Battle of Longewala: Difference between revisions

| caption          = '''Tank tracks at Longewala'''. Photographic reconnaissance image taken at the time showing the desperate last minute manoeuvres by Pakistani tanks in the Longewala sector. Circles show destroyed Pakistani tanks

| result            = Indian victory<ref>p.1187, IDSA</ref>

| commander1        = [[File:Flag of Indian Army.svg|20px]] Brig. E.N.Ramadoss<br>[[File:Flag of Indian Army.svg|20px]] Lt. Col Mohammed Khursheed Hussain<ref>{{cite book |last=Lal |first=Pratap Chandra |isbn=978-81-7062-008-2 |url=http://www.abebooks.com/9788170620082/Years-Iaf-Lal-Marshal-8170620082/plp |title=My Years with the Iaf |year=1986 |access-date=6 July 2013}}</ref><br>[[File:Flag of Indian Army.svg|20px]] Maj. [[Kuldip Singh Chandpuri]]<br>[[File:BSF Logo.svg|20px]] Assistant Commandant. Ajmer Singh Sodhi<br>[[File:Flag of Indian Army.svg|20px]] 2Lt. Dharam Veer Bhan<br><br> [[File:BSF Logo.svg|20px]] Naik. Bhairon Singh<br>[[File:Air Force Ensign of India.svg|20px]] Wg. Cdr. M.S. Bawa<br>[[File:Air Force Ensign of India.svg|20px]] Wg. Cdr. R.A. Cowasjee<br>[[File:Air Force Ensign of India.svg|20px]] Wg. Cdr. N.L. Gupta<br>[[File:Air Force Ensign of India.svg|20px]] Wg. Cdr. Suresh<br>[[File:Air Force Ensign of India.svg|20px]] Wg. Cdr. Sherwin Tully<br>[[File:Flag of Indian Army.svg|20px]] Maj. Atma Singh

| strength2        = 1 [[Motorized infantry|Mobile infantry brigade]] (containing 2,000 soldiers)<ref name=DeRouen>{{cite book|last=DeRouen|first=Karl R.|title=Civil Wars of the World|year=2007|publisher=ABC-CLIO|isbn=978-1851099191|editor=Karl R. DeRouen, Uk Heo|page=596}}</ref><ref name=Jaques>{{cite book|last=Jaques|first=Tony|title=Dictionary of Battles and Sieges: A Guide to 8,500 Battles from Antiquity Through the Twenty-First Century|year=2007|publisher=Greenwood|isbn=978-0313335389|page=597}}</ref><br>40 [[tank]]s<ref name=Jaques />

| casualties1      = 2 soldiers killed<ref name="Francis">{{cite book|author=Col J Francis (Retd)|title=Short Stories from the History of the Indian Army Since August 1947|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=rotnAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA93|date=30 August 2013|publisher=Vij Books India Pvt Ltd|isbn=978-93-82652-17-5|pages=93–96}}</ref><ref name="mention">{{cite web |title=1971 war hero gives hour-by-hour account of the battle of Longewala |url=https://www.mynation.com/news/1971-war-hero-gives-hour-by-hour-account-of-the-battle-of-laungewala-pjcyzd |publisher=Asianet News Network Pvt Ltd |access-date=17 August 2020}}</ref> 5 camels killed.

| casualties2      = 200 soldiers killed<ref name="Francis">{{cite book|author=Col J Francis (Retd)|title=Short Stories from the History of the Indian Army Since August 1947|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=rotnAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA93|date=30 August 2013|publisher=Vij Books India Pvt Ltd|isbn=978-93-82652-17-5|pages=93–96}}</ref><br/>36 tanks destroyed,  

The '''Battle of Longewala''' (4–7 December 1971) was one of the first major [[engagement (military)|engagements]] in the western sector during the [[Indo-Pakistani War of 1971]], fought between assaulting [[Pakistani]] forces and [[India]]n defenders at the Indian border post of [[Longewala]], in the [[Thar Desert]] of [[Rajasthan]] state in [[India]].The battle was fought between 120 Indian soldiers accompanied by 4 [[Hawker Hunter|Hunter fighter aircraft]] and 2000-3000 Pakistani soldiers accompanied by 30-40 tanks.

The Pakistani commanders made several questionable decisions, including a failure of their [[strategic intelligence]] to foresee availability of Indian [[strike aircraft]] in the Longewala area, exercising [[operational mobility]] with little or no [[route reconnaissance]], and conducting a tactical [[frontal assault]] with no [[engineer reconnaissance]].<ref name="theprint.in">https://theprint.in/opinion/the-1971-battle-of-longewala-a-night-of-confusion-sam-manekshaws-order-pakistans-folly/329321/</ref> This led to the Pakistani [[brigade]] group being left extremely vulnerable to air attack, vehicles becoming bogged in terrain not suitable for the movement of armoured vehicles as they tried to deploy off a single track, these being more susceptible to enemy fire by using external fuel storage in [[military tactics|tactical combat]], attempting to execute a night attack over unfamiliar terrain, and infantry being surprised by [[obstacles to troop movement]] causing confusion and stalling the attack during the crucial hours of darkness, when the assaulting infantry still had a measure of concealment from Indian [[small arms]] and [[infantry support weapon]] fire.<ref name="theprint.in"/>

On the Indian side, the post was held by A Company, 23rd Battalion, Punjab Regiment, led by Maj. [[Kuldip Singh Chandpuri]], the defences occupying a high sand dune which dominated the area that was largely intractable to vehicles.<ref name="TI" /> The post was surrounded by a [[barbed wire]] fence of three stands. The rest of the battalion was located at Sadhewala, 17&nbsp;km north-east of the Longewala post. Chandpuri commanded an infantry company reinforced by a section each of [[Medium machine gun|MMGs]] and [[L16 81mm mortar]], and one Jeep-mounted [[Recoilless rifle|RCL]]. His two other recoilless rifle teams of the anti-tank section were under training at the battalion headquarters. Major Chandpuri also had under his command a four-man team of the camel Border Security Force division.<ref name=SS>Shorey A. ''Sainik Samachar''. Vol.52, No.4, 16– 28February 2005</ref> The Longewala post had no armoured vehicles, but artillery support was available from a battery of 170 Field Regiment (Veer Rajput) tasked in direct support to the battalion, and 168 Field Regiment which had been deployed to the area in secrecy just a day earlier. The direct support battery was attached to 168 Field Regiment and served as its "Sierra" Battery. Immediately after PAF strikes on Indian airfields on 3 December, Chandpuri dispatched a 20-man strong patrol under 2Lt. Dharam Veer Bhan to Boundary Pillar (BP) 638, on the international border. This patrol was to play an important part in detecting the advances of Pakistani forces.

During the night of the 4th, 2Lt. Dharam Veer Bhan's platoon, while on a patrol, detected noises across the border that suggested a large number of armoured vehicles approaching.<ref>p.177, Nayar</ref> These were soon confirmed by reports&nbsp;— from the Army's Air Observation Post aircraft flown by Maj. Atma Singh&nbsp;— in the area of a 20&nbsp;km long armoured column on the track leading to the post advancing in the general direction of the Longewala post.<ref>p.239, Rao</ref> Directing 2Lt. Dharam Veer Bhan's patrol to trail the advancing armoured column, Chandpuri got in touch with battalion headquarters requesting urgent reinforcements and armour and artillery support. Battalion HQ gave him the choice of staying put, and containing the attack as much as possible, or carrying out a tactical retreat of the company to Ramgarh, as reinforcements would not be available for at least six hours. Considering that Chandpuri's command had no transportation, and was facing a mobile enemy, he decided to maintain the defensive position of the post where his troops at least had the benefit of prepared defensive works, rather than conducting a withdrawal at night that was a far riskier option.

The Pakistani forces began their attack at 12:30 am.<ref name="p.83, Imprint">p.83, Imprint</ref> As the offensive approached the lone outpost, Pakistani artillery opened up across the border with medium artillery guns, killing five of the ten camels from the [[Border Security Force|BSF]] detachment. As the column of 45 tanks neared the post, Indian defences, lacking the time to lay a prepared minefield, laid a hasty anti-tank minefield as the enemy advanced, one infantryman being killed in the process.<ref>http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/jaipur/Years-later-Longewala-reminds-the-do-or-die-battle/articleshow/27554710.cms</ref><ref name="p.42, Sharma">p.42, Sharma</ref> The Indian infantry held their fire until the leading Pakistani tanks had approached to 15–30 metres before firing their [[PIAT]]s.<ref name="p.42, Sharma"/> They accounted for the first two tanks on the track with their Jeep-mounted 106&nbsp;mm [[M40 recoilless rifle]], with one of its crew being killed during the engagement.<ref>There is a suggestion that there were two RCL-armed Jeeps at the post</ref> This weapon proved quite effective because it was able to engage the thinner top armour of the Pakistani tanks from its elevated position, firing at often stationary, bogged down vehicles. In all, the post defenders claimed 12 tanks destroyed or damaged. The initial Pakistani attack stalled almost immediately when the infantry discovered the barbed wire which was unseen in the night, and interpreted it to signify a minefield. Firing for the Indian RCL crews was made easier by the flames of fires when the spare fuel tanks on the Pakistani tanks, intended to supplement their internal capacity for the advance to [[Jaisalmer]], exploded, at once providing ample light for Indians located on higher ground, and creating a dense acrid [[smoke screen]] at ground level for the Pakistani infantry, adding to the confusion. Two hours were lost as Pakistani sappers were brought up, only to discover there was no minefield. However, at this time Pakistani infantry were required to make another attack, from a different direction, but in the dawn light. The Pakistani advance then attempted to surround the post two hours later by vehicles getting off the road, but many vehicles, particularly armoured personnel carriers and tanks, in trying to soften up the Indian defenders before attacking, became bogged down in the soft sand of the area surrounding the post. Throughout the engagement, Maj. Chandpuri continued to direct the supporting artillery fire.<ref name="p.42, Sharma"/>

The battle of Longewala saw heavy Pakistani losses and few Indian casualties. Since the Indians were able to use the defenders' advantage, they managed to inflict heavy losses on the Pakistanis. Indian casualties in the battle were two soldiers along with one of their jeep mounted recoilless rifles knocked out. Pakistani losses were 200 soldiers killed.<ref name="Francis"/> The Pakistanis suffered the loss of 34 tanks destroyed or abandoned, and lost 500 additional vehicles.<ref name=Jaques /> The [[Hamoodur Rahman Commission|judicial commission]] set up at the end of war recommended the commander of 18 Division, Maj. Gen. Mustafa, to be tried for negligence during the war.<ref name="HRC Report">{{Cite report|author=Hamoodur Rehman |author-link=Hamoodur Rehman |author2=Sheikh Anwarul Haq |author3=Tufail Ali Abdul Rehman |title=Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report |url=http://www.pppusa.org/Acrobat/Hamoodur%20Rahman%20Commission%20Report.pdf |publisher=Government of Pakistan |pages=79–80 |access-date=19 July 2013 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120304011310/http://www.pppusa.org/Acrobat/Hamoodur%20Rahman%20Commission%20Report.pdf |archive-date= 4 March 2012 }}</ref>

The Battle of Longewala was depicted in the 1997 [[Bollywood]] film ''[[Border (1997 film)|Border]]'', which was directed by [[J.P. Dutta]] and starred [[Sunny Deol]] as Maj. Kuldip Singh Chandpuri, [[Jackie Shroff]] as Wg. Cdr. M.S. Bawa, [[Sunil Shetty]] as Assistant Commandant. Bhairon Singh (BSF), and [[Akshaye Khanna]] as 2 Lt. Dharam Veer Bhan.<ref>p.17, Alter</ref> The main criticism of the movie was that it showed Indian forces being in a terrible position before any sort of help came from the [[Indian Air Force]]. The movie also exaggerates the casualties of Indian soldiers for dramatic purposes.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0118751/|title=Border|date=1 January 2000|access-date=2 August 2016|via=IMDb}}</ref> This was not the case in the real incident as Indian forces had defended a position on a height that commanded the area, and were able to defend it effectively due to tactical mistakes made by the Pakistani commanders. This resulted in only two [[sepoy]]s being killed before combat ceased. Indian troops were later able to capture damaged or abandoned Pakistani tanks.<ref>p.17-18, Alter</ref>