First Anglo-Afghan War: Difference between revisions

| date              = 1 October 1838 – October 1842

| place            = [[Afghanistan]]

* British withdrawal<ref name="Kohn">{{Cite book |last=Kohn |first=George Childs |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=qTDfAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA5 |title=Dictionary of Wars. Revised Edition |date=2013 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-135-95494-9 |location=London/New York |page=5}}</ref>

* [[Dost Mohammad Khan]] reinstalled to the throne of Kabul<ref name="Kohn" />

| combatant2        = {{flag|British Empire}}

| strength1        = 20,000 militia infantry<br>30 [[guns]]<br>5,000 light tribal cavalry

| strength2        = 10,000 line infantry soldiers<br>30,000 [[camp followers]]<br>200 guns<br>1,500 heavy cavalry<br>5,000 Shah Shuja Durrani local indian levy

}}

The British then sent an [[Kabul Expedition (1842)|''Army of Retribution'']] to Kabul to avenge the destruction of the previous forces. After recovering prisoners, they left Afghanistan by the end of the year. Dost Mohammed returned from exile in India to resume his rule.

The 19th century was a period of diplomatic competition between the British and Russian empires for spheres of influence in [[South Asia]] known as the "[[The Great Game|Great Game]]" to the British and the "Tournament of Shadows" to the Russians.<ref name="Perry, James page 110">Perry, James ''Arrogant Armies'', Edison: CastleBooks, 2005 p. 110.</ref> With the exception of [[Paul I of Russia|Emperor Paul]] who ordered an invasion of India in 1800 (which was cancelled after his assassination in 1801), no Russian [[tsar]] ever seriously considered invading India, but for most of the 19th century, Russia was viewed as "the enemy" in Britain; and any Russian advance into Central Asia, into what is now Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, was always assumed (in London) to be directed towards the conquest of India, as the American historian [[David Fromkin]] observed, "no matter how far-fetched" such an interpretation might be.<ref>Fromkin, David "The Great Game in Asia" pp. 936–51 from ''Foreign Affairs'', Volume 58, Issue 4, Spring 1980 pp. 937–38</ref> In 1832, the [[Reform Act 1832|First Reform Bill]] lowering the franchise requirements to vote and hold office in the United Kingdom was passed, which the ultra-conservative Emperor [[Nicholas I of Russia]] openly disapproved of, setting the stage for an Anglo-Russian "cold war", with many believing that Russian autocracy and British democracy were bound to clash.<ref>Fromkin, David "The Great Game in Asia" pp. 936–51 from ''Foreign Affairs'', Volume 58, Issue 4, Spring 1980 p. 938</ref> In 1837, [[Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston|Lord Palmerston]] and [[John Hobhouse, 1st Baron Broughton|John Hobhouse]], fearing the instability of [[Afghanistan]], the [[Sindh]], and the increasing power of the [[Sikh Empire|Sikh kingdom]] to the northwest, raised the spectre of a possible Russian invasion of [[Company rule in India|British India]] through Afghanistan. The British tended to misunderstand the foreign policy of the Emperor Nicholas I as anti-British and intent upon an expansionary policy in Asia; whereas in fact though Nicholas disliked Britain as a liberal democratic state that he considered to be rather "strange", he always believed it was possible to reach an understanding with Britain on spheres of influence in Asia, believing that the essentially conservative nature of British society would retard the advent of liberalism.<ref>Riasanovsky, Nicholas ''Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825–1855'', Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959 p. 255.</ref> The main goal of Nicholas's foreign policy was not the conquest of Asia, but rather upholding the ''status quo'' in Europe, especially by co-operating with Prussia and [[Austria]], and in isolating France, as [[Louis Philippe I]], the King of the French was a man whom Nicholas hated as an "usurper".<ref>Riasanovsky, Nicholas ''Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825–1855'', Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959 pp. 257–58.</ref> The duc d'Orleans had once been Nicholas's friend, but when he assumed the throne of France after the revolution of 1830, Nicholas was consumed with hatred for his former friend who, as he saw it, had gone over to what he perceived as the dark side of liberalism.<ref>Riasanovsky, Nicholas ''Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825–1855'', Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959 p. 258.</ref> The idea that Russia was a threat to the East India Company is one version of events. Scholars now favour a different interpretation that the fear of the East India Company was in fact the decision of Dost Mohammed Khan and the Qajar Ruler of Iran to form an alliance and extinguish Sikh rule in Punjab. The British feared that an invading Islamic army would lead to an uprising in India by the people and princely states therefore it was decided to replace Dost Mohammed Khan with a more pliant ruler. "Rumours could cost lives and Empire itself. Therefore instead of fixating on the oriental other, the East India Company played up the threat of the Russian bear".<ref name="Husain">{{Cite book |last=Husain |first=Farrukh |title=Afghanistan in the age of empires: the great game for South and Central Asia |date=2018 |publisher=Silk Road Books |isbn=978-1-5272-1633-4 |pages=81, 412}}</ref>

When [[Governor-General of India]] [[George Eden, 1st Earl of Auckland|Lord Auckland]] heard about the arrival of Russian envoy Count [[Jan Prosper Witkiewicz]] (better known by the Russian version of his name as [[Yan Vitkevich]]) in Kabul and the possibility that Dost Mohammad might turn to Russia for support, his political advisers exaggerated the threat.<ref name=keay419/> [[Alexander Burnes]], the Scotsman who served as the East India Company's chief political officer in Afghanistan, described Witkiewicz: "He was a gentlemanly and agreeable man, of about thirty years of age, spoke French, Turkish and Persian fluently, and wore the uniform of an officer of the Cossacks".<ref name="Macintyre, Ben p. 205">Macintyre, Ben ''The Man Who Would Be King'', New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2002 p. 205</ref> The presence of Witkiewicz had thrown Burnes into a state of despair, leading one contemporary to note that he "abandoned himself to despair, bound his head with wet towels and handkerchiefs and took to the smelling bottle".<ref name="Macintyre, Ben p. 205" /> Dost Mohammad had in fact invited Count Witkiewicz to Kabul as a way to frighten the British into making an alliance with him against his archenemy [[Ranjit Singh]], the Maharaja of the Punjab, not because he really wanted an alliance with Russia. The British had the power to compel Singh to return the former Afghan territories he had conquered whereas the Russians did not, which explains why Dost Mohammad Khan wanted an alliance with the British. Burnes wrote home after having dinner with Count Witkiewicz and Dost Mohammad in late December 1837: "We are in a mess home. The emperor of Russia has sent an envoy to Kabul to offer...money [to the Afghans] to fight Rajeet Singh!!! I could not believe my own eyes or ears."<ref name="Perry, James page 111" /> On 20 January 1838, Lord Auckland sent an ultimatum to Dost Mohammad telling him: "You must desist from all correspondence with Russia. You must never receive agents from them, or have aught to do with them without our sanction; you must dismiss Captain Viktevitch [Witkiewicz] with courtesy; you must surrender all claims to Peshawar".<ref>Macintyre, Ben ''The Man Who Would Be King'', New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2002 pp. 205–06</ref> Burnes himself had complained that Lord Auckland's letter was "so dictatorial and supercilious as to indicate the writer's intention that it should give offense", and tried to avoid delivering it for long as possible.<ref>Macintyre, Ben ''The Man Who Would Be King'', New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2002 p. 206</ref> Dost Mohammad was indeed offended by the letter, but in order to avoid a war, he had his special military advisor, the American adventurer [[Josiah Harlan]], engage in talks with Burnes to see if some compromise could be arranged.<ref name="Macintyre, Ben pp. 206">Macintyre, Ben ''The Man Who Would Be King'', New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2002 pp. 206–07</ref> Burnes in fact had no power to negotiate anything, and Harlan complained that Burnes was just stalling, which led to Dost Mohammad expelling the British diplomatic mission on 26 April 1838.<ref name="Macintyre, Ben pp. 206" />

On 23 July 1839, in a surprise attack, the British-led forces [[Battle of Ghazni|captured]] the fortress of [[Ghazni]], which overlooks a plain leading eastward into the [[Khyber Pakhtunkhwa]].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Forbes |first=Archibald |year=2014 |title=The Afghan Wars 1839-42 and 1878-80 |url=http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/8428/pg8428-images.html |access-date=27 February 2019 |publisher=Project Gutenberg EBook}}</ref> The British troops blew up one city gate and marched into the city in a euphoric mood. During the battle, the British suffered 200 killed and wounded, while the Afghans suffered 500 killed and 1,500 captured. Ghazni was well-supplied, which eased the further advance considerably.<ref name="Husain" /><ref name="Sandes">Sandes, Lt Col E.W.C., 'The Indian Sappers and Miners' pp 133-147. The Institution of Royal Engineers, Chatham, 1948.</ref>

In the absence of the traditional winter capital of Peshawar, on November 2 Shuja left the [[Bala Hissar, Kabul|Bala Hissar]] to seek refuge from the cold in Jalalabad.<ref name="king" />

On 13 November 1839, while en route to India, the Bombay column of the British Indian Army attacked, as a form of reprisal, the Baloch tribal fortress of [[Kalat, Pakistan|Kalat]],<ref>{{Cite book |last=Holdsworth |first=T W E |url=http://www.wdl.org/en/item/14410/ |title=Campaign of the Indus: In a Series of Letters from an Officer of the Bombay Division |date=1840 |publisher=Private Copy |access-date=2014-11-25|pages = 111–127}}</ref> from where [[Baloch people|Baloch]] tribes had harassed and attacked British convoys during the move towards the Bolan Pass.

[[File:Dost Mohammad Khan’s Surrender 1840.jpg|thumb|right|250px|Dost Mohammad Khan’s surrender in 1840 following his victory at Parwan Darra.]]

Dost Mohammad's surrender has been given much speculation by historians as to why he surrendered.{{sfn|Lee|2019|p=256}} A number of explanations range from Dost Mohammad's surrender, oddly even after his victory at Parwan Darra.{{sfn|Lee|2019|p=256}} According to Jonathan lee, some of these depictions include Dost Mohammad believing that the British were destined to rule between the Indus and more.{{sfn|Lee|2019|p=256}} Others claim according to Jonathan lee, that, after the defeat at Saighan, Dost Mohammad was free to surrender without loss of honour.{{sfn|Lee|2019|p=256}} Another theory being that Dost Mohammad surrendered due to the brave suicidal charge done by Captain Fraser and Dr Lord, where he could have recognized resistance as futile.{{sfn|Lee|2019|p=256}} This theory however, did not make any sense as where the 2nd Bengal horse faced many defy orders to charge with them, the British lost multiple men due to this and inevitably, the battle.{{sfn|Lee|2019|p=256}} Another theory to Dost Mohammad's surrender was his family being in custody with the British, and about to be exiled to British India.{{sfn|Lee|2019|p=256}} This theory is even less credible, however, due to the fact that the British promising to treat them honourably, as Dost was in no position regardless to change this.{{sfn|Lee|2019|p=256}} Nonetheless, whatever reason Dost Mohammad had surrendered for, it was clear he was not surrendering as a defeated man, as he had successfully defeated the British at Parwan Darra, and even forced their withdrawal from Bamiyan.{{sfn|Lee|2019|p=256}} The revolt in Kohistan also put the military favor within Dost Mohammad's reach, yet for some reason, he decided to give up resistance.{{sfn|Lee|2019|p=256}} [[Mohan Lal Kashmiri|Mohan Lal]] gives the most clear and coherent theory was to why Dost Mohammad surrendered, as according to Lal, Dost Mohammad Khan was plotted against, and in battle, a sniper planned to assassinate him.{{sfn|Lee|2019|p=256}} As further explained by Lal, this was plotted out by Kohistani Amirs, who would then blame the British for this.{{sfn|Lee|2019|p=256}} Lal's accounts and claims are supported by letters to Dost Mohammad Khan from Sultan Muhammad Khan of Nijrab, who had warned the Amir of a plot that was circulating from Maliks who were planning to betray and assassinate him.{{sfn|Lee|2019|p=256}} Abd al-Karim Alawi, who wrote a near contemporary account of the First Anglo-Afghan War, elaborates further on the details of this plot.{{sfn|Lee|2019|p=256}}{{sfn|Lee|2019|p=257}} According to Al-Karim, Sales and Burnes were in contact with the Malik of ‘Ali Hissar, who agreed to kill or capture Dost Mohammad and his two sons in exchange for a substantial payment.{{sfn|Lee|2019|p=257}} According to confidential information shared by British officers, Macnaghten and Burnes had been intercepting communications from Sultan Muhammad Khan of Nijrab, and his supporters.{{sfn|Lee|2019|p=257}} As a result, Macnaghten forged a letter from a well-wisher in Kabul, sending a letter to Dost Mohammad Khan, where it warned the Amir of a plot on his life.{{sfn|Lee|2019|p=257}} Dost Mohammad Khan, having read this letter, was convinced that there was indeed, a plot on his life, as he did not have reason to trust the Kohistanis, as decades prior, he attacked and razed the region.{{sfn|Lee|2019|p=257}} As a result, the only person he seemed to have trusted was Sultan Muhammad Khan of Nijrab.{{sfn|Lee|2019|p=257}} As a result, Dost Mohammad’s options were limited, as the Mir Wali and Murad Beg signed a treaty with Shah Shuja, no longer offering sanctuary for Dost Mohammad.{{sfn|Lee|2019|p=257}} His experience in Bukhara and how he had to escape swayed Dost Mohammad from trying to seek refuge in Balkh, as he could be imprisoned, or even killed.{{sfn|Lee|2019|p=257}} Therefore, he went to the only choice he could think of, the British.{{sfn|Lee|2019|p=257}} The British cantonment at Kabul was only a few hours ride from Parwan Darra, and he had already received assurances that he would be treated honourably in captivity and exile.{{sfn|Lee|2019|p=257}} As a result, Dost Mohammad’s “surrender” is treated by Jonathan Lee and many other historians as nothing akin to surrender, rather seeking refuge with the British government through an old tradition of grabbing the stirrup.{{sfn|Lee|2019|p=257}} An old Turco-Mongolian tradition called rikab giriftan.{{sfn|Lee|2019|p=257}} Atkinson states that Dost Mohammad was seeking the protection of the British government through this action, and as a result, a famous sketch was produced showing Macnaghten and Dost Mohammad shaking hands as a sign of friendship.{{sfn|Lee|2019|p=258}} According to Jonathan Lee, Akbar Khan had later stated that his father “Thrown himself upon the honour of the British government, in times of need”.{{sfn|Lee|2019|p=258}} Macnaghten was elated to hear the news, as according to Jonathan Lee, he stated: “The Afghans are gunpowder and the Dost is a lighted match”.{{sfn|Lee|2019|p=258}} Dost Mohammad was treated honourably, and even was housed in the Bala Hissar, with Dost Mohammad allowed to meet his family, and write to his sons that were in open resistance.{{sfn|Lee|2019|p=258}} Dost Mohammad was also allowed to ride on horse with an escort.{{sfn|Lee|2019|p=258}} During his stay in the Bala Hissar, he held a secret court, with many coming to pay their respects to the former Amir.{{sfn|Lee|2019|p=258}} This had shown Dost Mohammad's popularity, and opposite to Shah Shuja's claims, Shah Shuja was seen as unpopular by many.{{sfn|Lee|2019|p=258}} In Macnaghten's letters, it was shown that he expressed sympathy for Dost Mohammad, showing a very clear contrast to what he referred to him now compared to two years prior, where he denounced Dost Mohammad in the Simla declaration.{{sfn|Lee|2019|p=258}} Macnaghten even asked the Governor General to treat Dost Mohammad better than when they had Shah Shuja in his exile, since to his statement: “We ejected the Dost, who never offended us, in support of our policy, of which he was the victim”.{{sfn|Lee|2019|p=258}}

==Aftermath==

In 1878, the British invaded again, beginning the [[Second Anglo-Afghan War]].

In 1843, the British army [[chaplain]], G.R. Gleig, wrote a memoir of the disastrous First Anglo-Afghan War, describing it as:

The [[Afghan Church|Church of St. John the Evangelist]] located in [[Navy Nagar]], [[Mumbai]], [[India]], more commonly known as the Afghan Church, was dedicated in 1852 as a memorial to the dead of the conflict.

* Bombay Sappers & Miners – [[Bombay Engineer Group]]

* [[31st Bengal Infantry]]

* [[19th Bombay Infantry]]

* 2nd, [[3rd Bengal Light Cavalry]] – mutinied in 1857

* 2nd, 3rd Companies of [[Bengal Sappers and Miners]] – mutinied in 1857

* 16th, 35th, 37th, 48th Bengal Infantry – mutinied in 1857

==Fictional depictions==

==External links==

* [http://britishbattles.com/first-afghan-war/ghuznee.htm First Afghan War (Battle of Ghuznee)]

* [http://britishbattles.com/first-afghan-war/kabul-1842.htm First Afghan War (Battle of Kabul 1842)]