Operation Gibraltar: Difference between revisions

| strength1        = 100,000–200,000

| strength2        = 5,000–30,000<ref>{{Cite web|last=Vij|first=Shivam|date=2015-08-27|title=Why neither India nor Pakistan won the 1965 war {{!}} DW {{!}} 27.08.2015|url=https://www.dw.com/en/why-neither-india-nor-pakistan-won-the-1965-war/a-18677930|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200709165529/https://www.dw.com/en/why-neither-india-nor-pakistan-won-the-1965-war/a-18677930|archive-date=2020-07-09|access-date=2020-10-31|website=DW.COM|language=en-GB}}</ref>

| casualties1      = Unknown

| casualties2      = Unknown

'''Operation Gibraltar''' was the codename of a [[military operation]] planned and executed by the [[Pakistan Army]] in the [[India]]n-administered state of [[Jammu and Kashmir (state)|Jammu and Kashmir]] in August 1965. The operation's strategy was to covertly cross the [[Line of Control|Line of Control (LoC)]] and instigate the [[Muslims|Muslim]]-majority [[Kashmiris|Kashmiri]] population into an [[Intifada|uprising]] against [[Government of India|Indian rule]].<ref>{{Cite web|last=Faruqui|first=Ahmad|date=2018-08-06|title=Why did Operation Gibraltar fail?|url=https://dailytimes.com.pk/278669/why-did-operation-gibraltar-fail/|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200705204428/https://dailytimes.com.pk/278669/why-did-operation-gibraltar-fail/|archive-date=2020-07-05|access-date=2020-10-31|website=Daily Times|language=en-US}}</ref> The [[Pakistan Armed Forces|military leadership]] believed that a rebellion (sparked by Operation Gibraltar) by the local Kashmiri population against Indian authorities would serve as [[Pakistan]]'s ''[[casus belli]]'' against India on the [[United Nations|international stage]].<ref>{{Cite web|last=M. Hali|first=Sultan|date=2012-03-21|title=Operation Gibraltar—An Unmitigated Disaster?|url=https://criterion-quarterly.com/operation-gibraltar-an-unmitigated-disaster/|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201031070144/https://criterion-quarterly.com/operation-gibraltar-an-unmitigated-disaster/|archive-date=2020-10-31|access-date=2020-10-31|website=Criterion Quarterly|language=en-US}}</ref>

In August 1965, Pakistani troops from the [[Azad Kashmir Regular Force]],<ref name="Kashmir-The Troubled Frontiers">{{cite news |work= Kashmir-The Troubled Frontiers  |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=lf2jAQAAQBAJ&q=Azad+Kashmir+Regular+Force&pg=PT247 |title=Azad Kashmir Regular Forces |first=Maj Gen Afsir|last=Karim |date=4 April 1981|isbn = 9781935501763}}</ref><ref name="Kashmir-The Untold Story">{{cite news |work= Kashmir-The Untold Story|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0cPjAAAAQBAJ&q=Azad+Kashmir+Regular+Force&pg=PT40 |title=Azad Kashmir Regular Force |first=Christopher|last=Snedden |date=2 January 2012|isbn = 9789350298985}}</ref> disguised as locals, entered Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir from Pakistani-administered [[Azad Kashmir|Azad Jammu and Kashmir]] with the goal of fomenting an insurgency amongst the Muslim-majority population in the [[Kashmir Valley]]. However, the strategy went awry from the outset due to poor coordination, and the infiltrators' presence was soon disclosed to the [[Indian Armed Forces|Indian military]].

Following the operation's failure and discovery of the Pakistani infiltration, India launched a full-scale military attack on [[West Pakistan]], invading [[Punjab, Pakistan|Pakistani Punjab]] and clashing with Pakistani forces, sparking the [[Indo-Pakistani War of 1965]],<ref>Also known as the '''Second Kashmir War'''.</ref> which was the first major engagement between the two neighbouring states since the [[Indo-Pakistani War of 1947–1948]].<ref>Also known as the '''First Kashmir War'''.</ref>

Following the [[First Kashmir War]] (1947–1948), which saw India maintaining its hold over two-thirds of Kashmir, Pakistan sought an opportunity to win the remaining Kashmir areas. The opening came after the [[Sino-Indian War]] in 1962 after India's war with the [[People's Republic of China|China]] and as a result the [[Indian Military]] was undergoing massive changes both in personnel and equipment. During this period, despite being numerically smaller than the Indian Military, Pakistan's armed forces had a qualitative edge in air power and armour over India,<ref name="Dennis">"India and the United States estranged democracies", 1941–1991, {{ISBN|1-4289-8189-6}}, DIANE Publishing, pp 235, 238</ref> which Pakistan sought to utilise before India completed its defence build-up. The [[Rann of Kutch]] episode in the summer of 1965, where Indian and Pakistani forces clashed, resulted in some positives for Pakistan. Moreover, in December 1963, the disappearance of a holy relic<ref>It is believed to be the hair of [[Prophets in Islam|Islamic prophet]] [[Muhammad]], the founder of Islam</ref> from the Hazratbal shrine in Srinagar, created turmoil and intense Islamic feeling among Muslims in the valley, which was viewed by Pakistan as ideal for revolt.<ref>Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War By Victoria Schofield Published by I.B.Tauris, pp 108, {{ISBN|1-86064-898-3}}, 2003</ref> These factors bolstered the Pakistani command's thinking: that the use of covert methods followed by the threat of an all out war would force a resolution in Kashmir.<ref>[http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/globalization/kashmir.pdf The Jammu and Kashmir conflict Overview] by Meredith Weiss 25 June 2002 – Hosted on [[Yale University]]</ref><ref>[http://www.stanford.edu/group/sjir/3.1.06_kapur-narang.html The Fate of Kashmir International Law or Lawlessness? By Vikas Kapur and Vipin Narang] Stanford Journal of International Relations, [[Stanford University]]</ref><ref>[http://story.malaysiasun.com/index.php/ct/9/cid/303b19022816233b/id/284377/cs/1/ Pak Radio's claim of India starting 1965 war falls flat] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120207004747/http://story.malaysiasun.com/index.php/ct/9/cid/303b19022816233b/id/284377/cs/1/ |date=7 February 2012 }}

{| class="infobox" border="1" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0"

| '''Name of Force''' || '''Area of operation'''

|-----

| color="#cc99cc" |  [[Saladin|Salahudin]] || Srinagar Valley

|-----

| color="#cc99cc" |  [[Mahmud of Ghazni|Ghaznavi]] ||  Mendhar-Rajauri  

|-----

| color="#cccccb" |  [[Tariq]] ||  [[Kargil town|Kargil]] – [[Dras]]s  

|-----

| color="#cccccc" |  [[Babur]] ||  Nowshera-Sundarbani  

|-----

| color="#cccccc" |  [[Muhammad bin Qasim|Qasim]] ||  Bandipura-Sonarwain  

|-----

| color="#cccccc" |  [[Khalid ibn al-Walid|Khalid]] ||  Qazinag-Naugam  

|-----

| color="#cccccc" |  Nusrat ||  Tithwal-Tangdhar  

|-----

| color="#cccccc" |  [[Sikandar-e-Azam|Sikandar]]

| Gurais  

|-----

| color="#cccccc" |  [[Jalal-ud-din Khalji|Khilji]] ||  Kel-Minimarg  

Despite initial reservations by the [[President of Pakistan]] [[Ayub Khan (Field Marshal)|Ayub Khan]], the operation was set in motion. In the first week of August 1965, (some sources put it at 24 July)<ref name="Pervaiz">{{cite book | author=Pervaiz Iqbal | title=The Armed Forces of Pakistan | publisher=Allen & Unwin | year=2004 | isbn=1-86508-119-1}}</ref> Pakistani troops who were members of [[Azad Kashmir Regular Force]] (Now [[Azad Kashmir Regiment]]) began to cross the [[Line of Control|Cease Fire Line]]  dividing Indian- and Pakistani-held Kashmir across the [[Pir Panjal]] Range into [[Gulmarg]], [[Uri, Jammu and Kashmir|Uri]] and [[Baramulla]]. Several columns were to occupy key heights around the Kashmir valley and encourage a general revolt, which would be followed by direct combat by Pakistani troops. According to Indian sources as many as 30,000<ref name="kvkr"/><ref name ="Rediff">{{cite web | last = Karim| first = Major General Afsir (retd)| title = The 1965 War: Lessons yet to be learnt| work = The Rediff Special| publisher = Rediff.com India Ltd| date = 19 September 2005| url = http://in.rediff.com/news/2005/sep/19war.htm| access-date = 2007-07-08}}</ref> – 40,000 men had crossed the line, while Pakistani sources put it at 5,000 -7,000 only.<ref>[http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/sept/grand-slam.htm Grand Slam — A Battle of Lost Opportunities] by Major (Retd.) Agha Humayun Amin, Defence Journal (Pakistan), September 2000</ref> These troops known as the "Gibraltar Force"<ref name="kvkr">{{cite book|last=Rao|first=K. V. Krishna|title=Prepare or perish: a study of national security|year=1991|publisher=Lancer Publishers|isbn=978-81-7212-001-6|pages=123|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=G7xPaJomYsEC&q=Operation%20Gibraltar%20Casualties&pg=PA123}}</ref> were organized and commanded by Major General [[Akhtar Hussain Malik]], GoC 12 Division <ref name="Mustasad"/><ref name="Sukhwant"/> The troops were divided into 10 forces (5 companies each).<ref name="kvkr"/> The 10 forces were given different code names, mostly after historically significant [[Muslim]] rulers.<ref name ="Rediff" /> The operation's name, [[Gibraltar]], itself was chosen for the [[Islam]]ic connotations.<ref>{{cite web | last = Sehgal| first = Ikram | title = GIBRALTAR-2| work = Defence Journal (reproduced from The Nation newspaper)| publisher = Dynavis (Pvt) Ltd| url = http://www.defencejournal.com/jul99/gibraltor-2.htm| access-date = 2007-07-08}}</ref> The 8th century [[Umayyad conquest of Hispania]] was launched from Gibraltar, a situation not unlike that Pakistan envisaged for Indian Kashmir, i.e. conquest of Kashmir from Operation Gibraltar. The areas chosen were mainly on the de facto Cease Fire line as well as in the populous Kashmir Valley.

The plan was multi-pronged. Infiltrators would mingle with the local populace and incite them to rebellion. Meanwhile, [[guerrilla warfare]] would commence, destroying [[bridge]]s, tunnels and highways, harassing enemy [[Telecommunication|communication]]s, logistic installations and headquarters as well as attacking airfields,<ref>My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir (7th Edition), pp 409</ref> with a view to create the conditions of an "armed insurrection" in Kashmir — leading to a national uprising against Indian rule. It was assumed that India would neither counter-attack,<ref>{{cite web | last = Faruqui| first = Ahmad| title = Remembering 6th of September 1965| work = Pakistan Link| url = http://www.pakistanlink.com/Opinion/2004/Sept04/17/05.html| access-date = 2007-07-08 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20070930165129/http://www.pakistanlink.com/Opinion/2004/Sept04/17/05.html <!-- Bot retrieved archive --> |archive-date = 2007-09-30}}</ref> nor involve itself in another full-scale war, and the capture of Kashmir would rapidly follow. Out of the 9 Infiltrating Forces, only [[Ghaznavi Force]] under command Maj [[Malik Munawar Khan Awan]] managed to achieve its objective in Mehndar-Rajouri area.<ref name="Dawn">{{cite news |work= Dawn  |url=http://www.dawn.com/news/1203708 |title=Gibraltar, Grand Slam and war |first=Cyril|last=Almeida |date=30 August 2015}}</ref><ref name="Aryasamaj">{{cite news |work= Aryasamaj  |url=http://www.aryasamaj.org/newsite/node/3007 |title=Operation Gibraltar |first=Brigadier Chitranjan|last=Sawant, VSM |date=20 July 2015}}</ref><ref name="From Kutch to Tashkent:The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965">{{cite news |work=From Kutch to Tashkent:The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965  |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5a0NAQAAQBAJ&q=Ghaznavi+Force+operation+gibraltar&pg=PA117 |title= OPERATION GIBRALTAR |first=Farooq|last=Bajwa |date=12 March 2010|isbn = 9781849042307}}</ref><ref name="Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis">{{cite news |work=Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=DcKGAwAAQBAJ&q=Budhil+Jammu+Kashmir+Gibraltar&pg=PA92 |title= Low Intensity Operations in India |first=Vivek|last=Chadha |date=1 April 2012|isbn = 9788132102014}}</ref>

The '''Ghaznavi Force''' (Urdu:غزنوی فورس), named after famous Muslim invader [[Mahmud of Ghazni]], was an auxiliary Special Operations unit formed by the [[Pakistan Army]] as part of Operation Gibraltar in 1965 to infiltrate [[Jammu and Kashmir (state)|Jammu and Kashmir]] in the hopes of provoking a local revolt against the Indian regime there. It had a strength of approximately 200 and was composed of regular soldiers of the [[Azad Kashmir Regular Force]] and commandos from the Pakistani [[Special Service Group]]. Its commander was decorated officer Major [[Malik Munawar Khan Awan]] SJ.<ref name="Bajwa2013">{{cite book|author=Farooq Bajwa|title=From Kutch to Tashkent: The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5a0NAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA117|date=30 September 2013|publisher=Hurst Publishers|isbn=978-1-84904-230-7|pages=117–}}</ref>

The Ghaznavi Force was one of 10 units, each named after a historic Muslim leader, to be assembled for the operation by the Pakistan Army. It infiltrated [[Jammu and Kashmir (state)|Jammu and Kashmir]] in July 1965 to operate in the Poonch-Rajuri area. It was resupplied with ammunition dropped from [[Pakistan Air Force]] planes.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.rediff.com/news/special/war/20050919.htm|title=The 1965 War: Lessons yet to be learnt}}</ref>

While the covert infiltration was a complete failure that ultimately led to the [[Indo-Pakistani War of 1965]], military analysts have differed on whether the plan itself was flawed. Some have held that the plan was well-conceived but was let down by poor execution{{Citation needed|date=March 2017}}, but almost all Pakistani and neutral analysts have maintained that the entire operation was "a clumsy attempt"<ref>South Asia in World Politics By Devin T. Hagerty, 2005 Rowman & Littlefield, {{ISBN|0-7425-2587-2}}, p 26</ref> and doomed to collapse. The Pakistani Army's failures started with the supposition that a generally discontented Kashmiri people, given the opportunity provided by the Pakistani advance, would revolt against their Indian rulers, bringing about a swift and decisive surrender of Kashmir. The Kashmiri people, however, did not revolt. Instead, the Indian Army was provided with enough information to learn of Operation Gibraltar and the fact that the Army was battling not insurgents, as they had initially supposed, but Pakistani Army regulars.<ref name="Mankekar1967">{{cite book|last=Mankekar|first=D. R.|title=Twentytwo fateful days: Pakistan cut to size|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=HQcLAQAAIAAJ|access-date=8 November 2011|year=1967|publisher=Manaktalas|pages=62–63, 67}}</ref>

According to then Chief of the [[Pakistan Air Force]], [[Air Marshal]] [[Nur Khan]], there was little coordination amongst the military services on the impending operation.<ref>{{cite web | title = Nur Khan reminisces '65 war| work = Pakistan's Dawn (newspaper)| date = 6 September 2005| url = http://www.dawn.com/2005/09/06/nat2.htm| access-date = 2006-07-08}}</ref> Pakistani author [[Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema]] notes that [[Musa Khan]], Pakistan's [[:Category:Chiefs of Army Staff, Pakistan|Chief of the Army Staff]], was reportedly so confident that the plan would succeed and conflict would be localized to Kashmir that he did not inform the Air Force, as he believed the operation would not require any major air action.<ref name="Pervaiz" /> Many senior Pakistani military officers and political leaders were unaware of the impending crisis, thus surprising not only India, but also Pakistan itself.<ref>Kashmir in the Shadow of War: regional rivalries in a nuclear age By Robert G. Wirsing Pg 158</ref>