Pakistan–United States relations

Islamic republic of Pakistan and the United States formed diplomatic relations on 15 August 1947, coinciding with Pakistan's creation. On that day, the United States was among the first countries to officially acknowledge the new nation.

The relationship between Pakistan and the United States has been likened to a "roller coaster," marked by periods of strong cooperation interspersed with significant bilateral tensions. Despite this tumultuous history, the Pakistani military has played a crucial role in American geopolitical strategy and has been recognised as a major non-NATO ally since 2002. Following Pakistan's involvement in the Afghan peace process and the Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, many U.S. policymakers are reassessing their country's ties with Pakistan. Concurrently, the strategic alignment between the United States and India has intensified the challenges faced by Pakistani diplomacy.

Background

During the Cold War era (1945–1991), Pakistan aligned itself with the Western Bloc, led by the United States, in opposition to the Eastern Bloc dominated by the Soviet Union, which promoted Socialism as its economic model while Capitalism was championed by the West. After the military coup in Pakistan in 1958, President Muhammad Ayub Khan forged a robust military partnership with the United States. Throughout the Bangladesh Liberation War and the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, the U.S. provided support to Pakistan against both the Provisional Government of Bangladesh and India. Following Pakistan's defeat, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who held anti-American sentiments, sought to strengthen ties with the Soviet Union. In 1977, Bhutto was ousted in a military coup led by Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq.

The dynamics shifted after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, as Pakistan and the United States collaborated to fund and support the anti-communist Afghan Mujahideen during the subsequent First Afghan Civil War. Since 1965, the United States has imposed sanctions on Pakistan multiple times to ensure alignment with its strategic objectives. Relations saw an improvement when Pakistan participated alongside the U.S. in conflicts in Somalia and Bosnia. However, following India’s nuclear tests in 1998, the U.S. once again suspended aid and imposed sanctions, only to restore them following American engagement in Afghanistan in 2001.

Disagreements over strategies in the Afghan War, coupled with mutual distrust and differing priorities, led to significant criticism from both sides regarding their approaches to achieving shared goals in the War on Terror. The United States continues to accuse the Pakistani military of backing non-state actors, including the Taliban. Additionally, incidents such as drone strikes, a friendly fire situation at Salala, and the arrest of a spy in Lahore have further strained relations between the two nations.

External Influences on Pakistan–U.S. Relations

The fraught relationship between the United States and Pakistan continues to deteriorate, compounded by a series of crises. In the early 2010s, allegations surfaced that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was financially incentivising journalists to publish negative articles about the U.S. Nevertheless, both nations remain committed to fostering a cooperative relationship aimed at combating terrorist groups in the War on Terror.

In recent years, however, it can be argued that Islamabad has diminished in strategic importance to the West, especially following the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces from Afghanistan. During the conflict, Pakistan served as a crucial supply route for NATO operations in Afghanistan, which significantly shaped bilateral relations. However, with the conclusion of the war and the exit of American troops in the early 2020s, Pakistan's leverage with the U.S. has waned, as the latter no longer relies on Islamabad for engagement in Afghanistan.

Pakistan's prolonged rivalry and conflict with India, a key strategic partner of the United States, particularly regarding the Kashmir issue, along with its steadfast strategic alliance with China amid the great power competition between the U.S. and China, complicates Pakistan's attempts to enhance its relationship with the United States.

Diaspora

Approximately 5,54,202 individuals of Pakistani descent identify as Pakistani Americans residing in the United States, while around 52,486 Americans live in Pakistan. Furthermore, Pakistan is home to one of the largest U.S. embassies located in Islamabad, alongside the largest consulate-general in terms of staff and facilities, situated in Karachi.

History

1947–1958: Relations between the United States and the newly-created Pakistan

After its creation from India, Pakistan faced challenges in establishing itself as a non-aligned entity within the global arena. In East Pakistan, pro-communist factions enjoyed considerable backing, whereas the pro-Soviet Pakistan Socialist Party was largely sidelined in West Pakistan. The political scene in West Pakistan was predominantly influenced by the pro-American Pakistan Muslim League, which had a strong foothold in the affluent region of Punjab (Pakistani), though its support in East Pakistan was comparatively limited.

Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan sought to foster amicable relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union, believing that an alliance with both superpowers could yield benefits for Pakistan. However, concerns were raised by both the Pakistani military and foreign service regarding whether the Soviets possessed the political will and capability to extend military, technical, and economic support to Pakistan at the level they were beginning to offer to India. Despite this skepticism, Pakistan approached the USSR for military assistance, which was predictably denied, as the Soviet Union had already aligned itself with India. Furthermore, the government's attempts to engage with the Soviet Union were met with disapproval from Pakistan's conservative middle class, who viewed the USSR as an atheist and socialist ally of India.

In 1950, the United States made a diplomatic overture to Pakistan by inviting Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan for an official state visit. With the USSR having rejected capitalist Pakistan and aligning itself with its adversaries, Pakistani policymakers realised that it was unfeasible to maintain amicable relations with both superpowers. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan accepted the American invitation and embarked on a 23-day official state visit to the United States starting from 03 May 1950. This visit became highly politicised in Pakistan, provoking outrage among leftist factions and marking a pivotal moment that established warm diplomatic relations for several decades. However, it is reported that during this initial trip, President Truman asked Khan to allow the CIA to set up a base in Pakistan to monitor Soviet activities— a request that Khan declined.

Between 1950 and 1953, numerous prominent political and military leaders from Pakistan visited the United States. Among them was Army Commander Ayub Khan, who would later establish a strongly pro-American military regime. Other notable figures included Foreign Minister Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, Foreign Secretary Ikram-Ullah Khan, Finance Minister Malik Ghulam Muhammad, and Defense Secretary Iskandar Mirza, all of whom made official state visits to the U.S. during this period.

Defense relations between Pakistan and the United States were significantly bolstered almost immediately after Liaquat Ali Khan's visit to the U.S. The personal goodwill towards Pakistan remained evident even after the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951. During Khawaja Nazimuddin's administration, both Pakistani and American officials fostered positive sentiments towards each other. This goodwill was particularly highlighted in 1953 when Secretary of State John Foster Dulles advocated for wheat aid to Pakistan, stating during hearings before the sub-committee on Agriculture and Forestry that "the people of Pakistan had a splendid military tradition." He also remarked that upon his arrival in Karachi, he was welcomed by a guard of honour that he considered the "finest" he had ever encountered.

The close relationship between the two nations was further solidified with the signing of a mutual defense treaty in May 1954, which led to hundreds of Pakistani military officers receiving training in the United States. Additionally, a U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) was established in Rawalpindi, which was then the capital of Pakistan. The training provided to Pakistani officers encompassed not only military tactics but also leadership, management, and economic theory.

In 1956, President Dwight D. Eisenhower sought approval from Pakistan's newly appointed Prime Minister, Huseyn Suhravardy, to lease the Peshawar Air Station (PAS) for the purpose of gathering intelligence on Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles. The request was approved, and shortly thereafter, the United States constructed an airstrip and a command and control center at the location to commence operations. The facility was classified as top-secret, with even high-ranking Pakistani officials like Zulfikar Ali Bhutto being denied access.

American interest in fostering Pakistan as an ally against the spread of communism was largely centered on maintaining strong relations with the Pakistani military. Prime Minister Huseyn Suhravardy made several official visits to the United States, often accompanied by Army Commander Ayub Khan. Following a military coup in 1958, Ayub Khan contended that leftist activists posed a threat to American interests in Pakistan. He successfully persuaded U.S. officials that the Pakistani military was the most robust and capable institution to lead the nation.

1958–1971: relations during the military dictatorships of Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan

Under Ayub Khan's leadership, Pakistan established a strong alliance with the United States. Ayub Khan was an ardent supporter of American interests, and during a visit to the U.S. in 1954, prior to assuming the presidency, he famously told American Brigadier-General Henry A. Byroade, "I didn't come here to look at barracks. Our army can be your army if you want us. But let's make a decision." His positive perception of the United States remained intact when he took power. Throughout the 1960s, the general sentiment among Pakistan's population was pro-American, reflecting a favorable view of the U.S.

In 1960, Ayub Khan authorized the United States to conduct its first espionage missions over the Soviet Union from the Peshawar Air Base, which had recently been upgraded with American financial aid. In May of that year, the U-2 incident occurred when pilot Gary Powers was captured by the USSR. The CIA informed Ayub Khan about the incident while he was on a state visit in London; he reportedly shrugged it off, indicating that he had anticipated such an event would eventually occur.

In 1961, Khan made his inaugural visit to the United States as the head of state. The goodwill extended towards him by the Americans was clearly demonstrated through an extravagant state dinner at Mount Vernon and a ticker tape parade held in his honor in New York City.

American military assistance was primarily focused on West Pakistan, with economic benefits similarly concentrated there and predominantly utilized by West Pakistan. This led to growing resentment in East Pakistan, where the lack of economic development was directed not only towards the United States but also towards their counterparts in West Pakistan. In response to these grievances, the East Pakistan parliament passed a resolution condemning the 1954 military pact with the United States.

The United States further augmented economic aid to Pakistan via consortium companies. During this period, West Pakistan experienced a remarkable rate of economic growth, earning the country recognition as a successful example of capitalism in a developing nation. In 1964, the GDP growth rate reached an impressive 9.38%.

In 1962, relations between Pakistan and the United States began to deteriorate. Following India's significant defeat in the Sino-Indian War, the U.S. provided arms to India without notifying Pakistan or addressing its concerns that these weapons could be used against it. Ayub Khan was particularly disheartened that Pakistan's decision to refrain from exploiting India's vulnerabilities during the conflict with China did not lead to substantial U.S. efforts to negotiate a resolution to the Kashmir dispute.

Believing that diplomatic avenues would not yield favorable outcomes for Pakistan, the country initiated Operation Gibraltar against India, which escalated into the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. The war resulted in a stalemate, and economic growth in 1965 plummeted to just 0.88%. However, the economy quickly recovered, achieving a GDP growth rate of 2.32% in 1966 and 9.79% in 1969. Despite this rebound, the immense economic toll of the war, coupled with the absence of a decisive victory, led Khan to relinquish his presidential powers to army commander Yahya Khan (who was not related) in 1969.

American President Lyndon Johnson fostered warm personal relations with the leaders of both India and Pakistan, but this approach led to unintended negative consequences. Since 1954, the U.S. alliance with Pakistan had prompted India to strengthen its ties with the Soviet Union. Johnson aimed for a more balanced policy towards both nations to alleviate tensions in South Asia and draw both countries closer to the United States. With a significant military commitment already in Vietnam, Johnson moved away from the traditional American perspective that categorised Indian subcontinent into 'allies' and 'neutrals.' He envisioned a strategy to cultivate positive relations with both India and Pakistan by providing arms and financial assistance to each while maintaining a stance of neutrality amidst their ongoing border disputes. However, this perceived even-handedness inadvertently drove Pakistan closer to Communist China and further solidified India's alignment with the Soviet Union.

Pakistan's role in U.S.-China relations

President Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, leveraged Pakistan's close relationship with the People's Republic of China to establish secret communications that culminated in Kissinger's covert visit to China in July 1971, following a trip to Pakistan. These clandestine contacts paved the way for Nixon's historic visit to China in 1972, which ultimately led to the normalisation of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

1971: Relations during war Indo-Pakistan war

At the onset of hostilities that led to the two-week Indo-Pakistani War of December 1971, President Nixon urged Yahya Khan to restrain Pakistani forces to prevent further escalation and protect Pakistan's interests. Nixon was concerned that an Indian attack on West Pakistan could result in socialist India's dominance over the Indian subcontinent, thereby enhancing the influence of the Soviet Union. Conversely, Yahya Khan feared that the emergence of an independent Bangladesh would threaten the cohesion of West Pakistan.

Despite these concerns, Indian military support for Bengali guerrillas and a significant influx of Bengali refugees into India contributed to escalating tensions, ultimately resulting in a declared war between India and Pakistan. During this period, the United States covertly facilitated the shipment of military equipment from Iran, Turkey, and Jordan to Pakistan, reimbursing these countries for their contributions despite facing objections from Congress. Simultaneously, the U.S. threatened to cut off aid to Pakistan as a means of pressuring it to cease hostilities, while also seeking to prevent India from establishing dominance in the evolving political landscape of the Indian subcontinent.

Near the end of the Indo-Pakistani War in December 1971, the Nixon Administration recognised Pakistan's imminent defeat but responded by deploying the USS Enterprise and Task Force-74 of the United States Seventh Fleet into the Indian Ocean. This military maneuver was perceived as a warning to India against escalating its attacks on West Pakistan. Given that this was during the height of the Vietnam War, the show of force was interpreted as a sign of support for the beleaguered West Pakistan Armed Forces.

Declassified CIA intelligence documents indicated that U.S. officials believed "India intended to dismember Pakistan and destroy its armed forces," which posed a potential loss of a U.S. ally in the Cold War that America could not afford. Nixon characterised India as a "Soviet stooge" before ordering the deployment of the Enterprise to lead Task Force-74. U.S. assessments suggested that India could decisively defeat Pakistan if fully backed by the Soviet Union. Consequently, Nixon sent a message to the Soviet Union urging them to cease their support for India. In his words, he called on the Soviets "in the strongest possible...(...)... terms to restrain India with which... (Soviets) have great influence and for whose actions you must share responsibility."

Democratic government (1971–1977)

In 1975, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto gifted a carved ivory set of chess to the United States President Gerald Ford.

Following the 1970 elections, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a charismatic democratic socialist, assumed the presidency from 1971 to 1974 and subsequently became Prime Minister in 1974. This era is often characterised as a "quiet cold war" involving Pakistan and its democratic socialist government under Bhutto. Although his socialist ideas were aligned with some communist principles, he did not formally ally with communism. Under Bhutto's leadership, Pakistan sought to engage with the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, fostering closer ties with the Soviet bloc and the Soviet Union.

At the same time, Bhutto attempted to maintain a balanced relationship with the United States, but these efforts were largely met with resistance. While he opposed ultra-leftist ideologies, Bhutto was a strong advocate for left-wing politics, which had been opposed by the U.S. since the early days of his government in Pakistan.

When differences develop, a small country should not take on a great power head-on, it is wiser for it to duck, detour, side-step and try to enter from the back-door...

— Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, on U.S.-Pakistan relations,

Despite Richard Nixon's strong friendship and positive relations with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the dynamics shifted dramatically during Jimmy Carter's presidency. Carter, known for his anti-socialist stance, imposed stricter sanctions on Pakistan and exerted pressure on the government through the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Brigadier-General Henry Byroade. The socialist orientation of Bhutto’s administration and his left-wing policies alarmed the United States, raising concerns about the potential loss of Pakistan as an ally in the Cold War. The American perception was that Bhutto's government displayed a degree of sympathy towards leftist ideologies and maintained a favorable approach towards the Soviet Union. This relationship was particularly troubling for the U.S., as it seemed to facilitate the Soviet Union's access to Pakistan's warm water ports—an asset that both superpowers coveted but lacked.

In the 1976 presidential election, Jimmy Carter was elected as President of the United States, and he used his inaugural address to express his commitment to pursuing a ban on nuclear weapons. With Carter's rise to power, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto found himself cut off from the connections he had previously established with the U.S. administration under Nixon. As a result, Bhutto faced an embargo and pressure from a President who fundamentally opposed the political goals he aimed to achieve. In his speech, Carter subtly signaled his disapproval of Bhutto’s ambitions and electoral plans.

In response to Carter, Bhutto initiated a more assertive diplomatic campaign directed at the United States and the Western world regarding nuclear issues. His firm position on nuclear matters placed the United States, particularly Carter, in a challenging position at the United Nations, where it became difficult for them to counter Bhutto's criticisms. Bhutto criticised India's nuclear program, accusing it of contributing to nuclear proliferation, effectively sidelining both India and the Soviet Union in the discourse. Through letters to global and Western leaders, Bhutto articulated his intentions clearly, making it evident to the United States and the international community what his stance was on nuclear policy:

Pakistan was exposed to a kind of "nuclear threat and blackmail" unparalleled elsewhere..... (...)... If the world's community failed to provide political insurance to Pakistan and other countries against the nuclear blackmail, these countries would be a constraint to launch atomic bomb programs of their own!... [A]ssurances provided by the United Nations were not "Enough!"...

— Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, statement written in "Eating Grass", source

Despite the embargo imposed by Carter on Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, with the technical expertise and diplomatic guidance of Foreign Minister Aziz Ahmed, managed to acquire sensitive equipment, common metal materials, and electronic components disguised as "common items." This subterfuge significantly advanced Pakistan's atomic bomb project. Although Bhutto sought to address the escalating tensions, Carter deliberately undermined the negotiations. Historian Abdul Ghafoor Buhgari, in his thesis, accuses Carter of damaging Bhutto's credibility. However, he opposed Bhutto's execution and urged General Zia-ul-Haq to spare his life.

The senior leadership of the Pakistan Peoples Party attempted to engage with various ambassadors and high commissioners from different countries, but they refrained from meeting the U.S. ambassador, fully aware of Carter's "noble" role in the situation. By the time the Carter administration became aware of Bhutto's nuclear ambitions, the program had progressed significantly, which adversely impacted the SALT I Treaty, leading it toward collapse. This situation highlighted President Carter's failure to curb nuclear proliferation, particularly as the arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States intensified.

In 1974, following India’s nuclear test near Pakistan’s eastern border, codenamed Smiling Buddha, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto sought to persuade the United States to impose economic sanctions on India. However, this effort proved unsuccessful. During a meeting between Pakistan's ambassador to the U.S. and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the latter remarked that the nuclear test was "a fait accompli" and that Pakistan would have to adjust to this reality, acknowledging that it was "a little rough" for Pakistan.

As the 1970s progressed, relations between Bhutto and the U.S. further deteriorated. Bhutto continued to oversee research on weapons, and in a 1976 meeting with Kissinger, the Secretary of State warned him that if he did not cancel, modify, or delay the Reprocessing Plant Agreement, the U.S. would make "a horrible example" of him. Bhutto ended the meeting by stating, "For my country's sake, for the sake of the people of Pakistan, I did not succumb to that blackmail and threats."

Following this encounter, Bhutto intensified his policies of nationalisation and industrialisation, while also taking decisive steps to promote scientific research related to atomic weapons. He authorised the establishment of the Chagai weapon-testing laboratories, despite U.S. opposition, which predicted that this action could lead to a devastating conflict between India and Pakistan in the future. By 1978, Pakistan's atomic bomb project had reached full maturity, culminating in a cold test conducted in 1983, known as Kirana-I.

In 1974, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto convened the Organisation of Islamic Conference with the aim of uniting the Muslim world. However, in 1977, he was arrested by his own appointed army chief, Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, who imposed martial law and took over as president in 1978. The following year, in 1979, Bhutto was executed by hanging for the murder of a political rival.

Military dictatorship (1977–1988)

Crile and Charlie Wilson meeting with ISI officers in the 1980s.

In 1979, following the Grand Mosque Seizure, a group of Pakistani students set fire to the American embassy in Islamabad, resulting in its complete destruction and the deaths of two Americans, as they protested against perceived U.S. involvement.

After the ousting and subsequent execution of Bhutto, Pakistan's relationship with the United States began to improve. On 24 December 1979, the Soviet 40th Army invaded Afghanistan, prompting President Carter to announce his doctrine (known as the Carter Doctrine). This doctrine included the establishment of a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), an increase in the deployment of United States Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT), and a collective security framework for the region. It also committed the U.S. to defend Pakistan through the transfer of substantial military aid and financial support.

In the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the ISI and CIA launched Operation Cyclone, a multibillion-dollar initiative aimed at undermining the communist regime and defeating Soviet forces in Afghanistan. During General Zia-ul-Haq's military rule, relations between Pakistan and the United States reached an all-time high, with the U.S. providing billions of dollars in economic and military assistance to Pakistan. The Soviet invasion in December 1979 underscored the shared interests of both nations in countering the Soviet Union.

In 1981, Pakistan and the U.S. agreed on a military and economic assistance program valued at $3.2 billion, designed to help Pakistan address the increased security threats in the region and its economic development challenges. With U.S. support, Pakistan undertook the largest covert operation in history, supplying arms and resources to anti-Soviet fighters in Afghanistan.

Space science collaboration

In the 1990s, the United States, along with the Missile Technology Control Regime, imposed restrictions on Pakistan's space program due to concerns over the country's purported covert missile development activities. The U.S. had initiated collaboration with Pakistan in peaceful space technology during the 1960s, following the establishment of the Sonmiani Terminal in 1961, which included the construction of an airfield and a launch pad. In 1962, the Space Research Commission successfully launched Rehbar-I, the first solid-fuel rocket, developed in close partnership with NASA. This achievement made Pakistan the first country in the Indian subcontinent and the tenth globally to conduct a rocket launch. Between 1962 and 1972, around 200 rockets were launched from Sonmiani; however, this cooperation diminished after 1972. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the U.S. further tightened its embargo on Pakistan's space development. In 1998, sanctions were placed on DESTO, the country's leading astronautics research organisation. However, these sanctions were lifted in 2001 by the Bush administration.

Public Opinion

The ongoing conflicts have significantly deteriorated public sentiment in both countries, with each viewing the other as one of its least preferred nations. In 2012, merely 10% of Americans reported having trust in Pakistan, while only 12% of Pakistanis held a positive opinion of the United States during the same period. The U.S. also faced low approval ratings across various nations in the Greater Middle East, with figures such as 19% in Egypt, 15% in Turkey, and 12% in Jordan. Furthermore, around 74% of Pakistanis considered the United States to be an adversary.

American foreign policy was particularly unpopular in Pakistan, especially regarding U.S. drone strikes. According to a Pew survey, 74% of Pakistanis felt that these drone strikes resulted in the deaths of few innocent civilians. Additionally, U.S. aid programs were often criticised and perceived as instruments for promoting American interests at the cost of Pakistan's security, undermining so-called democracy, and encouraging corruption. Only 12% of Pakistanis viewed U.S. economic assistance positively, with an even smaller fraction, just 8%, seeing U.S. military aid as beneficial for the country.