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The tests achieved their main objective of giving India the capability to build [[Fission bomb|fission]] and [[thermonuclear weapon]]s with yields up to 200 [[kilotons]].<ref name=":0" /> The [[Rajagopala Chidambaram|then-Chairman]] of the [[Atomic Energy Commission of India|Indian Atomic Energy Commission]] described each one of the explosions of ''Pokhran-II'' to be "equivalent to several tests carried out by other nuclear weapon states over decades".<ref>{{Cite journal|date=January 2–15, 1999|title=We have an adequate scientific database for designing ... a credible nuclear deterrent|url=https://frontline.thehindu.com/static/html/fl1601/16010840.htm|url-status=live|journal=[[Frontline (magazine)|Frontline]]|volume=16|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191028030113/https://frontline.thehindu.com/static/html/fl1601/16010840.htm|archive-date=28 October 2019}}</ref> Subsequently, India established [[computer simulation]] capability to predict the yields of nuclear explosives whose designs are related to the designs of explosives used in this test.<ref name=":0" /> | The tests achieved their main objective of giving India the capability to build [[Fission bomb|fission]] and [[thermonuclear weapon]]s with yields up to 200 [[kilotons]].<ref name=":0" /> The [[Rajagopala Chidambaram|then-Chairman]] of the [[Atomic Energy Commission of India|Indian Atomic Energy Commission]] described each one of the explosions of ''Pokhran-II'' to be "equivalent to several tests carried out by other nuclear weapon states over decades".<ref>{{Cite journal|date=January 2–15, 1999|title=We have an adequate scientific database for designing ... a credible nuclear deterrent|url=https://frontline.thehindu.com/static/html/fl1601/16010840.htm|url-status=live|journal=[[Frontline (magazine)|Frontline]]|volume=16|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191028030113/https://frontline.thehindu.com/static/html/fl1601/16010840.htm|archive-date=28 October 2019}}</ref> Subsequently, India established [[computer simulation]] capability to predict the yields of nuclear explosives whose designs are related to the designs of explosives used in this test.<ref name=":0" /> | ||
''Pokhran-II'' consisted of five detonations, the first of which was a [[Thermonuclear weapon|fusion bomb]] while the remaining four were [[fission bomb]]s.<ref name="CNN India Bureau, 1998" /> The tests were initiated on 11 May 1998, under the assigned code name ''Operation Shakti'', with the detonation of one fusion and two fission bombs.<ref name="CNN India Bureau, 1998" /> On 13 May 1998, two additional fission devices were detonated,<ref name="Nuclear politics" /> and the [[Premiership of Atal Bihari Vajpayee|Indian government]] led by [[Prime Minister of India|Prime Minister]] [[Atal Bihari Vajpayee]] shortly convened a press conference to declare India as a full-fledged nuclear state.<ref name="Nuclear politics" /> The tests resulted in a [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 1172|variety of sanctions]] against India by a number of major | ''Pokhran-II'' consisted of five detonations, the first of which was a [[Thermonuclear weapon|fusion bomb]] while the remaining four were [[fission bomb]]s.<ref name="CNN India Bureau, 1998" /> The tests were initiated on 11 May 1998, under the assigned code name ''Operation Shakti'', with the detonation of one fusion and two fission bombs.<ref name="CNN India Bureau, 1998" /> On 13 May 1998, two additional fission devices were detonated,<ref name="Nuclear politics" /> and the [[Premiership of Atal Bihari Vajpayee|Indian government]] led by [[Prime Minister of India|Prime Minister]] [[Atal Bihari Vajpayee]] shortly convened a press conference to declare India as a full-fledged nuclear state.<ref name="Nuclear politics" /> The tests resulted in a [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 1172|variety of sanctions]] against India by a number of major countries including Japan and the United States. | ||
Many names have been assigned to these tests; originally these were collectively called ''Operation Shakti–98'', and the five nuclear bombs were designated ''Shakti-I'' through to ''Shakti-V''. More recently, the operation as a whole has come to be known as ''Pokhran II'', and the 1974 explosion as ''Pokhran-I''.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Why May 11 be celebrated as National Technology Day? Things you should know|url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/education/current-affairs/why-may-11-be-celebrated-as-national-technology-day-things-you-should-know/articleshow/75669853.cms|website=Times of India}}</ref> | Many names have been assigned to these tests; originally these were collectively called ''Operation Shakti–98'', and the five nuclear bombs were designated ''Shakti-I'' through to ''Shakti-V''. More recently, the operation as a whole has come to be known as ''Pokhran II'', and the 1974 explosion as ''Pokhran-I''.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Why May 11 be celebrated as National Technology Day? Things you should know|url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/education/current-affairs/why-may-11-be-celebrated-as-national-technology-day-things-you-should-know/articleshow/75669853.cms|website=Times of India}}</ref> | ||
== India's nuclear bomb project == | == India's nuclear bomb project == | ||
Efforts towards building the [[nuclear weapon|nuclear bomb]], infrastructure, and research on related [[Nuclear technology|technologies]] have been undertaken by India since [[World War II]]. Origins of [[Indian nuclear programme|India's nuclear program]] date back to 1944 when [[Nuclear Physics|nuclear physicist]] [[Homi J. Bhabha|Homi Bhabha]] began persuading the [[Indian National Congress | Efforts towards building the [[nuclear weapon|nuclear bomb]], infrastructure, and research on related [[Nuclear technology|technologies]] have been undertaken by [[India]] since [[World War II]]. Origins of [[Indian nuclear programme|India's nuclear program]] date back to [[1944]] when [[Nuclear Physics|nuclear physicist]] [[Homi J. Bhabha|Homi Bhabha]] began persuading the [[Indian National Congress]] towards the harnessing of [[Nuclear power in India|nuclear energy]]— a year later he established the [[Tata Institute of Fundamental Research]] (TIFR).<ref name=":1">{{Cite web|title=Homi Bhabha and how World War II was responsible for creating India's nuclear future|url=https://theprint.in/theprint-profile/homi-bhabha-and-how-world-war-ii-was-responsible-for-creating-indias-nuclear-future/312842/|website=The print}}</ref> | ||
In 1950s, the preliminary studies were carried out at the [[Bhabha Atomic Research Centre|BARC]] and plans were developed to produce [[plutonium]] and other [[bomb]] components. In 1962, India and [[People's Republic of China|China]] [[Sino-Indian War|engaged]] in the disputed [[Northern India|northern front]], and was further intimidated with a Chinese [[596 (nuclear test)|nuclear test]] in 1964. Direction towards [[militarisation]] of the [[Indian nuclear programme|nuclear program]] slowed down when [[Vikram Sarabhai]] became its head and [[Lal Bahadur Shastri]] showed little interest after becoming the [[Prime Minister of India|Prime Minister]] in that year.<ref name=":1" /> | In 1950s, the preliminary studies were carried out at the [[Bhabha Atomic Research Centre|BARC]] and plans were developed to produce [[plutonium]] and other [[bomb]] components. In 1962, India and [[People's Republic of China|China]] [[Sino-Indian War|engaged]] in the disputed [[Northern India|northern front]], and was further intimidated with a Chinese [[596 (nuclear test)|nuclear test]] in 1964. Direction towards [[militarisation]] of the [[Indian nuclear programme|nuclear program]] slowed down when [[Vikram Sarabhai]] became its head and [[Lal Bahadur Shastri]] showed little interest after becoming the [[Prime Minister of India|Prime Minister]] in that year.<ref name=":1" /> | ||
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[[File:Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, India.jpg|thumb|250px|right|The [[Marine Corps Intelligence Activity|US Marine Intelligence]] maps showing the Indian test site, 1997.]] | [[File:Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, India.jpg|thumb|250px|right|The [[Marine Corps Intelligence Activity|US Marine Intelligence]] maps showing the Indian test site, 1997.]] | ||
Unlike Pakistan's [[Nuclear test site|weapon–testing laboratories]], there was very little that India could do to hide its activity at [[Pokhran]].<ref name="India Today">{{cite news | title = Books: Weapons of Peace—How the CIA was Fooled | newspaper = India Today | url = http://www.india-today.com/itoday/17051999/books.html | access-date = 30 October 2006 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20160112002020/http://www.india-today.com/itoday/17051999/books.html | archive-date = 12 January 2016 | url-status = dead }}</ref> Unlike the high-altitude [[Mountain ranges of Pakistan|granite mountains]] in Pakistan, the bushes are sparse and the dunes in the [[Rajasthan Desert]] | Unlike Pakistan's [[Nuclear test site|weapon–testing laboratories]], there was very little that India could do to hide its activity at [[Pokhran]].<ref name="India Today">{{cite news | title = Books: Weapons of Peace—How the CIA was Fooled | newspaper = India Today | url = http://www.india-today.com/itoday/17051999/books.html | access-date = 30 October 2006 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20160112002020/http://www.india-today.com/itoday/17051999/books.html | archive-date = 12 January 2016 | url-status = dead }}</ref> Unlike the high-altitude [[Mountain ranges of Pakistan|granite mountains]] in Pakistan, the bushes are sparse and the dunes in the [[Rajasthan Desert]] provide little cover from [[Surveillance satellite|probing satellites]].<ref name="India Today" /> The [[Indian Intelligence Agency]] had been aware of United States [[Nuclear MASINT|spy satellites]] and the [[CIA]] had been detecting Indian test preparations since 1995. Therefore, the tests required complete [[secrecy]] in India and also needed to avoid detection by other countries.<ref name="India Today" /> The [[58th Engineer Regiment (India)|58th Engineer Regiment]] of the [[Indian Army Corps of Engineers]] was commissioned to prepare the test sites to avoid detection by the United States [[Nuclear MASINT|spy satellites]]. The 58th Engineer's commander [[Colonel]] Gopal Kaushik supervised the test preparations and ordered his "staff officers take all measures to ensure total secrecy."<ref name="India Today" /> | ||
Extensive planning was done by a small group of scientists, senior military officers and senior politicians to ensure that the test preparations would remain secret, and even senior members of the [[Indian government]] didn't know what was going on. The chief scientific adviser and the Director of [[Defence Research and Development Organisation|Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO)]], [[A.P.J. Abdul Kalam|Dr. Abdul Kalam]], and [[R. Chidambaram|Dr. R. Chidambaram]], the Director of the [[Department of Atomic Energy|Department of Atomic Energy (DAE)]], were the chief coordinators of this test planning.<ref name="Nuclear politics" /> The scientists and engineers of the [[Bhabha Atomic Research Centre|Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC)]], the [[Atomic Minerals Directorate for Exploration and Research|Atomic Minerals Directorate for Exploration and Research (AMDER)]], and the [[Defence Research and Development Organisation|Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO)]] were involved in the nuclear weapon assembly, layout, detonation and data collection.<ref name="Nuclear politics" /> A small group of senior scientists were involved in the detonation process. All scientists were required to wear army uniforms to preserve the secrecy of the tests. Since 1995, the 58th Engineer Regiment had learned how to avoid satellite detection.<ref name="Nuclear politics" /> Work was mostly done during night, and equipment was returned to the original place to give the impression that it was never moved.<ref name="Nuclear politics" /> | Extensive planning was done by a small group of scientists, senior military officers and senior politicians to ensure that the test preparations would remain secret, and even senior members of the [[Indian government]] didn't know what was going on. The chief scientific adviser and the Director of [[Defence Research and Development Organisation|Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO)]], [[A.P.J. Abdul Kalam|Dr. Abdul Kalam]], and [[R. Chidambaram|Dr. R. Chidambaram]], the Director of the [[Department of Atomic Energy|Department of Atomic Energy (DAE)]], were the chief coordinators of this test planning.<ref name="Nuclear politics" /> The scientists and engineers of the [[Bhabha Atomic Research Centre|Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC)]], the [[Atomic Minerals Directorate for Exploration and Research|Atomic Minerals Directorate for Exploration and Research (AMDER)]], and the [[Defence Research and Development Organisation|Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO)]] were involved in the nuclear weapon assembly, layout, detonation and data collection.<ref name="Nuclear politics" /> A small group of senior scientists were involved in the detonation process. All scientists were required to wear army uniforms to preserve the secrecy of the tests. Since 1995, the 58th Engineer Regiment had learned how to avoid satellite detection.<ref name="Nuclear politics" /> Work was mostly done during night, and equipment was returned to the original place to give the impression that it was never moved.<ref name="Nuclear politics" /> | ||
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=== China === | === China === | ||
On 12 May the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated: "The Chinese government is seriously concerned about the nuclear tests conducted by India," and that the tests "run counter to the current international trend and are not conducive to peace and stability in South Asia.".<ref name="New York Times, 13 May 1998">{{cite news|title=China is 'Seriously Concerned' But Restrained in Its Criticism|newspaper=New York Times, 13 May 1998|date=13 May 1998}}</ref> The next day the [[Chinese Foreign Ministry]] issued the statement clearly stating that "it is shocked and strongly condemned" the Indian nuclear tests and called for the international community to "adopt a unified stand and strongly demand that India immediate stop development of nuclear weapons".<ref name="CNS Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies">{{cite news|last=Resources on India and Pakistan|title=China's Reaction to India's Nuclear Tests|url=http://cns.miis.edu/archive/country_india/china/nsacris.htm|access-date=15 May 2012|newspaper=CNS Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies|date=1999|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130103195522/http://cns.miis.edu/archive/country_india/china/nsacris.htm|archive-date=3 January 2013|df=dmy-all}}</ref> China further rejected India's stated rationale of needing nuclear capabilities to counter a Chinese threat as "totally unreasonable".<ref name="CNS Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies" /> In a meeting with [[Masayoshi Takemura]] of [[Democratic Party of Japan]], [[Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China]] [[Qian Qichen]] was quoted as saying that India's nuclear tests were a "serious matter," particularly because they were conducted in light of the fact that more than 140 countries have signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. "It is even more unacceptable that India claims to have conducted the tests to counter what it called a ''"China threat''".<ref name="CNS Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies" /> On 24 November 1998, the [[ | On 12 May the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated: "The Chinese government is seriously concerned about the nuclear tests conducted by India," and that the tests "run counter to the current international trend and are not conducive to peace and stability in South Asia.".<ref name="New York Times, 13 May 1998">{{cite news|title=China is 'Seriously Concerned' But Restrained in Its Criticism|newspaper=New York Times, 13 May 1998|date=13 May 1998}}</ref> The next day the [[Chinese Foreign Ministry]] issued the statement clearly stating that "it is shocked and strongly condemned" the Indian nuclear tests and called for the international community to "adopt a unified stand and strongly demand that India immediate stop development of nuclear weapons".<ref name="CNS Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies">{{cite news|last=Resources on India and Pakistan|title=China's Reaction to India's Nuclear Tests|url=http://cns.miis.edu/archive/country_india/china/nsacris.htm|access-date=15 May 2012|newspaper=CNS Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies|date=1999|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130103195522/http://cns.miis.edu/archive/country_india/china/nsacris.htm|archive-date=3 January 2013|df=dmy-all}}</ref> China further rejected India's stated rationale of needing nuclear capabilities to counter a Chinese threat as "totally unreasonable".<ref name="CNS Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies" /> In a meeting with [[Masayoshi Takemura]] of [[Democratic Party of Japan]], [[Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China]] [[Qian Qichen]] was quoted as saying that India's nuclear tests were a "serious matter," particularly because they were conducted in light of the fact that more than 140 countries have signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. "It is even more unacceptable that India claims to have conducted the tests to counter what it called a ''"China threat''".<ref name="CNS Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies" /> On 24 November 1998, the [[Embassy of China, New Delhi|Chinese Embassy, New Delhi]] issued a formal statement: | ||
{{quote|text=(sic).... But regrettably, India conducted nuclear tests last May, which has run against the contemporary historical trend and seriously affected peace and stability in South Asia. Pakistan also conducted nuclear tests later on. India's nuclear tests have not only led to the escalation of tensions between India and Pakistan and provocation of nuclear arms races in South Asia, but also dealt a heavy blow to international nuclear disarmament and the global nonproliferation regime. It is only natural that India's nuclear tests have met with extensive condemnation and aroused serious concern from the international community.|sign=[[ | {{quote|text=(sic).... But regrettably, India conducted nuclear tests last May, which has run against the contemporary historical trend and seriously affected peace and stability in South Asia. Pakistan also conducted nuclear tests later on. India's nuclear tests have not only led to the escalation of tensions between India and Pakistan and provocation of nuclear arms races in South Asia, but also dealt a heavy blow to international nuclear disarmament and the global nonproliferation regime. It is only natural that India's nuclear tests have met with extensive condemnation and aroused serious concern from the international community.|sign=[[Embassy of China, New Delhi]]<ref name="The Hindu, 24/xi-1998">{{cite news|last=Active Correspondents|title=India-China Claim 'active approach|newspaper=The Hindu, 24/xi-1998|date=24 November 1998}}</ref>}} | ||
=== Pakistan === | === Pakistan === | ||
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== In popular culture == | == In popular culture == | ||
* ''[[Parmanu: The Story of Pokhran]]'' is a 2018 [[Bollywood]] movie based on India's underground Pokhran-II nuclear tests. | * ''[[Parmanu: The Story of Pokhran]]'' is a 2018 [[Bollywood]] movie based on India's underground Pokhran-II nuclear tests.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/john-abraham-parmanu-poster-pokhran-nuclear-tests/1/1025701.html |title=John Abraham unveils Parmanu poster: All you need to know about the story of Pokhran |last=Ghosh |first=Samrudhi |work=India Today |date=14 August 2017 |access-date=11 November 2017}}</ref> | ||
* ''[[War and Peace (2002 film)|War and Peace]]'': A documentary by [[Anand Patwardhan]].<ref>{{Citation|last=SatyaShodak|title=War and Peace—Anand Patwardhan|date=2017-12-18|url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qSieC-Qbeb8|access-date=2019-06-01}}{{cbignore}}{{Dead Youtube links}}</ref> | * ''[[War and Peace (2002 film)|War and Peace]]'': A documentary by [[Anand Patwardhan]].<ref>{{Citation|last=SatyaShodak|title=War and Peace—Anand Patwardhan|date=2017-12-18|url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qSieC-Qbeb8|access-date=2019-06-01}}{{cbignore}}{{Dead Youtube links|date=February 2022}}</ref> | ||
== See also == | == See also == | ||