report]] appeared to classify the Khobragade incident as an example of human trafficking, stating: "An Indian consular officer at the New York consulate was indicted in December 2013 for visa fraud related to her alleged exploitation of an Indian domestic worker."<ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/devyani-khobragade-featured-in-us-human-trafficking-report/article6134380.ece|title=Devyani Khobragade featured in U.S. human trafficking report |work=The Hindu |date=June 21, 2014}}</ref> In response, India showed no urgency to allow visits to India by the newly appointed US anti-human trafficking ambassador [[Susan P. Coppedge]] and the US special envoy for LGBT rights Randy Berry. Under [[Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code]] homosexuality was illegal in India. Indian Ambassador to the US, Arun K. Singh reiterated India's commitment to work within an international framework to tackle the problem of trafficking but rejected any "unilateral assessments" by another country saying "We will never accept it" and downplayed the importance of the visits: "When you ask a US official when somebody will be given a visa, they always say 'we will assess when visa is applied for.'{{nbsp}}... I can do no better than to reiterate the US position."<ref>{{cite news|title=India blocks visits by U.S. officials despite warmer ties|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-india-idUSKCN0T92YI20151120|publisher=Reuters |date=November 20, 2015}}</ref> | ||
In February 2016, the Obama administration notified the US Congress that it intended to provide Pakistan eight nuclear-capable [[F-16 fighters]] and assorted military goods, including eight [[AN/APG-68]](V)9 airborne radars and eight ALQ-211(V)9 electronic warfare suites, | In February 2016, the Obama administration notified the US Congress that it intended to provide Pakistan eight nuclear-capable [[F-16 fighters]] and assorted military goods, including eight [[AN/APG-68]](V)9 airborne radars and eight ALQ-211(V)9 electronic warfare suites,<ref>{{cite news|title=US to give Pakistan eight F-16s, India fumes|url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/US-to-give-Pakistan-eight-F-16s-India-fumes/articleshow/50979409.cms|work=[[The Times of India]] |date=February 14, 2016}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=India disappointed by U.S. sale of F-16 fighters to Pakistan|url=https://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2016/02/14/india-disappointed-us-sale-f-16-fighters-pakistan/80373748/|work=Military Times |date=February 14, 2016}}</ref> despite strong reservations from US lawmakers regarding the transfer of any nuclear-capable platforms to Pakistan.<ref>{{cite news|title=US shouldn't sell nuclear-armed version of F-16 to Pak: Republican leadership|url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/US-shouldnt-sell-nuclear-armed-version-of-F-16-to-Pak-Republican-leadership/articleshow/49826432.cms|work=[[The Times of India]] |date=November 18, 2015}}</ref> The Indian Government summoned the US Ambassador to India to convey its disapproval regarding the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan.<ref>{{cite news|title=F-16, Pervez Musharraf pour cold water on Indo-Pak dialogue|url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/F-16-Pervez-Musharraf-pour-cold-water-on-Indo-Pak-dialogue/articleshow/50988622.cms|work=[[The Times of India]] |date=February 15, 2016}}</ref> | ||
==== Modi–Trump relationship (2017–2021) ==== | ==== Modi–Trump relationship (2017–2021) ==== | ||
[[File:The Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi meeting the President of United States of America (USA), Mr. Donald Trump, at White House, in Washington DC, USA on June 26, 2017 (2).jpg|thumb|Indian Prime Minister [[Narendra Modi]] with US President [[Donald Trump]] in the [[Oval Office]], June 2017]] | [[File:The Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi meeting the President of United States of America (USA), Mr. Donald Trump, at White House, in Washington DC, USA on June 26, 2017 (2).jpg|thumb|Indian Prime Minister [[Narendra Modi]] with US President [[Donald Trump]] in the [[Oval Office]], June 2017]] | ||
In February 2017, Indian ambassador to the US [[Navtej Sarna]] hosted a reception for the [[National Governors Association]] (NGA), which was attended by the governors of 25 states and senior representatives of three more states. This was the first time such an event had occurred. Explaining the reason for the gathering, Virginia Governor and NGA Chair [[Terry McAuliffe]] stated that "We clearly understand the strategic importance of India, of India–US relations. As we grow our 21st century economy, India has been so instrumental in helping us build our technology, medical professions. We recognise a country that has been such a close strategic ally of the US. That's why we the Governors are here tonight." | In February 2017, Indian ambassador to the US [[Navtej Sarna]] hosted a reception for the [[National Governors Association]] (NGA), which was attended by the governors of 25 states and senior representatives of three more states. This was the first time such an event had occurred. Explaining the reason for the gathering, Virginia Governor and NGA Chair [[Terry McAuliffe]] stated that "We clearly understand the strategic importance of India, of India–US relations. As we grow our 21st century economy, India has been so instrumental in helping us build our technology, medical professions. We recognise a country that has been such a close strategic ally of the US. That's why we the Governors are here tonight."<ref>{{cite web|title=India is Americas greatest strategic partner: top US Governor|url=http://www.moneycontrol.com/news/current-affairs/india-is-americas-greatest-strategic-partner-top-us-governor_8555021.html|website=Money Control|date=February 25, 2017|access-date=February 25, 2017|archive-date=February 26, 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170226044936/http://www.moneycontrol.com/news/current-affairs/india-is-americas-greatest-strategic-partner-top-us-governor_8555021.html|url-status=dead}}</ref> | ||
In October 2018, India inked a historic agreement worth US$5.43 billion with [[Russia]] to procure four [[S-400 Triumf]] surface-to-air missile defence systems—one of the most powerful [[Missile defence|missile defence systems]] in the world—ignoring America's [[Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act|CAATSA act]]. The US threatened India with sanctions over India's decision to buy the S-400 missile defense system from Russia. | In October 2018, India inked a historic agreement worth US$5.43 billion with [[Russia]] to procure four [[S-400 Triumf]] surface-to-air missile defence systems—one of the most powerful [[Missile defence|missile defence systems]] in the world—ignoring America's [[Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act|CAATSA act]]. The US threatened India with sanctions over India's decision to buy the S-400 missile defense system from Russia.<ref>{{cite news |title=India, facing sanctions for Russian arms deals, says it wants to pivot spending to the US |url=https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/23/india-to-pivot-spending-to-the-us-amid-russia-arms-deals-sanctions.html |work=CNBC |date=May 23, 2019}}</ref> The US also threatened India with sanctions over India's decision to buy [[Petroleum industry in Iran|oil from Iran]].<ref>{{cite news |title=US threatens India with CAATSA if it continues to purchase fuel from Iran |url=https://in.news.yahoo.com/us-threatens-india-caatsa-continues-044500451.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmN6Lw&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAKaVNQwtIyx5VcUJEIUOfD9ctVgk-FwVXbjLNopQAhvSqfnLaEkMIdy1Nu6FTMpBnOLPId5gx7c19HfIWMX_OVDjHVUdaYxX2kipal0yFoOvqhbCEtohboYjB56mlE0YSGPqhTzEsv1L_4rR0_JSRyFuK2AdXq6NVhBBRoR1VZ8r |work=Yahoo News |date=October 12, 2018}}</ref> However, the [[First presidency of Donald Trump|Trump administration]] avoided sanctioning India for the Russian S-400 missile system, while sanctioning [[Turkey]] and China for the same purchases.<ref name="TA">{{Cite news |date=June 27, 2023 |title=Tracing the arc of American 'exception-ism' for India |language=en-IN |work=The Hindu |url=https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/tracing-the-arc-of-american-exception-ism-for-india/article67016550.ece |access-date=June 28, 2023 |issn=0971-751X}}</ref> | ||
[[File:President Trump and the First Lady in India (49583481291).jpg|thumb|President [[Donald Trump]] and Indian Prime Minister [[Narendra Modi]] at [[Namaste Trump]] rally in [[Ahmedabad]], India on February 24, 2020]] | [[File:President Trump and the First Lady in India (49583481291).jpg|thumb|President [[Donald Trump]] and Indian Prime Minister [[Narendra Modi]] at [[Namaste Trump]] rally in [[Ahmedabad]], India on February 24, 2020]] | ||
[[File:President Trump and the First Lady in India (49584141701).jpg|thumb|PM Modi gifts exemplar of [[Mahatma Gandhi]]'s [[three wise monkeys]] to President Trump]] | [[File:President Trump and the First Lady in India (49584141701).jpg|thumb|PM Modi gifts exemplar of [[Mahatma Gandhi]]'s [[three wise monkeys]] to President Trump]] | ||
President [[Donald Trump]] grew closer to India's [[BJP]] government, which shared similar [[Right-wing populism|right-wing]] views. He repeatedly praised Modi's leadership and avoided any negative criticism of the Indian government's actions on the [[Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019|citizenship]] and [[Revocation of the special status of Jammu and Kashmir|Kashmir]] disputes. | President [[Donald Trump]] grew closer to India's [[BJP]] government, which shared similar [[Right-wing populism|right-wing]] views. He repeatedly praised Modi's leadership and avoided any negative criticism of the Indian government's actions on the [[Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019|citizenship]] and [[Revocation of the special status of Jammu and Kashmir|Kashmir]] disputes.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Menon |first=Shivshankar |date=August 11, 2020 |title=How Trump and Modi Refashioned the Relationship Between America and India |language=en-US |url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-08-11/modi-india-league-nationalists |access-date=March 20, 2023 |issn=0015-7120}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Why Modi Will Prefer a Trumpian World Order, Rather Than a Biden-Harris Presidency |url=https://thewire.in/world/modi-trump-authoritarianism-biden-harris |access-date=March 20, 2023 |website=The Wire}}</ref> The Trump administration was consistent with the [[Premiership of Narendra Modi|Modi administration]] in combating "[[radical Islamic terrorism]]",<ref>{{Cite web |date=February 24, 2020 |title=India, US to defend people from radical Islamic terrorism: Trump |url=https://www.dailyexcelsior.com/india-us-to-defend-people-from-radical-islamic-terrorism-trump/ |access-date=April 28, 2023 |website=dailyexcelsior.com |language=en-US}}</ref> and the US reiterated its support for India's elimination of [[Pakistan and state-sponsored terrorism|terrorist training camp in Pakistan]].<ref>{{Cite web |title=NSA Ajit Doval calls Mike Pompeo, US reiterates its support for India's airstrike on Jaish terror camp in Pakistan |url=https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/nsa-ajit-doval-mike-pompeo-united-states-reiterates-support-india-airstrike-jaish-terror-camp-pakistan-1466861-2019-02-28 |access-date=April 28, 2023 |website=India Today |date=February 28, 2019 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |title=Trump, India's Modi Call On Pakistan To Stem Terror Attacks |language=en |work=RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty |url=https://www.rferl.org/a/trump-brands-pakistani-militant-terrorist-as-greets-indian-leader-modi-white-house-drone-sale/28580849.html |access-date=April 28, 2023}}</ref> | ||
In early 2020, India provided its agreement for terminating an export embargo on a medicinal drug known as [[hydroxychloroquine]] amidst the combat against the ongoing coronavirus ([[COVID-19]]) [[pandemic]], after Trump threatened retaliation against India if it did not comply with terminating the export embargo on hydroxychloroquine. | In early 2020, India provided its agreement for terminating an export embargo on a medicinal drug known as [[hydroxychloroquine]] amidst the combat against the ongoing coronavirus ([[COVID-19]]) [[pandemic]], after Trump threatened retaliation against India if it did not comply with terminating the export embargo on hydroxychloroquine.<ref>{{cite web|title=Hydroxychloroquine: India agrees to release drug after Trump retaliation threat|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-52196730|work=[[BBC News]] |access-date=August 20, 2020 |date=April 7, 2020}}</ref><ref name="CV">{{Cite web|first=Indrani|last=Bagchi |date=April 24, 2021 |title=US Covid Vaccine News: First obligation is to Americans, says US on India's request for vaccine raw materials {{!}} World News - Times of India|url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/first-obligation-is-to-americans-says-us-on-indias-request-for-vaccine-raw-materials/articleshow/82219263.cms|access-date=April 24, 2021|website=The Times of India|language=en}}</ref> | ||
On December 21, 2020, President Trump awarded Modi with the [[Legion of Merit]] for elevating India–United States relations. The Legion of Merit was awarded to Modi along with Prime Minister of Australia [[Scott Morrison]] and former Prime Minister of Japan [[Shinzo Abe]], the "original architects" of the [[Quadrilateral Security Dialogue|QUAD]]. | On December 21, 2020, President Trump awarded Modi with the [[Legion of Merit]] for elevating India–United States relations. The Legion of Merit was awarded to Modi along with Prime Minister of Australia [[Scott Morrison]] and former Prime Minister of Japan [[Shinzo Abe]], the "original architects" of the [[Quadrilateral Security Dialogue|QUAD]].<ref>{{Cite news|last=Gupta|first=Shishir |date=December 22, 2020 |title=US' Legion of Merit award for QUAD architects sends multiple messages|language=en|work=Hindustan Times|url=https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/us-legion-of-merit-award-for-quad-architects-sends-multiple-messages/story-bSHX0b7SNJXkmxTiHVU8hI.html |access-date=December 22, 2020}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|last=Sharma|first=Aakriti|date=December 22, 2020|title=After UAE's 'Order of Zayed' Indian PM Narendra Modi & QUAD Allies Awarded 'Legion of Merit' By US Government|language=en-US|work=eurasiantimes.com|url=https://eurasiantimes.com/after-uaes-order-of-zayed-pm-narendra-modi-awarded-legion-of-merit-by-us-government/ |access-date=December 22, 2020}}</ref> | ||
====Modi–Biden relationship (2021–2025)==== | ====Modi–Biden relationship (2021–2025)==== | ||
[[File:The Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi in a Bilateral Meeting with the President of the United States of America, Mr. Joe Biden, at White House, in Washington DC, USA on September 24, 2021 (6).jpg|thumb|Indian Prime Minister [[Narendra Modi]] with US President [[Joe Biden]] in the [[Oval Office]], September 2021]] | [[File:The Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi in a Bilateral Meeting with the President of the United States of America, Mr. Joe Biden, at White House, in Washington DC, USA on September 24, 2021 (6).jpg|thumb|Indian Prime Minister [[Narendra Modi]] with US President [[Joe Biden]] in the [[Oval Office]], September 2021]] | ||
US–India ties began to strain in April 2021 when India faced a massive spike in [[COVID-19]] infections. The US had invoked the [[Defense Production Act of 1950]] to [[Defense Production Act of 1950|ban the export of raw materials]] needed to produce vaccines in order to prioritize domestic vaccine production. | US–India ties began to strain in April 2021 when India faced a massive spike in [[COVID-19]] infections. The US had invoked the [[Defense Production Act of 1950]] to [[Defense Production Act of 1950|ban the export of raw materials]] needed to produce vaccines in order to prioritize domestic vaccine production.<ref>{{Cite news|last1=Jain|first1=Rupam|last2=Rocha|first2=Euan |date=March 11, 2021 |title=U.S. curbs on raw material exports could dent new Quad alliance's vaccine push|work=Reuters|url=https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/us-curbs-raw-material-exports-could-dent-new-quad-alliances-vaccine-push-2021-03-11/}}</ref> According to ''[[The Times of India]]'', this also caused an explosion of anti-US sentiment in India, as the US had vaccine reserves and refused to share COVID-19 vaccine patents.<ref>{{Cite web |date=April 25, 2021 |title=As criticism mounts, US assures help to Covid-hit India {{!}} India News - Times of India|url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/as-anti-us-sentiment-explodes-biden-admin-assures-help-to-covid-hit-india/articleshow/82241523.cms|access-date=April 25, 2021|website=The Times of India|language=en}}</ref> This came after a plea by [[Adar Poonawalla]], CEO of the [[Serum Institute of India]], to lift the embargo on export of raw materials needed to ramp up production of COVID-19 vaccines, was rejected.<ref name="CV" /> However, in late April, right after a phone call with [[Ajit Doval]], the [[National Security Advisor (India)|National Security Advisor of India]], the [[Biden administration]] stated it would make raw materials necessary for production of the [[Oxford–AstraZeneca COVID-19 vaccine]] available to India, and began to send more than {{INR convert|714|c|year=2021}} worth of drug treatments, [[COVID-19 testing#Antibody tests|rapid diagnostic tests]], [[ventilator]]s, [[personal protective equipment]], and mechanical parts needed to manufacture vaccines to India, along with a team of public health experts from the [[United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention]]. The US also stated that it planned to finance the expansion of [[Biological E. Limited]], an Indian-based COVID-19 vaccine production company.<ref>{{Cite news |date=April 25, 2021 |title=The Latest: Biden says US set on helping India with pandemic|work=The Associated Press|url=https://apnews.com/article/travel-coronavirus-vaccine-tokyo-osaka-coronavirus-pandemic-eed2b8c9c6d0e69d400a1a8bac9895e4 |access-date=April 25, 2021}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=April 27, 2021 |title=The Latest: Biden: Sending help to India during virus surge|work=The Associated Press|url=https://apnews.com/article/technology-pandemics-europe-india-coronavirus-pandemic-adb43be663eeddb0ec638f1acf376735}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|last=Pathi|first=Krutika |date=April 29, 2021|title=India cases set new global record; millions vote in 1 state|work=The Associated Press|url=https://apnews.com/article/india-coronavirus-business-health-a8f84ca9d9a4d9be322a4d9e9f614f6f}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|last=Sharma|first=Ashok |date=May 1, 2021 |title=Hospital fire kills 18 virus patients as India steps up jabs|work=[[The Associated Press]]|url=https://apnews.com/article/india-fires-health-coronavirus-f500cb7b9e28871cf6e4e9e6ccbc1529}}</ref> India entered negotiations with the US after it declared that it would share 60 million Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccines with the world.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Jain|first=Rupam |date=April 27, 2021 |title=Vital medical supplies reach India as COVID deaths near 200,000|work=Reuters|url=https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-posts-323144-new-covid-19-cases-2021-04-27/}}</ref> | ||
In a meeting of the [[Quadrilateral Security Dialogue]] on the implications of the [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine]] for the region, President Biden noted India's abstention on a UN resolution condemning the invasion, saying that most global allies were united against Russia. | In a meeting of the [[Quadrilateral Security Dialogue]] on the implications of the [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine]] for the region, President Biden noted India's abstention on a UN resolution condemning the invasion, saying that most global allies were united against Russia.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news-2022-03-03/card/biden-holds-call-on-ukraine-with-leaders-of-australia-india-japan-wXpZeQ8Ev6l4HSAlCVhV|last=Siddiqui|first=Sabrina|date=March 3, 2022|location=Washington|title=Biden Holds Call on Ukraine With Leaders of Australia, India, Japan|work=[[The Wall Street Journal]]}}</ref> Speaking to the [[United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations|US Senate Foreign Relations Committee]], US diplomat [[Donald Lu]] said the Biden administration was still considering sanctions against India over its S-400 deal with Russia and its abstention at the UN.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/india/india-ukraine-sanction-biden-unga-b2027646.html|title = US could sanction India after it abstained on Ukraine vote at UN|last=Mishra|first=Stuti|work= The Independent |date=March 3, 2022}}</ref> However, the Biden administration ruled out secondary sanctions against India for its considerable oil imports or defence engagement from Russia.<ref name="TA" /> | ||
===== Strengthen cooperation in various fields ===== | ===== Strengthen cooperation in various fields ===== | ||
Although there are certain differences over the [[Russian invasion of Ukraine]], the United States and India strengthened cooperation in defense, semiconductors, critical minerals, space, climate, education, healthcare and other fields during the [[Joe Biden presidency]]. | Although there are certain differences over the [[Russian invasion of Ukraine]], the United States and India strengthened cooperation in defense, semiconductors, critical minerals, space, climate, education, healthcare and other fields during the [[Joe Biden presidency]].<ref name="ML">{{Cite news |date=June 23, 2023 |title=Worldview with Suhasini Haidar {{!}} PM Modi in US {{!}} A major leap forward for India-US ties? |language=en-IN |work=The Hindu |url=https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/worldview-with-suhasini-haidar-pm-modi-in-us-a-major-leap-forward-for-india-us-ties/article67002279.ece |access-date=June 25, 2023 |issn=0971-751X}}</ref> Biden called the ties with India "one of the defining relationships of the 21st century".<ref>{{Cite news |date=June 23, 2023 |title=Joe Biden and Narendra Modi hail 'defining' US-India partnership |language=en-GB |work=BBC News |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-65994923 |access-date=July 3, 2023}}</ref> In a joint statement in 2023, Modi and Biden reiterated the call for concerted action against all groups identified by the United Nations as terrorist organisations, including Al-Qaeda, ISIS (Daesh), Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Hizb-ul-Mujhahideen (HuM). They also called out the [[Afghan Taliban]] authorities and Pakistan on the issue of terrorism.<ref>{{Cite web |date=June 23, 2023 |title=Biden joins Modi to ask Pakistan to stop terrorism |url=https://www.deccanherald.com/national/biden-joins-modi-to-ask-pakistan-to-stop-terrorism-1230677.html |access-date=June 25, 2023 |website=Deccan Herald |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Biden, Modi Call for Inclusive Govt in Afghanistan |url=https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-183899 |access-date=June 25, 2023 |website=TOLOnews |language=en}}</ref> The joint statement declared that the two countries have strong ties spanning "seas to stars".<ref>{{Cite web |date=June 24, 2023 |title=Silent on Russia, joint statement hails ties spanning 'seas to stars' |url=https://indianexpress.com/article/india/silent-on-russia-joint-statement-hails-ties-spanning-seas-to-stars-8683090/ |access-date=July 9, 2023 |website=The Indian Express |language=en}}</ref> | ||
===== Spying allegations against India ===== | ===== Spying allegations against India ===== | ||
{{See also|Canada–India diplomatic row}} | {{See also|Canada–India diplomatic row}} | ||
In November 2023, it was reported that US authorities prevented a plot to assassinate [[Gurpatwant Singh Pannun]], a Sikh separatist leader of the [[Khalistan movement]], within American borders. | In November 2023, it was reported that US authorities prevented a plot to assassinate [[Gurpatwant Singh Pannun]], a Sikh separatist leader of the [[Khalistan movement]], within American borders.<ref>{{Cite news |title=U.S. Says Indian Official Directed Assassination Plot in New York |work=The New York Times |date=November 29, 2023 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/29/nyregion/sikh-assassination-plot-charges-india.html |last1=McKinley |first1=Jesse |last2=Barnes |first2=Julian E. |last3=Austen |first3=Ian }}</ref> Pannun had made threats to bomb the [[Parliament of India|Indian Parliament]] and [[Air India]] flights, is now facing charges related to terrorist activities by India's NIA.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Khalistani terrorist Gurpatwant Pannun threatens to blow up Air India flight |date=November 5, 2023 |url=https://www.livemint.com/news/india/khalistani-terrorist-gurpatwant-pannun-threatens-to-blow-up-air-india-flight-india-asks-canada-to-enhance-security-11699175959575.html}}</ref> United States federal prosecutors filed charges against Nikhil Gupta, an Indian national, alleging his involvement in a conspiracy with an Indian government official to carry out the assassination of Pannun.<ref>{{Cite web |title=India Accidentally Hired a DEA Agent to Kill Sikh American Activist, Federal Prosecutors Say |date=November 29, 2023 |url=https://theintercept.com/2023/11/29/india-assassination-plot-us-citizen-nikhil-gupta/}}</ref> India voiced apprehension over the connection of one of its government officials to the plot, distancing itself from the incident and saying it contradicted government policy.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Cohen |first1=Luc |last2=Mason |first2=Jeff |last3=Brunnstrom |first3=David |last4=Cohen |first4=Luc |last5=Mason |first5=Jeff |date=December 1, 2023 |title=US links Indian official to murder plot that India calls 'contrary to policy' |language=en |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-charges-indian-national-with-conspiracy-assassinate-sikh-advocate-2023-11-29/ |access-date=December 10, 2023}}</ref> In December 2023, it was reported that [[Joe Biden|President Joe Biden]] cancelled plans to attend India's January 2024 [[Delhi Republic Day parade]].<ref>https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/india/biden-india-visit-republic-day-quad-summit-b2462567.html</ref> | ||
==== Modi–Trump relationship (2025–present) ==== | ==== Modi–Trump relationship (2025–present) ==== | ||
[[File:President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the White House.jpg|right|thumb|Indian Prime Minister [[Narendra Modi]] with US President [[Donald Trump]] in the [[Oval Office]], February 2025]]India rejected Trump's offer to mediate [[China–India relations|India-China tensions]]. | [[File:President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the White House.jpg|right|thumb|Indian Prime Minister [[Narendra Modi]] with US President [[Donald Trump]] in the [[Oval Office]], February 2025]]India rejected Trump's offer to mediate [[China–India relations|India-China tensions]].<ref>{{cite news |title=Donald Trump ruffles feathers with mediation offer to ease India-China tension |url=https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/donald-trump-ruffles-feathers-with-offer-to-help-ties-between-india-and-china/article69220597.ece |work=The Hindu |date=February 15, 2025}}</ref> In May, again, India rejected Trump's and his vice president's offer to mediate when the [[2025 India–Pakistan conflict]] unfolded. The Indian Prime Minister first conveyed this directly to Trump in June. In late July, Modi reiterated the point during a parliamentary debate.<ref>{{Cite web |title="No World Leader Asked Us To Stop Op Sindoor": PM Modi On Congress' Trump Charge |url=https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/no-world-leader-asked-india-to-stop-op-sindoor-pm-modi-8976066 |access-date=July 30, 2025 |website=www.ndtv.com |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=India's Modi tells Trump there was no US mediation in Pakistan truce |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/6/18/indias-modi-maintains-there-was-no-us-mediation-in-pakistan-ceasefire |access-date=July 30, 2025 |website=Al Jazeera |language=en}}</ref> | ||
On February 13, 2025, Indian Prime Minister [[Narendra Modi]] became the fourth world leader to visit Donald Trump at the White House. During the meeting, Modi praised the [[Trumpism|MAGA]] movement. | On February 13, 2025, Indian Prime Minister [[Narendra Modi]] became the fourth world leader to visit Donald Trump at the White House. During the meeting, Modi praised the [[Trumpism|MAGA]] movement.<ref>{{cite news |title=Key takeaways from Donald Trump's meeting with India's Narendra Modi |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/2/14/key-takeaways-from-donald-trumps-meeting-with-indias-narendra-modi |work=Al Jazeera |date=February 14, 2025}}</ref><ref name=":0">{{Cite web |title=India's Modi says Trump has 'clear roadmap' in second term |website=[[Reuters]] |date=March 17, 2025 |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/india/indias-modi-says-trump-has-clear-roadmap-second-term-2025-03-17/}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Amid Trump's Tariff Threats, India And US Inch Closer Towards Trade Deal |url=https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/amid-trumps-tariff-threats-india-and-us-inch-closer-towards-trade-deal-8046546 |access-date=April 1, 2025 |website=www.ndtv.com |language=en}}</ref> | ||
===== Pahalgam attack and Indo-Pak ceasefire ===== | ===== Pahalgam attack and Indo-Pak ceasefire ===== | ||
Following the [[2025 Pahalgam attack]], the United States initially expressed support for India’s right to respond. President Donald Trump condemned the attack and offered condolences, while US officials reiterated India’s sovereignty in handling its security challenges. | Following the [[2025 Pahalgam attack]], the United States initially expressed support for India’s right to respond. President Donald Trump condemned the attack and offered condolences, while US officials reiterated India’s sovereignty in handling its security challenges.<ref>{{Cite news |date=May 8, 2025 |title='Pakistan doesn't get to play the victim': Nikki Haley backs India's right to retaliate after Pahalgam terror attack |url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/pakistan-doesnt-get-to-play-the-victim-nikki-haley-backs-indias-right-to-retaliate-after-pahalgam-terror-attack/articleshow/121003760.cms |access-date=August 7, 2025 |work=The Times of India |issn=0971-8257}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=April 23, 2025 |title=What world leaders said after militant attack in India's Kashmir |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/india/what-world-leaders-said-after-militant-attack-indias-kashmir-2025-04-23/ |access-date=August 7, 2025 |work=Reuters |language=en}}</ref> However, bilateral tensions emerged in the weeks that followed—particularly over conflicting claims regarding [[2025 India–Pakistan conflict|the May ceasefire with Pakistan]]—after India's announcement of halting Operation Sindoor. While the [[Second Trump administration|Trump administration]] and several US media reports credited American diplomacy for facilitating the truce, Indian officials rejected these assertions. | ||
On July 30, 2025, President Trump announced 25% tariffs on India in addition to a penalty due to India's purchase of military equipment from Russia. | On July 30, 2025, President Trump announced 25% tariffs on India in addition to a penalty due to India's purchase of military equipment from Russia.<ref name=":11">{{Cite web |last=Singh |first=Vikram J. |date=December 9, 2020 |title=Spurred by China Rivalry, U.S., India Deepen Strategic Ties |url=https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/12/spurred-china-rivalry-us-india-deepen-strategic-ties |access-date=May 21, 2023 |website=United States Institute of Peace |language=en }}{{Dead link|date=August 2025 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref> The move was widely interpreted in Indian media as a response to New Delhi’s consistent emphasis on strategic autonomy and its rejection of third-party mediation.<ref name="ET-tariff">[https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/trump-administration-imposes-25-percent-tariff-on-indian-goods-over-russian-arms-deal/articleshow/123006578.cms Trump administration imposes 25% tariff on Indian goods over Russian arms deal], Economic Times, July 30, 2025</ref> In the weeks that followed, a perceptible shift was noted in President Trump's public statements regarding South Asia. While earlier expressions had focused on supporting India’s counterterrorism efforts, subsequent remarks increasingly highlighted the role of US diplomacy in facilitating the India–Pakistan ceasefire. In public addresses, including a White House briefing and a campaign rally in July, President Trump asserted that American engagement had helped de-escalate the conflict and suggested such efforts merited international recognition.<ref name="AJ-nobel">[https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/19/trump-says-he-deserves-nobel-for-averting-war-in-kashmir Trump says he deserves Nobel for 'averting war' in Kashmir], Al Jazeera, July 19, 2025</ref> | ||
These claims were formally denied by Indian officials. Minister of External Affairs [[S. Jaishankar]] stated in Parliament that no calls or contact occurred between the Indian and US leadership during the period in question and that the ceasefire had been initiated through bilateral military dialogue. | These claims were formally denied by Indian officials. Minister of External Affairs [[S. Jaishankar]] stated in Parliament that no calls or contact occurred between the Indian and US leadership during the period in question and that the ceasefire had been initiated through bilateral military dialogue.<ref name="ET-call">[https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/no-call-between-pm-modi-and-trump-between-april-22-and-june-17-jaishankar-rejects-us-presidents-involvement-in-ceasefire-with-pakistan/articleshow/122955374.cms No call between PM Modi and Trump between April 22 and June 17: Jaishankar], Economic Times, July 28, 2025</ref><ref name="NIE-ceasefire">[https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2025/Jul/28/jaishankar-denies-trumps-involvement-in-india-pak-ceasefire-says-no-call-or-contact-with-modi Jaishankar denies Trump’s involvement in India–Pak ceasefire], New Indian Express, July 28, 2025</ref> Several Indian media outlets noted a correlation between the timing of the US tariff announcement and the increased emphasis in Washington on American diplomatic efforts in South Asia. Commentators in both countries described the developments as indicative of growing friction over differing narratives regarding the ceasefire and broader regional dynamics.<ref name="ET-tariff" /> | ||
===== Tariff and energy dispute over Russia and Pakistan ===== | ===== Tariff and energy dispute over Russia and Pakistan ===== | ||
{{See also|2025 United States–India diplomatic and trade crisis}} | {{See also|2025 United States–India diplomatic and trade crisis}} | ||
In July 2025, President Trump criticized India for continuing [[India and the Russian invasion of Ukraine|oil trade with Russia]] despite ongoing [[International sanctions during the Russian invasion of Ukraine|Western sanctions]]. Earlier in July, US Senator [[Lindsey Graham]] introduced a [[Sanctioning Russia Act|sanctions bill]] proposing tariffs of up to 500% on countries—including India—that continued to [[2023 Russian oil products sanctions and price cap|trade oil with Russia]]. | In July 2025, President Trump criticized India for continuing [[India and the Russian invasion of Ukraine|oil trade with Russia]] despite ongoing [[International sanctions during the Russian invasion of Ukraine|Western sanctions]]. Earlier in July, US Senator [[Lindsey Graham]] introduced a [[Sanctioning Russia Act|sanctions bill]] proposing tariffs of up to 500% on countries—including India—that continued to [[2023 Russian oil products sanctions and price cap|trade oil with Russia]].<ref>{{Cite web |date=July 2, 2025 |title=Will the US really impose 500% tariffs on India and China for trading with Russia? |url=https://www.firstpost.com/explainers/us-500-percent-tariffs-india-china-russia-trade-ukraine-sanctions-13902276.html |access-date=July 2, 2025 |website=Firstpost |language=en-us}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=US Plans 500% Tariffs On Top Russian Oil Buyers. How It Will Affect India |url=https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/us-plans-500-tariffs-on-top-russian-oil-buyers-how-will-it-affect-india-8810964 |access-date=July 2, 2025 |website=NDTV |language=en}}</ref> Towards the end of July, Trump announced a 25% "reciprocal [[Tariffs in the second Trump administration|tariff]]"<ref name=":12">{{Cite web |title=Donald Trump Snubs India, Signs Oil Deal With Pak. What Does This Mean? |url=https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/donald-trump-snubs-india-signs-oil-deal-with-pak-what-does-this-mean-8990365 |access-date=July 31, 2025 |website=NDTV |language=en}}</ref> on Indian goods and additional 25% penalties linked to India's purchase of Russian arms and energy, taking total tariffs to around 50%.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Jones |first1=Callum |last2=MacRae |first2=Penelope |url=https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/aug/27/trump-tariff-india-russian-oil-purchase|title=Trump imposes 50% tariff on India as punishment for buying Russian oil |work=The Guardian |date=August 27, 2025 }}</ref> Trump also revealed a proposed trade and energy development agreement with Pakistan. According to his [[Truth Social]] post, the United States would support the exploration and extraction of Pakistan's "massive" oil reserves through American firms, although the specifics of the deal remained unclear. However, geoscientist Moin Raza Khan, former managing director of [[Pakistan Petroleum Limited]], disputed these claims, stating that Trump’s assertions about Pakistan’s vast oil reserves did not reflect reality. Khan emphasized the lack of reliable data. Similarly, GA Sabri, a former Pakistani federal petroleum official, dismissed the claims as a "political gimmick."<ref name=":12" /><ref>{{Cite news |last1=Ellis-Petersen |first1=Hannah |last2=Baloch |first2=Shah Meer |date=September 27, 2025 |title=Trump brags of 'massive' oil deal in Pakistan – but drilling has not found any |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/sep/27/pakistan-us-oil-deal-analysis-trump |access-date=September 29, 2025 |work=The Guardian |language=en-GB |issn=0261-3077}}</ref> Trump also took a swipe at the Indian economy, describing it as "dead" in the context of stalled negotiations over dairy and agricultural market access.<ref name=":12" /> According to American investment bank [[Jefferies Group|Jefferies]], the unusually high tariffs were largely driven by former President Donald Trump's personal dissatisfaction after India declined his offer to mediate in its conflict with Pakistan, which may have hindered his efforts to position himself as a peace broker and [[Nobel Peace Prize]] candidate.<ref name=":13">{{Cite web |last= |first= |date=August 31, 2025 |title=Trump's decisions based on vendettas, grudges? What US political commentator said |url=https://www.indiatoday.in/world/us-news/story/donald-trumps-decisions-based-on-vendettas-grudges-what-us-political-commentator-rick-sanchez-said-2779681-2025-08-31 |access-date=September 1, 2025 |website=India Today |language=en}}</ref> | ||
In September 2025, a thaw in bilateral relations was observed when U.S. President Donald Trump made a phone call to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to extend birthday greetings. Following the call, Trump posted on [[Twitter|X]], commending Modi for doing a "tremendous job" and expressing gratitude for his support toward efforts aimed at ending the Russia–Ukraine conflict. | In September 2025, a thaw in bilateral relations was observed when U.S. President Donald Trump made a phone call to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to extend birthday greetings. Following the call, Trump posted on [[Twitter|X]], commending Modi for doing a "tremendous job" and expressing gratitude for his support toward efforts aimed at ending the Russia–Ukraine conflict.<ref>{{Cite web |date=September 17, 2025 |title=India-US: Trump's birthday call to Modi as trade talks go on in Delhi |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgjedz3y5eo |access-date=September 19, 2025 |website=www.bbc.com |language=en-GB}}</ref> | ||
U.S. President Donald Trump said on 14 January 2026 that countries that do business with Iran will face a new 25% tariff. This includes India which imports 8% of Iran's goods to as of 2023. | U.S. President Donald Trump said on 14 January 2026 that countries that do business with Iran will face a new 25% tariff. This includes India which imports 8% of Iran's goods to as of 2023.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Buchwald |first=Elisabeth |date=2026-01-12 |title=Trump ‘immediately’ imposes 25% tariffs on countries that do business with Iran. That could include China {{!}} CNN Business |url=https://www.cnn.com/2026/01/12/business/tariffs-trump-iran |access-date=2026-02-26 |website=CNN |language=en}}</ref> | ||
In February 2026, U.S. President Donald Trump announced a trade agreement with India that would lower U.S. tariffs on Indian goods to approximately 18 percent. The deal was linked to India’s reported agreement to stop purchasing Russian oil, aiming to reduce Moscow’s energy revenues amid the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. | In February 2026, U.S. President Donald Trump announced a trade agreement with India that would lower U.S. tariffs on Indian goods to approximately 18 percent. The deal was linked to India’s reported agreement to stop purchasing Russian oil, aiming to reduce Moscow’s energy revenues amid the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Egan |first=David Goldman, Matt |date=2026-02-02 |title=Trump slashes tariffs on India after he says Modi agrees to stop buying Russian oil {{!}} CNN Business |url=https://www.cnn.com/2026/02/02/business/india-russian-oil-trump-tariffs |access-date=2026-02-03 |website=CNN |language=en}}</ref> | ||
== Military relations == | == Military relations == | ||
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| caption7 = [[Minister of External Affairs (India)|Indian External Affairs Minister]] [[S. Jaishankar]] meets [[United States Secretary of Defense|U.S. Secretary of Defense of the United States]] [[Lloyd Austin]] at [[The Pentagon]] in [[Arlington County, Virginia]] in September 2022 | | caption7 = [[Minister of External Affairs (India)|Indian External Affairs Minister]] [[S. Jaishankar]] meets [[United States Secretary of Defense|U.S. Secretary of Defense of the United States]] [[Lloyd Austin]] at [[The Pentagon]] in [[Arlington County, Virginia]] in September 2022 | ||
}} | }} | ||
Though the Indian Air Force never operated the [[F-86 Sabre]], a small group of [[Indian Air Force]] pilots trained on the aircraft in the United States in 1963–65 under a brief diplomatic arrangement. The training contributed to doctrinal exposure rather than operational deployment. | Though the Indian Air Force never operated the [[F-86 Sabre]], a small group of [[Indian Air Force]] pilots trained on the aircraft in the United States in 1963–65 under a brief diplomatic arrangement. The training contributed to doctrinal exposure rather than operational deployment.<ref>{{cite web |last=Gupta |first=Anchit |title=Beyond Borders: IAF Pilots on a Sabre Adventure |url=https://iafhistory.in/2022/06/23/beyond-borders-iaf-pilots-on-a-sabre-adventure/ |website=IAFHistory |date=June 23, 2022 |access-date=May 5, 2025}}</ref> | ||
The US has four [[Foundational agreement|"foundational" agreements]] that it signs with its defence partners. The Pentagon describes the agreements as "routine instruments that the US uses to promote military cooperation with partner-nations". American officials have stated that the agreements are not prerequisites for bilateral defence co-operation, but make it simpler and more cost-effective to carry out activities such as refueling aircraft or ships in each other's countries and providing disaster relief. | The US has four [[Foundational agreement|"foundational" agreements]] that it signs with its defence partners. The Pentagon describes the agreements as "routine instruments that the US uses to promote military cooperation with partner-nations". American officials have stated that the agreements are not prerequisites for bilateral defence co-operation, but make it simpler and more cost-effective to carry out activities such as refueling aircraft or ships in each other's countries and providing disaster relief.<ref>{{cite news|title=Foundational agreements won't compromise India's security: U.S.|url=http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/foundational-agreements-wont-compromise-indias-security-us/article7213305.ece|newspaper=The Hindu |access-date=July 24, 2017 |language=en|date=May 16, 2015|last1=Lakshman|first1=Narayan}}</ref> The first of the four agreements, the General Security Of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), was signed by India and the US in 2002. The agreement enables the sharing of military intelligence between the two countries and requires each country to protect the others' classified information.{{Citation needed|date=August 2025}} | ||
The second agreement, the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), was signed by the two countries on August 29, 2016. The LEMOA permits the military of either country to use the others' bases for re-supplying or carrying out repairs. The agreement does not make the provision of logistical support binding on either country, and requires individual clearance for each request. | The second agreement, the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), was signed by the two countries on August 29, 2016. The LEMOA permits the military of either country to use the others' bases for re-supplying or carrying out repairs. The agreement does not make the provision of logistical support binding on either country, and requires individual clearance for each request.<ref>{{cite news|title=India, US sign military logistics pact|url=http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/India-US-sign-military-logistics-pact/article14598282.ece|newspaper=The Hindu |access-date=July 24, 2017 |language=en |date=August 30, 2016 |last1=George|first1=Varghese K.}}</ref> The third agreement, Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) was signed during the inaugural 2+2 dialogue in September 2018.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Pubby |first1=Manu |title=India, US ink Comcasa deal at 2+2 dialogue |url=https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/comcasa-india-to-get-access-to-real-time-encrypted-information-from-us/articleshow/65710975.cms |work=The Economic Times |date=September 7, 2018}}</ref> It is an India-specific variant of Communications and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) that enables the two countries to share secure communication and exchange information on approved equipment during bilateral and multinational training exercises and operations. The fourth agreement, the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA), signed in 2020, permits the exchange of unclassified and controlled unclassified geospatial products, topographical, nautical, and aeronautical data, products and services between India and the US [[National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency]] (NGA).<ref>{{cite web|title=India will eventually ink other agreements pushed by US: Manohar Parrikar|url=http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/india-will-eventually-ink-other-agreements-pushed-by-us-manohar-parrikar-3003315/|website=The Indian Express |access-date=July 24, 2017 |date=August 30, 2016}}</ref><ref name=":0" /> | ||
Harsh V. Pant, professor of International relations at [[King's College London]], highlighted the importance of India to US strategic planning, saying: "India is key to the US' ability to create a stable [[balance of power (international relations)|balance of power]] in the larger Indo-Pacific and at a time of resource constraints, it needs partners like India to shore up its sagging credibility in the region in face of Chinese onslaught." Robert Boggs, professor of South Asia Studies at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, opines that the US "overestimates both India's desire to improve the relationship and the benefits doing so would bring". | Harsh V. Pant, professor of International relations at [[King's College London]], highlighted the importance of India to US strategic planning, saying: "India is key to the US' ability to create a stable [[balance of power (international relations)|balance of power]] in the larger Indo-Pacific and at a time of resource constraints, it needs partners like India to shore up its sagging credibility in the region in face of Chinese onslaught." Robert Boggs, professor of South Asia Studies at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, opines that the US "overestimates both India's desire to improve the relationship and the benefits doing so would bring".<ref>{{cite news|title=Friends Without Benefits|url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/friends-without-benefits|issue=January/February 2015|work=Foreign Affairs}}</ref> | ||
As part of America's policies to counter China, | As part of America's policies to counter China,<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://asiatimes.com/2017/10/us-woos-india-100-year-alliance-china/|title=US woos India into 100-year alliance against China|first=M. K.|last=Bhadrakumar|date=October 21, 2017|website=Asia Times}}</ref> one of the [[first Trump administration]]'s policies was to make India a major defence partner, for which it was in talks with Indian representatives to sell highly technologically advanced [[Predator drones]].<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/newsindia/trump-administration-agrees-to-supply-predator-drones-to-india/ar-AAwzvn4?ocid=spartanntp |title=Trump administration agrees to supply Predator drones to India |website=[[MSN]] |access-date=May 1, 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180501161256/https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/newsindia/trump-administration-agrees-to-supply-predator-drones-to-india/ar-AAwzvn4?ocid=spartanntp |archive-date=May 1, 2018 |url-status=dead }}</ref> India has floated a tender to buy 100 multi-role fighter aircraft in the [[Indian MRCA competition]] (also called the "Mother of all defence deals"), worth around US$15 billion under [[Narendra Modi]]'s [[Make in India]] initiative. Although the deal was yet to be finalised as of 2018, the Trump administration pushed for sales of advanced [[F-16 jet fighter]]s,<ref>{{Cite news | url=https://www.newindianexpress.com/business/2018/apr/07/us-defence-major-lockheed-martin-welcomes-indias-mega-procurement-initiative-for-over-100-fighter-j-1798300.html | title=US defence major Lockheed Martin welcomes India's mega procurement initiative for over 100 fighter jets| newspaper=The New Indian Express}}</ref> and [[F/A-18 Super Hornet]].<ref>{{Cite web | url=https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/we-will-offer-the-latest-fa-18-boeing-india-chief/article23505309.ece | title=We will offer the latest F/A-18: Boeing India chief| date=April 11, 2018}}</ref> | ||
The Indian Army and US Army have conducted an annual training practice called Yudh Abhyas since 2002. | The Indian Army and US Army have conducted an annual training practice called Yudh Abhyas since 2002.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Peri |first=Dinakar |date=November 29, 2022 |title=Five bilateral Army exercises under way, including 'Yudh Abhyas' in Uttarakhand |language=en-IN |work=The Hindu |url=https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/five-bilateral-army-exercises-under-way-including-yudh-abhyas-in-uttarakhand/article66201755.ece |access-date=February 8, 2023 |issn=0971-751X}}</ref> In June 2015, US defence secretary [[Ashton Carter]] visited India and became the first American defence secretary to visit an Indian military command. In December of the same year, [[Manohar Parrikar]] became the first Indian defence minister to visit the [[US Pacific Command]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/india-us-barack-obama-richard-verma/ |title=India, US and a year of togetherness |publisher=The Indian Express |date=December 26, 2015 |access-date=December 30, 2015}}</ref> In March 2016, India rejected a proposal by the US to join naval patrols in the [[South China Sea]] alongside Japan and Australia. Defense Minister [[Manohar Parrikar]] said: "India has never taken part in any joint patrol; we only do joint exercises. The question of joint patrol does not arise."<ref>{{cite news|title=India Rejects Joint Naval Patrols with US in South China Sea|url=https://www.voanews.com/a/india-rejects-joint-naval-patrols-with-us-in-south-china-sea/3231567.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160311165044/http://www.voanews.com/content/india-rejects-joint-naval-patrols-with-us-in-south-china-sea/3231567.html|url-status=live |archive-date=March 11, 2016 |publisher=Voice of America |date=March 11, 2016}}</ref><ref name=":0" /> | ||
In January 2017, Peter Lavoy, Senior Director for South Asian Affairs at the [[US National Security Council]], declared that the partnership between India and the United States under Barack Obama's administration had been "incredibly successful". Lavoy stated, "I can tell you quite definitively that due to our partnerships, several terrorism plots were foiled. Indian lives and American lives were saved because of this partnership." | In January 2017, Peter Lavoy, Senior Director for South Asian Affairs at the [[US National Security Council]], declared that the partnership between India and the United States under Barack Obama's administration had been "incredibly successful". Lavoy stated, "I can tell you quite definitively that due to our partnerships, several terrorism plots were foiled. Indian lives and American lives were saved because of this partnership."<ref>{{cite news|title=Many a terror plot foiled due to India-U.S. cooperation: White House|url=http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/Many-a-terror-plot-foiled-due-to-India-U.S.-cooperation-White-House/article17008284.ece|newspaper=The Hindu |access-date=January 12, 2017 |date=January 8, 2017}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=India-US Together 'Foiled Several Terror Plots', Says Top US Official|url=http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/india-us-cooperation-incredibly-successful-helped-foil-several-terror-plots-us-official-1646401|website=NDTV.com |access-date=January 12, 2017}}</ref> | ||
On October 27, 2020, the United States and India signed the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA), enabling greater information-sharing and further defense cooperation, to counter China's growing military power in the region. | On October 27, 2020, the United States and India signed the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA), enabling greater information-sharing and further defense cooperation, to counter China's growing military power in the region.<ref>{{cite web |last1= Griffiths |first1= James |title= India signs defensive agreement with US following Himalayan standoff with China |url= https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/27/asia/us-india-defense-china-intl-hnk/index.html |access-date=October 27, 2020 |website=CNN |date=October 27, 2020 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20201028052816/https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/27/asia/us-india-defense-china-intl-hnk/index.html | archive-date=October 28, 2020}}</ref> During the 2+2 ministerial dialogue, the last agreement of four so-called "foundational agreements" for sharing sensitive information and sales of advanced military hardware was signed.<ref>{{Cite news |last=The Indian Hawk |first=Defence News |date=October 27, 2020 |title=India, US to sign BECA agreement during 2+2 dialogue to facilitate exchange of sensitive information |work=[[The Indian Hawk]] |url=https://www.theindianhawk.com/2020/10/india-us-to-sign-beca-agreement-during.html |access-date=February 20, 2025}}</ref> | ||
On August 16, 2022, US Air Force Secretary [[Frank Kendall]] said that "the Indian defence attaché now has un-escorted access to [[The Pentagon]] which is commencement with our close relationship with India's status as a major defense partner," and added that "if you don't think un-escorted access to the Pentagon is a big deal, I can't get into [[The Pentagon]] without an escort". | On August 16, 2022, US Air Force Secretary [[Frank Kendall]] said that "the Indian defence attaché now has un-escorted access to [[The Pentagon]] which is commencement with our close relationship with India's status as a major defense partner," and added that "if you don't think un-escorted access to the Pentagon is a big deal, I can't get into [[The Pentagon]] without an escort".<ref>{{Cite web |date=August 16, 2022 |title=Indian defence attaché now has unescorted access to Pentagon: US Air Force |url=https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/indian-defence-attach-now-has-unescorted-access-to-pentagon-us-air-force-101660615023340.html |access-date=March 23, 2023 |website=Hindustan Times |language=en}}</ref> | ||
During Modi's visit in 2023, the US and India agreed that [[Hindustan Aeronautics Limited|Hindustan Aeronautics]] would jointly produce [[General Electric F414|GE F-414]] jet engines. | During Modi's visit in 2023, the US and India agreed that [[Hindustan Aeronautics Limited|Hindustan Aeronautics]] would jointly produce [[General Electric F414|GE F-414]] jet engines.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Sahu |first=Ambuj |date=June 23, 2023 |title=What Does the GE-F414 Jet Engine Deal Mean for U.S.-India Defense Relations? |url=https://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-does-ge-f414-jet-engine-deal-mean-us-india-defense-relations-206577 |access-date=June 25, 2023 |website=The National Interest |language=en}}</ref> The two sides also reached an agreement to purchase [[General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper|MQ-9B]] drones.<ref name="ML" /> | ||
In 2024, both signed two key agreements to strengthen their defense cooperation: the Security of Supply Arrangement (SOSA), which allows reciprocal priority support for defense-related goods and services; and a Memorandum of Agreement to post Indian Liaison Officers in key US Commands, starting with the US Special Operations Command. | In 2024, both signed two key agreements to strengthen their defense cooperation: the Security of Supply Arrangement (SOSA), which allows reciprocal priority support for defense-related goods and services; and a Memorandum of Agreement to post Indian Liaison Officers in key US Commands, starting with the US Special Operations Command.<ref>{{Cite web |date=August 27, 2024 |title=Explained: The two new US-India agreements, signed as part of growing defence ties |url=https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-global/two-new-us-india-agreements-a-short-history-of-growing-defence-ties-9534655/ |access-date=September 4, 2024 |website=The Indian Express |language=en}}</ref> | ||
=== Counterterrorism cooperation === | === Counterterrorism cooperation === | ||
India–US counterterrorism cooperation has significantly deepened since the early 2000s, evolving into a central pillar of their strategic partnership. The establishment of the Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism in 2001 marked the beginning of systematic collaboration, focusing on intelligence sharing, financial tracking of terrorist networks, and capacity-building through joint training and technology transfer. | India–US counterterrorism cooperation has significantly deepened since the early 2000s, evolving into a central pillar of their strategic partnership. The establishment of the Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism in 2001 marked the beginning of systematic collaboration, focusing on intelligence sharing, financial tracking of terrorist networks, and capacity-building through joint training and technology transfer.<ref name=":2">{{Cite web |last=Kaura |first=Vinay |date=August 8, 2017 |title=India-US Counterterrorism Cooperation: The Way Forward |url=https://besacenter.org/india-counterterrorism-cooperation/ |access-date=May 29, 2025 |website=Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies |language=en-US}}</ref><ref name=":3">{{Cite web |title=U.S.-India Counterterrorism Cooperation: Deepening the Partnership |url=https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg68297/html/CHRG-112hhrg68297.htm |access-date=May 29, 2025 |website=www.govinfo.gov}}</ref> The [[2008 Mumbai attacks]] served as a catalyst, prompting both nations to intensify intelligence exchanges and operational cooperation, and leading to the signing of the Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative in 2010. This initiative facilitated closer collaboration on information sharing, investigative best practices, and advanced counterterrorism techniques.<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":3" /> High-level dialogues, such as the Homeland Security Dialogue and the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue, have further institutionalized cooperation, with joint statements increasingly reflecting shared concerns over Pakistan-based terrorist groups and calling for accountability for cross-border attacks.<ref name=":4">{{Cite web |last=Mishra |first=Sylvia |date=October 4, 2018 |title=India–US 2+2 dialogue: changing the narrative on counterterrorism? |url=https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/india-us-22-dialogue-changing-the-narrative-on-counterterrorism/ |access-date=May 29, 2025 |website=The Strategist |language=en-AU}}</ref><ref name=":2" /> | ||
In recent years, India and the US have expanded their partnership to include joint military exercises focused on counterterrorism, such as Yudh Abhyas and Vajra Prahar, and have worked together in multilateral forums like the Global Counter Terrorism Forum and the Quad Counterterrorism Working Group. | In recent years, India and the US have expanded their partnership to include joint military exercises focused on counterterrorism, such as Yudh Abhyas and Vajra Prahar, and have worked together in multilateral forums like the Global Counter Terrorism Forum and the Quad Counterterrorism Working Group.<ref name=":4" /><ref name=":5">{{Cite web |title=U.S.-India Cooperation in Counterterrorism: Redefining Convergence Amidst Challenges |url=https://www.orfonline.org/research/u-s-india-cooperation-in-counterterrorism-redefining-convergence-amidst-challenges |access-date=May 29, 2025 |website=Observer Research Foundation |language=en}}</ref> Both countries have also coordinated efforts to designate terrorist leaders and groups at the [[United Nations]] and have supported actions at the [[Financial Action Task Force]] to pressure states supporting terrorism.<ref name=":4" /><ref name=":5" /> While the US and India share the goal of combating terrorism, their approaches sometimes diverge due to differing geopolitical priorities and operational capabilities, with the US favoring more direct military action and India emphasizing regional diplomacy and multilateral engagement.<ref name=":5" /> Nevertheless, the partnership continues to adapt to emerging threats, with ongoing efforts to enhance intelligence-sharing, law enforcement cooperation, and regional security in the Indo-Pacific.<ref name=":5" /> | ||
In April 2025, President Trump condemned [[2025 Pahalgam attack|terrorist attack in Pahalgam]], Jammu and Kashmir, which resulted in the deaths of 26 civilians. In his public remarks, President Trump referred to the attack as “a bad one” and acknowledged the long-standing tensions in the region. In a subsequent interview, Trump emphasized that India would handle the situation independently, saying, “They’ll figure it out one way or another.” He also personally expressed condolences to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, offering full US support following the attack. US State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce stated that, as President Trump and Secretary of State [[Marco Rubio]] had made clear, the United States stood with India and strongly condemned all acts of terrorism. She added that they mourned the lives lost, wished for the swift recovery of the injured, and called for the perpetrators of the heinous act to be brought to justice. | In April 2025, President Trump condemned [[2025 Pahalgam attack|terrorist attack in Pahalgam]], Jammu and Kashmir, which resulted in the deaths of 26 civilians. In his public remarks, President Trump referred to the attack as “a bad one” and acknowledged the long-standing tensions in the region. In a subsequent interview, Trump emphasized that India would handle the situation independently, saying, “They’ll figure it out one way or another.” He also personally expressed condolences to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, offering full US support following the attack. US State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce stated that, as President Trump and Secretary of State [[Marco Rubio]] had made clear, the United States stood with India and strongly condemned all acts of terrorism. She added that they mourned the lives lost, wished for the swift recovery of the injured, and called for the perpetrators of the heinous act to be brought to justice.<ref name="Bhirani">{{Cite news |last1=Bhirani |first1=Garvit |last2=Ghosh |first2=Sanchari |date=April 26, 2025 |title=Donald Trump calls Pahalgam terror attack a 'bad one' - here's what he said on growing India-Pakistan tension |url=https://www.livemint.com/news/world/donald-trump-calls-pahalgam-terror-attack-a-bad-one-heres-what-he-said-on-growing-india-pakistan-tension-11745624773900.html |access-date=May 7, 2025 |work=Live Mint}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=April 26, 2025 |title='They'll figure it out one way or another': Donald Trump on India-Pakistan tensions after Pahalgam terror attack |url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/theyll-figure-it-out-one-way-or-another-donald-trump-on-india-pakistan-tensions-after-pahalgam-terror-attack/articleshow/120633075.cms? |access-date=May 7, 2025 |work=The Times of India |issn=0971-8257}}</ref> | ||
In May 2025, following India's retaliatory response dubbed "[[2025 India–Pakistan conflict|Operation Sindoor]]", India sent a 10-member multi-party delegation led by MP [[Shashi Tharoor]] to the US to brief lawmakers, think tanks, and media on the Pahalgam attack and India’s response. The team emphasized the precision and restraint of the strikes on terror camps in Pakistan and Pakistan administered Kashmir, presenting a united stance on national security and cross-border terrorism. | In May 2025, following India's retaliatory response dubbed "[[2025 India–Pakistan conflict|Operation Sindoor]]", India sent a 10-member multi-party delegation led by MP [[Shashi Tharoor]] to the US to brief lawmakers, think tanks, and media on the Pahalgam attack and India’s response. The team emphasized the precision and restraint of the strikes on terror camps in Pakistan and Pakistan administered Kashmir, presenting a united stance on national security and cross-border terrorism.<ref>{{Cite news |date=May 17, 2025 |title=Shashi Tharoor to lead high-profile US delegation to brief on Operation Sindoor; Milind Deora, Sudip Bandyopadhyay included |url=https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/shashi-tharoor-to-lead-high-profile-us-delegation-to-brief-on-operation-sindoor-milind-deora-sudip-bandyopadhyay-included/articleshow/121229147.cms |access-date=May 29, 2025 |work=The Economic Times |issn=0013-0389}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=May 25, 2025 |title='Don't work for the govt': What Shashi Tharoor said on Operation Sindoor and India's stand on terrorism |url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/dont-work-for-the-govt-what-shashi-tharoor-said-on-operation-sindoor-and-indias-stand-on-terrorism/articleshow/121390918.cms |access-date=May 29, 2025 |work=The Times of India |issn=0971-8257}}</ref> During their visit to the [[National September 11 Memorial & Museum|9/11 Memorial]] in New York, Tharoor and the delegation paid tribute to the victims and underscored the shared global challenge of terrorism, calling for international solidarity and mutual strength to combat it.<ref name=":9">{{Cite AV media |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RezunCJoGIk |title=Shashi Tharoor Pays Tribute at 9/11 Memorial Upon Arrival in USA for All-Party Delegation |date=May 25, 2025 |publisher=News9 Live |access-date=May 29, 2025 |via=YouTube}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=May 25, 2025 |title=Members of all-party delegation led by Congress MP Tharoor pay tribute at 9/11 Memorial |url=https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/members-of-all-party-delegation-led-by-congress-mp-tharoor-pay-tribute-at-9/11-memorial/articleshow/121388546.cms |access-date=May 29, 2025 |work=The Economic Times |issn=0013-0389}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=May 25, 2025 |title=Very moving moment: Shashi Tharoor as he pays tributes at 9/11 memorial in US |url=https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/shashi-tharoor-911-memorial-attacks-tributes-delegation-pak-terrorism-operation-sindoor-2730121-2025-05-25 |access-date=May 29, 2025 |website=India Today |language=en}}</ref><ref name=":10">{{Cite news |date=May 25, 2025 |title=Shashi Tharoor visits 9/11 memorial in US, says Pakistan's terrorism 'not acceptable to us' |url=https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-not-interested-in-warfare-shashi-tharoor-rips-into-pakistan-during-us-visit-operation-sindoor-pahalgam-attack-101748140050483.html |access-date=May 29, 2025 |work=Hindustan Times}}</ref> Tharoor reflected on his personal experience of 9/11—drawing parallels between the US and India as victims of terror—and stressed that India would not remain passive in the face of future attacks, urging that those who finance, train, and harbor terrorists must be held accountable.<ref name=":9" /><ref name=":10" /><ref>{{Cite web |title=Shashi Tharoor's "Don't Work For Government" Reply To Pahalgam Question |url=https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/shashi-tharoor-praises-indias-operation-sindoor-against-pakistan-in-us-i-dont-work-for-government-but-8500794 |access-date=May 29, 2025 |website=NDTV |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Singh |first=Yoshita |title=We will not be sitting quietly if...: Tharoor on Pahalgam attack |url=https://www.rediff.com/news/report/indias-precision-strikes-send-clear-message-tharoor-on-op-sindoor/20250525.htm |access-date=May 29, 2025 |website=Rediff |language=en}}</ref> | ||
==== Pakistan factor ==== | ==== Pakistan factor ==== | ||
India–US counterterrorism cooperation since the 2000s has been marked by growing convergence on the threat posed by Pakistan-based terrorist groups. While both countries have historically maintained separate bilateral relationships with Pakistan, the 2008 Mumbai attacks catalyzed a shift, with the US increasingly acknowledging India's concerns about cross-border terrorism originating from Pakistani soil. Joint statements from high-level dialogues, such as the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue, have explicitly called on Pakistan to take concrete action against terrorist groups operating from its territory and to bring perpetrators of attacks like the Mumbai attacks, [[2016 Pathankot attack|Pathankot attack]], and [[2016 Uri attack|Uri attack]] to justice. | India–US counterterrorism cooperation since the 2000s has been marked by growing convergence on the threat posed by Pakistan-based terrorist groups. While both countries have historically maintained separate bilateral relationships with Pakistan, the 2008 Mumbai attacks catalyzed a shift, with the US increasingly acknowledging India's concerns about cross-border terrorism originating from Pakistani soil. Joint statements from high-level dialogues, such as the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue, have explicitly called on Pakistan to take concrete action against terrorist groups operating from its territory and to bring perpetrators of attacks like the Mumbai attacks, [[2016 Pathankot attack|Pathankot attack]], and [[2016 Uri attack|Uri attack]] to justice.<ref name=":4" /> The US has supported India in international forums, including the [[United Nations Security Council]] and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), to pressure Pakistan to curb terror financing and dismantle militant infrastructure.<ref name=":4" /><ref name=":6">{{Cite web |last=Ranjan |first=Mukesh |date=May 11, 2025 |title=India to send team to UNSC with fresh proof of Pakistan terror links |url=https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2025/May/11/india-to-send-team-to-unsc-with-fresh-proof-of-pakistan-terror-links |access-date=May 29, 2025 |website=The New Indian Express |language=en}}</ref> | ||
Despite this alignment, direct joint US–India action against Pakistan has been limited to diplomatic, economic, and multilateral measures rather than coordinated military operations. The US has imposed aid suspensions and advocated for Pakistan's inclusion on the FATF 'grey list' for its failure to act against groups targeting India. | Despite this alignment, direct joint US–India action against Pakistan has been limited to diplomatic, economic, and multilateral measures rather than coordinated military operations. The US has imposed aid suspensions and advocated for Pakistan's inclusion on the FATF 'grey list' for its failure to act against groups targeting India.<ref name=":8">{{Cite web |title=The Grey List: more trouble for Pakistan's economy {{!}} Lowy Institute |url=https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/grey-list-more-trouble-pakistan-s-economy |access-date=May 29, 2025 |website=www.lowyinstitute.org |language=en}}</ref><ref name=":4" /> India, for its part, has conducted targeted cross-border strikes against terrorist camps in Pakistan and presented evidence of Pakistani complicity in terrorism at the UN, often with US backing.<ref name=":6" /><ref name=":8" /> However, operational cooperation—such as intelligence sharing on Pakistan-based threats—remains cautious, with the US sometimes hesitant to share sensitive information fully, reflecting broader geopolitical complexities.<ref name=":3" /><ref>{{Cite web |title=India-U.S. Counterterrorism Cooperation |url=https://www.brookings.edu/articles/india-u-s-counterterrorism-cooperation/ |access-date=May 29, 2025 |website=Brookings |language=en-US}}</ref> Overall, while both countries have not engaged in joint military action against Pakistan, their partnership has strengthened international efforts to hold Pakistan accountable for cross-border terrorism and has elevated the issue in global counterterrorism discourse.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/amid-india-pakistan-tensions-the-us-must-rebalance-its-security-priorities-in-south-asia/#:~:text=Yet%20even%20as%20the%20United,the%20root%20of%20the%20problems.|title=Amid India-Pakistan tensions, the US must rebalance its security priorities in South Asia |date=May 19, 2025 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.orfonline.org/english/research/u-s-india-cooperation-in-counterterrorism-redefining-convergence-amidst-challenges#:~:text=In%20Afghanistan%2C%20for%20example%2C%20India's,regional%20dynamics%20despite%20shared%20goals.|title=U.S.-India Cooperation in Counterterrorism: Redefining Convergence Amidst Challenges}}</ref> | ||
==== Extraditions ==== | ==== Extraditions ==== | ||
The most prominent successful terrorist extradition from the United States to India is that of [[Tahawwur Hussain Rana]]. In April 2025, Rana was extradited to India for his alleged role in the [[2008 Mumbai attacks|2008 Mumbai terror attacks]], which killed 166 people. This marked the first such extradition in a terrorism-related case between the two countries. The extradition followed years of legal proceedings and diplomatic efforts, with the [[Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] ultimately rejecting Rana's appeals and the [[United States Department of Justice|US Department of Justice]] actively assisting Indian authorities in the process. | The most prominent successful terrorist extradition from the United States to India is that of [[Tahawwur Hussain Rana]]. In April 2025, Rana was extradited to India for his alleged role in the [[2008 Mumbai attacks|2008 Mumbai terror attacks]], which killed 166 people. This marked the first such extradition in a terrorism-related case between the two countries. The extradition followed years of legal proceedings and diplomatic efforts, with the [[Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] ultimately rejecting Rana's appeals and the [[United States Department of Justice|US Department of Justice]] actively assisting Indian authorities in the process.<ref name=":7">{{Cite web |date=April 11, 2025 |title=U.S. extradites key suspected conspirator behind 2008 Mumbai terror attacks to India |url=https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/u-s-extradites-key-suspected-conspirator-behind-2008-mumbai-terror-attacks-to-india |access-date=May 29, 2025 |website=PBS News |language=en-us}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=April 10, 2025 |title=US extradites key suspect in Mumbai terror attacks that killed 166 people |url=https://apnews.com/article/india-mumbai-attacks-suspect-extradition-us-ba1f0aaa0ec4ef777654f5b284058b5b |access-date=May 29, 2025 |website=AP News |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=April 10, 2025 |title=Canadian wanted for 2008 Mumbai attacks arrives in India after US extradition |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/india/canadian-wanted-2008-mumbai-attacks-arrives-india-after-us-extradition-2025-04-10/ |access-date=May 29, 2025 |work=Reuters |language=en}}</ref> Rana was wanted in India for allegedly aiding [[Lashkar-e-Taiba]], a Pakistani militant group blamed for the attacks.<ref name=":7" /> At a joint press conference with the Indian Prime Minister [[Narendra Modi]] on February 14, president Donald Trump stated that the United States was returning "a very violent man" to India immediately to face justice there.<ref>{{Cite news |date=April 10, 2025 |title=26/11 Mumbai attacks mastermind Tahawwur Rana extradited, arrested: NIA |url=https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/tahawwur-hussain-rana-successfully-extradited-nia/articleshow/120164591.cms |access-date=May 29, 2025 |work=The Economic Times |issn=0013-0389}}</ref> | ||
==Nuclear cooperation== | ==Nuclear cooperation== | ||
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{{Main|Pokhran-II}} | {{Main|Pokhran-II}} | ||
In 1998, India tested nuclear weapons which resulted in several US, Japanese, and European sanctions on India. India's then-defence minister, [[George Fernandes]], said that India's [[India and weapons of mass destruction|program]] was necessary as it provided a deterrence to potential nuclear threats. Most of the sanctions imposed on India were removed by 2001. | In 1998, India tested nuclear weapons which resulted in several US, Japanese, and European sanctions on India. India's then-defence minister, [[George Fernandes]], said that India's [[India and weapons of mass destruction|program]] was necessary as it provided a deterrence to potential nuclear threats. Most of the sanctions imposed on India were removed by 2001.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.firstpost.com/explainers/us-sanctions-india-1998-trump-tariffs-2025-trade-war-history-13928613.html#:~:text=How%20India%20persevered,US%20President%20to%20waive%20sanctions.&text=The%20US%20Department%20of%20Defense,the%20foundation%20of%20strategic%20partnership.|title=Trump tariffs: What happened when US sanctioned India in 1998? Déjà vu for New Delhi? |work=Firstpost |date=August 28, 2025 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/ht-this-day-september-24-2001-us-lifts-sanctions-on-india-pakistan-101727083193429.html|title=HT This Day: September 24, 2001 — US lifts sanctions on India, Pakistan |date=September 23, 2024 }}</ref> India has categorically stated that it will never use weapons first but will retaliate if attacked.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://archive.pib.gov.in/release02/lyr2003/rjan2003/04012003/r040120033.html#:~:text=PIB%20Press%20Releases,of%20retaliating%20with%20nuclear%20weapons;|title=CABINET COMMITTEE ON SECURITY REVIEWS PROGRESS IN OPERATIONALIZING INDIA'S NUCLEAR DOCTRINE}}</ref> | ||
The economic sanctions imposed by the United States in response to India's nuclear tests in May 1998 appeared, at least initially, to seriously damage India–US relations. President [[Bill Clinton]] imposed wide-ranging sanctions pursuant to the [[Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty|1994 Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act]]. US sanctions on Indian entities involved in the nuclear industry and opposition to international financial institution loans for non-humanitarian assistance projects in India. The United States encouraged India to sign the [[Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty]] (CTBT) immediately and without condition. The United States also called for restraint in missile and nuclear testing and deployment by both India and Pakistan. | The economic sanctions imposed by the United States in response to India's nuclear tests in May 1998 appeared, at least initially, to seriously damage India–US relations. President [[Bill Clinton]] imposed wide-ranging sanctions pursuant to the [[Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty|1994 Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act]]. US sanctions on Indian entities involved in the nuclear industry and opposition to international financial institution loans for non-humanitarian assistance projects in India. The United States encouraged India to sign the [[Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty]] (CTBT) immediately and without condition. The United States also called for restraint in missile and nuclear testing and deployment by both India and Pakistan.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999-04/press-releases/india-pakistan-test-new-missiles-us-urges-restraint|title=India, Pakistan Test New Missiles; U.S. Urges Restraint}}</ref> The non-proliferation dialogue initiated after the 1998 nuclear tests has bridged many of the gaps in understanding between the countries.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://2009-2017.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/india/28590.htm|title=India (11/03)}}</ref> | ||
=== Easing of tension === | === Easing of tension === | ||
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In December 2006, the US Congress passed the historic India–United States Civilian Nuclear Agreement|Henry J. Hyde US–India Peaceful Atomic Cooperation Act, which allows direct civilian nuclear commerce with India for the first time in 30 years. US policy had been opposed to nuclear cooperation with India in prior years because India had developed nuclear weapons against international conventions, and had never signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The legislation clears the way for India to buy US nuclear reactors and fuel for civilian use. | In December 2006, the US Congress passed the historic India–United States Civilian Nuclear Agreement|Henry J. Hyde US–India Peaceful Atomic Cooperation Act, which allows direct civilian nuclear commerce with India for the first time in 30 years. US policy had been opposed to nuclear cooperation with India in prior years because India had developed nuclear weapons against international conventions, and had never signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The legislation clears the way for India to buy US nuclear reactors and fuel for civilian use. | ||
The [[India–United States Civil Nuclear Agreement]]—also referred to as the "123 Agreement"—signed on October 10, 2008, is a bilateral agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation which governs civil nuclear trade between American and Indian firms participating in each other's civil nuclear energy sector. | The [[India–United States Civil Nuclear Agreement]]—also referred to as the "123 Agreement"—signed on October 10, 2008, is a bilateral agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation which governs civil nuclear trade between American and Indian firms participating in each other's civil nuclear energy sector.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.dpcc.co.in/pdf/nuclearenergyprogramme.pdf |title=India's nuclear energy programme|website=www.dpcc.co.in |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120504112517/http://www.dpcc.co.in/pdf/nuclearenergyprogramme.pdf |archive-date=May 4, 2012}}</ref><ref>Schaffer, ''India and the United States'' (2010) pp 89-117</ref><ref name=":0" /> For the agreement to be operational, nuclear vendors and operators must comply with India's 2010 [[Nuclear Liability Act]] which stipulates that nuclear suppliers, contractors and operators must bear financial responsibility in case of an accident. | ||
On March 27, 2019, India and the US signed an agreement to "strengthen bilateral security and civil nuclear cooperation" including the construction of six American nuclear reactors in India. | On March 27, 2019, India and the US signed an agreement to "strengthen bilateral security and civil nuclear cooperation" including the construction of six American nuclear reactors in India.<ref>{{cite web |date=March 13, 2019 |title=U.S. and India commit to building six nuclear power plants|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-india-nuclearnuclearpower/u-s-and-india-commit-to-building-six-nuclear-power-plants-idUSKCN1QU2UJ |access-date=March 28, 2019 |website=Reuters|language=en}}</ref> | ||
===Post– 9/11=== | ===Post– 9/11=== | ||
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India's contribution to the [[war on terror]] has helped India's diplomatic relations with several countries. Over the past few years, India has held numerous joint military exercises with United States and European nations that have resulted in a strengthened US–India and EU–India bilateral relationship. | India's contribution to the [[war on terror]] has helped India's diplomatic relations with several countries. Over the past few years, India has held numerous joint military exercises with United States and European nations that have resulted in a strengthened US–India and EU–India bilateral relationship. | ||
However, India has not signed the [[Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty|CTBT]], or the [[Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty]], claiming the discriminatory nature of the treaty that allows the five declared nuclear countries of the world to keep their nuclear arsenals and develop them using computer simulation testing. Prior to its nuclear testing, India had pressed for a comprehensive destruction of nuclear weapons by all countries of the world in a time-bound frame. This was not favoured by the United States and by certain other countries. Presently, India has declared its policy of "no-first use of nuclear weapons" and the maintenance of a "credible nuclear deterrence". The US, under President [[George W. Bush]], lifted most of its sanctions on India and resumed military co-operation. Relations with the US have considerably improved in recent years, with the two countries taking part in joint naval exercises off the coast of India and joint air exercises both in India as well as in the United States. | However, India has not signed the [[Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty|CTBT]], or the [[Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty]], claiming the discriminatory nature of the treaty that allows the five declared nuclear countries of the world to keep their nuclear arsenals and develop them using computer simulation testing. Prior to its nuclear testing, India had pressed for a comprehensive destruction of nuclear weapons by all countries of the world in a time-bound frame. This was not favoured by the United States and by certain other countries. Presently, India has declared its policy of "no-first use of nuclear weapons" and the maintenance of a "credible nuclear deterrence". The US, under President [[George W. Bush]], lifted most of its sanctions on India and resumed military co-operation. Relations with the US have considerably improved in recent years, with the two countries taking part in joint naval exercises off the coast of India and joint air exercises both in India as well as in the United States.<ref>[http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/nation/20060920-0101-hawaii-indianarmy.html Indian Troops training with U.S. Army in Hawaii],''signonsandiego.com''</ref><ref>[https://www.pacaf.af.mil/News/story/storyID/123027770/ Air Force personnel fly with Indian Air Force], ''pacaf.af.mil''</ref><ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20061123152637/http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=26464 Indian Soldiers with U.S. Marines, Sailors], ''navy.mil''</ref> | ||
India has pushed for reforms in the [[United Nations]] and in the [[World Trade Organization]] with mixed results. India's candidature for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council is currently backed by several countries including Russia, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Brazil, African Union nations and the US. In 2005, the US signed a nuclear co-operation agreement with India even though the latter is not a part of the [[Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty]]. The United States agreed that India's strong nuclear non-proliferation record made it an exception and persuaded other [[Nuclear Suppliers Group]] members to sign similar deals with India. | India has pushed for reforms in the [[United Nations]] and in the [[World Trade Organization]] with mixed results. India's candidature for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council is currently backed by several countries including Russia, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Brazil, African Union nations and the US. In 2005, the US signed a nuclear co-operation agreement with India even though the latter is not a part of the [[Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty]]. The United States agreed that India's strong nuclear non-proliferation record made it an exception and persuaded other [[Nuclear Suppliers Group]] members to sign similar deals with India. | ||
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{{Further|US India CEO Forum}} | {{Further|US India CEO Forum}} | ||
The United States is one of India's largest direct investors. From 1991 to 2004, the stock of FDI inflow increased from US$11 million to $344.4 million, and totaling $4.13 billion. This is a compound rate increase of 57.5 percent annually. Indian direct investments abroad began in 1992, and Indian corporations and registered partnership firms now can and do invest in businesses up to 100 percent of their net worth. India's largest outgoing investments are in the manufacturing sector, which accounts for 54.8 percent of the country's foreign investments. The second largest are in non-financial services (software development), accounting for 35.4 percent of investments. According to the data of the commerce ministry, in 2021–22, bilateral trade in goods between the two countries crossed $119.42 billion. Exports to the US increased to $76.11 billion in 2021-22 from $51.62 billion in previous fiscal year, while imports rose to $43.31 billion as compared to about $29 billion in 2020–21. | The United States is one of India's largest direct investors. From 1991 to 2004, the stock of FDI inflow increased from US$11 million to $344.4 million, and totaling $4.13 billion. This is a compound rate increase of 57.5 percent annually. Indian direct investments abroad began in 1992, and Indian corporations and registered partnership firms now can and do invest in businesses up to 100 percent of their net worth. India's largest outgoing investments are in the manufacturing sector, which accounts for 54.8 percent of the country's foreign investments. The second largest are in non-financial services (software development), accounting for 35.4 percent of investments. According to the data of the commerce ministry, in 2021–22, bilateral trade in goods between the two countries crossed $119.42 billion. Exports to the US increased to $76.11 billion in 2021-22 from $51.62 billion in previous fiscal year, while imports rose to $43.31 billion as compared to about $29 billion in 2020–21.<ref name="NDTV">{{cite web |title=US Becomes India's Biggest Trading Partner, Surpasses China |date=May 29, 2022 |url=https://www.ndtv.com/business/us-becomes-india-biggest-trading-partner-surpasses-china-3018969 |access-date=May 29, 2022 |publisher=[[NDTV]]}}</ref> Tensions arose in 2025 as US President Donald Trump imposed tariffs on Indian goods, particularly pharmaceuticals, prompting negotiations to mitigate economic impacts.<ref name=":1">{{Cite web |date=March 12, 2025 |title=Trump: Tariffs on Indian drugs will be a bitter pill for Americans |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckg8ke45gq0o |access-date=March 19, 2025 |website=www.bbc.com |language=en-GB}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last1=M |first1=Vivek Kumar |last2=Rajeswaran |first2=Bharath |title=Indian shares log weekly losses as IT stocks drop on US growth worries |website=[[Reuters]] |date=March 13, 2025 |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/india/indias-benchmark-indexes-may-open-higher-soft-us-domestic-data-2025-03-13/}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last1=Kumar |first1=Manoj |last2=Kumar |first2=Manoj |title=India and US making progress towards trade deal, officials say |website=[[Reuters]] |date=March 29, 2025 |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/india-us-making-progress-towards-trade-deal-officials-say-2025-03-29/}}</ref> Nearly half of all generic drugs in the US came from India, with Indian generics saving $219 billion in healthcare costs in 2022 alone.<ref name=":1" /> In late July 2025, Trump threatened to raise tariffs on Indian imports to 25% if the allies failed to complete a long-term trade deal.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.cnn.com/2025/07/29/business/india-tariffs-trump|title=Trump threatens India with tariffs as high as 25% |first=David|last=Goldman|date=July 29, 2025|website=CNN}}</ref> | ||
As of 2025, according to the Global Trade Research Initiative, the US earns between $80–85 billion annually from India through sectors like higher education, digital services, financial consulting, intellectual property, and defense sales. These earnings create a net surplus of $35–40 billion for the US. | As of 2025, according to the Global Trade Research Initiative, the US earns between $80–85 billion annually from India through sectors like higher education, digital services, financial consulting, intellectual property, and defense sales. These earnings create a net surplus of $35–40 billion for the US.<ref>{{Cite web |date=May 26, 2025 |title=$40 billion yearly: US profits from India far exceed what trade data reveals, yet pushes tariff cuts over a 'deficit' - BusinessToday |url=https://www.businesstoday.in/india/story/40-billion-yearly-us-profits-from-india-far-exceed-what-trade-data-reveals-yet-pushes-tariff-cuts-over-a-deficit-477827-2025-05-26 |access-date=September 9, 2025 |website=Business Today |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=May 26, 2025 |title=US enjoys $35-40 bn surplus with India if services, arms, royalties included: GTRI |url=https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/us-enjoys-35-40-bn-surplus-with-india-if-services-arms-royalties-included-gtri/articleshow/121413435.cms? |access-date=September 9, 2025 |work=The Economic Times |issn=0013-0389}}</ref> | ||
A major 500 billion dollar trade deal is expected to be signed between the two countries to expand their trade relations and give India better access to American consumer market. The deal is expected to be signed in the QUAD summit 2025 in India with US President Donald Trump present there.{{Citation needed|date=August 2025}} | A major 500 billion dollar trade deal is expected to be signed between the two countries to expand their trade relations and give India better access to American consumer market. The deal is expected to be signed in the QUAD summit 2025 in India with US President Donald Trump present there.{{Citation needed|date=August 2025}} | ||
After a long time period of tariff tensions between the two countries, on 2 February 2026, it was reported that India and the US have signed a significant trade agreement. According to the deal the US tariffs on goods from India will be about 18%. In return India agreed to reduce to zero, trade barriers on products from the US, while expanding purchases from the US energy, technology, agriculture and defense sectors. The agreement was achieved after a key political element was settled, India will stop buying Russian oil. | After a long time period of tariff tensions between the two countries, on 2 February 2026, it was reported that India and the US have signed a significant trade agreement. According to the deal the US tariffs on goods from India will be about 18%. In return India agreed to reduce to zero, trade barriers on products from the US, while expanding purchases from the US energy, technology, agriculture and defense sectors. The agreement was achieved after a key political element was settled, India will stop buying Russian oil.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2026 |title=US to cut tariffs on India to 18%, India agrees to end Russian oil purchases |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/india/trump-says-agreed-trade-deal-with-india-2026-02-02/?}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=2026 |title=India to ramp up purchases of US oil, arms, aircraft; open some farm access |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/india/indias-commitment-buy-us-goods-under-deal-includes-petroleum-defence-aircraft-2026-02-03/?}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2026-02-02 |title=US agrees to drop tariffs after India stops Russian oil purchases |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5yve1x9zv0o |access-date=2026-02-03 |website=www.bbc.com |language=en-GB}}</ref> | ||
=== Trade relations === | === Trade relations === | ||
[[File:Bush Manmohan Singh CEO Meeting.jpg|thumb|US President [[George W. Bush]] and Indian Prime Minister [[Manmohan Singh]] during a meeting with Indian and American business leaders in [[New Delhi]] in March 2006]] | [[File:Bush Manmohan Singh CEO Meeting.jpg|thumb|US President [[George W. Bush]] and Indian Prime Minister [[Manmohan Singh]] during a meeting with Indian and American business leaders in [[New Delhi]] in March 2006]] | ||
[[File:India March 2015 - 35A9754 (16295964164).jpg|thumb|US [[Food and Drug Administration]] and Indian [[List of Union Government agencies of India#Statutory Bodies|Export Inspection Council]] officials review a [[memorandum of understanding]] on food safety in 2015]] | [[File:India March 2015 - 35A9754 (16295964164).jpg|thumb|US [[Food and Drug Administration]] and Indian [[List of Union Government agencies of India#Statutory Bodies|Export Inspection Council]] officials review a [[memorandum of understanding]] on food safety in 2015]] | ||
The United States is India's [[List of the largest trading partners of India|largest trading partner]] since 2021, | The United States is India's [[List of the largest trading partners of India|largest trading partner]] since 2021,<ref name="NDTV" /> and India is its [[List of the largest trading partners of the United States|7th largest trading partner]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.worldsrichestcountries.com/top_indian_importers_trade_partners.html |title=Top India Import Partners |publisher=Worldsrichestcountries.com |access-date=December 30, 2015}}</ref> In 2017, the US exported $25.7 billion worth of goods to India, and imported $48.6 billion worth of Indian goods.<ref>{{Cite web | url=https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top1712yr.html |title = Foreign Trade: Data}}</ref> Major imports from India include [[information technology]] services, [[textiles]], [[machinery]], [[Gemstone|gems]] and [[diamonds]], [[chemicals]], [[iron]] and [[steel]] products, [[coffee]], [[tea]], and other edible food products. Major American items imported by India include [[aircraft]], [[fertilisers]], [[computer hardware]], [[scrap metal]], and medical equipment.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.indianembassy.org/indusrel/trade.htm |title=India – U.S. Trade and Economic Relations<!-- Bot generated title --> |access-date=May 20, 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080512152307/http://www.indianembassy.org/indusrel/trade.htm |archive-date=May 12, 2008 |url-status=dead}}</ref><ref name="DoS">{{cite web|url=https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3454.htm |title=India |publisher=U.S. Department of State |access-date=April 2, 2016}}</ref> | ||
The United States is also India's largest investment partner, with a direct investment of $10 billion (accounting for 9 percent of total foreign investment). Americans have made notable foreign investments in India's power generation, telecommunications, ports, roads, petroleum exploration and processing, and mining industries. | The United States is also India's largest investment partner, with a direct investment of $10 billion (accounting for 9 percent of total foreign investment). Americans have made notable foreign investments in India's power generation, telecommunications, ports, roads, petroleum exploration and processing, and mining industries.<ref name="DoS" /> American imports from India amounted to $46.6 billion or 2% of its overall imports, and 15.3% of India's overall exports in 2015. Major goods exported from India to the US include gemstones, precious metals and coins, pharmaceuticals, oil, machinery, textiles (including knit & crochet), [[organic chemicals]], vehicles, and iron or steel products.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.worldsrichestcountries.com/top-india-exports.html |title=Top India Exports |publisher=Worldsrichestcountries.com |access-date=April 7, 2016}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.worldsrichestcountries.com/top_us_imports.html |title=Top US Imports |publisher=Worldsrichestcountries.com |access-date=April 7, 2016}}</ref> American exports to India amounted to $20.5 billion or 5.2% of India's overall imports in 2015. Major commodities exported from the US to India include gemstones, precious metals and coins, machinery, electronic equipment, medical equipment, oil, aircraft/spacecraft, plastics, organic chemicals, fruits and nuts.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.worldsrichestcountries.com/top_us_exports.html |title=Top US Exports |publisher=Worldsrichestcountries.com |access-date=April 7, 2016}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.worldsrichestcountries.com/top-india-imports.html |title=Top India Imports |publisher=Worldsrichestcountries.com |access-date=April 7, 2016}}</ref> | ||
In July 2005, President Bush and Prime Minister [[Manmohan Singh]] created a new programme called the Trade Policy Forum. | In July 2005, President Bush and Prime Minister [[Manmohan Singh]] created a new programme called the Trade Policy Forum.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/us/rm/2005/52753.htm|title=The U.S. and India: An Emerging Entente?|website=2001-2009.state.gov|access-date=July 27, 2017}}</ref> It is run by a representative from each nation. The United States Trade Representative was [[Rob Portman]], and the Indian Commerce Secretary then-[[Ministry of Commerce and Industry (India)|Minister of Commerce]] [[Kamal Nath]]. The goal of the programme is to increase bilateral trade and investment flow. There are five main sub-divisions of the Trade Policy Forum, including The Agricultural Trade group, which has three main objectives: agreeing on terms that will allow India to export mangoes to the United States; permitting India's Agricultural and Process Food Products Export Development Authority (APEDA) to certify Indian products to the standards of the US [[U.S. Department of Agriculture|Department of Agriculture]]; and executing regulation procedures for approving [[edible wax]] on fruit.{{Citation needed|date=August 2025}} | ||
The goals of the Tariff and Non-Tariff Barriers group include agreeing that insecticides manufactured by US companies can be sold throughout India. India had also agreed to cut special regulations on trading [[carbonated drinks]], many [[Pharmaceutical drug|medicinal drugs]], and lowering regulations on many imports that are not of an agricultural nature. Both nations have agreed to discuss improved facets of Indian regulation in the trade of [[jewellery]], [[computer parts]], [[motorcycles]], [[fertiliser]], and those tariffs that affect American exporting of [[boric acid]]. The group has also discussed matters such as those wishing to break into the accounting market, [[Indian companies]] gaining licenses for the [[telecommunications]] industry, and setting policies regarding [[Indian media]] and [[broadcasting]] markets. Other foci include the exchange of valuable information on recognizing different professional services, discussing the movement and positioning of people in developing industries, continuation of talks on financial services markets, limitation of equities, insurance, retail, joint investment in agricultural processing and transportation industries, and small business initiatives.{{Citation needed|date=August 2025}} | The goals of the Tariff and Non-Tariff Barriers group include agreeing that insecticides manufactured by US companies can be sold throughout India. India had also agreed to cut special regulations on trading [[carbonated drinks]], many [[Pharmaceutical drug|medicinal drugs]], and lowering regulations on many imports that are not of an agricultural nature. Both nations have agreed to discuss improved facets of Indian regulation in the trade of [[jewellery]], [[computer parts]], [[motorcycles]], [[fertiliser]], and those tariffs that affect American exporting of [[boric acid]]. The group has also discussed matters such as those wishing to break into the accounting market, [[Indian companies]] gaining licenses for the [[telecommunications]] industry, and setting policies regarding [[Indian media]] and [[broadcasting]] markets. Other foci include the exchange of valuable information on recognizing different professional services, discussing the movement and positioning of people in developing industries, continuation of talks on financial services markets, limitation of equities, insurance, retail, joint investment in agricultural processing and transportation industries, and small business initiatives.{{Citation needed|date=August 2025}} | ||
On August 3, 2018, India became the third Asian nation to be granted Strategic Trade Authorization-1 (STA-1) status by the United States. STA-1 enables the export of high-technology products in civil space and defence from the US to India. | On August 3, 2018, India became the third Asian nation to be granted Strategic Trade Authorization-1 (STA-1) status by the United States. STA-1 enables the export of high-technology products in civil space and defence from the US to India.<ref>{{cite web |first=Lalit K. |last=Jha |title=India third Asian nation to get STA-1 status from US |url=https://www.livemint.com/Politics/GvUiFqQuVzLnBYuM5mwFuK/India-third-Asian-nation-to-get-STA1-status-from-US.htm |website=Livemint |access-date=December 5, 2018 |language=en |date=August 4, 2018}} {{dead link|date=November 2019 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=US: India fulfils all conditions, but out of Nuclear Suppliers Group due to China's veto - Times of India |url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/us-india-meets-all-qualifications-to-be-member-of-nsg/articleshow/65792316.cms |website=The Times of India |date=September 13, 2018 |access-date=December 5, 2018}}</ref> On February 15, 2023, Air India announced an order of 470 jets, out of which 220 jets would be bought from Boeing and the other 250 from Airbus. This is one of the biggest aircraft orders in the commercial jet industry. The deal was acknowledged by both the US President and India's Prime Minister's Office.<ref>{{Cite web |date=February 17, 2023 |title=The wide body aircraft ordered by Air India |url=https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-sci-tech/wide-body-aircraft-air-india-8451544/ |access-date=February 21, 2023 |website=The Indian Express |language=en}}</ref> During Modi's visit in 2023, resolution of six of seven outstanding WTO disputes between the US and India was reached through mutually agreed solutions and market access.<ref name="ML" /> | ||
On July 30, 2025, US President Donald Trump announced that Indian products would be subject to 25% tariffs upon arrival in the United States starting August 1, and that a "penalty" would be added for the [[India and the Russian invasion of Ukraine|purchase of Russian oil]]. | On July 30, 2025, US President Donald Trump announced that Indian products would be subject to 25% tariffs upon arrival in the United States starting August 1, and that a "penalty" would be added for the [[India and the Russian invasion of Ukraine|purchase of Russian oil]].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Radio-Canada |title=L'Inde devient la nouvelle cible des droits de douane de Donald Trump |url=https://ici.radio-canada.ca/nouvelle/2182554/inde-etats-unis-tarifs-armement-russie |access-date=July 30, 2025 |website=www.ici.radio-canada.ca |date=July 30, 2025 |language=EN-US}}</ref> On August 6, 2025, President Trump raised the tariff to 50%, a 25% increase, over India's purchase of Russian oil.<ref>{{Cite web |date=August 6, 2025 |title=Trump threatens 50% tariffs on India for buying Russian oil |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1dxr1g4y7yo |access-date=August 6, 2025 |website=www.bbc.com |language=en-GB}}</ref> The new rate will take effect on August 27, 2025.<ref>{{Cite news |date=August 6, 2025 |title=Trump to Double India's Tariff to 50% Over Russian Oil Purchases |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/06/us/politics/trump-india-tariffs-russia-oil.html |access-date=August 6, 2025 |language=en}}</ref> | ||
On October 22, 2025, the United States imposed sanctions on Russian oil companies [[Rosneft]] and [[Lukoil]], | On October 22, 2025, the United States imposed sanctions on Russian oil companies [[Rosneft]] and [[Lukoil]],<ref>{{cite news |last1=Shan |first1=Lee Ying |title=China and India to face supply jolt as U.S. targets Russia's oil giants |url=https://www.cnbc.com/2025/10/23/china-india-us-russia-oil-sanctions-rosneft-lukoil.html |work=CNBC |date=October 23, 2025}}</ref> affecting their customers in India.<ref>{{cite news |title=India poised to sharply cut Russian oil imports after sanctions, sources say |url=https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/indian-refiners-review-russian-oil-contracts-after-us-sanctions-source-says-2025-10-23/ |work=Reuters |date=October 23, 2025}}</ref> | ||
{| class="wikitable" | {| class="wikitable" | ||
|+US-India goods trade in billions of US dollars (1990−2025) | |+US-India goods trade in billions of US dollars (1990−2025)<ref>{{Cite web |last=US Census Bureau |title=Trade in Goods with India |url=https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5330.html |access-date=July 13, 2024 |website=www.census.gov |language=EN-US}}</ref> | ||
! | ! | ||
!1990 | !1990 | ||
| Line 392: | Line 392: | ||
==== Fentanyl ==== | ==== Fentanyl ==== | ||
India has increasingly been implicated in the [[Fentanyl|illicit fentanyl trade]], with a 2025 US intelligence report highlighting its role as a significant supplier of precursor chemicals, second only to [[China]]. The report, published in March 2025, notes that Indian pharmaceutical companies have been linked to exports of fentanyl precursors to [[Mexico]] and [[Guatemala]], fueling the opioid crisis in the US This follows India's inclusion in the 2024 [[US Department of Justice]] indictments, targeting executives from pharmaceutical firms involved in the trade. | India has increasingly been implicated in the [[Fentanyl|illicit fentanyl trade]], with a 2025 US intelligence report highlighting its role as a significant supplier of precursor chemicals, second only to [[China]]. The report, published in March 2025, notes that Indian pharmaceutical companies have been linked to exports of fentanyl precursors to [[Mexico]] and [[Guatemala]], fueling the opioid crisis in the US This follows India's inclusion in the 2024 [[US Department of Justice]] indictments, targeting executives from pharmaceutical firms involved in the trade.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Mogul |first=Rhea |date=March 28, 2025 |title=India among top suppliers of illicit fentanyl precursors, US intelligence report says |url=https://edition.cnn.com/2025/03/28/india/india-us-fentanyl-report-intl-hnk/index.html |access-date=April 1, 2025 |website=CNN |language=en}}</ref> | ||
=== Science and technology === | === Science and technology === | ||
On January 31, 2023, the US–India Civil Space Joint Working Group met for the eighth time. The group is a collaboration of space agencies [[Indian Space Research Organisation|ISRO]] and [[NASA]]. The working group planned to launch The NASA-ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar mission in 2024 which is expected to map Earth using two different radar frequencies to monitor resources like water, forests, and agriculture. | On January 31, 2023, the US–India Civil Space Joint Working Group met for the eighth time. The group is a collaboration of space agencies [[Indian Space Research Organisation|ISRO]] and [[NASA]]. The working group planned to launch The NASA-ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar mission in 2024 which is expected to map Earth using two different radar frequencies to monitor resources like water, forests, and agriculture.<ref>{{Cite web |website=United States Department of State |title=U.S.-India Civil Space Joint Working Group Advances Bilateral Space Collaboration |url=https://www.state.gov/u-s-india-civil-space-joint-working-group-advances-bilateral-space-collaboration/ }}</ref> | ||
In January 2023, the national security advisors of India and the US announced the launch of the US–India Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET). Under iCET, both sides will work together in the fields of artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, advanced wireless technology, space and semiconductor supply chain resilience. | In January 2023, the national security advisors of India and the US announced the launch of the US–India Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET). Under iCET, both sides will work together in the fields of artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, advanced wireless technology, space and semiconductor supply chain resilience.<ref>{{Cite web |author-link=Husain Haqqani and Aparna Pande |date=March 14, 2023 |title=The US raises its bet on India |url=https://thehill.com/opinion/international/3899812-the-us-raises-its-bet-on-india/ |access-date=March 17, 2023 |website=The Hill |language=en-US}}</ref> India signed the [[Artemis Accords]] in 2023, joining 26 other countries working on exploration of the moon, Mars, and beyond; additionally, NASA will provide advanced training to ISRO astronauts with the goal of launching a joint effort to the International Space Station in 2024.<ref name="ML" /> | ||
=== Role of Indian diaspora === | === Role of Indian diaspora === | ||
{{See also|Indian Americans}} | {{See also|Indian Americans}} | ||
The Indian diaspora significantly bolsters India–US economic relations through key contributions in technology, entrepreneurship, and academia. Their presence in Silicon Valley and leadership roles in various sectors fosters innovation and collaboration, while their entrepreneurial ventures strengthen economic ties. Additionally, the diaspora serves as a vital link for investments between the two countries, and their involvement in education and research contributes to advancements in science and technology. Beyond economics, the diaspora's cultural initiatives promote understanding and dialogue, further enhancing the overall relationship between India and the US. | The Indian diaspora significantly bolsters India–US economic relations through key contributions in technology, entrepreneurship, and academia. Their presence in Silicon Valley and leadership roles in various sectors fosters innovation and collaboration, while their entrepreneurial ventures strengthen economic ties. Additionally, the diaspora serves as a vital link for investments between the two countries, and their involvement in education and research contributes to advancements in science and technology. Beyond economics, the diaspora's cultural initiatives promote understanding and dialogue, further enhancing the overall relationship between India and the US.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Varma |first=N. Shradha |title=Indian Diaspora: Analysis of Its Advantage to the Home Country and to the World |url=https://digitalcommons.du.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1168&context=irbe |format=pdf |access-date=November 11, 2023 |journal=International Review of Business and Economics |volume=4 |issue=2 |pages=433–439 |doi=10.56902/IRBE.2020.4.2.2 |date=2020|doi-access=free}}</ref> | ||
== India-US strategic partnership == | == India-US strategic partnership == | ||
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=== During the Cold War (1960–1990) === | === During the Cold War (1960–1990) === | ||
India–US strategic relations grew in the early 1960s, as the rise of the [[People's Republic of China]] worried policymakers in Washington, D.C. The Chinese government's assertion in [[Tibet]], its role in the [[Korean War]], and other such acts concerned Washington. As relations between India and China were heated during the late '50s, the Americans found a golden opportunity to take advantage of this situation to promote India as a counterweight to China. | India–US strategic relations grew in the early 1960s, as the rise of the [[People's Republic of China]] worried policymakers in Washington, D.C. The Chinese government's assertion in [[Tibet]], its role in the [[Korean War]], and other such acts concerned Washington. As relations between India and China were heated during the late '50s, the Americans found a golden opportunity to take advantage of this situation to promote India as a counterweight to China.<ref name="AT">{{cite web|url=http://www.assamtribune.com/scripts/details.asp?id=feb1507%5Cedit1|archive-url=https://archive.today/20070616041613/http://www.assamtribune.com/scripts/details.asp?id=feb1507%5Cedit1|url-status=dead|title=The Assam Tribune Online |date=June 16, 2007 |archive-date=June 16, 2007 |website=archive.is}}</ref> | ||
=== Post–Cold War era (1990–2014) === | === Post–Cold War era (1990–2014) === | ||
After the [[end of the Cold War]], Indian and American interests converged in a number of areas, including [[counter-terrorism]], promotion of democracy, counter-proliferation, freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean, and the [[balance of power (international relations)|balance of power]] in Asia. | After the [[end of the Cold War]], Indian and American interests converged in a number of areas, including [[counter-terrorism]], promotion of democracy, counter-proliferation, freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean, and the [[balance of power (international relations)|balance of power]] in Asia.<ref name="AT" /> India emerged in the 21st century as increasingly vital to core US foreign policy interests. India, a dominant actor in its region and the home of more than one billion citizens, is now often characterised as a nascent [[great power]] and an "indispensable partner" of the US, one that many analysts view as a potential counterweight to the growing clout of [[China]].<ref>{{cite journal |author1=Brendon J. Cannon & Ash Rossiter |title=The "Indo-Pacific" – Regional Dynamics in the 21st Century's New Geopolitical Center of Gravity |date=2018 |volume=3 |issue=2 |url=https://rpquarterly.kureselcalismalar.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Rising-Powers-Quarterly-Volume-3-Issue-2.pdf |website=risingpowersproject.com |issn=2547-9423}}</ref> | ||
In a meeting between President [[George W. Bush]] and Prime Minister [[Atal Bihari Vajpayee]] in November 2001, the two leaders expressed a strong interest in transforming the US–India bilateral relationship. High-level meetings and concrete cooperation between the two countries increased during 2002 and 2003. In January 2004, the US and India launched the "Next Steps in Strategic Partnership" (NSSP), which was both a milestone in the transformation of the bilateral relationship and a blueprint for its further progress. | In a meeting between President [[George W. Bush]] and Prime Minister [[Atal Bihari Vajpayee]] in November 2001, the two leaders expressed a strong interest in transforming the US–India bilateral relationship. High-level meetings and concrete cooperation between the two countries increased during 2002 and 2003. In January 2004, the US and India launched the "Next Steps in Strategic Partnership" (NSSP), which was both a milestone in the transformation of the bilateral relationship and a blueprint for its further progress.<ref>{{Cite web |date=January 12, 2004 |title=Statement by the President:Next Steps in Strategic Partnership with India |url=https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/pr/28109.htm |website=U.S. State Department}}</ref> In July 2005, Bush hosted Prime Minister [[Manmohan Singh]] in [[Washington, D.C.]] The two leaders announced the successful completion of the NSSP, as well as other agreements which further enhanced cooperation in the areas of civil nuclear, civil space, and high-technology commerce. Other initiatives announced included a US–India economic dialogue; the fight against [[HIV|HIV/AIDS]]; disaster relief; technology cooperation; an agriculture knowledge initiative; a trade policy forum; energy dialogue; CEO Forum; and an initiative to assist each other in furthering democracy and freedom.<ref>{{cite web |date=July 18, 2005 |title=Joint Statement Between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh |url=https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050718-6.html |access-date=December 17, 2013 |work=[[whitehouse.gov]] |via=[[NARA|National Archives]]}}</ref> President Bush made a reciprocal visit to India in March 2006, during which the progress of these initiatives were reviewed, and new initiatives were launched.<ref>{{Cite news |date=December 23, 2005 |title=India calling! George Bush to come visiting in 2006 |work=The Times of India |url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-calling-george-bush-to-come-visiting-in-2006/articleshow/1343293.cms?from=mdr |access-date=June 25, 2023 |issn=0971-8257}}</ref> | ||
As the world's oldest and largest democracies, respectively, the US and India share historic ties. | As the world's oldest and largest democracies, respectively, the US and India share historic ties.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://blogs.state.gov/stories/2013/06/22/us-and-india-world-s-oldest-and-largest-democracies-share-historical-ties|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20160401031015/https://blogs.state.gov/stories/2013/06/22/us-and-india-world-s-oldest-and-largest-democracies-share-historical-ties|url-status=dead|title=Technical Difficulties|archivedate=April 1, 2016}}</ref> India is a founding member of the "Community of Democracies"—a prominent endeavor of the United States for promotion of democracy. However, India rejected a suggestion by the US about setting up a Centre for Asian Democracy.<ref>{{cite web |author=TI Trade |url=http://www.assamtribune.com/scripts/details.asp?id=apr2307\edit3 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20070616041613/http://www.assamtribune.com/scripts/details.asp?id=apr2307%5Cedit3 |url-status=dead |archive-date=June 16, 2007 |title=The Assam Tribune Online |publisher=Assamtribune.com |access-date=November 21, 2009}}</ref> | ||
Indian Prime Minister [[Manmohan Singh]] was the guest of honour at the first state dinner of the [[Obama administration|administration]] of US President [[Barack Obama]], which took place on November 24, 2009. Obama later [[2010 Barack Obama visit to India|visited India]] from November 6–9, 2010, signing numerous trade and defence agreements with India. He addressed the joint session of the [[Parliament of India|Indian parliament]] in New Delhi—becoming only the second US president to do so—and announced that the United States would lend its support to [[Reform of the United Nations Security Council|India's bid]] for a permanent seat in the [[United Nations Security Council]], signifying the growing strategic dimension of the relationship between the world's two largest democracies. | Indian Prime Minister [[Manmohan Singh]] was the guest of honour at the first state dinner of the [[Obama administration|administration]] of US President [[Barack Obama]], which took place on November 24, 2009. Obama later [[2010 Barack Obama visit to India|visited India]] from November 6–9, 2010, signing numerous trade and defence agreements with India. He addressed the joint session of the [[Parliament of India|Indian parliament]] in New Delhi—becoming only the second US president to do so—and announced that the United States would lend its support to [[Reform of the United Nations Security Council|India's bid]] for a permanent seat in the [[United Nations Security Council]], signifying the growing strategic dimension of the relationship between the world's two largest democracies.<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/11/08/obama.india.address/index.html |work=CNN |title=Obama backs permanent seat for India on Security Council |date=November 8, 2010}}</ref> | ||
=== After the rise of the BJP (2014–present) === | === After the rise of the BJP (2014–present) === | ||
In 2016, India and the United States signed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement | In 2016, India and the United States signed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement<ref>{{cite web|url=https://thediplomat.com/2016/08/india-us-sign-logistics-exchange-agreement-what-you-need-to-know/|title=India, US Sign Logistics Exchange Agreement|work=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]] |access-date=August 30, 2016}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/08/30/asia-pacific/key-step-toward-stronger-defense-ties-u-s-india-ink-military-logistics-agreement/|title=In key step toward stronger defense ties, U.S., India ink military logistics agreement|work=[[The Japan Times]] |access-date=August 30, 2016 |date=August 30, 2016}}</ref> and India was declared a Major Defense Partner of the United States.<ref name="India US Defence" /> During US President Trump's visit to India in 2020, both sides agree to establish "Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership".<ref>{{cite web |title=Joint Statement: Vision and Principles for the United States-India Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership |url=https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-vision-principles-united-states-india-comprehensive-global-strategic-partnership/ |publisher=Trump White House |access-date=February 25, 2020}}</ref> | ||
In both the [[2017 Doklam standoff]] and the [[2020–2021 China–India skirmishes]], the United States provided India with intelligence it possessed, and the two sides discussed the crisis on Ladakh border. The US was also involved in securing the release of Indian pilot [[Abhinandan Varthaman]] from Pakistani custody following the [[2019 Balakot airstrike]]. | In both the [[2017 Doklam standoff]] and the [[2020–2021 China–India skirmishes]], the United States provided India with intelligence it possessed, and the two sides discussed the crisis on Ladakh border. The US was also involved in securing the release of Indian pilot [[Abhinandan Varthaman]] from Pakistani custody following the [[2019 Balakot airstrike]].<ref>{{cite web |author1=Abhijnan Rej |title=How India Dealt with Donald Trump |url=https://manage.thediplomat.com/2020/11/how-india-dealt-with-donald-trump/ |publisher=DIPLOMAT MEDIA INC |date=2020}}</ref> According to former US secretary of state [[Mike Pompeo]], the US played a role in extinguishing tensions between India and Pakistan in 2019, when Pakistan and India were at the verge of nuclear war.<ref>{{Cite web |publisher=The Newspaper's Correspondent |date=January 25, 2023 |title=US 'prevented' South Asia nuclear war in 2019, claims Pompeo |url=https://www.dawn.com/news/1733471 |access-date=January 25, 2023 |website=DAWN.COM |language=en}}</ref> | ||
The strategic meetings between both countries is called the '2+2' dialogue. Representatives holding Foreign and Defense portfolios from each of the two countries participate in this meeting. The inaugural 2+2 dialogue between the two nations took place in September 2018 during the [[first Trump administration]]. The meeting involved the foreign minister [[Sushma Swaraj]] and then Defence Minister [[Nirmala Sitharaman]] representing India, while Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Secretary of Defence [[Jim Mattis|James Mattis]] represented the United States. Some agreements, including the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) (2018), were signed in these meetings. | The strategic meetings between both countries is called the '2+2' dialogue. Representatives holding Foreign and Defense portfolios from each of the two countries participate in this meeting. The inaugural 2+2 dialogue between the two nations took place in September 2018 during the [[first Trump administration]]. The meeting involved the foreign minister [[Sushma Swaraj]] and then Defence Minister [[Nirmala Sitharaman]] representing India, while Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Secretary of Defence [[Jim Mattis|James Mattis]] represented the United States. Some agreements, including the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) (2018), were signed in these meetings.<ref>{{Cite web |date=November 10, 2023 |title=India holds '2+2' Ministerial dialogue with the US: What it means |url=https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/everyday-explainers/ministers-india-us-two-plus-two-dialogue-explained-9021601/ |access-date=November 22, 2023 |website=The Indian Express |language=en}}</ref> | ||
[[File:Howdy, Modi! (48783742533).jpg|thumb|Prime Minister [[Narendra Modi]] and President [[Donald Trump]] attending the [[Howdy Modi]] event in [[Houston]], 2019]] | [[File:Howdy, Modi! (48783742533).jpg|thumb|Prime Minister [[Narendra Modi]] and President [[Donald Trump]] attending the [[Howdy Modi]] event in [[Houston]], 2019]] | ||
On October 27, 2020, US and India signed a military agreement on sharing sensitive satellite data. The Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement, or BECA, allows the US's strategic partners to access a range of sensitive geospatial and aeronautical data which is useful for military actions. | On October 27, 2020, US and India signed a military agreement on sharing sensitive satellite data. The Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement, or BECA, allows the US's strategic partners to access a range of sensitive geospatial and aeronautical data which is useful for military actions.<ref>{{Cite web|date=October 27, 2020|title=2+2 dialogue: India, US sign crucial agreement on geo-spatial intelligence|url=https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-us-22-dialogue-beca-pompeo-esper-rajnath-jaishankar-6897216/|access-date=October 27, 2020|website=The Indian Express|language=en}}</ref> In December 2020, US India Business Council president [[Nisha Desai Biswal]] claimed that the ties between the two nations will continue and grow stronger in 2021, as the [[Biden administration]] would prioritize their trade deals for a prospering economic relationship.<ref>{{Cite news |date=December 25, 2020 |title=2021 to provide important opportunities to broaden India-US partnership: Biswal|newspaper=The Economic Times|url=https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/2021-to-provide-important-opportunities-to-broaden-india-us-partnership-biswal/articleshow/79950979.cms?from=mdr}}</ref> In December 2022, based on BECA, the United States provided real-time location information of the [[People's Liberation Army Ground Force|PLA]] soldiers to help [[2022 Yangtse clash|India fight China]], during the confrontation in [[Arunachal Pradesh]].<ref>{{Cite web |date=March 21, 2023 |title=US shared intel with India to repel Chinese troops? White House says... |url=https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/us-shared-intel-with-india-to-repel-chinese-troops-white-house-says-101679378652669.html |access-date=March 22, 2023 |website=Hindustan Times |language=en}}</ref> | ||
=== Observer reactions === | === Observer reactions === | ||
US [[Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]] [[Mike Mullen]] encouraged stronger military ties between the two nations, and said that "India has emerged as an increasingly important strategic partner [of the US]". | US [[Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]] [[Mike Mullen]] encouraged stronger military ties between the two nations, and said that "India has emerged as an increasingly important strategic partner [of the US]".<ref>{{cite web |title=India has emerged as a strategic partner for U.S.: Mullen |url=http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/001200906101311.htm |access-date=March 25, 2018 |website=The Hindu |archive-date=November 4, 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121104101025/http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/001200906101311.htm |url-status=dead }}</ref> In 2010, US Undersecretary of State [[William J. Burns (diplomat)|William J. Burns]] also said, "Never has there been a moment when India and America mattered more to each other."<ref>{{cite web |title=India, U.S. Launch Strategic Talks – Global Security Newswire – NTI |url=http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20100602_6708.php |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101105092451/http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20100602_6708.php |archive-date=November 5, 2010 |access-date=September 27, 2014 |work=NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative}}</ref> | ||
In the wake of the [[2025 India–Pakistan conflict]], Indian [[Member of Parliament, Lok Sabha|Member of Parliament]] [[Shashi Tharoor]] expressed concern that US President Donald Trump made a false equivalence between India and Pakistan by equating the perpetrator with the victim in the aftermath of the [[2025 Pahalgam attack|terrorist incident]] in Kashmir. | In the wake of the [[2025 India–Pakistan conflict]], Indian [[Member of Parliament, Lok Sabha|Member of Parliament]] [[Shashi Tharoor]] expressed concern that US President Donald Trump made a false equivalence between India and Pakistan by equating the perpetrator with the victim in the aftermath of the [[2025 Pahalgam attack|terrorist incident]] in Kashmir.<ref>{{cite news |agency=PTI |title=Politician wanting to take credit: Tharoor slams Trump for declaring halting of Indo-Pak hostilities |url=https://www.deccanherald.com/india/politician-wanting-to-take-credit-tharoor-slams-trump-for-declaring-halting-of-indo-pak-hostilities-3537116 |work=Deccan Herald |date=May 13, 2025}}</ref> | ||
=== Post interim trade agreement === | === Post interim trade agreement === | ||
Following this economic agreement between the two countries, the strategic cooperation grew tighter. On 16, February 2026, it was reported that India seized three [[Iranian shadow fleet|Iranian oil tankers]], that were sanctioned by the US. | Following this economic agreement between the two countries, the strategic cooperation grew tighter. On 16, February 2026, it was reported that India seized three [[Iranian shadow fleet|Iranian oil tankers]], that were sanctioned by the US.<ref name=":14" /><ref name=":15" /> | ||
== Triangular relations == | == Triangular relations == | ||
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=== Africa === | === Africa === | ||
India and the United States have held two "India–US Dialogue on Africa" sessions as of 2024. | India and the United States have held two "India–US Dialogue on Africa" sessions as of 2024.<ref>{{Cite web |last=apofeed |date=May 14, 2024 |title=The Second India-United States Dialogue on Africa |url=https://african.business/2024/05/apo-newsfeed/the-second-india-united-states-dialogue-on-africa |access-date=February 26, 2025 |website=African Business |language=en-GB}}</ref> | ||
=== Asia === | === Asia === | ||
{{See also|Indo-Pacific|South Asian foreign policy of the Barack Obama administration}} | {{See also|Indo-Pacific|South Asian foreign policy of the Barack Obama administration}} | ||
In the 21st century, India–United States cooperation has aimed to [[China threat theory|contain China]] in Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific with the help of broader organizations, such as the [[Quadrilateral Security Dialogue|Quad]] which includes Japan and Australia. | In the 21st century, India–United States cooperation has aimed to [[China threat theory|contain China]] in Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific with the help of broader organizations, such as the [[Quadrilateral Security Dialogue|Quad]] which includes Japan and Australia.<ref>{{Cite web |title=The India-China-US Triangle |url=https://diplomatist.com/2021/02/12/the-india-china-us-triangle/ |access-date=February 24, 2025 |website=Diplomatist |language=en}}</ref><ref name=":0" /> In 2009, [[Robert O. Blake, Jr.|Robert Blake]], [[Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs]], dismissed any concerns over a rift with India regarding American [[AfPak]] policy in South Asia, calling India and the United States "natural allies".<ref name="blake12">{{cite web |title=We're sorry, that page can't be found. |url=https://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/remarks/125513.htm |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090705085818/http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/remarks/125513.htm |archive-date=July 5, 2009 |access-date=March 25, 2018 |website=state.gov}}</ref> However, American ties with Pakistan and Bangladesh have sometimes clashed with India's military and political preferences in its neighborhood.<ref>{{Cite news |date=August 15, 2024 |title=India pressed U.S. to go easy on Bangladeshi leader before her ouster, officials say |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/08/15/india-bangladesh-sheikh-hasina/ |newspaper=The Washington Post}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=October 2, 2024 |title=Demystifying the Bangladesh-India-US triangle |url=https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/geopolitical-insights/news/demystifying-the-bangladesh-india-us-triangle-3717226 |access-date=February 24, 2025 |website=The Daily Star |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last= |first= |date=August 1, 2019 |title=India unhappy with U.S. aid to Pakistan |url=https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-unhappy-with-us-aid-to-pakistan/article28787611.ece/ |access-date=March 9, 2025 |work=The Hindu |language=en-IN |issn=0971-751X}}</ref> | ||
India and United States have differences over the role of US's mediation in India's conflicts in its neighborhood that particularly involve Pakistan. For instance, in 2025, US President [[Donald Trump]] claimed multiple times how he stopped the [[2025 India–Pakistan conflict|2025 India-Pakistan conflict]] by leveraging trade | India and United States have differences over the role of US's mediation in India's conflicts in its neighborhood that particularly involve Pakistan. For instance, in 2025, US President [[Donald Trump]] claimed multiple times how he stopped the [[2025 India–Pakistan conflict|2025 India-Pakistan conflict]] by leveraging trade<ref>{{Cite AV media |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nZhrKt68Tzk |title=I Stopped India-Pakistan War: Trump Claims He 'Solved' India-Pakistan War Threat Through Trade |date=July 28, 2025 |last=India Today |access-date=July 29, 2025 |via=YouTube}}</ref>—despite US Vice President [[JD Vance]] who earlier stated that US would not intervene—<ref>{{Cite news |last=Roth |first=Andrew |date=May 8, 2025 |title=Vance says US won't intervene in India-Pakistan conflict: 'None of our business' |url=https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/may/08/jd-vance-india-pakistan |access-date=July 29, 2025 |work=The Guardian |language=en-GB |issn=0261-3077}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last1=Singh |first1=Kanishka |last2=Singh |first2=Kanishka |date=May 9, 2025 |title=US VP Vance says war between India and Pakistan will be 'none of our business' |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/us-vp-vance-says-war-between-india-pakistan-will-be-none-our-business-2025-05-09/ |access-date=July 29, 2025 |work=Reuters |language=en}}</ref> while India firmly rejected the claims and stated that the military operations that were part of [[Operation Sindoor]] only ceased when India's military objectives were achieved.<ref>{{Cite web |date=July 28, 2025 |title='Baseless': India rejects Trump's claim he ended Pakistan conflict |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/south-asia/article/3319894/defence-minister-slams-baseless-claim-india-bowed-pressure-end-pakistan-conflict |access-date=July 29, 2025 |website=South China Morning Post |language=en}}</ref> Both the Indian External Affairs Minister [[S. Jaishankar]] and the Indian Defence Minister [[Rajnath Singh]] rejected the claims on different occasions with the former attributing the cessation of hostilities to military actions by India.<ref>{{Cite news |date=July 28, 2025 |title=Defence minister denies India bowed to pressure to end fighting with Pakistan |url=https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/defence-minister-denies-india-bowed-pressure-end-fighting-with-pakistan-2025-07-28/ |access-date=July 29, 2025 |work=Reuters |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=May 29, 2025 |title='It was Indian military action': Jaishankar denies US role in ceasefire with Pakistan, says 'draw your conclusions' on China link |url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/it-was-indian-military-action-jaishankar-denies-us-role-in-ceasefire-with-pakistan-says-draw-you-conclusions-on-china-link/articleshow/121423798.cms |access-date=July 29, 2025 |work=The Times of India |issn=0971-8257}}</ref> | ||
In August 2025, Pakistan’s army chief Field Marshal [[Asim Munir]] reportedly stated during a dinner in Florida that if Pakistan faced an existential threat, “we’ll take half the world down with us.” India condemned the reported remarks as “nuclear sabre-rattling” and described them as irresponsible, with the Ministry of External Affairs also expressing regret that such statements were made on the soil of a friendly third country, referring to the United States. | In August 2025, Pakistan’s army chief Field Marshal [[Asim Munir]] reportedly stated during a dinner in Florida that if Pakistan faced an existential threat, “we’ll take half the world down with us.” India condemned the reported remarks as “nuclear sabre-rattling” and described them as irresponsible, with the Ministry of External Affairs also expressing regret that such statements were made on the soil of a friendly third country, referring to the United States.<ref>{{Cite news |date=August 11, 2025 |title=India decries 'sabre rattling' after Pakistan army chief's reported nuclear remarks |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/india-decries-sabre-rattling-after-pakistan-army-chiefs-reported-nuclear-remarks-2025-08-11/ |access-date=August 12, 2025 |work=Reuters |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title="Nuke Sabre-Rattling Is Pak's Stock-In-Trade": India On Asim Munir Comments |url=https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/pakistan-irresponsible-state-with-nukes-sources-on-asim-munir-comments-9061158 |access-date=August 12, 2025 |website=NDTV |language=en}}</ref> | ||
=== European and Western countries === | === European and Western countries === | ||
==== Canada ==== | ==== Canada ==== | ||
Both Canada and the United States allege that the Indian government ordered assassinations on [[Sikh separatists]] who were their citizens. Regarding the 2023 [[Canada–India diplomatic row]] on this matter, State Department spokesman [[Matthew Miller (spokesperson)|Matthew Miller]] said in October 2024 that "We wanted to see the government of India cooperate with Canada in its investigation. Obviously, they have not; they have chosen an alternate path." | Both Canada and the United States allege that the Indian government ordered assassinations on [[Sikh separatists]] who were their citizens. Regarding the 2023 [[Canada–India diplomatic row]] on this matter, State Department spokesman [[Matthew Miller (spokesperson)|Matthew Miller]] said in October 2024 that "We wanted to see the government of India cooperate with Canada in its investigation. Obviously, they have not; they have chosen an alternate path."<ref>{{Cite web |title=India should take Canada allegations 'seriously,' US says – DW – 10/16/2024 |url=https://www.dw.com/en/india-should-take-canada-allegations-seriously-us-says/a-70508045 |access-date=February 24, 2025 |website=dw.com |language=en}}</ref> | ||
==== United Kingdom ==== | ==== United Kingdom ==== | ||
{{See also|History of United Kingdom–United States relations#Pre-Independence India}} | {{See also|History of United Kingdom–United States relations#Pre-Independence India}} | ||
Serious tension erupted over American demands that [[British Raj|India]] be given independence, a proposition Churchill vehemently rejected. For years Roosevelt had encouraged Britain's disengagement from India. The American position was based on principled opposition to colonialism, practical concern for the outcome of the war, and the expectation of a large American role in a post-colonial era. In 1942 when the [[Indian National Congress|Congress Party]] launched a [[Quit India]] movement, the colonial authorities arrested tens of thousands of activists (including [[Mahatma Gandhi]]). Meanwhile, India became the main American staging base for aid to [[Republic of China (1912–1949)|China]]. Churchill threatened to resign if Roosevelt continued to push his demands, and Roosevelt backed down. | Serious tension erupted over American demands that [[British Raj|India]] be given independence, a proposition Churchill vehemently rejected. For years Roosevelt had encouraged Britain's disengagement from India. The American position was based on principled opposition to colonialism, practical concern for the outcome of the war, and the expectation of a large American role in a post-colonial era. In 1942 when the [[Indian National Congress|Congress Party]] launched a [[Quit India]] movement, the colonial authorities arrested tens of thousands of activists (including [[Mahatma Gandhi]]). Meanwhile, India became the main American staging base for aid to [[Republic of China (1912–1949)|China]]. Churchill threatened to resign if Roosevelt continued to push his demands, and Roosevelt backed down.<ref>Eric S. Rubin, "America, Britain, and Swaraj: Anglo-American Relations and Indian Independence, 1939–1945," ''India Review'' (Jan–March 2011) 10#1 pp 40–80</ref><ref>{{cite book |author=Arthur Herman |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=hdPmzLtU5G4C |title=Gandhi & Churchill: The Epic Rivalry That Destroyed an Empire and Forged Our Age |publisher=Random House Digital, Inc. |year=2008 |isbn=9780553804638 |pages=472–539}}</ref> Churchill was a believer in the integrity of the British Empire, but he was voted out of office in the summer of 1945. Attlee's new Labour government was much more favorable toward Indian aspirations. The process of [[Decolonization|de-colonization]] was highlighted by the independence Britain granted to India, Pakistan and Ceylon (now [[Sri Lanka]]) in 1947. The United States approved, but provided no financial or diplomatic support.<ref>Nicholas Owen, "Attlee governments: The end of empire 1945–51." ''Contemporary British History'' 3.4 (1990): 12-16.</ref><ref>R. J. Moore, "Decolonisation in India: Towards partition and independence in India." ''Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics'' 20.2 (1982): 189-199.</ref> | ||
==== Ukraine ==== | ==== Ukraine ==== | ||
During the [[Biden administration]] and the start of the [[Russian invasion of Ukraine]], there were initially significant tensions regarding India's ties with Russia. However, the [[second Trump administration]] is anticipated to seek a quick end to the conflict, likely reducing India's distance from the United States on European security issues. | During the [[Biden administration]] and the start of the [[Russian invasion of Ukraine]], there were initially significant tensions regarding India's ties with Russia. However, the [[second Trump administration]] is anticipated to seek a quick end to the conflict, likely reducing India's distance from the United States on European security issues.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Mohan |first=C. Raja |date=February 27, 2025 |title=India Sees Opportunities as Trump Jettisons the Western Order |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/02/18/modi-trump-india-us-china-russia-europe-ukraine/ |access-date=February 26, 2025 |website=Foreign Policy |language=en-US}}</ref>{{Update inline|date=August 2025}} | ||
=== Latin America and the Caribbean === | === Latin America and the Caribbean === | ||
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{{See also|Anglicisation|Indian Americans#Culture|Americans in India#Culture}} | {{See also|Anglicisation|Indian Americans#Culture|Americans in India#Culture}} | ||
Cultural relations between India and the United States are among the strongest pillars of the bilateral relationship and are largely driven by deep people-to-people ties, shared democratic norms, and sustained educational, artistic, and intellectual exchange. The Indian-American diaspora—numbering over 4.5 million people as of 2025—plays a central role in bridging the two societies and has become one of the most influential immigrant communities in the United States. Indian Americans are highly represented in science, technology, medicine, business, academia, and public service, contributing significantly to the U.S. economy while maintaining close cultural, familial, and emotional ties to India. | Cultural relations between India and the United States are among the strongest pillars of the bilateral relationship and are largely driven by deep people-to-people ties, shared democratic norms, and sustained educational, artistic, and intellectual exchange. The Indian-American diaspora—numbering over 4.5 million people as of 2025—plays a central role in bridging the two societies and has become one of the most influential immigrant communities in the United States. Indian Americans are highly represented in science, technology, medicine, business, academia, and public service, contributing significantly to the U.S. economy while maintaining close cultural, familial, and emotional ties to India.<ref name=":0" /> | ||
Educational exchange has been a cornerstone of cultural engagement. India has consistently been among the top sources of international students in the United States, particularly in STEM fields, management, and research-oriented disciplines. Student, research, and high-skilled worker visa programs have facilitated long-term professional networks and innovation ecosystems linking Silicon Valley, major U.S. universities, and India’s technology hubs. Alumni of U.S. institutions have gone on to play leading roles in India’s private sector, civil society, and government, reinforcing a virtuous cycle of cooperation. | Educational exchange has been a cornerstone of cultural engagement. India has consistently been among the top sources of international students in the United States, particularly in STEM fields, management, and research-oriented disciplines. Student, research, and high-skilled worker visa programs have facilitated long-term professional networks and innovation ecosystems linking Silicon Valley, major U.S. universities, and India’s technology hubs. Alumni of U.S. institutions have gone on to play leading roles in India’s private sector, civil society, and government, reinforcing a virtuous cycle of cooperation. | ||
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=== Public opinion and polling === | === Public opinion and polling === | ||
Public opinion data consistently reflects strong mutual goodwill. According to annual World Affairs surveys conducted by [[Gallup (company)|Gallup]], India has ranked among the most favorably viewed countries by Americans. In 2015, 71% of Americans held a favorable view of India, | Public opinion data consistently reflects strong mutual goodwill. According to annual World Affairs surveys conducted by [[Gallup (company)|Gallup]], India has ranked among the most favorably viewed countries by Americans. In 2015, 71% of Americans held a favorable view of India,<ref>{{cite web |last1=Loschky |first1=Jay |last2=Riffkin |first2=Rebecca |date=March 13, 2015 |title=Canada, Great Britain Are Americans' Most Favored Nations |url=https://www.gallup.com/poll/181961/canada-great-britain-americans-favored-nations.aspx |publisher=Gallup.com}}</ref> rising to 74% in 2017,<ref>{{cite web |last=Newport |first=Frank |date=February 20, 2017 |title=North Korea Remains Least-Popular Country Among Americans |url=https://news.gallup.com/poll/204074/north-korea-remains-least-popular-country-among-americans.aspx |access-date=February 6, 2018 |publisher=Gallup.com |language=en-us}}</ref> 72% in 2019,<ref>{{cite web |last=McCarthy |first=Justin |date=March 11, 2019 |title=Americans' Favorable Views of China Take 12-Point Hit |url=https://news.gallup.com/poll/247559/americans-favorable-views-china-point-hit.aspx |access-date=September 8, 2019 |website=Gallup.com |language=en-us}}</ref> 75% in 2020,<ref>{{cite web |last=McCarthy |first=Justin |date=March 3, 2020 |title=Iran, North Korea Liked Least by Americans |url=https://news.gallup.com/poll/287153/iran-north-korea-liked-least-americans.aspx |access-date=February 21, 2021 |website=Gallup.com |publisher=Inc Gallup |language=en}}</ref> 77% in 2022,<ref>{{Cite web |last=Brenan |first=Megan |date=March 14, 2022 |title=Americans Rate Canada, Britain, France, Japan Most Favorably |url=https://news.gallup.com/poll/390641/americans-rate-canada-britain-france-japan-favorably.aspx |access-date=April 20, 2022 |website=Gallup.com |publisher=Inc Gallup |language=en}}</ref> and 70% in 2023.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Brenan |first=Megan |date=March 21, 2023 |title=Canada, Britain Favored Most in U.S.; Russia, N. Korea Least |url=https://news.gallup.com/poll/472421/canada-britain-favored-russia-korea-least.aspx |access-date=March 25, 2023 |website=Gallup.com |publisher=Gallup Inc |language=en}}</ref> India has frequently ranked within the top tier of countries viewed positively by the American public, ahead of many traditional allies. | ||
Reciprocal sentiment in India is equally strong. A [[Morning Consult]] poll conducted in August 2021, following the [[Fall of Kabul (2021)|fall of Afghanistan]], found that 79% of Indians viewed the United States favorably, with only 10% holding unfavorable views—the highest favorability rating recorded among the 15 major countries surveyed. Notably, this rating exceeded Americans’ own favorability toward the United States at the time. | Reciprocal sentiment in India is equally strong. A [[Morning Consult]] poll conducted in August 2021, following the [[Fall of Kabul (2021)|fall of Afghanistan]], found that 79% of Indians viewed the United States favorably, with only 10% holding unfavorable views—the highest favorability rating recorded among the 15 major countries surveyed. Notably, this rating exceeded Americans’ own favorability toward the United States at the time.<ref name="auto">{{Cite web |last=Yokley |first=Eli |date=August 26, 2021 |title=How the World Sees America Amid Its Chaotic Withdrawal from Afghanistan |url=https://morningconsult.com/2021/08/26/united-states-favorability-global-countries-afghanistan/ |url-access=limited |website=morningconsult.com}}</ref> These trends underscore the unusually strong public-level foundation of the bilateral relationship. | ||
=== Cinema and visual media === | === Cinema and visual media === | ||
Film has been a powerful vehicle of cultural exchange. Indian cinema, including Bollywood and regional industries, has gained a growing audience in the United States, driven by the diaspora as well as increased mainstream exposure through streaming platforms and theatrical releases. Films such as [[RRR]] achieved unprecedented commercial and cultural success in the United States in the 2020s, signaling broader American interest in Indian storytelling, music, and spectacle. | Film has been a powerful vehicle of cultural exchange. Indian cinema, including Bollywood and regional industries, has gained a growing audience in the United States, driven by the diaspora as well as increased mainstream exposure through streaming platforms and theatrical releases. Films such as [[RRR]] achieved unprecedented commercial and cultural success in the United States in the 2020s, signaling broader American interest in Indian storytelling, music, and spectacle.<ref>{{Cite news |title=South Asian film is on the rise in America |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2023/04/08/south-asian-film-united-states/ |newspaper=Washington Post}}</ref> | ||
American cinema has long enjoyed widespread popularity in India, particularly since the end of the Cold War and India’s economic liberalization. India has emerged as one of the top global markets for Hollywood films, with U.S. studios increasingly tailoring releases, marketing strategies, and collaborations for Indian audiences. | American cinema has long enjoyed widespread popularity in India, particularly since the end of the Cold War and India’s economic liberalization. India has emerged as one of the top global markets for Hollywood films, with U.S. studios increasingly tailoring releases, marketing strategies, and collaborations for Indian audiences.<ref>{{Cite news |title=Hollywood in for blockbuster year in India |url=https://www.livemint.com/industry/media/hollywood-in-for-blockbuster-year-in-india-11673862686533.html |work=Livemint}}</ref> Earlier films such as [[Mississippi Masala]] also played an important role in exploring the experiences of Indian Americans and race relations in the United States, helping bring South Asian narratives into mainstream American discourse. | ||
=== Health, spirituality, and lifestyle === | === Health, spirituality, and lifestyle === | ||
Indian traditions related to health, wellness, and spirituality have had a lasting influence in the United States. Practices such as [[Yoga]] and meditation have become widely adopted across American society, spanning fitness, mental health, education, and alternative medicine. Indian spiritual leaders played a formative role in this exchange, most notably [[Swami Vivekananda]], who introduced aspects of Vedanta and yoga philosophy to American audiences at the turn of the twentieth century, helping lay the intellectual foundation for later cross-cultural engagement. | Indian traditions related to health, wellness, and spirituality have had a lasting influence in the United States. Practices such as [[Yoga]] and meditation have become widely adopted across American society, spanning fitness, mental health, education, and alternative medicine. Indian spiritual leaders played a formative role in this exchange, most notably [[Swami Vivekananda]], who introduced aspects of Vedanta and yoga philosophy to American audiences at the turn of the twentieth century, helping lay the intellectual foundation for later cross-cultural engagement.<ref>{{Cite web |date=June 20, 2019 |title=Yoga Landed in the U.S. Way Earlier Than You'd Think—And Fitness Was Not the Point |url=https://www.history.com/news/yoga-vivekananda-america |access-date=November 15, 2024 |website=History |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last1=Magazine |first1=Smithsonian |last2=Gritz |first2=Jennie Rothenberg |title=The Indian Guru Who Brought Eastern Spirituality to the West |url=https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-indian-guru-who-brought-eastern-spirituality-to-the-west-180980896/ |access-date=November 15, 2024 |website=Smithsonian Magazine |language=en}}</ref> In the contemporary period, wellness exchanges continue through academic research, medical collaboration, and cultural tourism. | ||
[[File:Deputy Secretary Verma Hosts Cricket Event (53788984088).jpg|thumb|Former U.S. Ambassador to India Richard Verma celebrating the United States hosting the 2024 Men's T20 World Cup]] | [[File:Deputy Secretary Verma Hosts Cricket Event (53788984088).jpg|thumb|Former U.S. Ambassador to India Richard Verma celebrating the United States hosting the 2024 Men's T20 World Cup]] | ||
=== Music === | === Music === | ||
Musical exchange between India and the United States dates back to the early twentieth century. American music entered India partly through colonial-era networks and was strongly influenced by African American [[jazz]] traditions, which resonated with Indian modernist and urban cultural movements. | Musical exchange between India and the United States dates back to the early twentieth century. American music entered India partly through colonial-era networks and was strongly influenced by African American [[jazz]] traditions, which resonated with Indian modernist and urban cultural movements.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Sen |first=Biswarup |date=October 1, 2024 |title=Introduction: western popular music and Indian modernity |journal=South Asian History and Culture |volume=15 |issue=4 |pages=359–373 |doi=10.1080/19472498.2024.2414698 |issn=1947-2498|doi-access=free }}</ref> In later decades, rock, pop, hip-hop, and electronic music gained widespread popularity in India, while Indian classical and fusion music influenced American artists and audiences. | ||
In the 21st century, collaborations between Indian and American musicians, composers, and producers have increased, particularly in film scoring, electronic music, and global pop. Indian American artists have played a prominent role in blending genres and shaping transnational musical identities. | In the 21st century, collaborations between Indian and American musicians, composers, and producers have increased, particularly in film scoring, electronic music, and global pop. Indian American artists have played a prominent role in blending genres and shaping transnational musical identities. | ||
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=== Sports and recreation === | === Sports and recreation === | ||
{{See also|Sport in British India#North America|Parcheesi|label 1=American sports in British India}} | {{See also|Sport in British India#North America|Parcheesi|label 1=American sports in British India}} | ||
Sport has emerged as a growing arena of cultural connection. Cricket was introduced to both India and the United States during the era of the British Empire, but while it flourished in South Asia, the United States gravitated toward baseball following the [[American Civil War|Civil War]]. | Sport has emerged as a growing arena of cultural connection. Cricket was introduced to both India and the United States during the era of the British Empire, but while it flourished in South Asia, the United States gravitated toward baseball following the [[American Civil War|Civil War]].<ref>{{Cite web |date=June 21, 2024 |title=Why cricket, once a thriving game in US, died at the hands of baseball |url=https://www.indiatoday.in/history-of-it/story/cricket-usa-history-american-civil-war-baseball-india-t20-world-cup-2024-2555977-2024-06-21 |access-date=February 20, 2025 |website=India Today |language=en}}</ref> | ||
In the 21st century, the growth of the Indian-American community and increased private investment have helped revive [[cricket in the United States]]. The launch of [[Major League Cricket]] and the rising popularity of [[T20 cricket]]—including the United States co-hosting the [[2024 Men's T20 World Cup]]—marked significant milestones in sporting cooperation and visibility. | In the 21st century, the growth of the Indian-American community and increased private investment have helped revive [[cricket in the United States]]. The launch of [[Major League Cricket]] and the rising popularity of [[T20 cricket]]—including the United States co-hosting the [[2024 Men's T20 World Cup]]—marked significant milestones in sporting cooperation and visibility.<ref>{{Cite web |date=July 8, 2024 |title=We don't like cricket no...we love it! America surprises at the T20 Cricket World Cup |url=https://www.uts.edu.au/about/uts-business-school/research/centre-sport-business-and-society/news/we-dont-cricket-no...we-love-it-america-surprises-t20-cricket-world-cup |access-date=November 15, 2024 |website=University of Technology Sydney |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |title=Cricket is having a moment in the US. Can it bowl over American audiences? |url=https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2024/0611/cricket-world-cup-india-pakistan |access-date=November 15, 2024 |work=Christian Science Monitor |issn=0882-7729}}</ref> At the same time, American sports leagues, fitness culture, and recreational norms have gained a substantial following in India, further reinforcing mutual cultural familiarity. | ||
== Public opinion == | == Public opinion == | ||
[[Gallup (company)|Gallup]]'s annual World Affairs survey shows India is perceived by [[Americans]] as their sixth favorite nation in the world, with 71% of Americans viewing India favorably in 2015, | [[Gallup (company)|Gallup]]'s annual World Affairs survey shows India is perceived by [[Americans]] as their sixth favorite nation in the world, with 71% of Americans viewing India favorably in 2015,<ref>{{cite web |last1=Loschky |first1=Jay |last2=Riffkin |first2=Rebecca |date=March 13, 2015 |title=Canada, Great Britain Are Americans' Most Favored Nations |url=http://www.gallup.com/poll/181961/canada-great-britain-americans-favored-nations.aspx |publisher=Gallup.com}}</ref> and 70% in 2023.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Brenan |first=Megan |date=March 21, 2023 |title=Canada, Britain Favored Most in U.S.; Russia, N. Korea Least |url=https://news.gallup.com/poll/472421/canada-britain-favored-russia-korea-least.aspx |access-date=March 25, 2023 |website=Gallup.com |publisher=Gallup Inc |language=en}}</ref> Gallup polls found that 74% of Americans viewed India favorably in 2017,<ref>{{cite web |last=Newport |first=Frank |date=February 20, 2017 |title=North Korea Remains Least-Popular Country Among Americans |url=http://news.gallup.com/poll/204074/north-korea-remains-least-popular-country-among-americans.aspx |access-date=February 6, 2018 |publisher=Gallup.com |language=en-us}}</ref> 72% in 2019,<ref>{{cite web |last=McCarthy |first=Justin |date=March 11, 2019 |title=Americans' Favorable Views of China Take 12-Point Hit |url=https://news.gallup.com/poll/247559/americans-favorable-views-china-point-hit.aspx |access-date=September 8, 2019 |website=Gallup.com |language=en-us}}</ref> 75% in 2020<ref>{{cite web |last=McCarthy |first=Justin |date=March 3, 2020 |title=Iran, North Korea Liked Least by Americans |url=https://news.gallup.com/poll/287153/iran-north-korea-liked-least-americans.aspx |access-date=February 21, 2021 |website=Gallup.com |publisher=Inc Gallup |language=en}}</ref> and 77% in 2022.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Brenan |first=Megan |date=March 14, 2022 |title=Americans Rate Canada, Britain, France, Japan Most Favorably |url=https://news.gallup.com/poll/390641/americans-rate-canada-britain-france-japan-favorably.aspx |access-date=April 20, 2022 |website=Gallup.com |publisher=Inc Gallup |language=en}}</ref> According to a [[Morning Consult]] poll conducted in August 2021 after the [[Fall of Kabul (2021)|fall of Afghanistan]], 79% of Indians viewed the United States favorably, compared to 10% who viewed the United States unfavorably. This was the highest favorability rating out of all 15 major countries surveyed and higher than US citizens' own favorability rating of the US at the time.<ref name="auto" /> | ||
== Embassies and consulates == | == Embassies and consulates == | ||
{{col-begin}} | {{col-begin}} | ||
{{col-2}} | {{col-2}} | ||
;Indian missions in the United States | ;Indian missions in the United States<ref>{{Cite web |title=Embassy of India, Washington D.C. |url=https://www.indianembassyusa.gov.in/pages/MTc |access-date=June 24, 2024 |website=www.indianembassyusa.gov.in}}</ref> | ||
* [[Washington, D.C.]] (Embassy) | * [[Washington, D.C.]] (Embassy) | ||
* [[Atlanta]] (Consulate General) | * [[Atlanta]] (Consulate General) | ||
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* [[Seattle]] (Consulate General) | * [[Seattle]] (Consulate General) | ||
{{col-2}} | {{col-2}} | ||
;United States missions in India | ;United States missions in India<ref>{{Cite web |title=Embassy & Consulates |url=https://in.usembassy.gov/embassy-consulates/ |access-date=June 24, 2024 |website=U.S. Embassy & Consulates in India |language=en-US}}</ref> | ||
* [[New Delhi]] (Embassy) | * [[New Delhi]] (Embassy) | ||
* [[Chennai]] (Consulate General) | * [[Chennai]] (Consulate General) | ||
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* [[Mumbai]] (Consulate General) | * [[Mumbai]] (Consulate General) | ||
* [[Bengaluru]] (Consulate General) | * [[Bengaluru]] (Consulate General) | ||
* [[Ahmedabad]] (Consulate, Planned) | * [[Ahmedabad]] (Consulate, Planned)<ref name="JS">{{cite web |title=Joint Statement from the United States and India |date=June 22, 2023 |url=https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/06/22/joint-statement-from-the-united-states-and-india/ |publisher=[[The White House]] |access-date=June 22, 2023}}</ref> | ||
{{col-end}} | {{col-end}} | ||
<gallery class="center"> | |||
File:Embassy of India, Washington, D.C. front.jpg|Embassy of India in Washington, D.C. | File:Embassy of India, Washington, D.C. front.jpg|Embassy of India in Washington, D.C. | ||
File:Consulate General of India building, Atlanta.jpg|Consulate-General of India in Atlanta | File:Consulate General of India building, Atlanta.jpg|Consulate-General of India in Atlanta | ||
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File:New India House 003.JPG|Consulate-General of India in New York City | File:New India House 003.JPG|Consulate-General of India in New York City | ||
File:Consulate General of India in San Francisco.jpg|Consulate-General of India in San Francisco | File:Consulate General of India in San Francisco.jpg|Consulate-General of India in San Francisco | ||
</gallery> | |||
<gallery class="center"> | |||
File:US Embassy New Delhi.jpg|Embassy of the United States in New Delhi | File:US Embassy New Delhi.jpg|Embassy of the United States in New Delhi | ||
File:US Consulate General in Chennai lit with the Ukrainian flag to stand united with Ukraine.jpg|Consulate-General of the United States in Chennai | File:US Consulate General in Chennai lit with the Ukrainian flag to stand united with Ukraine.jpg|Consulate-General of the United States in Chennai | ||
File:US Consulate in Mumbai lit with Ukrainian colours to stand united with Ukraine.jpg|Consulate-General of the United States in Mumbai | File:US Consulate in Mumbai lit with Ukrainian colours to stand united with Ukraine.jpg|Consulate-General of the United States in Mumbai | ||
</gallery> | |||
==Head of state visits== | ==Head of state visits== | ||
| Line 638: | Line 638: | ||
* Hooper, Jane. ''Yankees in the Indian Ocean: American Commerce and Whaling, 1786–1860'' (Ohio University Press, 2022) [https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=58405 online review] | * Hooper, Jane. ''Yankees in the Indian Ocean: American Commerce and Whaling, 1786–1860'' (Ohio University Press, 2022) [https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=58405 online review] | ||
* Isaacs, Harold R. ''Scratches on Our Minds: American Images of China and India'' (1958) [https://archive.org/details/scratchesonourmi010380mbp online] | * Isaacs, Harold R. ''Scratches on Our Minds: American Images of China and India'' (1958) [https://archive.org/details/scratchesonourmi010380mbp online] | ||
* Jackson, Carl T. "The Influence of Asia upon American Thought: A Bibliographical Essay." ''American Studies International'' 22#1 (1984), pp.&nbsp;3–31, {{JSTOR|41280625}} covers China, India & | * Jackson, Carl T. "The Influence of Asia upon American Thought: A Bibliographical Essay." ''American Studies International'' 22#1 (1984), pp.&nbsp;3–31, {{JSTOR|41280625}} covers China, India & Japan | ||
* Jain, Rashmi K. ''The United States and India: 1947–2006 A Documentary Study'' (2007) | * Jain, Rashmi K. ''The United States and India: 1947–2006 A Documentary Study'' (2007) | ||
* Karl, David J. "U.S.-India Relations: The Way Forward," ''Orbis'' (2012) 56#2 pp 308–327 [http://ac.els-cdn.com/S0030438712000130/1-s2.0-S0030438712000130-main.pdf?_tid=ddc2563a-6dcd-11e2-a7a0-00000aacb35d&acdnat=1359874353_ffab2d02b7f2c8443148967141f32f72 online] | * Karl, David J. "U.S.-India Relations: The Way Forward," ''Orbis'' (2012) 56#2 pp 308–327 [http://ac.els-cdn.com/S0030438712000130/1-s2.0-S0030438712000130-main.pdf?_tid=ddc2563a-6dcd-11e2-a7a0-00000aacb35d&acdnat=1359874353_ffab2d02b7f2c8443148967141f32f72 online] | ||
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* {{cite book |last=Riedel|first=Bruce |author-mask=6 |title=JFK's Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, the CIA, and Sino-Indian War |date=2015 |location= Washington, D.C.|publisher=Brookings Institution Press|isbn=978-0-8157-2699-9}} | * {{cite book |last=Riedel|first=Bruce |author-mask=6 |title=JFK's Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, the CIA, and Sino-Indian War |date=2015 |location= Washington, D.C.|publisher=Brookings Institution Press|isbn=978-0-8157-2699-9}} | ||
* Rotter, Andrew J. ''Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947–1964'' (2000) | * Rotter, Andrew J. ''Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947–1964'' (2000) | ||
* Roy, Dr. P. C. ''Indo-U.S. Economic Relations''. Rajouri Garden, New Delhi: Deep & | * Roy, Dr. P. C. ''Indo-U.S. Economic Relations''. Rajouri Garden, New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1986. 73–125. | ||
* Schaffer, Teresita C. ''India and the United States in the 21st Century: Reinventing Partnership'' (2010) | * Schaffer, Teresita C. ''India and the United States in the 21st Century: Reinventing Partnership'' (2010) | ||
* Sharma, G. D. ''Indo Us Defence Cooperation'' (Vij Books, 2012), [https://www.amazon.com/Indo-Defence-Cooperation-Capt-Sharma/dp/9381411433/ref=tmm_pap_title_0 excerpt and text search] | * Sharma, G. D. ''Indo Us Defence Cooperation'' (Vij Books, 2012), [https://www.amazon.com/Indo-Defence-Cooperation-Capt-Sharma/dp/9381411433/ref=tmm_pap_title_0 excerpt and text search] | ||
Latest revision as of 12:36, 22 March 2026
India |
United States |
|---|---|
| Diplomatic mission | |
| Embassy of India, Washington, D.C. | Embassy of the United States, New Delhi |
| Envoy | |
| Ambassador Vinay Mohan Kwatra | Ambassador Sergio Gor |

India and the United States established diplomatic relations in 1947 following the independence of India from the United Kingdom. Over the decades, the relationship has evolved into a broad-based strategic partnership grounded in shared democratic values, commitment to individual freedoms, and respect for the rule of law. As of 2025, India–United States relations encompass close cooperation across defense, technology, trade, education, and people-to-people ties, reflecting converging interests in promoting stability, prosperity, and a rules-based international order, even as differences persist on specific trade and energy issues.
In early 2026, energy policy emerged as a point of discussion within India–United States relations, as analysts assessed whether India could shift a portion of its crude oil imports from Russia to Venezuela amid political pressure from the United States.[1][2] Experts noted that such a transition would face logistical, economic, and contractual challenges, and that India had not formally committed to altering its existing oil procurement strategy.[3][4] The United States and India announced a comprehensive trade agreement under which President Donald Trump stated that India agreed to halt purchases of Russian oil and to increase imports of U.S. and potentially Venezuelan crude, alongside broad tariff reductions on Indian goods.[5][6] Indian officials said energy security and diversification remained key priorities, with Indian refiners requiring a wind-down period to complete previously booked Russian oil shipments and with no immediate directive to abruptly cease all Russian oil purchases.[7] Data showed a significant decline in India’s Russian oil imports amid ongoing negotiations and Indian energy officials indicated a broadened sourcing strategy that included crude from other regions, reflecting a shift toward diversification without an immediate full withdrawal from Russian supplies.[8][9]
Background[edit | edit source]
Early engagement and Cold War context[edit | edit source]
India and the United States began engaging with one another soon after India’s independence in 1947, with early cooperation in areas such as food security, education, and institution-building. However, the broader geopolitical dynamics of the Cold War shaped the trajectory of the relationship. In 1955, Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact, later renamed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), in which the United States held observer status, resulting in a limited strategic alignment between Washington and Islamabad.[10]
India, prioritizing strategic autonomy and decolonization-era sovereignty, pursued an independent foreign policy and was a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961, seeking to avoid formal alignment with either bloc during the Cold War.[11] While India also developed close ties with the Soviet Union during this period, engagement with the United States continued in parallel through diplomacy, development assistance, and people-to-people exchanges. Differences over regional security, including U.S. support for Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, led to periods of strain, but did not sever bilateral ties.
The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked a turning point. India’s economic liberalization and the emergence of a unipolar world created new opportunities for convergence, leading both countries to reassess the relationship in light of shared democratic values and complementary interests.[12]
Expansion into a comprehensive partnership[edit | edit source]
In the twenty-first century, India’s foreign policy has emphasized strategic autonomy while actively engaging major global powers to advance national development and regional stability.[13] This approach aligned with growing U.S. recognition of India as a key partner in Asia and beyond.
Under the administrations of Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, bilateral relations deepened substantially, with Washington acknowledging India’s core interests and supporting its rise as a responsible global power.[14] Landmark developments included the expansion of bilateral trade and investment, enhanced cooperation on counterterrorism and global security, and U.S. support for India’s greater role in global governance institutions. India’s admission into major multilateral export control regimes, along with U.S. backing for its entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group, further underscored growing trust and strategic alignment.[15]
Since 2014, strategic cooperation has accelerated across defense, technology, and regional security.[16] The United States designated India a "Major Defense Partner," reflecting a high degree of confidence and long-term commitment in defense collaboration.[17] Cooperation has also expanded within multilateral and minilateral frameworks such as the Quad and the I2U2 Group, reflecting shared interests in a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific and in addressing global challenges through partnership.[18]
History[edit | edit source]
Age of Exploration[edit | edit source]
The term "Indian", which has been used as an alternative for the Indigenous peoples of the Americas, originated with Christopher Columbus, who, in his search for India, thought that he had arrived in the East Indies. This historical misnomer has persisted over the centuries, shaping cultural perceptions and narratives surrounding Native American identity.[19][20][21][22][23][24]
American Revolution, the East India Company, and early America context[edit | edit source]
Prior to the 1770s, Americans admired the expansion of the British Empire, feeling proud to be part of an expansion of British influence around the world.[25] Some Indians (from places such as Bombay and Bengal) were sent to the latter for slavery or indentured servitude.[26] Today, descendants of such East Indian slaves may have a small percent of DNA from Asian ancestors but it likely falls below the detectable levels for today's DNA tests.[27] The American Founding Fathers maintained awareness and admiration of affairs in Mysore in its resistance to London.[28] The American Continental Congress, unable to send a full expedition to the subcontinent, instead encouraged its pirate navy to attack East India Company ships.[25]
The flag of the East India Company is said to have inspired the Continental Union Flag of 1775, ultimately inspiring the current flag of the United States, as both flags were of the same design.[29] Mysorean rockets were also used in the Battle of Baltimore, and are mentioned in "The Star-Spangled Banner", the national anthem of the United States: And the rockets' red glare, the bombs bursting in air.[30]
Under British Raj (1858–1947)[edit | edit source]
India |
United States |
|---|---|
Religious connections[edit | edit source]


The relationships between India in the days of the British Raj and the United States were thick.[31] Swami Vivekananda promoted Yoga and Vedanta in the United States at the World's Parliament of Religions in Chicago, during the World's Fair in 1893. Mark Twain visited India in 1896[32] and described it in his travelogue Following the Equator with both revulsion and attraction before concluding that India was the only foreign land he dreamed about or longed to see again.[33] Regarding India, Americans learned more from English writer Rudyard Kipling.[34] Mahatma Gandhi had an important influence on the philosophy of non-violence promoted by American civil rights movement leader Martin Luther King Jr. in the 1950s.[35]
President Franklin D. Roosevelt[edit | edit source]
In the 1930s and early-1940s, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt voiced strong support to the Indian independence movement despite being allies with Britain.[36][37] The first significant immigration from India before 1965 involved Sikh farmers going to California in the early-twentieth century.[38]
Case of Bhagat Singh Thind[edit | edit source]
United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind was a landmark legal case in the United States that reverberated through issues of immigration, citizenship, and race. In 1920, Bhagat Singh Thind, an Indian Sikh man, applied for naturalization under the Naturalization Act of 1906, which permitted naturalization only for "free white persons" and "persons of African nativity or descent." Thind contended that his high-caste Indian heritage aligned with the scientific definition of "Caucasian," thereby qualifying him for citizenship."[39]
The case reached the Supreme Court of the United States in 1923. However, the Court unanimously ruled against Thind, asserting that while he might indeed meet the scientific classification of "Caucasian," the term "white person" in the naturalization laws was construed to apply exclusively to individuals of European descent. This pivotal decision had far-reaching implications, not only for Thind but for countless other South Asians aspiring for US citizenship. It set a legal precedent that explicitly excluded South Asians from being considered "white" for naturalization purposes, effectively prohibiting their path to citizenship.[40][41]
During World War II[edit | edit source]

During World War II, 1941–1945, India became the main base for the American China Burma India Theater (CBI) in the war against Japan. Tens of thousands of American servicemen arrived, bringing all sorts of advanced technology, and currency; they left in 1945. Serious tension erupted over American demands, led by US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, that India be given independence, a proposition Churchill vehemently rejected. For years, Roosevelt encouraged British disengagement from India. The American position was based on an opposition to Europeans having colonies and a practical concern for the outcome of the war, and the expectation of a large American role in a post-independence era. Churchill threatened to resign if Roosevelt continued to push his case, causing Roosevelt to back down.[42][43] Meanwhile, India became the main American staging base to fly aid to China. During World War II, the Panagarh Airport in Bengal Province of India was used as a supply transport airfield from 1942 to 1945 by the United States Army Air Forces Tenth Air Force and as a repair and maintenance depot for B-24 Liberator heavy bombers by Air Technical Service Command.[44][45]
After Independence (1947–1997)[edit | edit source]




Nehru era[edit | edit source]
The United States under the Truman administration leaned towards favouring India in the late-1940s as a consequence of most US planners seeing India more valuable diplomatically than neighboring Pakistan.[46] However, during the Cold War, Jawaharlal Nehru's policy of neutrality was cumbersome to many American observers. American Ambassador Henry F. Grady told the State Department in December 1947 that he had informed Nehru "that this is a question that cannot be straddled and that India should get on the democratic side immediately".[47] In 1948, Nehru rejected American suggestions for resolving the Kashmir crisis via third party mediation.[48]
Nehru chose United States as the first country to visit abroad as Prime Minister. However, this 1949 tour of the United States was "an undiplomatic disaster" that left bad feelings on both sides.[49] Nehru and his top aide V. K. Krishna Menon discussed whether India should "align with United States 'somewhat' and build up our economic and military strength."[50] The Truman administration was quite favorable and indicated it would give Nehru anything he asked for. Nehru refused, and thereby forfeited the chance for a gift of one million tons of wheat.[51] The American Secretary of State Dean Acheson recognized Nehru's potential world role but added that he was "one of the most difficult men with whom I have ever had to deal."[52] The American visit had some benefits in that Nehru gained widespread understanding and support for his nation, and he himself gained a much deeper understanding of the American outlook.[53]
India rejected the American advice that it should not recognize the Communist conquest of China, but it did back the US when it supported the 1950 United Nations resolution condemning North Korea's aggression in the Korean War. India tried to act as a mediator to help end the war, and served as a conduit for diplomatic messages between the US and China. Although no Indian troops took part in the war, India did send a Medical Corps of 346 army doctors to help the UN side.[54] Meanwhile, poor harvests forced India to ask for American aid for its food security, which was given starting in 1950.[55] In the first dozen years of Indian independence (1947–59), the US provided $1.700,000,000 in aid; including $931,000,000 in food. The Soviet Union provided about half as much in monetary terms, however made much larger contributions in kind, taking the form of infrastructural aid; soft loans; technical knowledge transfer; economic planning and skills involved in the areas of steel mills; machine building; hydroelectric power; and other heavy industries, especially nuclear energy and space research.[56] In 1961, the US pledged $1,000,000,000 in development loans, in addition to $1,300,000,000 of free food.[57] President Dwight D. Eisenhower sent John Sherman Cooper as ambassador in 1956–57, who got along very well with Nehru.[58]
In terms of rhetoric, Nehru—as both prime minister and foreign minister (1947–64)—promoted a moralistic rhetoric attacking both the Soviet bloc and the US and its bloc. Nehru tried to build a nonaligned movement, paying special attention to the many new nations in the Third World released from European colonial status at this time. President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles themselves used moralistic rhetoric to attack the evils of Communism.[59]
In 1959, Eisenhower became the first US president to visit India to strengthen the staggering ties between the two nations. He was so supportive that the New York Times remarked, "It did not seem to matter much whether Nehru had actually requested or been given a guarantee that the US would help India to meet further Chinese Communist aggression. What mattered was the obvious strengthening of Indian–American friendship to a point where no such guarantee was necessary."[60]
During John F. Kennedy's presidency from 1961 to 1963, India was considered a strategic partner and counterweight to the rise of Communist China. Kennedy said:[61]
"Chinese Communists have been moving ahead the last 10 years. India has been making some progress, but if India does not succeed with her 450 million people, if she can't make freedom work, then people around the world are going to determine, particularly in the underdeveloped world, that the only way they can develop their resources is through the Communist system."
Relations took a nosedive when India annexed the Portuguese colony of Goa in 1961. The Kennedy administration condemned the armed action of the Indian government and demanded that all Indian forces be unconditionally withdrawn from Goan soil, at the same time, cutting foreign aid appropriations to India by 25 percent.[62] In response, Menon, now the Minister of Defence, lectured Kennedy on the importance of US-Soviet compromise and dismissed the admonishments of the Kennedy administration as "vestige(s) of Western imperialism".[63] The Kennedy administration openly supported India during the 1962 Sino-Indian war and considered the Chinese action as "blatant Chinese Communist aggression against India".[64][65] The United States Air Force flew in arms, ammunition and clothing supplies to the Indian troops and the United States Navy sent the USS Kitty Hawk aircraft carrier from the Pacific Ocean to India, though it was recalled before it reached the Bay of Bengal since the crisis had passed.[66][67] Kennedy insisted that Washington defend India as it would any ally, saying, "We should defend India, and therefore we will defend India."[68][69]
Indira-Rajiv era[edit | edit source]
Following the assassination of Kennedy in 1963, India–US relations deteriorated gradually. While Kennedy's successor Lyndon B. Johnson sought to maintain relations with India to counter Communist China, he also sought to strengthen ties with Pakistan with the hopes of easing tensions with China and weakening India's growing military buildup as well.[70] Relations then hit an all-time low under the Nixon administration in the early 1970s. Nixon shifted away from the neutral stance which his predecessors had taken towards India-Pakistan hostilities. He established a very close relationship with Pakistan, aiding it militarily and economically, as India, now under the leadership of Indira Gandhi, was leaning towards Soviet Union. He considered Pakistan as a very important ally to counter Soviet influence in the Indian subcontinent and establish ties with China, with whom Pakistan was very close.[71] During the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, the US openly supported Pakistan and deployed its aircraft carrier USS Enterprise towards the Bay of Bengal, which was seen as a show of force by the US in support of the West Pakistani forces.[72] Later in 1974, India conducted its first nuclear test, Smiling Buddha, which was opposed by the US, however it also concluded that the test did not violate any agreement.[73][74]
In the late 1970s, with the Janata Party leader Morarji Desai becoming the prime minister, India improved its relations with the US, led by Jimmy Carter, despite the latter signing an order in 1978 barring nuclear material from being exported to India due to India's non-proliferation record.[75]
Despite the return of Indira Gandhi to power in 1980, the relations between the two countries continued to improve gradually, although India did not support the United States in its role in the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. Indian Foreign Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao expressed "grave concern" over the United States's decision to "rearm" Pakistan; the two countries were working closely together to counter the Soviets in Afghanistan.[76] The Reagan administration provided limited assistance to India. India sounded out Washington on the purchase of a range of US defence technology. In 1984, Washington approved the supply of selected technology to India, including gas turbines for naval frigates and engines for prototypes for India's light combat aircraft. There were also unpublicized transfers of technology, including the engagement of a US company, Continental Electronics, to design and build a new VLF communications station, which was commissioned in the late 1980s.[77]
Contemporary relations[edit | edit source]
Post-liberalization era[edit | edit source]
Under Bill Clinton (President 1993–2001) and P. V. Narasimha Rao (Prime Minister 1991–1996) both sides mishandled relations, according to Arthur G. Rubinoff. Clinton simultaneously pressured India to liberalize its economy while criticizing New Delhi on human rights and nuclear issues. In the face of criticism from Washington and opposition at home, Indian leaders lost their enthusiasm for rapprochement and reverted to formalistic protocol over substantive diplomacy. The Brown Amendment that restored American aid to Pakistan in 1995 was an irritant. In returning to a Cold War style rhetoric, Indian parliamentarians and American congressmen demonstrated their unwillingness to establish a new relationship.[78][79]
NDA I and II governments (1998–2004)[edit | edit source]


Soon after Atal Bihari Vajpayee became Indian prime minister, he authorized nuclear weapons testing at Pokhran. The United States strongly condemned this testing, promised sanctions, and voted in favor of a United Nations Security Council resolution condemning the tests. President Clinton imposed economic sanctions on India, including cutting off all military and economic aid; freezing loans by American banks to state-owned Indian companies; prohibiting loans to the Indian government for all except food purchases; prohibiting American aerospace technology and uranium exports to India; and requiring the US to oppose all loan requests by India to international lending agencies.[80] However, these sanctions proved ineffective—India was experiencing strong economic growth, and its trade with the US only constituted a small portion of its GDP. Only Japan joined the US in imposing direct sanctions, while most other nations continued to trade with India. The sanctions were soon lifted. Afterward, the Clinton administration and Prime Minister Vajpayee exchanged representatives to help rebuild relations.[81] In March 2000, Clinton visited India, undertaking bilateral and economic discussions with Vajpayee. This would mark the first US presidential trip to India since 1978.[82] During the visit, the Indo-US Science & Technology Forum was established.[83]
Over the course of improved diplomatic relations with the Bush administration, India agreed to allow close international monitoring of its nuclear weapons development, although it refused to give up its current nuclear arsenal.[84] In 2004, the US decided to grant major non-NATO ally (MNNA) status to Pakistan. The US extended the MNNA strategic working relationship to India but the offer was turned down.[85][86] After the September 11 attacks against the US in 2001, President George W. Bush collaborated closely with India in controlling and policing the strategically critical Indian Ocean sea lanes from the Suez Canal to Singapore.[81]
UPA I and II governments (2004–2014)[edit | edit source]

During the George W. Bush administration, relations between India and the United States improved greatly, primarily over common concerns regarding growing Islamic extremism, energy security, and climate change.[87] George W. Bush commented: "India is a great example of democracy. It is very devout, has diverse religious heads, but everyone is comfortable about their religion. The world needs India".[88] Journalist Fareed Zakaria, in his book The Post-American World, described Bush as "being the most pro-Indian president in American history."[89] According to Rejaul Karim Laskar, a scholar of Indian foreign policy and ideologue of the Indian National Congress, the ruling UPA coalition saw a "transformation in bilateral ties with the US", as a result of which the relations now covers "a wide range of issues, including high technology, space, education, agriculture, trade, clean energy, counter- terrorism, etc".[90]
After the December 2004 tsunami, the US and Indian navies cooperated in search and rescue operations and in the reconstruction of affected areas.[91] Since 2004, Washington and New Delhi pursued a "strategic partnership" based on shared values and generally convergent geopolitical interests. Numerous economic, security, and global initiatives, including plans for civilian nuclear cooperation, are underway. First launched in 2005, cooperation on nuclear weapons reversed three decades of American non-proliferation policy. Also in 2005, United States and India signed a ten-year defense framework agreement, with the goal of expanding bilateral security cooperation. The two countries engaged in numerous and unprecedented combined military exercises, and major US arms sales to India were concluded.[92] After Hurricane Katrina, India donated $5 million to the American Red Cross and sent two planeloads of relief supplies and materials to help.[93] The value of all bilateral trade tripled from 2004 to 2008 and continued to grow, while two-way investment also increased.[94] In November 2010, President Barack Obama visited India and addressed a joint session of the Indian Parliament,[95] where he backed India's bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.[96]
Strategic and military determinants[edit | edit source]
In March 2009, the Obama administration cleared the US$2.1 billion sale of eight P-8 Poseidons to India.[97] This deal, and the $5 billion agreement to provide Boeing C-17 military transport aircraft and General Electric F414 engines announced during Obama's November 2010 visit, made the US one of the top three military suppliers to India (after Israel and Russia).[98]
US spying incidents[edit | edit source]
In July and November 2013, India demanded that the US respond to allegations that the Indian UN mission in New York City and the Indian Embassy in Washington, D.C. had been targeted for spying.[99] A 2010 document leaked by Edward Snowden and published by The Washington Post revealed that US intelligence agencies had been authorized to spy on Narendra Modi (who was then the Chief Minister of the Indian state of Gujarat).[100][101]
WikiLeaks revelations that Western intelligence agencies used foreign aid workers and staff at non-governmental organizations as non-official cover prompted India to increase monitoring of satellite phones and movement of personnel working for humanitarian relief organizations and development aid agencies in the vicinity of sensitive locations.[102][103]
Foreign policy issues during the early 2010s[edit | edit source]

According to some analysts,[who?] India–US relations were strained over the approach of the Obama administration to Pakistan and the handling of the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.[104][105] India's National Security Adviser M. K. Narayanan criticized the Obama administration for linking the Kashmir dispute to the instability in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and said that by doing so, President Obama was "barking up the wrong tree."[106] Foreign Policy in February 2009 also criticized Obama's approach to South Asia, saying that "India can be a part of the solution rather than part of the problem" in South Asia. It suggested that India take a more proactive role in rebuilding Afghanistan, irrespective of the attitude of the Obama administration.[107] Bloomberg reported that, since the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the public mood in India has been to pressure Pakistan more aggressively to take actions against the culprits behind the terrorist attack, and predicted that this might be reflected in the Indian general elections in May 2009. Consequently, the Obama administration may have found itself at odds with India's rigid stance against terrorism.[108]
In the early 2010s, India and US governments have differed on a variety of regional issues ranging from America's military relations with Pakistan and India's military relations with Russia to foreign policy disagreements relating to Iran, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Myanmar and Bangladesh.[109][110]
India criticized the Obama administration's decision to limit H-1B (temporary) visas, and India's then External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee (later, the president of India until 2017) said that India would oppose US "protectionism" at various international forums.[111] India's Commerce Minister Kamal Nath said that India may move against Obama's outsourcing policies at the World Trade Organization.[112] In May 2009, Obama reiterated his anti-outsourcing views and criticized the current US tax policy "that says you should pay lower taxes if you create a job in Bangalore, India, than if you create one in Buffalo, New York."[113] However, during the US India Business Council meeting in June 2009, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton advocated for stronger economic ties between India and the United States.[114]
In June 2010, the United States and India formally re-engaged the US-India Strategic Dialogue initiated under President Bush when a large delegation of high-ranking Indian officials, led by External Affairs Minister S. M. Krishna, visited Washington, D.C. As leader of the US delegation, Secretary of State Clinton lauded India as "an indispensable partner and a trusted friend".[115] President Obama appeared briefly at a United States Department of State reception to declare his firm belief that America's relationship with India "will be one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century."[116] The Strategic Dialogue produced a joint statement in which the two countries pledged to "deepen people-to-people, business-to-business, and government-to-government linkages ... for the mutual benefit of both countries and for the promotion of global peace, stability, economic growth and prosperity."[117] It outlined extensive bilateral initiatives in ten key areas, covering a wide range of security-related, economic, and societal topics.[118]
In November 2010, Obama became the second US president (after Richard Nixon in 1969) to undertake a visit to India in his first term in office. On November 8, Obama also became the second US president (after Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1959) to ever address a joint session of the Parliament of India. In a major policy shift, Obama declared US support for India's permanent membership on the UN Security Council.[119][120] He also announced the removal of export control restrictions on several Indian companies, and concluded trade deals worth $10 billion, which are expected to create and/or support 50,000 jobs in the US.[121]
Devyani Khobragade incident[edit | edit source]
In December 2013, Devyani Khobragade, the Deputy Consul General of India in New York, was arrested and accused by US federal prosecutors of submitting false work visa documents and paying her housekeeper "far less than the minimum legal wage."[122] The ensuing incident saw protests from the Indian government and a rift in relations, with outrage expressed that Khobragade was strip-searched and held in the general inmate population.[122] Former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said that Khobragade's treatment was "deplorable".[123]
India demanded an apology from the US over her alleged "humiliation" and called for the charges to be dropped, which the US declined to do.[124] The Indian government retaliated for what it viewed as the mistreatment of its consular official by revoking the ID cards and other privileges of US consular personnel and their families in India and removing security barriers in front of the US Embassy in New Delhi.[125] Nancy J. Powell, the US ambassador to India, resigned following the incident, which was widely seen by India "as fallout from the imbroglio."[126] Within a year of the incident, US–India relations were warming again, as President Obama visited India in January 2015.[126]
Modi government (2014–present)[edit | edit source]
Modi–Obama relationship (2014–2017)[edit | edit source]

By 2016, India–United States relations improved significantly during the Premiership of Narendra Modi which began in 2014.[127] India and the US share an extensive and expanding cultural, strategic, military, and economic relationship[128][129][130] which is in the phase of implementing confidence building measures (CBM) to overcome the legacy of trust deficit—brought about by adversarial US foreign policies[131][132] and multiple instances of technology denial[133][134][135]—which have plagued the relationship over several decades.[136]
Key developments included the rapid growth of India's economy; closer ties between the Indian and American industries, especially in the Information and communications technology (ICT), engineering and medical sectors; an informal entente to manage an increasingly assertive China; robust cooperation on counter-terrorism; the deterioration of US-Pakistan relations; easing of export controls over dual-use goods & technologies (99% of licenses applied were, as of 2016, approved);[137] and reversal of long-standing American opposition to India's strategic program.
Income creation in the US through knowledge-based employment by Asian Indians has outpaced every other ethnic group according to US Census data.[138] Growing financial and political clout of the affluent Asian Indian diaspora is noteworthy. Indian American households are the most prosperous in the US, with a median revenue of US$100,000, and are followed by Chinese Americans at US$65,000. The average household revenue in the USA is US$63,000.[139] The political influence of the large Indian-American community is reflected in the largest country-specific caucus in the United States Congress,[140] while between 2009 and 2010 more than 100,000 Indian students attended American colleges and universities.[141]
The 2014 State Department's annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report appeared to classify the Khobragade incident as an example of human trafficking, stating: "An Indian consular officer at the New York consulate was indicted in December 2013 for visa fraud related to her alleged exploitation of an Indian domestic worker."[142] In response, India showed no urgency to allow visits to India by the newly appointed US anti-human trafficking ambassador Susan P. Coppedge and the US special envoy for LGBT rights Randy Berry. Under Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code homosexuality was illegal in India. Indian Ambassador to the US, Arun K. Singh reiterated India's commitment to work within an international framework to tackle the problem of trafficking but rejected any "unilateral assessments" by another country saying "We will never accept it" and downplayed the importance of the visits: "When you ask a US official when somebody will be given a visa, they always say 'we will assess when visa is applied for.' ... I can do no better than to reiterate the US position."[143]
In February 2016, the Obama administration notified the US Congress that it intended to provide Pakistan eight nuclear-capable F-16 fighters and assorted military goods, including eight AN/APG-68(V)9 airborne radars and eight ALQ-211(V)9 electronic warfare suites,[144][145] despite strong reservations from US lawmakers regarding the transfer of any nuclear-capable platforms to Pakistan.[146] The Indian Government summoned the US Ambassador to India to convey its disapproval regarding the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan.[147]
Modi–Trump relationship (2017–2021)[edit | edit source]

In February 2017, Indian ambassador to the US Navtej Sarna hosted a reception for the National Governors Association (NGA), which was attended by the governors of 25 states and senior representatives of three more states. This was the first time such an event had occurred. Explaining the reason for the gathering, Virginia Governor and NGA Chair Terry McAuliffe stated that "We clearly understand the strategic importance of India, of India–US relations. As we grow our 21st century economy, India has been so instrumental in helping us build our technology, medical professions. We recognise a country that has been such a close strategic ally of the US. That's why we the Governors are here tonight."[148]
In October 2018, India inked a historic agreement worth US$5.43 billion with Russia to procure four S-400 Triumf surface-to-air missile defence systems—one of the most powerful missile defence systems in the world—ignoring America's CAATSA act. The US threatened India with sanctions over India's decision to buy the S-400 missile defense system from Russia.[149] The US also threatened India with sanctions over India's decision to buy oil from Iran.[150] However, the Trump administration avoided sanctioning India for the Russian S-400 missile system, while sanctioning Turkey and China for the same purchases.[151]


President Donald Trump grew closer to India's BJP government, which shared similar right-wing views. He repeatedly praised Modi's leadership and avoided any negative criticism of the Indian government's actions on the citizenship and Kashmir disputes.[152][153] The Trump administration was consistent with the Modi administration in combating "radical Islamic terrorism",[154] and the US reiterated its support for India's elimination of terrorist training camp in Pakistan.[155][156]
In early 2020, India provided its agreement for terminating an export embargo on a medicinal drug known as hydroxychloroquine amidst the combat against the ongoing coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, after Trump threatened retaliation against India if it did not comply with terminating the export embargo on hydroxychloroquine.[157][158]
On December 21, 2020, President Trump awarded Modi with the Legion of Merit for elevating India–United States relations. The Legion of Merit was awarded to Modi along with Prime Minister of Australia Scott Morrison and former Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe, the "original architects" of the QUAD.[159][160]
Modi–Biden relationship (2021–2025)[edit | edit source]

US–India ties began to strain in April 2021 when India faced a massive spike in COVID-19 infections. The US had invoked the Defense Production Act of 1950 to ban the export of raw materials needed to produce vaccines in order to prioritize domestic vaccine production.[161] According to The Times of India, this also caused an explosion of anti-US sentiment in India, as the US had vaccine reserves and refused to share COVID-19 vaccine patents.[162] This came after a plea by Adar Poonawalla, CEO of the Serum Institute of India, to lift the embargo on export of raw materials needed to ramp up production of COVID-19 vaccines, was rejected.[158] However, in late April, right after a phone call with Ajit Doval, the National Security Advisor of India, the Biden administration stated it would make raw materials necessary for production of the Oxford–AstraZeneca COVID-19 vaccine available to India, and began to send more than ₹714 crore (US$100 million) worth of drug treatments, rapid diagnostic tests, ventilators, personal protective equipment, and mechanical parts needed to manufacture vaccines to India, along with a team of public health experts from the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The US also stated that it planned to finance the expansion of Biological E. Limited, an Indian-based COVID-19 vaccine production company.[163][164][165][166] India entered negotiations with the US after it declared that it would share 60 million Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccines with the world.[167]
In a meeting of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue on the implications of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine for the region, President Biden noted India's abstention on a UN resolution condemning the invasion, saying that most global allies were united against Russia.[168] Speaking to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, US diplomat Donald Lu said the Biden administration was still considering sanctions against India over its S-400 deal with Russia and its abstention at the UN.[169] However, the Biden administration ruled out secondary sanctions against India for its considerable oil imports or defence engagement from Russia.[151]
Strengthen cooperation in various fields[edit | edit source]
Although there are certain differences over the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the United States and India strengthened cooperation in defense, semiconductors, critical minerals, space, climate, education, healthcare and other fields during the Joe Biden presidency.[170] Biden called the ties with India "one of the defining relationships of the 21st century".[171] In a joint statement in 2023, Modi and Biden reiterated the call for concerted action against all groups identified by the United Nations as terrorist organisations, including Al-Qaeda, ISIS (Daesh), Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Hizb-ul-Mujhahideen (HuM). They also called out the Afghan Taliban authorities and Pakistan on the issue of terrorism.[172][173] The joint statement declared that the two countries have strong ties spanning "seas to stars".[174]
Spying allegations against India[edit | edit source]
In November 2023, it was reported that US authorities prevented a plot to assassinate Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, a Sikh separatist leader of the Khalistan movement, within American borders.[175] Pannun had made threats to bomb the Indian Parliament and Air India flights, is now facing charges related to terrorist activities by India's NIA.[176] United States federal prosecutors filed charges against Nikhil Gupta, an Indian national, alleging his involvement in a conspiracy with an Indian government official to carry out the assassination of Pannun.[177] India voiced apprehension over the connection of one of its government officials to the plot, distancing itself from the incident and saying it contradicted government policy.[178] In December 2023, it was reported that President Joe Biden cancelled plans to attend India's January 2024 Delhi Republic Day parade.[179]
Modi–Trump relationship (2025–present)[edit | edit source]

India rejected Trump's offer to mediate India-China tensions.[180] In May, again, India rejected Trump's and his vice president's offer to mediate when the 2025 India–Pakistan conflict unfolded. The Indian Prime Minister first conveyed this directly to Trump in June. In late July, Modi reiterated the point during a parliamentary debate.[181][182]
On February 13, 2025, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi became the fourth world leader to visit Donald Trump at the White House. During the meeting, Modi praised the MAGA movement.[183][184][185]
Pahalgam attack and Indo-Pak ceasefire[edit | edit source]
Following the 2025 Pahalgam attack, the United States initially expressed support for India’s right to respond. President Donald Trump condemned the attack and offered condolences, while US officials reiterated India’s sovereignty in handling its security challenges.[186][187] However, bilateral tensions emerged in the weeks that followed—particularly over conflicting claims regarding the May ceasefire with Pakistan—after India's announcement of halting Operation Sindoor. While the Trump administration and several US media reports credited American diplomacy for facilitating the truce, Indian officials rejected these assertions.
On July 30, 2025, President Trump announced 25% tariffs on India in addition to a penalty due to India's purchase of military equipment from Russia.[188] The move was widely interpreted in Indian media as a response to New Delhi’s consistent emphasis on strategic autonomy and its rejection of third-party mediation.[189] In the weeks that followed, a perceptible shift was noted in President Trump's public statements regarding South Asia. While earlier expressions had focused on supporting India’s counterterrorism efforts, subsequent remarks increasingly highlighted the role of US diplomacy in facilitating the India–Pakistan ceasefire. In public addresses, including a White House briefing and a campaign rally in July, President Trump asserted that American engagement had helped de-escalate the conflict and suggested such efforts merited international recognition.[190]
These claims were formally denied by Indian officials. Minister of External Affairs S. Jaishankar stated in Parliament that no calls or contact occurred between the Indian and US leadership during the period in question and that the ceasefire had been initiated through bilateral military dialogue.[191][192] Several Indian media outlets noted a correlation between the timing of the US tariff announcement and the increased emphasis in Washington on American diplomatic efforts in South Asia. Commentators in both countries described the developments as indicative of growing friction over differing narratives regarding the ceasefire and broader regional dynamics.[189]
Tariff and energy dispute over Russia and Pakistan[edit | edit source]
In July 2025, President Trump criticized India for continuing oil trade with Russia despite ongoing Western sanctions. Earlier in July, US Senator Lindsey Graham introduced a sanctions bill proposing tariffs of up to 500% on countries—including India—that continued to trade oil with Russia.[193][194] Towards the end of July, Trump announced a 25% "reciprocal tariff"[195] on Indian goods and additional 25% penalties linked to India's purchase of Russian arms and energy, taking total tariffs to around 50%.[196] Trump also revealed a proposed trade and energy development agreement with Pakistan. According to his Truth Social post, the United States would support the exploration and extraction of Pakistan's "massive" oil reserves through American firms, although the specifics of the deal remained unclear. However, geoscientist Moin Raza Khan, former managing director of Pakistan Petroleum Limited, disputed these claims, stating that Trump’s assertions about Pakistan’s vast oil reserves did not reflect reality. Khan emphasized the lack of reliable data. Similarly, GA Sabri, a former Pakistani federal petroleum official, dismissed the claims as a "political gimmick."[195][197] Trump also took a swipe at the Indian economy, describing it as "dead" in the context of stalled negotiations over dairy and agricultural market access.[195] According to American investment bank Jefferies, the unusually high tariffs were largely driven by former President Donald Trump's personal dissatisfaction after India declined his offer to mediate in its conflict with Pakistan, which may have hindered his efforts to position himself as a peace broker and Nobel Peace Prize candidate.[198]
In September 2025, a thaw in bilateral relations was observed when U.S. President Donald Trump made a phone call to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to extend birthday greetings. Following the call, Trump posted on X, commending Modi for doing a "tremendous job" and expressing gratitude for his support toward efforts aimed at ending the Russia–Ukraine conflict.[199]
U.S. President Donald Trump said on 14 January 2026 that countries that do business with Iran will face a new 25% tariff. This includes India which imports 8% of Iran's goods to as of 2023.[200]
In February 2026, U.S. President Donald Trump announced a trade agreement with India that would lower U.S. tariffs on Indian goods to approximately 18 percent. The deal was linked to India’s reported agreement to stop purchasing Russian oil, aiming to reduce Moscow’s energy revenues amid the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.[201]
Military relations[edit | edit source]
Though the Indian Air Force never operated the F-86 Sabre, a small group of Indian Air Force pilots trained on the aircraft in the United States in 1963–65 under a brief diplomatic arrangement. The training contributed to doctrinal exposure rather than operational deployment.[202]
The US has four "foundational" agreements that it signs with its defence partners. The Pentagon describes the agreements as "routine instruments that the US uses to promote military cooperation with partner-nations". American officials have stated that the agreements are not prerequisites for bilateral defence co-operation, but make it simpler and more cost-effective to carry out activities such as refueling aircraft or ships in each other's countries and providing disaster relief.[203] The first of the four agreements, the General Security Of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), was signed by India and the US in 2002. The agreement enables the sharing of military intelligence between the two countries and requires each country to protect the others' classified information.[citation needed]
The second agreement, the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), was signed by the two countries on August 29, 2016. The LEMOA permits the military of either country to use the others' bases for re-supplying or carrying out repairs. The agreement does not make the provision of logistical support binding on either country, and requires individual clearance for each request.[204] The third agreement, Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) was signed during the inaugural 2+2 dialogue in September 2018.[205] It is an India-specific variant of Communications and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) that enables the two countries to share secure communication and exchange information on approved equipment during bilateral and multinational training exercises and operations. The fourth agreement, the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA), signed in 2020, permits the exchange of unclassified and controlled unclassified geospatial products, topographical, nautical, and aeronautical data, products and services between India and the US National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA).[206][184]
Harsh V. Pant, professor of International relations at King's College London, highlighted the importance of India to US strategic planning, saying: "India is key to the US' ability to create a stable balance of power in the larger Indo-Pacific and at a time of resource constraints, it needs partners like India to shore up its sagging credibility in the region in face of Chinese onslaught." Robert Boggs, professor of South Asia Studies at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, opines that the US "overestimates both India's desire to improve the relationship and the benefits doing so would bring".[207]
As part of America's policies to counter China,[208] one of the first Trump administration's policies was to make India a major defence partner, for which it was in talks with Indian representatives to sell highly technologically advanced Predator drones.[209] India has floated a tender to buy 100 multi-role fighter aircraft in the Indian MRCA competition (also called the "Mother of all defence deals"), worth around US$15 billion under Narendra Modi's Make in India initiative. Although the deal was yet to be finalised as of 2018, the Trump administration pushed for sales of advanced F-16 jet fighters,[210] and F/A-18 Super Hornet.[211]
The Indian Army and US Army have conducted an annual training practice called Yudh Abhyas since 2002.[212] In June 2015, US defence secretary Ashton Carter visited India and became the first American defence secretary to visit an Indian military command. In December of the same year, Manohar Parrikar became the first Indian defence minister to visit the US Pacific Command.[213] In March 2016, India rejected a proposal by the US to join naval patrols in the South China Sea alongside Japan and Australia. Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar said: "India has never taken part in any joint patrol; we only do joint exercises. The question of joint patrol does not arise."[214][184]
In January 2017, Peter Lavoy, Senior Director for South Asian Affairs at the US National Security Council, declared that the partnership between India and the United States under Barack Obama's administration had been "incredibly successful". Lavoy stated, "I can tell you quite definitively that due to our partnerships, several terrorism plots were foiled. Indian lives and American lives were saved because of this partnership."[215][216]
On October 27, 2020, the United States and India signed the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA), enabling greater information-sharing and further defense cooperation, to counter China's growing military power in the region.[217] During the 2+2 ministerial dialogue, the last agreement of four so-called "foundational agreements" for sharing sensitive information and sales of advanced military hardware was signed.[218]
On August 16, 2022, US Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall said that "the Indian defence attaché now has un-escorted access to The Pentagon which is commencement with our close relationship with India's status as a major defense partner," and added that "if you don't think un-escorted access to the Pentagon is a big deal, I can't get into The Pentagon without an escort".[219]
During Modi's visit in 2023, the US and India agreed that Hindustan Aeronautics would jointly produce GE F-414 jet engines.[220] The two sides also reached an agreement to purchase MQ-9B drones.[170]
In 2024, both signed two key agreements to strengthen their defense cooperation: the Security of Supply Arrangement (SOSA), which allows reciprocal priority support for defense-related goods and services; and a Memorandum of Agreement to post Indian Liaison Officers in key US Commands, starting with the US Special Operations Command.[221]
Counterterrorism cooperation[edit | edit source]
India–US counterterrorism cooperation has significantly deepened since the early 2000s, evolving into a central pillar of their strategic partnership. The establishment of the Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism in 2001 marked the beginning of systematic collaboration, focusing on intelligence sharing, financial tracking of terrorist networks, and capacity-building through joint training and technology transfer.[222][223] The 2008 Mumbai attacks served as a catalyst, prompting both nations to intensify intelligence exchanges and operational cooperation, and leading to the signing of the Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative in 2010. This initiative facilitated closer collaboration on information sharing, investigative best practices, and advanced counterterrorism techniques.[222][223] High-level dialogues, such as the Homeland Security Dialogue and the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue, have further institutionalized cooperation, with joint statements increasingly reflecting shared concerns over Pakistan-based terrorist groups and calling for accountability for cross-border attacks.[224][222]
In recent years, India and the US have expanded their partnership to include joint military exercises focused on counterterrorism, such as Yudh Abhyas and Vajra Prahar, and have worked together in multilateral forums like the Global Counter Terrorism Forum and the Quad Counterterrorism Working Group.[224][225] Both countries have also coordinated efforts to designate terrorist leaders and groups at the United Nations and have supported actions at the Financial Action Task Force to pressure states supporting terrorism.[224][225] While the US and India share the goal of combating terrorism, their approaches sometimes diverge due to differing geopolitical priorities and operational capabilities, with the US favoring more direct military action and India emphasizing regional diplomacy and multilateral engagement.[225] Nevertheless, the partnership continues to adapt to emerging threats, with ongoing efforts to enhance intelligence-sharing, law enforcement cooperation, and regional security in the Indo-Pacific.[225]
In April 2025, President Trump condemned terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir, which resulted in the deaths of 26 civilians. In his public remarks, President Trump referred to the attack as “a bad one” and acknowledged the long-standing tensions in the region. In a subsequent interview, Trump emphasized that India would handle the situation independently, saying, “They’ll figure it out one way or another.” He also personally expressed condolences to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, offering full US support following the attack. US State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce stated that, as President Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio had made clear, the United States stood with India and strongly condemned all acts of terrorism. She added that they mourned the lives lost, wished for the swift recovery of the injured, and called for the perpetrators of the heinous act to be brought to justice.[226][227]
In May 2025, following India's retaliatory response dubbed "Operation Sindoor", India sent a 10-member multi-party delegation led by MP Shashi Tharoor to the US to brief lawmakers, think tanks, and media on the Pahalgam attack and India’s response. The team emphasized the precision and restraint of the strikes on terror camps in Pakistan and Pakistan administered Kashmir, presenting a united stance on national security and cross-border terrorism.[228][229] During their visit to the 9/11 Memorial in New York, Tharoor and the delegation paid tribute to the victims and underscored the shared global challenge of terrorism, calling for international solidarity and mutual strength to combat it.[230][231][232][233] Tharoor reflected on his personal experience of 9/11—drawing parallels between the US and India as victims of terror—and stressed that India would not remain passive in the face of future attacks, urging that those who finance, train, and harbor terrorists must be held accountable.[230][233][234][235]
Pakistan factor[edit | edit source]
India–US counterterrorism cooperation since the 2000s has been marked by growing convergence on the threat posed by Pakistan-based terrorist groups. While both countries have historically maintained separate bilateral relationships with Pakistan, the 2008 Mumbai attacks catalyzed a shift, with the US increasingly acknowledging India's concerns about cross-border terrorism originating from Pakistani soil. Joint statements from high-level dialogues, such as the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue, have explicitly called on Pakistan to take concrete action against terrorist groups operating from its territory and to bring perpetrators of attacks like the Mumbai attacks, Pathankot attack, and Uri attack to justice.[224] The US has supported India in international forums, including the United Nations Security Council and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), to pressure Pakistan to curb terror financing and dismantle militant infrastructure.[224][236]
Despite this alignment, direct joint US–India action against Pakistan has been limited to diplomatic, economic, and multilateral measures rather than coordinated military operations. The US has imposed aid suspensions and advocated for Pakistan's inclusion on the FATF 'grey list' for its failure to act against groups targeting India.[237][224] India, for its part, has conducted targeted cross-border strikes against terrorist camps in Pakistan and presented evidence of Pakistani complicity in terrorism at the UN, often with US backing.[236][237] However, operational cooperation—such as intelligence sharing on Pakistan-based threats—remains cautious, with the US sometimes hesitant to share sensitive information fully, reflecting broader geopolitical complexities.[223][238] Overall, while both countries have not engaged in joint military action against Pakistan, their partnership has strengthened international efforts to hold Pakistan accountable for cross-border terrorism and has elevated the issue in global counterterrorism discourse.[239][240]
Extraditions[edit | edit source]
The most prominent successful terrorist extradition from the United States to India is that of Tahawwur Hussain Rana. In April 2025, Rana was extradited to India for his alleged role in the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, which killed 166 people. This marked the first such extradition in a terrorism-related case between the two countries. The extradition followed years of legal proceedings and diplomatic efforts, with the US Supreme Court ultimately rejecting Rana's appeals and the US Department of Justice actively assisting Indian authorities in the process.[241][242][243] Rana was wanted in India for allegedly aiding Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistani militant group blamed for the attacks.[241] At a joint press conference with the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on February 14, president Donald Trump stated that the United States was returning "a very violent man" to India immediately to face justice there.[244]
Nuclear cooperation[edit | edit source]
Pokhran tests[edit | edit source]
In 1998, India tested nuclear weapons which resulted in several US, Japanese, and European sanctions on India. India's then-defence minister, George Fernandes, said that India's program was necessary as it provided a deterrence to potential nuclear threats. Most of the sanctions imposed on India were removed by 2001.[245][246] India has categorically stated that it will never use weapons first but will retaliate if attacked.[247]
The economic sanctions imposed by the United States in response to India's nuclear tests in May 1998 appeared, at least initially, to seriously damage India–US relations. President Bill Clinton imposed wide-ranging sanctions pursuant to the 1994 Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act. US sanctions on Indian entities involved in the nuclear industry and opposition to international financial institution loans for non-humanitarian assistance projects in India. The United States encouraged India to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) immediately and without condition. The United States also called for restraint in missile and nuclear testing and deployment by both India and Pakistan.[248] The non-proliferation dialogue initiated after the 1998 nuclear tests has bridged many of the gaps in understanding between the countries.[249]
Easing of tension[edit | edit source]
In late September 2001, President Bush lifted sanctions imposed under the terms of the 1994 Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act following India's nuclear tests in May 1998. A succession of non-proliferation dialogues bridged many of the gaps in understanding between the countries.
In December 2006, the US Congress passed the historic India–United States Civilian Nuclear Agreement|Henry J. Hyde US–India Peaceful Atomic Cooperation Act, which allows direct civilian nuclear commerce with India for the first time in 30 years. US policy had been opposed to nuclear cooperation with India in prior years because India had developed nuclear weapons against international conventions, and had never signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The legislation clears the way for India to buy US nuclear reactors and fuel for civilian use.
The India–United States Civil Nuclear Agreement—also referred to as the "123 Agreement"—signed on October 10, 2008, is a bilateral agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation which governs civil nuclear trade between American and Indian firms participating in each other's civil nuclear energy sector.[250][251][184] For the agreement to be operational, nuclear vendors and operators must comply with India's 2010 Nuclear Liability Act which stipulates that nuclear suppliers, contractors and operators must bear financial responsibility in case of an accident.
On March 27, 2019, India and the US signed an agreement to "strengthen bilateral security and civil nuclear cooperation" including the construction of six American nuclear reactors in India.[252]
Post– 9/11[edit | edit source]
India's contribution to the war on terror has helped India's diplomatic relations with several countries. Over the past few years, India has held numerous joint military exercises with United States and European nations that have resulted in a strengthened US–India and EU–India bilateral relationship.
However, India has not signed the CTBT, or the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, claiming the discriminatory nature of the treaty that allows the five declared nuclear countries of the world to keep their nuclear arsenals and develop them using computer simulation testing. Prior to its nuclear testing, India had pressed for a comprehensive destruction of nuclear weapons by all countries of the world in a time-bound frame. This was not favoured by the United States and by certain other countries. Presently, India has declared its policy of "no-first use of nuclear weapons" and the maintenance of a "credible nuclear deterrence". The US, under President George W. Bush, lifted most of its sanctions on India and resumed military co-operation. Relations with the US have considerably improved in recent years, with the two countries taking part in joint naval exercises off the coast of India and joint air exercises both in India as well as in the United States.[253][254][255]
India has pushed for reforms in the United Nations and in the World Trade Organization with mixed results. India's candidature for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council is currently backed by several countries including Russia, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Brazil, African Union nations and the US. In 2005, the US signed a nuclear co-operation agreement with India even though the latter is not a part of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The United States agreed that India's strong nuclear non-proliferation record made it an exception and persuaded other Nuclear Suppliers Group members to sign similar deals with India.
On March 2, 2006, India and the United States signed the Indo-US Nuclear Pact on co-operation in civilian nuclear field. This was signed during the four days state visit of US President George Bush in India. On its part, India would separate its civilian and military nuclear programmes, and the civilian programmes would be brought under the safeguards of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The United States would sell India the reactor technologies and the nuclear fuel for setting up and upgrading its civilian nuclear programme. The US Congress needed to ratify this pact since US federal law prohibits the trading of nuclear technologies and materials outside the framework of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
Economic relations[edit | edit source]
The United States is one of India's largest direct investors. From 1991 to 2004, the stock of FDI inflow increased from US$11 million to $344.4 million, and totaling $4.13 billion. This is a compound rate increase of 57.5 percent annually. Indian direct investments abroad began in 1992, and Indian corporations and registered partnership firms now can and do invest in businesses up to 100 percent of their net worth. India's largest outgoing investments are in the manufacturing sector, which accounts for 54.8 percent of the country's foreign investments. The second largest are in non-financial services (software development), accounting for 35.4 percent of investments. According to the data of the commerce ministry, in 2021–22, bilateral trade in goods between the two countries crossed $119.42 billion. Exports to the US increased to $76.11 billion in 2021-22 from $51.62 billion in previous fiscal year, while imports rose to $43.31 billion as compared to about $29 billion in 2020–21.[256] Tensions arose in 2025 as US President Donald Trump imposed tariffs on Indian goods, particularly pharmaceuticals, prompting negotiations to mitigate economic impacts.[257][258][259] Nearly half of all generic drugs in the US came from India, with Indian generics saving $219 billion in healthcare costs in 2022 alone.[257] In late July 2025, Trump threatened to raise tariffs on Indian imports to 25% if the allies failed to complete a long-term trade deal.[260]
As of 2025, according to the Global Trade Research Initiative, the US earns between $80–85 billion annually from India through sectors like higher education, digital services, financial consulting, intellectual property, and defense sales. These earnings create a net surplus of $35–40 billion for the US.[261][262]
A major 500 billion dollar trade deal is expected to be signed between the two countries to expand their trade relations and give India better access to American consumer market. The deal is expected to be signed in the QUAD summit 2025 in India with US President Donald Trump present there.[citation needed]
After a long time period of tariff tensions between the two countries, on 2 February 2026, it was reported that India and the US have signed a significant trade agreement. According to the deal the US tariffs on goods from India will be about 18%. In return India agreed to reduce to zero, trade barriers on products from the US, while expanding purchases from the US energy, technology, agriculture and defense sectors. The agreement was achieved after a key political element was settled, India will stop buying Russian oil.[263][264][265]
Trade relations[edit | edit source]


The United States is India's largest trading partner since 2021,[256] and India is its 7th largest trading partner.[266] In 2017, the US exported $25.7 billion worth of goods to India, and imported $48.6 billion worth of Indian goods.[267] Major imports from India include information technology services, textiles, machinery, gems and diamonds, chemicals, iron and steel products, coffee, tea, and other edible food products. Major American items imported by India include aircraft, fertilisers, computer hardware, scrap metal, and medical equipment.[268][269]
The United States is also India's largest investment partner, with a direct investment of $10 billion (accounting for 9 percent of total foreign investment). Americans have made notable foreign investments in India's power generation, telecommunications, ports, roads, petroleum exploration and processing, and mining industries.[269] American imports from India amounted to $46.6 billion or 2% of its overall imports, and 15.3% of India's overall exports in 2015. Major goods exported from India to the US include gemstones, precious metals and coins, pharmaceuticals, oil, machinery, textiles (including knit & crochet), organic chemicals, vehicles, and iron or steel products.[270][271] American exports to India amounted to $20.5 billion or 5.2% of India's overall imports in 2015. Major commodities exported from the US to India include gemstones, precious metals and coins, machinery, electronic equipment, medical equipment, oil, aircraft/spacecraft, plastics, organic chemicals, fruits and nuts.[272][273]
In July 2005, President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh created a new programme called the Trade Policy Forum.[274] It is run by a representative from each nation. The United States Trade Representative was Rob Portman, and the Indian Commerce Secretary then-Minister of Commerce Kamal Nath. The goal of the programme is to increase bilateral trade and investment flow. There are five main sub-divisions of the Trade Policy Forum, including The Agricultural Trade group, which has three main objectives: agreeing on terms that will allow India to export mangoes to the United States; permitting India's Agricultural and Process Food Products Export Development Authority (APEDA) to certify Indian products to the standards of the US Department of Agriculture; and executing regulation procedures for approving edible wax on fruit.[citation needed]
The goals of the Tariff and Non-Tariff Barriers group include agreeing that insecticides manufactured by US companies can be sold throughout India. India had also agreed to cut special regulations on trading carbonated drinks, many medicinal drugs, and lowering regulations on many imports that are not of an agricultural nature. Both nations have agreed to discuss improved facets of Indian regulation in the trade of jewellery, computer parts, motorcycles, fertiliser, and those tariffs that affect American exporting of boric acid. The group has also discussed matters such as those wishing to break into the accounting market, Indian companies gaining licenses for the telecommunications industry, and setting policies regarding Indian media and broadcasting markets. Other foci include the exchange of valuable information on recognizing different professional services, discussing the movement and positioning of people in developing industries, continuation of talks on financial services markets, limitation of equities, insurance, retail, joint investment in agricultural processing and transportation industries, and small business initiatives.[citation needed]
On August 3, 2018, India became the third Asian nation to be granted Strategic Trade Authorization-1 (STA-1) status by the United States. STA-1 enables the export of high-technology products in civil space and defence from the US to India.[275][276] On February 15, 2023, Air India announced an order of 470 jets, out of which 220 jets would be bought from Boeing and the other 250 from Airbus. This is one of the biggest aircraft orders in the commercial jet industry. The deal was acknowledged by both the US President and India's Prime Minister's Office.[277] During Modi's visit in 2023, resolution of six of seven outstanding WTO disputes between the US and India was reached through mutually agreed solutions and market access.[170]
On July 30, 2025, US President Donald Trump announced that Indian products would be subject to 25% tariffs upon arrival in the United States starting August 1, and that a "penalty" would be added for the purchase of Russian oil.[278] On August 6, 2025, President Trump raised the tariff to 50%, a 25% increase, over India's purchase of Russian oil.[279] The new rate will take effect on August 27, 2025.[280]
On October 22, 2025, the United States imposed sanctions on Russian oil companies Rosneft and Lukoil,[281] affecting their customers in India.[282]
| 1990 | 2000 | 2010 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| US exports to India | 2.5 | 3.7 | 19.2 | 21.5 | 21.6 | 25.6 | 33.2 | 34.2 | 27.1 | 39.8 | 46.9 | 40.3 | 41.5 | 38.2 |
| US imports from India | 3.2 | 10.7 | 29.5 | 44.8 | 46.0 | 48.5 | 54.2 | 57.9 | 51.3 | 73.3 | 85.5 | 83.7 | 87.3 | 88.2 |
| Trade balance | −0.7 | −7.0 | −10.3 | −24.4 | −24.4 | −22.9 | −21.1 | −23.7 | −24.2 | −33.5 | −38.6 | −43.3 | −45.8 | −50.0 |
Fentanyl[edit | edit source]
India has increasingly been implicated in the illicit fentanyl trade, with a 2025 US intelligence report highlighting its role as a significant supplier of precursor chemicals, second only to China. The report, published in March 2025, notes that Indian pharmaceutical companies have been linked to exports of fentanyl precursors to Mexico and Guatemala, fueling the opioid crisis in the US This follows India's inclusion in the 2024 US Department of Justice indictments, targeting executives from pharmaceutical firms involved in the trade.[284]
Science and technology[edit | edit source]
On January 31, 2023, the US–India Civil Space Joint Working Group met for the eighth time. The group is a collaboration of space agencies ISRO and NASA. The working group planned to launch The NASA-ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar mission in 2024 which is expected to map Earth using two different radar frequencies to monitor resources like water, forests, and agriculture.[285]
In January 2023, the national security advisors of India and the US announced the launch of the US–India Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET). Under iCET, both sides will work together in the fields of artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, advanced wireless technology, space and semiconductor supply chain resilience.[286] India signed the Artemis Accords in 2023, joining 26 other countries working on exploration of the moon, Mars, and beyond; additionally, NASA will provide advanced training to ISRO astronauts with the goal of launching a joint effort to the International Space Station in 2024.[170]
Role of Indian diaspora[edit | edit source]
The Indian diaspora significantly bolsters India–US economic relations through key contributions in technology, entrepreneurship, and academia. Their presence in Silicon Valley and leadership roles in various sectors fosters innovation and collaboration, while their entrepreneurial ventures strengthen economic ties. Additionally, the diaspora serves as a vital link for investments between the two countries, and their involvement in education and research contributes to advancements in science and technology. Beyond economics, the diaspora's cultural initiatives promote understanding and dialogue, further enhancing the overall relationship between India and the US.[287]
India-US strategic partnership[edit | edit source]

During the Cold War (1960–1990)[edit | edit source]
India–US strategic relations grew in the early 1960s, as the rise of the People's Republic of China worried policymakers in Washington, D.C. The Chinese government's assertion in Tibet, its role in the Korean War, and other such acts concerned Washington. As relations between India and China were heated during the late '50s, the Americans found a golden opportunity to take advantage of this situation to promote India as a counterweight to China.[288]
Post–Cold War era (1990–2014)[edit | edit source]
After the end of the Cold War, Indian and American interests converged in a number of areas, including counter-terrorism, promotion of democracy, counter-proliferation, freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean, and the balance of power in Asia.[288] India emerged in the 21st century as increasingly vital to core US foreign policy interests. India, a dominant actor in its region and the home of more than one billion citizens, is now often characterised as a nascent great power and an "indispensable partner" of the US, one that many analysts view as a potential counterweight to the growing clout of China.[289]
In a meeting between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in November 2001, the two leaders expressed a strong interest in transforming the US–India bilateral relationship. High-level meetings and concrete cooperation between the two countries increased during 2002 and 2003. In January 2004, the US and India launched the "Next Steps in Strategic Partnership" (NSSP), which was both a milestone in the transformation of the bilateral relationship and a blueprint for its further progress.[290] In July 2005, Bush hosted Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in Washington, D.C. The two leaders announced the successful completion of the NSSP, as well as other agreements which further enhanced cooperation in the areas of civil nuclear, civil space, and high-technology commerce. Other initiatives announced included a US–India economic dialogue; the fight against HIV/AIDS; disaster relief; technology cooperation; an agriculture knowledge initiative; a trade policy forum; energy dialogue; CEO Forum; and an initiative to assist each other in furthering democracy and freedom.[291] President Bush made a reciprocal visit to India in March 2006, during which the progress of these initiatives were reviewed, and new initiatives were launched.[292]
As the world's oldest and largest democracies, respectively, the US and India share historic ties.[293] India is a founding member of the "Community of Democracies"—a prominent endeavor of the United States for promotion of democracy. However, India rejected a suggestion by the US about setting up a Centre for Asian Democracy.[294]
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was the guest of honour at the first state dinner of the administration of US President Barack Obama, which took place on November 24, 2009. Obama later visited India from November 6–9, 2010, signing numerous trade and defence agreements with India. He addressed the joint session of the Indian parliament in New Delhi—becoming only the second US president to do so—and announced that the United States would lend its support to India's bid for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council, signifying the growing strategic dimension of the relationship between the world's two largest democracies.[295]
After the rise of the BJP (2014–present)[edit | edit source]
In 2016, India and the United States signed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement[296][297] and India was declared a Major Defense Partner of the United States.[17] During US President Trump's visit to India in 2020, both sides agree to establish "Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership".[298]
In both the 2017 Doklam standoff and the 2020–2021 China–India skirmishes, the United States provided India with intelligence it possessed, and the two sides discussed the crisis on Ladakh border. The US was also involved in securing the release of Indian pilot Abhinandan Varthaman from Pakistani custody following the 2019 Balakot airstrike.[299] According to former US secretary of state Mike Pompeo, the US played a role in extinguishing tensions between India and Pakistan in 2019, when Pakistan and India were at the verge of nuclear war.[300]
The strategic meetings between both countries is called the '2+2' dialogue. Representatives holding Foreign and Defense portfolios from each of the two countries participate in this meeting. The inaugural 2+2 dialogue between the two nations took place in September 2018 during the first Trump administration. The meeting involved the foreign minister Sushma Swaraj and then Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman representing India, while Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Secretary of Defence James Mattis represented the United States. Some agreements, including the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) (2018), were signed in these meetings.[301]

On October 27, 2020, US and India signed a military agreement on sharing sensitive satellite data. The Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement, or BECA, allows the US's strategic partners to access a range of sensitive geospatial and aeronautical data which is useful for military actions.[302] In December 2020, US India Business Council president Nisha Desai Biswal claimed that the ties between the two nations will continue and grow stronger in 2021, as the Biden administration would prioritize their trade deals for a prospering economic relationship.[303] In December 2022, based on BECA, the United States provided real-time location information of the PLA soldiers to help India fight China, during the confrontation in Arunachal Pradesh.[304]
Observer reactions[edit | edit source]
US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen encouraged stronger military ties between the two nations, and said that "India has emerged as an increasingly important strategic partner [of the US]".[305] In 2010, US Undersecretary of State William J. Burns also said, "Never has there been a moment when India and America mattered more to each other."[306]
In the wake of the 2025 India–Pakistan conflict, Indian Member of Parliament Shashi Tharoor expressed concern that US President Donald Trump made a false equivalence between India and Pakistan by equating the perpetrator with the victim in the aftermath of the terrorist incident in Kashmir.[307]
Post interim trade agreement[edit | edit source]
Following this economic agreement between the two countries, the strategic cooperation grew tighter. On 16, February 2026, it was reported that India seized three Iranian oil tankers, that were sanctioned by the US.[2][3]
Triangular relations[edit | edit source]
Africa[edit | edit source]
India and the United States have held two "India–US Dialogue on Africa" sessions as of 2024.[308]
Asia[edit | edit source]
In the 21st century, India–United States cooperation has aimed to contain China in Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific with the help of broader organizations, such as the Quad which includes Japan and Australia.[309][184] In 2009, Robert Blake, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, dismissed any concerns over a rift with India regarding American AfPak policy in South Asia, calling India and the United States "natural allies".[310] However, American ties with Pakistan and Bangladesh have sometimes clashed with India's military and political preferences in its neighborhood.[311][312][313]
India and United States have differences over the role of US's mediation in India's conflicts in its neighborhood that particularly involve Pakistan. For instance, in 2025, US President Donald Trump claimed multiple times how he stopped the 2025 India-Pakistan conflict by leveraging trade[314]—despite US Vice President JD Vance who earlier stated that US would not intervene—[315][316] while India firmly rejected the claims and stated that the military operations that were part of Operation Sindoor only ceased when India's military objectives were achieved.[317] Both the Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and the Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh rejected the claims on different occasions with the former attributing the cessation of hostilities to military actions by India.[318][319]
In August 2025, Pakistan’s army chief Field Marshal Asim Munir reportedly stated during a dinner in Florida that if Pakistan faced an existential threat, “we’ll take half the world down with us.” India condemned the reported remarks as “nuclear sabre-rattling” and described them as irresponsible, with the Ministry of External Affairs also expressing regret that such statements were made on the soil of a friendly third country, referring to the United States.[320][321]
European and Western countries[edit | edit source]
Canada[edit | edit source]
Both Canada and the United States allege that the Indian government ordered assassinations on Sikh separatists who were their citizens. Regarding the 2023 Canada–India diplomatic row on this matter, State Department spokesman Matthew Miller said in October 2024 that "We wanted to see the government of India cooperate with Canada in its investigation. Obviously, they have not; they have chosen an alternate path."[322]
United Kingdom[edit | edit source]
Serious tension erupted over American demands that India be given independence, a proposition Churchill vehemently rejected. For years Roosevelt had encouraged Britain's disengagement from India. The American position was based on principled opposition to colonialism, practical concern for the outcome of the war, and the expectation of a large American role in a post-colonial era. In 1942 when the Congress Party launched a Quit India movement, the colonial authorities arrested tens of thousands of activists (including Mahatma Gandhi). Meanwhile, India became the main American staging base for aid to China. Churchill threatened to resign if Roosevelt continued to push his demands, and Roosevelt backed down.[323][324] Churchill was a believer in the integrity of the British Empire, but he was voted out of office in the summer of 1945. Attlee's new Labour government was much more favorable toward Indian aspirations. The process of de-colonization was highlighted by the independence Britain granted to India, Pakistan and Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) in 1947. The United States approved, but provided no financial or diplomatic support.[325][326]
Ukraine[edit | edit source]
During the Biden administration and the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there were initially significant tensions regarding India's ties with Russia. However, the second Trump administration is anticipated to seek a quick end to the conflict, likely reducing India's distance from the United States on European security issues.[327][needs update]
Latin America and the Caribbean[edit | edit source]
Cultural relations[edit | edit source]
Cultural relations between India and the United States are among the strongest pillars of the bilateral relationship and are largely driven by deep people-to-people ties, shared democratic norms, and sustained educational, artistic, and intellectual exchange. The Indian-American diaspora—numbering over 4.5 million people as of 2025—plays a central role in bridging the two societies and has become one of the most influential immigrant communities in the United States. Indian Americans are highly represented in science, technology, medicine, business, academia, and public service, contributing significantly to the U.S. economy while maintaining close cultural, familial, and emotional ties to India.[184]
Educational exchange has been a cornerstone of cultural engagement. India has consistently been among the top sources of international students in the United States, particularly in STEM fields, management, and research-oriented disciplines. Student, research, and high-skilled worker visa programs have facilitated long-term professional networks and innovation ecosystems linking Silicon Valley, major U.S. universities, and India’s technology hubs. Alumni of U.S. institutions have gone on to play leading roles in India’s private sector, civil society, and government, reinforcing a virtuous cycle of cooperation.
Language, media, cuisine, festivals, and religion further reinforce cultural familiarity. English as a shared working language, combined with the global reach of Indian and American media, has helped normalize cross-cultural consumption. Indian festivals such as Diwali and Holi are increasingly celebrated in U.S. cities, while American cultural norms and popular culture are deeply embedded in urban India, especially among younger generations.
Public opinion and polling[edit | edit source]
Public opinion data consistently reflects strong mutual goodwill. According to annual World Affairs surveys conducted by Gallup, India has ranked among the most favorably viewed countries by Americans. In 2015, 71% of Americans held a favorable view of India,[328] rising to 74% in 2017,[329] 72% in 2019,[330] 75% in 2020,[331] 77% in 2022,[332] and 70% in 2023.[333] India has frequently ranked within the top tier of countries viewed positively by the American public, ahead of many traditional allies.
Reciprocal sentiment in India is equally strong. A Morning Consult poll conducted in August 2021, following the fall of Afghanistan, found that 79% of Indians viewed the United States favorably, with only 10% holding unfavorable views—the highest favorability rating recorded among the 15 major countries surveyed. Notably, this rating exceeded Americans’ own favorability toward the United States at the time.[334] These trends underscore the unusually strong public-level foundation of the bilateral relationship.
Cinema and visual media[edit | edit source]
Film has been a powerful vehicle of cultural exchange. Indian cinema, including Bollywood and regional industries, has gained a growing audience in the United States, driven by the diaspora as well as increased mainstream exposure through streaming platforms and theatrical releases. Films such as RRR achieved unprecedented commercial and cultural success in the United States in the 2020s, signaling broader American interest in Indian storytelling, music, and spectacle.[335]
American cinema has long enjoyed widespread popularity in India, particularly since the end of the Cold War and India’s economic liberalization. India has emerged as one of the top global markets for Hollywood films, with U.S. studios increasingly tailoring releases, marketing strategies, and collaborations for Indian audiences.[336] Earlier films such as Mississippi Masala also played an important role in exploring the experiences of Indian Americans and race relations in the United States, helping bring South Asian narratives into mainstream American discourse.
Health, spirituality, and lifestyle[edit | edit source]
Indian traditions related to health, wellness, and spirituality have had a lasting influence in the United States. Practices such as Yoga and meditation have become widely adopted across American society, spanning fitness, mental health, education, and alternative medicine. Indian spiritual leaders played a formative role in this exchange, most notably Swami Vivekananda, who introduced aspects of Vedanta and yoga philosophy to American audiences at the turn of the twentieth century, helping lay the intellectual foundation for later cross-cultural engagement.[337][338] In the contemporary period, wellness exchanges continue through academic research, medical collaboration, and cultural tourism.

Music[edit | edit source]
Musical exchange between India and the United States dates back to the early twentieth century. American music entered India partly through colonial-era networks and was strongly influenced by African American jazz traditions, which resonated with Indian modernist and urban cultural movements.[339] In later decades, rock, pop, hip-hop, and electronic music gained widespread popularity in India, while Indian classical and fusion music influenced American artists and audiences.
In the 21st century, collaborations between Indian and American musicians, composers, and producers have increased, particularly in film scoring, electronic music, and global pop. Indian American artists have played a prominent role in blending genres and shaping transnational musical identities.
Sports and recreation[edit | edit source]
Sport has emerged as a growing arena of cultural connection. Cricket was introduced to both India and the United States during the era of the British Empire, but while it flourished in South Asia, the United States gravitated toward baseball following the Civil War.[340]
In the 21st century, the growth of the Indian-American community and increased private investment have helped revive cricket in the United States. The launch of Major League Cricket and the rising popularity of T20 cricket—including the United States co-hosting the 2024 Men's T20 World Cup—marked significant milestones in sporting cooperation and visibility.[341][342] At the same time, American sports leagues, fitness culture, and recreational norms have gained a substantial following in India, further reinforcing mutual cultural familiarity.
Public opinion[edit | edit source]
Gallup's annual World Affairs survey shows India is perceived by Americans as their sixth favorite nation in the world, with 71% of Americans viewing India favorably in 2015,[343] and 70% in 2023.[344] Gallup polls found that 74% of Americans viewed India favorably in 2017,[345] 72% in 2019,[346] 75% in 2020[347] and 77% in 2022.[348] According to a Morning Consult poll conducted in August 2021 after the fall of Afghanistan, 79% of Indians viewed the United States favorably, compared to 10% who viewed the United States unfavorably. This was the highest favorability rating out of all 15 major countries surveyed and higher than US citizens' own favorability rating of the US at the time.[334]
Embassies and consulates[edit | edit source]
|
|
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Embassy of India in Washington, D.C.
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Consulate-General of India in Atlanta
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Consulate-General of India in Houston
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Consulate-General of India in New York City
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Consulate-General of India in San Francisco
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Embassy of the United States in New Delhi
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Consulate-General of the United States in Chennai
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Consulate-General of the United States in Mumbai
Head of state visits[edit | edit source]
| Name | Dates | Location | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Dwight D. Eisenhower | December 9–14, 1959 | New Delhi, Agra |
| 2 | Richard Nixon | July 31 – August 1, 1969 | New Delhi |
| 3 | Jimmy Carter | January 1–3, 1978 | New Delhi, Daulatpur Nasirabad (now Carterpuri) |
| 4 | Bill Clinton | March 19–25, 2000 | New Delhi, Agra, Jaipur, Hyderabad, Mumbai |
| 5 | George W. Bush | March 1–3, 2006 | New Delhi, Hyderabad |
| 6 | Barack Obama | November 6–9, 2010
January 25–27, 2015 |
Mumbai, New Delhi |
| 7 | Donald Trump | February 24–25, 2020 | Ahmedabad, Agra, New Delhi |
| 8 | Joe Biden | September 8–10, 2023 | New Delhi |
See also[edit | edit source]
- Geostrategic
- Blue Team (U.S. politics)
- Free and Open Indo-Pacific
- India as an emerging superpower
- India–United States Civil Nuclear Agreement
- Group of Three (G3)
- Malabar (naval exercise)
- Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
- String of Pearls (Indian Ocean)
- CIA activities in India
- Cultural and peoples relations
- Sikhism in the United States
- Hinduism in the United States
- Americans in India
- Indian Americans
- Buddhism in the United States
- Foreign relations
- Canada–India relations
- China–United States relations
- China containment policy
- India–European Union relations
- Pakistan–United States relations
References[edit | edit source]
- ↑ Sharma, Yashraj. "Can India switch from Russian to Venezuelan oil, as Trump wants?". Al Jazeera. Retrieved February 4, 2026.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 Choudhary, Sanjeev (February 3, 2026). "India-US trade deal: India will drop Russian oil, pivot to US, Venezuela, says Trump". The Economic Times. ISSN 0013-0389. Retrieved February 4, 2026.
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Further reading[edit | edit source]
- Aspen Institute India. The United States and India: A Shared Strategic Future (Council on Foreign Relations, 2011) online
- Ayres, Alyssa and C. Raja Mohan, eds. Power Realignments in Asia: China, India and the United States (2009) JSTOR 48504849
- Brands, H. W. India and the United States: The Cold Peace (1990) online free to borrow
- Brands, H. W. Inside the Cold War: Loy Henderson and the Rise of the American Empire 1918–1961 (1991) pp 196–230; Loy Henderson was US Ambassador, 1948–51
- Chary, M. Srinivas. The Eagle and the Peacock: U.S. Foreign Policy toward India since Independence (1995) online
- Chaudhuri, Rudra. Forged in Crisis: India and the United States since 1947 (Oxford UP, 2014); online; DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199354863.001.0001
- Clymer, Kenton J. Quest for Freedom: The United States and India's Independence (1995)
- Fink, Leon. "Siren Song of Economic Development: U.S. Missions to India, 1952–1975" in Fink, Undoing the Liberal World Order: Progressive Ideals and Political Realities Since World War II (Columbia UP, 2022) online pp. 126–162
- Gopal, Sarvepalli. Jawaharlal Nehru: a Biography Volume 1 1889-1947 (1975); Jawaharlal Nehru Vol. 2 1947-1956 (1979); Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography Volume 3 1956-1964 (2014), detailed coverage of diplomacy
- Gould, H.A. and S. Ganguly, eds. The hope and the reality: US-Indian relations from Roosevelt to Reagan (1992).
- Govil, Nitin. Orienting Hollywood: A Century of Film Culture Between Los Angeles and Bombay (NYU Press, 2015)
- Hart, David M., and Zoltan J. Acs. "High-tech immigrant entrepreneurship in the United States." Economic Development Quarterly (2011) 25#2 pp: 116–129. online
- Heimsath, C.H. and Surjit Mansingh. A diplomatic history of modern India (1971) online
- Hilsman, Roger. To move a nation; the politics of foreign policy in the administration of John F. Kennedy (1967) pp 275–357. on 1961–63.
- Hooper, Jane. Yankees in the Indian Ocean: American Commerce and Whaling, 1786–1860 (Ohio University Press, 2022) online review
- Isaacs, Harold R. Scratches on Our Minds: American Images of China and India (1958) online
- Jackson, Carl T. "The Influence of Asia upon American Thought: A Bibliographical Essay." American Studies International 22#1 (1984), pp. 3–31, JSTOR 41280625 covers China, India & Japan
- Jain, Rashmi K. The United States and India: 1947–2006 A Documentary Study (2007)
- Karl, David J. "U.S.-India Relations: The Way Forward," Orbis (2012) 56#2 pp 308–327 online
- Kux, Dennis. India and The United States: Estranged Democracies 1941–1991 (1993)
- McMahon, Robert J. Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India and Pakistan (1994) excerpt and text search
- Madan, Tanvi. "With an eye to the east: the China factor and the US-India relationship, 1949-1979" (PhD dissertation, U Texas 2012). online free
- Malone, David M., C. Raja Mohan, and Srinath Raghavan, eds. The Oxford handbook of Indian foreign policy (2015) pp 481–94.
- Merrill, Dennis (1990). Bread and the Ballot: The United States and India's Economic Development, 1947–1963. UNC Press.
- Mishra, Sylvia. "Forged in Crisis: India and the United States since 1947." Indian Foreign Affairs Journal 9#3 (2014): 301+.
- Mistry, Dinshaw. Aligning Unevenly: India and the United States (Honolulu: East-West Center, 2016), focus after 2000 online.
- Pant, Harsh V (2009). "The US-India Nuclear Pact: Policy, Process, and Great Power Politics". Asian Security. 5 (3): 273–95. doi:10.1080/14799850903179012. S2CID 144493366.
- Raghavan, Srinath. The Most Dangerous Place: A History of the United States in South Asia. (Penguin Random House India, 2018); also published as Fierce Enigmas: A History of the United States in South Asia.(2018 )
- Rani, Sudesh. "Indo-US Maritime Cooperation: Challenges and Prospects," Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India, Vol. 8, No. 2, (December 2012) Pages: 123-43 doi:10.1080/09733159.2012.742664
- Riedel, Bruce (2013). Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 978-0-8157-2408-7.
- —————— (2015). JFK's Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, the CIA, and Sino-Indian War. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 978-0-8157-2699-9.
- Rotter, Andrew J. Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947–1964 (2000)
- Roy, Dr. P. C. Indo-U.S. Economic Relations. Rajouri Garden, New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1986. 73–125.
- Schaffer, Teresita C. India and the United States in the 21st Century: Reinventing Partnership (2010)
- Sharma, G. D. Indo Us Defence Cooperation (Vij Books, 2012), excerpt and text search
- Sokolski, Henry. United States and India Strategic Cooperation (2010)
- Vinod, M.J. United States foreign policy toward India (1991)
Recent[edit | edit source]
- Bajpai, Kanti, Selina Ho, and Manjari Chatterjee Miller, eds. Routledge Handbook of China–India Relations (Routledge, 2020). excerpt
- Malone, David M., C. Raja Mohan, and Srinath Raghavan, eds. The Oxford handbook of Indian foreign policy (2015) excerpt pp 481–494.
- Martin, Michael F., et al. "India-U.S. Economic Relations: In Brief" Current Politics and Economics of Northern and Western Asia 24#1 (2015): 99+.
- Mukherjee, Rohan. "Chaos as opportunity: the United States and world order in India's grand strategy." Contemporary Politics 26.4 (2020): 420-438 online.
- Raghavan, Srinath. The Most Dangerous Place: A History of the United States in South Asia. (Penguin Random House India, 2018); also published as Fierce Enigmas: A History of the United States in South Asia.(2018). online review; also see excerpt
- Rajagopalan, Rajesh. "U.S.-India Relations under President Trump: Promise and Peril." Asia Policy, no. 24 (2017).
- Rubinoff, Arthur G. "Missed opportunities and contradictory policies: Indo-American relations in the Clinton-Rao years." Pacific Affairs (1996): 499-517 JSTOR 2761184
- Talbott, Strobe. Engaging India: Diplomacy, democracy, and the bomb (Brookings Institution Press, 2010). online
- Tellis, Ashley J. 'The Surprising Success of the U.S.-Indian Partnership: Trump and Modi Have Deepened Defense Cooperation Against the Odds'. Foreign Affairs 20 (February 2020) online
- Tellis, Ashley. "Narendra Modi and US–India Relations." in Making of New India: Transformation Under Modi Government (2018): 525-535 online.
- van de Wetering, Carina. Changing US Foreign Policy toward India: US-India Relations since the Cold War (2016) excerpt
Primary sources[edit | edit source]
- Bowles, Chester (1969). A View from New Delhi: Selected Speeches and Writings, 1963–1969. Yale U.P. ISBN 978-0-300-10546-9., US ambassador 1951–53 and 1963–69; excerpt and text search
- Bowles, Chester. Promises to Keep (1972), autobiography; pp 531–79 by US ambassador 1951–53 and 1963–69
- Galbraith, John K. Ambassador's journal: a personal account of the Kennedy years (1969) online, he was US ambassador to India 1961–63
- U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), many volumes of primary sources; the complete texts of these large books are all online. See Guide to FRUS. For example, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971 was published in 2005 and is online here. The most recent volumes are Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972 (2005) online here and Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976 (2007) online here.
External links[edit | edit source]
| Library resources about India–United States relations |
- The United States and India: Emerging Allies or Necessary Partners Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2022
- Natural Allies? The India-US Relations from the Clinton Administration to the Trump Era French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), 2020
- Blake, Jr., Robert O. "U.S.-India Relations: the Making of a Comprehensive Relationship." US official speech at India's Army War College, August 23, 2004; online
- History of India – US Relations, official US site
- India-U.S. Relations Archived May 30, 2010, at the Wayback Machine Congressional Research Service
- Indian Embassy: India – US Relations: A General Overview, official Indian site
- Deepening U.S.-India Economic Engagement, Q&A with US Ambassador Susan Esserman (September 2011)
- A Way Forward in U.S.-India Defense Cooperation, July 2011 interview with Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta
- Charting the Future of U.S.-India Relations, June 2011 interview with Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering
- U.S. Department of state: The Future of US-India Relations
- U.S. Department of Agriculture: U.S.–India Trade Relations
- Tariffs On India, Trade With Pakistan: Rewinding Latest Round Of Trump Deals












