Battles and operations of the Indian National Army: Difference between revisions

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The '''Battles and Operations involving the Indian National Army''' during [[World War II]] were all fought in the [[Southeast Asia Theatre of World War II|South-East Asian theatre]]. These range from the earliest deployments of the INA's preceding units in espionage during [[Malayan Campaign]] in 1942, through the more substantial commitments during the Japanese [[Ha Go]] and [[U Go]] offensives in the [[Upper Burma]] and [[Manipur]] region, to the defensive battles during the Allied [[Burma Campaign]]. The INA's brother unit in [[Europe]], the [[Indische Legion]] did not see any substantial deployment although some were engaged in [[Atlantic wall]] duties, special operations in Persia and Afghanistan, and later a small deployment in Italy. The INA was not considered a significant military threat. However, it was deemed a significant strategic threat especially to the [[British Indian Army|Indian Army]], with [[Archibald Wavell, 1st Earl Wavell|Wavell]] describing it as a target of prime importance.<ref name=Aldrich159>{{Harvnb|Aldrich|2000|p=159}}</ref>

The [[Indian National Army]] was [[First INA|initially formed]] under [[Mohan Singh Deb]] consisting of prisoners taken by the Japan in her Malayan campaign and at [[Fall of Singapore|Singapore]]. Later, after it was reorganized under [[Subhas Chandra Bose]], it drew a large number of civilian volunteers from Malaya and Burma. Ultimately, a force of under 40,000 was formed, although only two divisions ever participated in battle. In 1943, intelligence and special services groups from the INA were instrumental in destabilizing the British Indian Army in the early stages of the [[Arakan Campaign 1942–1943|Arakan offensive]]. It was during this time that the [[British Military Intelligence]] began propaganda work to shield the true numbers who joined the INA, and also described stories of Japanese brutalities that indicated, falsely, INA involvement. Further, the Indian press was prohibited from publishing any accounts whatsoever of the INA.

Around this time, the [[Quit India movement]] had reached a crescendo within India, while the continuing British reversals [[Burma campaign#Allied setbacks, 1942–1943|at Burma]] further affected the morale of the army. The [[Noel Irwin|Irwin]]'s [[Burma campaign#First Arakan campaign|First Campaign]] had been contained and then beaten back by inferior Japanese forces at Donbaik. Intelligence analysis of the failure, as well as Irwin's own personal analysis of the campaign attributed significant demoralisation and rising discontent amongst Indian troops due to the subversive activity of INA agents at the frontline, as well as rising nationalist (or “[[Indian National Congress|Pro-Congress]]”) sentiments.<ref name="Fay 1993 410"/> The activities of these agents were addressed at the Sepoys and these found enough support to successfully encourage defection without attracting the attention of the officers commanding the units. Soon, defection by British Indian troops had become a problem significant and regular enough in the Burma theatre to form a regular part of the intelligence summaries in the first half of 1943.<ref name="Fay 1993 410"/>

The strategy of operation of the [[Indian National Army]], in relation to the opening Japanese offensive, was to be of a [[guerrilla]] force that would initiate defections among the British Indian troops, as well as garner support and sympathy among the local population for the INA.

The INA's own strategy was to avoid set-piece battles for which it lacked arms, armament as well as man-power.<ref name=Fay292>{{Harvnb|Fay|1993|p=292}}</ref><ref name=Fay298>{{Harvnb|Fay|1993|p=298}}</ref> Initially, it sought to obtain arms as well as increase its ranks from Indian soldiers expected to defect. Once across the hills of [[North-East India]] and into the [[Gangetic plain]], it was expected to live off the land and garner support, supplies, and ranks from amongst the local populace to ultimately touch off a revolution. [[Prem Kumar Sahgal]], an officer of the INA once Military secretary to Subhas Chandra Bose and later tried in the first [[Red Fort trials]], explained that although the war itself hung in balance and nobody was sure if the Japanese would win, initiating a popular revolution with grass-root support within India would ensure that even if Japan lost the war ultimately, Britain would not be in a position to re-assert its colonial authority,<ref>{{Harvnb|Fay|1993|p=138}}</ref> which was ultimately the aim of the INA and [[Azad Hind]].

  |publisher=[[Hindustan Times]]  

From this position, a unit of the 2nd battalion moved to relieve Japanese forces at [[Falam, Myanmar|Falam]] while a second company moved to [[Hakha]].<ref name=Fay286/> The 3rd battalion was meanwhile moved to [[Fort White, Burma|Fort White]]-[[Tonzang]] area in anticipation of fall of [[Messervy]]'s forces that would allow it to receive possible volunteers, as well as begin its advance into India.<ref name=Fay286/>

The initial successes in upper Burma, the engagements at Kohima, and the encirclement of Imphal was a key factor in convincing the INA that the offensive was succeeding. The forward HQ of the INA was moved to Maymyo, in anticipation of moving into Indian territory and taking charge of these as they fell.

The 4th Guerrilla regiment, which had reached [[Mandalay]] by the time the Imphal offensive was called off, was in the meantime ordered southwest to [[Myingyan]], which it was tasked to defend. The troops, however held considerable resentment against the attitude and conduct of some of its officers, which had started souring by the time it was on the move.<ref name=Fay316/> At Mandalay, the unit suffered a mutiny, with six hundred men refusing to obey orders from officers. Although they were arrested, they were not ultimately [[court-martial]]led on [[Subhas Chandra Bose]]'s refusal to consent.<ref name=Fay317>{{Harvnb|Fay|1993|p=317}}</ref> The unit was transferred to the command of [[Gurubaksh Singh Dhillon]] at Myingyan. On 29 January 1945, the 4th under Dhillon was ordered south to Nyaungu to oppose the elements of British IV corps moving down the Gangaw valley, troops of [[William Slim|Slim]]'s South Lancashire Regiment.

The 2nd Infantry, with [[Col P.K Sahgal]] in charge, was in the meantime tasked to take defensive positions at [[Mount Popa]], which it was hoped would help secure the [[Yenangyaung]] with its oilfields.<ref name=Fay334>{{Harvnb|Fay|1993|p=334}}</ref> Sahgal's unit was tasked to work with a unit of the 28th Army, the Kanjo force or Kanjo ''Butai'' commanded by Yamamoto Tsunoru. The unit started reaching Popa in the middle of February in bits and pieces, making their way up from [[Prome]] on foot. Popa lay east of the Messervy's 17th Indian Division's course, heading towards Myingyan-Meiktila road.

To prevent the allied forces from identifying his actual strength while the rest of his troops arrived in small packet, Sahgal set up active and aggressive patrolling, with Dhillon ordering the same to his unit. The troops successfully laid ambushes and engaged the British troops using [[guerrilla]] tactics. Lacking heavy arms or artillery support, Sahgal's forces used guerrilla tactics, working in small units with the Kanjo Butai (a regiment detached from the Japanese 55th Division), and was successful for a considerable period of time.<ref>{{Harvnb|Fay|1993|pp=341–352}}</ref>

As the Japanese forces withdrew from Rangoon and the city prepared to surrender, the British PoWs were released from their captivity. The 6000 strong INA contingent in the city under [[Major Loganathan]] surrendered to the provisional British formed by these troops and helped maintain law and order in the crumbling city before forces from Slim's 14th Army entered the city.

The [[Indische Legion]] was an Indian armed unit raised in 1941 attached to the [[Wehrmacht]], ostensibly according to the concept of an Indian Liberation force<ref>Axis War Makes Easier Task of Indians. Chandra Bose's Berlin Speech. Chandra Bose’s Berlin Speech. ''Syonan Sinbun, 26 January 1943''.</ref> during [[World War II]] by [[Subhas Chandra Bose]] in [[Nazi Germany]]. The initial recruits were Indian student volunteers resident in Germany at the time, and a handful from the Indian PoWs captured by [[Rommel]] during his North Africa Campaign. It would later draw a larger number of Indian PoWs as volunteers. Indische Legion was supposed to become a pathfinder that was to precede a much larger Indo-German force in a caucasian campaign into the western frontiers of British India and was supposed to encourage public resentment of the Raj and incite the [[British Indian army]] into revolt. A majority of the troops of the Free India Legion were only ever stationed in Europe -mostly in non-combat duties- from [[Netherlands]], to [[Atlantic Wall]] duties in France till the [[invasion of Normandy|Allied invasion of France]].  A small contingent, including the leadership and the officer corps, was also transferred to [[Azad Hind]] after its formation and saw action in the INA's Burma Campaign.<ref>Kurowski, The Brandenburgers - Global Mission., p. 137</ref>

From Beverloo in [[Belgium]], '''I Battalion''' was reassigned to [[Zandvoort]] in May 1943 where they stayed until relieved by [[Georgian SSR|Georgian]] troops in August. In September 1943, the battalion was deployed on the Atlantic coast of Bordeaux on the [[Bay of Biscay]]. The '''II Battalion''' moved from Beverloo to the island of [[Texel]] in May 1943 and stayed there till relieved in September of that year. From here, it was deployed to Les Sables d'Olonne in France.<ref name="Houterman">Houterman, Eastern Troops in Zeeland, The Netherlands, 1943-1945, p. 63</ref> The '''III Battalion''' remained at [[Oldebroek]] as Corps Reserve until the end of September 1943,<ref name="Houterman"/> where they gained a "wild and loathsome"<ref>BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3684288.stm</ref> reputation amongst the natives.

The Legion was stationed in the [[Arrondissement of Bordeaux|Lacanau]] region of [[Bordeaux]] at the time of the [[Normandy landings]] and remained there for up to two months after D-Day. On 8 August, its control was transferred to the [[Waffen SS]] (as was that of every other volunteer unit of the [[Wehrmacht]]). Command of the legion was very shortly transferred from [[Kurt Krapp]] to [[Heinz Bertling]]. On 15 August 1944, the unit pulled out of Lacanau to make its way back to Germany. It was in the second leg of this journey, from Poitier to Chatrou that it suffered its first combat casualty (Lt Ali Khan) while engaging French Regular forces in the town of Dun. The unit also engaged with allied [[Armoured forces|armour]] at Nuis St. Georges while retreating across the [[Loire]] to Dijon. It was regularly harassed by the [[Maquis (World War II)|French Resistance]], suffering two more casualties (Lt Kalu Ram and Capt Mela Ram). The unit moved from Remisemont, through [[Alsace]], to Oberhofen near the town of Heuberg in Germany in the winter of 1944,<ref>Davis, Flags of the Third Reich 2: Waffen SS, pp. 22</ref> where it stayed till March 1945.

The 9th Company of II Battalion of the Legion also saw action in [[Italy]]. Having been deployed in the spring of 1944, it faced the British 5th Corps and the [[Polish 2nd Corps]] before it was withdrawn from the front to be used in antipartisan operations. It surrendered to the Allied forces April 1945, still in Italy.<ref>Antonio J Munuz - The East came West</ref>

The INA's role in military terms is considered to be relatively insignificant, given its small numerical strength, lack of heavy weapons (it utilised captured British and Dutch arms initially), relative dependence on Japanese logistics and planning as well as its lack of independent planning. Shah Nawaz claims in his personal memoirs that the INA was a very potent and motivated force. Fay however, reinforces the argument that the INA was relatively less significant in military terms. Its special services group played a significant part in halting the [[First Arakan Offensive]] while still under Mohan Singh's command. Later, during the Japanese [[U-GO]] offensive towards Manipur in 1944, it played a crucial and successful role in the diversionary attacks in Arakan as well as in the Manipur Basin itself where it fought with Mutaguchi's 15th Army.<ref name=Sarkar411>{{Harvnb|Sarkar|1983|p=411}}</ref> It qualified itself well in the Battles in Arakan, Manipur, Imphal, and later during the withdrawal through Manipur and Burma. The commanders like L.S. Mishra, Raturi, Mansukhlal, M.Z. Kiyani, and others attracted the attention of the Japanese as well as the British forces. Later, during the Burma Campaign, it did play a notable role in the Battles of [[Battle of Irrawaddy|Irrawaddy]] and [[Battle of Meiktilla|Meiktilla]] especially in the latter, supporting the Japanese offensive and tying down British troops. Fay also notes the published accounts of several veterans, including that of [[William Slim]] that portrays INA-troops as incapable fighters and untrustworthy, and points out the inconsistencies and conflicts between the different accounts to conclude that intelligence propaganda as well as institutional bias may have played a significant part in the portrayed opinions. It is however noted that the INA did indeed suffer a number of notable incidences of desertion. Fay notes the significant ones amongst these were not during the offensives into Manipur and the subsequent retreat through Burma, when incidences of desertion did occur but at a far smaller numbers than the fourteenth army told its troops. The significant desertions, Fay notes, occurred around the Battles at Irrawaddy and later around Popa. During the fall of Rangoon, 6000 INA troops manned the city to maintain order before allied troops entered the city.

==Notes and references==

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