History of Indian foreign relations
The history of Indian foreign policy [lower-alpha 1] pertains to the country's international relations after gaining independence. This includes the period when India was a Dominion from 1947 to 1950 and continues with its status as a Republic starting in 1950.
Nehru's foreign policy[edit]
From 1947 to 1964, Jawaharlal Nehru, who was the Prime Minister of India, played a key role in establishing the country's foreign policy, often with the help of Krishna Menon. Nehru also held the position of Minister of External Affairs and made all significant decisions regarding foreign policy after discussing them with his advisors. He then delegated the management of international relations to senior officials in the Indian Foreign Service. Nehru addressed five main issues during this time:[1][2]
- One of the significant challenges in India's foreign policy following independence in 1947 was the tumultuous partition of the subcontinent, which resulted in the creation of Pakistan as a separate nation. The relationship between India and Pakistan was marked by tension, primarily due to border conflicts. This hostility led to multiple wars, including the first conflict from 1947 to 1948 and another in 1965.[3]
- During this time, another significant foreign policy challenge for India was its relationship with China, which lies to the north. India acknowledged the People's Republic of China in 1950 and set up diplomatic ties with it. However, ongoing border disputes ultimately resulted in the Sino-Indian War in 1962.[4]
- Non-Alignment movement: India adopted a policy of non-alignment during the Cold War, with Jawaharlal Nehru playing a pivotal role in the Non-Aligned Movement. This movement included developing nations that chose not to align with either the Western bloc, led by the United States and Britain, or the Eastern bloc, led by the Soviet Union.[5] Nehru harbored aspirations of creating an international coalition among non-colonial and colonized nations. However, the global landscape was increasingly divided due to the Cold War's emergence.
Recognizing the urgency of formulating policies concerning the Cold War and India's relationships with Pakistan, Britain, and the Commonwealth, Nehru prioritized these issues over other plans. While he viewed the Soviet Union with suspicion, he sought to reassure Western powers that India would not align with the Soviet bloc in times of war or peace. Nehru's aversion to the Cold War stemmed from his belief that deeper involvement would hinder India's long-term goals of economic growth and national development. Consequently, he took a leadership role in promoting the principles of non-alignment.
- Kashmir conflict: The Kashmir conflict represented a significant foreign policy challenge for Nehru, focusing on the division of the region of Kashmir, which has a predominantly Muslim population. Both India and Pakistan claimed the entire territory, leading to several conflicts over its division. The United Nations attempted to mediate a resolution, but these efforts did not yield a successful outcome.
At the UN, discussions included support from the Soviet Union for Pakistan's position, which raised the possibility of arbitration or a plebiscite to determine the future of the region. Nevertheless, Pakistan was not ready to adhere to the UN resolution regarding India maintaining a minimal presence of forces in Kashmir to facilitate the completion of the plebiscite and maintain law and order situations. This decision solidified India's stance on the matter and influenced the complexities surrounding the search for a peaceful resolution.
- Economic development: India encountered the challenge of advancing economic development while also securing foreign aid and investment to reach its objectives. The country sought assistance from both Western and Eastern bloc nations, but this aid was frequently tied to political alignment or other stipulations. Nehru aimed for India to achieve self-sufficiency in its economic efforts.
Nehru decided to maintain India's membership in the British Commonwealth, even though there was significant distrust of Britain within his Congress party. Common concerns included the British UN delegation's open support for Pakistan regarding Kashmir, Britain's military assistance to Pakistan, and London's backing of Dutch efforts against Indonesian nationalism. During that period, the Commonwealth served primarily as a forum for discussion, but one of its goals was to represent the interests of Third World countries. Not being a member would have strengthened Pakistan's position. Additionally, there was a clear need for American support in terms of aid, loans, and trade. Nehru wanted to avoid becoming overly dependent on the United States, so maintaining ties with Britain and the Commonwealth acted as a counterbalance. He also emphasized that the symbolic role of the King should be limited to ensure that there was no perception of royal sovereignty in India.
Foreign policy since 1989[edit]
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the conclusion of the Cold War in 1989, India was freed from the complexities of its nonaligned stance during that era. Diplomat Shivshankar Menon highlighted five key policy decisions made during this time: the 1993 Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement with China; the Civil Nuclear Agreement with the United States in 2005; the decision not to use force against Pakistan after the 2008 Mumbai attacks; addressing the civil war in Sri Lanka; and the declaration of a No First Use policy regarding nuclear weapons.
Notes[edit]
- ↑ भारत के वैदेशिक सम्बन्धों का इतिहास
References[edit]
- ↑ David M. Malone et al. eds. The Oxford handbook of Indian foreign policy (2015) pp 92–103.
- ↑ C.H. Heimsath, Surjit Mansingh, A diplomatic history of modern India (1971) online
- ↑ Malone, e Oxford handbook of Indian foreign policy (2015) pp 370–83
- ↑ Malone, e Oxford handbook of Indian foreign policy (2015) pp 356–369.
- ↑ Itty Abraham, "From Bandung to NAM: Non-alignment and Indian foreign policy, 1947–65." Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 46.2 (2008): 195-219. online Archived 2023-07-14 at the Wayback Machine