Incumbent: Difference between revisions

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{{short description|Current holder of a political office}}
{{short description|Current holder of a political office}}
{{redirect|Re-election|the system used in the English Football League until 1986|Re-election (Football League)}}
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{{for|the ecclesiastical office|Incumbent (ecclesiastical)}}
{{redirect|Re-election|the system used in the English Football League|Re-election (Football League)}}
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When newcomers look to fill an open office, voters tend to compare and contrast the candidates' qualifications, positions on political issues, and personal characteristics in a relatively straightforward way. Elections featuring an incumbent, on the other hand, are, as Guy Molyneux puts it, "fundamentally a referendum on the incumbent."<ref>Guy Molyneux, [https://prospect.org/article/big-five-oh/ The Big Five-Oh], ''The American Prospect'', 1 October 2004.</ref> Voters will first grapple with the record of the incumbent. Only if they decide to "fire" the incumbent do they begin to evaluate whether each of the challengers is an acceptable alternative.
When newcomers look to fill an open office, voters tend to compare and contrast the candidates' qualifications, positions on political issues, and personal characteristics in a relatively straightforward way. Elections featuring an incumbent, on the other hand, are, as Guy Molyneux puts it, "fundamentally a referendum on the incumbent."<ref>Guy Molyneux, [https://prospect.org/article/big-five-oh/ The Big Five-Oh], ''The American Prospect'', 1 October 2004.</ref> Voters will first grapple with the record of the incumbent. Only if they decide to "fire" the incumbent do they begin to evaluate whether each of the challengers is an acceptable alternative.


A 2017 study in the ''[[British Journal of Political Science]]'' argues that the incumbency advantage stems from the fact that voters evaluate the incumbent's ideology individually whereas they assume that any challenger shares his party's ideology.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal|last=Peskowitz|first=Zachary|date=2017-05-01|title=Ideological Signaling and Incumbency Advantage|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science/article/ideological-signaling-and-incumbency-advantage/1598F3657E22CD138EAAC246432DFA72|journal=British Journal of Political Science|volume=49|issue=2|pages=467–490|doi=10.1017/S0007123416000557|issn=0007-1234}}</ref> This means that the incumbency advantage gets more significant as political polarization increases.<ref name=":0" /> A 2017 study in the ''[[The Journal of Politics|Journal of Politics]]'' found that incumbents have "a far larger advantage" in on-cycle elections than in [[Off-year election|off-cycle elections]].<ref>{{Cite journal|last=de Benedictis-Kessner|first=Justin|date=2017-12-07|title=Off-Cycle and Out of Office: Election Timing and the Incumbency Advantage|journal=The Journal of Politics|volume=80|pages=119–132|doi=10.1086/694396|issn=0022-3816}}</ref>
A 2017 study in the ''[[British Journal of Political Science]]'' argues that the incumbency advantage stems from the fact that voters evaluate the incumbent's ideology individually whereas they assume that any challenger shares his party's ideology.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal|last=Peskowitz|first=Zachary|date=2017-05-01|title=Ideological Signaling and Incumbency Advantage|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science/article/ideological-signaling-and-incumbency-advantage/1598F3657E22CD138EAAC246432DFA72|journal=British Journal of Political Science|volume=49|issue=2|pages=467–490|doi=10.1017/S0007123416000557|s2cid=157292602|issn=0007-1234}}</ref> This means that the incumbency advantage gets more significant as political polarization increases.<ref name=":0" /> A 2017 study in the ''[[The Journal of Politics|Journal of Politics]]'' found that incumbents have "a far larger advantage" in on-cycle elections than in [[Off-year election|off-cycle elections]].<ref>{{Cite journal|last=de Benedictis-Kessner|first=Justin|date=2017-12-07|title=Off-Cycle and Out of Office: Election Timing and the Incumbency Advantage|journal=The Journal of Politics|volume=80|pages=119–132|doi=10.1086/694396|s2cid=222440248|issn=0022-3816}}</ref>


===Business usage===
===Business usage===
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==Anti-incumbency==
==Anti-incumbency==
{{main|anti-incumbency}}
{{main|anti-incumbency}}
However, there exist scenarios in which the incumbency factor itself leads to the downfall of the incumbent. Popularly known as the [[anti-incumbency|anti-incumbency factor]], situations of this kind occur when the incumbent has proven himself not worthy of office during his tenure and the challengers demonstrate this to the voters. An anti-incumbency factor can also be responsible for bringing down incumbents who have been in office for many successive terms despite performance indicators, simply because the voters are convinced by the challengers of a need for change. It is also argued that the holders of extensively powerful offices are subject to immense pressure which leaves them politically impotent and unable to command enough public confidence for re-election; such is the case, for example, with the [[President of France|Presidency of France]].<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/02/francs-presidency-is-too-powerful-to-work-emmanuel-macron-elections/ |title=France's Presidency Is Too Powerful to Work |author=Robert Tombs |date=May 2, 2017 |publisher=Polling Report |access-date=December 3, 2017}}</ref> Voters who experience the negative [[Shock (economics)|economic shock]] of a loss of income are less likely to vote for an incumbent candidate than those who have not experienced such a shock.<ref name="Margalit">{{Cite journal|last=Margalit|first=Yotam|date=2019-05-11|title=Political Responses to Economic Shocks|url=https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050517-110713|journal=Annual Review of Political Science|language=en|volume=22|issue=1|pages=277–295|doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-050517-110713|issn=1094-2939|doi-access=free}}</ref>
However, there exist scenarios in which the incumbency factor itself leads to the downfall of the incumbent. Popularly known as the [[anti-incumbency|anti-incumbency factor]], situations of this kind occur when the incumbent has proven themself not worthy of office during his tenure and the challengers demonstrate this to the voters. An anti-incumbency factor can also be responsible for bringing down incumbents who have been in office for many successive terms despite performance indicators, simply because the voters are convinced by the challengers of a need for change. It is also argued that the holders of extensively powerful offices are subject to immense pressure which leaves them politically impotent and unable to command enough public confidence for re-election; such is the case, for example, with the [[President of France|Presidency of France]].<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/02/francs-presidency-is-too-powerful-to-work-emmanuel-macron-elections/ |title=France's Presidency Is Too Powerful to Work |author=Robert Tombs |date=May 2, 2017 |publisher=Polling Report |access-date=December 3, 2017}}</ref> Voters who experience the negative [[Shock (economics)|economic shock]] of a loss of income are less likely to vote for an incumbent candidate than those who have not experienced such a shock.<ref name="Margalit">{{Cite journal|last=Margalit|first=Yotam|date=2019-05-11|title=Political Responses to Economic Shocks|journal=Annual Review of Political Science|language=en|volume=22|issue=1|pages=277–295|doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-050517-110713|issn=1094-2939|doi-access=free}}</ref>


Nick Panagakis, a pollster, coined what he dubbed the ''incumbent rule'' in 1989—that any voter who claims to be undecided towards the end of the election will probably end up voting for a challenger.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.pollingreport.com/incumbent.htm |title=Incumbent Rule |author=Nick Panagakis |date=February 27, 1989 |publisher=Polling Report |access-date=February 5, 2016}}</ref>
Nick Panagakis, a pollster, coined what he dubbed the ''incumbent rule'' in 1989—that any voter who claims to be undecided towards the end of the election will probably end up voting for a challenger.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.pollingreport.com/incumbent.htm |title=Incumbent Rule |author=Nick Panagakis |date=February 27, 1989 |publisher=Polling Report |access-date=February 5, 2016}}</ref>