Centre-right politics: Difference between revisions

Created by Ajay Kumar
Last edited February 18, 2026
Created a new article
 
Navi guy (talk | contribs)
refine structure as per guidelines
 
Line 1: Line 1:
{{Short description|Political orientation}}
{{Short description|Political orientation}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=January 2015}}{{Use British English|date=August 2016}}
{{Good article}}
{{Party politics}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=November 2023}}
'''Centre-right politics''' lean to the [[Right-wing politics|right]] of the [[Left–right politics|political spectrum]], but are closer to the [[Centrism|centre]]. Parties of the centre-right generally support [[liberal democracy]], [[capitalism]], the [[market economy]], [[Property rights (economics)|private property rights]], and a modest [[welfare state]]. They support [[conservatism]] and [[economic liberalism]] and oppose [[socialism]] and [[communism]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Rohrschneider |first=Robert |date=May 2000 |title=<i>The New Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies</i>. Han-Georg Betz , Stefan Immerfall |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/jop.62.2.2647710 |journal=The Journal of Politics |volume=62 |issue=2 |pages=619–620 |doi=10.1086/jop.62.2.2647710 |issn=0022-3816}}</ref>
{{Use Oxford spelling|date=October 2025}}
{{Party politics|political spectrum}}
'''Centre-right politics''' is the set of [[right-wing politics|right-wing]] political [[ideologies]] that lean closer to the [[political centre]]. It is commonly associated with [[conservatism]], [[Christian democracy]], [[liberal conservatism]], and [[conservative liberalism]]. Conservative and liberal centre-right political parties have historically performed better in elections in the [[Anglosphere]] than other centre-right parties, while Christian democracy has been the primary centre-right ideology in Europe.


From the 1780s to the 1880s, there was a shift in the [[Western world]] of [[social class]] structure and the economy, moving away from the [[nobility]] and [[mercantilism]], towards [[capitalism]].<ref>{{citation | last = Kahan | first = Alan S.| contribution = The unexpected honeymoon of mind and money, 1730–1830 | editor-last = Kahan | editor-first = Alan S. | title = Mind vs. money: the war between intellectuals and capitalism | page = 88 | publisher = [[Transaction Publishers]] | location = New Brunswick, New Jersey | year = 2010 | isbn = 978-1412810630 | postscript = .}}</ref><ref>{{cite news | last1 = Shenon | first1 = Philip | last2 = Greenhouse | first2 = Linda | author-link2 = Linda Greenhouse | title = Washington talk: Briefing; the King and the Joker | url = https://www.nytimes.com/1988/08/17/us/washington-talk-briefing-the-king-and-the-joker.html | work = [[The New York Times]] | date = 17 August 1988 | quote = This is the [[Title of Nobility Clause|''title of nobility'' clause]], which provides: 'No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States'.}}{{subscription required}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal | last = Wood | first = Diane | author-link = Diane Wood | title = Our 18th century constitution in the 21st century world | journal = New York University Law Review, Madison Lecture | volume = 80 | issue = 4 | pages = 1079–1107 | publisher = [[New York University School of Law]] | date = October 2005 | url = http://www.nyulawreview.org/issues/volume-80-number-4/our-18th-century-constitution-21st-century-world | quote = Debate [over the Constitution's] meaning is inevitable whenever something as specific as the... Titles of Nobility Clause is not at issue | access-date = 12 October 2015 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20171020124019/http://www.nyulawreview.org/issues/volume-80-number-4/our-18th-century-constitution-21st-century-world | archive-date = 20 October 2017 | url-status = dead }} pp. 105. [http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/pdf/NYULawReview-80-4-Wood.pdf Pdf.] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171020131306/http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/pdf/NYULawReview-80-4-Wood.pdf |date=20 October 2017 }}</ref> This general economic shift toward capitalism affected centre-right movements, such as the [[Conservative Party (UK)|Conservative Party]] of the United Kingdom, and the [[Republican Party (United States)|Republican Party]] of the United States, which responded by becoming supportive of capitalism.<ref name="IanAdams">{{cite book | last = Adams | first = Ian | title = Political ideology today | page = [https://archive.org/details/politicalideolog0000adam/page/57 57] | publisher = [[Manchester University Press]] | location = Manchester New York | year = 2001 | edition = 2nd | isbn = 978-0719060205 | url = https://archive.org/details/politicalideolog0000adam/page/57 }}</ref>
The centre-right commonly supports ideas such as [[small government]], [[law and order (politics)|law and order]], [[freedom of religion]], and strong [[national security]]. It has historically stood in opposition to [[radical politics]], [[redistributive policies]], [[multiculturalism]], [[illegal immigration]], and [[LGBT]] acceptance. Economically, the centre-right supports [[free market]]s and the [[social market economy]], with [[market liberalism]] and [[neoliberalism]] being common centre-right economic positions. It typically seeks to preserve the cultural and socioeconomic ''[[status quo]]'' and believes that changes should be [[gradualism|implemented gradually]].


The [[International Democrat Union]] is an alliance of centre-right (as well as some further right-wing) political parties – including the UK Conservative Party, the [[Conservative Party of Canada]], the [[Republican Party (United States)|Republican Party]] of the United States, the [[Liberal Party of Australia]], the [[New Zealand National Party]] and [[Christian democracy|Christian democratic]] parties – which declares commitment to human rights as well as economic development.<ref>[[International Democrat Union]]. ([http://www.idu.org/history.aspx History.] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120701100556/http://www.idu.org/history.aspx |date=1 July 2012 }} [http://www.idu.org/founder.aspx Founders.] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120701095758/http://www.idu.org/founder.aspx |date=1 July 2012 }} [http://www.idu.org/principle.aspx Declaration of Principles.] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120701093802/http://www.idu.org/principle.aspx |date=1 July 2012 }}) Accessed on 22 June 2012.</ref>
The centre-right is derived from the [[left–right political spectrum]] of the [[French Revolution]]. It first developed as a political force with the creation of [[party system]]s in the 19th century, when [[monarchist]] and religious conservatives competed with [[individualist]] and [[anti-clerical]] liberals. Christian democracy developed in the 1870s as another response to anti-clericalism. The centre-right provided a moderate position to compete with socialism in the 19th century, and it became a driving force for [[liberal democracy]] in the early 20th century.


Ideologies characterised as centre-right include [[liberal conservatism]] and some variants of [[liberalism]] and [[Christian democracy]], among others. The economic aspects of the modern centre-right have been influenced by [[economic liberalism]], generally supporting [[free markets]], limited [[government spending]] and other policies heavily associated with [[neoliberalism]]. The moderate right is neither universally [[social conservatism|socially conservative]] nor [[cultural liberalism|culturally liberal]], and often combines both beliefs with support for [[civil liberties]] and elements of [[traditional conservatism|traditionalism]].
The centre-right was reconfigured after [[World War II]] to temper support for nationalism; it became a dominant political position throughout the [[Western world]], particularly with the spread of Christian democracy across Europe. It aligned with the [[Western bloc]] during the Cold War, and in Europe it heavily influenced [[democratic consolidation]] and [[European integration]]. Global economic downturn in the 1970s caused a rise in support for neoliberalism and [[neoconservatism]]. The [[dissolution of the Soviet Union]] allowed a new centre-right movement to develop and take power in [[Central Europe|Central]] and [[Eastern Europe]] through the 1990s. The [[2008 financial crisis]] led to declining support for the centre-right.


Historical examples of centre-right schools of thought include [[One Nation Conservatism]] in the United Kingdom, [[Red Tories]] in Canada, and [[Rockefeller Republicans]] in the United States. [[New Democrats]] in the United States also embraced several aspects of centre-right policy, including [[balanced budgets]], [[free trade]], [[deregulation]], and [[welfare reform]]. These ideological factions contrast with [[far right|far-right]] policies and [[right-wing populism]]. They also tend to be more supportive of [[cultural liberalism]] and [[green conservatism]] than right-wing variants.
== Ideologies ==
The centre-right is heterogeneous and encompasses multiple distinct ideologies.{{Sfn|Gidron|Ziblatt|2019|pp=18, 24}}{{Sfn|Taflaga|2023|p=137}} Centre-right parties and coalitions are traditionally understood to be divided into separate factions depending on their priorities: economic, social, and cultural.{{Sfn|Gidron|Ziblatt|2019|p=24}} They are unified by their opposition to [[left-wing politics]].{{Sfn|Taflaga|2023|pp=138–139}}


According to a 2019 study, centre-right parties had approximately 27% of the vote share in 21 Western democracies in 2018.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal|last1=Gidron|first1=Noam|last2=Ziblatt|first2=Daniel|date=2019-05-11|title=Center-Right Political Parties in Advanced Democracies|journal=Annual Review of Political Science|language=en|volume=22|issue=1|pages=17–35|doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-090717-092750|doi-access=free|issn=1094-2939}}</ref> This was a decline from 37% in 1960.<ref name=":0" />
Christian democracy is a political ideology predominant in Europe that is often described as centre-right.{{Sfn|Hellwig|Kweon|Vowles|2020|p=162}}{{Sfn|Gidron|Ziblatt|2019|p=18}}{{Sfn|Ostrowski|2023|p=6}} It applies Christian morality to political issues, giving a religious justification for supporting [[democratization]], [[individual liberties]], and international cooperation.{{Sfn|Botsiou|2010|p=177}} Christian democrats hold conservative positions on most issues, but in a more moderate fashion than groups specifically described as conservative, and they trend centrist on economic issues.{{Sfn|Gidron|Ziblatt|2019|pp=24–25}} Instead of a strong government, it advocates [[decentralization]] where other social units such as family, the community, and various organizations are major actors in society.{{Sfn|Botsiou|2010|pp=178, 182}} While still supporting a [[market economy]], Christian democrats are more open to [[market intervention]] than conservatives, so as to prevent [[social inequality]].{{Sfn|Hatzivassiliou|2010|pp=210–211}} Unlike historical Christian political movements, Christian democracy is non-denominational and is not affiliated with the [[Catholic Church]].{{Sfn|Botsiou|2010|p=177}} Political scientists disagree as to whether post-war Christian democracy is continuous with that of the 19th century or if it is a new school of thought.{{Sfn|Taflaga|2023|p=139}}
Conservatism is commonly grouped with the centre-right,{{Sfn|Taflaga|2023|p=137}}{{Sfn|Hellwig|Kweon|Vowles|2020|p=162}}{{Sfn|Gidron|Ziblatt|2019|p=18}} though adherents of the far-right may argue that the centre-right is insufficiently conservative.{{Sfn|Hirschberger|Voges|2024|p=15}} [[Liberalism]] is sometimes grouped with the centre-right when it is expressed as conservative liberalism.{{Sfn|Ostrowski|2023|p=6}}{{Sfn|Taflaga|2023|p=138}}{{Sfn|Gidron|Ziblatt|2019|pp=20–21}} The centre-right can also include a liberal variant of conservatism.{{Sfn|Ostrowski|2023|p=6}}{{Sfn|Arndt|2017|p=496}} Conservative centre-right parties are more likely to incorporate [[ethnic nationalism]] relative to liberal centre-right parties.{{Sfn|Sandal|Loizides|2013|p=419 note 1}} Conservatives and liberals both oppose heavy governmental involvement in the economy.{{Sfn|Bale|2008|p=324}} Right-liberalism is common in Europe,{{Sfn|Noël|Thérien|2008|p=233}} contrasted with the [[centrist]] liberalism in Canada and the United Kingdom,{{Sfn|Gidron|Ziblatt|2019|p=21}} and with the [[Social liberalism|left-liberalism]] of the United States.{{Sfn|Noël|Thérien|2008|p=233}} Economic ideologies associated with the centre-right include neoliberalism{{Sfn|Hellwig|Kweon|Vowles|2020|p=161}}{{Sfn|Taflaga|2023|p=143}} and market liberalism.{{Sfn|Ostrowski|2023|p=6}}{{Sfn|Gidron|Ziblatt|2019|pp=24, 26}} Other ideologies sometimes grouped under the centre-right descriptor include [[agrarianism]]{{Sfn|Gidron|Ziblatt|2019|pp=21–22}} and populist [[nationalism]].{{Sfn|Gidron|Ziblatt|2019|pp=26, 28}}


==History==
Centre-right liberal and conservative parties have historically been successful in the [[Anglosphere]], such as those in Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, and they have made up the primary centre-right ideologies in Scandinavia.{{Sfn|Taflaga|2023|p=139}} In contemporary politics, these two ideologies often co-exist in the same party.{{Sfn|Taflaga|2023|p=140}} Christian democracy has been the predominant centre-right ideology in continental Europe, particularly in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. It has performed most successfully in Catholic countries, while Christian democracy in other countries takes on more left-wing positions or fails to gain influence.{{Sfn|Taflaga|2023|p=139}} Christian democratic parties are affiliated with the [[Centrist Democrat International]] and centre-right liberal parties are affiliated with the [[International Democracy Union]].{{Sfn|Salih|2006|p=153}} In Europe, centre-right parties are affiliated with the [[European People's Party]].{{Sfn|Sandal|Loizides|2013|p=419 note 1}}{{Sfn|Botsiou|2010|p=174}}
===French Revolution to World War II===
The prominent inspiration for the centre-right (especially in Britain) was the [[traditionalist conservatism]] of [[Edmund Burke]].<ref>{{citation | last = Eatwell | first = Roger | author-link = Roger Eatwell | contribution = The nature of the Right: the right as a variety of styles of thought | editor-last1 = Eatwell | editor-first1 = Roger | editor-last2 = O'Sullivan | editor-first2 = Noël | editor-link = Roger Eatwell | title = The nature of the right: American and European politics and political thought since 1789 | page = 66 | publisher = Twayne Publishers | location = Boston | year = 1990 | series = Themes in right-wing ideology and politics series | isbn = 9780861879342 | quote = Burke has been seen as the father of modern British conservatism, which serves as the best example of the moderate right tradition. }}</ref> Burke's traditionalist conservatism was more moderate than the [[continental conservatism]] developed by [[Joseph de Maistre]] in [[France]], that upon experiencing the [[French Revolution]] completely denounced the status quo that existed immediately prior to the revolution (unlike Burke) and de Maistre sought a [[reactionary]] counter-revolution that would dismantle all modern society and return it to a strictly religious-based society.<ref>{{citation | last1 = Adams | first1 = Bert | last2 = Sydie | first2 = R.A. | contribution = Section I The origins of sociological theory: the philosophical precursors of sociology | editor-last1 = Adams | editor-first1 = Bert | editor-last2 = Sydie | editor-first2 = R.A. | title = Sociological theory | pages = 25–26 | publisher = Pine Forge Press | location = Thousand Oaks, California | year = 2001 | isbn = 9780761985570 | postscript = .}}</ref> While Burke condemned the French Revolution, he had supported the [[American Revolution]] that he viewed as being a conservative revolution.<ref name="David">{{citation | last = Bridge | first = Carl | author-link = Carl Bridge | contribution = Burke and the conservative tradition | editor-last1 = Close | editor-first1 = David H. | editor-last2 = Bridge | editor-first2 = Carl | editor-link2 = Carl Bridge | title = Revolution: a history of the idea | page = 81 | publisher = [[Croom Helm Ltd.]] | location = London | year = 1985 | isbn = 9780709934202 | postscript = .}}</ref> Burke claimed that the Americans revolted for the same reason as the English had during the [[Glorious Revolution]], in both cases a monarch had overstepped the boundaries of his duties.<ref name="David" /> Burke claimed that the American Revolution was justified because King George III had overstepped his customary rights by imposing taxes on the American colonists without their consent.<ref name="David" /> Burke opposed the French Revolution because he opposed its anti-traditionalism and its use of abstract ideas, such as the [[Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen]] and its [[egalitarianism|universal egalitarianism]] that Burke rebuked by claiming that it effectively endorsed "hairdressers" being able to be politicians.<ref name="David" />


In Britain, the traditionalist conservative movement was represented in the British Conservative Party.<ref name="IanAdams" /> Conservative [[Prime Minister of the United Kingdom]] [[Benjamin Disraeli]] sought to address social problems affecting the working class due to lack of assistance from the laissez-faire economy and formed his [[one nation conservatism]] that claimed that lack of assistance for the lower classes had divided British society into two nations – the rich and the poor as the result of unrestrained private enterprise, he claimed that he sought to break down.<ref name="IanAdams_a">{{cite book | last = Adams | first = Ian | title = Political ideology today | page = [https://archive.org/details/politicalideolog0000adam/page/59 59] | publisher = Manchester University Press | location = Manchester New York | year = 2001 | edition = 2nd | isbn = 9780719060205 | url = https://archive.org/details/politicalideolog0000adam/page/59 }}</ref> Disraeli said that he supported a united British nation while presenting the other parties representing the upper-class or the lower-class.<ref name="IanAdams" /> Disraeli was hostile to [[free trade]] and preferred aristocratic [[paternalism]] as well as promoting [[imperialism]].<ref name="IanAdams" /> However, with the revival in Britain of the socialist movement with the rise of the Labour Party and the demise of the Liberal Party, the Conservative Party shifted to become a supporter of capitalism and an opponent of [[socialism]], while advocacy of capitalism was promoted within the principles of traditionalist conservatism.<ref name="IanAdams" />
== Positions ==
=== Governance ===
Centre-right politics is associated with conservative positions on social and cultural issues and free-market liberal positions on economic issues—centre-right parties see their strongest support among demographics that share all of these positions.{{Sfn|Gidron|Ziblatt|2019|p=29}} It broadly supports small government, though different factions hold different beliefs about when the state should intervene in economic and social affairs.{{Sfn|Taflaga|2023|pp=137–138, 141}} Conservatives generally have limited trust in human nature and believe society forms a natural hierarchical structure. Liberalism is individualist and maintains that people are best fit to make decisions for themselves.{{Sfn|Taflaga|2023|p=138}} Christian democrats lean toward [[personalism]], which places value on individuals but adopts [[collectivist]] and [[corporatist]] elements as well as hierarchy.{{Sfn|Taflaga|2023|p=139}}


Another centre-right movement that arose in France in response to the French Revolution was the beginning of the [[Christian democracy]] movement, where moderate conservative Catholics accepted the democratic elements of the French Revolution.<ref name="IanAdams_a" /> The first Christian democratic party was founded in Italy in 1919 by [[Luigi Sturzo]], but it was suppressed by the [[Italian Fascism|Italian Fascist]] regime and was forced into exile in France.<ref name="IanAdams_a" /> In France, Sturzo founded an international movement that supported the creation of a European [[common market]] and European integration to prevent war, amongst those who attended the group included future German Chancellor [[Konrad Adenauer]], [[Alcide de Gasperi]] and [[Robert Schuman]].<ref name="IanAdams_a" />
The centre-right generally seeks to preserve the societal ''status quo'', in both a cultural and socioeconomic context,{{Sfn|Bale|2008|p=319}} and it is opposed to the radical politics espoused by the far-right.{{Sfn|Gidron|Ziblatt|2019|p=26}} Instead, it displays [[loss-averse]] tendencies and leans toward gradualism.{{Sfn|Cliffe|2023}} [[Constitutionalism]] and [[separation of powers]] are championed by the centre-right, combining protections for individual liberties with [[rule of law]].{{Sfn|Botsiou|2010|p=181}} The centre-right's handling of the economy, its incrementalist approach to politics, and its support for the ''status quo'' have been attributed to its ability to remain in power for extended periods of time.{{Sfn|Taflaga|2023|p=142}}


===Post–World War II===
=== Economics ===
In Europe after [[World War II]], centre-right Christian democratic parties arose as powerful political movements while the Catholic traditionalist movements in Europe diminished in strength.<ref name="IanAdams_a" /> Christian democratic movements became major movements in [[Austria]], the [[Benelux]] countries, [[Germany]] and [[Italy]].<ref name="IanAdams_a" />
The centre-right commonly supports a social market economy, rejecting both socialism and ''[[laissez-faire]]'' capitalism.{{Sfn|Cliffe|2023}} First developed by Christian democrats in post-war Germany, this system allows the state to intervene in the economy to regulate how business may be conducted, but it opposes [[nationalization]] or infringement on the free market.{{Sfn|Hatzivassiliou|2010|p=212}} Social market economies allow cooperation between employers and unions, and they provide for basic welfare programs.{{Sfn|Hatzivassiliou|2010|p=212}} This is more common among centre-right parties that appeal to working-class voters, as they otherwise have less incentive to hold these positions.{{Sfn|Arndt|2017|p=498}}{{Sfn|Gidron|Ziblatt|2019|p=25}} Centre-right conservatives oppose redistributive policies, believing that individuals should be allowed to retain their wealth. This tends to attract the more wealthy to the ideology.{{Sfn|Woshinsky|2007|p=113}} While left-wing politics involves [[class conflict]], centre-right parties forgo this in favour of supporting overall [[economic growth]] across classes.{{Sfn|Taflaga|2023|p=141}}


[[Neoliberalism]] arose as an economic theory by [[Milton Friedman]] that condemned government [[Economic interventionism|interventionism in the economy]] that it associated with socialism and [[Collectivist anarchism|collectivism]].<ref>{{cite book | last = Adams | first = Ian | title = Political ideology today | page = [https://archive.org/details/politicalideolog0000adam/page/206 206] | publisher = Manchester University Press | location = Manchester New York | year = 2001 | edition = 2nd | isbn = 9780719060205 | url = https://archive.org/details/politicalideolog0000adam/page/206 }}</ref> Neoliberals rejected [[Keynesian economics]] that they claimed advocate too much emphasis on relieving [[unemployment]] in response to their observance of the [[Great Depression]], identifying the real problem as being with [[inflation]] and advocate the policy of [[monetarism]] to deal with inflation.<ref>{{cite book | last = Adams | first = Ian | title = Political ideology today | page = [https://archive.org/details/politicalideolog0000adam/page/207 207] | publisher = Manchester University Press | location = Manchester New York | year = 2001 | edition = 2nd | isbn = 9780719060205 | url = https://archive.org/details/politicalideolog0000adam/page/207 }}</ref>
Alongside its support for lowering spending, the centre-right supports lower taxes.{{Sfn|Pardos-Prado|2015|p=354}}{{Sfn|Bale|2008|p=319}} In some cases, they may advocate [[private-public partnership]] or emphasize policies geared toward economic growth—these traits are common in Latin America where centre-right parties differentiate themselves from far-right parties by appealing to the middle and working classes.{{Sfn|Luna|Kaltwasser|2014|p=5}} In most countries, centre-right ideologies such as conservatism and Christian democracy are perceived by the public as most capable of managing the economy.{{Sfn|Hellwig|Kweon|Vowles|2020|pp=161–162}}{{Sfn|Taflaga|2023|p=141}} Economic downturn often leads to a short-term benefit for centre-right parties before a longer-term benefit for centre-left parties.{{Sfn|Hellwig|Kweon|Vowles|2020|p=179}}


Neoliberal economics was endorsed by Conservative British Prime Minister [[Margaret Thatcher]] who adapted it as part of a [[Free market|free-market]] conservatism closer to the developments in [[American conservatism]], while traditionalist conservatism became less influential within the British Conservative Party.<ref>{{cite book | last = Adams | first = Ian | title = Political ideology today | page = [https://archive.org/details/politicalideolog0000adam/page/58 58] | publisher = Manchester University Press | location = Manchester New York | year = 2001 | edition = 2nd | isbn = 9780719060205 | url = https://archive.org/details/politicalideolog0000adam/page/58 }}</ref> However, the British [[Conservative Party (UK)|Conservative Party]] still has a large traditional conservative base, particularly the conservative [[Cornerstone Group]]. Thatcher publicly supported centre-right politics and supported its spread in [[Eastern Europe]] after the end of the [[Marxism-Leninism|Marxist-Leninist]] regimes in the late 1980s and early 1990s.<ref>{{citation | last = Evans | first = Eric J. | author-link = Eric J. Evans | contribution = Thatcher abroad III: the bringer of freedom? Principle, pragmatism and the limits of power | editor-last = Evans | editor-first = Eric J. | editor-link = Eric J. Evans | title = Thatcher and Thatcherism | page = 107 | publisher = Routledge | location = London New York | year = 1997 | isbn = 9780203178980 | quote = Thatcher praised the winning party of the Hungarian election of 1990 as what she called a "really genuine centre-right government".}}</ref> After the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, a variety of centre-right political parties have emerged there, including many that support neoliberalism.<ref>{{citation | last = Hanley | first = Seán | contribution = Blue velvet: the rise and decline of the new Czech Right | editor-last1 = Szczerbiak | editor-first1 = Aleks | editor-last2 = Hanley | editor-first2 = Seán | title = Centre-right parties in post-communist East-Central Europe | page = 37 | publisher = Routledge | location = London New York | year = 2006 | isbn = 9780415347815 | postscript = .}}</ref><ref>{{cite news | last = Smith | first = John | title = Labour's lackluster tuition fee pledge is the tip of the iceberg: mainstream politics is melting away | url = https://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/john-smith/labour's-lackluster-tuition-fee-pledge-is-tip-of-iceberg-mainstream-politics-i | work = [[openDemocracy]] | date = 4 March 2015 }}</ref>
=== Social and cultural issues ===
[[File:CDU Wahlkampfplakat - kaspl010.JPG|thumb|A 1953 poster for the centre-right [[Christian Democratic Union of Germany|Christian Democratic Union]] in Germany, invoking [[anti-communism]]. In English: "All ways of Marxism lead to Moscow! Therefore CDU"]]
The centre-right places emphasis on protecting [[public safety]],{{Sfn|Luna|Kaltwasser|2014|p=5}} preserving national security, and maintaining law and order.{{Sfn|Pardos-Prado|2015|p=354}}{{Sfn|Bale|2008|p=319}}{{Sfn|Taflaga|2023|p=137}} It supports democratization around the world, and some centre-right groups consider [[regime change]] an appropriate means to spread and protect democracy.{{Sfn|Freudenstein|2010|p=245}} Taking a strong pro-peace stance can alienate members of a centre-right voting bloc. It is often more reluctant to support peace agreements because these often involve compromising on other centre-right positions such as maintaining a strong ethnic and religious identity.{{Sfn|Sandal|Loizides|2013|p=401}} The centre-right leans toward [[Paternalistic conservatism|paternalism]] over [[individualism]] and social harmony over societal conflict.{{Sfn|Cliffe|2023}} It is also associated with anti-communism, which earned it support during the [[Cold War]].{{Sfn|Vaida|2017|pp=8–9}}{{Sfn|Botsiou|2010|p=173}}


In the United States, President [[Ronald Reagan]] (1981–1989) adopted many policies stemming from [[Milton Friedman]]'s economic theories, including principles from the [[Chicago school of economics]] and [[monetarism]].<ref>{{cite news | last = Cornwell | first = Rupert | author-link = Rupert Cornwell | title = Milton Friedman, free-market economist who inspired Reagan and Thatcher, dies aged 94 | url = https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/milton-friedman-freemarket-economist-who-inspired-reagan-and-thatcher-dies-aged-94-424665.html | work = [[The Independent]] | publisher = Independent Print Ltd | location = Washington | date = 17 November 2006 }}</ref> While social conservatives and the rise of the [[Christian Right]] contributed greatly to forming the [[Reagan Coalition]], the President also had the support of centre-right economic neoliberals. Using Friedman's neoliberal theories, the Reagan administration cut the marginal income tax from 70% to 28%{{citation needed|date=June 2021}} and slowed [[government spending]] growth from 10% in 1982 to 1% in 1987, thereby reducing [[inflation]] from 13.5% to 4.1% and civilian [[unemployment]] from 7.6% to 5.5% of the workforce throughout his tenure.<ref>{{cite web | title = The second American revolution: Reagonomics | url = http://www.reaganfoundation.org/economic-policy.aspx | website = reaganfoundation.org | publisher = [[Ronald Reagan Presidential Library]] }}</ref>
Culturally, the centre-right has prioritized national and religious identity, especially by the mid-20th century.{{Sfn|Gidron|Ziblatt|2019|p=27}} It has used religion and moral values as uniting elements, particularly with the [[middle class]].{{Sfn|Taflaga|2023|p=141}} European centre-right parties place higher priority on [[Christianity]] and providing support to Christians—a trait often shared with their far-right counterparts.{{Sfn|Hirschberger|Voges|2024|p=178}} The centre-right more strongly supports freedom of religion overall, as opposed to generalized support of [[human rights]] expressed by left-wing ideologies.{{Sfn|Hirschberger|Voges|2024|p=179}} As the European centre-right secularizes, it becomes less likely to support [[social conservatism|conservative positions on social issues]].{{Sfn|Magni|Reynolds|2023|p=51}} Centre-right parties that take strong stances on cultural issues are more susceptible to radicalize and adopt far-right positions.{{Sfn|Gidron|Ziblatt|2019|p=27}}
 
While [[opposition to immigration]] is most commonly associated with far-right politics, the centre-right can attract support from voters with more moderate anti-immigrant positions.{{Sfn|Pardos-Prado|2015|p=354}} Centre-right opposition to immigration comes from the challenge that immigration presents to the ''status quo'' and to national identity.{{Sfn|Taflaga|2023|p=137}} Supporters of centre-right politics in Europe often fear that immigration will lead to consequences such as [[immigration and crime|increased crime]], [[welfare and immigration|abuse of welfare]], or acts of [[terrorism]]. Centre-right political parties sometimes take stronger positions against multiculturalism to gain an advantage over far-right parties.{{Sfn|Bale|2008|p=319}} The centre-right is more likely to present immigration as a prominent issue when it is placed in the context of economic and cultural policy.{{Sfn|Pardos-Prado|2015|p=354}}
 
Right-wing politics has historically opposed social acceptance of [[lesbian, gay, and bisexual]] people, but the European centre-right has come to support protections on the basis of sexual orientation.{{Sfn|Magni|Reynolds|2023|pp=50–51}} Some centre-right groups have taken the position that gay marriage and adoption by gay couples are an extension of the traditional [[nuclear family]].{{Sfn|Magni|Reynolds|2023|pp=51–53}} Such support has not been widely extended to [[transgender]] people.{{Sfn|Magni|Reynolds|2023|p=50}}
 
Centre-right parties support environmental preservation, though they are often seen as less interested in the subject than left-wing parties. The centre-right rejects concepts of [[climate grief]] or catastrophism, arguing that they can reduce interest in solving environmental issues.{{Sfn|Lilkov|2018|pp=173, 177}}
 
== History ==
=== Early history ===
[[File:Sir Joshua Reynolds - Edmund Burke, 1729 - 1797. Statesman, orator and author - PG 2362 - National Galleries of Scotland.jpg|thumb|The philosophy of [[Edmund Burke]] was a foundation for modern [[conservatism]].]]
The concept of centre-right politics is derived from the left–right political spectrum, which originated with the seating arrangements of the [[National Assembly (French Revolution)|National Assembly]] during the French Revolution.{{Sfn|Woshinsky|2007|p=109}} The centre-right came into being in the 19th century, developing with the earliest [[political parties]].{{Sfn|Taflaga|2023|p=137}} Modern conservatism was derived from the ideas of British philosopher Edmund Burke and various 17th century figures who preceded him.{{Sfn|Taflaga|2023|p=138}} The liberal movement was heavily influenced by English philosopher [[John Locke]], including his support for [[property rights]] and the right to overthrow tyrannical government.{{Sfn|Taflaga|2023|p=138}}
 
Early conservative and liberal parties clashed with one another: conservatives supported monarchy, land-owners, and the church, while liberals supported anti-clericalism, free markets, individualism, and scientific advancement.{{Sfn|Taflaga|2023|p=138}} Due to limitations in [[suffrage]], early centre-right parties were able to maintain sufficient support by appealing solely to the upper class.{{Sfn|Gidron|Ziblatt|2019|p=27}} Christian democracy developed as a new European ideology in the 1870s as a response to the [[anti-clericalism]] advocated by liberals. Closely aligned with Catholicism, its ideals were reflected in the ''[[Rerum novarum]]'' issued by [[Pope Leo XIII]].{{Sfn|Taflaga|2023|p=138}}
 
The European centre-right was a force of moderation in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Conservatism stood between socialism and the strongly [[anti-socialist]] church by advocating a more tempered approach.{{Sfn|Gidron|Ziblatt|2019|pp=25–26}} Christian democracy likewise presented itself as an alternative to liberalism and socialism.{{Sfn|Taflaga|2023|p=138}} Centre-right figures were involved in early democratization processes to ensure that their own advantages from the previous ''status quo'' were retained.{{Sfn|Gidron|Ziblatt|2019|pp=25–26}} Centre-right liberalism declined with the beginning of the 20th century, and many liberal parties merged with conservative parties.{{Sfn|Taflaga|2023|p=138}}
 
=== Interwar period ===
After [[World War I]], several European nations formed weak centre-right parties,{{Sfn|Ziblatt|2017|p=339}} which grew through a consolidation of the middle-class at the expense of socialist parties.{{Sfn|Luebbert|1991|p=8}} These centre-right parties gained influence during the [[Depression of 1920–1921]], where they responded with measures such as a restoration of the [[gold standard]].{{Sfn|Ziblatt|2017|pp=288–289}} Among the strongest of these parties were [[National Bloc (France)|National Bloc]] and its successors in France, the [[Conservative Party (UK)|Conservative Party]] in the United Kingdom, and a coalition of the [[Catholic Conservative Party]] and the [[Free Democratic Party of Switzerland|Radicals]] in Switzerland.{{Sfn|Luebbert|1991|p=228}} Christian democracy found a place among the European centre-right during the [[interwar period]].{{Sfn|Hatzivassiliou|2010|p=210}} Centre-right parties became the primary supporters of liberal democracy at this time, challenging the historical association of liberalism with the [[labour movement]]. The liberal centre-right opposed the other two European ideologies that were growing in popularity: [[fascism]] and [[social democracy]].{{Sfn|Luebbert|1991|p=2}}
 
The European centre-right declined between 1931 and 1935 as the [[Great Depression]] set in.{{Sfn|Ziblatt|2017|pp=170–171}} In nations where the centre-right lacked a unified party, such as Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, far-right movements seized power.{{Sfn|Ziblatt|2017|p=339}} Strong pre-existing centre-right parties retained power in other countries, including Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.{{Sfn|Ziblatt|2017|p=358}} The use of market economics to keep wages steady, as well as the relative weakness of labour unions, meant that centre-right liberalism went unchallenged in much of Europe.{{Sfn|Luebbert|1991|p=233}}
 
=== Post-war era ===
[[File:Winston Churchill with General de Gaulle during an inspection of French troops at Marrakesh in Morocco, January 1944 (cropped).jpg|thumb|[[Winston Churchill]] (left) and [[Charles de Gaulle]] (right) were leading post-war figures of [[One-nation conservatism|British conservatism]] and [[Gaullism]], respectively.]]
In the [[aftermath of World War II]], the old centre-right was discredited in Europe, where it was seen as responsible for the Great Depression and complicit in the rise of fascism.{{Sfn|Hatzivassiliou|2010|p=209}} European centre-right parties worked closely with the centre-left and the political centre in the [[post-war era]], helping to define the welfare state, democratic consolidation, and European integration.{{Sfn|Vaida|2017|p=3}}{{Sfn|Gidron|Ziblatt|2019|p=26}}{{Sfn|Botsiou|2010|p=176}} They sought to avoid the far-right and far-left politics that had brought about Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, respectively,{{Sfn|Vaida|2017|p=3}}{{Sfn|Hatzivassiliou|2010|p=207}} and they saw European integration as a means to protect against socialism and anti-Christianity.{{Sfn|Botsiou|2010|pp=189–190}} The modern centre-right developed in response as a political unification of several distinct right-wing schools of thought.{{Sfn|Gidron|Ziblatt|2019|p=24}}{{Sfn|Cliffe|2023}} Ideological diversity meant flexibility in policy positions, but it also caused [[Political faction|factionalism]] across centre-right parties.{{Sfn|Botsiou|2010|pp=179–180}} The centre-right became a dominant political force in much of the western world over the following decades, including the American [[Republican Party (United States)|Republican Party]] as led by [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]], one-nation conservatism of the British Conservative Party,{{Sfn|Cliffe|2023}} and [[Gaullism]] of the [[Rally of the French People]].{{Sfn|Botsiou|2010|p=180}}
 
Europe had little appetite for nationalist ideologies after the end of fascism, so Christian democracy was popularized as an alternative right-wing ideology. Instead of nationalism, its ideas were based on [[traditional values]], pragmatism, and support for moderate state intervention.{{Sfn|Botsiou|2010|pp=176–177}}{{Sfn|Vaida|2017|p=4}}{{Sfn|Hatzivassiliou|2010|pp=210–211}} Its conception of government was heavily influenced by the constitutionalism and separation of powers of the United Kingdom and the United States.{{Sfn|Botsiou|2010|p=181}} [[West Germany]] reformed its centre-right faction with the creation of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU). Formed by a grassroots Christian movement, the CDU played a significant role in forming post-war Germany,{{Sfn|Ziblatt|2017|p=334}} combining social Christianity, market liberalism, and [[national conservatism]].{{Sfn|Gidron|Ziblatt|2019|p=24}} Its social market economy model proved to be influential across Europe.{{Sfn|Hatzivassiliou|2010|p=212}} Alcide De Gasperi similarly brought about the creation of a strong Christian democratic movement in Italy,{{Sfn|Cliffe|2023}} which was a leading political force in various coalitions for over 50 years.{{Sfn|Vaida|2017|p=4}} The United Kingdom was the only major exception to the spread of Christian democracy, as its old centre-right was seen as triumphant under the wartime leadership of Winston Churchill, and the failure of Nazi Germany to invade meant that its pre-war institutions remained intact.{{Sfn|Hatzivassiliou|2010|pp=211, 213}} Here conservatism remained dominant, meaning less state intervention relative to other European nations.{{Sfn|Hatzivassiliou|2010|p=214}}
 
=== Cold War ===
During the Cold War, centre-right groups supported the United States and the [[Western Bloc]], opposing the Soviet Union and the [[Eastern Bloc]].{{Sfn|Cliffe|2023}} In several countries, centre-right parties were opposed by domestic communism on top of their opposition to the Soviet Union.{{Sfn|Hatzivassiliou|2010|p=208}} As suffrage expanded and the centre-right spread across social classes, cultural issues and social identity, such as support for nationalism and religion, became more prominent themes.{{Sfn|Gidron|Ziblatt|2019|p=27}} The European centre-right began supporting [[social integration]] as a means to limit the appeal of the nationalism that had led to fascism.{{Sfn|Gidron|Ziblatt|2019|p=26}} In the United States, the centre-right was associated with the [[Rockefeller Republican]] faction of the Republican Party.{{Sfn|Starr|2018}} The American centre-right promoted pro-business stances over the following decades, which led to economic justifications for supporting higher taxes as well as social programs such as [[public housing]].{{Sfn|Gidron|Ziblatt|2019|p=26}}
 
Christian democrats supported a modest welfare state, and the European centre-right was reluctant to support more radical initiatives to liberalize the economy.{{Sfn|Botsiou|2010|p=178}} In Southeast Asia, the centre-right secured power in countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, implementing growth-oriented policies based on free market policies with moderate governmental intervention, leading to significant economic expansion.{{Sfn|Rock|2018|p=44}} The centre-right rose to power in Greece with the [[New Democracy (Greece)|New Democracy]] party in the 1970s, led by [[Konstantinos Karamanlis]] as [[Metapolitefsi|Greece transitioned]] from dictatorship to democracy.{{Sfn|Filandros|2010|pp=223–224}} Spain and Portugal underwent similar transitions as they emerged from dictatorship.{{Sfn|Filandros|2010|p=223}}{{Sfn|Cliffe|2023}}
 
The 1970s saw decreasing support for welfare policies with the end of the [[postwar economic boom]] and the economic fallout of the [[1970s energy crisis]]. This led to increased support for [[privatization]] and cuts in welfare spending.{{Sfn|Vaida|2017|p=7}} It also led a period of opposition to immigration in Europe at this time.{{Sfn|Bale|2008|p=320}} By the 1980s, the [[post-war consensus]] had ended, with the [[new right]] supporting neoconservatism and neoliberalism.{{Sfn|Taflaga|2023|p=140}} At this time, centre-right parties took a more active role in challenging the welfare state and union influence.{{Sfn|Gidron|Ziblatt|2019|p=25}}
 
The predominantly centre-right United States Republican Party began a rightward shift in the 1980s, with its moderate factions declining in numbers over the following decades.{{Sfn|Starr|2018}} The Indian [[Bharatiya Janata Party]] followed the Western centre-right strategy in the 1980s and 1990s, appealing to the centre while maintaining a militarist, nationalist platform.{{Sfn|De Leon|Desai|Tuğal|2009|p=204}} New political parties were formed in Turkey after the [[1980 Turkish coup d'état|1980 coup d'état]], and the [[Motherland Party (Turkey)|Motherland Party]], led by businessmen and tradesmen, implemented secular neoliberal policies.{{Sfn|De Leon|Desai|Tuğal|2009|pp=207–208}} In European nations, women were most likely to support the centre-right until a leftward shift among women took place over the 1970s and 1980s.{{Sfn|Abendschön|Steinmetz|2014|p=316}}
 
=== 1990s ===
Eastern and Central Europe were introduced to centre-right politics in the 1990s after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.{{Sfn|Cliffe|2023}} These movements—which preferred not to be identified as parties due to the term's association with communism—were made up of intellectual groups that had been dissidents during communist rule.{{Sfn|Freudenstein|2010|p=240}} The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland all had strong opposition movements under communism, allowing these movements to form strong centre-right parties.{{Sfn|Vachudova|2008|p=388}} In nations where the centre-right lacked experience in political organization, many of the first-generation centre-right movements lost momentum and faded into irrelevance in the years thereafter.{{Sfn|Freudenstein|2010|p=241}} Nationalism and populism became the dominant political forces here until the end of the decade.{{Sfn|Vachudova|2008|p=388}}
 
Centre-right liberals in Central and Eastern Europe supported integration with the Western World and acceleration of industrialization, while conservatives wished to preserve individual national identities and protect Catholic traditions from Western secularism.{{Sfn|Freudenstein|2010|p=242, 244}} Post-communist centre-right groups were more inclined toward liberal positions, favouring market capitalist policies over government intervention, which was associated with communist rule.{{Sfn|Freudenstein|2010|pp=247–248}} Anti-communism and anti-totalitarianism were paramount among all factions of the centre-right in these regions, and they condemned the West for treating [[mass killings under communist regimes]] differently than [[the Holocaust]].{{Sfn|Freudenstein|2010|p=245}}
 
More broadly, the European centre-right became increasingly secular by the 1990s, creating a division between centre-right parties that were more liberal on social issues and [[Christian right|religious right]] parties that maintained conservative positions on social issues.{{Sfn|Magni|Reynolds|2023|p=51}} Secularism especially became a challenge for Christian democracy, causing it to lose political influence.{{Sfn|Taflaga|2023|p=142}} African political parties rapidly began joining [[political international]]s in the 1990s. Among the centre-right, collaboration began between the Ghana [[New Patriotic Party]], the [[Malawi Congress Party]], and the Kenya [[Democratic Party (Kenya)|Democratic Party]].{{Sfn|Salih|2006|p=153}} Japan, which had been ruled almost consistently by the centre-right [[Liberal Democratic Party (Japan)|Liberal Democratic Party]] for decades, saw a proliferation of centre-right opposition parties by the 1990s, with new parties forming and established parties shifting toward the centre-right to remain competitive.{{Sfn|Winkler|Taniguchi|2022|pp=503–506}}
 
Following the rise of the [[Third Way]] among left-wing politics in the 1990s, the centre-right was forced to moderate, sacrificing the more aggressive aspects of right-wing politics that developed in the 1980s and abandoning its opposition to the welfare state.{{Sfn|Noël|Thérien|2008|p=169}} It saw reduced support at this time as the centre-left usurped much of its leverage on economic issues.{{Sfn|Gidron|Ziblatt|2019|p=19}}{{Sfn|Botsiou|2010|p=173}} In Western Europe, this marked the beginning of a broader decline in moderate politics.{{Sfn|Vaida|2017|p=4}}
 
=== 21st century ===
The 2000s saw a shift back to the right in Europe, where centre-right parties formed coalition governments with far-right parties in countries such as France, Italy, and the Netherlands.{{Sfn|Noël|Thérien|2008|p=187}} The European and American centre-right adopted some nationalist far-right ideas at this time, including positions on immigration and crime.{{Sfn|Noël|Thérien|2008|p=188}} Centre-right parties in other countries shifted leftward with pro-labour policies to remain competitive with the centre-left—this included parties in Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Sweden.{{Sfn|Arndt|2017|p=498}} The 2000s also saw an example of a successful populist centre-right party with the ascension of [[Forza Italia (1994)|Forza Italia]], led by [[Silvio Berlusconi]].{{Sfn|Zaslove|2008|pp=327–328}}
 
During the [[2003 invasion of Iraq]], centre-right parties in Europe were more likely to send military forces than centre-left parties.{{Sfn|Noël|Thérien|2008|p=207}} This was especially true in Central and Eastern Europe, where memories of the Soviet Union encouraged close alignment with the United States and strong support for combatting dictatorships.{{Sfn|Freudenstein|2010|pp=252–253}} The centre-right in this region fragmented at the onset of the 21st century as much of the centre-right shifted away from liberalism to more conservative and nationalist politics with a strong stance against European integration.{{Sfn|Vachudova|2008|pp=401–402}} As [[Islamism]] lost support in Turkey, many Islamists moved to the centre-right, forming the new [[Justice and Development Party (Turkey)|Justice and Development Party]]. This party was more accepting of secularism and neoliberalism, and it became the nation's dominant political force.{{Sfn|De Leon|Desai|Tuğal|2009|pp=209–210}}
[[File:Sebastián Piñera & Mauricio Macri.jpg|thumb|Presidents [[Sebastián Piñera]] (left) of Chile and [[Mauricio Macri]] (right) of Argentina were elected amid a resurgence of the centre-right in their respective nations in the 2010s.]]
Although citizens throughout Latin America most commonly self-identified as centre-right, the region saw a surge of popularity for expanding government programs and [[state ownership]],{{Sfn|Luna|Kaltwasser|2014|p=38}} leading to [[pink tide|a leftward shift]] that began in 1998.{{Sfn|Niedzwiecki|Pribble|2017|p=73}} In Bolivia, dissatisfaction with the centre-right's handling of economic crises reached a crescendo with public demonstrations that relegated the centre-right to a relatively ineffective opposition.{{Sfn|Bowen|2014|p=106}} Colombia was an exception, where the long-standing centre-right dominance remained unchallenged.{{Sfn|Wills-Otero|2014|p=195}} Centre-right parties retook power in several Latin American countries by the 2010s,{{Sfn|Niedzwiecki|Pribble|2017|p=73}} including the [[National Renewal (Chile)|National Renewal]] in Chile and the [[Republican Proposal]] in Argentina,{{Sfn|Niedzwiecki|Pribble|2017|p=76}} as well as a centre-right coalition in Venezuela.{{Sfn|Niedzwiecki|Pribble|2017|p=73}}
 
Canada was one of the last Anglosphere countries for the centre-right to be restored after World War II, with no centre-right parties holding power until the [[premiership of Stephen Harper]] in 2006.{{Sfn|Taflaga|2023|p=140}} The [[2008 financial crisis]] was followed by a decline in support for major centre-right and centre-left parties through the 2010s.{{Sfn|Hellwig|Kweon|Vowles|2020|p=158}}{{Sfn|Gidron|Ziblatt|2019|p=19}} For the centre-right, this occurred most prominently in newer democracies, while support was steadier in more established ones.{{Sfn|Hellwig|Kweon|Vowles|2020|p=163}} To regain support, the European centre-right shifted toward the centre and moved away from neoliberalism, replacing it with a renewed focus on public safety, economic growth, and social issues.{{Sfn|Arvanitopoulos|Tzifakis|2010|pp=1–2}} It saw further trouble later in the decade with the [[European debt crisis]] causing governments to enact controversial [[austerity]] policies, particularly through spending cuts and [[value-added tax]]es. These further pushed the public from the centre-right to opposition parties across the political spectrum.{{Sfn|Vaida|2017|p=11}} The weakening of the centre-right corresponded with increased support for the far-right.{{Sfn|Gidron|Ziblatt|2019|p=19}}
 
To align more closely with conservative allies, Christian democratic parties had begun adopting more conservative economic policies by 2013.{{Sfn|Gidron|Ziblatt|2019|p=25}} The American centre-right supported [[traditionalist conservatism]] and neoconservatism at the beginning of the 21st century; however, by the 2010s these groups had lost influence as the Republican Party shifted from the centre-right to [[right-wing populism]].{{Sfn|Starr|2018}}
 
The centre-right underwent a decline throughout the western world in the late 2010s and early 2020s, led by demographic changes such as increased [[tertiary education]] and ethnic diversity as well as the waning influence of religion and the rise of [[identity politics]]. At this time, the centre-left came into power and centre-right parties drifted rightward or were supplanted by new far-right parties.{{Sfn|Cliffe|2023}}


==See also==
==See also==
{{columns-list|colwidth=30em|
{{Portal|Political science|Conservatism}}
* [[Conservative liberalism]]
{{columns-list|colwidth=20em|
* [[Centre-left politics]]
* {{anl|Bourgeois party}}
* [[Christian democracy]]
* {{anl|Classical liberalism}}
* [[Compassionate conservatism]]
* {{anl|Counter-revolutionary}}
* [[Far-right politics]]
* {{anl|Cultural conservatism}}
* [[Fusionism]] (or [[libertarian conservatism]])
* [[Glossary of the French Revolution]]
* [[Glossary of the French Revolution]]
* [[Left-right politics]]
* [[List of right-wing political parties]]
* [[List of right-wing political parties]]
* [[Moderate conservatism]]
* {{anl|Moderate conservatism}}
* [[Moderate nationalism]]
* {{anl|National liberalism}}
* [[National liberalism]]
* {{anl|Paternalistic conservatism}}
* [[One-nation conservatism]]
* {{anl|Reactionary}}
* [[Political spectrum]]
* [[Religion in politics]]
* [[Radical centrism]]
* {{anl|Whiggism}}
* [[Right-wing politics]]
}}
}}


==References==
== Notes ==
{{Reflist|30em}}
{{Reflist|30em}}
== References ==
=== Books ===
* {{Cite book |last=Arvanitopoulos |first=Constantine |url=https://archive.org/details/springer_10.1007-978-3-642-00560-2 |title=Reforming Europe: The Role of the Centre-Right |year=2010 |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-3-642-00560-2}}
** {{harvc |last=Arvanitopoulos |first=Constantine |last2=Tzifakis |first2=Nikolaos |c=Introduction |in=Arvanitopoulos |year=2010 |pp=1–8}}
** {{harvc |last=Botsiou |first=Konstantina E. |c=The European Centre-Right and European Integration: The Formative Years |in=Arvanitopoulos |year=2010 |pp=173–206}}
** {{harvc |last=Filandros |first=Ioannis |c=The Origins and Foundations of the New Democracy Party |in=Arvanitopoulos |year=2010 |pp=223–238}}
** {{harvc |last=Freudenstein |first=Ronald |c=Sense and Sensibility: EU Eastern Enlargement and the Future of Europe's Centre-Right |in=Arvanitopoulos |year=2010 |pp=239–258}}
** {{harvc |last=Hatzivassiliou |first=Evanthis |c=The Emergence of a New European Centre-Right, 1945–1962 |in=Arvanitopoulos |year=2010 |pp=207–222}}
* {{Cite book |last1=Hellwig |first1=Timothy |title=Democracy Under Siege? Parties, Voters and Elections After the Great Recession |url=https://academic.oup.com/book/40549 |url-access=subscription |last2=Kweon |first2=Yesola |last3=Vowles |first3=Jack |year=2020 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-884620-8}}
* {{Cite book |last1=Hirschberger |first1=Bernd |title=Religious Freedom and Populism: The Appropriation of a Human Right and How to Counter It |last2=Voges |first2=Katja |year=2024 |url=https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783839468272/html |url-access=subscription |publisher=transcript Verlag |doi=10.1515/9783839468272 |isbn=978-3-8394-6827-2}}
* {{Cite book |last=Luebbert |first=Gregory M. |title=Liberalism, Fascism, Or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe |url=https://archive.org/details/liberalismfascis0000lueb |url-access=registration |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=1991 |isbn=9780198023074}}
* {{Cite book |editor-last=Luna |editor-first=Juan Pablo |url=https://archive.org/details/resilienceoflati0000unse |url-access=registration |title=The Resilience of the Latin American Right |editor-last2=Kaltwasser |editor-first2=Cristóbal Rovira |year=2014 |publisher=JHU Press |isbn=978-1-4214-1390-7}}
** {{harvc |last=Bowen |first=James D. |c=The Right and Nonparty Forms of Representation and Participation |in=Luna |in2=Kaltwasser |year=2014}}
** {{harvc |last=Wills-Otero |first=Laura |c=Colombia: Analyzing the Strategies for Political Action of Álvaro Uribe's Government, 2002–10 |in=Luna |in2=Kaltwasser |year=2014}}
* {{Cite book |last1=Noël |first1=Alain |title=Left and Right in Global Politics |url=https://archive.org/details/leftrightingloba0000noel |url-access=registration |last2=Thérien |first2=Jean-Philippe |year=2008 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-139-47252-4}}
* {{Cite book |last=Salih |first=M. A. Mohamed |title=Globalising Democracy: Party Politics in Emerging Democracies |publisher=Routledge |year=2006 |isbn=9780203965719 |editor-last=Burnell |editor-first=Peter |chapter=Globalising Party Politics in Africa: The Influence of Party-based Democracy Networks |pages=141–162}}
* {{Cite book |last=Taflaga |first=Marija |chapter=The Centre-Right: Christian Democrats, Conservatives, and Liberals |pages=137–148 |editor-last=Carter |editor-first=Neil |title=The Routledge Handbook of Political Parties |url=https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/edit/10.4324/9780429263859/routledge-handbook-political-parties-neil-carter-daniel-keith-sofia-vasilopoulou-gyda-sindre/ |url-access=subscription |editor-last2=Keith |editor-first2=Daniel |editor-last3=Sindre |editor-first3=Gyda M. |editor-last4=Vasilopoulou |editor-first4=Sofia |year=2023 |publisher=Routledge |doi=10.4324/9780429263859 |isbn=978-0-429-55441-4}}
* {{Cite book |last=Woshinsky |first=Oliver |title=Explaining Politics: Culture, Institutions, and Political Behavior |url=https://archive.org/details/explainingpoliti0000wosh |url-access=registration |publisher=Taylor & Francis |year=2007 |isbn=9781135901349}}
* {{Cite book |last=Ziblatt |first=Daniel |author-link=Daniel Ziblatt |title=Conservative Political Parties and the Birth of Democracy |url=https://archive.org/details/conservativepart0000zibl |url-access=registration |year=2017 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-107-00162-6}}
=== Journals ===
* {{Cite journal |last1=Abendschön |first1=S. |last2=Steinmetz |first2=S. |year=2014 |title=The Gender Gap in Voting Revisited: Women's Party Preferences in a European Context |url=https://academic.oup.com/sp/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/sp/jxu009 |journal=Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society |volume=21 |issue=2 |pages=315–344 |doi=10.1093/sp/jxu009 |issn=1072-4745}}
* {{Cite journal |last=Arndt |first=Christoph |year=2017 |title=Public Policy-making and Risk Profiles: Scandinavian Centre-right Governments after the Turn of the Millennium |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1755773916000072/type/journal_article |url-access=subscription |journal=European Political Science Review |volume=9 |issue=4 |pages=495–518 |doi=10.1017/S1755773916000072 |issn=1755-7739}}
* {{Cite journal |last=Bale |first=Tim |author-link=Tim Bale |year=2008 |title=Turning Round the Telescope. Centre-right Parties and Immigration and Integration Policy in Europe |url=http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13501760701847341 |url-access= |journal=Journal of European Public Policy |volume=15 |issue=3 |pages=315–330 |doi=10.1080/13501760701847341 |issn=1350-1763}}
* {{Cite journal |last1=De Leon |first1=Cedric |last2=Desai |first2=Manali |last3=Tuğal |first3=Cihan |year=2009 |title=Political Articulation: Parties and the Constitution of Cleavages in the United States, India, and Turkey |url=http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9558.2009.01345.x |journal=Sociological Theory |volume=27 |issue=3 |pages=193–219 |doi=10.1111/j.1467-9558.2009.01345.x |issn=0735-2751|url-access=subscription }}
* {{Cite journal |last1=Gidron |first1=Noam |last2=Ziblatt |first2=Daniel |author-link2=Daniel Ziblatt |year=2019 |title=Center-Right Political Parties in Advanced Democracies |url=https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev-polisci-090717-092750 |journal=Annual Review of Political Science |volume=22 |issue=1 |pages=17–35 |doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-090717-092750 |issn=1094-2939}}
* {{Cite journal |last=Lilkov |first=Dimitar |year=2018 |title=Dealing with Climate Change: A European Centre–right perspective |journal=European View |volume=17 |issue=2 |pages=172–180 |doi=10.1177/1781685818808720 |issn=1781-6858|doi-access=free }}
* {{Cite journal |last1=Magni |first1=Gabriele |last2=Reynolds |first2=Andrew |author-link2=Andrew Reynolds (political scientist) |year=2023 |title=Why Europe's Right Embraces Gay Rights |url=https://muse.jhu.edu/article/875798 |url-access=subscription |journal=Journal of Democracy |volume=34 |issue=1 |pages=50–64 |doi=10.1353/jod.2023.0003 |issn=1086-3214}}
* {{Cite journal |last1=Niedzwiecki |first1=Sara |last2=Pribble |first2=Jennifer |year=2017 |title=Social Policies and Center-Right Governments in Argentina and Chile |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1531426X00010281/type/journal_article |url-access=subscription |journal=Latin American Politics and Society |volume=59 |issue=3 |pages=72–97 |doi=10.1111/laps.12027 |issn=1531-426X}}
* {{Cite journal |last=Ostrowski |first=Marius S. |author-link=Marius Ostrowski |year=2023 |title=The Ideological Morphology of Left–Centre–Right |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13569317.2022.2163770 |journal=Journal of Political Ideologies |volume=28 |issue=1 |pages=1–15 |doi=10.1080/13569317.2022.2163770 |s2cid=256033370 |issn=1356-9317}}
* {{Cite journal |last=Pardos-Prado |first=Sergi |year=2015 |title=How Can Mainstream Parties Prevent Niche Party Success? Center-Right Parties and the Immigration Issue |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/680040 |url-access=subscription |journal=The Journal of Politics |volume=77 |issue=2 |pages=352–367 |doi=10.1086/680040 |jstor=10.1086/680040 |issn=0022-3816}}
* {{Cite journal |last=Rock |first=Michael T. |year=2018 |title=The Last Fifty Years: Development Strategy and Development Performance in Southeast Asia |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/26539197 |journal=Journal of Southeast Asian Economies |volume=35 |issue=1 |pages=39–49 |doi=10.1355/ae35-1e |jstor=26539197 |issn=2339-5095|url-access=subscription }}
* {{Cite journal |last1=Sandal |first1=Nukhet |last2=Loizides |first2=Neophytos |year=2013 |title=Center-Right Parties in Peace Processes: 'Slow Learning' or Punctuated Peace Socialization? |url=http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2012.00971.x |url-access=subscription |journal=Political Studies |volume=61 |issue=2 |pages=401–421 |doi=10.1111/j.1467-9248.2012.00971.x |issn=0032-3217}}
* {{Cite journal |last=Vaida |first=Ovidiu |date=2017 |title=The New Challenges for the European Centre-Right and Centre-Left at the Beginning of New Century |url=https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=577969 |url-access= |journal=Online Journal Modelling the New Europe |issue=23 |pages=3–18 |doi=10.24193/OJMNE.2017.23.01 |issn=2247-0514|doi-access=free }}
* {{Cite journal |last=Vachudova |first=Milada Anna |year=2008 |title=Centre—Right Parties and Political Outcomes in East Central Europe |url=http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1354068808090252 |url-access=subscription |journal=Party Politics |volume=14 |issue=4 |pages=387–405 |doi=10.1177/1354068808090252 |issn=1354-0688}}
* {{Cite journal |last1=Winkler |first1=Christian G. |last2=Taniguchi |first2=Naoko |year=2022 |title=Only Right Makes Might? Center-Right Policy Competition Among Major Japanese Parties After Electoral Reform |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1598240822000285/type/journal_article |url-access=subscription |journal=Journal of East Asian Studies |volume=22 |issue=3 |pages=503–523 |doi=10.1017/jea.2022.28 |issn=1598-2408}}
* {{Cite journal |last=Zaslove |first=Andrej |year=2008 |title=Here to Stay? Populism as a New Party Type |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1062798708000288/type/journal_article |journal=European Review |volume=16 |issue=3 |pages=319–336 |doi=10.1017/S1062798708000288 |issn=1062-7987|url-access=subscription }}
=== Web ===
* {{Cite web |last=Cliffe |first=Jeremy |date=2023-02-15 |title=The Strange Death of the Centre Right |url=https://www.newstatesman.com/international-politics/2023/02/strange-death-centre-right-moderate-conservatism |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230225082048/https://www.newstatesman.com/international-politics/2023/02/strange-death-centre-right-moderate-conservatism |archive-date=2023-02-25 |website=New Statesman}}
* {{Cite web |last=Starr |first=Paul |date=2018-10-22 |title=What Happened to Center-Right America? |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/22/opinion/trump-center-right-america.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181022122241/https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/22/opinion/trump-center-right-america.html |archive-date=2018-10-22 |access-date=2024-05-09 |website=The New York Times |issn=0362-4331}}


{{Political spectrum}}
{{Political spectrum}}


{{DEFAULTSORT:Centre-right politics}}
{{DEFAULTSORT:Centre-right politics}}
[[Category:Centre-right politics| ]]
[[Category:Centrism]]
[[Category:Political spectrum]]
[[Category:Political spectrum]]
[[Category:Political terminology]]
[[Category:Political terminology]]
[[Category:Right-wing politics]]
[[Category:Right-wing politics]]
[[Category:Centrism]]
[[Category:Centre-right politics| ]]

Latest revision as of 07:07, 18 February 2026


Centre-right politics is the set of right-wing political ideologies that lean closer to the political centre. It is commonly associated with conservatism, Christian democracy, liberal conservatism, and conservative liberalism. Conservative and liberal centre-right political parties have historically performed better in elections in the Anglosphere than other centre-right parties, while Christian democracy has been the primary centre-right ideology in Europe.

The centre-right commonly supports ideas such as small government, law and order, freedom of religion, and strong national security. It has historically stood in opposition to radical politics, redistributive policies, multiculturalism, illegal immigration, and LGBT acceptance. Economically, the centre-right supports free markets and the social market economy, with market liberalism and neoliberalism being common centre-right economic positions. It typically seeks to preserve the cultural and socioeconomic status quo and believes that changes should be implemented gradually.

The centre-right is derived from the left–right political spectrum of the French Revolution. It first developed as a political force with the creation of party systems in the 19th century, when monarchist and religious conservatives competed with individualist and anti-clerical liberals. Christian democracy developed in the 1870s as another response to anti-clericalism. The centre-right provided a moderate position to compete with socialism in the 19th century, and it became a driving force for liberal democracy in the early 20th century.

The centre-right was reconfigured after World War II to temper support for nationalism; it became a dominant political position throughout the Western world, particularly with the spread of Christian democracy across Europe. It aligned with the Western bloc during the Cold War, and in Europe it heavily influenced democratic consolidation and European integration. Global economic downturn in the 1970s caused a rise in support for neoliberalism and neoconservatism. The dissolution of the Soviet Union allowed a new centre-right movement to develop and take power in Central and Eastern Europe through the 1990s. The 2008 financial crisis led to declining support for the centre-right.

Ideologies[edit | edit source]

The centre-right is heterogeneous and encompasses multiple distinct ideologies.[1][2] Centre-right parties and coalitions are traditionally understood to be divided into separate factions depending on their priorities: economic, social, and cultural.[3] They are unified by their opposition to left-wing politics.[4]

Christian democracy is a political ideology predominant in Europe that is often described as centre-right.[5][6][7] It applies Christian morality to political issues, giving a religious justification for supporting democratization, individual liberties, and international cooperation.[8] Christian democrats hold conservative positions on most issues, but in a more moderate fashion than groups specifically described as conservative, and they trend centrist on economic issues.[9] Instead of a strong government, it advocates decentralization where other social units such as family, the community, and various organizations are major actors in society.[10] While still supporting a market economy, Christian democrats are more open to market intervention than conservatives, so as to prevent social inequality.[11] Unlike historical Christian political movements, Christian democracy is non-denominational and is not affiliated with the Catholic Church.[8] Political scientists disagree as to whether post-war Christian democracy is continuous with that of the 19th century or if it is a new school of thought.[12] Conservatism is commonly grouped with the centre-right,[2][5][6] though adherents of the far-right may argue that the centre-right is insufficiently conservative.[13] Liberalism is sometimes grouped with the centre-right when it is expressed as conservative liberalism.[7][14][15] The centre-right can also include a liberal variant of conservatism.[7][16] Conservative centre-right parties are more likely to incorporate ethnic nationalism relative to liberal centre-right parties.[17] Conservatives and liberals both oppose heavy governmental involvement in the economy.[18] Right-liberalism is common in Europe,[19] contrasted with the centrist liberalism in Canada and the United Kingdom,[20] and with the left-liberalism of the United States.[19] Economic ideologies associated with the centre-right include neoliberalism[21][22] and market liberalism.[7][23] Other ideologies sometimes grouped under the centre-right descriptor include agrarianism[24] and populist nationalism.[25]

Centre-right liberal and conservative parties have historically been successful in the Anglosphere, such as those in Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, and they have made up the primary centre-right ideologies in Scandinavia.[12] In contemporary politics, these two ideologies often co-exist in the same party.[26] Christian democracy has been the predominant centre-right ideology in continental Europe, particularly in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. It has performed most successfully in Catholic countries, while Christian democracy in other countries takes on more left-wing positions or fails to gain influence.[12] Christian democratic parties are affiliated with the Centrist Democrat International and centre-right liberal parties are affiliated with the International Democracy Union.[27] In Europe, centre-right parties are affiliated with the European People's Party.[17][28]

Positions[edit | edit source]

Governance[edit | edit source]

Centre-right politics is associated with conservative positions on social and cultural issues and free-market liberal positions on economic issues—centre-right parties see their strongest support among demographics that share all of these positions.[29] It broadly supports small government, though different factions hold different beliefs about when the state should intervene in economic and social affairs.[30] Conservatives generally have limited trust in human nature and believe society forms a natural hierarchical structure. Liberalism is individualist and maintains that people are best fit to make decisions for themselves.[14] Christian democrats lean toward personalism, which places value on individuals but adopts collectivist and corporatist elements as well as hierarchy.[12]

The centre-right generally seeks to preserve the societal status quo, in both a cultural and socioeconomic context,[31] and it is opposed to the radical politics espoused by the far-right.[32] Instead, it displays loss-averse tendencies and leans toward gradualism.[33] Constitutionalism and separation of powers are championed by the centre-right, combining protections for individual liberties with rule of law.[34] The centre-right's handling of the economy, its incrementalist approach to politics, and its support for the status quo have been attributed to its ability to remain in power for extended periods of time.[35]

Economics[edit | edit source]

The centre-right commonly supports a social market economy, rejecting both socialism and laissez-faire capitalism.[33] First developed by Christian democrats in post-war Germany, this system allows the state to intervene in the economy to regulate how business may be conducted, but it opposes nationalization or infringement on the free market.[36] Social market economies allow cooperation between employers and unions, and they provide for basic welfare programs.[36] This is more common among centre-right parties that appeal to working-class voters, as they otherwise have less incentive to hold these positions.[37][38] Centre-right conservatives oppose redistributive policies, believing that individuals should be allowed to retain their wealth. This tends to attract the more wealthy to the ideology.[39] While left-wing politics involves class conflict, centre-right parties forgo this in favour of supporting overall economic growth across classes.[40]

Alongside its support for lowering spending, the centre-right supports lower taxes.[41][31] In some cases, they may advocate private-public partnership or emphasize policies geared toward economic growth—these traits are common in Latin America where centre-right parties differentiate themselves from far-right parties by appealing to the middle and working classes.[42] In most countries, centre-right ideologies such as conservatism and Christian democracy are perceived by the public as most capable of managing the economy.[43][40] Economic downturn often leads to a short-term benefit for centre-right parties before a longer-term benefit for centre-left parties.[44]

Social and cultural issues[edit | edit source]

A 1953 poster for the centre-right Christian Democratic Union in Germany, invoking anti-communism. In English: "All ways of Marxism lead to Moscow! Therefore CDU"

The centre-right places emphasis on protecting public safety,[42] preserving national security, and maintaining law and order.[41][31][2] It supports democratization around the world, and some centre-right groups consider regime change an appropriate means to spread and protect democracy.[45] Taking a strong pro-peace stance can alienate members of a centre-right voting bloc. It is often more reluctant to support peace agreements because these often involve compromising on other centre-right positions such as maintaining a strong ethnic and religious identity.[46] The centre-right leans toward paternalism over individualism and social harmony over societal conflict.[33] It is also associated with anti-communism, which earned it support during the Cold War.[47][48]

Culturally, the centre-right has prioritized national and religious identity, especially by the mid-20th century.[49] It has used religion and moral values as uniting elements, particularly with the middle class.[40] European centre-right parties place higher priority on Christianity and providing support to Christians—a trait often shared with their far-right counterparts.[50] The centre-right more strongly supports freedom of religion overall, as opposed to generalized support of human rights expressed by left-wing ideologies.[51] As the European centre-right secularizes, it becomes less likely to support conservative positions on social issues.[52] Centre-right parties that take strong stances on cultural issues are more susceptible to radicalize and adopt far-right positions.[49]

While opposition to immigration is most commonly associated with far-right politics, the centre-right can attract support from voters with more moderate anti-immigrant positions.[41] Centre-right opposition to immigration comes from the challenge that immigration presents to the status quo and to national identity.[2] Supporters of centre-right politics in Europe often fear that immigration will lead to consequences such as increased crime, abuse of welfare, or acts of terrorism. Centre-right political parties sometimes take stronger positions against multiculturalism to gain an advantage over far-right parties.[31] The centre-right is more likely to present immigration as a prominent issue when it is placed in the context of economic and cultural policy.[41]

Right-wing politics has historically opposed social acceptance of lesbian, gay, and bisexual people, but the European centre-right has come to support protections on the basis of sexual orientation.[53] Some centre-right groups have taken the position that gay marriage and adoption by gay couples are an extension of the traditional nuclear family.[54] Such support has not been widely extended to transgender people.[55]

Centre-right parties support environmental preservation, though they are often seen as less interested in the subject than left-wing parties. The centre-right rejects concepts of climate grief or catastrophism, arguing that they can reduce interest in solving environmental issues.[56]

History[edit | edit source]

Early history[edit | edit source]

The philosophy of Edmund Burke was a foundation for modern conservatism.

The concept of centre-right politics is derived from the left–right political spectrum, which originated with the seating arrangements of the National Assembly during the French Revolution.[57] The centre-right came into being in the 19th century, developing with the earliest political parties.[2] Modern conservatism was derived from the ideas of British philosopher Edmund Burke and various 17th century figures who preceded him.[14] The liberal movement was heavily influenced by English philosopher John Locke, including his support for property rights and the right to overthrow tyrannical government.[14]

Early conservative and liberal parties clashed with one another: conservatives supported monarchy, land-owners, and the church, while liberals supported anti-clericalism, free markets, individualism, and scientific advancement.[14] Due to limitations in suffrage, early centre-right parties were able to maintain sufficient support by appealing solely to the upper class.[49] Christian democracy developed as a new European ideology in the 1870s as a response to the anti-clericalism advocated by liberals. Closely aligned with Catholicism, its ideals were reflected in the Rerum novarum issued by Pope Leo XIII.[14]

The European centre-right was a force of moderation in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Conservatism stood between socialism and the strongly anti-socialist church by advocating a more tempered approach.[58] Christian democracy likewise presented itself as an alternative to liberalism and socialism.[14] Centre-right figures were involved in early democratization processes to ensure that their own advantages from the previous status quo were retained.[58] Centre-right liberalism declined with the beginning of the 20th century, and many liberal parties merged with conservative parties.[14]

Interwar period[edit | edit source]

After World War I, several European nations formed weak centre-right parties,[59] which grew through a consolidation of the middle-class at the expense of socialist parties.[60] These centre-right parties gained influence during the Depression of 1920–1921, where they responded with measures such as a restoration of the gold standard.[61] Among the strongest of these parties were National Bloc and its successors in France, the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom, and a coalition of the Catholic Conservative Party and the Radicals in Switzerland.[62] Christian democracy found a place among the European centre-right during the interwar period.[63] Centre-right parties became the primary supporters of liberal democracy at this time, challenging the historical association of liberalism with the labour movement. The liberal centre-right opposed the other two European ideologies that were growing in popularity: fascism and social democracy.[64]

The European centre-right declined between 1931 and 1935 as the Great Depression set in.[65] In nations where the centre-right lacked a unified party, such as Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, far-right movements seized power.[59] Strong pre-existing centre-right parties retained power in other countries, including Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.[66] The use of market economics to keep wages steady, as well as the relative weakness of labour unions, meant that centre-right liberalism went unchallenged in much of Europe.[67]

Post-war era[edit | edit source]

Winston Churchill (left) and Charles de Gaulle (right) were leading post-war figures of British conservatism and Gaullism, respectively.

In the aftermath of World War II, the old centre-right was discredited in Europe, where it was seen as responsible for the Great Depression and complicit in the rise of fascism.[68] European centre-right parties worked closely with the centre-left and the political centre in the post-war era, helping to define the welfare state, democratic consolidation, and European integration.[69][32][70] They sought to avoid the far-right and far-left politics that had brought about Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, respectively,[69][71] and they saw European integration as a means to protect against socialism and anti-Christianity.[72] The modern centre-right developed in response as a political unification of several distinct right-wing schools of thought.[3][33] Ideological diversity meant flexibility in policy positions, but it also caused factionalism across centre-right parties.[73] The centre-right became a dominant political force in much of the western world over the following decades, including the American Republican Party as led by Dwight D. Eisenhower, one-nation conservatism of the British Conservative Party,[33] and Gaullism of the Rally of the French People.[74]

Europe had little appetite for nationalist ideologies after the end of fascism, so Christian democracy was popularized as an alternative right-wing ideology. Instead of nationalism, its ideas were based on traditional values, pragmatism, and support for moderate state intervention.[75][76][11] Its conception of government was heavily influenced by the constitutionalism and separation of powers of the United Kingdom and the United States.[34] West Germany reformed its centre-right faction with the creation of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU). Formed by a grassroots Christian movement, the CDU played a significant role in forming post-war Germany,[77] combining social Christianity, market liberalism, and national conservatism.[3] Its social market economy model proved to be influential across Europe.[36] Alcide De Gasperi similarly brought about the creation of a strong Christian democratic movement in Italy,[33] which was a leading political force in various coalitions for over 50 years.[76] The United Kingdom was the only major exception to the spread of Christian democracy, as its old centre-right was seen as triumphant under the wartime leadership of Winston Churchill, and the failure of Nazi Germany to invade meant that its pre-war institutions remained intact.[78] Here conservatism remained dominant, meaning less state intervention relative to other European nations.[79]

Cold War[edit | edit source]

During the Cold War, centre-right groups supported the United States and the Western Bloc, opposing the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc.[33] In several countries, centre-right parties were opposed by domestic communism on top of their opposition to the Soviet Union.[80] As suffrage expanded and the centre-right spread across social classes, cultural issues and social identity, such as support for nationalism and religion, became more prominent themes.[49] The European centre-right began supporting social integration as a means to limit the appeal of the nationalism that had led to fascism.[32] In the United States, the centre-right was associated with the Rockefeller Republican faction of the Republican Party.[81] The American centre-right promoted pro-business stances over the following decades, which led to economic justifications for supporting higher taxes as well as social programs such as public housing.[32]

Christian democrats supported a modest welfare state, and the European centre-right was reluctant to support more radical initiatives to liberalize the economy.[82] In Southeast Asia, the centre-right secured power in countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, implementing growth-oriented policies based on free market policies with moderate governmental intervention, leading to significant economic expansion.[83] The centre-right rose to power in Greece with the New Democracy party in the 1970s, led by Konstantinos Karamanlis as Greece transitioned from dictatorship to democracy.[84] Spain and Portugal underwent similar transitions as they emerged from dictatorship.[85][33]

The 1970s saw decreasing support for welfare policies with the end of the postwar economic boom and the economic fallout of the 1970s energy crisis. This led to increased support for privatization and cuts in welfare spending.[86] It also led a period of opposition to immigration in Europe at this time.[87] By the 1980s, the post-war consensus had ended, with the new right supporting neoconservatism and neoliberalism.[26] At this time, centre-right parties took a more active role in challenging the welfare state and union influence.[38]

The predominantly centre-right United States Republican Party began a rightward shift in the 1980s, with its moderate factions declining in numbers over the following decades.[81] The Indian Bharatiya Janata Party followed the Western centre-right strategy in the 1980s and 1990s, appealing to the centre while maintaining a militarist, nationalist platform.[88] New political parties were formed in Turkey after the 1980 coup d'état, and the Motherland Party, led by businessmen and tradesmen, implemented secular neoliberal policies.[89] In European nations, women were most likely to support the centre-right until a leftward shift among women took place over the 1970s and 1980s.[90]

1990s[edit | edit source]

Eastern and Central Europe were introduced to centre-right politics in the 1990s after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.[33] These movements—which preferred not to be identified as parties due to the term's association with communism—were made up of intellectual groups that had been dissidents during communist rule.[91] The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland all had strong opposition movements under communism, allowing these movements to form strong centre-right parties.[92] In nations where the centre-right lacked experience in political organization, many of the first-generation centre-right movements lost momentum and faded into irrelevance in the years thereafter.[93] Nationalism and populism became the dominant political forces here until the end of the decade.[92]

Centre-right liberals in Central and Eastern Europe supported integration with the Western World and acceleration of industrialization, while conservatives wished to preserve individual national identities and protect Catholic traditions from Western secularism.[94] Post-communist centre-right groups were more inclined toward liberal positions, favouring market capitalist policies over government intervention, which was associated with communist rule.[95] Anti-communism and anti-totalitarianism were paramount among all factions of the centre-right in these regions, and they condemned the West for treating mass killings under communist regimes differently than the Holocaust.[45]

More broadly, the European centre-right became increasingly secular by the 1990s, creating a division between centre-right parties that were more liberal on social issues and religious right parties that maintained conservative positions on social issues.[52] Secularism especially became a challenge for Christian democracy, causing it to lose political influence.[35] African political parties rapidly began joining political internationals in the 1990s. Among the centre-right, collaboration began between the Ghana New Patriotic Party, the Malawi Congress Party, and the Kenya Democratic Party.[27] Japan, which had been ruled almost consistently by the centre-right Liberal Democratic Party for decades, saw a proliferation of centre-right opposition parties by the 1990s, with new parties forming and established parties shifting toward the centre-right to remain competitive.[96]

Following the rise of the Third Way among left-wing politics in the 1990s, the centre-right was forced to moderate, sacrificing the more aggressive aspects of right-wing politics that developed in the 1980s and abandoning its opposition to the welfare state.[97] It saw reduced support at this time as the centre-left usurped much of its leverage on economic issues.[98][48] In Western Europe, this marked the beginning of a broader decline in moderate politics.[76]

21st century[edit | edit source]

The 2000s saw a shift back to the right in Europe, where centre-right parties formed coalition governments with far-right parties in countries such as France, Italy, and the Netherlands.[99] The European and American centre-right adopted some nationalist far-right ideas at this time, including positions on immigration and crime.[100] Centre-right parties in other countries shifted leftward with pro-labour policies to remain competitive with the centre-left—this included parties in Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Sweden.[37] The 2000s also saw an example of a successful populist centre-right party with the ascension of Forza Italia, led by Silvio Berlusconi.[101]

During the 2003 invasion of Iraq, centre-right parties in Europe were more likely to send military forces than centre-left parties.[102] This was especially true in Central and Eastern Europe, where memories of the Soviet Union encouraged close alignment with the United States and strong support for combatting dictatorships.[103] The centre-right in this region fragmented at the onset of the 21st century as much of the centre-right shifted away from liberalism to more conservative and nationalist politics with a strong stance against European integration.[104] As Islamism lost support in Turkey, many Islamists moved to the centre-right, forming the new Justice and Development Party. This party was more accepting of secularism and neoliberalism, and it became the nation's dominant political force.[105]

Presidents Sebastián Piñera (left) of Chile and Mauricio Macri (right) of Argentina were elected amid a resurgence of the centre-right in their respective nations in the 2010s.

Although citizens throughout Latin America most commonly self-identified as centre-right, the region saw a surge of popularity for expanding government programs and state ownership,[106] leading to a leftward shift that began in 1998.[107] In Bolivia, dissatisfaction with the centre-right's handling of economic crises reached a crescendo with public demonstrations that relegated the centre-right to a relatively ineffective opposition.[108] Colombia was an exception, where the long-standing centre-right dominance remained unchallenged.[109] Centre-right parties retook power in several Latin American countries by the 2010s,[107] including the National Renewal in Chile and the Republican Proposal in Argentina,[110] as well as a centre-right coalition in Venezuela.[107]

Canada was one of the last Anglosphere countries for the centre-right to be restored after World War II, with no centre-right parties holding power until the premiership of Stephen Harper in 2006.[26] The 2008 financial crisis was followed by a decline in support for major centre-right and centre-left parties through the 2010s.[111][98] For the centre-right, this occurred most prominently in newer democracies, while support was steadier in more established ones.[112] To regain support, the European centre-right shifted toward the centre and moved away from neoliberalism, replacing it with a renewed focus on public safety, economic growth, and social issues.[113] It saw further trouble later in the decade with the European debt crisis causing governments to enact controversial austerity policies, particularly through spending cuts and value-added taxes. These further pushed the public from the centre-right to opposition parties across the political spectrum.[114] The weakening of the centre-right corresponded with increased support for the far-right.[98]

To align more closely with conservative allies, Christian democratic parties had begun adopting more conservative economic policies by 2013.[38] The American centre-right supported traditionalist conservatism and neoconservatism at the beginning of the 21st century; however, by the 2010s these groups had lost influence as the Republican Party shifted from the centre-right to right-wing populism.[81]

The centre-right underwent a decline throughout the western world in the late 2010s and early 2020s, led by demographic changes such as increased tertiary education and ethnic diversity as well as the waning influence of religion and the rise of identity politics. At this time, the centre-left came into power and centre-right parties drifted rightward or were supplanted by new far-right parties.[33]

See also[edit | edit source]

Notes[edit | edit source]

  1. Gidron & Ziblatt 2019, pp. 18, 24.
  2. 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 Taflaga 2023, p. 137.
  3. 3.0 3.1 3.2 Gidron & Ziblatt 2019, p. 24.
  4. Taflaga 2023, pp. 138–139.
  5. 5.0 5.1 Hellwig, Kweon & Vowles 2020, p. 162.
  6. 6.0 6.1 Gidron & Ziblatt 2019, p. 18.
  7. 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 Ostrowski 2023, p. 6.
  8. 8.0 8.1 Botsiou 2010, p. 177.
  9. Gidron & Ziblatt 2019, pp. 24–25.
  10. Botsiou 2010, pp. 178, 182.
  11. 11.0 11.1 Hatzivassiliou 2010, pp. 210–211.
  12. 12.0 12.1 12.2 12.3 Taflaga 2023, p. 139.
  13. Hirschberger & Voges 2024, p. 15.
  14. 14.0 14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4 14.5 14.6 14.7 Taflaga 2023, p. 138.
  15. Gidron & Ziblatt 2019, pp. 20–21.
  16. Arndt 2017, p. 496.
  17. 17.0 17.1 Sandal & Loizides 2013, p. 419 note 1.
  18. Bale 2008, p. 324.
  19. 19.0 19.1 Noël & Thérien 2008, p. 233.
  20. Gidron & Ziblatt 2019, p. 21.
  21. Hellwig, Kweon & Vowles 2020, p. 161.
  22. Taflaga 2023, p. 143.
  23. Gidron & Ziblatt 2019, pp. 24, 26.
  24. Gidron & Ziblatt 2019, pp. 21–22.
  25. Gidron & Ziblatt 2019, pp. 26, 28.
  26. 26.0 26.1 26.2 Taflaga 2023, p. 140.
  27. 27.0 27.1 Salih 2006, p. 153.
  28. Botsiou 2010, p. 174.
  29. Gidron & Ziblatt 2019, p. 29.
  30. Taflaga 2023, pp. 137–138, 141.
  31. 31.0 31.1 31.2 31.3 Bale 2008, p. 319.
  32. 32.0 32.1 32.2 32.3 Gidron & Ziblatt 2019, p. 26.
  33. 33.00 33.01 33.02 33.03 33.04 33.05 33.06 33.07 33.08 33.09 Cliffe 2023.
  34. 34.0 34.1 Botsiou 2010, p. 181.
  35. 35.0 35.1 Taflaga 2023, p. 142.
  36. 36.0 36.1 36.2 Hatzivassiliou 2010, p. 212.
  37. 37.0 37.1 Arndt 2017, p. 498.
  38. 38.0 38.1 38.2 Gidron & Ziblatt 2019, p. 25.
  39. Woshinsky 2007, p. 113.
  40. 40.0 40.1 40.2 Taflaga 2023, p. 141.
  41. 41.0 41.1 41.2 41.3 Pardos-Prado 2015, p. 354.
  42. 42.0 42.1 Luna & Kaltwasser 2014, p. 5.
  43. Hellwig, Kweon & Vowles 2020, pp. 161–162.
  44. Hellwig, Kweon & Vowles 2020, p. 179.
  45. 45.0 45.1 Freudenstein 2010, p. 245.
  46. Sandal & Loizides 2013, p. 401.
  47. Vaida 2017, pp. 8–9.
  48. 48.0 48.1 Botsiou 2010, p. 173.
  49. 49.0 49.1 49.2 49.3 Gidron & Ziblatt 2019, p. 27.
  50. Hirschberger & Voges 2024, p. 178.
  51. Hirschberger & Voges 2024, p. 179.
  52. 52.0 52.1 Magni & Reynolds 2023, p. 51.
  53. Magni & Reynolds 2023, pp. 50–51.
  54. Magni & Reynolds 2023, pp. 51–53.
  55. Magni & Reynolds 2023, p. 50.
  56. Lilkov 2018, pp. 173, 177.
  57. Woshinsky 2007, p. 109.
  58. 58.0 58.1 Gidron & Ziblatt 2019, pp. 25–26.
  59. 59.0 59.1 Ziblatt 2017, p. 339.
  60. Luebbert 1991, p. 8.
  61. Ziblatt 2017, pp. 288–289.
  62. Luebbert 1991, p. 228.
  63. Hatzivassiliou 2010, p. 210.
  64. Luebbert 1991, p. 2.
  65. Ziblatt 2017, pp. 170–171.
  66. Ziblatt 2017, p. 358.
  67. Luebbert 1991, p. 233.
  68. Hatzivassiliou 2010, p. 209.
  69. 69.0 69.1 Vaida 2017, p. 3.
  70. Botsiou 2010, p. 176.
  71. Hatzivassiliou 2010, p. 207.
  72. Botsiou 2010, pp. 189–190.
  73. Botsiou 2010, pp. 179–180.
  74. Botsiou 2010, p. 180.
  75. Botsiou 2010, pp. 176–177.
  76. 76.0 76.1 76.2 Vaida 2017, p. 4.
  77. Ziblatt 2017, p. 334.
  78. Hatzivassiliou 2010, pp. 211, 213.
  79. Hatzivassiliou 2010, p. 214.
  80. Hatzivassiliou 2010, p. 208.
  81. 81.0 81.1 81.2 Starr 2018.
  82. Botsiou 2010, p. 178.
  83. Rock 2018, p. 44.
  84. Filandros 2010, pp. 223–224.
  85. Filandros 2010, p. 223.
  86. Vaida 2017, p. 7.
  87. Bale 2008, p. 320.
  88. De Leon, Desai & Tuğal 2009, p. 204.
  89. De Leon, Desai & Tuğal 2009, pp. 207–208.
  90. Abendschön & Steinmetz 2014, p. 316.
  91. Freudenstein 2010, p. 240.
  92. 92.0 92.1 Vachudova 2008, p. 388.
  93. Freudenstein 2010, p. 241.
  94. Freudenstein 2010, p. 242, 244.
  95. Freudenstein 2010, pp. 247–248.
  96. Winkler & Taniguchi 2022, pp. 503–506.
  97. Noël & Thérien 2008, p. 169.
  98. 98.0 98.1 98.2 Gidron & Ziblatt 2019, p. 19.
  99. Noël & Thérien 2008, p. 187.
  100. Noël & Thérien 2008, p. 188.
  101. Zaslove 2008, pp. 327–328.
  102. Noël & Thérien 2008, p. 207.
  103. Freudenstein 2010, pp. 252–253.
  104. Vachudova 2008, pp. 401–402.
  105. De Leon, Desai & Tuğal 2009, pp. 209–210.
  106. Luna & Kaltwasser 2014, p. 38.
  107. 107.0 107.1 107.2 Niedzwiecki & Pribble 2017, p. 73.
  108. Bowen 2014, p. 106.
  109. Wills-Otero 2014, p. 195.
  110. Niedzwiecki & Pribble 2017, p. 76.
  111. Hellwig, Kweon & Vowles 2020, p. 158.
  112. Hellwig, Kweon & Vowles 2020, p. 163.
  113. Arvanitopoulos & Tzifakis 2010, pp. 1–2.
  114. Vaida 2017, p. 11.

References[edit | edit source]

Books[edit | edit source]

Journals[edit | edit source]

Web[edit | edit source]