Aadhaar: Difference between revisions

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{{Use Indian English|date=December 2022}}
{{Use Indian English|date=December 2022}}
{{Infobox project
{{Infobox project
| logo              =  
| logo              = [[File:Aadhaar Logo.svg|250px]]
| image              =
| image              =
| caption            = "Mera Aadhaar, Meri Pehchaan"<ref name=AboutUIDAI/>
| caption            = "Mera Aadhaar, Meri Pehchaan"<ref name=AboutUIDAI/>
| launched            = {{Start date and age|df=yes|2009|01|28}}<ref name=AboutUIDAI/>
| launched            = {{Start date and age|df=yes|2009|01|28}}<ref name=AboutUIDAI/>
| country            = [[India]]
| country            = [[India]]
| budget              = {{INRConvert|113.66|b|lk=r}} (up to the month of August 2019)<ref name="UIDAIFinance">{{cite web|url=https://uidai.gov.in/about-uidai/about-uidai/financials.html|title=UIDAI Finance and Budge Section|website=UIDAI|access-date=29 May 2018}}</ref>
| budget              = {{INRConvert|11366|c|lk=on}} (up to the month of August 2019)<ref name="UIDAIFinance">{{cite web|url=https://uidai.gov.in/about-uidai/about-uidai/financials.html|title=UIDAI Finance and Budge Section|website=UIDAI|access-date=29 May 2018}}</ref>
| key_people = *[[Nandan Nilekani]], Co-founder of [[Infosys]], first Chairman, UIDAI
| key_people = *[[Nandan Nilekani]], Co-founder of [[Infosys]], first Chairman, UIDAI
*[[J. Satyanarayana]], [[Indian Administrative Service|IAS]], Chairman, UIDAI  
*[[J. Satyanarayana]], [[Indian Administrative Service|IAS]], Chairman, UIDAI  
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}}
}}


'''Aadhaar''' ([[Hindi]]: {{transl|hi|ISO|ādhār}}, {{lit|base, foundation}})<ref>{{Cite encyclopedia |editor-last=McGregor |editor-first=R. S. |url=https://dsal.uchicago.edu/dictionaries/mcgregor/ |encyclopedia=The Oxford Hindi-English dictionary |date=1993 |isbn=0-19-864317-9 |publication-place=Oxford |publisher=Oxford University Press |oclc=30111536 |entry=आधार |page=86 |entry-url=https://dsal.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/app/mcgregor_query.py?page=86}}</ref> is a 12-digit unique identity number that can be obtained voluntarily by the citizens of [[India]] and resident foreign nationals who have spent over 182 days in twelve months immediately preceding the date of application for enrolment, based on their [[biometric]] and [[demography|demographic]] data. The data is collected by the [[Unique Identification Authority of India]] (UIDAI), a statutory authority established in January 2009 by the [[Government of India]], under the jurisdiction of the [[Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology]], following the provisions of the [[Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and other Subsidies, benefits and services) Act, 2016]].<ref name=AboutUIDAI>{{cite web|title=About UIDAI|url=https://uidai.gov.in/about-uidai/about-uidai.html|publisher=UIDAI|access-date=25 July 2017}}</ref>
'''Aadhaar''' ([[Hindi]]: आधार, {{lit|base, foundation}}; sometimes informally called '''UIDAI ID''' or '''UIDAI Number''')<ref>{{Cite encyclopedia |editor-last=McGregor |editor-first=R. S. |url=https://dsal.uchicago.edu/dictionaries/mcgregor/ |encyclopedia=The Oxford Hindi-English dictionary |date=1993 |isbn=0-19-864317-9 |publication-place=Oxford |publisher=Oxford University Press |oclc=30111536 |entry=आधार |page=86 |entry-url=https://dsal.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/app/mcgregor_query.py?page=86}}</ref> is a 12-digit unique identity number that can be obtained voluntarily by the citizens of [[India]] and resident foreign nationals who have spent over 182 days in twelve months immediately preceding the date of application for enrolment, based on their [[biometric]] and [[demography|demographic]] data. The data is collected by the [[Unique Identification Authority of India]] (UIDAI), a statutory authority established in January 2009 by the [[Government of India]], under the jurisdiction of the [[Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology]], following the provisions of the [[Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and other Subsidies, benefits and services) Act, 2016]].<ref name=AboutUIDAI>{{cite web|title=About UIDAI|url=https://uidai.gov.in/about-uidai/about-uidai.html|publisher=UIDAI|access-date=25 July 2017}}</ref>


Aadhaar is the world's largest [[biometric ID system]]. [[World Bank Chief Economist]] [[Paul Romer]] described Aadhaar as "the most sophisticated ID programme in the world".<ref>{{cite web|title='Adhaar' most sophisticated ID programme in the world : World Bank |url=http://www.daijiworld.com/news/newsDisplay.aspx?newsID=442948|website=Daiji World|access-date=17 March 2017}}</ref> Considered a proof of residence and not a proof of citizenship, Aadhaar does not itself grant any rights to domicile in India.<ref name=AadharrNotCitizenship>{{cite web|title=Aadhaar Card not proof of citizenship: Calcutta HC|date=25 December 2016|url=http://www.livelaw.in/aadhaar-card-not-proof-citizenship-calcutta-hc/|access-date=4 March 2017}}</ref> In June 2017, the [[Ministry of Home Affairs (India)|Home Ministry]] clarified that Aadhaar is not a valid [[identity document|identification document]] for Indians travelling to [[Nepal]] and [[Bhutan]].<ref>{{cite web|title=Aadhaar not valid for Indians travelling to Nepal, Bhutan: Home Ministry|url=http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/aadhaar-not-valid-for-indians-travelling-to-nepal-bhutan-home-ministry-1716773?pfrom=home-india|access-date=25 June 2017}}</ref>
Aadhaar is the world's largest [[biometric ID system]]. [[World Bank Chief Economist]] [[Paul Romer]] described Aadhaar as "the most sophisticated ID programme in the world".<ref>{{cite web|title='Adhaar' most sophisticated ID programme in the world : World Bank |url=http://www.daijiworld.com/news/newsDisplay.aspx?newsID=442948|website=Daiji World|access-date=17 March 2017}}</ref> Considered a proof of residence and not a proof of citizenship, Aadhaar does not itself grant any rights to domicile in India.<ref name=AadharrNotCitizenship>{{cite web|title=Aadhaar Card not proof of citizenship: Calcutta HC|date=25 December 2016|url=http://www.livelaw.in/aadhaar-card-not-proof-citizenship-calcutta-hc/|access-date=4 March 2017}}</ref> In June 2017, the [[Ministry of Home Affairs (India)|Home Ministry]] clarified that Aadhaar is not a valid [[identity document|identification document]] for Indians travelling to [[Nepal]] and [[Bhutan]].<ref>{{cite web|title=Aadhaar not valid for Indians travelling to Nepal, Bhutan: Home Ministry|url=http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/aadhaar-not-valid-for-indians-travelling-to-nepal-bhutan-home-ministry-1716773?pfrom=home-india|access-date=25 June 2017}}</ref>
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Prior to the enactment of the Act, the UIDAI had functioned, since 28{{nbsp}}January 2009, as an attached office of the Planning Commission (now [[NITI Aayog]]). On 3{{nbsp}}March 2016, a [[Money bill#India|money bill]] was introduced in the Parliament to give legislative backing to Aadhaar.<ref name="Tabled-BL">{{cite news|title=Aadhaar legislation tabled as a money Bill|url=http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/new-aadhaar-bill-introduced-as-money-bill-in-lok-sabha/article8309587.ece|work=[[Business Line]]|date=3 March 2016}}</ref> On 11{{nbsp}}March 2016, the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and other Subsidies, benefits and services) Act, 2016, was passed in the [[Lok Sabha]].<ref name="PassedLokSabha-LM">{{cite news|title=Aadhaar bill passed in Lok Sabha|url=http://www.livemint.com/Politics/UgblAmPPHetk71sjQUqcvN/Aadhaar-bill-passed-in-Lok-Sabha-the-story-so-far.html|access-date=11 March 2016|work=[[Live Mint]]|date=11 March 2016}}</ref><ref>{{cite act|url=http://www.indiacode.nic.in/acts-in-pdf/2016/201618.pdf|year=2016|title=The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and other Subsidies, benefits and services) Act, 2016|index=18|access-date=20 July 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160816175154/http://www.indiacode.nic.in/acts-in-pdf/2016/201618.pdf|archive-date=16 August 2016|url-status=dead}}</ref>
Prior to the enactment of the Act, the UIDAI had functioned, since 28{{nbsp}}January 2009, as an attached office of the Planning Commission (now [[NITI Aayog]]). On 3{{nbsp}}March 2016, a [[Money bill#India|money bill]] was introduced in the Parliament to give legislative backing to Aadhaar.<ref name="Tabled-BL">{{cite news|title=Aadhaar legislation tabled as a money Bill|url=http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/new-aadhaar-bill-introduced-as-money-bill-in-lok-sabha/article8309587.ece|work=[[Business Line]]|date=3 March 2016}}</ref> On 11{{nbsp}}March 2016, the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and other Subsidies, benefits and services) Act, 2016, was passed in the [[Lok Sabha]].<ref name="PassedLokSabha-LM">{{cite news|title=Aadhaar bill passed in Lok Sabha|url=http://www.livemint.com/Politics/UgblAmPPHetk71sjQUqcvN/Aadhaar-bill-passed-in-Lok-Sabha-the-story-so-far.html|access-date=11 March 2016|work=[[Live Mint]]|date=11 March 2016}}</ref><ref>{{cite act|url=http://www.indiacode.nic.in/acts-in-pdf/2016/201618.pdf|year=2016|title=The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and other Subsidies, benefits and services) Act, 2016|index=18|access-date=20 July 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160816175154/http://www.indiacode.nic.in/acts-in-pdf/2016/201618.pdf|archive-date=16 August 2016|url-status=dead}}</ref>


Aadhaar is the subject of several rulings by the [[Supreme Court of India]]. On 23{{nbsp}}September 2013, the Supreme Court issued an interim order saying that "no person should suffer for not getting Aadhaar",<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.hindustantimes.com/delhi-news/no-person-should-suffer-for-not-getting-aadhaar-sc/story-i4lEYx2uIRpMObetGOazTO.html|title=No person should suffer for not getting Aadhaar: SC|date=23 September 2013}}</ref> adding that the government cannot deny a service to a resident who does not possess Aadhaar, as it is voluntary and not mandatory.<ref name="AadharCourtTie">{{cite news|url=http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/dont-tie-up-benefits-to-aadhaar-court-tells-centre/article5162837.ece|title=Don't tie up benefits to Aadhaar, court tells Centre|date=24 September 2013|work=[[The Hindu]]|access-date=27 May 2015}}</ref> The court also limited the scope of the programme and reaffirmed the voluntary nature of the identity number in other rulings.<ref name=Aug11>{{cite news|url=http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/aadhaar-card-not-mandatory-supreme-court-rules-1206134|title=Aadhaar Card Not Mandatory, Supreme Court Rules|publisher=[[NDTV]]|date=11 August 2015|access-date=6 September 2015}}</ref><ref name=IBN11Aug>{{cite news|title=SC rules Aadhaar card not mandatory, says government cannot share any personal information|url=http://www.ibnlive.com/news/india/sc-rules-aadhaar-card-not-mandatory-says-government-cannot-share-any-personal-information-1038130.html|access-date=6 September 2015|publisher=[[CNN-IBN]]|date=11 August 2015}}</ref><ref name=":0">{{Cite news|url=http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/aadhaar-cannot-be-mandatory-for-welfare-schemes-supreme-court/article17671381.ece|title=Supreme Court counters push for Aadhaar|work=The Hindu|access-date=2017-04-02|language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url= https://scroll.in/topic/38792/identity-project |title= Identity project {{!}} Scroll.in |website= scroll.in |language=en |access-date= 2017-12-03}}</ref> On 24{{nbsp}}August 2017 the Indian Supreme Court delivered a landmark verdict affirming the [[right to privacy]] as a fundamental right, overruling previous judgments on the issue.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-41033954|title=Indian top court stands up for privacy|date=24 August 2017|publisher=BBC}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url= https://www.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2012/35071/35071_2012_Judgement_24-Aug-2017.pdf |title=Judgment 24 Aug 2017 by the Supreme Court of India|language=en |access-date= 2018-09-17}}(Puttaswamy v. Union)</ref>
Aadhaar is the subject of several rulings by the [[Supreme Court of India]]. On 23{{nbsp}}September 2013, the Supreme Court issued an interim order saying that "no person should suffer for not getting Aadhaar",<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.hindustantimes.com/delhi-news/no-person-should-suffer-for-not-getting-aadhaar-sc/story-i4lEYx2uIRpMObetGOazTO.html|title=No person should suffer for not getting Aadhaar: SC|date=23 September 2013}}</ref> adding that the government cannot deny a service to a resident who does not possess Aadhaar, as it is voluntary and not mandatory.<ref name="AadharCourtTie">{{cite news|url=http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/dont-tie-up-benefits-to-aadhaar-court-tells-centre/article5162837.ece|title=Don't tie up benefits to Aadhaar, court tells Centre|date=24 September 2013|work=[[The Hindu]]|access-date=27 May 2015}}</ref> The court also limited the scope of the programme and reaffirmed the voluntary nature of the identity number in other rulings.<ref name=Aug11>{{cite news|url=http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/aadhaar-card-not-mandatory-supreme-court-rules-1206134|title=Aadhaar Card Not Mandatory, Supreme Court Rules|publisher=[[NDTV]]|date=11 August 2015|access-date=6 September 2015}}</ref><ref name=IBN11Aug>{{cite news|title=SC rules Aadhaar card not mandatory, says government cannot share any personal information|url=http://www.ibnlive.com/news/india/sc-rules-aadhaar-card-not-mandatory-says-government-cannot-share-any-personal-information-1038130.html|access-date=6 September 2015|publisher=[[CNN-IBN]]|date=11 August 2015}}</ref><ref name=":0">{{Cite news|url=http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/aadhaar-cannot-be-mandatory-for-welfare-schemes-supreme-court/article17671381.ece|title=Supreme Court counters push for Aadhaar|work=The Hindu|access-date=2017-04-02|language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url= https://scroll.in/topic/38792/identity-project |title= Identity project {{!}} Scroll.in |website= scroll.in |language=en |access-date= 2017-12-03}}</ref> On 24{{nbsp}}August 2017 the Indian Supreme Court delivered a landmark verdict affirming the [[right to privacy]] as a fundamental right, overruling previous judgments on the issue.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-41033954|title=Indian top court stands up for privacy|date=24 August 2017|publisher=BBC}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url= https://www.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2012/35071/35071_2012_Judgement_24-Aug-2017.pdf |title= Judgment 24 Aug 2017 by the Supreme Court of India |language= en |access-date= 2018-09-17 |archive-date= 2 August 2018 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20180802083724/https://www.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2012/35071/35071_2012_Judgement_24-Aug-2017.pdf |url-status= dead }}(Puttaswamy v. Union)</ref>
A five-judge constitutional bench of the Supreme Court heard various cases relating to the validity of Aadhaar<ref>{{cite web|url=https://thewire.in/192610/supreme-court-to-set-up-constitution-bench-to-hear-pleas-against-aadhaar/|title=Aadhar Case: SC to Set up Constitution Bench to Hear Pleas Against Aadhaar|website=thewire.in|language=en-GB|access-date=2017-11-28}}</ref> on various grounds including privacy, surveillance, and exclusion from welfare benefits.<ref name="Aadhaar Act Case Background">{{cite web|url=http://scobserver.clpr.org.in/cases/aadhar-card-case/|title=Aadhaar Act Case Background|website=scobserver.clpr.org.in}}</ref> On 9{{nbsp}}January 2017 the five-judge Constitution bench of the Supreme Court of India reserved its judgement on the interim relief sought by petitions to extend the deadline making Aadhaar mandatory for everything from bank accounts to mobile services. The final hearing began on 17{{nbsp}}January 2018.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.bloombergquint.com/law-and-policy/2017/12/14/government-to-extend-all-aadhaar-linking-deadlines-to-march-31|title=Government To Extend All Aadhaar Linking Deadlines To March 31|website=bloombergquint.com/}}</ref> In September 2018, the top court upheld the validity of the Aadhaar system.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/09/india-top-court-upholds-constitution-validity-aadhaar-card-180926054727305.html|title=India's top court upholds constitution validity of Aadhaar card|publisher=Al Jazeera|access-date=2018-09-26}}</ref> In the September 2018 judgment, the Supreme Court nevertheless stipulated that the Aadhaar card is not mandatory for opening bank accounts, getting a mobile number, or being admitted to a school.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.thehansindia.com/posts/index/National/2018-09-26/Supreme-Court-verdict-on-Aadhar--Unique-is-better-than-best/414346|title=Supreme Court verdict on Aadhar|website=The Hans India|date=26 September 2018|language=en|access-date=2018-09-26}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://setopati.net/political/131199|title=Aadhar is constitutional but don't make it mandatory: Indian SC to govt {{!}} Setopati - Nepal's Digital Newspaper|website=setopati.net|language=en-US|access-date=2018-09-26}}</ref> Some [[civil liberty]] groups such as the Citizens Forum for Civil Liberties and the Indian Social Action Forum (INSAF) have also opposed the project over privacy concerns.<ref name=UIDAssault>{{cite news|title=UID an assault on individual liberty: Activists|url=http://www.rediff.com/money/report/uid-an-assault-on-individual-liberty/20100906.htm|access-date=29 May 2015|work=[[Rediff]]|date=6 September 2010}}</ref><ref name=Ignorance>{{cite news|title=AADHAR: Union Cabinet of Ignorance!|url=http://www.rediff.com/news/report/upa-a-cabinet-of-ignorance-on-aadhaar/20130131.htm|access-date=29 May 2015|work=[[Rediff]]}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/nine-issues-to-debate-on-aadhaar-bill/article8341611.ece|title=Nine issues to debate on Aadhaar Bill|date=11 March 2016|newspaper=The Hindu|language=en-IN|issn=0971-751X|access-date=28 June 2016}}</ref>
A five-judge constitutional bench of the Supreme Court heard various cases relating to the validity of Aadhaar<ref>{{cite web|url=https://thewire.in/192610/supreme-court-to-set-up-constitution-bench-to-hear-pleas-against-aadhaar/|title=Aadhar Case: SC to Set up Constitution Bench to Hear Pleas Against Aadhaar|website=thewire.in|language=en-GB|access-date=2017-11-28}}</ref> on various grounds including privacy, surveillance, and exclusion from welfare benefits.<ref name="Aadhaar Act Case Background">{{cite web|url=http://scobserver.clpr.org.in/cases/aadhar-card-case/|title=Aadhaar Act Case Background|website=scobserver.clpr.org.in|access-date=27 February 2018|archive-date=27 February 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180227153935/http://scobserver.clpr.org.in/cases/aadhar-card-case/|url-status=dead}}</ref> On 9{{nbsp}}January 2017 the five-judge Constitution bench of the Supreme Court of India reserved its judgement on the interim relief sought by petitions to extend the deadline making Aadhaar mandatory for everything from bank accounts to mobile services. The final hearing began on 17{{nbsp}}January 2018.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.bloombergquint.com/law-and-policy/2017/12/14/government-to-extend-all-aadhaar-linking-deadlines-to-march-31|title=Government To Extend All Aadhaar Linking Deadlines To March 31|website=bloombergquint.com/|date=14 December 2017 }}</ref> In September 2018, the top court upheld the validity of the Aadhaar system.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/09/india-top-court-upholds-constitution-validity-aadhaar-card-180926054727305.html|title=India's top court upholds constitution validity of Aadhaar card|publisher=Al Jazeera|access-date=2018-09-26}}</ref> In the September 2018 judgment, the Supreme Court nevertheless stipulated that the Aadhaar card is not mandatory for opening bank accounts, getting a mobile number, or being admitted to a school.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.thehansindia.com/posts/index/National/2018-09-26/Supreme-Court-verdict-on-Aadhar--Unique-is-better-than-best/414346|title=Supreme Court verdict on Aadhar|website=The Hans India|date=26 September 2018|language=en|access-date=2018-09-26}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://setopati.net/political/131199|title=Aadhar is constitutional but don't make it mandatory: Indian SC to govt {{!}} Setopati - Nepal's Digital Newspaper|website=setopati.net|language=en-US|access-date=2018-09-26}}</ref> Some [[civil liberty]] groups such as the Citizens Forum for Civil Liberties and the Indian Social Action Forum (INSAF) have also opposed the project over privacy concerns.<ref name=UIDAssault>{{cite news|title=UID an assault on individual liberty: Activists|url=http://www.rediff.com/money/report/uid-an-assault-on-individual-liberty/20100906.htm|access-date=29 May 2015|work=[[Rediff]]|date=6 September 2010}}</ref><ref name=Ignorance>{{cite news|title=AADHAR: Union Cabinet of Ignorance!|url=http://www.rediff.com/news/report/upa-a-cabinet-of-ignorance-on-aadhaar/20130131.htm|access-date=29 May 2015|work=[[Rediff]]}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/nine-issues-to-debate-on-aadhaar-bill/article8341611.ece|title=Nine issues to debate on Aadhaar Bill|date=11 March 2016|newspaper=The Hindu|language=en-IN|issn=0971-751X|access-date=28 June 2016}}</ref>


Despite the validity of Aadhaar being challenged in the court,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://scobserver.clpr.org.in/cases/aadhar-card-case/|title=Challenge to the Constitutionality of Aadhaar Act 2016}}</ref><ref>[https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/26/indian-court-upholds-legality-of-worlds-largest-biometric-database Indian court upholds legality of world's largest biometric database] ''The Guardian'', 2018</ref> the [[central government]] has pushed citizens to link their Aadhaar numbers with a host of services, including mobile SIM cards, bank accounts, the [[Employees' Provident Fund Organisation]], and a large number of welfare schemes including but not limited to the [[Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act]], the [[Public Distribution System]], and old age pensions.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/the-long-list-of-aadhaar-linked-schemes/article17641068.ece|title=The long list of Aadhaar-linked schemes|last=Deepalakshmi|first=K.|date=2017-03-24|work=The Hindu|access-date=2017-11-28|language=en-IN|issn=0971-751X}}</ref> In 2017, reports suggested that HIV patients were being forced to discontinue treatment for fear of identity breach as access to the treatment has become contingent on producing Aadhaar.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://scroll.in/pulse/857656/across-india-hiv-positive-people-drop-out-of-treatment-programmes-as-centres-insist-on-aadhaar|title=Why Aadhaar is prompting HIV positive people to drop out of treatment programmes across India|last=Rao|first=Menaka|work=Scroll.in|access-date=2017-11-28|language=en-US}}</ref>
Despite the validity of Aadhaar being challenged in the court,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://scobserver.clpr.org.in/cases/aadhar-card-case/|title=Challenge to the Constitutionality of Aadhaar Act 2016|access-date=27 February 2018|archive-date=27 February 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180227153935/http://scobserver.clpr.org.in/cases/aadhar-card-case/|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>[https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/26/indian-court-upholds-legality-of-worlds-largest-biometric-database Indian court upholds legality of world's largest biometric database] ''The Guardian'', 2018</ref> the [[central government]] has pushed citizens to link their Aadhaar numbers with a host of services, including mobile SIM cards, bank accounts, the [[Employees' Provident Fund Organisation]], and a large number of welfare schemes including but not limited to the [[Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act]], the [[Public Distribution System]], old age pensions and public health insurances.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/the-long-list-of-aadhaar-linked-schemes/article17641068.ece|title=The long list of Aadhaar-linked schemes|last=Deepalakshmi|first=K.|date=2017-03-24|work=The Hindu|access-date=2017-11-28|language=en-IN|issn=0971-751X}}</ref> In 2017, reports suggested that HIV patients were being forced to discontinue treatment for fear of identity breach as access to the treatment has become contingent on producing Aadhaar.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://scroll.in/pulse/857656/across-india-hiv-positive-people-drop-out-of-treatment-programmes-as-centres-insist-on-aadhaar|title=Why Aadhaar is prompting HIV positive people to drop out of treatment programmes across India|last=Rao|first=Menaka|work=Scroll.in|access-date=2017-11-28|language=en-US}}</ref>


==Unique Identification Authority==
==Unique Identification Authority==
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The UIDAI is mandated to assign a 12-digit unique identification (UID) number (termed "Aadhaar") to all the residents of India. The implementation of the UID scheme entails generation and assignment of UIDs to residents; defining mechanisms and processes for interlinking UIDs with partner databases; operation and management of all stages of the UID life cycle; framing policies and procedures for updating mechanism and defining usage and applicability of UIDs for delivery of various services, among others.<ref name=GoInotification/> The number is linked to the resident's basic demographic and biometric information such as a photograph, ten [[fingerprint]]s and two [[iris scan]]s, which are stored in a centralised database.<ref name="WhatIs?">{{cite news|title=Learning with the Times: What is Aadhaar?|url=http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Learning-with-the-Times-What-is-Aadhaar/articleshow/6680601.cms|access-date=29 May 2015|work=[[The Times of India]]|date=4 December 2010}}</ref>
The UIDAI is mandated to assign a 12-digit unique identification (UID) number (termed "Aadhaar") to all the residents of India. The implementation of the UID scheme entails generation and assignment of UIDs to residents; defining mechanisms and processes for interlinking UIDs with partner databases; operation and management of all stages of the UID life cycle; framing policies and procedures for updating mechanism and defining usage and applicability of UIDs for delivery of various services, among others.<ref name=GoInotification/> The number is linked to the resident's basic demographic and biometric information such as a photograph, ten [[fingerprint]]s and two [[iris scan]]s, which are stored in a centralised database.<ref name="WhatIs?">{{cite news|title=Learning with the Times: What is Aadhaar?|url=http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Learning-with-the-Times-What-is-Aadhaar/articleshow/6680601.cms|access-date=29 May 2015|work=[[The Times of India]]|date=4 December 2010}}</ref>


The UIDAI was initially set up by the [[Government of India]] in January 2009, as an attached office under the aegis of the [[Planning Commission (India)|Planning Commission]] via a notification in the ''[[Gazette of India]]''.<ref name=GoInotification>{{cite web|title=Notification No.-A-43011/02/2009-Admn.I, 28 January 2009, Planning Commission, Government of India|url= http://www.uidai.gov.in/images/notification_28_jan_2009.pdf|date=28 January 2009|website=UIDAI|access-date=7 July 2015}}</ref> According to the notification, the UIDAI was given the responsibility to lay down plans and policies to implement the UID scheme, to own and operate the UID database, and to be responsible for its updating and maintenance on an ongoing basis.
The UIDAI was initially set up by the [[Government of India]] in January 2009, as an attached office under the aegis of the [[Planning Commission (India)|Planning Commission]] via a notification in the ''[[Gazette of India]]''.<ref name=GoInotification>{{cite web|title=Notification No.-A-43011/02/2009-Admn.I, 28 January 2009, Planning Commission, Government of India|url=http://www.uidai.gov.in/images/notification_28_jan_2009.pdf|date=28 January 2009|website=UIDAI|access-date=7 July 2015|archive-date=13 April 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160413162120/http://uidai.gov.in/images/notification_28_jan_2009.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref> According to the notification, the UIDAI was given the responsibility to lay down plans and policies to implement the UID scheme, to own and operate the UID database, and to be responsible for its updating and maintenance on an ongoing basis.


The UIDAI data centre is located at the [[Manesar#Industrial Model Township (IMT), Manesar|Industrial Model Township (IMT)]], [[Manesar]],<ref name="HR-Review">{{cite web |url=http://haryanasamvad.gov.in/store/document/HR-Review-January-2013.pdf |title=Haryana Review 2013 |access-date=18 April 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160508155230/http://haryanasamvad.gov.in/store/document/HR-Review-January-2013.pdf |archive-date=8 May 2016 |url-status=dead }}</ref> which was inaugurated by the then [[Chief minister (India)|Chief minister]] of [[Haryana]] [[Bhupinder Singh Hooda]] on 7 January 2013.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.hindustantimes.com/gurgaon/new-uidai-data-centre-to-come-up-at-manesar/story-2uPu8Vf85cWTmqCMiW8ofL.html|title=New UIDAI data centre to come up at Manesar|date=2013-01-07|work=Hindustan Times|access-date=2018-02-08|language=en}}</ref> Aadhaar data is kept in about 7,000 servers in [[Bengaluru]] and [[Manesar]].<ref>{{cite web|url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/aadhaar-enabled-dbt-savings-estimated-over-rs-90000-crore/articleshow/64949162.cms|title=Aadhaar-enabled DBT savings estimated over Rs 90,000 crore|website=[[The Times of India]]}}</ref>
The UIDAI data centre is located at the [[Manesar#Industrial Model Township (IMT), Manesar|Industrial Model Township (IMT)]], [[Manesar]],<ref name="HR-Review">{{cite web |url=http://haryanasamvad.gov.in/store/document/HR-Review-January-2013.pdf |title=Haryana Review 2013 |access-date=18 April 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160508155230/http://haryanasamvad.gov.in/store/document/HR-Review-January-2013.pdf |archive-date=8 May 2016 |url-status=dead }}</ref> which was inaugurated by the then [[Chief minister (India)|Chief minister]] of [[Haryana]] [[Bhupinder Singh Hooda]] on 7 January 2013.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.hindustantimes.com/gurgaon/new-uidai-data-centre-to-come-up-at-manesar/story-2uPu8Vf85cWTmqCMiW8ofL.html|title=New UIDAI data centre to come up at Manesar|date=2013-01-07|work=Hindustan Times|access-date=2018-02-08|language=en}}</ref> Aadhaar data is kept in about 7,000 servers in [[Bengaluru]] and [[Manesar]].<ref>{{cite news|url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/aadhaar-enabled-dbt-savings-estimated-over-rs-90000-crore/articleshow/64949162.cms|title=Aadhaar-enabled DBT savings estimated over Rs 90,000 crore|website=[[The Times of India]]|date=11 July 2018 }}</ref>


Starting with the issuing of the first UID in September 2010, the UIDAI has been aiming to issue an Aadhaar number to all the residents ensuring that it is robust enough to eliminate duplicate and fake identities, and that the number can be verified and authenticated in an easy and cost-effective way online anywhere, anytime.<ref name="administrative1">{{Cite journal|last=Chin|first=Roger|date=June 2015|title=India's Aadhaar Project: The Unprecedented and Unique Partnership for Inclusion|url=https://jas.uitm.edu.my/images/CURRENT_ISSUES/1.pdf|journal=Journal of Administrative Science}}</ref> In a notification dated 16{{nbsp}}December 2010 the Government of India indicated that it would recognise a letter issued by the UIDAI containing details of name, address, and Aadhaar number, as an official, valid document.<ref name=RBInotification>{{cite web|title=Government of India Notification (No. 14/2010 / F. No. 6/2/2007 – ES)|url=https://rbi.org.in/scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=6284&Mode=0|website=[[Reserve Bank of India]]|access-date=7 July 2015|date=15 March 2011}}</ref> Aadhaar is not intended to replace any existing identity cards, nor does it constitute proof of citizenship.<ref name=NilekaniNotCards>{{cite news|title=Nilekani to give numbers, ministries to issue cards|url=http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2009-07-16/news/28448725_1_ration-cards-pan-cards-biometric|access-date=27 May 2015|work=[[The Economic Times]]|date=16 July 2009}}</ref> Aadhaar neither confers [[citizenship]] nor guarantees rights, benefits, or entitlements. Aadhaar is a random number that never starts with a 0 or 1, and is not loaded with profiling or intelligence that would make it insusceptible to fraud or theft, and thus provides a measure of privacy in this regard. The unique ID also qualifies as a valid ID while availing various government services such as a [[Liquefied petroleum gas|LPG]] connection, a subsidised ration, [[kerosene]] from the [[Public Distribution System|PDS]], or benefits under [[National Social Assistance Scheme|NSAP]] or pension schemes, [[ESign (India)|e-sign]], a [[digital locker]],<ref name="Digital locker">{{cite news|title=Move to link digital locker with Aadhaar challenged|url=http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/move-to-link-digital-locker-with-aadhaar-challenged/article7387459.ece|access-date=8 August 2015|work=[[The Hindu]]|date=5 July 2015}}</ref> a Universal Account Number (UAN) under [[Employees' Provident Fund Organisation of India|EPFO]],<ref name=PFAadhaar/> and some other services such as a SIM card or opening a bank account.<ref name="NilekaniTakesCharge">{{cite news|title=Nilekani takes charge, says first set of IDs in 12-18 months|url=http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Nilekani-takes-charge-says-first-set-of-IDs-in-12-18-months/articleshow/4812763.cms?referral=PM|access-date=27 May 2015|work=[[The Times of India]]|date=24 July 2009}}</ref><ref name=NPCIFAQ>{{cite web|title=Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) By Customers: Aadhaar Payment Bridge (APB) System|url=http://www.npci.org.in/documents/FAQs_on_APBS_for_Customers1.pdf|website=[[National Payments Corporation of India]]|access-date=7 July 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150319024158/http://www.npci.org.in/documents/FAQs_on_APBS_for_Customers1.pdf|archive-date=19 March 2015|url-status=dead}}</ref> According to the UIDAI website, any Aadhaar holder or service provider can verify the genuineness of an Aadhaar number through a user-friendly service of UIDAI called the Aadhaar Verification Service (AVS), which is available on its website.<ref name=VerificationService>{{cite news|title=India launches Aadhaar verification services, enrolment centers|url=http://www.zdnet.com/article/india-launches-aadhaar-verification-services-enrolment-centers/|access-date=8 August 2015|publisher=ZDNet|date=27 May 2013}}</ref><ref name=Verify>{{cite web|title=Verify Aadhaar|url=https://resident.uidai.net.in/aadhaarverification|publisher=UIDAI|access-date=9 July 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150710112912/https://resident.uidai.net.in/aadhaarverification|archive-date=10 July 2015|url-status=dead}}</ref> Also, a resident already enrolled under the [[National Population Register]] is not required to enrol again for Aadhaar.<ref name=Where>{{cite web|title=Where to Enroll|url=http://uidai.gov.in/where-to-enroll.html|publisher=UIDAI|access-date=9 July 2015}}</ref>
Starting with the issuing of the first UID in September 2010, the UIDAI has been aiming to issue an Aadhaar number to all the residents ensuring that it is robust enough to eliminate duplicate and fake identities, and that the number can be verified and authenticated in an easy and cost-effective way online anywhere, anytime.<ref name="administrative1">{{Cite journal|last=Chin|first=Roger|date=June 2015|title=India's Aadhaar Project: The Unprecedented and Unique Partnership for Inclusion|url=https://jas.uitm.edu.my/images/CURRENT_ISSUES/1.pdf|journal=Journal of Administrative Science}}</ref> In a notification dated 16{{nbsp}}December 2010 the Government of India indicated that it would recognise a letter issued by the UIDAI containing details of name, address, and Aadhaar number, as an official, valid document.<ref name=RBInotification>{{cite web|title=Government of India Notification (No. 14/2010 / F. No. 6/2/2007 – ES)|url=https://rbi.org.in/scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=6284&Mode=0|website=[[Reserve Bank of India]]|access-date=7 July 2015|date=15 March 2011}}</ref> Aadhaar is not intended to replace any existing identity cards, nor does it constitute proof of citizenship.<ref name=NilekaniNotCards>{{cite news|title=Nilekani to give numbers, ministries to issue cards|url=http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2009-07-16/news/28448725_1_ration-cards-pan-cards-biometric|access-date=27 May 2015|work=[[The Economic Times]]|date=16 July 2009}}</ref> Aadhaar neither confers [[citizenship]] nor guarantees rights, benefits, or entitlements. Aadhaar is a random number that never starts with a 0 or 1, and is not loaded with profiling or intelligence that would make it insusceptible to fraud or theft, and thus provides a measure of privacy in this regard. The unique ID also qualifies as a valid ID while availing various government services such as a [[Liquefied petroleum gas|LPG]] connection, a subsidised ration, [[kerosene]] from the [[Public Distribution System|PDS]], or benefits under [[National Social Assistance Scheme|NSAP]] or pension schemes, [[ESign (India)|e-sign]], a [[digital locker]],<ref name="Digital locker">{{cite news|title=Move to link digital locker with Aadhaar challenged|url=http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/move-to-link-digital-locker-with-aadhaar-challenged/article7387459.ece|access-date=8 August 2015|work=[[The Hindu]]|date=5 July 2015}}</ref> a Universal Account Number (UAN) under [[Employees' Provident Fund Organisation of India|EPFO]],<ref name=PFAadhaar/> and some other services such as a SIM card or opening a bank account.<ref name="NilekaniTakesCharge">{{cite news|title=Nilekani takes charge, says first set of IDs in 12-18 months|url=http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Nilekani-takes-charge-says-first-set-of-IDs-in-12-18-months/articleshow/4812763.cms?referral=PM|access-date=27 May 2015|work=[[The Times of India]]|date=24 July 2009}}</ref><ref name=NPCIFAQ>{{cite web|title=Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) By Customers: Aadhaar Payment Bridge (APB) System|url=http://www.npci.org.in/documents/FAQs_on_APBS_for_Customers1.pdf|website=[[National Payments Corporation of India]]|access-date=7 July 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150319024158/http://www.npci.org.in/documents/FAQs_on_APBS_for_Customers1.pdf|archive-date=19 March 2015|url-status=dead}}</ref> According to the UIDAI website, any Aadhaar holder or service provider can verify the genuineness of an Aadhaar number through a user-friendly service of UIDAI called the Aadhaar Verification Service (AVS), which is available on its website.<ref name=VerificationService>{{cite news|title=India launches Aadhaar verification services, enrolment centers|url=http://www.zdnet.com/article/india-launches-aadhaar-verification-services-enrolment-centers/|access-date=8 August 2015|publisher=ZDNet|date=27 May 2013}}</ref><ref name=Verify>{{cite web|title=Verify Aadhaar|url=https://resident.uidai.net.in/aadhaarverification|publisher=UIDAI|access-date=9 July 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150710112912/https://resident.uidai.net.in/aadhaarverification|archive-date=10 July 2015|url-status=dead}}</ref> Also, a resident already enrolled under the [[National Population Register]] is not required to enrol again for Aadhaar.<ref name=Where>{{cite web|title=Where to Enroll|url=http://uidai.gov.in/where-to-enroll.html|publisher=UIDAI|access-date=9 July 2015}}</ref>
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In 1999 after the [[Kargil war]], the [[Kargil Review Committee]], headed by security analyst [[K. Subrahmanyam]], was formed to study the state of [[national security]]. It submitted its report to the then [[Prime Minister of India|Prime Minister]], [[Atal Bihari Vajpayee]], on 7{{nbsp}}January 2000.<ref name="KargilCommittee">{{cite news|url=http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1702/17020310.htm|title=A committee and some questions: A first-person account with regard to the Kargil Review Committee Report and its implications.|date=4 February 2000|work=[[Frontline (magazine)|Frontline]]}}</ref> Among its various recommendations was the proposal that citizens in villages in border regions be issued identity cards on a priority basis, with such ID cards issued later to all people living in border states.<ref name="KargilReview">{{cite news|url=http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/mar/04kargil.htm|title=The Kargil Review Committee Report: 'The fallacy of showing the LOC as running northeast to the Karakoram Pass must be exposed'|date=4 March 2000|work=[[Rediff]]|access-date=26 May 2015}}</ref><ref name="UIDConceals" />
In 1999 after the [[Kargil war]], the [[Kargil Review Committee]], headed by security analyst [[K. Subrahmanyam]], was formed to study the state of [[national security]]. It submitted its report to the then [[Prime Minister of India|Prime Minister]], [[Atal Bihari Vajpayee]], on 7{{nbsp}}January 2000.<ref name="KargilCommittee">{{cite news|url=http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1702/17020310.htm|title=A committee and some questions: A first-person account with regard to the Kargil Review Committee Report and its implications.|date=4 February 2000|work=[[Frontline (magazine)|Frontline]]}}</ref> Among its various recommendations was the proposal that citizens in villages in border regions be issued identity cards on a priority basis, with such ID cards issued later to all people living in border states.<ref name="KargilReview">{{cite news|url=http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/mar/04kargil.htm|title=The Kargil Review Committee Report: 'The fallacy of showing the LOC as running northeast to the Karakoram Pass must be exposed'|date=4 March 2000|work=[[Rediff]]|access-date=26 May 2015}}</ref><ref name="UIDConceals" />


The Rangarajan Commission set up to revamp the statistical system in India in 2000 recommended under the Socio-economic statistics chapter the setting up of a centralised database of citizens in India. The Commission submitted its report to the Government in August 2001<ref name="Commission Report">{{cite news|url=http://www.mospi.gov.in/background-national-statistical-commission-nsc|title=Background of the National Statistical Commission (NSC) |publisher= Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation {{!}} Government of India|access-date=10 March 2020}}</ref> and in its analysis noted under para 9.2.26. Many developed countries and an increasing number of developing countries, including China, have databases of their citizens while also providing for each adult individual citizen of the country a unique identification number. Such a unique identification number assigned to a citizen would be a proof of his/her identity for a variety of purposes. The major advantage is that all this can be taken care of by simply producing citizen identity card as a proof of individual identity. Presently, there are different kinds of cards and means of establishing identity in India, such as electoral identity card, income-tax PAN card, passport, ration card, driving licence, birth, and education certificates, etc. However, none of the systems are equipped to handle a population figure that exceeds more than one billion in India. So far there has not been any attempt whatsoever to standardise a format of citizen's database, which can link the information available for each citizen from different sources and analyse this according to the needs and project a comprehensive picture of the human resources in the country."<ref name="mospi">{{cite web|url=http://www.mospi.gov.in/92-population-and-basic-statistics-local-level|title=9.2 Population and Basic Statistics at the Local Level|publisher=[[Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation]]|access-date=7 February 2019}}</ref> Further, the Commission made the specific recommendation under para 9.2.27 made the following observations:  9.2.27 Taking note of the initiative taken by the Ministry of Home Affairs for issuing national identification cards to the citizens, the Commission concludes that:
The Rangarajan Commission set up to revamp the statistical system in India in 2000 recommended under the Socio-economic statistics chapter the setting up of a centralised database of citizens in India. The Commission submitted its report to the Government in August 2001<ref name="Commission Report">{{cite news|url=http://www.mospi.gov.in/background-national-statistical-commission-nsc|title=Background of the National Statistical Commission (NSC) |publisher= Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation {{!}} Government of India|access-date=10 March 2020}}</ref> and in its analysis noted under para 9.2.26. Many developed countries and an increasing number of developing countries, including China, have databases of their citizens while also providing for each adult individual citizen of the country a unique identification number. Such a unique identification number assigned to a citizen would be a proof of his/her identity for a variety of purposes. The major advantage is that all this can be taken care of by simply producing citizen identity card as a proof of individual identity. Presently, there are different kinds of cards and means of establishing identity in India, such as electoral identity card, income-tax PAN card, passport, ration card, driving licence, birth, and education certificates, etc. However, none of the systems are equipped to handle a population figure that exceeds more than 1 billion in India. So far there has not been any attempt whatsoever to standardise a format of citizen's database, which can link the information available for each citizen from different sources and analyse this according to the needs and project a comprehensive picture of the human resources in the country."<ref name="mospi">{{cite web|url=http://www.mospi.gov.in/92-population-and-basic-statistics-local-level|title=9.2 Population and Basic Statistics at the Local Level|publisher=[[Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation]]|access-date=7 February 2019}}</ref> Further, the Commission made the specific recommendation under para 9.2.27 made the following observations:  9.2.27 Taking note of the initiative taken by the Ministry of Home Affairs for issuing national identification cards to the citizens, the Commission concludes that:
A centralised database of the citizens of the country with a system of issuing a unique identification number/card<ref name="mospi"/> has several potential benefits to its citizens and will improve the efficiency of administration. The project, if implemented, will have obvious benefits to the statistical system.
A centralised database of the citizens of the country with a system of issuing a unique identification number/card<ref name="mospi"/> has several potential benefits to its citizens and will improve the efficiency of administration. The project, if implemented, will have obvious benefits to the statistical system.


A Group of Ministers (GoM), headed by [[L. K. Advani]], was formed to study the recommendations and examine possible implementation. The GoM submitted its report in May 2001 in which it accepted the recommendation for an ID card and stated that a "multi-purpose National Identity Card" project would be started soon, with the card to be issued first in border villages and then elsewhere.<ref name="UIDConceals" /><ref name="GoMReport">{{cite news|title=Group of Ministers' Report on "Reforming the National Security System"|url=http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2001/rmay2001/23052001/r2305200110.html|work=[[Press Information Bureau]]|access-date=26 May 2015|date=23 May 2001}}</ref> In late September 2001 the [[Ministry of External Affairs (India)|Ministry of External Affairs]] proposed that a mandatory national identity card be issued. This announcement followed reports that some people had obtained multiple [[Indian passport]]s with different details. This was attributed to the lack of computerisation between the passport centres.<ref name="PassportFraud">{{cite news|title=Govt in no position to check passport fraud|url=http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Govt-in-no-position-to-check-passport-fraud/articleshow/1002214008.cms|access-date=26 May 2015|work=[[The Times of India]]|date=21 September 2001}}</ref><ref name="SecondPassport">{{cite news|title=Obtaining second passport is easy|url=http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/hyderabad/Obtaining-second-passport-is-easy/articleshow/2056623137.cms|access-date=26 May 2015|work=[[The Times of India]]|date=23 September 2001}}</ref> In December 2003 the Citizenship (Amendment) Bill 2003 was introduced in the [[Lok Sabha]] by L.{{nbsp}}K. Advani. It primarily aimed to provide various rights to [[Non-resident Indian and person of Indian origin|persons of Indian origin]],<ref name="DualCitizen">{{cite news|title=Dual citizenship Bill passed|url=http://www.thehindu.com/2003/12/23/stories/2003122308150100.htm|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161220103623/http://www.thehindu.com/2003/12/23/stories/2003122308150100.htm|url-status=dead|archive-date=20 December 2016|access-date=26 May 2015|work=[[The Hindu]]|date=22 December 2003}}</ref> but the bill also introduced Clause{{nbsp}}14{{nbsp}}(a) that said: "The Central Government may compulsorily register every citizen of India and issue national identity card to him."<ref name="UIDConceals" /><ref name="Amendment">{{cite web|title=The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2003|url=http://indiankanoon.org/doc/949775/|publisher=Indian Kanoon|access-date=26 May 2015}}</ref><ref name="FullAct-Citizenship">{{cite web|title=The Citizenship Act, 1955 (as of 2005)|url=http://mha1.nic.in/pdfs/ic_act55.pdf|publisher=[[Ministry of Home Affairs (India)]]|access-date=26 May 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150616035355/http://mha1.nic.in/pdfs/ic_act55.pdf|archive-date=16 June 2015|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref name="PRSActFull">{{cite web|title=The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2003|url=http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/vikas_doc/docs/acts_new/1167485133_citizenship_amendment.pdf|publisher=[[PRS Legislative Research]]|access-date=26 May 2015}}</ref>
A Group of Ministers (GoM), headed by [[L. K. Advani]], was formed to study the recommendations and examine possible implementation. The GoM submitted its report in May 2001 in which it accepted the recommendation for an ID card and stated that a "multi-purpose National Identity Card" project would be started soon, with the card to be issued first in border villages and then elsewhere.<ref name="UIDConceals" /><ref name="GoMReport">{{cite news|title=Group of Ministers' Report on "Reforming the National Security System"|url=http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2001/rmay2001/23052001/r2305200110.html|work=[[Press Information Bureau]]|access-date=26 May 2015|date=23 May 2001}}</ref> In late September 2001 the [[Ministry of External Affairs (India)|Ministry of External Affairs]] proposed that a mandatory national identity card be issued. This announcement followed reports that some people had obtained multiple [[Indian passport]]s with different details. This was attributed to the lack of computerisation between the passport centres.<ref name="PassportFraud">{{cite news|title=Govt in no position to check passport fraud|url=http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Govt-in-no-position-to-check-passport-fraud/articleshow/1002214008.cms|access-date=26 May 2015|work=[[The Times of India]]|date=21 September 2001}}</ref><ref name="SecondPassport">{{cite news|title=Obtaining second passport is easy|url=http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/hyderabad/Obtaining-second-passport-is-easy/articleshow/2056623137.cms|access-date=26 May 2015|work=[[The Times of India]]|date=23 September 2001}}</ref> In December 2003 the Citizenship (Amendment) Bill 2003 was introduced in the [[Lok Sabha]] by L.{{nbsp}}K. Advani. It primarily aimed to provide various rights to [[Non-resident Indian and person of Indian origin|persons of Indian origin]],<ref name="DualCitizen">{{cite news|title=Dual citizenship Bill passed|url=http://www.thehindu.com/2003/12/23/stories/2003122308150100.htm|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161220103623/http://www.thehindu.com/2003/12/23/stories/2003122308150100.htm|url-status=dead|archive-date=20 December 2016|access-date=26 May 2015|work=[[The Hindu]]|date=22 December 2003}}</ref> but the bill also introduced Clause{{nbsp}}14{{nbsp}}(a) that said: "The Central Government may compulsorily register every citizen of India and issue national identity card to him."<ref name="UIDConceals" /><ref name="Amendment">{{cite web|title=The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2003|url=http://indiankanoon.org/doc/949775/|publisher=Indian Kanoon|access-date=26 May 2015}}</ref><ref name="FullAct-Citizenship">{{cite web|title=The Citizenship Act, 1955 (as of 2005)|url=http://mha1.nic.in/pdfs/ic_act55.pdf|publisher=[[Ministry of Home Affairs (India)]]|access-date=26 May 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150616035355/http://mha1.nic.in/pdfs/ic_act55.pdf|archive-date=16 June 2015|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref name="PRSActFull">{{cite web|title=The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2003|url=http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/vikas_doc/docs/acts_new/1167485133_citizenship_amendment.pdf|publisher=[[PRS Legislative Research]]|access-date=26 May 2015|archive-date=24 September 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150924084049/http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/vikas_doc/docs/acts_new/1167485133_citizenship_amendment.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref>


===2009–2013===
===2009–2013===
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In late November 2012 a former [[Karnataka High Court]] judge, [[K. S. Puttaswamy]], and a lawyer, Parvesh Khanna, filed a [[Public Interest Litigation]] (PIL) against the government in the [[Supreme Court of India]]. They contended that the government was implementing the project without any legislative backing. They pointed out that the National Identification Authority of India Bill 2010, which had been introduced in the [[Rajya Sabha]], was still pending.<ref name="PILResponse">{{cite news|url=http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-11-30/news/35483074_1_aadhaar-numbers-unique-identification-authority-uidai|title=Supreme Court seeks government's response on PIL challenging Aadhaar implementation|date=30 November 2012|work=[[The Economic Times]]|access-date=27 May 2015}}</ref> They further said that since the UIDAI was proceeding only on the basis of an executive order issued on 28{{nbsp}}January 2009, it could not collect biometric data of citizens as it would be a [[violation of privacy]] under [[Fundamental rights in India|Article 21 of the Constitution]].<ref name="NoticePIL">{{cite news|url=http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Supreme-Court-notice-to-govt-on-PIL-over-Aadhar/articleshow/17433755.cms|title=Supreme Court notice to govt on PIL over Aadhar|date=1 December 2012|work=[[The Times of India]]|access-date=27 May 2015}}</ref> In December 2011 the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance, led by [[Yashwant Sinha]], rejected the National Identification Authority of India Bill 2010 and suggested modifications. It termed the project "unethical and violative of Parliament's prerogatives".<ref name="Panelrejects" /> On 23{{nbsp}}September 2013 the Supreme Court issued an [[interim order]] saying that the government could not deny a service to anyone who did not possess Aadhaar, as the identity number was voluntary.<ref name="AadharCourtTie" /><ref name="PuttaSwamyvsIndia">{{cite court|litigants=K. S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India|court=[[Supreme Court of India]]|year=2013|url=http://judis.nic.in/temp/494201232392013p.txt|quote=In the meanwhile, no person should suffer for not getting the Adhaar card in spite of the fact that some authority had issued a circular making it mandatory and when any person applies to get the Aadhaar Card voluntarily, it may be checked whether that person is entitled for it under the law and it should not be given to any illegal immigrant.}}</ref><ref name="TippingPoint">{{cite news|url=http://forbesindia.com/article/big-bet/how-nandan-nilekani-took-aadhaar-past-the-tipping-point/36259/0|title=How Nandan Nilekani Took Aadhaar Past The Tipping Point|date=8 October 2013|work=[[Forbes]] (India)|access-date=27 May 2015}}</ref>
In late November 2012 a former [[Karnataka High Court]] judge, [[K. S. Puttaswamy]], and a lawyer, Parvesh Khanna, filed a [[Public Interest Litigation]] (PIL) against the government in the [[Supreme Court of India]]. They contended that the government was implementing the project without any legislative backing. They pointed out that the National Identification Authority of India Bill 2010, which had been introduced in the [[Rajya Sabha]], was still pending.<ref name="PILResponse">{{cite news|url=http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-11-30/news/35483074_1_aadhaar-numbers-unique-identification-authority-uidai|title=Supreme Court seeks government's response on PIL challenging Aadhaar implementation|date=30 November 2012|work=[[The Economic Times]]|access-date=27 May 2015}}</ref> They further said that since the UIDAI was proceeding only on the basis of an executive order issued on 28{{nbsp}}January 2009, it could not collect biometric data of citizens as it would be a [[violation of privacy]] under [[Fundamental rights in India|Article 21 of the Constitution]].<ref name="NoticePIL">{{cite news|url=http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Supreme-Court-notice-to-govt-on-PIL-over-Aadhar/articleshow/17433755.cms|title=Supreme Court notice to govt on PIL over Aadhar|date=1 December 2012|work=[[The Times of India]]|access-date=27 May 2015}}</ref> In December 2011 the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance, led by [[Yashwant Sinha]], rejected the National Identification Authority of India Bill 2010 and suggested modifications. It termed the project "unethical and violative of Parliament's prerogatives".<ref name="Panelrejects" /> On 23{{nbsp}}September 2013 the Supreme Court issued an [[interim order]] saying that the government could not deny a service to anyone who did not possess Aadhaar, as the identity number was voluntary.<ref name="AadharCourtTie" /><ref name="PuttaSwamyvsIndia">{{cite court|litigants=K. S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India|court=[[Supreme Court of India]]|year=2013|url=http://judis.nic.in/temp/494201232392013p.txt|quote=In the meanwhile, no person should suffer for not getting the Adhaar card in spite of the fact that some authority had issued a circular making it mandatory and when any person applies to get the Aadhaar Card voluntarily, it may be checked whether that person is entitled for it under the law and it should not be given to any illegal immigrant.}}</ref><ref name="TippingPoint">{{cite news|url=http://forbesindia.com/article/big-bet/how-nandan-nilekani-took-aadhaar-past-the-tipping-point/36259/0|title=How Nandan Nilekani Took Aadhaar Past The Tipping Point|date=8 October 2013|work=[[Forbes]] (India)|access-date=27 May 2015}}</ref>


In late September 2013, following the Supreme Court verdict, [[Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs (India)|Union Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs and Planning]], [[Rajeev Shukla]], said that it would attempt to pass the National Identification Authority of India Bill 2010 in the winter session of the Parliament.<ref name="SeeksCover">{{cite news|title=Central government seeks statutory cover for UIDAI|url=http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/Central-government-seeks-statutory-cover-for-UIDAI/2013/09/25/article1802296.ece|access-date=27 May 2015|work=[[The New Indian Express]]|date=25 September 2013}}</ref> On 9{{nbsp}}October 2013 the [[National Payments Corporation of India]] launched an Aadhaar-based remittance system. Using the system, funds could be transferred to any Aadhaar-linked bank accounts if the Aadhaar number was known. It was announced that an SMS could be used for amounts up to {{INRConvert|5|k|lk=r}} and for amounts over that a mobile bank app could be used. By this time around 44 crore (440{{nbsp}}million) Aadhaar numbers had been issued.<ref name="PunchAadhaar">{{cite news|title=Punch in recipient's Aadhaar number to transfer funds|url=http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/23875312.cms|access-date=27 May 2015|work=[[The Economic Times]]|date=10 October 2013}}</ref>
In late September 2013, following the Supreme Court verdict, [[Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs (India)|Union Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs and Planning]], [[Rajeev Shukla]], said that it would attempt to pass the National Identification Authority of India Bill 2010 in the winter session of the Parliament.<ref name="SeeksCover">{{cite news|title=Central government seeks statutory cover for UIDAI|url=http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/Central-government-seeks-statutory-cover-for-UIDAI/2013/09/25/article1802296.ece|access-date=27 May 2015|work=[[The New Indian Express]]|date=25 September 2013}}</ref> On 9{{nbsp}}October 2013 the [[National Payments Corporation of India]] launched an Aadhaar-based remittance system. Using the system, funds could be transferred to any Aadhaar-linked bank accounts if the Aadhaar number was known. It was announced that an SMS could be used for amounts up to {{INRConvert|5|k|lk=r}} and for amounts over that a mobile bank app could be used. By this time around 440 million Aadhaar numbers had been issued.<ref name="PunchAadhaar">{{cite news|title=Punch in recipient's Aadhaar number to transfer funds|url=http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/23875312.cms|access-date=27 May 2015|work=[[The Economic Times]]|date=10 October 2013}}</ref>


===2014–2015===
===2014–2015===
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On 10 June 2014, the new government disbanded four cabinet committees to streamline the decision-making process; among them was the cabinet committee on Aadhaar.<ref name="ScrapsAadhaar">{{cite news|title=Narendra Modi scraps 4 Cabinet Committees, including the one on Aadhar|url=http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/modi-scraps-4-cabinet-committees-uidai/1/366234.html|access-date=29 May 2015|work=India Today|date=10 June 2014}}</ref> Also in June 2014, the [[Department of Electronics and Information Technology|IT Department]] held a meeting with the secretaries of the states to receive feedback on the project.<ref name="MeetingSecretaries">{{cite news|title=Aadhaar future at stake, govt seeks meeting with states|url=http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/aadhaar-future-at-stake-govt-seeks-meeting-with-states/|access-date=29 May 2015|work=The Indian Express|date=17 June 2014}}</ref>
On 10 June 2014, the new government disbanded four cabinet committees to streamline the decision-making process; among them was the cabinet committee on Aadhaar.<ref name="ScrapsAadhaar">{{cite news|title=Narendra Modi scraps 4 Cabinet Committees, including the one on Aadhar|url=http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/modi-scraps-4-cabinet-committees-uidai/1/366234.html|access-date=29 May 2015|work=India Today|date=10 June 2014}}</ref> Also in June 2014, the [[Department of Electronics and Information Technology|IT Department]] held a meeting with the secretaries of the states to receive feedback on the project.<ref name="MeetingSecretaries">{{cite news|title=Aadhaar future at stake, govt seeks meeting with states|url=http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/aadhaar-future-at-stake-govt-seeks-meeting-with-states/|access-date=29 May 2015|work=The Indian Express|date=17 June 2014}}</ref>


On 1 July 2014, Nilekani met with the prime minister Modi and finance minister [[Arun Jaitley]] to convince them of the project's merits.<ref name="NilekaniImpresses">{{cite news|title=Nandan Nilekani impresses Narendra Modi & Arun Jaitley, gets Aadhaar a lifeline|url=http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-07-24/news/51982210_1_uidai-project-uidai-official-aadhaar|access-date=29 May 2015|work=The Economic Times|date=24 July 2014}}</ref> On 5 July 2014, Modi announced that his government would retain the project, and asked an official to look into the possibility of linking the project with passports.<ref name="LifelineModi">{{cite news|title=Aadhaar, DBT get a lifeline, Modi to retain, push UPA schemes|url=http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/aadhaar-dbt-get-a-lifeline-modi-to-retain-push-upa-schemes/|access-date=29 May 2015|work=The Indian Express|date=7 July 2014}}</ref> The [[2014 Union budget of India|2014 budget]] allotted {{INRConvert|20.4|b}} to the project for the fiscal year 2014–2015. It was a substantial increase from the [[2013 Union budget of India|previous year's]] allotment of {{INRConvert|15.5|b}}.<ref name="AadhaarGovt">{{cite news|title=Govt to continue Aadhaar, provides Rs. 2k cr in 2014-15|url=http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/govt-to-continue-aadhaar-provides-rs-2k-cr-in-201415/article6197672.ece|access-date=29 May 2015|work=The Hindu|date=10 July 2014}}</ref> Also in July, it was reported that UIDAI would hire an advertising agency, and spend about {{INRConvert|300|m}} on an advertising campaign.<ref name="ImageMakeover">{{cite news|title=UIDAI set for an image makeover, to spend Rs 30 crore for its media campaign|url=http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-07-12/news/51392331_1_aadhaar-numbers-uidai-and-npr-unique-identification-authority|access-date=31 May 2015|work=The Economic Times|date=12 July 2014}}</ref>
On 1 July 2014, Nilekani met with the prime minister [[Narendra Modi]] and finance minister [[Arun Jaitley]] to convince them of the project's merits.<ref name="NilekaniImpresses">{{cite news|title=Nandan Nilekani impresses Narendra Modi & Arun Jaitley, gets Aadhaar a lifeline|url=http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-07-24/news/51982210_1_uidai-project-uidai-official-aadhaar|access-date=29 May 2015|work=The Economic Times|date=24 July 2014}}</ref> On 5 July 2014, Modi announced that his government would retain the project, and asked an official to look into the possibility of linking the project with passports.<ref name="LifelineModi">{{cite news|title=Aadhaar, DBT get a lifeline, Modi to retain, push UPA schemes|url=http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/aadhaar-dbt-get-a-lifeline-modi-to-retain-push-upa-schemes/|access-date=29 May 2015|work=The Indian Express|date=7 July 2014}}</ref> The [[2014 Union budget of India|2014 budget]] allotted {{INRConvert|20.4|b}} to the project for the fiscal year 2014–2015. It was a substantial increase from the [[2013 Union budget of India|previous year's]] allotment of {{INRConvert|15.5|b}}.<ref name="AadhaarGovt">{{cite news|title=Govt to continue Aadhaar, provides Rs. 2k cr in 2014-15|url=http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/govt-to-continue-aadhaar-provides-rs-2k-cr-in-201415/article6197672.ece|access-date=29 May 2015|work=The Hindu|date=10 July 2014}}</ref> Also in July, it was reported that UIDAI would hire an advertising agency, and spend about {{INRConvert|300|m}} on an advertising campaign.<ref name="ImageMakeover">{{cite news|title=UIDAI set for an image makeover, to spend ₹300 million for its media campaign|url=http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-07-12/news/51392331_1_aadhaar-numbers-uidai-and-npr-unique-identification-authority|access-date=31 May 2015|work=The Economic Times|date=12 July 2014}}</ref>


On 10 September 2014, the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs gave approval to Phase&nbsp;V of the UIDAI project, starting the enrolment process in [[Uttar Pradesh]], [[Bihar]], [[Chhattisgarh]], and [[Uttarakhand]].<ref name="PhaseV">{{cite news|title=UID phase-V: Aadhaar enrolments in four states get Cabinet approval|url=http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/uid-phase-v-aadhaar-enrolments-in-four-states-get-cabinet-approval/|access-date=29 May 2015|work=The Indian Express|date=11 September 2014}}</ref> The Union Cabinet allocated {{INRConvert|12|b}} to the project in order to reach the target of one billion enrolments by the end of 2015.<ref name="1200Clears">{{cite news|title=Union Cabinet clears Rs 1,200 crore for Aadhaar|url=http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Union-Cabinet-clears-Rs-1200-crore-for-Aadhaar/articleshow/42220760.cms|access-date=31 May 2015|work=The Times of India|date=11 September 2014}}</ref>
On 10 September 2014, the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs gave approval to Phase&nbsp;V of the UIDAI project, starting the enrolment process in [[Uttar Pradesh]], [[Bihar]], [[Chhattisgarh]], and [[Uttarakhand]].<ref name="PhaseV">{{cite news|title=UID phase-V: Aadhaar enrolments in four states get Cabinet approval|url=http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/uid-phase-v-aadhaar-enrolments-in-four-states-get-cabinet-approval/|access-date=29 May 2015|work=The Indian Express|date=11 September 2014}}</ref> The Union Cabinet allocated {{INRConvert|12|b}} to the project in order to reach the target of one billion enrolments by the end of 2015.<ref name="1200Clears">{{cite news|title=Union Cabinet clears Rs 12 billion for Aadhaar|url=http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Union-Cabinet-clears-Rs-1200-crore-for-Aadhaar/articleshow/42220760.cms|access-date=31 May 2015|work=The Times of India|date=11 September 2014}}</ref>


On 5 July 2015, finding the experience with DBT scheme in LPG "very encouraging", with a reported savings of {{INRConvert|127|b}} to the public exchequer this year, Jaitley said, "If we can realize the government's JAM—Jan Dhan, Aadhaar, Mobile—vision we can ensure that money goes directly and more quickly into the pockets of the poor and from the savings we achieve, we can put even more money for the poor. If we can be careful in our design and implementation, we can extend DBT to other commodities, so that the poor get more money to spend for their upliftment."<ref name="Growth">{{cite news|title= Need reforms backed by growth to end poverty|url=http://www.deccanherald.com/content/487686/need-reforms-backed-growth-end.html|access-date=6 July 2015|work=Deccan Herald|date=6 July 2015}}</ref>
On 5 July 2015, finding the experience with DBT scheme in LPG "very encouraging", with a reported savings of {{INRConvert|127|b}} to the public exchequer this year, Jaitley said, "If we can realize the government's JAM—Jan Dhan, Aadhaar, Mobile—vision we can ensure that money goes directly and more quickly into the pockets of the poor and from the savings we achieve, we can put even more money for the poor. If we can be careful in our design and implementation, we can extend DBT to other commodities, so that the poor get more money to spend for their upliftment."<ref name="Growth">{{cite news|title= Need reforms backed by growth to end poverty|url=http://www.deccanherald.com/content/487686/need-reforms-backed-growth-end.html|access-date=6 July 2015|work=Deccan Herald|date=6 July 2015}}</ref>
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On 11 March 2016 the [[Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and other Subsidies, benefits and services) Act, 2016]], was passed in the Lok Sabha.<ref name="PassedLokSabha-LM" /> During the Rajya Sabha debate on 16{{nbsp}}March, [[Sitaram Yechury]] of the [[Communist Party of India (Marxist)|CPI-M]] said that bill should not have been passed when the issue of the right to privacy was still in the Supreme Court.<ref name="YechurySpar-IT">{{cite news|title=Jaitley, Yechury spar in Rajya Sabha on Aadhaar as a Money Bill|url=http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/jaitley-to-yechury-definition-of-intolerance-cant-be-different-for-you-and-me/1/621545.html|access-date=16 March 2016|work=[[India Today]]|date=16 March 2016}}</ref> On 16 March 2016 the bill was returned to the Lok Sabha by the Rajya Sabha with some suggested amendments,<ref name="RSReturns-HT">{{cite news|title=Rajya Sabha returns Aadhaar bill to Lok Sabha with amendments|url=http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/rajya-sabha-returns-aadhaar-bill-to-lok-sabha-with-amendments/story-uCVCaTLOVVyOVwrHqEuOSI.html|access-date=16 March 2016|work=[[Hindustan Times]]|date=16 March 2016}}</ref> which the Lok Sabha promptly rejected.<ref name="RejectAmends-DNA">{{cite news|title=Aadhaar bill passed in Lok Sabha after rejection of amendments introduced in Rajya Sabha|url=http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-aadhar-bill-hits-rajya-sabha-roadblock-returned-to-lok-sabha-with-amendements-2190133|access-date=16 March 2016|work=[[DNA India]]|date=16 March 2016}}</ref>
On 11 March 2016 the [[Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and other Subsidies, benefits and services) Act, 2016]], was passed in the Lok Sabha.<ref name="PassedLokSabha-LM" /> During the Rajya Sabha debate on 16{{nbsp}}March, [[Sitaram Yechury]] of the [[Communist Party of India (Marxist)|CPI-M]] said that bill should not have been passed when the issue of the right to privacy was still in the Supreme Court.<ref name="YechurySpar-IT">{{cite news|title=Jaitley, Yechury spar in Rajya Sabha on Aadhaar as a Money Bill|url=http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/jaitley-to-yechury-definition-of-intolerance-cant-be-different-for-you-and-me/1/621545.html|access-date=16 March 2016|work=[[India Today]]|date=16 March 2016}}</ref> On 16 March 2016 the bill was returned to the Lok Sabha by the Rajya Sabha with some suggested amendments,<ref name="RSReturns-HT">{{cite news|title=Rajya Sabha returns Aadhaar bill to Lok Sabha with amendments|url=http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/rajya-sabha-returns-aadhaar-bill-to-lok-sabha-with-amendments/story-uCVCaTLOVVyOVwrHqEuOSI.html|access-date=16 March 2016|work=[[Hindustan Times]]|date=16 March 2016}}</ref> which the Lok Sabha promptly rejected.<ref name="RejectAmends-DNA">{{cite news|title=Aadhaar bill passed in Lok Sabha after rejection of amendments introduced in Rajya Sabha|url=http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-aadhar-bill-hits-rajya-sabha-roadblock-returned-to-lok-sabha-with-amendements-2190133|access-date=16 March 2016|work=[[DNA India]]|date=16 March 2016}}</ref>


The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) introduces Face Authentication to further strengthen Aadhaar security.<ref>{{cite news |title=Face recognition feature set to ensure stronger Aadhaar security; here's more detail |url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/faqs/aadhar-faqs/face-recognition-feature-set-to-ensure-stronger-aadhaar-security/articleshow/62518399.cms |work=[[The Times of India]]|date=13 March 2018}}</ref> It decided to enable 'Face Authentication' in fusion mode on registered devices by 1 July 2018, so that people facing difficulties in other existing mode of verification such as [[iris (anatomy)|iris]], [[Fingerprint]] or [[One Time Password]] (OTP) could easily authenticate.<ref>{{cite news |title=Aadhaar Authentication Via Face Recognition From July. How It Will Work |url=https://www.ndtv.com/business/aadhaar-authentication-via-face-recognition-from-july-how-it-will-work-1800194 |publisher=[[NDTV]] |date=15 January 2018}}</ref> The biometric technology was provided by consortium partners [[Tata Consultancy Services]] and Neurotechnology.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Macdonald |first={{!}} Ayang |date=2021-03-23 |title=Neurotechnology to provide biometric de-duplication software for India's Aadhaar program {{!}} Biometric Update |url=https://www.biometricupdate.com/202103/neurotechnology-to-provide-biometric-de-duplication-software-for-indias-aadhaar-program |access-date=2022-10-17 |website=www.biometricupdate.com |language=en-US}}</ref> In 2019, [[Nirmala Sitharaman]], the finance minister of India, has proposed the use of Aadhaar card for the cash transactions above {{INR}}50,000 in her maiden budget speech.<ref>{{cite web|url = https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/aadhaar-can-be-used-for-cash-transactions-above-rs-50-000-in-place-of-pan-2065428|title = Aadhaar Can Be Used For Cash Transactions Above Rs. 50,000: Official}}</ref>
The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) introduces Face Authentication to further strengthen Aadhaar security.<ref>{{cite news |title=Face recognition feature set to ensure stronger Aadhaar security; here's more detail |url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/faqs/aadhar-faqs/face-recognition-feature-set-to-ensure-stronger-aadhaar-security/articleshow/62518399.cms |work=[[The Times of India]]|date=13 March 2018}}</ref> It decided to enable 'Face Authentication' in fusion mode on registered devices by 1 July 2018, so that people facing difficulties in other existing mode of verification such as [[iris (anatomy)|iris]], [[Fingerprint]] or [[One Time Password]] (OTP) could easily authenticate.<ref>{{cite news |title=Aadhaar Authentication Via Face Recognition From July. How It Will Work |url=https://www.ndtv.com/business/aadhaar-authentication-via-face-recognition-from-july-how-it-will-work-1800194 |publisher=[[NDTV]] |date=15 January 2018}}</ref> The biometric technology was provided by consortium partners [[Tata Consultancy Services]] and [[Neurotechnology (company)|Neurotechnology]].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Macdonald |first={{!}} Ayang |date=2021-03-23 |title=Neurotechnology to provide biometric de-duplication software for India's Aadhaar program {{!}} Biometric Update |url=https://www.biometricupdate.com/202103/neurotechnology-to-provide-biometric-de-duplication-software-for-indias-aadhaar-program |access-date=2022-10-17 |website=www.biometricupdate.com |language=en-US}}</ref> In 2019, [[Nirmala Sitharaman]], the finance minister of India, has proposed the use of Aadhaar card for the cash transactions above {{INR}}50,000 in her maiden budget speech.<ref>{{cite web|url = https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/aadhaar-can-be-used-for-cash-transactions-above-rs-50-000-in-place-of-pan-2065428|title = Aadhaar Can Be Used For Cash Transactions Above Rs. 50,000: Official}}</ref>


==Predominant uses of Aadhaar==
==Predominant uses of Aadhaar==
===Direct Benefit Transfer ===
===Direct Benefit Transfer ===
{{Main|Direct Benefit Transfer}}
{{Main|Direct Benefit Transfer}}
The Aadhaar project has been linked to some public subsidy and [[unemployment benefit]] schemes such as the domestic LPG scheme and [[NREGA|MGNREGA]]. In these [[Direct Benefit Transfer]] (DBT) schemes, the subsidy money is directly transferred to a bank account which is Aadhaar-linked.<ref name=LinkLPG>{{cite news|title=Link your LPG connection to Aadhaar or bank a/c to keep getting subsidy|url=http://www.dnaindia.com/mumbai/report-link-your-lpg-connection-to-aadhaar-or-bank-ac-to-keep-getting-subsidy-2048799|access-date=31 May 2015|work=[[DNA India]]|date=2 January 2015}}</ref><ref name=NREGAcard>{{cite news|title=In convergence push, NREGA card to carry Aadhar number|url=http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-05-02/news/31538629_1_uidai-aadhar-number-uid-number|access-date=31 May 2015|work=[[The Economic Times]]|date=2 May 2012}}</ref> Previously, however, the direct-benefit transfer had been carried out quite successfully via the [[National Electronic Funds Transfer]] (NEFT) system, which did not depend on Aadhaar.
The Aadhaar project has been linked to welfare schemes and [[unemployment benefit]] schemes such as the domestic LPG scheme and [[NREGA|MGNREGA]]. In these [[Direct Benefit Transfer]] (DBT) schemes, the subsidy money is directly transferred to a bank account which is Aadhaar-linked.<ref name=LinkLPG>{{cite news|title=Link your LPG connection to Aadhaar or bank a/c to keep getting subsidy|url=http://www.dnaindia.com/mumbai/report-link-your-lpg-connection-to-aadhaar-or-bank-ac-to-keep-getting-subsidy-2048799|access-date=31 May 2015|work=[[DNA India]]|date=2 January 2015}}</ref><ref name=NREGAcard>{{cite news|title=In convergence push, NREGA card to carry Aadhar number|url=http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-05-02/news/31538629_1_uidai-aadhar-number-uid-number|access-date=31 May 2015|work=[[The Economic Times]]|date=2 May 2012}}</ref> Previously, however, the direct-benefit transfer had been carried out quite successfully via the [[National Electronic Funds Transfer]] (NEFT) system, which did not depend on Aadhaar.


On 29 July 2011, the [[Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas (India)|Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas]] signed a [[memorandum of understanding]] with UIDAI. The Ministry had hoped the ID system would help eliminate loss of the subsidised kerosene and LPG.<ref name=UIDAIPetroleum>{{cite news|title=UIDAI, Petroleum Ministry sign MoU on AADHAR|url=http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/uidai-petroleum-ministry-sign-mou-on-aadhar/article542304.ece?ref=relatedNews|access-date=31 May 2015|work=[[The Hindu]]|date=30 June 2011}}</ref> In May 2012 the government announced that it would begin issuing Aadhaar-linked MGNREGS cards.<ref name=NREGAcard/> On 26{{nbsp}}November 2012 a pilot programme was launched in 51 districts.<ref name=51Districts/>
On 29 July 2011, the [[Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas (India)|Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas]] signed a [[memorandum of understanding]] with UIDAI. The Ministry had hoped the ID system would help eliminate loss of the subsidised kerosene and LPG.<ref name=UIDAIPetroleum>{{cite news|title=UIDAI, Petroleum Ministry sign MoU on AADHAR|url=http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/uidai-petroleum-ministry-sign-mou-on-aadhar/article542304.ece?ref=relatedNews|access-date=31 May 2015|work=[[The Hindu]]|date=30 June 2011}}</ref> In May 2012 the government announced that it would begin issuing Aadhaar-linked MGNREGS cards.<ref name=NREGAcard/> On 26{{nbsp}}November 2012 a pilot programme was launched in 51 districts.<ref name=51Districts/>


Under the original policy for liquefied petroleum gas subsidies, the customers bought gas cylinders from retailers at subsidised prices, and the government compensated companies for their losses. Under the current Direct Benefit Transfer of LPG (DBTL), introduced in 2013, customers had to buy at full price, and the subsidy would be then directly credited to their Aadhaar-linked bank accounts. This scheme, however, did not take off, and in September 2013 a Supreme Court order put a halt on it.<ref name=AadharCourtTie/> Subsequently, the GOI constituted a committee to review the "Direct Benefits Transfer for LPG Scheme"<ref>{{cite web|title=Review of the Direct Benefit Transfer for LPG Scheme|url=http://petroleum.nic.in/docs/dhande.pdf|publisher=Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas|access-date=18 July 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150319221847/http://petroleum.nic.in/docs/dhande.pdf|archive-date=19 March 2015|url-status=dead}}</ref> to study the shortcomings in the scheme and recommend changes. The DBTL scheme was modified later as PAHAL by the new government in November 2014. Under PAHAL, subsidies could be credited to a purchaser's bank account even if he or she did not have an Aadhaar number. Official data show that cooking gas consumption during the January–June period grew at a slower 7.82%, which is nearly four percentage points less than the 11.4% growth in the same period last year.<ref name=DBTL>{{cite news|title=DBTL helps govt save Rs 10,000 crore as illegal LPG consumption falls|url=http://www.livemint.com/Industry/PGCreyRo9L9rCt3Vx3xyBO/DBTL-helps-govt-save-Rs10000-crore-as-illegal-LPG-consumpti.html|access-date=3 July 2015|work=[[Live Mint]]|date=3 July 2015}}</ref><ref name=NewLPG>{{cite news|title=New LPG subsidy transfer linked with Aadhaar starts today|url=http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-new-lpg-subsidy-transfer-linked-with-aadhaar-starts-today-2035310|access-date=31 May 2015|work=[[DNA India]]|date=15 November 2015}}</ref>
Under the original policy for liquefied petroleum gas subsidies, the customers bought gas cylinders from retailers at subsidised prices, and the government compensated companies for their losses. Under the current Direct Benefit Transfer of LPG (DBTL), introduced in 2013, customers had to buy at full price, and the subsidy would be then directly credited to their Aadhaar-linked bank accounts. This scheme, however, did not take off, and in September 2013 a Supreme Court order put a halt on it.<ref name=AadharCourtTie/> Subsequently, the GOI constituted a committee to review the "Direct Benefits Transfer for LPG Scheme"<ref>{{cite web|title=Review of the Direct Benefit Transfer for LPG Scheme|url=http://petroleum.nic.in/docs/dhande.pdf|publisher=Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas|access-date=18 July 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150319221847/http://petroleum.nic.in/docs/dhande.pdf|archive-date=19 March 2015|url-status=dead}}</ref> to study the shortcomings in the scheme and recommend changes. The DBTL scheme was modified later as PAHAL by the new government in November 2014. Under PAHAL, subsidies could be credited to a purchaser's bank account even if he or she did not have an Aadhaar number. Official data show that cooking gas consumption during the January–June period grew at a slower 7.82%, which is nearly four percentage points less than the 11.4% growth in the same period last year.<ref name=DBTL>{{cite news|title=DBTL helps govt save Rs 100 billion as illegal LPG consumption falls|url=http://www.livemint.com/Industry/PGCreyRo9L9rCt3Vx3xyBO/DBTL-helps-govt-save-Rs10000-crore-as-illegal-LPG-consumpti.html|access-date=3 July 2015|work=[[Live Mint]]|date=3 July 2015}}</ref><ref name=NewLPG>{{cite news|title=New LPG subsidy transfer linked with Aadhaar starts today|url=http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-new-lpg-subsidy-transfer-linked-with-aadhaar-starts-today-2035310|access-date=31 May 2015|work=[[DNA India]]|date=15 November 2015}}</ref>


The PAHAL scheme has covered 11.8 crore (118.9 million) of the 14.5 crore (145.4 million) active LPG consumers until March, as stated by the Petroleum Minister in the Parliament. The DBT has thereby become a "game changer" for India, claimed the Chief Economic Adviser to the Finance Ministry, Government of India, Arvind Subramanian, for in case of LPG subsidy, DBT had resulted in a 24% reduction in the sale of subsidised LPG, as "ghost beneficiaries" had been excluded. The savings to the government were to the tune of {{INRConvert|127|b|year=2014|mode=historical}} in 2014–2015.<ref name=PDS>{{cite news|title=NDA govt kicks off PDS reforms with direct cash transfers|url=http://www.livemint.com/Politics/BfeNi5AreTn1cJ8ROIzxXM/NDA-kicks-off-PDS-reforms.html|access-date=3 July 2015|work=[[Live Mint]]|date=3 July 2015}}</ref> The success of the modified scheme helped fuel marketing companies save almost {{INRConvert|80|b|lk=on|year=2014|mode=historical}} from November 2014 to June 2015, said oil company officials.<ref name=DBTL/> The DBT for the [[public distribution system]] (PDS) will be rolled out in September 2015.<ref name=PDS/>
The PAHAL scheme has covered 118.9 million of the 145.4 million active LPG consumers until March, as stated by the Petroleum Minister in the Parliament. The DBT has thereby become a "game changer" for India, claimed the Chief Economic Adviser to the Finance Ministry, Government of India, Arvind Subramanian, for in case of LPG subsidy, DBT had resulted in a 24% reduction in the sale of subsidised LPG, as "ghost beneficiaries" had been excluded. The savings to the government were to the tune of {{INRConvert|127|b|year=2014|mode=historical}} in 2014–2015.<ref name=PDS>{{cite news|title=NDA govt kicks off PDS reforms with direct cash transfers|url=http://www.livemint.com/Politics/BfeNi5AreTn1cJ8ROIzxXM/NDA-kicks-off-PDS-reforms.html|access-date=3 July 2015|work=[[Live Mint]]|date=3 July 2015}}</ref> The success of the modified scheme helped fuel marketing companies save almost {{INRConvert|80|b|lk=on|year=2014|mode=historical}} from November 2014 to June 2015, said oil company officials.<ref name=DBTL/> The DBT for the [[public distribution system]] (PDS) will be rolled out in September 2015.<ref name=PDS/>


The government's own data, however, suggest that the cost of implementing the DBT for LPG was over a million dollars, a figure quite at odds with the savings figures that the government cites.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Ready Reckoner: Oil Industry Information at a Glance|publisher=Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas|year=2016}}</ref>
The government's own data, however, suggest that the cost of implementing the DBT for LPG was over a million dollars, a figure quite at odds with the savings figures that the government cites.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Ready Reckoner: Oil Industry Information at a Glance|publisher=Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas|year=2016}}</ref>
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===Other uses by states===
===Other uses by states===
In the [[Hyderabad]] region of [[Telangana]] state, Aadhaar numbers were linked to ration cards to remove duplicate [[Ration card (India)|ration cards]]. The project was started in July 2012 and was carried out despite the 2013 Supreme Court order. More than 63,932 ration cards in the white category and 229,757 names were removed from its database in the drive between July 2012 and September 2014.<ref name=64000Bogus>{{cite news|title=64,000 bogus cards deactivated after survey|url=http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tp-andhrapradesh/64000-bogus-cards-deactivated-after-survey/article6403360.ece|access-date=31 May 2015|date=12 September 2014|work=[[The Hindu]]}}</ref><ref name=BogusRationCard>{{cite news|title=Aadhaar helps weed out bogus ration cards|url=http://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/Hyderabad/aadhaar-helps-weed-out-bogus-ration-cards/article5598190.ece|access-date=31 May 2015|work=[[The Hindu]]|date=21 January 2014}}</ref><ref name=HurdleFakeRation>{{cite news|title=Aadhaar hurdle in drive against fake ration cards|url=http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/telangana/aadhaar-hurdle-in-drive-against-fake-ration-cards/article6170576.ece|access-date=31 May 2015|work=[[The Hindu]]|date=2 July 2014}}</ref> In August 2012 the government of the state of [[Andhra Pradesh]] asked citizens to surrender illegal ration cards before it began to link them with Aadhaar numbers. By September 2014 1.5 million illegal ration cards had been surrendered.<ref name=15lakhbogus>{{cite news|title=15 lakh bogus ration cards found so far: Sunitha|url=http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/andhra-pradesh/15-lakh-bogus-ration-cards-found-so-far-sunitha/article6384014.ece|access-date=31 May 2015|work=[[The Hindu]]|date=6 September 2014}}</ref><ref name=FakeRationCards>{{cite news|title=2.10 lakh fake ration cards surrendered|url=http://www.newindianexpress.com/cities/hyderabad/article596021.ece|access-date=31 May 2015|work=[[The New Indian Express]]|date=26 August 2012}}</ref> In April 2015 the state of [[Maharashtra]] began enrolling all school students in the state in the Aadhaar project to implement the [[Right to Education Act]] properly.<ref name=MahaLinkSchool>{{cite news|title=Maharashtra to link school admission with Aadhaar|url=http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/maharashtra-to-link-school-admission-with-aadhaar/article7134236.ece|access-date=31 May 2015|work=[[The Hindu]]|date=23 April 2015}}</ref>
In the [[Hyderabad]] region of [[Telangana]] state, Aadhaar numbers were linked to ration cards to remove duplicate [[Ration card (India)|ration cards]]. The project was started in July 2012 and was carried out despite the 2013 Supreme Court order. More than 63,932 ration cards in the white category and 229,757 names were removed from its database in the drive between July 2012 and September 2014.<ref name=64000Bogus>{{cite news|title=64,000 bogus cards deactivated after survey|url=http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tp-andhrapradesh/64000-bogus-cards-deactivated-after-survey/article6403360.ece|access-date=31 May 2015|date=12 September 2014|work=[[The Hindu]]}}</ref><ref name=BogusRationCard>{{cite news|title=Aadhaar helps weed out bogus ration cards|url=http://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/Hyderabad/aadhaar-helps-weed-out-bogus-ration-cards/article5598190.ece|access-date=31 May 2015|work=[[The Hindu]]|date=21 January 2014}}</ref><ref name=HurdleFakeRation>{{cite news|title=Aadhaar hurdle in drive against fake ration cards|url=http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/telangana/aadhaar-hurdle-in-drive-against-fake-ration-cards/article6170576.ece|access-date=31 May 2015|work=[[The Hindu]]|date=2 July 2014}}</ref> In August 2012 the government of the state of [[Andhra Pradesh]] asked citizens to surrender illegal ration cards before it began to link them with Aadhaar numbers. By September 2014, 15 [[lakh]] (1.5 million) illegal ration cards had been surrendered.<ref name=15lakhbogus>{{cite news|title=15 lakh bogus ration cards found so far: Sunitha|url=http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/andhra-pradesh/15-lakh-bogus-ration-cards-found-so-far-sunitha/article6384014.ece|access-date=31 May 2015|work=[[The Hindu]]|date=6 September 2014}}</ref><ref name=FakeRationCards>{{cite news|title=2.10 lakh fake ration cards surrendered|url=http://www.newindianexpress.com/cities/hyderabad/article596021.ece|access-date=31 May 2015|work=[[The New Indian Express]]|date=26 August 2012}}</ref> In April 2015 the state of [[Maharashtra]] began enrolling all school students in the state in the Aadhaar project to implement the [[Right to Education Act]] properly.<ref name=MahaLinkSchool>{{cite news|title=Maharashtra to link school admission with Aadhaar|url=http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/maharashtra-to-link-school-admission-with-aadhaar/article7134236.ece|access-date=31 May 2015|work=[[The Hindu]]|date=23 April 2015}}</ref>


Electronic-Know Your Customer (e-KYC) using Aadhaar card is also being introduced to activate mobile connections instantly to check Aadhaar Card Status.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Khan|first=Danish|date=2016-08-17|title=Electronic KYC to enable instant activation of mobile phone connections with Aadhar|work=The Economic Times|url=https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/Electronic-KYC-to-enable-instant-activation-of-mobile-phone-connections-with-Aadhar/articleshow/53726630.cms|access-date=2020-06-05}}</ref>
Electronic-Know Your Customer (e-KYC) using Aadhaar card is also being introduced to activate mobile connections instantly to check Aadhaar Card Status.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Khan|first=Danish|date=2016-08-17|title=Electronic KYC to enable instant activation of mobile phone connections with Aadhar|work=The Economic Times|url=https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/Electronic-KYC-to-enable-instant-activation-of-mobile-phone-connections-with-Aadhar/articleshow/53726630.cms|access-date=2020-06-05}}</ref>
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Any type of land parcel categories i.e. agriculture lands, rural properties & urban properties (like houses, house sites, vacant lands) are managed by all land related department in the states. These are Revenue, Panchayat Raj, Municipal Administration, Registration, Survey & Settlements, Forest, Endowments, Wakf. Under the Land Hub core platform these departments integrating their land related services and issuing a new Bhudhaar number to each land holding or property upon ownership change.
Any type of land parcel categories i.e. agriculture lands, rural properties & urban properties (like houses, house sites, vacant lands) are managed by all land related department in the states. These are Revenue, Panchayat Raj, Municipal Administration, Registration, Survey & Settlements, Forest, Endowments, Wakf. Under the Land Hub core platform these departments integrating their land related services and issuing a new Bhudhaar number to each land holding or property upon ownership change.


In general Land records consists of two types<ref>{{cite web|url=https://ap.meeseva.gov.in/DeptPortal/Downloads/Note%20on%20BhuSeva%20-%20Copy.pdf|title=Bhudhaar Handout}}</ref> of data.
In general Land records consists of two types<ref>{{cite web|url=https://ap.meeseva.gov.in/DeptPortal/Downloads/Note%20on%20BhuSeva%20-%20Copy.pdf|title=Bhudhaar Handout|access-date=19 February 2019|archive-date=2 December 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211202064756/https://ap.meeseva.gov.in/DeptPortal/Downloads/Note%20on%20BhuSeva%20-%20Copy.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref> of data.


1) Textual data (like village name, name of land owner, survey number, extent, ID proof like Aadhaar, [[Voter ID (India)|voter id]] or other related documents).
1) Textual data (like village name, name of land owner, survey number, extent, ID proof like Aadhaar, [[Voter ID (India)|voter id]] or other related documents).
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The [[Bhudhaar]] issuing process contain 2 stages. Firstly Temporary Bhudhaar is assigned based on valid textual data of an agriculture land holding/rural property/urban property. It will be started with 99 and following numbers are generated on random basis only and there is no meaning for these 9 digits. But it is a unique id for that land holding / rural property/urban property. A special series number is allocated to government lands either agriculture lands or rural/urban properties.for example 99.312.725.202). "99" indicate that it is a temporary Bhudhaar.
The [[Bhudhaar]] issuing process contain 2 stages. Firstly Temporary Bhudhaar is assigned based on valid textual data of an agriculture land holding/rural property/urban property. It will be started with 99 and following numbers are generated on random basis only and there is no meaning for these 9 digits. But it is a unique id for that land holding / rural property/urban property. A special series number is allocated to government lands either agriculture lands or rural/urban properties.for example 99.312.725.202). "99" indicate that it is a temporary Bhudhaar.


Permanent Bhudhaar is assigned once the spatial data is also captured and linked to textual data, the spatial data contains measurement of the land and its resultant sketch(FMB), location of the land on ground along with [[geo-coordinates]]. To capture the measurement of land holding or a sub-division, [[Government of Andhra Pradesh|Andhra Pradesh Government]] using<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.apts.gov.in/pdf/RFP_CORS_Vol_I&II.pdf|title=CORS Tender}}</ref> [[Continuously Operating Reference Station]]" (CORS) a state-of the art technology in surveying of land holdings/properties.Once the Geo-coordinates captured was completed using CORS, Permanent Bhudhaar will be assigned and first two numbers i.e, 99 in the temporary Bhudhaar will be replaced with 28 (State Census Code).
Permanent Bhudhaar is assigned once the spatial data is also captured and linked to textual data, the spatial data contains measurement of the land and its resultant sketch(FMB), location of the land on ground along with [[geo-coordinates]]. To capture the measurement of land holding or a sub-division, [[Government of Andhra Pradesh|Andhra Pradesh Government]] using<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.apts.gov.in/pdf/RFP_CORS_Vol_I%26II.pdf|title=CORS Tender|access-date=19 February 2019|archive-date=7 February 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190207072937/https://www.apts.gov.in/pdf/RFP_CORS_Vol_I%26II.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref> [[Continuously Operating Reference Station]]" (CORS) a state-of the art technology in surveying of land holdings/properties.Once the Geo-coordinates captured was completed using CORS, Permanent Bhudhaar will be assigned and first two numbers i.e, 99 in the temporary Bhudhaar will be replaced with 28 (State Census Code).


==Impediments and other concerns==
==Impediments and other concerns==
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In March 2011 Rajanish Dass of [[IIM Ahmedabad]]'s Computer and Information Systems Group published a paper titled "Unique Identity Project in India: A divine dream or a miscalculated heroism". Dass claimed that even if enrolment was voluntary, it was being made mandatory by indirect means. He pointed out that essential schemes like the [[National Food Security Act, 2013]], was being linked to the UIDAI. He also stated that the feasibility of a project of this size had not been studied and raised concerns about the quality of the biometric data being collected. He cited statements of another researcher, [[Usha Ramanathan]], that the UIDAI would ultimately have to become profit-making to sustain itself.<ref name=IIMALoopHoles>{{cite news|title=IIMA prof's study finds loopholes in UID project|url=http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/iima-prof-s-study-finds-loopholes-in-uid-project/792408/0|access-date=30 May 2015|work=[[The Indian Express]]|date=18 March 2011}}</ref><ref name=Heroism>{{cite web|title=Unique Identification for Indians: A Divine Dream or a Miscalculated Heroism?|url=http://www.iimahd.ernet.in/assets/snippets/workingpaperpdf/17212155992011-03-04.pdf|publisher=[[IIM Ahmedabad]]|access-date=30 May 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150617214336/http://www.iimahd.ernet.in/assets/snippets/workingpaperpdf/17212155992011-03-04.pdf|archive-date=17 June 2015|url-status=dead}}</ref>
In March 2011 Rajanish Dass of [[IIM Ahmedabad]]'s Computer and Information Systems Group published a paper titled "Unique Identity Project in India: A divine dream or a miscalculated heroism". Dass claimed that even if enrolment was voluntary, it was being made mandatory by indirect means. He pointed out that essential schemes like the [[National Food Security Act, 2013]], was being linked to the UIDAI. He also stated that the feasibility of a project of this size had not been studied and raised concerns about the quality of the biometric data being collected. He cited statements of another researcher, [[Usha Ramanathan]], that the UIDAI would ultimately have to become profit-making to sustain itself.<ref name=IIMALoopHoles>{{cite news|title=IIMA prof's study finds loopholes in UID project|url=http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/iima-prof-s-study-finds-loopholes-in-uid-project/792408/0|access-date=30 May 2015|work=[[The Indian Express]]|date=18 March 2011}}</ref><ref name=Heroism>{{cite web|title=Unique Identification for Indians: A Divine Dream or a Miscalculated Heroism?|url=http://www.iimahd.ernet.in/assets/snippets/workingpaperpdf/17212155992011-03-04.pdf|publisher=[[IIM Ahmedabad]]|access-date=30 May 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150617214336/http://www.iimahd.ernet.in/assets/snippets/workingpaperpdf/17212155992011-03-04.pdf|archive-date=17 June 2015|url-status=dead}}</ref>


The debate on the feasibility of sustaining a project of the size of population of India is settled as over 122 crore (1.22 billion) Indians are enrolled in Aadhaar as of July 2018,<ref name="Dashboard" /> representing about 90% of the total estimated population.<ref name="UN_WPP">{{cite web |url=https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DataQuery/ |title=World Population Prospects: The 2018 Revision |type=custom data acquired via website |publisher=United Nations |access-date=22 July 2018 |quote=1,354,051,854 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160919061238/https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DataQuery/ |archive-date=19 September 2016 |url-status=dead }}</ref> The scheme complements other initiatives taken by the government, for example [[Digital India]], to benefit people by giving easier access to public services.
The debate on the feasibility of sustaining a project of the size of population of India is settled as over 1.22 billion Indians are enrolled in Aadhaar as of July 2018,<ref name="Dashboard" /> representing about 90% of the total estimated population.<ref name="UN_WPP">{{cite web |url=https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DataQuery/ |title=World Population Prospects: The 2018 Revision |type=custom data acquired via website |publisher=United Nations |access-date=22 July 2018 |quote=1,354,051,854 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160919061238/https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DataQuery/ |archive-date=19 September 2016 |url-status=dead }}</ref> The scheme complements other initiatives taken by the government, for example [[Digital India]], to benefit people by giving easier access to public services.


On 9 November 2012 the [[National Institute of Public Finance and Policy]] (NIPFP) published a paper titled ''A cost-benefit analysis of Aadhaar''. The paper claimed that by 2015–2016 the benefits of the project would surpass the costs, and by 2020–2021 the total benefit would be {{INRConvert|251|b}} against a total expenditure of {{INRConvert|48.35|b}}. The benefits would come from plugging leakages in various subsidy and social benefit schemes.<ref name=NIPFPAadhar>{{cite news|title=NIPFP study: 52.85 per cent returns expected from Aadhaar project|url=http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-11-10/news/35032814_1_aadhaar-project-unique-identification-authority-corruption-and-pilferage|access-date=27 May 2015|work=[[The Economic Times]]|date=10 November 2012}}</ref><ref name=CostBenefit>{{cite web|title=A cost-benefit analysis of Aadhaar|url=http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/genrep/rep_uid_cba_paper.pdf|publisher=[[National Institute of Public Finance and Policy]]|access-date=27 May 2015|date=9 November 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190711144136/http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/genrep/rep_uid_cba_paper.pdf|archive-date=11 July 2019|url-status=dead}}</ref>
On 9 November 2012 the [[National Institute of Public Finance and Policy]] (NIPFP) published a paper titled ''A cost-benefit analysis of Aadhaar''. The paper claimed that by 2015–2016 the benefits of the project would surpass the costs, and by 2020–2021 the total benefit would be {{INRConvert|251|b}} against a total expenditure of {{INRConvert|48.35|b}}. The benefits would come from plugging leakages in various subsidy and social benefit schemes.<ref name=NIPFPAadhar>{{cite news|title=NIPFP study: 52.85 per cent returns expected from Aadhaar project|url=http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-11-10/news/35032814_1_aadhaar-project-unique-identification-authority-corruption-and-pilferage|access-date=27 May 2015|work=[[The Economic Times]]|date=10 November 2012}}</ref><ref name=CostBenefit>{{cite web|title=A cost-benefit analysis of Aadhaar|url=http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/genrep/rep_uid_cba_paper.pdf|publisher=[[National Institute of Public Finance and Policy]]|access-date=27 May 2015|date=9 November 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190711144136/http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/genrep/rep_uid_cba_paper.pdf|archive-date=11 July 2019|url-status=dead}}</ref>
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On 11 August 2015, the Supreme Court directed the government to widely publicise in print and electronic media that Aadhaar was not mandatory for any welfare scheme. The Court also referred the petitions claiming Aadhaar was unconstitutional to a Constitutional Bench.<ref name=RemainOptional>{{cite news|title=Aadhaar shall remain optional: Supreme Court|url=http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/aadhaar-shall-remain-optional-supreme-court/article7525976.ece?homepage=true|access-date=11 August 2015|work=[[The Hindu]]|date=11 August 2015}}</ref>
On 11 August 2015, the Supreme Court directed the government to widely publicise in print and electronic media that Aadhaar was not mandatory for any welfare scheme. The Court also referred the petitions claiming Aadhaar was unconstitutional to a Constitutional Bench.<ref name=RemainOptional>{{cite news|title=Aadhaar shall remain optional: Supreme Court|url=http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/aadhaar-shall-remain-optional-supreme-court/article7525976.ece?homepage=true|access-date=11 August 2015|work=[[The Hindu]]|date=11 August 2015}}</ref>


On 19 July 2017, a nine judge bench of the Supreme Court began hearing the arguments on whether there is a fundamental right to privacy.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://scobserver.clpr.org.in/cases/fundamental-right-to-privacy/|title=Fundamental Right to Privacy Case|website=scobserver.clpr.org.in}}</ref> On 24 August 2017 the nine judge bench unanimously upheld the right to privacy as a fundamental right under the Constitution.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://scobserver.clpr.org.in/fundamental-right-to-privacy-verdict/|title=Summary of the judgment (in Plain English)|website=scobserver.clpr.org.in}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://scobserver.clpr.org.in/right-privacy-9-judge-verdict-plain-english-part-ii/|title=Summary of the judgment (Part 2)|website=scobserver.clpr.org.in}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://english.manoramaonline.com/news/nation/2017/08/24/privacy-fundamental-right-sc-judgment-aadhaar.html|title=Setback to Center, Supreme Court rules right to privacy as fundamental right|website=manoramaonline.com|access-date=20 January 2018}}</ref>
On 19 July 2017, a nine judge bench of the Supreme Court began hearing the arguments on whether there is a fundamental right to privacy.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://scobserver.clpr.org.in/cases/fundamental-right-to-privacy/|title=Fundamental Right to Privacy Case|website=scobserver.clpr.org.in|access-date=27 February 2018|archive-date=27 February 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180227153800/http://scobserver.clpr.org.in/cases/fundamental-right-to-privacy/|url-status=dead}}</ref> On 24 August 2017 the nine judge bench unanimously upheld the right to privacy as a fundamental right under the Constitution.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://scobserver.clpr.org.in/fundamental-right-to-privacy-verdict/|title=Summary of the judgment (in Plain English)|website=scobserver.clpr.org.in|access-date=27 February 2018|archive-date=27 February 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180227153901/http://scobserver.clpr.org.in/fundamental-right-to-privacy-verdict/|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://scobserver.clpr.org.in/right-privacy-9-judge-verdict-plain-english-part-ii/|title=Summary of the judgment (Part 2)|website=scobserver.clpr.org.in|access-date=27 February 2018|archive-date=27 February 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180227153957/http://scobserver.clpr.org.in/right-privacy-9-judge-verdict-plain-english-part-ii/|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://english.manoramaonline.com/news/nation/2017/08/24/privacy-fundamental-right-sc-judgment-aadhaar.html|title=Setback to Center, Supreme Court rules right to privacy as fundamental right|website=manoramaonline.com|access-date=20 January 2018}}</ref>


A five-judge constitutional bench of the Supreme Court has heard various cases relating to the validity of Aadhaar on various grounds including privacy, surveillance, and exclusion from welfare benefits.<ref name="Aadhaar Act Case Background"/> As of 27 February 2018, senior counsels Shyam Divan,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://scobserver.clpr.org.in/aadhaar-act-case-day-7-arguments/|title=Arguments by Mr. Shyam Divan|website=scobserver.clpr.org.in}}</ref> Kapil Sibal,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://scobserver.clpr.org.in/aadhaar-act-case-day-10-arguments/|title=Arguments by Mr. Kapil Sibal|website=scobserver.clpr.org.in}}</ref> and Gopal Subramanium,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://scobserver.clpr.org.in/aadhaar-act-caseday-13-arguments/|title=Arguments by Mr. Gopal Subramanium|website=scobserver.clpr.org.in}}</ref> argued over a span of 13 days in this matter.
A five-judge constitutional bench of the Supreme Court has heard various cases relating to the validity of Aadhaar on various grounds including privacy, surveillance, and exclusion from welfare benefits.<ref name="Aadhaar Act Case Background"/> As of 27 February 2018, senior counsels Shyam Divan,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://scobserver.clpr.org.in/aadhaar-act-case-day-7-arguments/|title=Arguments by Mr. Shyam Divan|website=scobserver.clpr.org.in|access-date=27 February 2018|archive-date=27 February 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180227154003/http://scobserver.clpr.org.in/aadhaar-act-case-day-7-arguments/|url-status=dead}}</ref> Kapil Sibal,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://scobserver.clpr.org.in/aadhaar-act-case-day-10-arguments/|title=Arguments by Mr. Kapil Sibal|website=scobserver.clpr.org.in|access-date=27 February 2018|archive-date=27 February 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180227154000/http://scobserver.clpr.org.in/aadhaar-act-case-day-10-arguments/|url-status=dead}}</ref> and Gopal Subramanium,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://scobserver.clpr.org.in/aadhaar-act-caseday-13-arguments/|title=Arguments by Mr. Gopal Subramanium|website=scobserver.clpr.org.in|access-date=27 February 2018|archive-date=27 February 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180227153951/http://scobserver.clpr.org.in/aadhaar-act-caseday-13-arguments/|url-status=dead}}</ref> argued over a span of 13 days in this matter.


In a majority opinion dated 26 September 2018, the Supreme Court upheld the use of Aadhaar.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Rajagopal |first1=Krishnadas |title=Aadhaar gets thumbs up from Supreme Court |url=https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/aadhaar-gets-thumbs-up-from-supreme-court/article25051538.ece |website=The Hindu |access-date=13 April 2019 |language=en-IN |date=26 September 2018}}</ref>
In a majority opinion dated 26 September 2018, the Supreme Court upheld the use of Aadhaar.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Rajagopal |first1=Krishnadas |title=Aadhaar gets thumbs up from Supreme Court |url=https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/aadhaar-gets-thumbs-up-from-supreme-court/article25051538.ece |website=The Hindu |access-date=13 April 2019 |language=en-IN |date=26 September 2018}}</ref>
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In 2013 in [[Goa]] the [[Central Bureau of Investigation|CBI]] was trying to solve the case of a rape of a schoolgirl. It approached a Goa local court saying that they had acquired some fingerprints from the scene that could be matched with the UIDAI database. The court asked the UIDAI to hand over all data of all persons in Goa to the CBI.<ref name=ShareData/><ref name=ProbeCrime/>
In 2013 in [[Goa]] the [[Central Bureau of Investigation|CBI]] was trying to solve the case of a rape of a schoolgirl. It approached a Goa local court saying that they had acquired some fingerprints from the scene that could be matched with the UIDAI database. The court asked the UIDAI to hand over all data of all persons in Goa to the CBI.<ref name=ShareData/><ref name=ProbeCrime/>


The UIDAI appealed in the [[Bombay High Court]] saying that accepting such a request would set precedent for more such requests. The High Court rejected the argument and on 26{{nbsp}}February 2014 in an interim order directed [[Central Forensic Science Laboratory]] (CFSL) to study the technological capability of the database to see if it could solve such a crime. The UIDAI then appealed in the Supreme Court. It argued that the chance of a [[false positive]] was 0.057% and with 60 crore (600 million) people in its database it would result in hundreds of thousands of false results.<ref name=ProbeCrime>{{cite news|title=Stop Aadhaar data use to probe crime: UIDAI to SC|url=http://indianexpress.com/article/cities/delhi/stop-aadhaar-data-use-to-probe-crime-uidai-to-sc-2/99/|access-date=27 May 2015|work=[[The Indian Express]]|date=19 March 2014}}</ref><ref name=CBISharing>{{cite news|title=UIDAI approaches SC over sharing data with CBI|url=http://www.deccanherald.com/content/392748/uidai-approaches-sc-over-sharing.html|access-date=27 May 2015|work=[[Deccan Herald]]|date=17 March 2014}}</ref>
The UIDAI appealed in the [[Bombay High Court]] saying that accepting such a request would set precedent for more such requests. The High Court rejected the argument and on 26{{nbsp}}February 2014 in an interim order directed [[Central Forensic Science Laboratory]] (CFSL) to study the technological capability of the database to see if it could solve such a crime. The UIDAI then appealed in the Supreme Court. It argued that the chance of a [[false positive]] was 0.057% and with 600 million people in its database it would result in hundreds of thousands of false results.<ref name=ProbeCrime>{{cite news|title=Stop Aadhaar data use to probe crime: UIDAI to SC|url=http://indianexpress.com/article/cities/delhi/stop-aadhaar-data-use-to-probe-crime-uidai-to-sc-2/99/|access-date=27 May 2015|work=[[The Indian Express]]|date=19 March 2014}}</ref><ref name=CBISharing>{{cite news|title=UIDAI approaches SC over sharing data with CBI|url=http://www.deccanherald.com/content/392748/uidai-approaches-sc-over-sharing.html|access-date=27 May 2015|work=[[Deccan Herald]]|date=17 March 2014}}</ref>


On 24 March 2014, the Supreme Court restrained the central government and the UIDAI from sharing data with any third party or agency, whether government or private, without the consent of the Aadhaar-holder in writing. Vide another interim order dated 16{{nbsp}}March 2015, the Supreme Court of India has directed that the Union of India and States and all their functionaries should adhere to the order passed by this court on 23{{nbsp}}September 2013. It observed that some government agencies were still treating Aadhaar as mandatory and asked all agencies to issue notifications clarifying that it was not.<ref name=ShareData>{{cite news|title=Don't exclude those without Aadhaar, share data: SC|url=http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/supreme-court-bars-sharing-of-uidai-info-denial-of-benefits-to-those-without-aadhaar/99/|access-date=27 May 2015|work=[[The Indian Express]]|date=25 March 2014}}</ref>
On 24 March 2014, the Supreme Court restrained the central government and the UIDAI from sharing data with any third party or agency, whether government or private, without the consent of the Aadhaar-holder in writing. Vide another interim order dated 16{{nbsp}}March 2015, the Supreme Court of India has directed that the Union of India and States and all their functionaries should adhere to the order passed by this court on 23{{nbsp}}September 2013. It observed that some government agencies were still treating Aadhaar as mandatory and asked all agencies to issue notifications clarifying that it was not.<ref name=ShareData>{{cite news|title=Don't exclude those without Aadhaar, share data: SC|url=http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/supreme-court-bars-sharing-of-uidai-info-denial-of-benefits-to-those-without-aadhaar/99/|access-date=27 May 2015|work=[[The Indian Express]]|date=25 March 2014}}</ref>


On 26 September 2018, the Supreme Court ruled that Section 57 of the Aadhaar Act was unconstitutional, meaning that private entities cannot compel their customers to provide their Aadhaar number as a condition of service to verify their identity, specifically citing requiring it for bank accounts, school admissions, and mobile phone service as examples of unlawful use cases. However, it did uphold its requirement for income tax filing and welfare programmes.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.thequint.com/news/india/supreme-court-strikes-down-section-57-of-aadhaar-act-what-it-means-for-you|title=Sec 57 of Aadhaar Act Struck Down. Here's What It Means For You|work=The Quint|access-date=2018-09-27|language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://qz.com/india/1351263/supreme-court-verdict-how-indias-aadhaar-id-became-mandatory/|title=Supreme Court verdict: How India's Aadhaar ID became mandatory |website=Quartz|language=en|access-date=2018-09-27}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/aadhaar-stays-minus-fangs-and-pangs/articleshow/65972588.cms|title=Aadhaar stays, minus fangs and pangs|work=The Times of India|access-date=2018-09-27}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/technology/india-id-aadhaar-supreme-court.html|title=India's Top Court Limits Sweep of Biometric ID Program|work=The New York Times|access-date=2018-09-27|language=en}}</ref>
On 26 September 2018, the Supreme Court ruled that Section 57 of the Aadhaar Act was unconstitutional, meaning that private entities cannot compel their customers to provide their Aadhaar number as a condition of service to verify their identity, specifically citing requiring it for bank accounts, school admissions, and mobile phone service as examples of unlawful use cases. However, it did uphold its requirement for income tax filing and welfare programmes.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.thequint.com/news/india/supreme-court-strikes-down-section-57-of-aadhaar-act-what-it-means-for-you|title=Sec 57 of Aadhaar Act Struck Down. Here's What It Means For You|work=The Quint|access-date=2018-09-27|language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://qz.com/india/1351263/supreme-court-verdict-how-indias-aadhaar-id-became-mandatory/|title=Supreme Court verdict: How India's Aadhaar ID became mandatory |website=Quartz|language=en|access-date=2018-09-27}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/aadhaar-stays-minus-fangs-and-pangs/articleshow/65972588.cms|title=Aadhaar stays, minus fangs and pangs|work=The Times of India|access-date=2018-09-27}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/technology/india-id-aadhaar-supreme-court.html|title=India's Top Court Limits Sweep of Biometric ID Program|work=The New York Times|date=26 September 2018 |access-date=2018-09-27|language=en |last1=Goel |first1=Vindu }}</ref>


===Land allotment dispute===
===Land allotment dispute===
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===Security concerns===
===Security concerns===
In an August 2009 interview with the ''[[Tehelka]]'', former chief of the [[Intelligence Bureau (India)|Intelligence Bureau]] (IB), Ajit Doval, said that Aadhaar was originally intended to flush out illegal immigrants, but social security benefits were later added to avoid privacy concerns.<ref name=barcodes>{{cite news|title=Falling Between the Barcodes|url=http://www.tehelka.com/falling-between-the-barcodes/?singlepage=1|access-date=7 July 2015|work=[[Tehelka]]|date=22 August 2009}}</ref> In December 2011 the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance, led by [[Yashwant Sinha]], rejected the National Identification Authority of India Bill, 2010, and suggested modifications. It expressed objections to the issuing of Aadhaar numbers to [[illegal immigrant]]s. The Committee said that the project was being implemented in an unplanned manner and bypassing the Parliament.<ref name=Panelrejects>{{cite news|title=Why Parliamentary Panel rejected the UID Bill|url=http://www.ibnlive.com/news/india/why-parliamentary-panel-rejected-the-uid-bill-428035.html|access-date=29 May 2015|publisher=[[CNN-IBN]]|date=13 December 2011}}</ref>
In an August 2009 interview with the ''[[Tehelka]]'', former chief of the [[Intelligence Bureau (India)|Intelligence Bureau]] (IB), Ajit Doval, said that Aadhaar was originally intended to flush out illegal immigrants, but social security benefits were later added to avoid privacy concerns.<ref name=barcodes>{{cite news|title=Falling Between the Barcodes|url=http://www.tehelka.com/falling-between-the-barcodes/?singlepage=1|access-date=7 July 2015|work=[[Tehelka]]|date=22 August 2009|archive-date=10 July 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150710142450/http://www.tehelka.com/falling-between-the-barcodes/?singlepage=1|url-status=dead}}</ref> In December 2011 the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance, led by [[Yashwant Sinha]], rejected the National Identification Authority of India Bill, 2010, and suggested modifications. It expressed objections to the issuing of Aadhaar numbers to [[illegal immigrant]]s. The Committee said that the project was being implemented in an unplanned manner and bypassing the Parliament.<ref name=Panelrejects>{{cite news|title=Why Parliamentary Panel rejected the UID Bill|url=http://www.ibnlive.com/news/india/why-parliamentary-panel-rejected-the-uid-bill-428035.html|access-date=29 May 2015|publisher=[[CNN-IBN]]|date=13 December 2011}}</ref>


In May 2013, deputy director general of the UIDAI, Ashok Dalwai, admitted that there had been some errors in the registration process. Some people had received Aadhaar cards with wrong photographs or fingerprints.<ref name=DogsTrees>{{cite news|title=Dogs, trees and chairs have Aadhaar cards|url=http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Dogs-trees-and-chairs-have-Aadhaar-cards/articleshow/20359001.cms?referral=PM|access-date=29 May 2015|work=[[The Times of India]]|date=31 May 2013}}</ref> According to Aloke Tikku of the ''[[Hindustan Times]]'', some officials of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) had criticised the UIDAI project in September 2013, with the officials saying that the Aadhaar number cannot be considered a credible proof of residence. As under the liberal pilot phase, where a person claimed to live was accepted as the address and recorded.<ref name=IBSlams>{{cite news|title=IB slams Uidai, says Aadhaar not credible as residence proof|url=http://www.hindustantimes.com/newdelhi/ib-slams-uidai-says-aadhaar-not-credible-as-residence-proof/article1-1126679.aspx|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150202091524/http://www.hindustantimes.com/newdelhi/ib-slams-uidai-says-aadhaar-not-credible-as-residence-proof/article1-1126679.aspx|url-status=dead|archive-date=2 February 2015|access-date=29 May 2015|work=[[Hindustan Times]]|date=25 September 2013}}</ref>
In May 2013, deputy director general of the UIDAI, Ashok Dalwai, admitted that there had been some errors in the registration process. Some people had received Aadhaar cards with wrong photographs or fingerprints.<ref name=DogsTrees>{{cite news|title=Dogs, trees and chairs have Aadhaar cards|url=http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Dogs-trees-and-chairs-have-Aadhaar-cards/articleshow/20359001.cms?referral=PM|access-date=29 May 2015|work=[[The Times of India]]|date=31 May 2013}}</ref> According to Aloke Tikku of the ''[[Hindustan Times]]'', some officials of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) had criticised the UIDAI project in September 2013, with the officials saying that the Aadhaar number cannot be considered a credible proof of residence. As under the liberal pilot phase, where a person claimed to live was accepted as the address and recorded.<ref name=IBSlams>{{cite news|title=IB slams Uidai, says Aadhaar not credible as residence proof|url=http://www.hindustantimes.com/newdelhi/ib-slams-uidai-says-aadhaar-not-credible-as-residence-proof/article1-1126679.aspx|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150202091524/http://www.hindustantimes.com/newdelhi/ib-slams-uidai-says-aadhaar-not-credible-as-residence-proof/article1-1126679.aspx|url-status=dead|archive-date=2 February 2015|access-date=29 May 2015|work=[[Hindustan Times]]|date=25 September 2013}}</ref>
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Certain [[mobile app]]s claim to verify an Aadhaar card using a [[QR code]] scanner. However, the QR code is not a secure representation of an Aadhaar card either and can be copied and edited. The only way to validate an Aadhaar card is to perform an online validation, which will confirm that the card number is valid, confirm the postal code and gender of the holder (but not their name or photo). In theory, this means that is possible to create a false Aadhaar card using the number of a genuine holder from the same postal code with the same gender, with the card subject to a number of cases of counterfeiting.<ref>{{cite news|title=Jobless engineer made over 100 fake Aadhaar cards - Times of India|url=http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/ahmedabad/jobless-engineer-made-over-100-fake-aadhaar-cards/articleshow/58406979.cms|access-date=28 May 2017|work=The Times of India}}</ref>
Certain [[mobile app]]s claim to verify an Aadhaar card using a [[QR code]] scanner. However, the QR code is not a secure representation of an Aadhaar card either and can be copied and edited. The only way to validate an Aadhaar card is to perform an online validation, which will confirm that the card number is valid, confirm the postal code and gender of the holder (but not their name or photo). In theory, this means that is possible to create a false Aadhaar card using the number of a genuine holder from the same postal code with the same gender, with the card subject to a number of cases of counterfeiting.<ref>{{cite news|title=Jobless engineer made over 100 fake Aadhaar cards - Times of India|url=http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/ahmedabad/jobless-engineer-made-over-100-fake-aadhaar-cards/articleshow/58406979.cms|access-date=28 May 2017|work=The Times of India}}</ref>


The digital document itself is self-signed by a non-internationally recognised certificate authority (n)Code Solutions, a division of [[Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilisers|Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizers]] Company Ltd (GNFC)<ref>{{cite web|title=India goes digital - Hacker News|url=https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=9163984|website=news.ycombinator.com}}</ref> and needs to be manually installed on the PC. This is despite [[Entrust]] assisting in the development of the solution.<ref>{{cite web|title=Entrust Datacard - Partner Profile — (N)Code Solutions|url=https://www.entrust.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/170322_nCode-case-study_FINAL.pdf|website=entrust.com|publisher=Entrust|access-date=28 May 2017|quote=In order to set up a Certifying Authority for the Ministry of Information Technology in India, (n)Code Solutions needed a technology partner for digital signature certificates. (n)Code Solutions worked with Entrust Datacard to set up a certificate authority infrastructure {{sic|comprised |hide=y|of}} Entrust Authority PKI that issues digital certificates and integrates with various applications and certificate profiles for individuals and corporations with various validity periods of one, two or three years based on individual customer needs.}}</ref>
The digital document itself is self-signed by a non-internationally recognised certificate authority (n)Code Solutions, a division of [[Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilisers|Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizers]] Company Ltd (GNFC)<ref>{{cite web|title=India goes digital - Hacker News|url=https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=9163984|website=news.ycombinator.com}}</ref> and needs to be manually installed on the PC. This is despite [[Entrust]] assisting in the development of the solution.<ref>{{cite web|title=Entrust Datacard - Partner Profile — (N)Code Solutions|url=https://www.entrust.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/170322_nCode-case-study_FINAL.pdf|website=entrust.com|publisher=Entrust|access-date=28 May 2017|quote=In order to set up a Certifying Authority for the Ministry of Information Technology in India, (n)Code Solutions needed a technology partner for digital signature certificates. (n)Code Solutions worked with Entrust Datacard to set up a certificate authority infrastructure {{sic|comprised |hide=y|of}} Entrust Authority PKI that issues digital certificates and integrates with various applications and certificate profiles for individuals and corporations with various validity periods of one, two or three years based on individual customer needs.|archive-date=21 January 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180121071313/https://www.entrust.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/170322_nCode-case-study_FINAL.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref>


===Application issues===
===Application issues===
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===Data leaks and security incidents===
===Data leaks and security incidents===
The Aadhaar database has experienced multiple data leaks and security breaches since its inception. These have ranged from the sale of unauthorised access by database administrators, the exposure of personal information on government websites, and unauthorised use and access of Aadhar data by private institutions.  
The Aadhaar database has experienced multiple data leaks and security breaches since its inception. These have ranged from the sale of unauthorised access by database administrators, the exposure of personal information on government websites, and unauthorised use and access of Aadhaar data by private institutions.  


The detailed personal information being collected is of extremely high importance to an individual. However, once collected, it is not being treated with the required sensitivity for privacy<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://thewire.in/119323/real-problem-aadhaar-lies-biometrics/|title=Four reasons you should worry about Aadhaar's use of Biometrics |work=The Wire|access-date=2017-03-28}}</ref> concerns. Major financial transactions are linked with information collected in Aadhaar. Data leaks<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://techcrunch.com/2019/01/31/aadhaar-data-leak/|title=Indian state government leaks thousands of Aadhaar numbers data|last=Whitter|first=Zack|date=31 January 2019|work=Techcrunch}}</ref> are a gold mine for criminals who now use sophisticated hackers. Government departments and various other agencies that collect this information such as banks cannot be trusted to maintain the secrecy of all this collected information.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://indiatoday.intoday.in/technology/story/aadhaar-data-of-130-millions-bank-account-details-leaked-from-govt-websites-report/1/943632.html|title=Aadhaar data of 130 millions leaked from govt websites: Report|access-date=2017-07-06|language=en}}</ref> Another case occurred wherein Aadhaar data collected by Reliance Jio was leaked online, and the data may now be widely available to hackers.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.fonearena.com/blog/224741/jio-customer-database-of-over-120-million-users-leaked-could-be-biggest-data-breach-in-india.html|title=Jio Customer Database of over 120 million users leaked, could be biggest data breach in India|website=fonearena.com|language=en-US|access-date=2017-07-13}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.indiatimes.com/technology/news/reliance-jio-says-it-s-not-hacked-aadhaar-data-not-leaked-but-online-users-insist-otherwise-325533.html|title=Reliance Jio Says It's Not Hacked, Aadhaar Data Not Leaked, But Online Users Insist Otherwise|work=The Times of India|access-date=2017-07-13|language=en}}</ref> The UIDAI confirms more than 200 government websites were publicly displaying confidential Aadhaar data; though removed now, the data leaked cannot be scrubbed from hackers' databases.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/210-govt-websites-made-public-aadhaar-details-uidai/articleshow/61711303.cms|title=Over 200 govt websites made Aadhaar details public: UIDAI - Times of India|work=The Times of India|access-date=2017-11-19}}</ref> In July 2017 privacy issues with regard to the Aadhaar card were discussed in the Supreme Court.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://english.manoramaonline.com/news/nation/2017/07/19/supreme-court-right-to-privacy-fundamental-right.html|title=Right to privacy can't be absolute, may be regulated: SC}}</ref>
The detailed personal information being collected is of extremely high importance to an individual. However, once collected, it is not being treated with the required sensitivity for privacy<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://thewire.in/119323/real-problem-aadhaar-lies-biometrics/|title=Four reasons you should worry about Aadhaar's use of Biometrics |work=The Wire|access-date=2017-03-28}}</ref> concerns. Major financial transactions are linked with information collected in Aadhaar. Data leaks<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://techcrunch.com/2019/01/31/aadhaar-data-leak/|title=Indian state government leaks thousands of Aadhaar numbers data|last=Whitter|first=Zack|date=31 January 2019|work=Techcrunch}}</ref> are a gold mine for criminals who now use sophisticated hackers. Government departments and various other agencies that collect this information such as banks cannot be trusted to maintain the secrecy of all this collected information.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://indiatoday.intoday.in/technology/story/aadhaar-data-of-130-millions-bank-account-details-leaked-from-govt-websites-report/1/943632.html|title=Aadhaar data of 130 millions leaked from govt websites: Report|access-date=2017-07-06|language=en|archive-date=13 July 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170713034502/http://indiatoday.intoday.in/technology/story/aadhaar-data-of-130-millions-bank-account-details-leaked-from-govt-websites-report/1/943632.html|url-status=dead}}</ref> Another case occurred wherein Aadhaar data collected by Reliance Jio was leaked online, and the data may now be widely available to hackers.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.fonearena.com/blog/224741/jio-customer-database-of-over-120-million-users-leaked-could-be-biggest-data-breach-in-india.html|title=Jio Customer Database of over 120 million users leaked, could be biggest data breach in India|website=fonearena.com|language=en-US|access-date=2017-07-13}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.indiatimes.com/technology/news/reliance-jio-says-it-s-not-hacked-aadhaar-data-not-leaked-but-online-users-insist-otherwise-325533.html|title=Reliance Jio Says It's Not Hacked, Aadhaar Data Not Leaked, But Online Users Insist Otherwise|work=The Times of India|access-date=2017-07-13|language=en}}</ref> The UIDAI confirms more than 200 government websites were publicly displaying confidential Aadhaar data; though removed now, the data leaked cannot be scrubbed from hackers' databases.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/210-govt-websites-made-public-aadhaar-details-uidai/articleshow/61711303.cms|title=Over 200 govt websites made Aadhaar details public: UIDAI - Times of India|work=The Times of India|access-date=2017-11-19}}</ref> In July 2017 privacy issues with regard to the Aadhaar card were discussed in the Supreme Court.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://english.manoramaonline.com/news/nation/2017/07/19/supreme-court-right-to-privacy-fundamental-right.html|title=Right to privacy can't be absolute, may be regulated: SC}}</ref>
<ref>{{cite web|url=http://quintdaily.com/2017/08/aadhar-is-future-india/|title=Aadhaar is Future India|website=quintdaily|date=6 August 2017}}</ref> A report from the Center for Internet and Society suggests that the records of about 13.5 crore (135{{nbsp}}million) Indians may have been leaked.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.outlookindia.com/newswire/story/aadhaar-numbers-and-personal-details-of-135-million-indians-may-have-leaked-says-cis-report/968774|title=Aadhaar Numbers And Personal Details of 135 Million Indians May Have Leaked, Says CIS Report|work=outlookindia.com|access-date=2017-11-14}}</ref> A loophole was identified that allows all records to be accessed by anyone<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-42575443|title=Aadhaar: 'Leak' in world's biggest database worries Indians}}</ref> though hackers can find other routes.
<ref>{{cite web|url=http://quintdaily.com/2017/08/aadhar-is-future-india/|title=Aadhaar is Future India|website=quintdaily|date=6 August 2017}}</ref> A report from the Center for Internet and Society suggests that the records of about 135 million Indians may have been leaked.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.outlookindia.com/newswire/story/aadhaar-numbers-and-personal-details-of-135-million-indians-may-have-leaked-says-cis-report/968774|title=Aadhaar Numbers And Personal Details of 135 Million Indians May Have Leaked, Says CIS Report|work=outlookindia.com|access-date=2017-11-14}}</ref> A loophole was identified that allows all records to be accessed by anyone<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-42575443|title=Aadhaar: 'Leak' in world's biggest database worries Indians}}</ref> though hackers can find other routes.


==== 2017 ====
==== 2017 ====
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In March 2017, the UIDAI blacklisted a contracted agency charged with collecting biometric data, after they shared a photograph containing the personal information of Indian cricketer M.S. Dhoni. The photo was tweeted as part of efforts to promote Aadhaar enrolment in India, and showed Dhoni enrolling, including a visual of his enrolment form being fed into a computer. The image was retweeted by several people, including [[Ravi Shankar Prasad]], the then-Information and Broadcasting Minister of the Indian Government.<ref>{{Cite web |date=29 March 2017 |title=MS Dhoni's Aadhaar details leaked on Twitter, wife Sakshi complains to IT minister |url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/ms-dhonis-aadhar-details-leaked-on-twitter-wife-sakshi-complains-to-it-minister/articleshow/57886970.cms |access-date=2022-07-06 |website=The Times of India |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2017-03-29 |title=MS Dhoni's Aadhaar details made public, Ravi Shankar Prasad promises action |url=https://indianexpress.com/article/india/sakshi-dhoni-raises-privacy-issue-after-ms-dhoni-aadhaar-details-made-public-on-twitter-ravi-shankar-prasad-promises-action-4590310/ |access-date=2022-07-06 |website=The Indian Express |language=en}}</ref>
In March 2017, the UIDAI blacklisted a contracted agency charged with collecting biometric data, after they shared a photograph containing the personal information of Indian cricketer M.S. Dhoni. The photo was tweeted as part of efforts to promote Aadhaar enrolment in India, and showed Dhoni enrolling, including a visual of his enrolment form being fed into a computer. The image was retweeted by several people, including [[Ravi Shankar Prasad]], the then-Information and Broadcasting Minister of the Indian Government.<ref>{{Cite web |date=29 March 2017 |title=MS Dhoni's Aadhaar details leaked on Twitter, wife Sakshi complains to IT minister |url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/ms-dhonis-aadhar-details-leaked-on-twitter-wife-sakshi-complains-to-it-minister/articleshow/57886970.cms |access-date=2022-07-06 |website=The Times of India |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2017-03-29 |title=MS Dhoni's Aadhaar details made public, Ravi Shankar Prasad promises action |url=https://indianexpress.com/article/india/sakshi-dhoni-raises-privacy-issue-after-ms-dhoni-aadhaar-details-made-public-on-twitter-ravi-shankar-prasad-promises-action-4590310/ |access-date=2022-07-06 |website=The Indian Express |language=en}}</ref>


In August 2017, a software engineer was arrested after he created an app that exploited vulnerabilites in the official Aadhaar app in order to allow him to re-route requests for data, after unlawfully accessing the networks of the [[National Informatics Centre]]. He was able to exploit the Aadhaar app before detection for six months, between January and July 2017.<ref>{{Cite news |others=Special Correspondent |date=2017-08-03 |title=IIT graduate illegally accesses Aadhaar data to create app, arrested |language=en-IN |work=The Hindu |url=https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/karnataka/techie-held-for-accessing-sensitive-aadhaar-data/article19421763.ece |access-date=2022-07-06 |issn=0971-751X}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2017-08-04 |title=An IIT graduate has been arrested for illegally accessing the Aadhaar database: Report-India News , Firstpost |url=https://www.firstpost.com/india/an-iit-graduate-has-been-arrested-for-illegally-accessing-the-aadhaar-database-report-3892045.html |access-date=2022-07-06 |website=Firstpost |language=en}}</ref>   
In August 2017, a software engineer was arrested after he created an app that exploited vulnerabilites in the official Aadhaar app in order to allow him to re-route requests for data, after unlawfully accessing the networks of the [[National Informatics Centre]]. He was able to exploit the Aadhaar app before detection for six months, between January and July 2017.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2017-08-03 |title=IIT graduate illegally accesses Aadhaar data to create app, arrested |language=en-IN |work=The Hindu |url=https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/karnataka/techie-held-for-accessing-sensitive-aadhaar-data/article19421763.ece |access-date=2022-07-06 |issn=0971-751X}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2017-08-04 |title=An IIT graduate has been arrested for illegally accessing the Aadhaar database: Report-India News , Firstpost |url=https://www.firstpost.com/india/an-iit-graduate-has-been-arrested-for-illegally-accessing-the-aadhaar-database-report-3892045.html |access-date=2022-07-06 |website=Firstpost |language=en}}</ref>   


Wikileaks tweeted on 25 August 2017 that the same American supplier of fingerprint and Iris scanning equipment that collaborated with the CIA to identify Osama Bin Laden was also supplying equipment to India.<ref>{{cite web |title=WikiLeaks suggests CIA may have access to India's Aadhaar data |date=26 August 2017 |url=http://www.businesstoday.in/technology/wikileaks-suggests-cia-may-have-access-to-indias-aadhaar-data/story/259089.html}}</ref> The complex structure of ownership is detailed in an article in Fountainink.in<ref>{{cite web |title=Aadhaar in the hand of spies |url=http://fountainink.in/reportage/aadhaar-in-the-hand-of-spies-}}</ref> Concerns were raised as early as 2011 in the Sunday ''Guardian'' regarding not following due process and handing over contracts to entities with links to the FBI and having a history of leaking data across countries.<ref>{{cite web |title=Foreign agencies can access Aadhar data |url=http://www.sunday-guardian.com/investigation/foreign-agencies-can-access-aadhar-data}}</ref> How the CIA can hack and access the Aadhaar database using a secret Expresslane project is documented in a report on the GGInews website<ref>{{Cite news |date=2017-08-25 |title=How CIA Spies Access India's Biometric Aadhaar Database {{!}} GGI News |language=en-US |work=GGI News |url=http://gginews.in/cia-spies-access-aadhaar-database/ |access-date=2017-11-14}}</ref> and saved in an archive lest it be removed.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2017-08-25 |title=How CIA Spies Access India's Biometric Aadhaar Database {{!}} GGI News |work=archive.is |url=http://gginews.in/cia-spies-access-aadhaar-database/ |url-status=dead |access-date=2017-11-14 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20170825153455/http://gginews.in/cia-spies-access-aadhaar-database/ |archive-date=2017-08-25}}</ref> Further communications have also identified the clauses under which data may have freely flowed to foreign agencies due to the nature and wordings in the Aadhaar contracts<ref>{{Cite news |date=2017-08-30 |title=Foreign Firms Given Access To Your Unencrypted Aadhaar Data {{!}} GGI News |language=en-US |work=GGI News |url=http://gginews.in/foreign-firms-given-access-unencrypted-aadhaar-data/ |access-date=2017-11-14}}</ref> and archived here.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2017-11-14 |title=Foreign Firms Given Access To Your Unencrypted Aadhaar Data {{!}} GGI News |work=archive.is |url=http://gginews.in/foreign-firms-given-access-unencrypted-aadhaar-data/ |url-status=dead |access-date=2017-11-14 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20171114054948/http://gginews.in/foreign-firms-given-access-unencrypted-aadhaar-data/ |archive-date=2017-11-14}}</ref>
Wikileaks tweeted on 25 August 2017 that the same American supplier of fingerprint and Iris scanning equipment that collaborated with the CIA to identify Osama Bin Laden was also supplying equipment to India.<ref>{{cite web |title=WikiLeaks suggests CIA may have access to India's Aadhaar data |date=26 August 2017 |url=http://www.businesstoday.in/technology/wikileaks-suggests-cia-may-have-access-to-indias-aadhaar-data/story/259089.html}}</ref> The complex structure of ownership is detailed in an article in Fountainink.in<ref>{{cite web |title=Aadhaar in the hand of spies |url=http://fountainink.in/reportage/aadhaar-in-the-hand-of-spies-}}</ref> Concerns were raised as early as 2011 in the Sunday ''Guardian'' regarding not following due process and handing over contracts to entities with links to the FBI and having a history of leaking data across countries.<ref>{{cite web |title=Foreign agencies can access Aadhaar data |url=http://www.sunday-guardian.com/investigation/foreign-agencies-can-access-aadhar-data |access-date=15 September 2017 |archive-date=22 September 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210922024612/http://www.sunday-guardian.com/investigation/foreign-agencies-can-access-aadhar-data |url-status=dead }}</ref> How the CIA can hack and access the Aadhaar database using a secret Expresslane project is documented in a report on the GGInews website<ref>{{Cite news |date=2017-08-25 |title=How CIA Spies Access India's Biometric Aadhaar Database {{!}} GGI News |language=en-US |work=GGI News |url=http://gginews.in/cia-spies-access-aadhaar-database/ |access-date=2017-11-14 |archive-date=25 August 2017 |archive-url=https://archive.ph/20170825153455/http://gginews.in/cia-spies-access-aadhaar-database/ |url-status=dead }}</ref> and saved in an archive lest it be removed.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2017-08-25 |title=How CIA Spies Access India's Biometric Aadhaar Database {{!}} GGI News |work=archive.is |url=http://gginews.in/cia-spies-access-aadhaar-database/ |url-status=dead |access-date=2017-11-14 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20170825153455/http://gginews.in/cia-spies-access-aadhaar-database/ |archive-date=2017-08-25}}</ref> Further communications have also identified the clauses under which data may have freely flowed to foreign agencies due to the nature and wordings in the Aadhaar contracts<ref>{{Cite news |date=2017-08-30 |title=Foreign Firms Given Access To Your Unencrypted Aadhaar Data {{!}} GGI News |language=en-US |work=GGI News |url=http://gginews.in/foreign-firms-given-access-unencrypted-aadhaar-data/ |access-date=2017-11-14 |archive-date=14 November 2017 |archive-url=https://archive.ph/20171114054948/http://gginews.in/foreign-firms-given-access-unencrypted-aadhaar-data/ |url-status=dead }}</ref> and archived here.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2017-11-14 |title=Foreign Firms Given Access To Your Unencrypted Aadhaar Data {{!}} GGI News |work=archive.is |url=http://gginews.in/foreign-firms-given-access-unencrypted-aadhaar-data/ |url-status=dead |access-date=2017-11-14 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20171114054948/http://gginews.in/foreign-firms-given-access-unencrypted-aadhaar-data/ |archive-date=2017-11-14}}</ref>


The Centre for Internet and Society, a non-profit research organisation from India, reported that during 2017, the Aadhaar of 13 crore (130 million) people was leaked as a result of information exposed on websites relating to four government social security schemes. These schemes were the National Social Assistance Programme and the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (managed by the Ministry of Rural Development), and the Daily Online Payment Reports under NREGA and Chandranna Bima Scheme (managed by the State Government of Andhra Pradesh).<ref>{{Cite web |date=2017-05-02 |title=Aadhaar data leak exposes cyber security flaws |url=https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/info-tech/aadhaar-data-leak-exposes-cyber-security-flaws/article64269282.ece |access-date=2022-07-04 |website=www.thehindubusinessline.com |language=en}}</ref>  In May 2017, the Central Government of India admitted in the Supreme Court that Aadhar data had been leaked several times in that year. Arghya Sengupta, the head of policy consulting institution, Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy, argued that none of the leaks had come directly from the Aadhar database, while the Attorney General, Mukul Rohatgi, defended the leaks and argued that, "one cannot have an absolute right over his or her body".<ref>{{Cite web |date=2017-05-04 |title=In Supreme Court, Centre admits Aadhaar data leak, critics cite 'civil liberties' |url=https://indianexpress.com/article/india/govt-admits-aadhaar-data-leak-critics-cite-civil-liberties-4639819/ |access-date=2022-07-04 |website=The Indian Express |language=en}}</ref> The leak of Aadhaar data was further confirmed publicly by the Ministry of Electronics and IT.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Government admits your Aadhaar data has been leaked |url=https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2017/mar/31/government-admits-your-aadhaar-data-has-been-leaked-1588027.html |access-date=2022-07-04 |website=The New Indian Express}}</ref>
The Centre for Internet and Society, a non-profit research organisation from India, reported that during 2017, the Aadhaar of 130 million people was leaked as a result of information exposed on websites relating to four government social security schemes. These schemes were the National Social Assistance Programme and the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (managed by the Ministry of Rural Development), and the Daily Online Payment Reports under NREGA and Chandranna Bima Scheme (managed by the State Government of Andhra Pradesh).<ref>{{Cite web |date=2017-05-02 |title=Aadhaar data leak exposes cyber security flaws |url=https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/info-tech/aadhaar-data-leak-exposes-cyber-security-flaws/article64269282.ece |access-date=2022-07-04 |website=www.thehindubusinessline.com |language=en}}</ref>  In May 2017, the Central Government of India admitted in the Supreme Court that Aadhaar data had been leaked several times in that year. Arghya Sengupta, the head of policy consulting institution, Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy, argued that none of the leaks had come directly from the Aadhaar database, while the Attorney General, Mukul Rohatgi, defended the leaks and argued that, "one cannot have an absolute right over his or her body".<ref>{{Cite web |date=2017-05-04 |title=In Supreme Court, Centre admits Aadhaar data leak, critics cite 'civil liberties' |url=https://indianexpress.com/article/india/govt-admits-aadhaar-data-leak-critics-cite-civil-liberties-4639819/ |access-date=2022-07-04 |website=The Indian Express |language=en}}</ref> The leak of Aadhaar data was further confirmed publicly by the Ministry of Electronics and IT.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Government admits your Aadhaar data has been leaked |url=https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2017/mar/31/government-admits-your-aadhaar-data-has-been-leaked-1588027.html |access-date=2022-07-04 |website=The New Indian Express}}</ref>


==== 2018 ====
==== 2018 ====
In 2018, the Aadhaar database suffered several breaches, resulting in 110 crore (1.1 billion) people's data being leaked and compromised. This was described by the [[World Economic Forum]] in 2019 as the "largest breach" of personal information in that year.<ref>{{Cite web |date=15 January 2019 |title=The Global Risks Report 2019 |url=https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-risks-report-2019/ |access-date=2022-07-04 |website=World Economic Forum |page=16 |language=en}}</ref> In the same year, Right to Information petitions filed by media organisations indicated that 210 Indian government officials and institutions had posted parts of the Aadhaar database in publicly accesssible sources, resulting in the leak of personal data, resulting in post-facto removals of this data by the Unique Identification Authority of India.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2017-11-19 |title=UIDAI reveals 210 govt websites made Aadhaar details public, did not specify when breach took place-India News , Firstpost |url=https://www.firstpost.com/india/uidai-reveals-210-govt-websites-made-aadhaar-details-public-did-not-specify-when-breach-took-place-4217597.html |access-date=2022-07-04 |website=Firstpost |language=en}}</ref>  
In 2018, the Aadhaar database suffered several breaches, resulting in 1.1 billion people's data being leaked and compromised. This was described by the [[World Economic Forum]] in 2019 as the "largest breach" of personal information in that year.<ref>{{Cite web |date=15 January 2019 |title=The Global Risks Report 2019 |url=https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-risks-report-2019/ |access-date=2022-07-04 |website=World Economic Forum |page=16 |language=en}}</ref> In the same year, Right to Information petitions filed by media organisations indicated that 210 Indian government officials and institutions had posted parts of the Aadhaar database in publicly accesssible sources, resulting in the leak of personal data, resulting in post-facto removals of this data by the Unique Identification Authority of India.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2017-11-19 |title=UIDAI reveals 210 govt websites made Aadhaar details public, did not specify when breach took place-India News , Firstpost |url=https://www.firstpost.com/india/uidai-reveals-210-govt-websites-made-aadhaar-details-public-did-not-specify-when-breach-took-place-4217597.html |access-date=2022-07-04 |website=Firstpost |language=en}}</ref>  


On 5 January 2018, media correspondents from The Tribune reported that they were, by posing as buyers, able to gain administrator access to the entire Aadhaar database for a payment of {{INRConvert|500}}, revealing major security flaws.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Rs 500, 10 minutes, and you have access to billion Aadhaar details |url=https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/archive/nation/rs-500-10-minutes-and-you-have-access-to-billion-aadhaar-details-523361 |access-date=2022-07-04 |website=Tribuneindia News Service |language=en}}</ref> Acknowledging this data breach, the Unique Identification Authority of India suspended 5000 officials from accessing the database after an investigation revealed misuse and unauthorised usage.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2018-01-09 |title=UIDAI blocks 5,000 officials from Aadhaar portal following reports of unauthorised usage- Technology News, Firstpost |url=https://www.firstpost.com/tech/news-analysis/uidai-blocks-5000-officials-from-aadhar-portal-following-reports-of-unauthorised-usage-4294143.html |access-date=2022-07-04 |website=Tech2}}</ref> The incident was widely reported internationally.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2018-01-04 |title=Personal data of a billion Indians sold online for £6, report claims |url=http://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/04/india-national-id-database-data-leak-bought-online-aadhaar |access-date=2022-07-06 |website=the Guardian |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |title=Analysis {{!}} A security breach in India has left a billion people at risk of identity theft |language=en-US |newspaper=Washington Post |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/01/04/a-security-breach-in-india-has-left-a-billion-people-at-risk-of-identity-theft/ |access-date=2022-07-06 |issn=0190-8286}}</ref> In response to the incident, UIDAI denied the breach, and filed a criminal complaint against the newspaper and journalists who reported the security flaws.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2018-01-07 |title=UIDAI files FIR against The Tribune, reporter Rachna Khaira for Aadhaar data breach story-India News , Firstpost |url=https://www.firstpost.com/india/uidai-files-fir-against-the-tribune-reporter-rachna-khaira-for-aadhaar-data-breach-story-4291109.html |access-date=2022-07-06 |website=Firstpost |language=en}}</ref>
On 5 January 2018, media correspondents from The Tribune reported that they were, by posing as buyers, able to gain administrator access to the entire Aadhaar database for a payment of {{INRConvert|500}}, revealing major security flaws.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Rs 500, 10 minutes, and you have access to billion Aadhaar details |url=https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/archive/nation/rs-500-10-minutes-and-you-have-access-to-billion-aadhaar-details-523361 |access-date=2022-07-04 |website=Tribuneindia News Service |language=en}}</ref> Acknowledging this data breach, the Unique Identification Authority of India suspended 5000 officials from accessing the database after an investigation revealed misuse and unauthorised usage.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2018-01-09 |title=UIDAI blocks 5,000 officials from Aadhaar portal following reports of unauthorised usage- Technology News, Firstpost |url=https://www.firstpost.com/tech/news-analysis/uidai-blocks-5000-officials-from-aadhar-portal-following-reports-of-unauthorised-usage-4294143.html |access-date=2022-07-04 |website=Tech2}}</ref> The incident was widely reported internationally.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2018-01-04 |title=Personal data of a billion Indians sold online for £6, report claims |url=http://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/04/india-national-id-database-data-leak-bought-online-aadhaar |access-date=2022-07-06 |website=the Guardian |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |title=Analysis {{!}} A security breach in India has left a billion people at risk of identity theft |language=en-US |newspaper=Washington Post |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/01/04/a-security-breach-in-india-has-left-a-billion-people-at-risk-of-identity-theft/ |access-date=2022-07-06 |issn=0190-8286}}</ref> In response to the incident, UIDAI denied the breach, and filed a criminal complaint against the newspaper and journalists who reported the security flaws.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2018-01-07 |title=UIDAI files FIR against The Tribune, reporter Rachna Khaira for Aadhaar data breach story-India News , Firstpost |url=https://www.firstpost.com/india/uidai-files-fir-against-the-tribune-reporter-rachna-khaira-for-aadhaar-data-breach-story-4291109.html |access-date=2022-07-06 |website=Firstpost |language=en}}</ref>
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In March 2018, an Indian security researcher noted that a vulnerability in the website of [[Indane (LPG)|Indane]] Gas, an Indian-government owned corporation supplying gas cylinders for domestic cooking, had resulted in exposing Aadhaar and personal data of every person enrolled with the Aadhaar database, and not just customers of Indane. American security website [[ZDNet]] reported that they spent a month attempting to contact the National Informatics Centre, the UIDAI, and Indian consulate officials in the United States, but did not receive a response, before they ran the story.<ref>{{Cite web |title=A new data leak hits Aadhaar, India's national ID database |url=https://www.zdnet.com/article/another-data-leak-hits-india-aadhaar-biometric-database/ |access-date=2022-07-06 |website=ZDNet |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Saldanha |first=Alison |date=2018-03-30 |title=Aadhaar security flaw can give access to data without OTP: Ethical hacker |work=Business Standard India |url=https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/aadhaar-security-and-authentication-flaw-can-give-access-to-data-without-otp-ethical-hacker-118033000123_1.html |access-date=2022-07-06}}</ref>  
In March 2018, an Indian security researcher noted that a vulnerability in the website of [[Indane (LPG)|Indane]] Gas, an Indian-government owned corporation supplying gas cylinders for domestic cooking, had resulted in exposing Aadhaar and personal data of every person enrolled with the Aadhaar database, and not just customers of Indane. American security website [[ZDNet]] reported that they spent a month attempting to contact the National Informatics Centre, the UIDAI, and Indian consulate officials in the United States, but did not receive a response, before they ran the story.<ref>{{Cite web |title=A new data leak hits Aadhaar, India's national ID database |url=https://www.zdnet.com/article/another-data-leak-hits-india-aadhaar-biometric-database/ |access-date=2022-07-06 |website=ZDNet |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Saldanha |first=Alison |date=2018-03-30 |title=Aadhaar security flaw can give access to data without OTP: Ethical hacker |work=Business Standard India |url=https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/aadhaar-security-and-authentication-flaw-can-give-access-to-data-without-otp-ethical-hacker-118033000123_1.html |access-date=2022-07-06}}</ref>  


On 20 March 2018, it was reported that Aadhaar data and linked personal information, including addresses, linked to a special scheme by the Government of Andhra Pradesh for women and girls had been left unsecured online and could be accessed by anyone, even though the scheme itself had been suspended in 2015.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Aadhaar data leak of Andhra Pradesh women raises security concerns |url=https://www.newindianexpress.com/states/andhra-pradesh/2018/mar/20/aadhaar-data-leak-of-andhra-pradesh-women-raises-security-concerns-1789648.html |access-date=2022-07-06 |website=The New Indian Express}}</ref>
On 20 March 2018, it was reported that Aadhaar data and linked personal information, including addresses, linked to a special scheme by the Government of Andhra Pradesh for women and girls had been left unsecured online and could be accessed by anyone, even though the scheme itself had been suspended in 2015.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Aadhaar data leak of Andhra Pradesh women raises security concerns |url=https://www.newindianexpress.com/states/andhra-pradesh/2018/mar/20/aadhaar-data-leak-of-andhra-pradesh-women-raises-security-concerns-1789648.html |access-date=2022-07-06 |website=The New Indian Express |archive-date=6 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220706101409/https://www.newindianexpress.com/states/andhra-pradesh/2018/mar/20/aadhaar-data-leak-of-andhra-pradesh-women-raises-security-concerns-1789648.html |url-status=dead }}</ref>


In May 2018, an Indian security researcher found that Aadhaar data linked to personal information, including caste identities, religious affiliation, bank accounts, and personal addresses and mobile numbers had been left unprotected on a website of the State Government of Andhra Pradesh, resulting in the leak of data belonging to 130,000 citizens.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Vidyut |date=2018-04-24 |title=New data leak allows targeting by religion, caste and locality and provides Aadhaar and bank details |url=https://www.medianama.com/2018/04/223-new-data-leak-allows-targeting-by-religion-caste-and-locality-and-provides-aadhaar-and-bank-details/ |access-date=2022-07-06 |website=MediaNama |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Government website leaked 1.3 lakh Aadhaar numbers, linked them with caste, religion: Researcher |url=https://scroll.in/latest/876775/government-website-leaked-1-3-lakh-aadhaar-numbers-linked-them-with-caste-religion-researcher |access-date=2022-07-06 |website=Scroll.in |language=en-US}}</ref>
In May 2018, an Indian security researcher found that Aadhaar data linked to personal information, including caste identities, religious affiliation, bank accounts, and personal addresses and mobile numbers had been left unprotected on a website of the State Government of Andhra Pradesh, resulting in the leak of data belonging to 130,000 citizens.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Vidyut |date=2018-04-24 |title=New data leak allows targeting by religion, caste and locality and provides Aadhaar and bank details |url=https://www.medianama.com/2018/04/223-new-data-leak-allows-targeting-by-religion-caste-and-locality-and-provides-aadhaar-and-bank-details/ |access-date=2022-07-06 |website=MediaNama |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Government website leaked 1.3 lakh Aadhaar numbers, linked them with caste, religion: Researcher |url=https://scroll.in/latest/876775/government-website-leaked-1-3-lakh-aadhaar-numbers-linked-them-with-caste-religion-researcher |access-date=2022-07-06 |website=Scroll.in |language=en-US}}</ref>


In September 2018, [[Ram Sewak Sharma|R.S. Sharma]], the chairman of India's Telecom Regulatory Authority of India and former UIDAI chairman, disclosed his Aadhar number on Twitter and challenged anyone to misuse it, in an effort to demonstrate the security of the Aadhaar programme. Using his Aadhaar, French researchers were able to access and disclose personal information belonging to Sharma, including his personal telephone number, tax identity card, his secretary's phone number, personal address, family photographs, date of birth, frequent flyer numbers, telecom operator, model of phone, details of personal purchases and transactions, and advised him to change his personal Gmail account password as a precaution.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2018-07-29 |title=Aadhaar safety: Trai chief throws challenge, French expert 'leaks' his data |work=Business Standard India |url=https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/aadhaar-safety-trai-chief-throws-challenge-french-expert-leaks-his-data-118072900077_1.html |access-date=2022-07-06}}</ref> The information was later used to make an unauthorised symbolic deposit of {{INRConvert|1}} in his personal bank account as well, teo demonstrate the possibility of blackmail and compromise.<ref>{{Cite web |date=30 July 2018 |first=Rachel |last=Chitra |title=Hackers deposit Re 1 in Trai chief's account |url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/hackers-deposit-re-1-in-trai-chiefs-account/articleshow/65190556.cms |access-date=2022-07-06 |website=The Times of India |language=en}}</ref> In 2020, his Aadhaar number was also used to unlawfully register him for certain government subsidies for which he was ineligible, resulting in the fraudulent receipt of government funding. Sharma has blamed this incident on the state government's failure to verify his enrolment.<ref>{{Cite web |date=14 December 2020 |first=Yasmin |last=Ahmed |title=Former UIDAI chief RS Sharma suffers Aadhaar fraud, Rs 6000 PM Kisan fund deposited in his account |url=https://www.indiatoday.in/technology/news/story/former-uidai-chief-rs-sharma-suffers-aadhaar-fraud-rs-6000-pm-kisan-fund-deposited-in-his-account-1749464-2020-12-14 |access-date=2022-07-06 |website=India Today |language=en}}</ref>
In September 2018, [[Ram Sewak Sharma|R.S. Sharma]], the chairman of India's Telecom Regulatory Authority of India and former UIDAI chairman, disclosed his Aadhaar number on Twitter and challenged anyone to misuse it, in an effort to demonstrate the security of the Aadhaar programme. Using his Aadhaar, French researchers were able to access and disclose personal information belonging to Sharma, including his personal telephone number, tax identity card, his secretary's phone number, personal address, family photographs, date of birth, frequent flyer numbers, telecom operator, model of phone, details of personal purchases and transactions, and advised him to change his personal Gmail account password as a precaution.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2018-07-29 |title=Aadhaar safety: Trai chief throws challenge, French expert 'leaks' his data |work=Business Standard India |url=https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/aadhaar-safety-trai-chief-throws-challenge-french-expert-leaks-his-data-118072900077_1.html |access-date=2022-07-06}}</ref> The information was later used to make an unauthorised symbolic deposit of {{INRConvert|1}} in his personal bank account as well, teo demonstrate the possibility of blackmail and compromise.<ref>{{Cite web |date=30 July 2018 |first=Rachel |last=Chitra |title=Hackers deposit Re 1 in Trai chief's account |url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/hackers-deposit-re-1-in-trai-chiefs-account/articleshow/65190556.cms |access-date=2022-07-06 |website=The Times of India |language=en}}</ref> In 2020, his Aadhaar number was also used to unlawfully register him for certain government subsidies for which he was ineligible, resulting in the fraudulent receipt of government funding. Sharma has blamed this incident on the state government's failure to verify his enrolment.<ref>{{Cite web |date=14 December 2020 |first=Yasmin |last=Ahmed |title=Former UIDAI chief RS Sharma suffers Aadhaar fraud, Rs 6000 PM Kisan fund deposited in his account |url=https://www.indiatoday.in/technology/news/story/former-uidai-chief-rs-sharma-suffers-aadhaar-fraud-rs-6000-pm-kisan-fund-deposited-in-his-account-1749464-2020-12-14 |access-date=2022-07-06 |website=India Today |language=en}}</ref>


=== Virtual ID ===
=== Virtual ID ===
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=== Revolving door problem ===
=== Revolving door problem ===
The question of the "[[Revolving door (politics)|revolving door]]" phenomenon (where "individuals using experience, knowledge and clout gained while in public service in pursuit of profit for private companies") has been raised in the context of Aadhaar, as people who were involved in the creation, design and popularisation of Aadhaar are now working in the private sector where they can use this knowledge for their own private enterprises which profit off this knowledge. Some examples of this are [[Khosla Ventures|Khosla Labs]] as well as [[iSPIRT]], a non-profit organisation which is dedicated to developing and supporting [[India Stack]]'s APIs has had many employees who were involved with UIDAI in various capacities.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://caravanmagazine.in/reportage/aadhaar-mixing-public-risk-private-profit|title=Aadhaar's mixing of public risk and private profit|last=Thaker|first=Aria|website=The Caravan|language=en|access-date=2019-07-22}}</ref>
The question of the "[[Revolving door (politics)|revolving door]]" phenomenon (where "individuals using experience, knowledge and clout gained while in public service in pursuit of profit for private companies") has been raised in the context of Aadhaar, as people who were involved in the creation, design and popularisation of Aadhaar are now working in the private sector where they can use this knowledge for their own private enterprises which profit off this knowledge. Some examples of this are [[Khosla Ventures|Khosla Labs]] as well as [[iSPIRT]], a non-profit organisation which is dedicated to developing and supporting [[India Stack]]'s APIs has had many employees who were involved with UIDAI in various capacities.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://caravanmagazine.in/reportage/aadhaar-mixing-public-risk-private-profit|title=Aadhaar's mixing of public risk and private profit|last=Thaker|first=Aria|website=The Caravan|language=en|access-date=2019-07-22}}</ref>{{Portal|India}}


=== CAG Report on the functioning of the UIDAI ===
=== CAG Report on the functioning of the UIDAI ===
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  | title=EC to start campaign to link voter ID with Aadhaar from August 1. Check details here |access-date=2022-08-25 |work=Mint |date=2022-07-25}}</ref> The Union Government claimed that this linking will be voluntary, but the bill passed in the parliament contradicts the claim.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Poddar |first1=Umang |title=Centre claims linking of Aadhaar to voter ID is voluntary – but bill in Parliament contradicts it |url=https://scroll.in/article/1013270/centre-claims-linking-of-aadhaar-to-voter-id-is-voluntary-but-bill-in-parliament-contradicts-it |access-date=2022-08-25 |work=Scroll.in |date=2021-12-21}}</ref> The rules issued by the Union Government mention that the only "sufficient cause" for a person to not link their Aadhaar Card with the Voter ID Card is if the person does not have one. The election officials cited 'orders from above' to pressure voters into linking these documents. <ref>{{cite news |last1=Poddar |first1=Umang |title=Aadhaar-voter ID linking is voluntary, says government – but law leaves little room to avoid it |url=https://scroll.in/article/1031224/aadhaar-voter-id-linking-is-voluntary-says-government-but-law-leaves-little-room-to-avoid-it |access-date=2022-08-25 |work=Scroll.in |date=2022-08-25}}</ref>  
  | title=EC to start campaign to link voter ID with Aadhaar from August 1. Check details here |access-date=2022-08-25 |work=Mint |date=2022-07-25}}</ref> The Union Government claimed that this linking will be voluntary, but the bill passed in the parliament contradicts the claim.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Poddar |first1=Umang |title=Centre claims linking of Aadhaar to voter ID is voluntary – but bill in Parliament contradicts it |url=https://scroll.in/article/1013270/centre-claims-linking-of-aadhaar-to-voter-id-is-voluntary-but-bill-in-parliament-contradicts-it |access-date=2022-08-25 |work=Scroll.in |date=2021-12-21}}</ref> The rules issued by the Union Government mention that the only "sufficient cause" for a person to not link their Aadhaar Card with the Voter ID Card is if the person does not have one. The election officials cited 'orders from above' to pressure voters into linking these documents. <ref>{{cite news |last1=Poddar |first1=Umang |title=Aadhaar-voter ID linking is voluntary, says government – but law leaves little room to avoid it |url=https://scroll.in/article/1031224/aadhaar-voter-id-linking-is-voluntary-says-government-but-law-leaves-little-room-to-avoid-it |access-date=2022-08-25 |work=Scroll.in |date=2022-08-25}}</ref>  


The linkage of Aadhaar with Voter ID card has several concerns. First, Aadhaar is not a proof of citizenship and such a linkage will not filter non-citizens. Another problem is the [[Unique Identification Authority of India]] in 2018 reported that Aadhaar based biometric authentication had a 12% error rate and linkage of voter ID with Aadhaar in Andhra and Telangana in 2015 lead to disenfranchisement of around 3 million voters leading to Supreme Court cancelling the linkage process. Yet another problem is that such a linkage would assign Aadhaar's demographic information to electoral database leading to misuse for profiling of voters, and India's lack of data protection laws makes it even worse.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Goyal |first1=Trishee |title=Explained {{!}} The concerns around Aadhaar-Voter ID linkage |url=https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/the-concerns-around-aadhaar-voter-id-linkage/article65821967.ece |access-date=2022-09-03 |work=[[The Hindu]] |date=2022-08-28}}</ref>
The linkage of Aadhaar with Voter ID card has several concerns. First, Aadhaar is not a proof of citizenship and such a linkage will not filter non-citizens. Another problem is the [[Unique Identification Authority of India]] in 2018 reported that Aadhaar based biometric authentication had a 12% error rate and linkage of voter ID with Aadhaar in Andhra and Telangana in 2015 lead to disenfranchisement of around 30 lakh (3 million) voters leading to Supreme Court cancelling the linkage process. Yet another problem is that such a linkage would assign Aadhaar's demographic information to electoral database leading to misuse for profiling of voters, and India's lack of data protection laws makes it even worse.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Goyal |first1=Trishee |title=Explained {{!}} The concerns around Aadhaar-Voter ID linkage |url=https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/the-concerns-around-aadhaar-voter-id-linkage/article65821967.ece |access-date=2022-09-03 |work=[[The Hindu]] |date=2022-08-28}}</ref>


==References==
==References==
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===Critical views===
===Critical views===
* {{cite web|title=Unique Identification for Indians: A Divine Dream or a Miscalculated Heroism?|url=https://eaadhaaruidai.com/tag/uid-number/|publisher=[[IIM Ahmedabad]]|author=Rajanish Dass|date=March 2011}}{{Dead link|date=September 2019 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}
* {{cite web |title=Unique Identification for Indians: A Divine Dream or a Miscalculated Heroism? |url=https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6426194.pdf |author=Rajanish Dass |date=March 2011}}
* {{cite news|author1=Kieran Clarke|author2=Shruti Sharma|author3=Damon Vis-Dunbar|title=Ghost savings: Understanding the fiscal impacts of India's LPG subsidy|url=https://www.iisd.org/blog/ghost-savings-understanding-fiscal-impacts-indias-lpg-subsidy|publisher=[[International Institute for Sustainable Development]]|date=30 September 2015}}
* {{cite news|author1=Kieran Clarke|author2=Shruti Sharma|author3=Damon Vis-Dunbar|title=Ghost savings: Understanding the fiscal impacts of India's LPG subsidy|url=https://www.iisd.org/blog/ghost-savings-understanding-fiscal-impacts-indias-lpg-subsidy|publisher=[[International Institute for Sustainable Development]]|date=30 September 2015|access-date=18 March 2016|archive-date=18 June 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200618042050/https://www.iisd.org/blog/ghost-savings-understanding-fiscal-impacts-indias-lpg-subsidy|url-status=dead}}
* Deciphering Aadhaar bill, its benefits and privacy issues
* Deciphering Aadhaar bill, its benefits and privacy issues
* [https://medium.com/@jackerhack/a-rant-on-aadhaar-6213e002f064#.qjde53lu1 A rant on Aadhaar]
* [https://medium.com/@jackerhack/a-rant-on-aadhaar-6213e002f064#.qjde53lu1 A rant on Aadhaar]