Indo-Pakistani War of 1965: Difference between revisions

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{{Infobox military conflict

| conflict          = Indo–Pakistani War of 1965

On 1 September 1965, Pakistan launched a counterattack, called [[Operation Grand Slam]], with the objective to capture the vital town of [[Akhnoor]] in [[Jammu and Kashmir (state)|Jammu]], which would sever communications and cut off supply routes to Indian troops. Ayub Khan calculated that "Hindu morale would not stand more than a couple of hard blows at the right time and place"<ref name="Underestimating India">{{cite web|url=http://www.indianexpress.com/news/underestimating-india/512676/0 |title=Underestimating India |publisher=Indian Express |date=4 September 2009 |access-date=21 December 2011}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1427 |title=Pakistan's Endgame in Kashmir – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |publisher=Carnegieendowment.org |access-date=21 December 2011}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=812 |title=Indian Air Force :: Flight of the Falcon |publisher=Bharat-rakshak.com |date=28 August 2010 |access-date=21 December 2011}}</ref> although by this time Operation Gibraltar had failed and India had [[Battle of Haji Pir Pass (1965)|captured the Haji Pir Pass]].<ref name="Underestimating India" /><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.defence.pk/forums/military-history/33329-1965-last-chance-get-kashmir-force-bhutto.html |title=1965 – last chance to get Kashmir by force – Bhutto |publisher=Defence.pk |access-date=21 December 2011 |archive-date=12 February 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100212022124/http://www.defence.pk/forums/military-history/33329-1965-last-chance-get-kashmir-force-bhutto.html |url-status=dead }}</ref> At 03:30 on 1 September 1965, the entire Chhamb area came under massive artillery bombardment. Pakistan had launched operation Grand Slam and India's Army Headquarter was taken by surprise.<ref name="Pradhan2007 page 12">{{cite book|author=R. D. Pradhan|title=1965 War, the Inside Story: Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan's Diary of India-Pakistan War|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ymYCJQjEGBUC|date=1 January 2007|publisher=Atlantic Publishers & Dist|isbn=978-81-269-0762-5|page=12}}</ref> Attacking with an overwhelming ratio of troops and technically superior tanks, Pakistan made gains against Indian forces, who were caught unprepared and suffered heavy losses. India responded by calling in its [[Indian Air Force|air force]] to blunt the Pakistani attack. The next day, Pakistan retaliated, its [[Pakistan Air Force|air force]] attacked Indian forces and air bases in both [[Kashmir]] and [[Punjab, Indian|Punjab]]. India's decision to open up the theatre of attack into Pakistani Punjab forced the Pakistani army to relocate troops engaged in the operation to defend Punjab. Operation Grand Slam therefore failed, as the Pakistan Army was unable to capture [[Akhnoor]]; it became one of the turning points in the war when India decided to relieve pressure on its troops in Kashmir by attacking Pakistan further south. In the valley, another area of strategic importance was [[Kargil]]. Kargil town was in Indian hands but Pakistan occupied high ground overlooking Kargil and Srinagar-Leh road. However, after the launch of a massive anti-infiltration operation by the Indian army, the Pakistani infiltrators were forced out of that area in the month of August.<ref name="Pradhan2007 page 10">{{cite book|author=R. D. Pradhan|title=1965 War, the Inside Story: Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan's Diary of India-Pakistan War|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ymYCJQjEGBUC|date=1 January 2007|publisher=Atlantic Publishers & Dist|isbn=978-81-269-0762-5|page=10}}</ref>

<!-- Deleted image removed: [[File:Gen Musa Khan at Khem Karan - 1965 War.jpg|thumb|General Musa Khan, C-in-C of Pakistan Army at Captured Khem Karan Railway Station, India. Gen. Abdul Hamid Khan and Brig. Sahib Dad Khan are on his right and left.]] -->

{{anchor|Battle of Munnabao}}On 8 September 1965, a company of 5 Maratha Light Infantry was sent to reinforce a Rajasthan Armed Constabulary (RAC) post at Munabao&nbsp;– a strategic hamlet about 250 kilometres from Jodhpur. Their brief was simple. To hold the post and to keep Pakistan's infantry battalions from overrunning the post at bay. But at Maratha Hill (in Munabao) – as the post has now been christened&nbsp;– the Indian company could barely manage to thwart the intense attack for 24 hours. A company of 3 Guards with 954 heavy mortar battery ordered to reinforce the RAC post at Munabao could never reach. The Pakistani Air Force had strafed the entire area, and also hit a railway train coming from Barmer with reinforcements near Gadra road railway station. On 10 September, Munabao fell into Pakistani hands, and efforts to capture the strategic point did not succeed.<ref>[http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/rajasthan/Army-cries-out-for-a-second-railway-line-between-Barmer-and-Jaisalmer/Article1-487591.aspx Army cries out for a second railway line between Barmer and Jaisalmer] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110605102845/http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/rajasthan/Army-cries-out-for-a-second-railway-line-between-Barmer-and-Jaisalmer/Article1-487591.aspx |date=5 June 2011 }}. Hindustan Times (17 December 2009). Retrieved on 2011-04-14.</ref>

The hostilities in the [[Rajasthan]] sector commenced on 8 September. Initially Pakistan Desert Force and the Hur militia (followers of Pir Pagaro) was placed in a defensive role, a role for which they were well suited as it turned out. The Hurs were familiar with the terrain and the local area and possessed many essential desert survival skills which their opponents and their comrades in the Pakistan Army did not. Fighting as mainly light infantry, the Hur inflicted many casualties on the Indian forces as they entered Sindh. The Hurs were also employed as skirmishers, harassing the Indians LOC, a task they often undertook on camels. As the battle wore on the Hurs and the Desert Force were increasingly used to attack and capture Indian villages inside [[Rajasthan]].<ref>History of Indo-Pak War of 1965. Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmed (ret). {{ISBN|969-8693-01-7}}</ref>

The two countries have made contradictory claims of combat losses during the war and few neutral sources have verified the claims of either country. The PAF claimed it shot down 104 IAF planes and lost 19 of its own, while the IAF claimed it shot down 73 PAF planes and lost 59.<ref>[http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/Books/Review-Airwar65.html ] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061105001826/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/Books/Review-Airwar65.html |date=5 November 2006 }}</ref> According to [[Pakistan Air Force|PAF]], It flew 86 F-86 Sabres, 10 F-104 Starfighters and 20 B-57 Canberras in a parade soon after the war was over. Thus disproving the IAF's claim of downing 73 PAF fighters, which at the time constituted nearly the entire Pakistani front-line fighter force.<ref>John Fricker, "Pakistan's Air Power", ''[[Flight International]]'' issue published 1969, pp. 89–90. [http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1969/1969%20-%200111.html?search=Pakistan%20Mirage%205], [http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1969/1969%20-%200112.html]. Retrieved: 3 November 2009</ref>

The two air forces were rather equal in the conflict, because much of the Indian air force remained farther east to guard against the possibility of China entering the war.<ref name="Chris Bishop 1997, pages 384-387">The Encyclopedia of 20th Century Air Warfare Edited by Chris Bishop (amber publishing 1997, republished 2004 pages 384–387 {{ISBN|1-904687-26-1}})</ref>

Since before the war, the People's Republic of China had been a major military associate of Pakistan and a military opponent of India, with whom it had [[Sino-Indian War|fought a brief war in 1962]]. China had also become a foreign patron for Pakistan and had given Pakistan $60 million in development assistance in 1965.<ref>Political Survival in Pakistan: Beyond Ideology, By Anas Malik page 85</ref> During the war, China openly supported the Pakistani position. It took advantage of the conflict to issue a strongly worded ultimatum to India condemning its "aggression" in Tibet and hinting at nuclear retaliation by China (China had exploded its first nuclear device the previous year).<ref name="McGarr_330"/> Despite strong fears of Chinese intervention on the side of Pakistan, the Chinese government ultimately exercised restraint.<ref name="Dimitrakis_57">{{cite book|last = Dimitrakis|first = Panagiotis|year = 2012|title =Failed Alliances of the Cold War: Britain's Strategy and Ambitions in Asia and the Middle East |publisher = Tauris & Co. |page=57 |isbn = 978-1-84885-974-6}}</ref> This was partly due to the logistical difficulties of a direct Chinese military intervention against India and India's improved military strength after its defeat by China in 1962.<ref name="strategies_156">{{cite book|last =Butt; Schofield|first =Usama; Julian|year = 2012|title =Pakistan: the U.S., geopolitics and grand strategies |publisher = Pluto Press |page=156 |isbn = 978-0-7453-3206-2}}</ref> China had also received strong warnings by the American and Soviet governments against expanding the scope of the conflict by intervening.<ref name="McGarr_330"/> In the face of this pressure, China backed down, extending the deadline for India to respond to its ultimatum and warning India against attacking [[East Pakistan]].<ref name="Riedel"/> Ultimately, Pakistan rejected Chinese offers of military aid, recognising that accepting it would only result in further alienating Pakistan internationally.<ref name="McGarr_330"/> International opinion considered China's actions to be dangerously reckless and aggressive, and it was soundly rebuked in the world press for its unnecessarily provocative stance during the conflict.<ref name="McGarr_330"/>

==Aftermath==