Seige of Badami
The Siege of Badami (1–20 May 1786) was conducted by forces of the Maratha Empire and the Nizam of Hyderabad against a Mysorean garrison at Badami, a fortified town in present-day northern Karnataka in India, during the Maratha-Mysore War. The allied army, numbering as many as 50,000 and led by the Maratha leader Hari Pant, stormed the city on 20 May; the fortress surrendered immediately thereafter.[1]
| Seige of Badami | |||||||||
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| Part of Maratha–Mysore Wars | |||||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||||
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| Strength | |||||||||
| 50000 | 3000 | ||||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||||
| 1000 | Unknown | ||||||||
Prelude[edit]
In February 1786, a meeting between Nana and Nizam Ali took place at Yadgir. During the discussions, the Nizam expressed that he had joined the Marathas out of friendship, despite being on good terms with Tipu. He warned that he would withdraw from the campaign if Nana did not alter his plans. Eventually, Nana chose to continue, and after extensive negotiations, it was agreed that any conquests would be shared equally between the Nizam and the Marathas.[2] The allies also decided to focus on recovering territories between the Krishna and the Tungabhadra rivers and to lay siege to Badami.[3]
However, in April, it was the Nizam who left the camp, leaving his forces under Tahawar Jung's command while he returned to Hyderabad. Reports suggest the Nizam was dissatisfied with the Yadgir arrangements, expecting territorial concessions like Bijapur from the Marathas, which he did not receive. Additionally, his dissatisfaction with the Marathas' failure to provide 60 lakhs of rupees for his troops, as promised by Nana, led to his decision to withdraw. Despite Nana, Hari Pant, and Mudhoji's efforts to persuade him to stay, the Nizam remained unimpressed.
The details of the treaty between the Marathas and the Nizam quickly became known, prompting Tipu to attempt to disrupt the alliance. He sent Nur Muhammad Khan with presents worth 5 lakhs of rupees to Holkar in hopes of securing his neutrality, and another envoy, Muhammad Ghyas Khan, with twelve elephants and three lakhs of rupees to Poona to dissuade Nana from starting hostilities. Despite these efforts, Nana decided to proceed with the campaign, sending agents Krishnarao Ballal and Balvantrao to the Nizam and Holkar to urge them into action.[4]
At the onset of the conflict, the Maratha army was in a dire state. Troops faced pay arrears, and there were frequent defections due to inadequate supplies. According to a contemporary account, the Marathas appeared indecisive and poorly prepared, with their internal divisions and financial difficulties hindering their effectiveness.[5] Without significant improvements in their situation, it was feared that Tipu Sultan would expand his dominions at their expense.[6]
Siege[edit]
Military operations began with the Siege of Badami, a fortified town located on a plain. The town was surrounded by a wide, flat plain to the front, rugged, hilly terrain to the rear, and high, rocky hills on either side, which were dominated by two strong forts. These forts were connected to the town by fortifications both in front and behind.[7] A significant tank within the fortifications at the rear provided water for the garrison, which numbered just over 3,000 men. The town was further defended by a solid wall, a dry ditch, a covered way, and a glacis.[8]
Starting on May 1, the allied armies repeatedly attacked the town’s walls but with little success. Consequently, an assault was planned, which began on the morning of May 20 with a barrage of rockets and artillery. This assault was met with heavy fire from the forts and caused significant casualties among the allied forces due to mines hidden in the ditch and covered way. Despite these setbacks, Badami was eventually captured. With the town in their possession, the forts' fall became inevitable. The garrison was cut off from their water supply, leading Ghulam Haidar, the commandant, to attempt negotiations for surrender. His proposals were initially rejected, prompting preparations for a renewed assault, which led to the forts' surrender on May 21 under the condition of personal safety for the garrison. Parashuram Bhau demanded the imprisonment of Ghulam Haidar, known for his role in the Nargund affair, but Nana and Haripant allowed him to leave unharmed to uphold their sworn commitments.[9]
After capturing Badami, Nana returned to Poona, Mudhoji Bhonsle went back to Nagpur leaving his troops under the command of his son Khandoji and Hari Pant, and Parashuram Bhau headed to Tasgaon for his son's sacred thread ceremony.[10] Consequently, the confederates appeared to relax their vigilance following the fall of Badami.[11]
References[edit]
- Duff, James Grant. A history of the Mahrattas, Volume 2
 - Kumar, Raj. Essays on modern India
 - Sen, Sailendra Nath. Anglo-Maratha relations, 1785-96
 
- ↑ Deodhar, Y. n (1962). Nana Phadnis And The External Affairs Of The Maratha Empire. p. 144.
 - ↑ Nandakumar, Sanish (2020-02-07). Rise and Fall of The Maratha Empire 1750-1818. Notion Press. ISBN 978-1-64783-961-1.
 - ↑ Sardesai, Govind Sakharam (1946). New History Of The Marathas Vol.3. pp. 178–179.
 - ↑ Sardesai, Govind Sakharam (1946). New History Of The Marathas Vol.3. pp. 178–179.
 - ↑ Nandakumar, Sanish (2020-02-07). Rise and Fall of The Maratha Empire 1750-1818. Notion Press. ISBN 978-1-64783-961-1.
 - ↑ Sardesai, Govind Sakharam (1946). New History Of The Marathas Vol.3. pp. 178–179.
 - ↑ Sen, Sailendra Nath (1994). Anglo-Maratha Relations, 1785-96. Popular Prakashan. pp. 51–54. ISBN 978-81-7154-789-0.
 - ↑ Sardesai, Govind Sakharam (1946). New History Of The Marathas Vol.3. pp. 178–179.
 - ↑ Sardesai, Govind Sakharam (1946). New History Of The Marathas Vol.3. pp. 178–179.
 - ↑ Sen, Sailendra Nath (1994). Anglo-Maratha Relations, 1785-96. Popular Prakashan. pp. 51–54. ISBN 978-81-7154-789-0.
 - ↑ Sardesai, Govind Sakharam (1946). New History Of The Marathas Vol.3. pp. 178–179.