.svg)
Operation Brasstacks: Difference between revisions
m
→Pakistan strategic response
(Created page with "{{Short description|Major combined Indian military exercise in Rajasthan, India}} {{Use Indian English|date=September 2014}} {{Use dmy dates|date=March 2014}} {{operational p...") |
->Gargitude |
||
| Line 56: | Line 56: | ||
After the success of the [[Israeli Air Force]]'s surprise [[Operation Opera]] air strike on the Iraqi [[nuclear power plant]] in Osirak in 1981, the [[Pakistan Armed Forces]] had been on alert. According to memoirs of nuclear strategist and [[theoretical physicist]] [[Munir Ahmad Khan]], hectic discussions took place every day between the Ministries of [[Ministry of Defence (Pakistan)|Defence]] and [[Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Pakistan)|Foreign Affairs]], amid fears that India might attack Pakistan, who was on route to becoming a [[nuclear power]]. Since 1981, the commanders of the [[Pakistan Armed Forces]] were given standing orders to mobilize their forces at once, from all directions, as quick as it could to divert such attacks.<ref name="Allied Publishers"/> | After the success of the [[Israeli Air Force]]'s surprise [[Operation Opera]] air strike on the Iraqi [[nuclear power plant]] in Osirak in 1981, the [[Pakistan Armed Forces]] had been on alert. According to memoirs of nuclear strategist and [[theoretical physicist]] [[Munir Ahmad Khan]], hectic discussions took place every day between the Ministries of [[Ministry of Defence (Pakistan)|Defence]] and [[Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Pakistan)|Foreign Affairs]], amid fears that India might attack Pakistan, who was on route to becoming a [[nuclear power]]. Since 1981, the commanders of the [[Pakistan Armed Forces]] were given standing orders to mobilize their forces at once, from all directions, as quick as it could to divert such attacks.<ref name="Allied Publishers"/> | ||
When ''Brasstacks'' was executed, Pakistan quickly responded with maneuvers of its own forces, first mobilizing the entire [[V Corps (Pakistan)|V Corps]] and then the [[PAF Base Minhas|Southern Air Command]], near the [[Indian state]] of [[Punjab (India)|Punjab]].<ref name="Allied Publishers"/> Within weeks, the [[Pakistan Navy]]'s combat ships and submarines were deployed for the purpose of intelligence management, in the northern [[Arabian Sea]].<ref name="Allied Publishers"/> The [[Government of Pakistan]] viewed this [[military exercise]] as a ''direct threat'' to Pakistan's physical existence.<ref name="Allied Publishers"/> This included further orders to deploy the entire [[Pakistan Army Armoured Corps|Armoured Corps]], with the V Corps, to move to the front lines.<ref name="Allied Publishers"/> By mid-January 1987, the Pakistani Armed Forces and Indian Army personnel stood within firing range along an extended border area.<ref name="Allied Publishers"/> The [[Foreign Office of Pakistan]] | When ''Brasstacks'' was executed, Pakistan quickly responded with maneuvers of its own forces, first mobilizing the entire [[V Corps (Pakistan)|V Corps]] and then the [[PAF Base Minhas|Southern Air Command]], near the [[Indian state]] of [[Punjab (India)|Punjab]].<ref name="Allied Publishers"/> Within weeks, the [[Pakistan Navy]]'s combat ships and submarines were deployed for the purpose of intelligence management, in the northern [[Arabian Sea]].<ref name="Allied Publishers"/> The [[Government of Pakistan]] viewed this [[military exercise]] as a ''direct threat'' to Pakistan's physical existence.<ref name="Allied Publishers"/> This included further orders to deploy the entire [[Pakistan Army Armoured Corps|Armoured Corps]], with the V Corps, to move to the front lines.<ref name="Allied Publishers"/> By mid-January 1987, the Pakistani Armed Forces and Indian Army personnel stood within firing range along an extended border area.<ref name="Allied Publishers"/> The [[Foreign Office of Pakistan]] summoned the Indian Ambassador to Pakistan, S. K. Singh, at midnight, to meet with [[Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Pakistan)|Minister of State for Foreign Affairs]], [[Zain Noorani]], who had just returned from an emergency meeting with Pakistan's President [[Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq|Zia-ul-Haq]]. Noorani advised the Indian Embassy that he had an important message from President Zia.<ref name="Allied Publishers"/> Noorani officially advised Singh that in the event of violation of Pakistan's [[sovereignty]] and territorial integrity by India, Pakistan was "capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on it."<ref name="Allied Publishers"/> When Singh asked Noorani whether this implied an [atomic] attack on [[Bombay]], Noorani replied: "it might be so".<ref name="Allied Publishers">{{cite book|title=The making of India's foreign policy.|year=2003|publisher=Allied Publishers|location=New Delhi|isbn=81-7764-402-5|pages=272|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=mFAhDuuyeLYC&q=operation+brasstacks+1986&pg=PA272|edition=3rd.|access-date=1 November 2012|chapter=Operation Brasstacks}}</ref> | ||
The situation could have potentially lead to a war between a ''de facto'' nuclear weapon state (India—who had already conducted a nuclear test in 1974, ''[[Smiling Buddha]]'', and a state known to have [[Nuclear power in Pakistan|nuclear infrastructure]], that was believed to be developing nuclear weapons at that time (Pakistan).<ref name="Allied Publishers"/> | The situation could have potentially lead to a war between a ''de facto'' nuclear weapon state (India—who had already conducted a nuclear test in 1974, ''[[Smiling Buddha]]'', and a state known to have [[Nuclear power in Pakistan|nuclear infrastructure]], that was believed to be developing nuclear weapons at that time (Pakistan).<ref name="Allied Publishers"/> | ||