1,326
edits
m
robot: Create/upgrade articles. If there is a mistake please report on my talk page.
->Kautilya3 (→Force levels: Copyedit (minor)) |
m (robot: Create/upgrade articles. If there is a mistake please report on my talk page.) |
||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
{{short description|Pakistani military operation in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965}} | |||
{{Other uses}} | {{Other uses}} | ||
{{Use dmy dates|date=January 2022}} | |||
{{Use dmy dates|date=January | |||
{{EngvarB|date=January 2021}} | {{EngvarB|date=January 2021}} | ||
{{Infobox military conflict | {{Infobox military conflict | ||
| conflict = Operation Grand Slam | | conflict = Operation Grand Slam | ||
| place = Chamb−[[Jourian]]−[[Akhnoor]] sector, [[Jammu and Kashmir (state)|Jammu and Kashmir]]{{efn|Chamb is now located in Pakistani-administered [[ | | place = Chamb−[[Jourian]]−[[Akhnoor]] sector, [[Jammu and Kashmir (state)|Jammu and Kashmir]]{{efn|Chamb is now located in Pakistani-administered [[Pakistan-occupied Kashmir|Pakistan-occupied Kashmir]] following Pakistan's seizure of the town in the [[Battle of Chamb]] in 1971; Jourian and Akhnoor remain under Indian control.}} | ||
| partof = the [[Indo-Pakistani War of 1965]] | | partof = the [[Indo-Pakistani War of 1965]] | ||
| date = September 1965 | | date = 1 September 1965<ref>{{Cite journal|last=GILLANI|first=M. A.|date=2013|title=Tawi to Chak Kirpal September 1965 War.|url=|journal=Defence Journal|volume=17| issue = 2|pages=64|via=EBSCO}}</ref> {{small|(Start)}} | ||
| map_type = India Jammu and Kashmir | | map_type = India Jammu and Kashmir | ||
| map_relief = | | map_relief = | ||
| Line 14: | Line 14: | ||
| map_caption = Location of [[Akhnoor]] within [[Jammu and Kashmir (union territory)|Jammu and Kashmir]] {{small|(present-day borders)}} | | map_caption = Location of [[Akhnoor]] within [[Jammu and Kashmir (union territory)|Jammu and Kashmir]] {{small|(present-day borders)}} | ||
| coordinates = {{coord|32.87|N|74.73|E|display=inline,title}} | | coordinates = {{coord|32.87|N|74.73|E|display=inline,title}} | ||
| result = Pakistani | | result = Pakistani failure<ref>{{harvp|Bajwa, From Kutch to Tashkent|2013|p=159}}: "Despite its bold objectives and initial success, Grand Slam failed in both its military and its political objectives. Militarily, Grand Slam was to result in the capture of the vital town of Akhnur which was a clear and stated objective of the operation, the only question mark being what troops of the 12 Division would do next...Politically, too, Grand Slam failed in its primary objective; the application of military force inside ICK had failed to convince either the Indian government or the international community that it was time for India to accept arbitration or a plebiscite in Kashmir to resolve the issue once and for all.'"</ref> | ||
| combatant1 = {{flag|Pakistan}} | | combatant1 = {{flag|Pakistan}} | ||
| combatant2 = {{flag|India}} | | combatant2 = {{flag|India}} | ||
| Line 37: | Line 37: | ||
{{Campaignbox Indo-Pakistani War of 1965}} | {{Campaignbox Indo-Pakistani War of 1965}} | ||
'''Operation Grand Slam''' was a key military operation of the [[Indo-Pakistani War of 1965]]. It refers to a plan drawn up by the [[Pakistan Army]] in May 1965 that consisted of an attack on the vital [[Akhnoor|Akhnoor Bridge]] in Indian [[Jammu and Kashmir (state)|Jammu and Kashmir]]. The bridge was not only the lifeline of an entire [[infantry]] division of the [[Indian Army]], but could also be used to threaten the city of [[Jammu]], an important logistical point for Indian forces. The operation ended in a failure for the Pakistan Army as the stated military objectives were not achieved, and Pakistani forces were subsequently forced to retreat following a counterattack by the Indian Army whereby a new [[Theater (warfare)|front]] was opened in the Pakistani province of [[Punjab, Pakistan|Punjab]]. | '''Operation Grand Slam''' was a key military operation of the [[Indo-Pakistani War of 1965]]. It refers to a plan drawn up by the [[Pakistan Army]] in May 1965 that consisted of an attack on the vital [[Akhnoor|Akhnoor Bridge]] in Indian-administered [[Jammu and Kashmir (state)|Jammu and Kashmir]]. The bridge was not only the lifeline of an entire [[infantry]] division of the [[Indian Army]], but could also be used to threaten the city of [[Jammu]], an important logistical point for Indian forces. The operation ended in a failure for the Pakistan Army as the stated military objectives were not achieved, and Pakistani forces were subsequently forced to retreat following a counterattack by the Indian Army whereby a new [[Theater (warfare)|front]] was opened in the Pakistani province of [[Punjab, Pakistan|Punjab]]. | ||
==Planning== | ==Planning== | ||
| Line 73: | Line 73: | ||
| label-color2 = hard red | | label-color2 = hard red | ||
| label-pos2 = top | | label-pos2 = top | ||
| mark-title2 = [[Chamb, | | mark-title2 = [[Chamb, Pakistan-occupied Kashmir]] | ||
| mark-description2 = Chhamb | | mark-description2 = Chhamb | ||
<!-- Pallanwala --> | <!-- Pallanwala --> | ||
| Line 162: | Line 162: | ||
The Operation Grand Slam was designed as a twin of the [[Operation Gibraltar]], both of which were meant to jeopardise India's control of Kashmir and bring it to the negotiating table without risking a general war across the international border.{{sfnp|Nawaz, Crossed Swords|2008|p=207}}<ref> | The Operation Grand Slam was designed as a twin of the [[Operation Gibraltar]], both of which were meant to jeopardise India's control of Kashmir and bring it to the negotiating table without risking a general war across the international border.{{sfnp|Nawaz, Crossed Swords|2008|p=207}}<ref> | ||
{{harvp|Roy & Gates, Unconventional Warfare in South Asia| | {{harvp|Roy & Gates, Unconventional Warfare in South Asia|2022}}: "By late 1964, Pakistan had developed two interrelated plans known as Operation GIBRALTAR and Operation GRANDSLAM to 'liberate' Kashmir." | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
The idea for Grand Slam came from President [[Ayub Khan]]. When he reviewed the plans for Gibraltar in May 1965, he pointed to [[Akhnur]] on the map and called it a "jugular" for India. By seizing Akhnur, India's overland supply route to Kashmir would be cut off.{{sfnp|Sirrs, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate|2016|p=52}} | The idea for Grand Slam came from President [[Ayub Khan]]. When he reviewed the plans for Gibraltar in May 1965, he pointed to [[Akhnur]] on the map and called it a "jugular" for India. By seizing Akhnur, India's overland supply route to Kashmir would be cut off.{{sfnp|Sirrs, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate|2016|p=52}} | ||
| Line 196: | Line 196: | ||
Even though Akhnur was not the "jugular" that President Ayub Khan imagined, it was still a key choke point. It had the only bridge across the [[Chenab River]] in this area, on which ran the supply route to the western districts of [[Rajouri district|Rajouri]] and [[Poonch district, India|Poonch]]. The bridge was capable of carrying only light tanks. It had not been strengthened over the years, despite warnings from various local commanders.{{efn|Brigadier Joginder Singh states that the commander of the 26 Division had assessed that the Akhnur bridge would be a target in a Pakistani operation and recommended strengthening it. He was reportedly asked to "proceed on pension".<ref>Agha Humayun Amin, [http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/aug/bookreview.htm Behind The Scenes] (Review), ''Defence Journal'', 2000.</ref>}} In addition, the cease-fire line was defended only lightly, as per the UN-mediated cease-fire agreement at the end of the [[First Kashmir War]]. It would be quickly overrun in the event of a full scale invasion.<ref>{{citation |last=Pradhan |first=R. D. |title=1965 War, the Inside Story: Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan's Diary of India-Pakistan War |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ymYCJQjEGBUC&pg=PA12 |year=2007 |publisher=Atlantic Publishers & Dist |isbn=978-81-269-0762-5 |page=12}}</ref> | Even though Akhnur was not the "jugular" that President Ayub Khan imagined, it was still a key choke point. It had the only bridge across the [[Chenab River]] in this area, on which ran the supply route to the western districts of [[Rajouri district|Rajouri]] and [[Poonch district, India|Poonch]]. The bridge was capable of carrying only light tanks. It had not been strengthened over the years, despite warnings from various local commanders.{{efn|Brigadier Joginder Singh states that the commander of the 26 Division had assessed that the Akhnur bridge would be a target in a Pakistani operation and recommended strengthening it. He was reportedly asked to "proceed on pension".<ref>Agha Humayun Amin, [http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/aug/bookreview.htm Behind The Scenes] (Review), ''Defence Journal'', 2000.</ref>}} In addition, the cease-fire line was defended only lightly, as per the UN-mediated cease-fire agreement at the end of the [[First Kashmir War]]. It would be quickly overrun in the event of a full scale invasion.<ref>{{citation |last=Pradhan |first=R. D. |title=1965 War, the Inside Story: Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan's Diary of India-Pakistan War |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ymYCJQjEGBUC&pg=PA12 |year=2007 |publisher=Atlantic Publishers & Dist |isbn=978-81-269-0762-5 |page=12}}</ref> | ||
At the time of the opening attack of Operation Grand Slam, the Chhamb Jaurian sector was defended on the Indian side by the [[191 Infantry Brigade (India)|191st (Independent) Infantry Brigade]], comprising three battalions, and supported by a squadron of [[20th Lancers (India)|20 Lancers]] , which was equipped with [[AMX-13]] light tanks.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://indianarmy.nic.in/writereaddata/documents/Articles1965/Ltgensatishnambiar230915.pdf |author=Lt Gen Satish Nambiar (retd)| title=Operations in the Chhamb and Sialkot Sectors |work=IndiaStrategic (September 2015 issue)|pages=54–56|date=23 September | At the time of the opening attack of Operation Grand Slam, the Chhamb Jaurian sector was defended on the Indian side by the [[191 Infantry Brigade (India)|191st (Independent) Infantry Brigade]], comprising three battalions, and supported by a squadron of [[20th Lancers (India)|20 Lancers]] , which was equipped with [[AMX-13]] light tanks.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://indianarmy.nic.in/writereaddata/documents/Articles1965/Ltgensatishnambiar230915.pdf |author=Lt Gen Satish Nambiar (retd)| title=Operations in the Chhamb and Sialkot Sectors |work=IndiaStrategic (September 2015 issue)|pages=54–56|date=23 September 2022}}</ref> | ||
=== Decision to launch === | === Decision to launch === | ||
[[File:Muhammad Ayub Khan.JPG|thumb|right|200px|Pakistani President [[Ayub Khan]], said to have had "loss of nerve and second thoughts" on ordering the Operation Grand Slam{{sfnp|Bajwa, From Kutch to Tashkent|2013|p=130}}]] | [[File:Muhammad Ayub Khan.JPG|thumb|right|200px|Pakistani President [[Ayub Khan]], said to have had "loss of nerve and second thoughts" on ordering the Operation Grand Slam{{sfnp|Bajwa, From Kutch to Tashkent|2013|p=130}}]] | ||
The Operation Gibraltar went badly. The plan was to infiltrate thousands of troops into Indian-administered Kashmir in the guise of 'mujahideen', who would carry out sabotage to demoralise the Indian forces and incite the local population to revolt. But the local population did not rise, the infiltrators were quickly identified and the Indian Army began to hunt them down.{{sfn|Jamal, Shadow War|2009|p=83}} In addition, the Indian Army moved across the cease-fire line to cut off the Pakistani infiltration routes and captured the [[Haji Pir pass]] (in [[Poonch Division|Pakistan-administered Poonch]]) some heights in the [[Kargil district|Kargil sector]].<ref> | The Operation Gibraltar went badly. The plan was to infiltrate thousands of troops into Indian-administered Kashmir in the guise of 'mujahideen', who would carry out sabotage to demoralise the Indian forces and incite the local population to revolt. But the local population did not rise, the infiltrators were quickly identified and the Indian Army began to hunt them down.{{sfn|Jamal, Shadow War|2009|p=83}} In addition, the Indian Army moved across the cease-fire line to cut off the Pakistani infiltration routes and captured the [[Haji Pir pass]] (in [[Poonch Division|Pakistan-administered Poonch]]) and some heights in the [[Kargil district|Kargil sector]].<ref> | ||
Haidar Imtiaz, [https://nation.com.pk/12-Sep-2015/1965-how-pakistan-won-the-war-of-propaganda 1965: How Pakistan won the war of propaganda], The Nation, 12 September 2015. | Haidar Imtiaz, [https://nation.com.pk/12-Sep-2015/1965-how-pakistan-won-the-war-of-propaganda 1965: How Pakistan won the war of propaganda], The Nation, 12 September 2015. | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
On 24 August, General Akhtar Malik started pressing the Army Headquarters for permission to launch the Operation Grand Slam. In his view, unless it was launched, it was only a matter of time before all the Gibraltar forces in Indian-administered Kashmir would be captured or killed, and nothing would have been achieved from the whole operation.{{sfnp|Bajwa, From Kutch to Tashkent|2013|p=130}} The Army referred the issue to the President, but Ayub Khan withheld | On 24 August, General Akhtar Malik started pressing the Army Headquarters for permission to launch the Operation Grand Slam. In his view, unless it was launched, it was only a matter of time before all the Gibraltar forces in Indian-administered Kashmir would be captured or killed, and nothing would have been achieved from the whole operation.{{sfnp|Bajwa, From Kutch to Tashkent|2013|p=130}} The Army referred the issue to the President, but Ayub Khan withheld approval. He went away to [[Swat (princely state)|Swat]] to reflect on options. On 28 August, after the fall of the Haji Pir Pass, Malik briefed the Army chief. It was believed that India would take more territory unless something was done. The Army chief approached the foreign minister [[Zulfikar Ali Bhutto]] (later prime minister) to obtain the President's approval. Bhutto is cited by the Army officers as having been the main driving force behind the entire military operation, and he was also said to be close enough to Ayub Khan to obtain his approval.{{sfnp|Bajwa, From Kutch to Tashkent|2013|p=130–132}} | ||
Bhutto returned from Swat the next day with the President's order to | Bhutto returned from Swat the next day with the President's order to | ||
{{ | {{blockquote|''take such action that will defreeze the Kashmir problem, weaken Indian resolve, and bring her to the conference table without provoking a general war''.}} | ||
Ayub Khan also ordered the army to be prepared for Indian retaliation. He also warned the army that it would be a long struggle.{{sfnp|Bajwa, From Kutch to Tashkent|2013|p=132}} | Ayub Khan also ordered the army to be prepared for Indian retaliation. He also warned the army that it would be a long struggle.{{sfnp|Bajwa, From Kutch to Tashkent|2013|p=132}} | ||
General Malik seemingly had his permission for the operation. But perhaps he didn't, because he knew fully well that he was provoking a general war contrary to the President's directive.<ref> | General Malik seemingly had his permission for the operation. But perhaps he didn't, because he knew fully well that he was provoking a general war contrary to the President's directive.<ref> | ||
{{harvp|Bajwa, From Kutch to Tashkent|2013|p=133}}: "Whatever Ayub's hope of a short war and Bhutto's hope of India confining the war to Kashmir, there was little doubt in the minds of 12 Division and its commander [General Malik] that the launch of Grand Slam would lead to general war with India. | {{harvp|Bajwa, From Kutch to Tashkent|2013|p=133}}: "Whatever Ayub's hope of a short war and Bhutto's hope of India confining the war to Kashmir, there was little doubt in the minds of 12 Division and its commander [General Malik] that the launch of Grand Slam would lead to general war with India. In a briefing to his senior officers before its launch, Malik was told by an obviously startled brigadier that 'This would mean war with India'. Malik replied sarcastically, 'You've been paid long enough to make a war.'" | ||
</ref>{{efn|The rest of the Army top brass would also seem to have ignored other aspects of the President's order because absolutely no preparations were made for facing Indian retaliation. Nor were supplies stockpiled for a long war. "General Ayub was told on the second day of the war by the Army Chief, General Musa Khan, that the Army had even run out of ammunition."<ref>{{citation |last=Hiranandani |first=Vice Admiral GM |title=Transition to Guardianship: The Indian Navy 1991–2000 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=w2snz5Cfb0gC&pg=RA1-PA1963-IA2 |publisher=Lancer Publishers LLC |year=2013 |ISBN=978-1-935501-66-4}}</ref>}} | </ref>{{efn|The rest of the Army top brass would also seem to have ignored other aspects of the President's order because absolutely no preparations were made for facing Indian retaliation. Nor were supplies stockpiled for a long war. "General Ayub was told on the second day of the war by the Army Chief, General Musa Khan, that the Army had even run out of ammunition."<ref>{{citation |last=Hiranandani |first=Vice Admiral GM |title=Transition to Guardianship: The Indian Navy 1991–2000 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=w2snz5Cfb0gC&pg=RA1-PA1963-IA2 |publisher=Lancer Publishers LLC |year=2013 |ISBN=978-1-935501-66-4}}</ref>}} | ||
| Line 218: | Line 218: | ||
The Pakistani Army commenced Operation Grand Slam at 0500 hours on 1 September 1965. | The Pakistani Army commenced Operation Grand Slam at 0500 hours on 1 September 1965. | ||
The [[Akhnoor]] sector was lightly defended by four Indian infantry battalions and a squadron of tanks. The infantry was stretched thin along the border and the [[AMX-13]] tanks were no match for the Pakistani [[M47 Patton]] and [[M48 Patton]] tanks. Against a militarily stronger and larger Pakistani thrust, the Indian forces retreated from their defensive positions. According to Pakistani military historian Major (retd.) A. H. Amin, the Pakistani forces in Operation Grand Slam had a 6 to 1 advantage over Indian AMX-13 tanks, which were like 'matchboxes' in front of the Pakistani Pattons. In terms of artillery, Pakistan's 8 inch guns were superior to anything that Indians had at that time and had an overall superiority of 6 to 1.<ref name="A H Amin">{{cite web |last=Amin |first=Major A. H. |title=Pakistan army till 1965 |url=https://www.scribd.com/doc/21693873/Indo-Pak-Wars-1947-71-A-STRATEGIC-AND-OPERATIONAL-ANALYSIS-BY-A-H-AMIN-THIS-BOOK-CAN-BE-PRINTED-FROM-THIS-SITE |work=defence analyst |publisher=pg 41 |access-date=27 September 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120104091720/https://www.scribd.com/doc/21693873/Indo-Pak-Wars-1947-71-A-STRATEGIC-AND-OPERATIONAL-ANALYSIS-BY-A-H-AMIN-THIS-BOOK-CAN-BE-PRINTED-FROM-THIS-SITE |archive-date=4 January | The [[Akhnoor]] sector was lightly defended by four Indian infantry battalions and a squadron of tanks. The infantry was stretched thin along the border and the [[AMX-13]] tanks were no match for the Pakistani [[M47 Patton]] and [[M48 Patton]] tanks. Against a militarily stronger and larger Pakistani thrust, the Indian forces retreated from their defensive positions. According to Pakistani military historian Major (retd.) A. H. Amin, the Pakistani forces in Operation Grand Slam had a 6 to 1 advantage over Indian AMX-13 tanks, which were like 'matchboxes' in front of the Pakistani Pattons. In terms of artillery, Pakistan's 8 inch guns were superior to anything that Indians had at that time and had an overall superiority of 6 to 1.<ref name="A H Amin">{{cite web |last=Amin |first=Major A. H. |title=Pakistan army till 1965 |url=https://www.scribd.com/doc/21693873/Indo-Pak-Wars-1947-71-A-STRATEGIC-AND-OPERATIONAL-ANALYSIS-BY-A-H-AMIN-THIS-BOOK-CAN-BE-PRINTED-FROM-THIS-SITE |work=defence analyst |publisher=pg 41 |access-date=27 September 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120104091720/https://www.scribd.com/doc/21693873/Indo-Pak-Wars-1947-71-A-STRATEGIC-AND-OPERATIONAL-ANALYSIS-BY-A-H-AMIN-THIS-BOOK-CAN-BE-PRINTED-FROM-THIS-SITE |archive-date=4 January 2022}}</ref> | ||
On the second day of the attack, the GOC of the [[12th Infantry Division (Pakistan)|12th Infantry Division]] Major General [[Akhtar Hussain Malik]], commanding the overall forces in the area, was replaced by Major General [[Yahya Khan]], the GOC of the [[7th Infantry Division (Pakistan)|7th Infantry Division]], which delayed the attack by one day. Not only did this decision cause confusion among the Pakistani officer cadre, the delay also permitted the Indians to rush reinforcements to the sector. When the attack recommenced on 3 September, the Indian forces in the sector were sufficiently reinforced to hold out for a few more days, but they did not have the strength to launch a counterattack. As the attack carried on for two more days without any significant gains in territory, the Indian Army opened up a new front, on 6 September, across the sensitive state of [[Punjab, Pakistan|Punjab]] in Pakistan. The advance of the Indian Army also threatened to cut across the right flank of the Pakistani attack. Realising the gravity of the threat, the [[Pakistan Army|Pakistani Army]] stopped its thrust into [[Jammu and Kashmir (state)|Kashmir]] and diverted forces to counter the Indian incursion. | On the second day of the attack, the GOC of the [[12th Infantry Division (Pakistan)|12th Infantry Division]] Major General [[Akhtar Hussain Malik]], commanding the overall forces in the area, was replaced by Major General [[Yahya Khan]], the GOC of the [[7th Infantry Division (Pakistan)|7th Infantry Division]], which delayed the attack by one day. Not only did this decision cause confusion among the Pakistani officer cadre, the delay also permitted the Indians to rush reinforcements to the sector. When the attack recommenced on 3 September, the Indian forces in the sector were sufficiently reinforced to hold out for a few more days, but they did not have the strength to launch a counterattack. As the attack carried on for two more days without any significant gains in territory, the Indian Army opened up a new front, on 6 September, across the sensitive state of [[Punjab, Pakistan|Punjab]] in Pakistan. The advance of the Indian Army also threatened to cut across the right flank of the Pakistani attack. Realising the gravity of the threat, the [[Pakistan Army|Pakistani Army]] stopped its thrust into [[Jammu and Kashmir (state)|Kashmir]] and diverted forces to counter the Indian incursion. | ||
| Line 229: | Line 229: | ||
==Bibliography== | ==Bibliography== | ||
* {{citation |last=Abbas |first=Hassan |title=Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=FHKsBwAAQBAJ&pg=PA44 |year=2015 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-317-46328-3 |ref={{sfnref |Abbas, Pakistan's Drift into Extremism | | * {{citation |last=Abbas |first=Hassan |title=Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=FHKsBwAAQBAJ&pg=PA44 |year=2015 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-317-46328-3 |ref={{sfnref |Abbas, Pakistan's Drift into Extremism |2022}}}} | ||
* {{citation |last=Bajwa |first=Farooq |title=From Kutch to Tashkent: The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5a0NAQAAQBAJ |date=2013 |publisher=C. Hurst & Co |location=London |ISBN=978-1-84904-230-7 |ref={{sfnref|Bajwa, From Kutch to Tashkent| | * {{citation |last=Bajwa |first=Farooq |title=From Kutch to Tashkent: The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5a0NAQAAQBAJ |date=2013 |publisher=C. Hurst & Co |location=London |ISBN=978-1-84904-230-7 |ref={{sfnref|Bajwa, From Kutch to Tashkent|2022}}}} | ||
* {{citation |last=Jamal |first=Arif |title=Shadow War: The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=TNO5MAAACAAJ |year=2009 |publisher=Melville House |ISBN=978-1-933633-59-6 |ref={{sfnref|Jamal, Shadow War| | * {{citation |last=Jamal |first=Arif |title=Shadow War: The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=TNO5MAAACAAJ |year=2009 |publisher=Melville House |ISBN=978-1-933633-59-6 |ref={{sfnref|Jamal, Shadow War|2022}}}} | ||
* {{citation |last=Nawaz |first=Shuja |title=Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jKyfAAAAMAAJ |year=2008 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-547660-6 |ref={{sfnref |Nawaz, Crossed Swords | | * {{citation |last=Nawaz |first=Shuja |title=Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jKyfAAAAMAAJ |year=2008 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-547660-6 |ref={{sfnref |Nawaz, Crossed Swords |2022}}}} | ||
* {{citation |last1=Roy |first1=Kaushik |last2=Gates |first2=Scott |title=Unconventional Warfare in South Asia: Shadow Warriors and Counterinsurgency |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=PdrcAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA89 |date=2014 |publisher=Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. |ISBN=978-1-4724-0579-1 |ref={{sfnref|Roy & Gates, Unconventional Warfare in South Asia| | * {{citation |last1=Roy |first1=Kaushik |last2=Gates |first2=Scott |title=Unconventional Warfare in South Asia: Shadow Warriors and Counterinsurgency |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=PdrcAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA89 |date=2014 |publisher=Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. |ISBN=978-1-4724-0579-1 |ref={{sfnref|Roy & Gates, Unconventional Warfare in South Asia|2022}}}} | ||
* {{citation |last=Sirrs |first=Owen L. |title=Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: Covert Action and Internal Operations |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_S-TDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA17 |date=2016 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-317-19609-9 |ref={{sfnref |Sirrs, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate | | * {{citation |last=Sirrs |first=Owen L. |title=Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: Covert Action and Internal Operations |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_S-TDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA17 |date=2016 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-317-19609-9 |ref={{sfnref |Sirrs, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate |2022}}}} | ||
* {{citation |last=Van Praagh |first=David |title=The Greater Game: India's Race with Destiny and China |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=kCI4492cHTEC |year=2003 |publisher=McGill-Queen's Press - MQUP |isbn=978-0-7735-2639-6 |ref={{sfnref|Van Praagh, The Greater Game| | * {{citation |last=Van Praagh |first=David |title=The Greater Game: India's Race with Destiny and China |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=kCI4492cHTEC |year=2003 |publisher=McGill-Queen's Press - MQUP |isbn=978-0-7735-2639-6 |ref={{sfnref|Van Praagh, The Greater Game|2022}}}} | ||
==External links== | ==External links== | ||
| Line 247: | Line 247: | ||
[[Category:Indo-Pakistani War of 1965]] | [[Category:Indo-Pakistani War of 1965]] | ||
[[Category:Military operations involving Pakistan]] | [[Category:Military operations involving Pakistan|Grand Slam]] | ||
[[Category:September 1965 events in Asia]] | [[Category:September 1965 events in Asia]] | ||