Operation Brasstacks: Difference between revisions

{{Use Indian English|date=September 2014}}

{{Use dmy dates|date=March 2014}}

'''Operation Brasstacks''' was a major [[combined arms]] [[military exercise]] of the [[Indian Armed Forces]] in [[Rajasthan]] state of India, that took place in 1986 until its execution{{clarify|date=July 2020}} in 1987.<ref name="Euroasia review">{{cite web |title=India Toying With Dangerous Cold Start War Doctrine – Analysis |publisher=Euroasia Review |access-date=31 October 2012|author=Brigadier-General Muhammad Aslam Khan Niazi of Pakistan Army Corps of Electrical and Mechanical Engineering |url=http://www.eurasiareview.com/29102011-india-toying-with-dangerous-cold-start-war-doctrine-analysis/}}</ref>

As part of a series of exercises to simulate the operational capabilities of the [[Indian armed forces]], it was the major and largest mobilization of Indian forces on the [[Indian subcontinent]], involving the combined strength of two Army Commands - almost 500,000 troops - half the Indian Army. Operation Brasstacks was tasked with two objectives: the initial goal was the deployment of ground troops.<ref name="Global Security">{{cite web|last=GS|title=Brass Tacks|url=http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/brass-tacks.htm|work=Global Security.org|publisher=Global Security|access-date=31 October 2012}}</ref> The other objective was to conduct a series of [[amphibious assault]] exercises by the [[Indian Navy]] near to the Pakistan naval base.{{which|date=July 2020}}<ref name="Global Security"/>  Operation Brasstacks involved numbers of infantry, mechanized, air assault divisions, and 500,000 army personnel who were massed within 100 miles of Pakistan.<ref name="Global Security"/> An amphibious assault group formed from Indian naval forces was planned and deployed near to the [[Korangi Creek]] of [[Karachi Division]] in Pakistan.<ref name="Global Security"/> However, the most important aim of this war alert simulation was to determine tactical [[nuclear strategy]], overseen by the Indian Army.<ref name="Global Security"/>

The military strategists of the [[Pakistan Military]] regarded this [[war game]] as a threatening exhibition of overwhelming conventional force, and the most critical moment in [[India–Pakistan relations]]. Pakistani military strategists even viewed this war game as reprisal{{clarify|date=July 2020| reason=rehearsal not reprisal?}} of [[nuclear war]].<ref name="Pakistan Link News">{{cite news |title=The Nuclear Danger in South Asia|url=http://pakistanlink.org/Commentary/2006/March06/03/02.HTM|access-date=31 October 2012|date=6 March 2012|author=Shafik H. Hashmi, Professor Emeritus of Political Science Georgia Southern University|agency=Pakistan Link News}}</ref> The security information website ''Global Security.org'' characterized Operation Brasstacks as "bigger than any [[Operation Strikeback|NATO exercise]] – and the biggest since World War II".<ref name="Global Security"/> Even today, Pakistan military analysts and strategists regard this as a "[[Blitzkrieg|blitzkrieg-like]]" integrated [[Soviet deep battle|deep offensive]] strategy to infiltrate into dense areas of Central Pakistan, on the other hand, India maintained that "[the] core objective of Operation Brasstacks was to test new concepts of mechanization, mobility, and air support devised by Indian army."<ref name="Euroasia review"/><ref name="Bharat-Rakshak">{{cite web|last=Mahar Regiment|title=General Krishnaswamy Sundarji|url=http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Personnel/Chiefs/156-K-Sundarji.html|publisher=Bharat-Rakshak|access-date=31 October 2012|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130527183522/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Personnel/Chiefs/156-K-Sundarji.html|archive-date=27 May 2013|df=dmy-all}}</ref>

The magnitude and large scale of the exercise led to Pakistani fears that India was displaying an overwhelming conventional superiority and was planning to invade Pakistan and dismember it by [[surgical strike]]s, as it did to [[East Pakistan]] during the [[Indo-Pakistani War of 1971|Indo-Pak 1971 ''Winter war'']].<ref name="Allied Publishers"/> According to General Hoon's memoirs, a letter was directed to Sundarji by Western Command, arguing that "when such a large exercise is conceived", the movement of Indian forces is going to attract the attention of Pakistan.<ref name="The Rediff Interview"/> General Hoon maintained that, General Sundarji did not inform Prime Minister [[Rajiv Gandhi]] about the scale of the operation and such details were hidden from him.<ref name="The Rediff Interview"/> Hoon also wrote in his memoir: "Brasstacks was no military exercise. It was a plan to build up the situation for a fourth war with Pakistan." Indian scholar, Paul Kapur further argues that during Operation Brasstacks, {{clarify span|Indian Army persuaded multiple times, but unsuccessfully, to attack Pakistan.|date=July 2020}}<ref name="NUS Press">{{cite book|last=Kapur|first=S. Paul|title=Dangerous deterrent : nuclear weapons proliferation and conflict in South Asia|year=2009|publisher=NUS Press|location=Singapore|isbn=978-9971-69-443-2|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=bt3WMTNX5QoC&q=PN+Hoon+Brasstacks&pg=PA86}}</ref><ref name="Rowman & Littlefield Publishers">{{cite book|last1=Art|first1=edited by Robert J.|title=The use of force : military power and international politics|year=2009|publisher=Rowman & Littlefield Publishers|location=Lanham, Md.|isbn=978-0-7425-5669-0|pages=380–390|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9OGHHbLbdAAC&q=PN+Hoon+Brasstacks&pg=PA384|edition=7th|author2=Waltz, Kenneth N.}}</ref>

It is theorised by author Robert Art and others that the Brasstacks crisis was not an inadvertent and accidental crisis caused by Pakistan's misinterpretation of a large scale Indian Army exercise, confined mainly to the vast Rajasthan desert sector, as provocative. <ref name="Rowman & Littlefield Publishers"/> Apparently, General Sunderji's strategy was to provoke Pakistan to respond and this would provide India with an excuse to implement existing contingency plans to go on to the offensive against Pakistan and take out its [[Pakistan and weapons of mass destruction|atomic bomb projects]] in a series of preventive strikes.<ref name="Rowman & Littlefield Publishers"/>

On January 1987, Pakistan had put its entire nuclear installations on "''high-alert''", and the crisis atmosphere was heightened.<ref name="Pakistan Link News"/> During this time, [[Abdul Qadeer Khan]] gave an interview to Indian diplomat, [[Kuldip Nayar]] in which he made it clear that "Pakistan would use its [[atomic weapons]] if its existence was threatened"; although he later denied having made such a statement.<ref name="Pakistan Link News"/> The Indian diplomats claimed that their diplomats in Islamabad were warned that Pakistan would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons if attacked. Pakistan denied the veracity of these statements.<ref name="Pakistan Link News"/>

Pakistan's President Zia visited India on February 1987, having been invited to see a cricket match between the two countries.<ref name="Pakistan Defence Journal">{{cite web|last=SPECIAL REPORT|title=PAKISTAN AND THE WORLD DURING THE ZIA REGIME|url=http://www.defencejournal.com/april98/ziaregime.htm|publisher=Pakistan Defence Journal|access-date=1 November 2012}}</ref>  Zia's estimation was that he and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi could meet quite cordially, but could not agree on substantive issues.<ref name="Pakistan Defence Journal"/>

According to events that played out and the stance taken by the Indian Army, ''Brasstacks'' was only an exercise and not supposed to be a provocative one. The media, particularly the Western media, was involved after this and intense diplomatic manoeuvres followed preventing any further escalation in hostilities. On multiple occasions, General Sunderji maintained that: "This was, is and always has been a training exercise. I can't answer why there have been misperceptions about it in some quarters."<ref name="The New York Times, 1987"/> India repeatedly charged Pakistan with its continuing scientific research on atomic bombs, while Pakistan sharply continued to reject the claims. A few days later, A. Q. Khan also rejected any statements issued regarding atomic bomb development, and has since said "his comments were taken out of context."<ref name="The New York Times, 1987"/>

The real motives behind this controversial military exercise are unknown and unclear. In 1999, former senior commander of Indian Army, Lieutenant-General P. N. Hoon remarked that the operation had mobilized the entire Indian army to Pakistan's eastern border.<ref name="The Rediff Interview"/> He further notes that, ''Brasstacks'' was a plan to build up a situation for a fourth war with Pakistan.<ref name="Rowman & Littlefield Publishers"/> Western scholars also theorized that ''Brasstacks'' has been an accidental crisis, caused by Pakistan's misinterpretation of an inadvertently provocative Indian Army exercise.<ref name="Rowman & Littlefield Publishers"/> Robert Art noted that, "General Sunderji's strategy was to provoke Pakistan's response and this would provide India with an excuse to implement existing contingency plans to go on to offensive against Pakistan and take out its [[Pakistan and weapons of mass destruction|atomic bomb projects]] in a preventive strikes."<ref name="Rowman & Littlefield Publishers"/> Even as of today, the Pakistan military analysts and strategists regarded this as a "[[Blitzkrieg|blitzkrieg-like]]"<ref name="Euroasia review"/> integrated deep offensive strategy to infiltrate into dense areas of Pakistan.<ref name="Euroasia review"/> The ''[[New York Times]]'' noted that India's accelerated drive for military technology, motivated Pakistan to turn to its rationale of stockpiling [[atomic bombs]] as a [[nuclear deterrent]].<ref name="The New York Times, 1987"/>

*[https://www.webcitation.org/query?url=http://www.geocities.com/siafdu/sundarji.html&date=2009-10-26+02:34:27 General Krishnaswamy Sundarrajan], ''Geocities'', 26 October 2009