People's Liberation Army: Difference between revisions

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{{Short description|Combined military forces of the People's Republic of China}}
{{Short description|Combined military forces of the People's Republic of China}}
{{other uses|Military of China (disambiguation)|Chinese Army (disambiguation)|People's Liberation Army (disambiguation)|Chinese Red Army}}
{{redirect|PLA}}
 
{{about|the overall military of the People's Republic of China|for the 'ground force' or army|People's Liberation Army Ground Force|other uses|People's Liberation Army (disambiguation)|and|Chinese Army (disambiguation)|and|People's Liberation Army (disambiguation)}}
{{use dmy dates|date=December 2019}}
{{Pp-semi-vandalism|small=yes}}
{{engvarB |date = November 2015}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=December 2019}}
 
{{Use British English |date = November 2015}}
{{Infobox national military
{{Infobox national military
| name = People's Liberation Army
| name = People's Liberation Army
| native_name = {{noitalic|{{lang|zh-Hans-CN|中国人民解放军}}}}<br />Zhōngguó Rénmín Jiěfàngjūn
| native_name = 中国人民解放军
| image = [[File:China Emblem PLA.svg|180px]]
| image = [[File:China Emblem PLA.svg|180px]]
| alt =  
| alt =  
| caption = Emblem of the People's Liberation Army
| caption = [[Emblem of the People's Liberation Army]]
| image2 = [[File:People's Liberation Army Flag of the People's Republic of China.svg|180px]]
| image2 = [[File:People's Liberation Army Flag of the People's Republic of China.svg|180px]]
| alt2 =  
| alt2 =  
| caption2 = [[Flag of the People's Liberation Army]]<br />The characters are "八一", referencing [[Nanchang uprising|August 1]].
| caption2 = [[Flag of the People's Liberation Army]]<br />The characters are "八一", referencing [[Nanchang uprising|August 1]].
| motto = {{lang|zh-Hans-CN|为人民服务}}<br />("[[Serve the People]]")
| motto = {{lang|zh-Hans-CN|为人民服务}}<br />("[[Serve the People]]")
| founded = {{Start date and age|df=yes|1927|8|1}}  
| founded = {{Start date and age|df=yes|1927|8|1}}<br>[[Nanchang uprising]]
| current_form = {{Start date and age|df=yes|1947|10|10}}<ref name=NRAPLA>{{cite web|url=http://m.cnwest.com/sxxw/a/2020/08/01/18969370.html|title=【延安记忆】"中国人民解放军"称谓由此开始|date=2020-08-01|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200822221319/http://m.cnwest.com/sxxw/a/2020/08/01/18969370.html|archive-date=2020-08-22|url-status=live|access-date=2020-08-22}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://photo.chinamil.com.cn/tsjs/2017-10/10/content_7780489.htm|title=1947年10月10日,《中国人民解放军宣言》发布|publisher=中国军网|date=2017-10-10|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200822211432/http://photo.chinamil.com.cn/tsjs/2017-10/10/content_7780489.htm|archive-date=2020-08-22|url-status=live|access-date=2020-08-22}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url = http://taihangsummit.com/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E5%85%B1%E4%BA%A7%E5%85%9A%E9%A2%86%E5%AF%BC%E7%9A%84%E7%BA%A2%E5%86%9B%E6%94%B9%E7%BC%96%E4%B8%BA%E5%85%AB%E8%B7%AF%E5%86%9B%E7%9A%84%E8%83%8C%E6%99%AF%E5%92%8C%E6%94%B9%E7%BC%96/ |title = 中国共产党领导的红军改编为八路军的背景和改编情况 – 太行英雄网 |access-date = 7 January 2022 |archive-date = 7 January 2022 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20220107174949/http://taihangsummit.com/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E5%85%B1%E4%BA%A7%E5%85%9A%E9%A2%86%E5%AF%BC%E7%9A%84%E7%BA%A2%E5%86%9B%E6%94%B9%E7%BC%96%E4%B8%BA%E5%85%AB%E8%B7%AF%E5%86%9B%E7%9A%84%E8%83%8C%E6%99%AF%E5%92%8C%E6%94%B9%E7%BC%96/ |url-status = live }}</ref>
| current_form = {{Start date and age|df=yes|1947|10|10}}
| branches = {{plainlist|
| branches = '''Services'''<br>{{Plain list|
# {{Army|China|name=Ground Force|size=23px}}
# {{Army|China|name=Ground Force|size=23px}}
# {{Navy|China|name=Navy|size=23px}}
# {{Navy|China|name=Navy|size=23px}}
# {{Air force|China|name=Air Force|size=23px}}
# {{Air force|China|name=Air Force|size=23px}}
# {{Flagicon image|Rocket Force Flag of the People's Republic of China.svg|size=23px}} [[People's Liberation Army Rocket Force|Rocket Force]]
# {{Flagicon image|Rocket Force Flag of the People's Republic of China.svg|size=23px}} [[People's Liberation Army Rocket Force|Rocket Force]]
# {{Flagicon image|PLASSF.svg|size=23px}} [[People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force|Strategic Support Force]]
}}
}}
| headquarters = August First Building (ceremonial), etc., [[Fuxing Road, Beijing|Fuxing Road]], [[Haidian District]], [[Beijing]]
'''Arms'''<br>{{Plain list|
| website ={{Official URL}}  
# [[File:Aerospace Flag of the People's Republic of China.svg|23x17px|border]] [[People's Liberation Army Aerospace Force|Aerospace Force]]
| commander-in-chief = [[File:Danghui.svg|18px]] [[File:National Emblem of the People's Republic of China (2).svg|18px]] [[Central Military Commission (China)|Central Military Commission]] (CMC)
# [[File:Cyberspace Flag of the People's Republic of China.svg|23x17px|border]] [[People's Liberation Army Cyberspace Force|Cyberspace Force]]
# [[File:Information Support Flag of the People's Republic of China.svg|23x17px|border]] [[People's Liberation Army Information Support Force|Information Support Force]]
# [[File:Joint Logistics Support Flag of the People's Republic of China.svg|23x17px|border]] [[People's Liberation Army Joint Logistics Support Force|Joint Logistics Support Force]]
}}
| headquarters = [[August First Building]], [[Fuxing Road, Beijing|Fuxing Road]], [[Haidian, Beijing]]
| website = {{Official URL}}
| commander-in-chief = [[Central Military Commission (China)|Central Military Commission]]
{{Infobox |child = yes
{{Infobox |child = yes
|label1 = [[Supreme Military Command of the People's Republic of China|CMC leadership]]
|label1 = [[Supreme Military Command of the People's Republic of China|CMC leadership]]
|data1 = '''[[Chairman of the Central Military Commission (China)|Chairman]]:'''<br />{{Flagicon image|Flag of the Chinese Communist Party.svg}}{{Flagdeco|China}} [[Xi Jinping]]<br /><br />'''[[Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission|Vice Chairmen]]''':<br />
|data1 = '''[[Chairman of the Central Military Commission (China)|Chairman]]:'''<br />{{Flagicon image|Flag of the Chinese Communist Party.svg}}{{Flagdeco|China}} [[Xi Jinping]]<br />'''[[Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission|Vice Chairman]]''':<br />{{Flagicon image|Rocket Force Flag of the People's Republic of China.svg}} [[Jiang (rank)|General]] [[Zhang Shengmin]]
{{Flagdeco|China|army}} [[Ranks of the People's Liberation Army Ground Force|General]]  [[Zhang Youxia]]
{{Flagdeco|China|army}} [[Ranks of the People's Liberation Army Ground Force|General]] [[He Weidong]]
}}
}}
| commander-in-chief_title = Governing body
| commander-in-chief_title = Governing body
| chief minister = {{Flagdeco|China|army}}{{Flagicon image|PLASSF.svg|size=15px}} [[Jiang (rank)|General]] [[Li Shangfu]]
| chief minister = {{Flagdeco|China|navy}} [[Jiang (rank)|Admiral]] [[Dong Jun]]
| chief minister_title = Minister of [[Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China|National Defense]]
| chief minister_title = [[Minister of National Defense (China)|Minister of National Defense]]
| minister           = {{Flagdeco|China|navy}} [[Jiang (rank)|Admiral]] [[Miao Hua]]
| minister = ''Vacant''
| minister_title     = Director of the [[Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission|Political Work Department]]
| minister_title = Director of the [[Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission|Political Work Department]]
| chief_of_staff     = {{Flagdeco|China|army}} [[Jiang (rank)|General]] [[Liu Zhenli (general)|Liu Zhenli]]
| chief_of_staff = ''Vacant''
| chief_of_staff_title = Chief of the [[Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission|Joint Staff Department]]
| chief_of_staff_title = Chief of the [[Joint Staff Department (China)|Joint Staff Department]]
| commander         = {{Flagicon image|Rocket Force Flag of the People's Republic of China.svg}} [[Jiang (rank)|General]] [[Zhang Shengmin]]
| commander = {{Flagicon image|Rocket Force Flag of the People's Republic of China.svg}} [[Jiang (rank)|General]] [[Zhang Shengmin]]
| commander_title = Secretary of [[Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Central Military Commission|Discipline Inspection Commission]]
| commander_title = Secretary of [[Discipline Inspection Commission of the Central Military Commission|Discipline Inspection Commission]]
<!-- Manpower -->
<!-- Manpower -->| age = 18
| age               = 18
| conscription = [[Conscription_in_China|Inactive since 1949]] (Law dictates a hybrid system of conscripts and volunteers)<ref name=":4" />
| conscription       = Yes by law, but not enforced in practice. All adult males must register for the draft.<ref>{{cite web | url=http://www.cna.com.tw/news/newsworld/201504020004-1.aspx | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170203162818/http://www.cna.com.tw/news/newsworld/201504020004-1.aspx | archive-date=3 February 2017 | title=解放軍地位高 農夫搶當兵 &#124; 全球中央 }}</ref>
| manpower_data =  
| manpower_data     =  
| manpower_age =  
| manpower_age       =  
| available =  
| available         =  
| available_f =  
| available_f       =  
| fit =  
| fit               =  
| fit_f =  
| fit_f             =  
| reaching =  
| reaching           =  
| reaching_f =  
| reaching_f         =  
| active = 2,035,000 (2025){{Sfn|The International Institute for Strategic Studies|2025|p=240}}
| active             = 2,035,000 (2022){{sfn|The International Institute for Strategic Studies|2022|p=255}}
| ranked = 1st
| ranked             = 1st
| reserve = 510,000 (2025){{sfn|The International Institute for Strategic Studies|2025|p=240}}
| reserve           = 510,000 (2022){{sfn|The International Institute for Strategic Studies|2022|p=255}}
| deployed = <!-- Financial -->
| deployed           =
| amount = US$314 billion (2024)<ref name="SIPRI-2020">{{Cite web |date=April 2025 |title=Trends in Military Expenditure 2024 |url=https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-04/2504_fs_milex_2024.pdf#page=2 |access-date=28 April 2025 |publisher=[[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]]}}</ref><br />([[List of countries by military expenditures|ranked 2nd]])
<!-- Financial -->
| percent_GDP = 1.7% (2024)<ref name="SIPRI-2020"/>
| amount             = US$293 billion (2022)<ref name="SIPRI-2020">{{cite web |last1=Tian |first1=Nan |last2=Fleurant |first2=Aude |last3=Kuimova |first3=Alexandra |last4=Wezeman |first4=Pieter D. |last5=Wezeman |first5=Siemon T. |date=24 April 2022 |title=Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2021 |url=https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2022-04/fs_2204_milex_2021_0.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220425064753/https://www.sipri.org/publications/2022/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-world-military-expenditure-2021 |archive-date=25 April 2022 |access-date=25 April 2022 |publisher=[[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]]}}</ref><br />([[List of countries by military expenditures|ranked 2nd]])  
| percent_GDP       = 1.7% (2022)<ref name="SIPRI-2020"/>  
| domestic_suppliers = {{blist
| domestic_suppliers = {{blist
| [[China National Aero-Technology Import & Export Corporation]]
| [[China National Aero-Technology Import & Export Corporation]]
Line 74: Line 75:
| [[China National Nuclear Corporation]]
| [[China National Nuclear Corporation]]
}}
}}
| foreign_suppliers = {{plainlist|
| foreign_suppliers = {{Plain list|
*{{flag|Russia}}
* {{Flag|Russia}}
*{{Flag|France}}  
* {{Flag|France}}
}}
}}
<br>''Historical'': {{unbulletedlist|{{USSR}}<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3139603/how-china-grew-buyer-major-arms-trade-player |title=China's arms trade: which countries does it buy from and sell to? |website=South China Morning Post |first=Maryann |last=Xue |date=4 July 2021 }}</ref>}}  
Historical: {{Unbulleted list|{{USSR}}<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3139603/how-china-grew-buyer-major-arms-trade-player |title=China's arms trade: which countries does it buy from and sell to? |website=South China Morning Post |first=Maryann |last=Xue |date=4 July 2021 |access-date=26 May 2022 |archive-date=26 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220526161751/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3139603/how-china-grew-buyer-major-arms-trade-player |url-status=live }}</ref>}}
| imports           = {{Currency|14.858 billion|USD|passthrough=yes|linked=no}} (2010–2021)<ref name="SIPRI"/>
| imports = {{Currency|14.858 billion|US$|passthrough=yes|linked=no}}<br>(2010–2021)<ref name="SIPRI"/>
| exports           = {{Currency|18.121 billion|USD|passthrough=yes|linked=no}} (2010–2021)<ref name="SIPRI">{{cite web|url=https://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php|title=TIV of arms imports/exports from China, 2010-2021|date=7 February 2022|work=[[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]]}}</ref>  
| exports = {{Currency|18.121 billion|US$|passthrough=yes|linked=no}}<br>(2010–2021)<ref name="SIPRI">{{cite web|url=https://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php|title=TIV of arms imports/exports from China, 2010–2021|date=7 February 2022|work=[[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]]|access-date=26 January 2023|archive-date=21 June 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230621145309/https://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php|url-status=live}}</ref>  
<!-- Related articles -->
<!-- Related articles -->| history = {{Plain list|
| history           = [[History of the People's Liberation Army|History of the PLA]]<br />[[Modernization of the People's Liberation Army|Modernization of the PLA]]<br />[[List of Chinese wars and battles|Historical Chinese wars and battles]]<br />[[List of wars involving the People's Republic of China|Military engagements]]
* [[History of the People's Liberation Army|History of the PLA]]
| ranks              = [[Ranks of the People's Liberation Army Ground Force|Army ranks]]<br />[[Ranks of the People's Liberation Army Navy|Navy ranks]]<br />[[Ranks of the People's Liberation Army Air Force|Air force ranks]]
* [[Modernization of the People's Liberation Army|Modernization of the PLA]]
* [[List of Chinese wars and battles|Historical Chinese wars and battles]]
* [[List of wars involving the People's Republic of China|Military engagements]]
}}
}}
{{Chinese
| ranks = {{Plain list|
* [[Ranks of the People's Liberation Army Ground Force|Army ranks]]
* [[Ranks of the People's Liberation Army Navy|Navy ranks]]
* [[Ranks of the People's Liberation Army Air Force|Air force ranks]]
}}
}}
{{Infobox Chinese
| title = Chinese People's Liberation Army
| title = Chinese People's Liberation Army
| t = 中國人民解放軍
| t = 中國人民解放軍
Line 91: Line 100:
| l = "China People Liberation Army"
| l = "China People Liberation Army"
| p = Zhōngguó Rénmín Jiěfàngjūn
| p = Zhōngguó Rénmín Jiěfàngjūn
| w = Chung<sup>1</sup>-kuo<sup>2</sup> Jen<sup>2</sup>-min<sup>2</sup> Chieh<sup>3</sup>-fang<sup>4</sup>-chün<sup>1</sup>
| tp = Jhong-guó Rén-mín Jiě-fàng-jyun
| w = {{tone superscript|Chung1-kuo2 Jen2-min2 Chieh3-fang4-chün1}}
| y = Jūng-gwok Yàhn-màhn Gáai-fong-gwān
| y = Jūng-gwok Yàhn-màhn Gáai-fong-gwān
| j = Zung1-gwok3 Jan4-man4 Gaai2-fong3-gwan1
| j = zung1 gwok3 jan4 man4 gaai2 fong3 gwan1
| bpmf = ㄓㄨㄥ ㄍㄨㄛˊ ㄖㄣˊ ㄇㄧㄣˊ ㄐㄧㄝˇ ㄈㄤˋ ㄐㄩㄣ
| bpmf = ㄓㄨㄥ ㄍㄨㄛˊ ㄖㄣˊ ㄇㄧㄣˊ ㄐㄧㄝˇ ㄈㄤˋ ㄐㄩㄣ
| mi = {{IPAc-cmn|zh|ong|1|.|g|uo|2|-|r|en|2|.|m|in|2|-|j|ie|3|.|f|ang|2|.|jun|1}}
| mi = {{IPAc-cmn|zh|ong|1|.|g|uo|2|-|r|en|2|.|m|in|2|-|j|ie|3|.|f|ang|2|.|jun|1}}
| ci = {{IPAc-yue|z|ung|1|.|gw|ok|3|-|j|an|4|.|m|an|4|-|g|aai|2|.|f|ong|3|.|gw|an|1}}
| ci = {{IPAc-yue|z|ung|1|-|gw|ok|3|-|j|an|4|-|m|an|4|-|g|aai|2|-|f|ong|3|-|gw|an|1}}
| order = st
| order = st
}}
}}
{{PRC military sidebar}}
{{Politics of China |expanded = Military }}
{{Politics of China |expanded = Military }}


The '''People's Liberation Army''' ('''PLA''') is the principal military force of the [[China|People's Republic of China]] and the armed wing of the [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP). The PLA consists of five [[Military branch|service branches]]: the [[People's Liberation Army Ground Force|Ground Force]], [[People's Liberation Army Navy|Navy]], [[People's Liberation Army Air Force|Air Force]], [[People's Liberation Army Rocket Force|Rocket Force]], and [[People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force|Strategic Support Force]]. It is under the leadership of the [[Central Military Commission (China)|Central Military Commission]] (CMC) with its [[Chairman of the Central Military Commission (China)|chairman]] as [[Supreme Military Command of the People's Republic of China|commander-in-chief]].
The '''People's Liberation Army''' ('''PLA''') is the military wing of the [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP) and the primary armed forces of the [[People's Republic of China]] (PRC). It consists of four [[Military branch|services]][[People's Liberation Army Ground Force|Ground Force]], [[People's Liberation Army Navy|Navy]], [[People's Liberation Army Air Force|Air Force]], and [[People's Liberation Army Rocket Force|Rocket Force]]—and four arms—[[People's Liberation Army Aerospace Force|Aerospace Force]], [[People's Liberation Army Cyberspace Force|Cyberspace Force]], [[People's Liberation Army Information Support Force|Information Support Force]], and [[People's Liberation Army Joint Logistics Support Force|Joint Logistics Support Force]]. It operates under the CCP's [[The Party commands the gun|absolute control]] and is led by the [[Central Military Commission (China)|Central Military Commission]] (CMC) with its [[Chairman of the Central Military Commission (China)|chairman]] as [[Supreme Military Command of the People's Republic of China|commander-in-chief]].


The PLA can trace its origins during the [[Republic of China (1912–1949)|Republican Era]] to the left-wing units of the [[National Revolutionary Army]] (NRA) of the [[Kuomintang]] (KMT) when they broke away in 1927 in an [[Nanchang Uprising|uprising]] against the [[nationalist government]] as the [[Chinese Red Army]], before being reintegrated into the NRA as units of [[New Fourth Army]] and [[Eighth Route Army]] during the [[Second Sino-Japanese War]]. The two NRA communist units were reconstituted as the PLA in 1947.<ref name=":2" /> Since 1949, the PLA has used nine different military strategies, which it calls "strategic guidelines". The most important came in 1956, 1980, and 1993.<ref name="M. Taylor Fravel 2019" /> In times of national emergency, the [[People's Armed Police]] (PAP) and the [[Militia (China)|China Militia]] act as a reserve and support element for the PLAGF. Politically, the PLA and PAP are represented in the [[National People's Congress]] (NPC) through a delegation of 285 deputies, all of whom are CCP members. Since the formation of the NPC, the joint PLA–PAP delegation has always constituted the largest delegation and today comprises just over 9% of the NPC.<ref>{{Cite news |date=27 April 2017 |title=第十三届全国人民代表大会代表名额分配方案 |language=zh |trans-title=Allocation Plan for Deputies to the Thirteenth National People's Congress |work=[[The National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China|National People's Congress]] |url=http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2017-04/27/content_2020775.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170626005308/http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2017-04/27/content_2020775.htm |archive-date=26 June 2017}}</ref>
The PLA can trace its origins during the [[Republic of China (1912–1949)|Republican era]] to the left-wing units of the [[National Revolutionary Army]] (NRA) of the [[Kuomintang]] (KMT), when they broke away in 1927 in an [[Nanchang Uprising|uprising]] against the [[nationalist government]] as the [[Chinese Red Army]] before being reintegrated into the NRA as units of [[New Fourth Army]] and [[Eighth Route Army]] during the [[Second Sino-Japanese War]]. The two NRA communist units were reconstituted as the PLA in 1947. Since 1949, the PLA has used nine different military strategies, which it calls "strategic guidelines". The most important came in 1956, 1980, and 1993. Politically, the PLA and the paramilitary [[People's Armed Police]] (PAP) have the [[People's Liberation Army and People's Armed Police delegation to the National People's Congress|largest delegation]] in the [[National People's Congress]] (NPC); the joint delegation currently has 281 deputies—over 9% of the total—all of whom are CCP members.


PRC law explicitly asserts the leadership of the CCP over the armed forces of China and designates the CMC as the nationwide military command of the People's Republic of China. The Party CMC operates under the name of the State CMC for legal and governmental functions and as the ceremonial [[Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China|Ministry of National Defense]] (MoD) for diplomatic functions. The PLA is obliged to follow the principle of the CCP's absolute [[civilian control of the military]] under the doctrine of "[[Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun|the party commands the gun]]" ({{Lang-zh|c=党指挥枪|p=Dǎng zhǐhuī qiāng}})<ref name="M. Taylor Fravel 2019">{{Cite book |last=Fravel |first=M. Taylor |title=Active Defense: China's Military Strategy since 1949 |date=2019-04-23 |publisher=[[Princeton University Press]] |isbn=978-0-691-18559-0 |doi=10.2307/j.ctv941tzj |jstor=j.ctv941tzj |s2cid=159282413 |author-link=Taylor Fravel}}</ref> In this sense, the PLA is not a national army of the type of traditional nation-states, but a political army or the armed branch of the CCP itself since its allegiance is to the party only and not the state or any constitution. At present, the CMC chairman is customarily also the CCP [[General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party|general secretary]].<ref>{{cite web |title=Xi Jinping Has a New Title: Commander-in-Chief of the People's Liberation Army |url=https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/xi-jinping-has-a-new-title-commander-in-chief-of-the-peoples-liberation-army/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211006042951/https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/xi-jinping-has-a-new-title-commander-in-chief-of-the-peoples-liberation-army/ |archive-date=6 October 2021 |access-date=2021-09-30 |website=[[The Diplomat]]}}</ref>
The PLA is not a traditional nation-state military. It is the armed wing of the CCP and controlled by the party, not by the state. The PLA's primary mission is the defense of the party and its interests. The PLA is the guarantor of the party's survival and rule, and the party prioritizes maintaining control and the loyalty of the PLA. According to Chinese law, the party has absolute control over the armed forces and the CMC exercises supreme military command; the party and state CMCs are practically a single body by membership. Since 1989, the [[General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party|CCP general secretary]] has also been the CMC Chairman; this grants significant political power as the only member of the [[Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|Politburo Standing Committee]] with direct responsibilities for the armed forces. The [[Ministry of National Defense (China)|Ministry of National Defense]] has no command authority; it is the PLA's interface with state and foreign entities and insulates the PLA from external influence.


Today, the majority of military units around the country are assigned to one of five [[Theater commands of the People's Liberation Army|theater commands]] by geographical location. The PLA is [[List of countries by number of military and paramilitary personnel|the world's largest military force]] (not including paramilitary or reserve forces) and has the second largest defense budget in the world. China's military expenditure was US$292&nbsp;billion in 2022, accounting for [[List of countries by military expenditures|13 percent of the world's defense expenditures]].'''''<ref name="SIPRI-20202">{{cite web |date=April 2023 |title=Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2022 |url=https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2023-04/2304_fs_milex_2022.pdf |access-date=29 April 2023 |publisher=[[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]]}}</ref>''''' It is also one of the fastest modernizing militaries in the world, and has been termed as a potential military superpower, with significant regional defense and rising global [[power projection]] capabilities.<ref name="Studies2020">{{cite book |author=International Institute for Strategic Studies |title=The Military Balance 2020 |date=15 February 2020 |publisher=[[Routledge]] |isbn=9780367466398 |location=London, England |page=259 |ref=IISS2020 |author-link=International Institute for Strategic Studies}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Global military spending remains high at $1.7 trillion |url=https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2018/global-military-spending-remains-high-17-trillion |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180527073110/https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2018/global-military-spending-remains-high-17-trillion |archive-date=27 May 2018 |access-date=2018-10-13 |website=[[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]] |date=2 May 2018 |language=en}}</ref>
Today, the majority of military units around the country are assigned to one of five [[Theater commands of the People's Liberation Army|theatre commands]] by geographical location. In addition to wartime arrangements, the PLA is also involved in the peacetime operations of other components of the armed forces. This is particularly visible in [[Territorial disputes of the People's Republic of China|maritime territorial disputes]] where the navy is heavily involved in the planning, coordination and execution of operations by the PAP's [[China Coast Guard]]. The PLA is [[List of countries by number of military and paramilitary personnel|the world's largest military force]] (not including paramilitary or [[People's Liberation Army Reserve Force|reserve forces]]) and has the second largest defence budget in the world. China's military expenditure was US$314&nbsp;billion in 2024, accounting for [[List of countries with highest military expenditures|12 percent of the world's defence expenditures]]. It is also one of the fastest modernizing militaries in the world, and has been termed as a potential military superpower, with significant regional defence and rising global [[power projection]] capabilities.<ref>{{cite web |title=Global military spending remains high at $1.7 trillion |url=https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2018/global-military-spending-remains-high-17-trillion |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180527073110/https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2018/global-military-spending-remains-high-17-trillion |archive-date=27 May 2018 |access-date=2018-10-13 |publisher=[[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]] |date=2 May 2018 |language=en}}</ref>{{Sfn|The International Institute for Strategic Studies|2025|p=240}}
 
== Mission ==
The PLA's primary mission is the defense of the CCP and its interests.{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|pp=13–14}} It is the guarantor of the party's survival and rule,{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|pp=13–14}}{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=521}} and the party prioritizes [[Civilian control of the military in communist states|maintaining control]] and the loyalty of the PLA.{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=521}}


== Stated mission ==
In 2004, [[paramount leader]] [[Hu Jintao]] stated the mission of the PLA as:<ref>{{cite web |url = https://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2009/RAND_CT332.pdf |title = The PLA Navy's ''New Historic Missions'': Expanding Capabilities for a Re-emergent Maritime Power |access-date = 1 April 2011 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20110428051927/http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2009/RAND_CT332.pdf |archive-date = 28 April 2011 |url-status = live }}</ref>
In 2004, [[paramount leader]] [[Hu Jintao]] stated the mission of the PLA as:<ref>{{cite web |url = https://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2009/RAND_CT332.pdf |title = The PLA Navy's ''New Historic Missions'': Expanding Capabilities for a Re-emergent Maritime Power |access-date = 1 April 2011 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20110428051927/http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2009/RAND_CT332.pdf |archive-date = 28 April 2011 |url-status = live }}</ref>
* The insurance of CCP leadership
* Consolidate the rule of the CCP
* The protection of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, internal security and national development of the [[China|People's Republic of China]]
* Ensure sovereignty, territorial integrity, internal security and national development of the People's Republic of China
* Safeguarding the country's interests
* Safeguard the country's interests
* Maintaining and safeguarding [[world peace]]
* Help maintain world peace
China describes its military posture as [[active defense]], defined in a 2015 state [[white paper]] as "We will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked."<ref name=":13">{{Cite book |last=Garlick |first=Jeremy |title=Advantage China: Agent of Change in an Era of Global Disruption |date=2024 |publisher=[[Bloomsbury Academic]] |isbn=978-1-350-25231-8 |pages=}}</ref>{{Rp|page=41}}


== History ==
== History ==
{{Main|History of the People's Liberation Army}}
{{Main|History of the People's Liberation Army}}
{{Further|Military history of China before 1911}}


=== Early history ===
=== Early history ===
{{Further|Chinese Civil War|Second Sino-Japanese War}}
{{Further|Chinese Civil War|Second Sino-Japanese War}}


The CCP founded its military wing on 1 August 1927 during the [[Nanchang uprising]], beginning the [[Chinese Civil War]]. [[Communist]] elements of the [[National Revolutionary Army]] rebelled under the leadership of [[Zhu De]], [[He Long]], [[Ye Jianying]], [[Zhou Enlai]], and other leftist elements of the [[Kuomintang]] (KMT), after the [[Shanghai massacre of 1927]].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Carter |first=James |date=4 August 2021 |title=The Nanchang Uprising and the birth of the PLA |url=https://thechinaproject.com/2021/08/04/the-nanchang-uprising-and-the-birth-of-the-pla/ |website=The China Project}}</ref> They were then known as the [[Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army]], or simply the Red Army.<ref>{{Cite web |date=17 June 2004 |title=History of the PLA's Ground Force Organisational Structure and Military Regions |url=https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/history-plas-ground-force-organisational-structure-and-military-regions |website=[[Royal United Services Institute]]}}</ref>
In 1925, the CCP's Central Military Department, was renamed the Central Military Commission.<ref name=":02">{{Cite book |last=Guo |first=Xuezhi |title=China's Security State: Philosophy, Evolution, and Politics |date=2012-08-29 |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |isbn=978-1-107-02323-9 |language=en |doi=10.1017/CBO9781139150897}}</ref>{{Reference page|page=304}} It was first led by [[Zhang Guotao]] who was replaced by [[Zhou Enlai]] in 1926 as head of the CMC.<ref name=":02" />{{Reference page|page=304}} At the time of the [[First United Front]], the CMC was not a unified military command structure but was more of an administrative liaison with other armed communist groups.<ref name=":02" />{{Reference page|page=304}}
 
In 1934 and 1935, the Red Army survived several campaigns led against it by [[Chiang Kai-Shek]]'s KMT and engaged in the [[Long March]].<ref name="Bianco">{{Cite book |last=Bianco |first=Lucien |title=Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915-1949 |title-link=Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915-1949 |date=1971 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-0-8047-0827-2 |pages=68 |language=en |author-link=Lucien Bianco}}</ref>
 
During the [[Second Sino-Japanese War]] from 1937 to 1945, the CCP's military forces were nominally integrated into the National Revolutionary Army of the [[Republic of China]] forming two main units, the [[Eighth Route Army]] and the [[New Fourth Army]].<ref name=":2">{{Cite book |last=Benton |first=Gregor |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ayLTpS8iujQC |title=New Fourth Army: Communist Resistance Along the Yangtze and the Huai, 1938-1941 |date=1999 |publisher=University of California Press |isbn=978-0-520-21992-2 |pages=396 |language=en}}</ref> During this time, these two military groups primarily employed [[guerrilla warfare|guerrilla tactics]], generally avoiding large-scale battles with the Japanese, at the same time consolidating by recruiting KMT troops and paramilitary forces behind Japanese lines into their forces.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Zedong |first=Mao |title=On Guerilla Warfare: Mao Tse-Tung On Guerilla Warfare |title-link=On Guerrilla Warfare |date=2017-11-02 |publisher=Martino Fine Books |isbn=978-1-68422-164-6 |language=en |author-link=Mao Zedong}}</ref>


After the [[Japanese surrender]] in 1945, the CCP continued to use the National Revolutionary Army unit structures until the decision was made in February 1947 to merge the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army, renaming the new million-strong force the People's Liberation Army (PLA).<ref name=":2" /> The reorganization was completed by late 1948. The PLA eventually won the Chinese Civil War, establishing the [[People's Republic of China]] in 1949.<ref>{{Cite web |title=The Chinese Revolution of 1949 |url=https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/chinese-rev |website=[[United States Department of State]], Office of the Historian}}</ref> It then underwent a drastic reorganization, with the establishment of the [[People's Liberation Army Air Force|Air Force]] leadership structure in November 1949, followed by the [[People's Liberation Army Navy|Navy]] leadership structure the following April.<ref>Ken Allen, [http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF182/CF182.ch9.pdf Chapter 9, "PLA Air Force Organization"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070929102648/http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF182/CF182.ch9.pdf|date=2007-09-29}}, The PLA as Organization, ed. James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 349.</ref><ref name="中国人民解放军海军成立70周年多国海军活动新闻发布会在青岛举行">{{cite web |title=中国人民解放军海军成立70周年多国海军活动新闻发布会在青岛举行 |url=http://www.mod.gov.cn/power/2019-04/20/content_4839865.htm |access-date=18 May 2020 |website=mod.gov.cn |publisher=[[Ministry of National Defence of the People's Republic of China]] |language=zh}}</ref>
The CCP founded its military wing on 1 August 1927 during the [[Nanchang uprising]], beginning the [[Chinese Civil War]]. Communist elements of the [[National Revolutionary Army]] rebelled under the leadership of [[Zhu De]], [[He Long]], [[Ye Jianying]], [[Zhou Enlai]], and other leftist elements of the [[Kuomintang]] (KMT) after the [[Shanghai massacre]] in 1927.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Carter |first=James |date=4 August 2021 |title=The Nanchang Uprising and the birth of the PLA |url=https://thechinaproject.com/2021/08/04/the-nanchang-uprising-and-the-birth-of-the-pla/ |website=The China Project |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=7 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221107180237/https://thechinaproject.com/2021/08/04/the-nanchang-uprising-and-the-birth-of-the-pla/ |url-status=live }}</ref> They were then known as the [[Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army]], or simply the Red Army.<ref>{{Cite web |date=17 June 2004 |title=History of the PLA's Ground Force Organisational Structure and Military Regions |url=https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/history-plas-ground-force-organisational-structure-and-military-regions |website=[[Royal United Services Institute]] |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=11 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221111215039/https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/history-plas-ground-force-organisational-structure-and-military-regions/ |url-status=live }}</ref> In 1934 and 1935, the Red Army survived several campaigns led against it by [[Chiang Kai-Shek]]'s Kuomintang and engaged in the [[Long March]].<ref name="Bianco">{{Cite book |last=Bianco |first=Lucien |title=Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915–1949 |title-link=Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915–1949 |date=1971 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-0-8047-0827-2 |page=68 |language=en |author-link=Lucien Bianco}}</ref>


In 1950, the leadership structures of the artillery, armored troops, air defense troops, public security forces, and worker–soldier militias were also established. The chemical warfare defense forces, the railroad forces, the communications forces, and the strategic forces, as well as other separate forces (like engineering and construction, logistics and medical services), were established later on.
During the [[Second Sino-Japanese War]] from 1937 to 1945, the CCP's military forces were nominally integrated into the National Revolutionary Army of the [[Republic of China (1912–1949)|Republic of China]], forming two main units, the [[Eighth Route Army]] and the [[New Fourth Army]].<ref name="Benton-1999">{{Cite book |last=Benton |first=Gregor |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ayLTpS8iujQC |title=New Fourth Army: Communist Resistance Along the Yangtze and the Huai, 1938–1941 |date=1999 |publisher=University of California Press |isbn=978-0-520-21992-2 |page=396 |language=en |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=15 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230115051955/https://books.google.com/books?id=ayLTpS8iujQC |url-status=live }}</ref> During this time, these two military groups primarily employed [[guerrilla warfare|guerrilla tactics]], generally avoiding large-scale battles with the Japanese, and at the same time consolidating by recruiting KMT troops and paramilitary forces behind Japanese lines into their forces.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Zedong |first=Mao |title=On Guerilla Warfare: Mao Tse-Tung On Guerilla Warfare |title-link=On Guerrilla Warfare |date=2017 |publisher=Martino Fine Books |isbn=978-1-68422-164-6 |language=en |author-link=Mao Zedong}}</ref>


In this early period, the People's Liberation Army overwhelmingly consisted of peasants.<ref name=":0" /> Its treatment of soldiers and officers was egalitarian<ref name=":0" /> and formal ranks were not adopted until 1955.<ref>{{Cite web |title=China's People's Liberation Army, the world's second largest conventional... |url=https://www.upi.com/Archives/1988/06/25/Chinas-Peoples-Liberation-Army-the-worlds-second-largest-conventional/9105583214400/ |access-date=2022-12-04 |website=UPI |language=en}}</ref> As a result of its egalitarian organization, the early PLA overturned strict traditional hierarchies that governed the lives of peasants.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book |last=Russo |first=Alessandro |title=Cultural Revolution and revolutionary culture |date=2020 |publisher=[[Duke University Press]] |isbn=978-1-4780-1218-4 |location=Durham |pages=36–37 |oclc=1156439609}}</ref> As sociologist Alessandro Russo summarizes, the peasant composition of the PLA hierarchy was a radical break with Chinese societal norms and "overturned the strict traditional hierarchies in unprecedented forms of egalitarianism[.]"<ref name=":0" />
After the [[Surrender of Japan|Japanese surrender]] in 1945, the CCP continued to use the National Revolutionary Army unit structures, until the decision was made in February 1947 to merge the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army.<ref name="Benton-1999" /> On October 10, 1947, the "[[Manifesto of the Chinese People's Liberation Army]]" was published, renaming the new million-strong force the People's Liberation Army (PLA).<ref>{{Cite web |author= |date=2017-07-06 |title=1946年,第一次使用"中国人民解放军"称谓 |url=http://www.guancha.cn/military-affairs/2017_07_06_416780.shtml |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20170709094507/http://www.guancha.cn/military-affairs/2017_07_06_416780.shtml |archivedate=2017-07-09 |accessdate= |publisher=解放军报 |language= |quote=}}</ref><ref name="NRAPLA2">{{cite web |date=2020-08-01 |title=【延安记忆】"中国人民解放军"称谓由此开始 |url=http://m.cnwest.com/sxxw/a/2020/08/01/18969370.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200822221319/http://m.cnwest.com/sxxw/a/2020/08/01/18969370.html |archive-date=2020-08-22 |access-date=2020-08-22}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |date=2017-10-10 |title=1947年10月10日,《中国人民解放军宣言》发布 |url=http://photo.chinamil.com.cn/tsjs/2017-10/10/content_7780489.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200822211432/http://photo.chinamil.com.cn/tsjs/2017-10/10/content_7780489.htm |archive-date=2020-08-22 |access-date=2020-08-22 |publisher=中国军网}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=中国共产党领导的红军改编为八路军的背景和改编情况 – 太行英雄网 |url=http://taihangsummit.com/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E5%85%B1%E4%BA%A7%E5%85%9A%E9%A2%86%E5%AF%BC%E7%9A%84%E7%BA%A2%E5%86%9B%E6%94%B9%E7%BC%96%E4%B8%BA%E5%85%AB%E8%B7%AF%E5%86%9B%E7%9A%84%E8%83%8C%E6%99%AF%E5%92%8C%E6%94%B9%E7%BC%96/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220107174949/http://taihangsummit.com/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E5%85%B1%E4%BA%A7%E5%85%9A%E9%A2%86%E5%AF%BC%E7%9A%84%E7%BA%A2%E5%86%9B%E6%94%B9%E7%BC%96%E4%B8%BA%E5%85%AB%E8%B7%AF%E5%86%9B%E7%9A%84%E8%83%8C%E6%99%AF%E5%92%8C%E6%94%B9%E7%BC%96/ |archive-date=7 January 2022 |access-date=7 January 2022}}</ref> The reorganization was completed by late 1948. The PLA eventually won the Chinese Civil War, establishing the [[People's Republic of China]] in 1949.<ref>{{Cite web |title=The Chinese Revolution of 1949 |url=https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/chinese-rev |website=[[United States Department of State]], Office of the Historian |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=19 May 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170519004017/https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/chinese-rev |url-status=live }}</ref>


=== Modernization and conflicts ===
=== Establishment of the People's Republic of China ===
{{Further|Korean War|Sino-Indian War|Sino-Soviet border conflict}}
{{Further|Korean War|Sino-Indian War|Sino-Soviet border conflict}}


[[File:PLA Enters Peking.jpg|thumb|PLA troops entering Beijing in 1949 during the [[Chinese Civil War]]]]
[[File:PLA Enters Peking.jpg|thumb|PLA troops entering Beijing in 1949 during the [[Chinese Civil War]]]]
[[File:Chinese troops leaving Korea.jpg|thumb|Chinese troops gathered on a T-34/85 or a Type 58 medium tank leaving [[North Korea]] in 1958, 5 years after the Korean War ended with an armistice (a ceasefire) in 1953. The banner in the background of the picture bears a slogan (in Chinese) which declares "The Friendship And Unity of the North Korean And Chinese Peoples Are Always Steadfast And Strong!"]]
[[File:Chinese troops leaving Korea.jpg|thumb|Chinese troops gathered on a T-34/85 or a Type 58 medium tank leaving [[North Korea]] in 1958, 5 years after the Korean War ended with an armistice (a ceasefire) in 1953. The banner in the background of the picture bears a slogan (in Chinese) which declares "The Friendship And Unity of the North Korean And Chinese Peoples Are Always Steadfast And Strong!"]]
[[File:China 10th Anniversary Parade in Beijing 01.jpg|thumb|Marshal [[Lin Biao]] surveying the soldiers during the 10th-anniversary military parade in 1959.]]
[[File:China 10th Anniversary Parade in Beijing 01.jpg|thumb|Marshal [[Lin Biao]] surveying the soldiers during the 10th-anniversary military parade in 1959]]


During the 1950s, the PLA with Soviet assistance began to transform itself from a peasant army into a modern one.<ref>{{citation |url=http://libweb.uoregon.edu/ec/e-asia/read/chicom.pdf |title=Pamphlet number 30-51, Handbook on the Chinese Communist Army |publisher=Department of the Army |date=7 December 1960 |access-date=1 April 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110429013230/http://libweb.uoregon.edu/ec/e-asia/read/chicom.pdf |archive-date=29 April 2011 |url-status=dead }}</ref> Since 1949, China has used nine different military strategies, which the PLA calls "strategic guidelines". The most important came in 1956, 1980, and 1993.<ref name="M. Taylor Fravel 2019"/> Part of this process was the reorganization that created thirteen military regions in 1955. The PLA also contained many former National Revolutionary Army units and generals who had defected to the PLA.{{Citation needed|date=November 2022}}
After the establishment of the PRC, the PLA underwent a drastic reorganization, with the establishment of the [[People's Liberation Army Air Force|Air Force]] leadership structure in November 1949, followed by the [[People's Liberation Army Navy|Navy]] leadership structure the following April.<ref>Ken Allen, [http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF182/CF182.ch9.pdf Chapter 9, "PLA Air Force Organization"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070929102648/http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF182/CF182.ch9.pdf|date=2007-09-29}}, The PLA as Organization, ed. James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 349.</ref><ref name="中国人民解放军海军成立70周年多国海军活动新闻发布会在青岛举行">{{cite web |title=中国人民解放军海军成立70周年多国海军活动新闻发布会在青岛举行 |url=http://www.mod.gov.cn/power/2019-04/20/content_4839865.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221001160506/http://www.mod.gov.cn/power/2019-04/20/content_4839865.htm |archive-date=1 October 2022 |access-date=18 May 2020 |website=mod.gov.cn |publisher=[[Ministry of National Defence of the People's Republic of China]] |language=zh}}</ref>


In November 1950, some units of the PLA under the name of the [[People's Volunteer Army]] intervened in the [[Korean War]] as United Nations forces under General [[Douglas MacArthur]] approached the [[Yalu River]].<ref name=":4">{{Cite book |last=Stewart |first=Richard |url=https://history.army.mil/brochures/kw-chinter/chinter.htm |title=The Korean War: The Chinese Intervention |date=2015-11-11 |publisher=CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform |isbn=978-1-5192-3611-1 |language=en}}</ref> Under the weight of this offensive, Chinese forces drove MacArthur's forces out of North Korea and captured [[Seoul]], but were subsequently pushed back south of Pyongyang north of the [[38th parallel north|38th Parallel]].<ref name=":4" /> The war also catalyzed the rapid modernization of the PLAAF.<ref>{{Citation |last1=Cliff |first1=Roger |title=The Evolution of Chinese Air Force Doctrine |date=2011 |url= |work=Shaking the Heavens and Splitting the Earth |pages=33–46 |series=Chinese Air Force Employment Concepts in the 21st Century |publisher=[[RAND Corporation]] |isbn=978-0-8330-4932-2 |jstor=10.7249/mg915af.10 |last2=Fei |first2=John |last3=Hagen |first3=Jeff |last4=Hague |first4=Elizabeth |last5=Heginbotham |first5=Eric |last6=Stillion |first6=John}}</ref>  
In this early period, the People's Liberation Army overwhelmingly consisted of peasants.<ref name="Russo-2020">{{Cite book |last=Russo |first=Alessandro |title=Cultural Revolution and revolutionary culture |date=2020 |publisher=[[Duke University Press]] |isbn=978-1-4780-1218-4 |location=Durham |pages=36–37 |oclc=1156439609}}</ref> Its treatment of soldiers and officers was [[Egalitarianism|egalitarian]]<ref name="Russo-2020" /> and formal ranks were not adopted until 1955.<ref name="upi.com">{{Cite web |title=China's People's Liberation Army, the world's second largest conventional... |url=https://www.upi.com/Archives/1988/06/25/Chinas-Peoples-Liberation-Army-the-worlds-second-largest-conventional/9105583214400/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221204232316/https://www.upi.com/Archives/1988/06/25/Chinas-Peoples-Liberation-Army-the-worlds-second-largest-conventional/9105583214400/ |archive-date=4 December 2022 |access-date=2022-12-04 |website=UPI |language=en}}</ref> As a result of its egalitarian organization, the early PLA overturned strict traditional hierarchies that governed the lives of peasants.<ref name="Russo-2020" /> As sociologist Alessandro Russo summarizes, the peasant composition of the PLA hierarchy was a radical break with Chinese societal norms and "overturned the strict traditional hierarchies in unprecedented forms of egalitarianism[.]"<ref name="Russo-2020" /> During the 1950s, the PLA with Soviet assistance began to transform itself from a peasant army into a modern one.<ref>{{citation |title=Pamphlet number 30-51, Handbook on the Chinese Communist Army |date=7 December 1960 |url=http://libweb.uoregon.edu/ec/e-asia/read/chicom.pdf |access-date=1 April 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110429013230/http://libweb.uoregon.edu/ec/e-asia/read/chicom.pdf |archive-date=29 April 2011 |url-status=dead |publisher=Department of the Army}}</ref>


In 1962, the PLA ground force also fought India in the [[Sino-Indian War]], achieving limited objectives.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Hoffman |first1=Steven A. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_bjADwAAQBAJ&q=chinese+army+patrols+ladakh+april+1962&pg=PA103 |title=India and the China Crisis |date=1990 |publisher=University of California Press |isbn=978-0-520-30172-6 |location=Berkeley |pages=101–104 |access-date=1 October 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211009120905/https://books.google.com/books?id=_bjADwAAQBAJ&q=chinese%2Barmy%2Bpatrols%2Bladakh%2Bapril%2B1962&pg=PA103 |archive-date=9 October 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Van Tronder |first1=Gerry |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=JrTNDwAAQBAJ&q=sino-indian+war+patrols+at+Ladakh+april+30+1962&pg=PT12 |title=Sino-Indian War: Border Clash: October–November 1962 |date=2018 |publisher=Pen and Sword Military |isbn=978-1-5267-2838-8 |access-date=1 October 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210625205658/https://books.google.com/books?id=JrTNDwAAQBAJ&q=sino-indian+war+patrols+at+Ladakh+april+30+1962&pg=PT12 |archive-date=25 June 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref> In [[Nathu La and Cho La clashes|a series of border clashes in 1967]] with Indian troops, the PLA suffered heavy numerical and tactical losses.<ref name="Chellaney">{{Cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ZCmFAAAAMAAJ |title=Asian Juggernaut: The Rise of China, India, and Japan |last=Brahma Chellaney |author-link=Brahma Chellaney |date=2006 |publisher=[[HarperCollins]] |isbn=9788172236502 |page=195 |language=en |quote=Indeed, Beijing's acknowledgement of Indian control over Sikkim seems limited to the purpose of facilitating trade through the vertiginous Nathu-la Pass, the scene of bloody artillery duels in September 1967 when Indian troops beat back attacking Chinese forces.}}</ref><ref name="Praagh">{{Cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=TbpU0HngYhoC&pg=PA301 |title=Greater Game: India's Race with Destiny and China |last=Van Praagh |first=David |date=2003 |publisher=McGill-Queen's Press - MQUP |isbn=9780773525887 |page=301 |language=en |quote=(Indian) ''jawans'' trained and equipped for high-altitude combat used US provided artillery, deployed on higher ground than that of their adversaries, to decisive tactical advantage at Nathu La and Cho La near the Sikkim-Tibet border. |access-date=6 August 2021 |archive-date=25 December 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181225173405/https://books.google.com/books?id=TbpU0HngYhoC&pg=PA301 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Hoontrakul">{{citation |first=Ponesak |last=Hoontrakul |chapter=Asia's Evolving Economic Dynamism and Political Pressures |editor1=P. Hoontrakul |editor2=C. Balding |editor3=R. Marwah |title=The Global Rise of Asian Transformation: Trends and Developments in Economic Growth Dynamics |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=RrKYBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA37 |year=2014 |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan US |isbn=978-1-137-41236-2 |page=37 |quote=Cho La incident (1967) - Victorious: India / Defeated : China |access-date=6 August 2021 |archive-date=25 December 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181225173404/https://books.google.com/books?id=RrKYBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA37%20 |url-status=live }}</ref>
In the PRC's early years, the PLA was a dominant [[Foreign policy of China|foreign policy]] institution in the country.<ref name="Loh">{{Cite book |last=Loh |first=Dylan M.H. |title=China's Rising Foreign Ministry: Practices and Representations of Assertive Diplomacy |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |year=2024 |isbn=9781503638204}}</ref>{{Rp|page=17}} Since 1949, China has used nine different military strategies, which the PLA calls "strategic guidelines". The most important came in 1956, 1980, and 1993.<ref name="M. Taylor Fravel 2019">{{Cite book |last=Fravel |first=M. Taylor |author-link=Taylor Fravel |title=Active Defense: China's Military Strategy since 1949 |date=2019 |publisher=[[Princeton University Press]] |isbn=978-0-691-18559-0 |volume=2 |doi=10.2307/j.ctv941tzj |jstor=j.ctv941tzj |s2cid=159282413}}</ref>


Before the [[Cultural Revolution]], military region commanders tended to remain in their posts for long periods. As the PLA took a stronger role in politics, this began to be seen as somewhat of a threat to the CCP's (or, at least, civilian) control of the military.{{Citation needed|date=November 2022}} The longest-serving military region commanders were [[Xu Shiyou]] in the [[Nanjing Military Region]] (1954–74), [[Yang Dezhi]] in the [[Jinan Military Region]] (1958–74), [[Chen Xilian]] in the [[Shenyang Military Region]] (1959–73), and [[Han Xianchu]] in the Fuzhou Military Region (1960–74).<ref name="autogenerated436">{{Cite book |last=Li |first=Xiaobing |url=https://archive.org/details/historyofmodernc0000lixi |title=A History of the Modern Chinese Army |date=2007 |publisher=[[University Press of Kentucky]] |isbn=978-0-8131-2438-4 |jstor=j.ctt2jcq4k}}</ref>
In November 1950, some units of the PLA under the name of the [[People's Volunteer Army]] intervened in the [[Korean War]] as United Nations forces under General [[Douglas MacArthur]] approached the [[Yalu River]].<ref name="Stewart-2015">{{Cite book |last=Stewart |first=Richard |url=https://history.army.mil/brochures/kw-chinter/chinter.htm |title=The Korean War: The Chinese Intervention |date=2015 |publisher=CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform |isbn=978-1-5192-3611-1 |language=en |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=12 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221112194350/https://history.army.mil/brochures/kw-chinter/chinter.htm |url-status=dead }}</ref> Under the weight of this offensive, Chinese forces drove MacArthur's forces out of North Korea and captured [[Seoul]], but were subsequently pushed back south of Pyongyang north of the [[38th parallel north|38th Parallel]].<ref name="Stewart-2015" /> The war also catalyzed the rapid modernization of the PLAAF.<ref>{{Citation |last1=Cliff |first1=Roger |title=The Evolution of Chinese Air Force Doctrine |date=2011 |url= |work=Shaking the Heavens and Splitting the Earth |pages=33–46 |series=Chinese Air Force Employment Concepts in the 21st Century |publisher=[[RAND Corporation]] |isbn=978-0-8330-4932-2 |jstor=10.7249/mg915af.10 |last2=Fei |first2=John |last3=Hagen |first3=Jeff |last4=Hague |first4=Elizabeth |last5=Heginbotham |first5=Eric |last6=Stillion |first6=John}}</ref>


In the early days of the Cultural Revolution, the PLA abandoned the use of the military ranks that it had adopted in 1955.<ref>{{Cite web |title=China's People's Liberation Army, the world's second largest conventional... |url=https://www.upi.com/Archives/1988/06/25/Chinas-Peoples-Liberation-Army-the-worlds-second-largest-conventional/9105583214400/ |access-date=2022-12-04 |website=UPI |language=en}}</ref>  
In 1962, the PLA Ground Force also fought India in the [[Sino-Indian War]].<ref>{{cite book |last1=Hoffman |first1=Steven A. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_bjADwAAQBAJ&q=chinese+army+patrols+ladakh+april+1962&pg=PA103 |title=India and the China Crisis |date=1990 |publisher=University of California Press |isbn=978-0-520-30172-6 |location=Berkeley |pages=101–104 |access-date=1 October 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211009120905/https://books.google.com/books?id=_bjADwAAQBAJ&q=chinese%2Barmy%2Bpatrols%2Bladakh%2Bapril%2B1962&pg=PA103 |archive-date=9 October 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Van Tronder |first1=Gerry |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=JrTNDwAAQBAJ&q=sino-indian+war+patrols+at+Ladakh+april+30+1962&pg=PT12 |title=Sino-Indian War: Border Clash: October–November 1962 |date=2018 |publisher=Pen and Sword Military |isbn=978-1-5267-2838-8 |access-date=1 October 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210625205658/https://books.google.com/books?id=JrTNDwAAQBAJ&q=sino-indian+war+patrols+at+Ladakh+april+30+1962&pg=PT12 |archive-date=25 June 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref> In [[Nathu La and Cho La clashes|a series of border clashes in 1967]] with Indian troops, the PLA suffered heavy numerical and tactical losses.<ref name="Chellaney2" /><ref name="Praagh">{{Cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=TbpU0HngYhoC&pg=PA301 |title=Greater Game: India's Race with Destiny and China |last=Van Praagh |first=David |date=2003 |publisher=McGill-Queen's Press – MQUP |isbn=978-0773525887 |page=301 |language=en |quote=(Indian) ''jawans'' trained and equipped for high-altitude combat used US provided artillery, deployed on higher ground than that of their adversaries, to decisive tactical advantage at Nathu La and Cho La near the Sikkim-Tibet border. |access-date=6 August 2021 |archive-date=25 December 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181225173405/https://books.google.com/books?id=TbpU0HngYhoC&pg=PA301 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Hoontrakul">{{citation |first=Ponesak |last=Hoontrakul |chapter=Asia's Evolving Economic Dynamism and Political Pressures |editor1=P. Hoontrakul |editor2=C. Balding |editor3=R. Marwah |title=The Global Rise of Asian Transformation: Trends and Developments in Economic Growth Dynamics |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=RrKYBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA37 |year=2014 |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan US |isbn=978-1-137-41236-2 |page=37 |quote=Cho La incident (1967) – Victorious: India / Defeated : China |access-date=6 August 2021 |archive-date=25 December 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181225173404/https://books.google.com/books?id=RrKYBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA37%20 |url-status=live }}</ref>


The establishment of a professional military force equipped with modern weapons and doctrine was the last of the [[Four Modernizations]] announced by Zhou Enlai and supported by [[Deng Xiaoping]].<ref name="Ebrey">{{cite web |author=Ebrey, Patricia Buckley |title=Four Modernizations Era |url=http://depts.washington.edu/chinaciv/graph/9confour.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101007221511/http://depts.washington.edu/chinaciv/graph/9confour.htm |archive-date=October 7, 2010<!-- 22:15:11 --> |access-date=October 20, 2012 |work=A Visual Sourcebook of Chinese Civilization |publisher=University of Washington}}</ref><ref name="ScienceTechnology">{{cite news |author=人民日报 |date=31 January 1963 |script-title=zh:在上海举行的科学技术工作会议上周恩来阐述科学技术现代化的重大意义 |language=zh |trans-title=Science and Technology in Shanghai at the conference on Zhou Enlai explained the significance of modern science and technology |pages=1 |newspaper=People's Daily |publisher=Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party |url=http://rmrbw.net/read.php?tid=302475&fpage=14 |url-status=dead |access-date=October 21, 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160214201234/http://rmrbw.net/read.php?tid=302475 |archive-date=February 14, 2016}}</ref> In keeping with Deng's mandate to reform, the PLA has demobilized millions of men and women since 1978 and has introduced modern methods in such areas as [[military recruitment|recruitment]] and manpower, [[military strategy|strategy]], and [[military education and training|education and training]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Mason |first=David |date=1984 |title=China's Four Modernizations: Blueprint for Development or Prelude to Turmoil? |url= |journal=[[Asian Affairs]] |volume=11 |issue=3 |pages=47–70 |doi=10.1080/00927678.1984.10553699 |issn=0092-7678 |jstor=30171968}}</ref> In 1979, the PLA fought [[Vietnam]] over a border skirmish in the [[Sino-Vietnamese War]] where both sides claimed victory.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Vincent |first=Travils |date=9 February 2022 |title=Why Won't Vietnam Teach the History of the Sino-Vietnamese War? |work=[[The Diplomat]] |url=https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/why-wont-vietnam-teach-about-the-sino-vietnamese-war/}}</ref> However, western analysts agree that Vietnam handily outperformed the PLA.<ref name="autogenerated436"/>
Before the [[Cultural Revolution]], military region commanders tended to remain in their posts for long periods. The longest-serving military region commanders were [[Xu Shiyou]] in the [[Nanjing Military Region]] (1954–74), [[Yang Dezhi]] in the [[Jinan Military Region]] (1958–74), [[Chen Xilian]] in the [[Shenyang Military Region]] (1959–73), and [[Han Xianchu]] in the Fuzhou Military Region (1960–74).<ref name="autogenerated436">{{Cite book |last=Li |first=Xiaobing |url=https://archive.org/details/historyofmodernc0000lixi |title=A History of the Modern Chinese Army |date=2007 |publisher=[[University Press of Kentucky]] |doi=10.2307/j.ctt2jcq4k |isbn=978-0-8131-2438-4 |jstor=j.ctt2jcq4k}}</ref> In the early days of the Cultural Revolution, the PLA abandoned the use of the military ranks that it had adopted in 1955.<ref name="upi.com" /> The [[Central Military Commission (China)|Central Military Commission]] had deemed that ranks were an expression of [[bourgeois right]] and hierarchy which led to individualist attitudes, inequality, and a sense of disunity.<ref name=":Kindler2">{{Cite book |last=Kindler |first=Benjamin |title=Writing to the Rhythm of Labor: Cultural Politics of the Chinese Revolution, 1942-1976 |date=2025 |publisher=[[Columbia University Press]] |isbn=978-0-231-21932-7 |location=New York City, NY}}</ref>{{Reference page|page=165}}


During the [[Sino-Soviet split]], strained relations between China and the Soviet Union resulted in bloody border clashes and mutual backing of each other's adversaries.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Fravel |first=M. Taylor |date=2007 |title=Power Shifts and Escalation: Explaining China's Use of Force in Territorial Disputes |journal=[[International Security]] |volume=32 |issue=3 |pages=44–83 |doi=10.1162/isec.2008.32.3.44 |issn=0162-2889 |jstor=30130518 |s2cid=57559936}}</ref> China and Afghanistan had neutral relations with each other during the King's rule.<ref name="AfCh1981">''China and Afghanistan'', Gerald Segal, Asian Survey, Vol. 21, No. 11 (Nov., 1981), University of California Press</ref> When the pro-Soviet Afghan Communists seized power in Afghanistan in 1978, relations between China and the Afghan communists quickly turned hostile.<ref name="fmprc.gov.cn">{{cite web |title=中华人民共和国外交部 |url=http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn//gxh/cgb/zcgmzysx/yz/1206/1206x1/t356107.htm}}</ref>{{Better source needed|reason=The current source is insufficiently reliable ([[WP:NOTRS]]).|date=November 2022}} The Afghan pro-Soviet communists supported China's enemies in Vietnam and blamed China for supporting Afghan anticommunist militants.<ref name=":5">{{Cite journal |last=Hilali |first=A.Z |date=September 2001 |title=China's response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan |journal=[[Central Asian Survey]] |language=en |volume=20 |issue=3 |pages=323–351 |doi=10.1080/02634930120095349 |s2cid=143657643 |issn=0263-4937}}</ref> China responded to the [[Soviet–Afghan War|Soviet invasion of Afghanistan]] by supporting the [[Afghan mujahideen]] and ramping up their military presence near Afghanistan in Xinjiang.<ref name=":5" /> China acquired military equipment from the United States to defend itself from Soviet attacks.<ref>{{cite book |author=S. Frederick Starri |editor=S. Frederick Starr |year=2004 |edition=illustrated |publisher=M.E. Sharpe |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GXj4a3gss8wC&pg=PA157 |title=Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland |isbn=0765613182 |page=157 |access-date=22 May 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151016131344/https://books.google.com/books?id=GXj4a3gss8wC&pg=PA157 |archive-date=16 October 2015 |url-status=live }}</ref>
The establishment of a professional military force equipped with modern weapons and doctrine was the last of the [[Four Modernizations]] announced by Zhou Enlai and supported by [[Deng Xiaoping]].<ref name="Ebrey">{{cite web |author=Ebrey, Patricia Buckley |title=Four Modernizations Era |url=http://depts.washington.edu/chinaciv/graph/9confour.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101007221511/http://depts.washington.edu/chinaciv/graph/9confour.htm |archive-date=October 7, 2010<!-- 22:15:11 --> |access-date=October 20, 2012 |work=A Visual Sourcebook of Chinese Civilization |publisher=University of Washington}}</ref><ref name="ScienceTechnology">{{cite news |author=人民日报 |date=31 January 1963 |script-title=zh:在上海举行的科学技术工作会议上周恩来阐述科学技术现代化的重大意义 |language=zh |trans-title=Science and Technology in Shanghai at the conference on Zhou Enlai explained the significance of modern science and technology |pages=1 |newspaper=People's Daily |publisher=Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party |url=http://rmrbw.net/read.php?tid=302475&fpage=14 |url-status=usurped |access-date=October 21, 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160214201234/http://rmrbw.net/read.php?tid=302475 |archive-date=February 14, 2016}}</ref> In keeping with Deng's mandate to reform, the PLA has demobilized millions of men and women since 1978 and has introduced modern methods in such areas as [[military recruitment|recruitment]] and manpower, [[military strategy|strategy]], and [[military education and training|education and training]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Mason |first=David |date=1984 |title=China's Four Modernizations: Blueprint for Development or Prelude to Turmoil? |url= |journal=[[Asian Affairs]] |volume=11 |issue=3 |pages=47–70 |doi=10.1080/00927678.1984.10553699 |issn=0092-7678 |jstor=30171968}}</ref> In 1979, the PLA fought [[Vietnam]] over a border skirmish in the [[Sino-Vietnamese War]] where both sides claimed victory.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Vincent |first=Travils |date=9 February 2022 |title=Why Won't Vietnam Teach the History of the Sino-Vietnamese War? |work=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]] |url=https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/why-wont-vietnam-teach-about-the-sino-vietnamese-war/ |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=18 February 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220218003020/https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/why-wont-vietnam-teach-about-the-sino-vietnamese-war/ |url-status=live }}</ref> However, western analysts generally agree that Vietnam handily outperformed the PLA.<ref name="autogenerated436"/>


The People's Liberation Army Ground Force trained and supported the Afghan Mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan War, moving its training camps for the mujahideen from Pakistan into China itself.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Szczudlik-Tatar |first=Justyna |date=October 2014 |title=China's Evolving Stance on Afghanistan: Towards More Robust Diplomacy with "Chinese Characteristics" |url=https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/184324/PISM%20Strategic%20File%20no%2022%20(58).pdf |journal=Strategic File |publisher=Polish Institute of International Affairs |volume=58 |issue=22}}</ref> Hundreds of millions of dollars worth of anti-aircraft missiles, rocket launchers, and machine guns were given to the Mujahideen by the Chinese.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Galster |first=Steve |date=9 October 2001 |title=Volume II: Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/essay.html |website=National Security Archive, [[George Washington University]]}}</ref> Chinese military advisors and army troops were also present with the Mujahideen during training.<ref>{{cite book |author=S. Frederick Starr |editor=S. Frederick Starr |year=2004 |edition=illustrated |publisher=M.E. Sharpe |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GXj4a3gss8wC&pg=PA158 |title=Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland |isbn=0765613182 |page=158 |access-date=22 May 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160819211206/https://books.google.com/books?id=GXj4a3gss8wC&pg=PA158 |archive-date=19 August 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref>
During the [[Sino-Soviet split]], strained relations between China and the Soviet Union resulted in bloody border clashes and mutual backing of each other's adversaries.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Fravel |first=M. Taylor |date=2007 |title=Power Shifts and Escalation: Explaining China's Use of Force in Territorial Disputes |journal=[[International Security]] |volume=32 |issue=3 |pages=44–83 |doi=10.1162/isec.2008.32.3.44 |issn=0162-2889 |jstor=30130518 |s2cid=57559936}}</ref> China and Afghanistan had neutral relations with each other during the King's rule.<ref name="AfCh1981">''China and Afghanistan'', Gerald Segal, Asian Survey, Vol. 21, No. 11 (Nov., 1981), University of California Press</ref> When the pro-Soviet Afghan Communists seized power in Afghanistan in 1978, relations between China and the Afghan communists quickly turned hostile.<ref name="Hilali-2001" /> The Afghan pro-Soviet communists supported China's enemies in Vietnam and blamed China for supporting Afghan anticommunist militants.<ref name="Hilali-2001">{{Cite journal |last=Hilali |first=A.Z |date=September 2001 |title=China's response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan |journal=[[Central Asian Survey]] |language=en |volume=20 |issue=3 |pages=323–351 |doi=10.1080/02634930120095349 |s2cid=143657643 |issn=0263-4937}}</ref> China responded to the [[Soviet–Afghan War|Soviet invasion of Afghanistan]] by supporting the [[Afghan mujahidin]] and ramping up their military presence near Afghanistan in Xinjiang.<ref name="Hilali-2001" /> China acquired military equipment from the United States to defend itself from Soviet attacks.<ref name=":7">{{cite book |author=Starri |first=S. Frederick |author-link=S. Frederick Starr |title=Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland |title-link=Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland |publisher=M.E. Sharpe |year=2004 |isbn=0765613182 |editor= |edition= |pages=157–158}}</ref>
 
The PLA Ground Force trained and supported the Afghan Mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan War, moving its training camps for the mujahideen from Pakistan into China itself.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Szczudlik-Tatar |first=Justyna |date=October 2014 |title=China's Evolving Stance on Afghanistan: Towards More Robust Diplomacy with "Chinese Characteristics" |url=https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/184324/PISM%20Strategic%20File%20no%2022%20(58).pdf |journal=Strategic File |publisher=Polish Institute of International Affairs |volume=58 |issue=22 |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=29 August 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230829133903/https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/184324/PISM%20Strategic%20File%20no%2022%20(58).pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> Hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of anti-aircraft missiles, rocket launchers, and machine guns were given to the Mujahideen by the Chinese.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Galster |first=Steve |date=9 October 2001 |title=Volume II: Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/essay.html |website=National Security Archive, [[George Washington University]] |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=6 September 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210906203727/https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/essay.html |url-status=live }}</ref> Chinese military advisors and army troops were also present with the Mujahideen during training.<ref name=":7" />


=== Since 1980 ===
=== Since 1980 ===
{{See also|North China Military Exercise}}
{{See also|North China Military Exercise}}


In 1981, the PLA conducted its largest [[North China Military Exercise|military exercise in North China]] since the founding of the People's Republic.<ref name="M. Taylor Fravel 2019" /><ref name=":3">{{Cite book |last=Godwin |first=Paul H. B. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=EiCeDwAAQBAJ&q=North+China+Military+Exercise+1981&pg=PT26 |title=The Chinese Defense Establishment: Continuity And Change In The 1980s |date=2019-06-18 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-000-31540-0 |language=en}}</ref> In the 1980s, China shrunk its military considerably to free up resources for [[economic development]], resulting in the relative decline in resources devoted to the PLA.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Zissis |first=Carin |date=5 December 2006 |title=Modernizing the People's Liberation Army of China |url=https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/modernizing-peoples-liberation-army-china |website=[[Council on Foreign Relations]]}}</ref> Following the [[People's Liberation Army at the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre|PLA's suppression]] of the [[1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre]], ideological correctness was temporarily revived as the dominant theme in Chinese military affairs.<ref>{{Cite news |date=30 April 2009 |title=PLA's "Absolute Loyalty" to the Party in Doubt |url=https://jamestown.org/program/plas-absolute-loyalty-to-the-party-in-doubt/ |website=[[The Jamestown Foundation]]}}</ref>
In 1981, the PLA conducted its largest [[North China Military Exercise|military exercise in North China]] since the founding of the People's Republic.<ref name="M. Taylor Fravel 2019" /><ref name="Godwin-2019">{{Cite book |last=Godwin |first=Paul H. B. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=EiCeDwAAQBAJ&q=North+China+Military+Exercise+1981&pg=PT26 |title=The Chinese Defense Establishment: Continuity And Change In The 1980s |date=2019 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-000-31540-0 |language=en |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=11 February 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240211032245/https://books.google.com/books?id=EiCeDwAAQBAJ&q=North+China+Military+Exercise+1981&pg=PT26#v=onepage&q=North%20China%20Military%20Exercise%201981&f=false |url-status=live }}</ref>


Reform and modernization have today resumed their position as the PLA's primary objectives, although the armed forces' political loyalty to the CCP has remained a leading concern.<ref>{{Cite news |date=20 August 2018 |title=Xi Jinping insists on PLA's absolute loyalty to Communist Party |work=[[The Economic Times]] |url=https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/xi-jinping-insists-on-plas-absolute-loyalty-to-communist-party/articleshow/65471728.cms?from=mdr}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Chan |first=Minnie |date=23 September 2022 |title=China's military told to 'resolutely do what the party asks it to do' |work=[[South China Morning Post]] |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3193454/chinas-military-told-resolutely-do-what-party-asks-it-do}}</ref> Another area of concern to the political leadership was the PLA's involvement in civilian economic activities. These activities were thought to have impacted PLA readiness and have led the political leadership to attempt to divest the PLA from its non-military business interests.<ref>{{Cite journal |date=December 1997 |title=The PLA's business interests: A long-term source of extra revenue |journal=Strategic Comments |language=en |volume=3 |issue=10 |pages=1–2 |doi=10.1080/1356788973104 |issn=1356-7888}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Bickford |first=Thomas J. |date=1994 |title=The Chinese Military and Its Business Operations: The PLA as Entrepreneur |journal=[[Asian Survey]] |volume=34 |issue=5 |pages=460–474 |doi=10.2307/2645058 |issn=0004-4687 |jstor=2645058}}</ref>
In the late 1980s, the central government had increasing expenditures and limited revenue.<ref name=":03">{{Cite book |last=Lin |first=Shuanglin |title=China's Public Finance: Reforms, Challenges, and Options |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |year=2022 |isbn=978-1-009-09902-8 |edition= |location=New York, NY}}</ref>{{Rp|page=43}} The central government encouraged its agencies and encouraged local governments to expand their services and pursue revenues.<ref name=":03" />{{Rp|page=43}} The PLA [[Business activities of the Chinese military|established businesses]] including hotels and restaurants.<ref name=":03" />{{Rp|page=43}} The PLA gained more autonomy and permission to engage in commercial activities in exchange for a reduced role in political affairs and limited budgets;{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=523}} the military was downsized to free resources for [[economic development]].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Zissis |first=Carin |date=5 December 2006 |title=Modernizing the People's Liberation Army of China |url=https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/modernizing-peoples-liberation-army-china |website=[[Council on Foreign Relations]] |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=12 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221112194350/https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/modernizing-peoples-liberation-army-china |url-status=live }}</ref> The lack of oversight, ineffective self-regulation, and [[Jiang Zemin]]'s and [[Hu Jintao]]'s lack of close personal ties to the PLA{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=523}} led to systemic corruption that persisted through the late-2010s.{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=51}} Jiang's attempt to divest the PLA of its commercial interests was only partially successful, as many were still run by close associates of PLA officers.{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=523}} Corruption lowered readiness and proficiency,{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=520}} was a barrier to modernization and professionalization,{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=526}} and eroded party control.{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=521}} The 2010s [[Anti-corruption campaign under Xi Jinping|anti-corruption campaigns and military reforms]] under [[Xi Jinping]] from the early-2010s were in part executed to address these problems.{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|pp=51-52}}{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=531}}
 
Following the [[People's Liberation Army at the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre|PLA's suppression]] of the [[1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre]], ideological correctness was temporarily revived as the dominant theme in Chinese military affairs.<ref>{{Cite news |date=30 April 2009 |title=PLA's "Absolute Loyalty" to the Party in Doubt |url=https://jamestown.org/program/plas-absolute-loyalty-to-the-party-in-doubt/ |website=[[The Jamestown Foundation]] |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=13 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221113113012/https://jamestown.org/program/plas-absolute-loyalty-to-the-party-in-doubt/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Reform and modernization have today resumed their position as the PLA's primary objectives, although the armed forces' political loyalty to the CCP has remained a leading concern.<ref>{{Cite news |date=20 August 2018 |title=Xi Jinping insists on PLA's absolute loyalty to Communist Party |work=[[The Economic Times]] |url=https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/xi-jinping-insists-on-plas-absolute-loyalty-to-communist-party/articleshow/65471728.cms?from=mdr |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=15 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230315132848/https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/xi-jinping-insists-on-plas-absolute-loyalty-to-communist-party/articleshow/65471728.cms?from=mdr |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Chan |first=Minnie |date=23 September 2022 |title=China's military told to 'resolutely do what the party asks it to do' |work=[[South China Morning Post]] |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3193454/chinas-military-told-resolutely-do-what-party-asks-it-do |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=19 October 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231019060837/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3193454/chinas-military-told-resolutely-do-what-party-asks-it-do |url-status=live }}</ref>


Beginning in the 1980s, the PLA tried to transform itself from a land-based power centered on a vast ground force to a smaller, more mobile, high-tech one capable of mounting operations beyond its borders.<ref name="M. Taylor Fravel 2019" /> The motivation for this was that a massive land invasion by Russia was no longer seen as a major threat, and the new threats to China are seen to be a declaration of independence by [[Taiwan]], possibly with assistance from the United States, or a confrontation over the [[Spratly Islands]].<ref name="autogenerated2005">The Political System of the People's Republic of China. Chief Editor Pu Xingzu, Shanghai, 2005, Shanghai People's Publishing House. {{ISBN|7-208-05566-1}}, Chapter 11 The State Military System.</ref>
Beginning in the 1980s, the PLA tried to transform itself from a land-based power centered on a vast ground force to a smaller, more mobile, high-tech one capable of mounting operations beyond its borders.<ref name="M. Taylor Fravel 2019" /> The motivation for this was that a massive land invasion by Russia was no longer seen as a major threat, and the new threats to China are seen to be a declaration of independence by [[Taiwan]], possibly with assistance from the United States, or a confrontation over the [[Spratly Islands]].<ref name="autogenerated2005">The Political System of the People's Republic of China. Chief Editor Pu Xingzu, Shanghai, 2005, Shanghai People's Publishing House. {{ISBN|7-208-05566-1}}, Chapter 11 The State Military System.</ref>


In 1985, under the leadership of the [[Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party]] and the CMC, the PLA changed from being constantly prepared to "hit early, strike hard and to fight a nuclear war" to developing the military in an era of peace.<ref name="M. Taylor Fravel 2019" /> The PLA reoriented itself to modernization, improving its fighting ability, and becoming a world-class force. Deng Xiaoping stressed that the PLA needed to focus more on quality rather than on quantity.<ref name="autogenerated2005"/>
In 1985, the PLA changed from being constantly prepared to "hit early, strike hard, and to fight a nuclear war" to developing the military in an era of peace.<ref name="M. Taylor Fravel 2019" /> The PLA reoriented itself to modernization, improving its fighting ability, and becoming a world-class force. Deng Xiaoping stressed that the PLA needed to focus more on quality rather than on quantity.<ref name="autogenerated2005"/>


The decision of the Chinese government in 1985 to reduce the size of the military by one million was completed by 1987. Staffing in military leadership was cut by about 50 percent. During the Ninth Five Year Plan (1996–2000) the PLA was reduced by a further 500,000. The PLA had also been expected to be reduced by another 200,000 by 2005. The PLA has focused on increasing mechanization and informatization to be able to fight a high-intensity war.<ref name="autogenerated2005"/>
The decision of the Chinese government in 1985 to reduce the size of the military by one million was completed by 1987. Staffing in military leadership was cut by about 50 percent. During the Ninth Five Year Plan (1996–2000) the PLA was reduced by a further 500,000. The PLA had also been expected to be reduced by another 200,000 by 2005. The PLA has focused on increasing mechanization and informatization to be able to fight a high-intensity war.<ref name="autogenerated2005"/>
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[[File:Chinese honor guard in column 070322-F-0193C-014.JPEG|thumb|upright=1.25|The [[Beijing Garrison Honor Guard Battalion|PLA Honor Guard]] in Beijing, 2007]]
[[File:Chinese honor guard in column 070322-F-0193C-014.JPEG|thumb|upright=1.25|The [[Beijing Garrison Honor Guard Battalion|PLA Honor Guard]] in Beijing, 2007]]


Former CMC chairman [[Jiang Zemin]] in 1990 called on the military to "meet political standards, be militarily competent, have a good working style, adhere strictly to discipline, and provide vigorous logistic support" ({{zh |s = 政治合格、军事过硬、作风优良、纪律严明、保障有力 |p = zhèngzhì hégé, jūnshì guòyìng, zuòfēng yōuliáng, jìlǜ yánmíng, bǎozhàng yǒulì }}).<ref>News of the Communist Party of China, [http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/67481/69242/69244/4690367.html Hyperlink] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061013101243/http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/67481/69242/69244/4690367.html |date=13 October 2006 }}. Retrieved 28 March 2007.</ref> The 1991 [[Gulf War]] provided the Chinese leadership with a stark realization that the PLA was an oversized, almost-obsolete force.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Farley |first=Robert |date=1 September 2021 |title=China Has Not Forgotten the Lessons of the Gulf War |work=[[National Interest]] |url=https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/china-has-not-forgotten-lessons-gulf-war-192949}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Scobell |first=Andrew |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA553490.pdf |title=Chinese Lessons from Other Peoples' Wars |date=2011 |publisher=Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College |isbn=978-1-58487-511-6 |language=en}}</ref>
Former CMC chairman Jiang in 1990 called on the military to "meet political standards, be militarily competent, have a good working style, adhere strictly to discipline, and provide vigorous logistic support" ({{zh |s = 政治合格、军事过硬、作风优良、纪律严明、保障有力 |p = zhèngzhì hégé, jūnshì guòyìng, zuòfēng yōuliáng, jìlǜ yánmíng, bǎozhàng yǒulì }}).<ref>{{Cite web |date=2006-08-11 |title=部队要做到政治合格、军事过硬、作风优良、纪律严明、保障有力 |trans-title=The troops must be politically qualified, militarily competent, have good conduct, strict discipline and strong support |url=http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/67481/69242/69244/4690367.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061013101243/http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/67481/69242/69244/4690367.html |archive-date=2006-10-13 |access-date=2024-12-30 |website=[[People's Daily]] |language=zh}}</ref> The 1991 [[Gulf War]] provided the Chinese leadership with a stark realization that the PLA was an oversized, almost-obsolete force.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Farley |first=Robert |date=1 September 2021 |title=China Has Not Forgotten the Lessons of the Gulf War |work=[[National Interest]] |url=https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/china-has-not-forgotten-lessons-gulf-war-192949 |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=11 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221111091521/https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/china-has-not-forgotten-lessons-gulf-war-192949 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Scobell |first=Andrew |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA553490.pdf |title=Chinese Lessons from Other Peoples' Wars |date=2011 |publisher=Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College |isbn=978-1-58487-511-6 |language=en |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=12 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221112194350/https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA553490.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> The USA's sending of two aircraft carrier groups to the vicinity of Taiwan during the [[Third Taiwan Strait Crisis]] prompted Jiang to order a ten-year PLA modernization program.<ref name=":054">{{Cite book |last=Lampton |first=David M. |title=Living U.S.-China Relations: From Cold War to Cold War |date=2024 |publisher=[[Rowman & Littlefield]] |isbn=978-1-5381-8725-8 |location=Lanham, MD |pages=225 |author-link=David M. Lampton}}</ref>
 
[[File:2025 Moscow Victory Day Parade 53.jpg|thumb|People's Liberation Army on Red Square in [[Moscow]] during the [[2025 Moscow Victory Day Parade|Victory Day parade]] on 9 May 2025]]
The possibility of a militarized Japan has also been a continuous concern to the Chinese leadership since the late 1990s.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Sasaki |first=Tomonori |date=23 September 2010 |title=China Eyes the Japanese Military: China's Threat Perception of Japan since the 1980s |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/abs/china-eyes-the-japanese-military-chinas-threat-perception-of-japan-since-the-1980s/4C3D00214448677422255F228609C395 |journal=The China Quarterly |language=en |volume=203 |pages=560–580 |doi=10.1017/S0305741010000597 |s2cid=153828298 |issn=1468-2648 |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=12 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221112194349/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/abs/china-eyes-the-japanese-military-chinas-threat-perception-of-japan-since-the-1980s/4C3D00214448677422255F228609C395 |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref> In addition, China's military leadership has been reacting to and learning from the successes and failures of the [[United States Armed Forces]] during the [[Kosovo War]],<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Sakaguchi |first1=Yoshiaki |last2=Mayama |first2=Katsuhiko |date=1999 |title=Significance of the War in Kosovo for China and Russia |url=http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/pdf/bulletin_e2001_1.pdf |journal=NIDS Security Reports |issue=3 |pages=1–23 |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=14 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220814012122/http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/pdf/bulletin_e2001_1.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> the [[United States invasion of Afghanistan|2001 invasion of Afghanistan]],<ref>{{Cite news |last=Sun |first=Yun |date=8 April 2020 |title=China's Strategic Assessment of Afghanistan |work=War on the Rocks |url=https://warontherocks.com/2020/04/chinas-strategic-assessment-of-afghanistan/ |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=12 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221112194347/https://warontherocks.com/2020/04/chinas-strategic-assessment-of-afghanistan/ |url-status=live }}</ref> the [[2003 invasion of Iraq]],<ref name="Chase-2007">{{Cite journal |last=Chase |first=Michael S. |date=19 September 2007 |title=China's Assessment of the War in Iraq: America's "Deepest Quagmire" and the Implications for Chinese National Security |url=https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-assessment-of-the-war-in-iraq-americas-deepest-quagmire-and-the-implications-for-chinese-national-security/ |journal=China Brief |publisher=[[The Jamestown Foundation]] |volume=7 |issue=17 |via= |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=12 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221112194353/https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-assessment-of-the-war-in-iraq-americas-deepest-quagmire-and-the-implications-for-chinese-national-security/ |url-status=live }}</ref> and the [[Iraqi insurgency (2003–2011)|Iraqi insurgency]].<ref name="Chase-2007" /> All these lessons inspired China to transform the PLA from a military based on quantity to one based on quality. Chairman Jiang Zemin officially made a "[[revolution in military affairs]]" (RMA) part of the official national military strategy in 1993 to [[Modernization of the People's Liberation Army|modernize the Chinese armed forces]].<ref name="Ji-1999">{{Cite journal |last=Ji |first=You |date=1999 |title=The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Evolution of China's Strategic Thinking |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/25798464 |journal=Contemporary Southeast Asia |volume=21 |issue=3 |pages=344–364 |jstor=25798464 |issn=0129-797X |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=12 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221112194351/https://www.jstor.org/stable/25798464 |url-status=live }}</ref>
 
A goal of the RMA is to transform the PLA into a force capable of winning what it calls "local wars under high-tech conditions" rather than a massive, numbers-dominated ground-type war.<ref name="Ji-1999" /> Chinese military planners call for short decisive campaigns, limited in both their geographic scope and their political goals. In contrast to the past, more attention is given to [[reconnaissance]], mobility, and deep reach. This new vision has shifted resources towards the navy and air force. The PLA is also actively preparing for [[space warfare]] and [[cyber-warfare]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Wortzel |first=Larry M. |date=2007 |title=The Chinese People's Liberation Army and Space Warfare |journal=Space Policy |publisher=[[American Enterprise Institute]] |jstor=resrep03013 |jstor-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Hjortdal |first=Magnus |date=2011 |title=China's Use of Cyber Warfare: Espionage Meets Strategic Deterrence |journal=[[Journal of Strategic Security]] |volume=4 |issue=2 |pages=1–24 |doi=10.5038/1944-0472.4.2.1 |issn=1944-0464 |jstor=26463924 |s2cid=145083379|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last1=Jinghua |first1=Lyu |title=What Are China's Cyber Capabilities and Intentions? |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2019/04/what-are-chinas-cyber-capabilities-and-intentions?lang=en |access-date=2022-11-12 |website=[[Carnegie Endowment for International Peace]] |language=en |archive-date=12 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221112194358/https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/04/01/what-are-china-s-cyber-capabilities-and-intentions-pub-78734 |url-status=live }}</ref>
 
In 2002, the PLA began holding military exercises with militaries from other countries.<ref name="Shinn-2023">{{Cite book |last1=Shinn |first1=David H. |title=China's Relations with Africa: a New Era of Strategic Engagement |last2=Eisenman |first2=Joshua |date=2023 |publisher=[[Columbia University Press]] |isbn=978-0-231-21001-0 |location=New York |author-link=David H. Shinn}}</ref>{{Rp|page=242}} From 2018 to 2023, more than half of these exercises have focused on military training other than war, generally antipiracy, or antiterrorism exercises involving combatting non-state actors.<ref name="Shinn-2023" />{{Rp|page=242}} In 2009, the PLA held its first military exercise in Africa, a humanitarian and medical training practice conducted in Gabon.<ref name="Shinn-2023" />{{Rp|page=242}}
 
For the past 10 to 20 years, the PLA has acquired some advanced weapons systems from Russia, including [[Sovremenny-class destroyer]]s,<ref>{{Cite web |last=Osborn |first=Kris |date=2022-03-21 |title=China Modernizes Its Russian-Built Destroyers With New Weapons |url=https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/china-modernizes-its-russian-built-destroyers-new-weapons-201352 |access-date=2022-11-12 |website=[[The National Interest]] |language=en |archive-date=4 February 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230204091606/https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/china-modernizes-its-russian-built-destroyers-new-weapons-201352 |url-status=live }}</ref> [[Sukhoi Su-27]]<ref>{{Cite web |last=Gao |first=Charlie |date=2021-01-01 |title=How China Got Their Own Russian-Made Su-27 "Flanker" Jets |url=https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/how-china-got-their-own-russian-made-su-27-%E2%80%9Cflanker%E2%80%9D-jets-175617 |access-date=2022-11-12 |website=[[The National Interest]] |language=en |archive-date=5 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221205160448/https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/how-china-got-their-own-russian-made-su-27-%E2%80%9Cflanker%E2%80%9D-jets-175617 |url-status=live }}</ref> and [[Kilo-class submarine|Kilo-class]] diesel-electric submarines.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Larson |first=Caleb |date=2021-05-11 |title=China's Deadly Kilo-Class Submarines Are From Russia With Love |url=https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/chinas-deadly-kilo-class-submarines-are-russia-love-184940 |access-date=2022-11-12 |website=[[The National Interest]] |language=en |archive-date=4 February 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230204232241/https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/chinas-deadly-kilo-class-submarines-are-russia-love-184940 |url-status=live }}</ref> It has also started to produce several new classes of destroyers and frigates including the [[Type 052D destroyer|Type 052D]] class guided-missile destroyer.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Vavasseur |first=Xavier |date=21 August 2022 |title=Five Type 052D Destroyers Under Construction In China |work=Naval News |url=https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/08/five-type-052d-destroyers-under-construction-in-china/ |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=25 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220825171507/https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/08/five-type-052d-destroyers-under-construction-in-china/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Wertheim |first=Eric |date=January 2020 |title=China's Luyang III/Type 052D Destroyer Is a Potent Adversary |work=[[United States Naval Institute]] |url=https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/january/chinas-luyang-iiitype-052d-destroyer-potent-adversary |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=10 June 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230610103513/https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/january/chinas-luyang-iiitype-052d-destroyer-potent-adversary |url-status=live }}</ref> In addition, the PLAAF has designed its very own [[Chengdu J-10]] fighter aircraft<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Rogoway |first1=Tyler |last2=Helfrich |first2=Emma |date=18 July 2022 |title=China's J-10 Fighter Spotted In New 'Big Spine' Configuration (Updated) |work=The Warzone |url=https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/chinas-j-10-fighter-spotted-in-new-big-spine-configuration |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=12 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221112194349/https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/chinas-j-10-fighter-spotted-in-new-big-spine-configuration |url-status=live }}</ref> and a new stealth fighter, the [[Chengdu J-20]].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Osborn |first=Kris |date=2022-10-04 |title=China Boosts J-20 Fighter Production to Counter U.S. Stealth Fighters |url=https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/china-boosts-j-20-fighter-production-counter-us-stealth-fighters-205178 |access-date=2022-11-12 |website=[[The National Interest]] |language=en |archive-date=1 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221201112242/https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/china-boosts-j-20-fighter-production-counter-us-stealth-fighters-205178 |url-status=live }}</ref> The PLA launched the new [[Type 094 submarine|Jin class]] nuclear submarines on 3 December 2004 capable of launching nuclear warheads that could strike targets across the Pacific Ocean<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Funaiole |first=Matthew P. |date=4 August 2021 |title=A Glimpse of Chinese Ballistic Missile Submarines |url=https://www.csis.org/analysis/glimpse-chinese-ballistic-missile-submarines |access-date= |website=[[Center for Strategic & International Studies]] |language=en |archive-date=7 October 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231007114240/https://www.csis.org/analysis/glimpse-chinese-ballistic-missile-submarines |url-status=live }}</ref> and have three aircraft carriers, with the latest, the Fujian, launched in 2022.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Lendon |first=Brad |date=2022-06-25 |title=Never mind China's new aircraft carrier, these are the ships the US should worry about |url=https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/25/asia/china-navy-aircraft-carrier-analysis-intl-hnk-ml-dst/index.html |access-date=2022-11-12 |website=[[CNN]] |language=en |archive-date=12 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221112194347/https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/25/asia/china-navy-aircraft-carrier-analysis-intl-hnk-ml-dst/index.html |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2022-07-19 |title=Fujian aircraft carrier doesn't have radar, weapon systems yet, photos show |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3185845/chinas-fujian-aircraft-carrier-doesnt-have-radar-and-weapon |access-date=2022-11-12 |website=South China Morning Post |language=en |archive-date=12 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221112194359/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3185845/chinas-fujian-aircraft-carrier-doesnt-have-radar-and-weapon |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Hendrix |first=Jerry |date=2022-07-06 |title=The Ominous Portent of China's New Carrier |url=https://www.nationalreview.com/2022/07/the-ominous-portent-of-chinas-new-carrier/ |access-date=2022-11-12 |website=[[National Review]] |language=en-US |archive-date=12 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221112194350/https://www.nationalreview.com/2022/07/the-ominous-portent-of-chinas-new-carrier/ |url-status=live }}</ref>


The possibility of a militarized Japan has also been a continuous concern to the Chinese leadership since the late 1990s.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Sasaki |first=Tomonori |date=23 September 2010 |title=China Eyes the Japanese Military: China's Threat Perception of Japan since the 1980s* |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/abs/china-eyes-the-japanese-military-chinas-threat-perception-of-japan-since-the-1980s/4C3D00214448677422255F228609C395 |journal=The China Quarterly |language=en |volume=203 |pages=560–580 |doi=10.1017/S0305741010000597 |s2cid=153828298 |issn=1468-2648}}</ref> In addition, China's military leadership has been reacting to and learning from the successes and failures of the [[Military of the United States|American military]] during the [[Kosovo War]],<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Sakaguchi |first1=Yoshiaki |last2=Mayama |first2=Katsuhiko |date=1999 |title=Significance of the War in Kosovo for China and Russia |url=http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/pdf/bulletin_e2001_1.pdf |journal=NIDS Security Reports |issue=3 |pages=1–23}}</ref> the [[War in Afghanistan (2001–present)|2001 invasion of Afghanistan]],<ref>{{Cite news |last=Sun |first=Yun |date=8 April 2020 |title=China's Strategic Assessment of Afghanistan |work=War on the Rocks |url=https://warontherocks.com/2020/04/chinas-strategic-assessment-of-afghanistan/}}</ref> the [[2003 invasion of Iraq]],<ref name=":6">{{Cite journal |last=Chase |first=Michael S. |date=19 September 2007 |title=China's Assessment of the War in Iraq: America's "Deepest Quagmire" and the Implications for Chinese National Security |url=https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-assessment-of-the-war-in-iraq-americas-deepest-quagmire-and-the-implications-for-chinese-national-security/ |journal=China Brief |publisher=[[The Jamestown Foundation]] |volume=7 |issue=17 |via=}}</ref> and the [[Iraqi insurgency (Iraq War)|Iraqi insurgency]].<ref name=":6" /> All these lessons inspired China to transform the PLA from a military based on quantity to one based on quality. Chairman Jiang Zemin officially made a "[[Revolution in Military Affairs]]" (RMA) part of the official national military strategy in 1993 to [[Modernization of the People's Liberation Army|modernize the Chinese armed forces]].<ref name=":7">{{Cite journal |last=JI |first=YOU |date=1999 |title=The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Evolution of China's Strategic Thinking |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/25798464 |journal=Contemporary Southeast Asia |volume=21 |issue=3 |pages=344–364 |doi=10.1355/CS21-3B |jstor=25798464 |issn=0129-797X}}</ref>
From 2014 to 2015, the PLA deployed 524 medical staff on a rotational basis to combat the [[Western African Ebola virus epidemic|Ebola virus outbreak]] in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau.<ref name="Shinn-2023" />{{Rp|page=245}} As of 2023, this was the PLA's largest medical assistance mission in another country.<ref name="Shinn-2023" />{{Rp|page=245}}


A goal of the RMA is to transform the PLA into a force capable of winning what it calls "local wars under high-tech conditions" rather than a massive, numbers-dominated ground-type war.<ref name=":7" /> Chinese military planners call for short decisive campaigns, limited in both their geographic scope and their political goals. In contrast to the past, more attention is given to [[reconnaissance]], mobility, and deep reach. This new vision has shifted resources towards the navy and air force. The PLA is also actively preparing for [[space warfare]] and [[cyber-warfare]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Wortzel |first=Larry M. |date=2007 |title=The Chinese People's Liberation Army and Space Warfare |journal= |publisher=[[American Enterprise Institute]] |jstor=resrep03013 |jstor-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Hjortdal |first=Magnus |date=2011 |title=China's Use of Cyber Warfare: Espionage Meets Strategic Deterrence |journal=[[Journal of Strategic Security]] |volume=4 |issue=2 |pages=1–24 |doi=10.5038/1944-0472.4.2.1 |issn=1944-0464 |jstor=26463924 |s2cid=145083379|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last1=Jinghua |first1=Lyu |title=What Are China's Cyber Capabilities and Intentions? |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/04/01/what-are-china-s-cyber-capabilities-and-intentions-pub-78734 |access-date=2022-11-12 |website=[[Carnegie Endowment for International Peace]] |language=en}}</ref>
China [[Deepening National Defense and Military Reform|re-organized its military from 2015 to 2016]]. In 2015, the PLA formed new units including the PLA Ground Force, the PLA Rocket Force, and the PLA Strategic Support Force.<ref>{{cite web |title=China establishes Rocket Force and Strategic Support Force |url=http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/photo-reports/2016-01/01/content_6840110.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160410043139/http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/photo-reports/2016-01/01/content_6840110.htm |archive-date=10 April 2016 |access-date=2 January 2016 |website=People's Liberation Army}}</ref> In 2016, the CMC replaced the four traditional military departments with a number of new bodies.<ref name=":Duan">{{Cite book |last=Duan |first=Lei |title=China under Xi Jinping: A New Assessment |publisher=[[Leiden University Press]] |year=2024 |isbn=9789087284411 |editor-last=Fang |editor-first=Qiang |pages= |chapter=Towards a More Joint Strategy: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms and Militia Reconstruction |jstor=jj.15136086 |editor-last2=Li |editor-first2=Xiaobing}}</ref>{{Rp|pages=288–289}} China replaced its system of seven military regions with newly established Theater Commands: [[Northern Theater Command|Northern]], [[Southern Theater Command|Southern]], [[Western Theater Command|Western]], [[Eastern Theater Command|Eastern]], and [[Central Theater Command|Central]].<ref name=":Duan" />{{Rp|page=289}} In the prior system, operations were segmented by military branch and region.<ref name=":Duan" />{{Rp|page=289}} In contrast, each Theater Command is intended to function as a unified entity with joint operations across different military branches.<ref name=":Duan" />{{Rp|page=289}}


For the past 10 to 20 years, the PLA has acquired some advanced weapons systems from Russia, including [[Sovremenny class destroyers]],<ref>{{Cite web |last=Osborn |first=Kris |date=2022-03-21 |title=China Modernizes Its Russian-Built Destroyers With New Weapons |url=https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/china-modernizes-its-russian-built-destroyers-new-weapons-201352 |access-date=2022-11-12 |website=[[The National Interest]] |language=en}}</ref> [[Sukhoi Su-27]]<ref>{{Cite web |last=Gao |first=Charlie |date=2021-01-01 |title=How China Got Their Own Russian-Made Su-27 "Flanker" Jets |url=https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/how-china-got-their-own-russian-made-su-27-%E2%80%9Cflanker%E2%80%9D-jets-175617 |access-date=2022-11-12 |website=[[The National Interest]] |language=en}}</ref> and [[Sukhoi Su-30]] aircraft,<ref>{{Cite web |last=Kadam |first=Tanmay |date=26 September 2022 |title=2 Russian Su-30 Fighters, The Backbone Of Indian & Chinese Air Force, Knocked Out By Ukraine - Kiev Claims |url=https://eurasiantimes.com/2-russian-su-30-fighters-the-backbone-of-indian-chinese-air-force-knocked-out-by-ukraine-kiev-claims/ |access-date=2022-11-12 |website=The Eurasian Times |language=en-US}}</ref> and [[Kilo class submarine|Kilo-class]] diesel-electric submarines.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Larson |first=Caleb |date=2021-05-11 |title=China's Deadly Kilo-Class Submarines Are From Russia With Love |url=https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/chinas-deadly-kilo-class-submarines-are-russia-love-184940 |access-date=2022-11-12 |website=[[The National Interest]] |language=en}}</ref> It has also started to produce several new classes of destroyers and frigates including the [[Type 052D]] class guided-missile destroyer.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Vavasseur |first=Xavier |date=21 August 2022 |title=Five Type 052D Destroyers Under Construction In China |work=Naval News |url=https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/08/five-type-052d-destroyers-under-construction-in-china/}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Wertheim |first=Eric |date=January 2020 |title=China's Luyang III/Type 052D Destroyer Is a Potent Adversary |work=[[United States Naval Institute]] |url=https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/january/chinas-luyang-iiitype-052d-destroyer-potent-adversary}}</ref> In addition, the PLAAF has designed its very own [[Chengdu J-10]] fighter aircraft<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Rogoway |first1=Tyler |last2=Helfrich |first2=Emma |date=18 July 2022 |title=China's J-10 Fighter Spotted In New 'Big Spine' Configuration (Updated) |work=The Warzone |url=https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/chinas-j-10-fighter-spotted-in-new-big-spine-configuration}}</ref> and a new stealth fighter, the [[Chengdu J-20]].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Osborn |first=Kris |date=2022-10-04 |title=China Boosts J-20 Fighter Production to Counter U.S. Stealth Fighters |url=https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/china-boosts-j-20-fighter-production-counter-us-stealth-fighters-205178 |access-date=2022-11-12 |website=[[The National Interest]] |language=en}}</ref> The PLA launched the new [[Type 094 submarine|Jin class]] nuclear submarines on 3 December 2004 capable of launching nuclear warheads that could strike targets across the Pacific Ocean<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Funaiole |first=Matthew P. |date=4 August 2021 |title=A Glimpse of Chinese Ballistic Missile Submarines |url=https://www.csis.org/analysis/glimpse-chinese-ballistic-missile-submarines |access-date= |website=[[Center for Strategic & International Studies]] |language=en}}</ref> and have three aircraft carriers, with the latest, the Fujian, launched in 2022.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Lendon |first=Brad |date=2022-06-25 |title=Never mind China's new aircraft carrier, these are the ships the US should worry about |url=https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/25/asia/china-navy-aircraft-carrier-analysis-intl-hnk-ml-dst/index.html |access-date=2022-11-12 |website=[[CNN]] |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2022-07-19 |title=Fujian aircraft carrier doesn't have radar, weapon systems yet, photos show |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3185845/chinas-fujian-aircraft-carrier-doesnt-have-radar-and-weapon |access-date=2022-11-12 |website=South China Morning Post |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Hendrix |first=Jerry |date=2022-07-06 |title=The Ominous Portent of China's New Carrier |url=https://www.nationalreview.com/2022/07/the-ominous-portent-of-chinas-new-carrier/ |access-date=2022-11-12 |website=[[National Review]] |language=en-US}}</ref>
The PLA on 1 August 2017 marked its 90th anniversary.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2017-03-15 |title=Exclusive: Massive parade tipped for PLA's 90th birthday |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2079193/massive-parade-tipped-plas-90th-birthday |access-date=2022-11-12 |website=[[South China Morning Post]] |language=en |archive-date=12 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221112194347/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2079193/massive-parade-tipped-plas-90th-birthday |url-status=live }}</ref> Before the big anniversary it mounted its biggest parade yet and the first outside of Beijing, held in the [[Zhurihe Training Base]] in the [[Northern Theater Command]] (within the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region).<ref>{{Cite news |last=Buckley |first=Chris |date=2017-07-30 |title=China Shows Off Military Might as Xi Jinping Tries to Cement Power |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/30/world/asia/china-military-parade-xi-jinping.html |access-date=2021-10-12 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=7 October 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211007084938/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/30/world/asia/china-military-parade-xi-jinping.html |url-status=live }}</ref>


In 2015, the PLA formed new units including the PLA Ground Force, the PLA Rocket Force and the PLA Strategic Support Force.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/photo-reports/2016-01/01/content_6840110.htm |title=China establishes Rocket Force and Strategic Support Force – China Military Online<!-- Bot generated title --> |access-date=2 January 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160410043139/http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/photo-reports/2016-01/01/content_6840110.htm |archive-date=10 April 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref>
In December 2023, [[Reuters]] reported a military leadership purge after high-ranking generals were ousted from the [[National People's Congress]].<ref>{{Cite news |date=December 31, 2023 |title=Chinese military purge exposes weakness, could widen |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/sweeping-chinese-military-purge-exposes-weakness-could-widen-2023-12-30/ |access-date=July 22, 2024 |work=[[Reuters]]}}</ref> Prior to 2017, over sixty generals were investigated and sacked.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2017-10-22 |title=Charting China's 'great purge' under Xi |language=en-GB |work=[[BBC News]] |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-41670162 |access-date=2024-01-01 |archive-date=6 June 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210606041942/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-41670162 |url-status=live }}</ref>


The PLA on 1 August 2017 marked its 90th anniversary.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2017-03-15 |title=Exclusive: Massive parade tipped for PLA's 90th birthday |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2079193/massive-parade-tipped-plas-90th-birthday |access-date=2022-11-12 |website=[[South China Morning Post]] |language=en}}</ref> Before the big anniversary it mounted its biggest parade yet and the first outside of Beijing, held in the [[Zhurihe Training Base]] in the [[Northern Theater Command]] (within the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region).<ref>{{Cite news |last=Buckley |first=Chris |date=2017-07-30 |title=China Shows Off Military Might as Xi Jinping Tries to Cement Power |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/30/world/asia/china-military-parade-xi-jinping.html |access-date=2021-10-12 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref>
=== Overseas deployments and UN peacekeeping operations ===
{{Further|List of countries with overseas military bases#China|People's Liberation Army Support Base in Djibouti}}
In addition to its [[People's Liberation Army Support Base in Djibouti|Support Base in Djibouti]], the PLA operates a base in Tajikistan and a [[listening station]] in Cuba.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Yan |first=Sophia |date=2024-07-10 |title=China constructing secret military base in Tajikistan to crush threat from Taliban |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/07/10/china-secret-military-base-tajikistan-taliban-afghanistan/ |access-date=2024-07-10 |work=[[The Daily Telegraph]] |language=en-GB |issn=0307-1235 |archive-date=22 July 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240722173910/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/07/10/china-secret-military-base-tajikistan-taliban-afghanistan/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=July 1, 2024 |title=Secret Signals: Decoding China's Intelligence Activities in Cuba |url=https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-cuba-spy-sigint |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240702051639/https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-cuba-spy-sigint/ |archive-date=2024-07-02 |access-date=2024-07-02 |website=[[Center for Strategic and International Studies]] |language=en}}</ref> The [[Espacio Lejano Station]] in Argentina is operated by a PLA unit.<ref name=":23">{{Cite news |last=Garrison |first=Cassandra |date=2019-01-31 |title=China's military-run space station in Argentina is a 'black box' |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-space-argentina-china-insight-idUSKCN1PP0I2 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220125031112/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-space-argentina-china-insight-idUSKCN1PP0I2 |archive-date=2022-01-25 |access-date=2022-01-25 |work=[[Reuters]] |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=October 4, 2022 |title=Eyes on the Skies: China's Growing Space Footprint in South America |url=https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-ground-stations-space |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221005034621/https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-ground-stations-space/ |archive-date=2022-10-05 |access-date=2022-10-04 |website=[[Center for Strategic and International Studies]] |language=en}}</ref> The PLAN has also undertaken rotational deployments of its warships at the [[Ream Naval Base]] in Cambodia.<ref>{{Cite web |last1=Cheang |first1=Sopheng |last2=David |first2=Rising |date=2024-05-08 |title=Chinese warships have been docked in Cambodia for 5 months, but government says it's not permanent |url=https://apnews.com/article/cambodia-china-naval-base-warships-ream-d4571e2ca53e682ce17c121312443b52 |access-date=2024-07-10 |website=[[Associated Press]] |language=en |archive-date=9 July 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240709235517/https://apnews.com/article/cambodia-china-naval-base-warships-ream-d4571e2ca53e682ce17c121312443b52 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=July 4, 2024 |title=Chinese warships rotate at Cambodia's Ream naval base |url=https://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/china-warships-ream-07042024025936.html |access-date=July 10, 2024 |work=[[Radio Free Asia]]}}</ref>


=== Peacekeeping operations ===
The People's Republic of China has sent the PLA to various hotspots as part of China's role as a prominent member of the United Nations.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Gowan |first=Richard |date=2020-09-14 |title=China's pragmatic approach to UN peacekeeping |url=https://www.brookings.edu/articles/chinas-pragmatic-approach-to-un-peacekeeping/ |access-date=2022-11-12 |website=[[Brookings Institution]] |language=en-US |archive-date=12 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221112194349/https://www.brookings.edu/articles/chinas-pragmatic-approach-to-un-peacekeeping/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Such units usually include engineers and logistical units and members of the paramilitary [[People's Armed Police]] and have been deployed as part of peacekeeping operations in [[Lebanon]],<ref name="Rowland-2022" /><ref>{{Cite report |url=https://isdp.eu/content/uploads/2018/03/PRC-Peacekeeping-Backgrounder.pdf |title=China's Role in UN Peacekeeping |date=March 2018 |publisher=Institute for Security & Development Policy |access-date=10 December 2022 |archive-date=5 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221005235516/https://isdp.eu/content/uploads/2018/03/PRC-Peacekeeping-Backgrounder.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> the [[Republic of the Congo]],<ref name="Rowland-2022">{{Cite report |url=https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Papers/WF_088_Rowland_Chinese_Security_Cooperation_Activities.pdf |title=Chinese Security Cooperation Activities: Trends and Implications for US Policy |last=Rowland |first=Daniel T. |date=September 2022 |access-date=10 December 2022 |archive-date=10 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221210200840/https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Papers/WF_088_Rowland_Chinese_Security_Cooperation_Activities.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> [[Sudan]],<ref>Daniel M. Hartnett, 2012-03-13, [http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2012/MEMO-PLA-PKO_final.pdf China's First Deployment of Combat Forces to a UN. Peacekeeping Mission—South Sudan] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121014025306/http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2012/MEMO-PLA-PKO_final.pdf |date=14 October 2012 }}, United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission</ref> [[Ivory Coast]],<ref>Bernard Yudkin Geoxavier, 2012-09-18, [http://yalejournal.org/2012/09/china-as-peacekeeper-an-updated-perspective-on-humanitarian-intervention/ China as Peacekeeper: An Updated Perspective on Humanitarian Intervention] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130131054018/http://yalejournal.org/2012/09/china-as-peacekeeper-an-updated-perspective-on-humanitarian-intervention/ |date=31 January 2013 }}, Yale Journal of International Affairs</ref> [[Haiti]],<ref>{{Cite news |date=1 February 2005 |title=Chinese Peacekeepers to Haiti: Much Attention, More Confusion |work=[[Royal United Services Institute]] |url=https://rusi.org/publication/chinese-peacekeepers-haiti-much-attention-more-confusion |access-date=10 December 2022 |archive-date=11 February 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240211032250/https://rusi.org/publication/chinese-peacekeepers-haiti-much-attention-more-confusion |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Nichols |first=Michelle |date=14 July 2022 |title=China pushes for U.N. arms embargo on Haiti criminal gangs |work=[[Reuters]] |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/china-pushes-un-arms-embargo-haiti-criminal-gangs-2022-07-14/ |access-date=10 December 2022 |archive-date=10 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221210200844/https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/china-pushes-un-arms-embargo-haiti-criminal-gangs-2022-07-14/ |url-status=live }}</ref> and more recently, [[Mali War|Mali]] and [[United Nations Mission in South Sudan|South Sudan]].<ref name="Rowland-2022" /><ref>{{Cite web |last=Dyrenforth |first=Thomas |date=2021-08-19 |title=Beijing's Blue Helmets: What to Make of China's Role in UN Peacekeeping in Africa |url=https://mwi.usma.edu/beijings-blue-helmets-what-to-make-of-chinas-role-in-un-peacekeeping-in-africa/ |access-date=2022-11-12 |website=[[Modern War Institute]] |language=en-US |archive-date=12 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221112194350/https://mwi.usma.edu/beijings-blue-helmets-what-to-make-of-chinas-role-in-un-peacekeeping-in-africa/ |url-status=live }}</ref>
The People's Republic of China has sent the PLA to various hotspots as part of China's role as a prominent member of the United Nations.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Gowan |first=Richard |date=2020-09-14 |title=China's pragmatic approach to UN peacekeeping |url=https://www.brookings.edu/articles/chinas-pragmatic-approach-to-un-peacekeeping/ |access-date=2022-11-12 |website=[[Brookings Institution]] |language=en-US}}</ref> Such units usually include engineers and logistical units and members of the paramilitary [[People's Armed Police]] and have been deployed as part of peacekeeping operations in [[Lebanon]],<ref name=":10" /><ref>{{Cite report |url=https://isdp.eu/content/uploads/2018/03/PRC-Peacekeeping-Backgrounder.pdf |title=China's Role in UN Peacekeeping |date=March 2018 |publisher=Institute for Security & Development Policy}}</ref> the [[Republic of the Congo]],<ref name=":10">{{Cite report |url=https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Papers/WF_088_Rowland_Chinese_Security_Cooperation_Activities.pdf |title=Chinese Security Cooperation Activities: Trends and Implications for US Policy |last=Rowland |first=Daniel T. |date=September 2022}}</ref> [[Sudan]],<ref>Daniel M. Hartnett, 2012-03-13, [http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2012/MEMO-PLA-PKO_final.pdf China's First Deployment of Combat Forces to a UN. Peacekeeping Mission—South Sudan] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121014025306/http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2012/MEMO-PLA-PKO_final.pdf |date=14 October 2012 }}, United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission</ref> [[Ivory Coast]],<ref>Bernard Yudkin Geoxavier, 2012-09-18, [http://yalejournal.org/2012/09/china-as-peacekeeper-an-updated-perspective-on-humanitarian-intervention/ China as Peacekeeper: An Updated Perspective on Humanitarian Intervention] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130131054018/http://yalejournal.org/2012/09/china-as-peacekeeper-an-updated-perspective-on-humanitarian-intervention/ |date=31 January 2013 }}, Yale Journal of International Affairs</ref> [[Haiti]],<ref>{{Cite news |date=1 February 2005 |title=Chinese Peacekeepers to Haiti: Much Attention, More Confusion |work=[[Royal United Services Institute]] |url=https://rusi.org/publication/chinese-peacekeepers-haiti-much-attention-more-confusion}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Nichols |first=Michelle |date=14 July 2022 |title=China pushes for U.N. arms embargo on Haiti criminal gangs |work=[[Reuters]] |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/china-pushes-un-arms-embargo-haiti-criminal-gangs-2022-07-14/}}</ref> and more recently, [[Northern Mali conflict|Mali]] and [[United Nations Mission in South Sudan|South Sudan]].<ref name=":10" /><ref>{{Cite web |last=Dyrenforth |first=Thomas |date=2021-08-19 |title=Beijing's Blue Helmets: What to Make of China's Role in UN Peacekeeping in Africa |url=https://mwi.usma.edu/beijings-blue-helmets-what-to-make-of-chinas-role-in-un-peacekeeping-in-africa/ |access-date=2022-11-12 |website=[[Modern War Institute]] |language=en-US}}</ref>


=== Engagements ===
=== Engagements ===
{{See also|List of wars involving the People's Republic of China}}
{{See also|List of wars involving the People's Republic of China}}


* 1927–1950: [[Chinese Civil War]]<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8WYSAAAAQBAJ |title=Historical Dictionary of the Chinese Civil War |publisher=The Scarecrow Press, Inc. |year=2013 |isbn=978-0810878730 |editor1-last=Lew |editor1-first=Christopher R. |location=Lanham, Maryland |page=3 |editor2-last=Leung |editor2-first=Pak-Wah}}</ref>
* 1927–1950: [[Chinese Civil War]]<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8WYSAAAAQBAJ |title=Historical Dictionary of the Chinese Civil War |publisher=The Scarecrow Press, Inc. |year=2013 |isbn=978-0810878730 |editor1-last=Lew |editor1-first=Christopher R. |location=Lanham, Maryland |page=3 |editor2-last=Leung |editor2-first=Pak-Wah |access-date=10 December 2022 |archive-date=11 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230411192241/https://books.google.com/books?id=8WYSAAAAQBAJ |url-status=live}}</ref>
* 1937–1945: [[Second Sino-Japanese War]]<ref name="Paine2012">{{cite book |last=Paine |first=S. C. M. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=bAYgAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA123 |title=The Wars for Asia, 1911–1949 |date=20 August 2012 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-139-56087-0 |page=123 |access-date=28 November 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221012012418/https://books.google.com/books?id=bAYgAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA123 |archive-date=12 October 2022 |url-status=live}}</ref>
* 1937–1945: [[Second Sino-Japanese War]]<ref name="Paine2012">{{cite book |last=Paine |first=S. C. M. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=bAYgAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA123 |title=The Wars for Asia, 1911–1949 |date=2012 |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |isbn=978-1-139-56087-0 |page=123 |access-date=28 November 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221012012418/https://books.google.com/books?id=bAYgAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA123 |archive-date=12 October 2022 |url-status=live}}</ref>
* 1949: [[Yangtze incident]] against British warships on the Yangtze River<ref>{{cite web |title=Security Check Required |url=http://www.britains-smallwars.com/RRGP/AMETHYST.htm |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150414010949/http://www.britains-smallwars.com/RRGP/AMETHYST.htm |archive-date=14 April 2015 |access-date=1 May 2016}}</ref>
* 1949: [[Amethyst incident|Yangtze incident]] against British warships on the Yangtze River<ref>{{cite web |title=Security Check Required |url=http://www.britains-smallwars.com/RRGP/AMETHYST.htm |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150414010949/http://www.britains-smallwars.com/RRGP/AMETHYST.htm |archive-date=14 April 2015 |access-date=1 May 2016}}</ref>
* 1949: [[Incorporation of Xinjiang into the People's Republic of China]]<ref>{{cite web |title=Sinkiang and Sino-Soviet Relations |url=http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/2008/P1953.pdf |access-date=14 March 2017}}</ref>
* 1949: [[Incorporation of Xinjiang into the People's Republic of China]]<ref>{{cite web |title=Sinkiang and Sino-Soviet Relations |url=http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/2008/P1953.pdf |access-date=14 March 2017 |archive-date=5 June 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110605043232/http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/2008/P1953.pdf |url-status=live}}</ref>
* 1950: [[Annexation of Tibet by the People's Republic of China]]<ref>Shakya 1999 p.32 (6 Oct); {{harvp|Goldstein|1997|p=45}} (7 Oct).</ref>
* 1950: [[Annexation of Tibet by the People's Republic of China]]<ref>Shakya 1999 p. 32 (6 Oct); {{harvp|Goldstein|1997|p=45}} (7 Oct).</ref>
* 1950–1953: [[Korean War]] under the banner of the Chinese [[People's Volunteer Army]]<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Ryan |first1=Mark A. |title=Chinese warfighting: The PLA experience since 1949 |last2=Finkelstein |first2=David M. |last3=McDevitt |first3=Michael A. |date=2003 |publisher=M.E. Sharpe |isbn=0-7656-1087-6 |location=Armonk, NY |page=125}}</ref>
* 1950–1953: [[Korean War]] under the banner of the Chinese [[People's Volunteer Army]]<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Ryan |first1=Mark A. |title=Chinese warfighting: The PLA experience since 1949 |last2=Finkelstein |first2=David M. |last3=McDevitt |first3=Michael A. |date=2003 |publisher=[[M.E. Sharpe]] |isbn=0-7656-1087-6 |location=Armonk, NY |page=125}}</ref>
* 1954–1955: [[First Taiwan Strait Crisis]]<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Rushkoff |first=Bennett C. |date=1981 |title=Eisenhower, Dulles and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, 1954-1955 |journal=[[Political Science Quarterly]] |volume=96 |issue=3 |pages=465–480 |doi=10.2307/2150556 |issn=0032-3195 |jstor=2150556}}</ref>
* 1954–1955: [[First Taiwan Strait Crisis]]<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Rushkoff |first=Bennett C. |date=1981 |title=Eisenhower, Dulles and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, 1954–1955 |journal=[[Political Science Quarterly]] |volume=96 |issue=3 |pages=465–480 |doi=10.2307/2150556 |issn=0032-3195 |jstor=2150556}}</ref>
* 1955–1970: [[Vietnam War]]<ref name="Zhai">{{Cite book |last=Zhai |first=Qiang |title=China and the Vietnam wars, 1950–1975 |publisher=University of North Carolina Press |year=2000 |isbn=978-0807825327 |location=Chapel Hill |oclc=41564973}}</ref>
* 1955–1970: [[Vietnam War]]<ref name="Zhai">{{Cite book |last=Zhai |first=Qiang |title=China and the Vietnam wars, 1950–1975 |publisher=[[University of North Carolina Press]] |year=2000 |isbn=978-0807825327 |location=Chapel Hill |oclc=41564973}}</ref>
* 1958: [[Second Taiwan Strait Crisis]] at [[Quemoy]] and [[Matsu (islands)|Matsu]]<ref name="1958 crisis">{{cite book |url=https://archive.org/details/The1958TaiwanStraitsCrisisADocumentedHistory/page/n183 |title=The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis_ A Documented History |date=1975}}</ref>
* 1958: [[Second Taiwan Strait Crisis]] at [[Quemoy]] and [[Matsu (islands)|Matsu]]<ref name="1958 crisis">{{cite book |url=https://archive.org/details/The1958TaiwanStraitsCrisisADocumentedHistory/page/n183 |title=The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis_ A Documented History |date=1975}}</ref>
* 1962: [[Sino-Indian War]]<ref>{{Cite book |last=Lintner |first=Bertil |title=China's India War: Collision Course on the Roof of the World |date=2018-01-25 |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |isbn=978-0-19-909163-8 |language=en |oclc=1034558154 |author-link=Bertil Lintner}}</ref>
* 1962: [[Sino-Indian War]]<ref>{{Cite book |last=Lintner |first=Bertil |title=China's India War: Collision Course on the Roof of the World |date=2018 |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |isbn=978-0-19-909163-8 |language=en |oclc=1034558154 |author-link=Bertil Lintner}}</ref>
* 1967: [[Chola incident|Border skirmishes]] with India<ref name="Chellaney2">{{Cite book |last=Brahma Chellaney |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ZCmFAAAAMAAJ |title=Asian Juggernaut: The Rise of China, India, and Japan |date=2006 |publisher=[[HarperCollins]] |isbn=9788172236502 |pages=195 |language=en |quote=Indeed, Beijing's acknowledgement of Indian control over Sikkim seems limited to the purpose of facilitating trade through the vertiginous Nathu-la Pass, the scene of bloody artillery duels in September 1967 when Indian troops beat back attacking Chinese forces. |author-link=Brahma Chellaney}}</ref>
* 1967: [[Nathu La and Cho La clashes|Border skirmishes]] with India<ref name="Chellaney2">{{Cite book |author=Brahma Chellaney |author-link=Brahma Chellaney |url=https://archive.org/details/asianjuggernautr0000chel |title=Asian Juggernaut: The Rise of China, India, and Japan |date=2006 |publisher=[[HarperCollins]] |isbn=978-8172236502 |page=195 |language=en |quote=Indeed, Beijing's acknowledgement of Indian control over Sikkim seems limited to the purpose of facilitating trade through the vertiginous Nathu-la Pass, the scene of bloody artillery duels in September 1967 when Indian troops beat back attacking Chinese forces.}}</ref>
* 1969: [[Sino-Soviet border conflict]]<ref>{{cite web |title=Некоторые малоизвестные эпизоды пограничного конфликта на о. Даманском |url=http://warfor.me/nekotoryie-maloizvestnyie-epizodyi-pogranichnogo-konflikta-na-o-damanskom/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180311140855/http://warfor.me/nekotoryie-maloizvestnyie-epizodyi-pogranichnogo-konflikta-na-o-damanskom/ |archive-date=11 March 2018 |access-date=10 March 2018 |work=Военное оружие и армии Мира}}</ref>
* 1969: [[Sino-Soviet border conflict]]<ref>{{cite web |title=Некоторые малоизвестные эпизоды пограничного конфликта на о. Даманском |url=http://warfor.me/nekotoryie-maloizvestnyie-epizodyi-pogranichnogo-konflikta-na-o-damanskom/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180311140855/http://warfor.me/nekotoryie-maloizvestnyie-epizodyi-pogranichnogo-konflikta-na-o-damanskom/ |archive-date=11 March 2018 |access-date=10 March 2018 |work=Военное оружие и армии Мира|date=3 February 2015 }}</ref>
* 1974: [[Battle of the Paracel Islands]] with [[South Vietnam]]<ref>Carl O. Schustser. [http://www.historynet.com/battle-paracel-islands.htm "Battle for Paracel Islands".]</ref>
* 1974: [[Battle of the Paracel Islands]] with [[South Vietnam]]<ref>Carl O. Schustser. [http://www.historynet.com/battle-paracel-islands.htm "Battle for Paracel Islands".] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220120162438/https://www.historynet.com/battle-paracel-islands.htm |date=20 January 2022 }}</ref>
* 1979: [[Sino-Vietnamese War]]<ref name="auto2">{{cite book |last=Elleman |first=Bruce A. |url=https://archive.org/details/modernchinesewar00elle |title=Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795–1989 |publisher=Routledge |year=2001 |isbn=0415214742 |page=[https://archive.org/details/modernchinesewar00elle/page/n309 297] |url-access=limited}}</ref>
* 1979: [[Sino-Vietnamese War]]<ref name="auto2">{{cite book |last=Elleman |first=Bruce A. |url=https://archive.org/details/modernchinesewar00elle |title=Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795–1989 |publisher=Routledge |year=2001 |isbn=0415214742 |page=[https://archive.org/details/modernchinesewar00elle/page/n309 297] |url-access=limited}}</ref>
* 1979–1990: [[Sino-Vietnamese conflicts 1979–1990]]<ref name="CarlyleAThayer">Carlyle A. Thayer, "Security Issues in Southeast Asia: The Third Indochina War", Conference on Security and Arms Control in the North Pacific, Australian National University, Canberra, August 1987.</ref>
* 1979–1990: [[Sino-Vietnamese conflicts (1979–1991)|Sino-Vietnamese conflicts]]<ref name="CarlyleAThayer">Carlyle A. Thayer, "Security Issues in Southeast Asia: The Third Indochina War", Conference on Security and Arms Control in the North Pacific, Australian National University, Canberra, August 1987.</ref>
* 1988: [[Johnson South Reef Skirmish]] with Vietnam<ref name="wenweipo">"[http://news.wenweipo.com/2009/04/22/HO0904220048.htm Secrets of the Sino-Vietnamese skirmish in the South China Sea] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130531042839/http://news.wenweipo.com/2009/04/22/HO0904220048.htm|date=2013-05-31}}", WENWEIPO.COM LIMITED, March 14, 1988.</ref>
* 1988: [[Johnson South Reef Skirmish]] with Vietnam<ref name="koo9-154">{{Cite book |last=Koo |first=Min Gyo |title=Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia |date=2010 |publisher=Springer New York |isbn=978-0-387-89669-4 |series=The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific |location=New York, NY |pages=154 |doi=10.1007/978-0-387-89670-0}}</ref>
* 1989: [[People's Liberation Army at Tiananmen Square protests of 1989|Enforcement of martial law in Beijing]] during the [[1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre]]<ref>{{Cite news |last=McFadden |first=Robert D. |date=5 June 1989 |title=The West Condemns the Crackdown |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/05/world/the-west-condemns-the-crackdown.html |access-date=25 May 2021 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref>
* 1989: [[People's Liberation Army at the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre|Enforcement of martial law in Beijing]] during the [[1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre]]<ref>{{Cite news |last=McFadden |first=Robert D. |date=5 June 1989 |title=The West Condemns the Crackdown |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/05/world/the-west-condemns-the-crackdown.html |access-date=25 May 2021 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=3 May 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190503230905/https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/05/world/the-west-condemns-the-crackdown.html |url-status=live }}</ref>
* 1990: [[Baren Township riot]]<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Dreyer |first=June Teufel |date=2005 |title=China's Vulnerability to Minority Separatism |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/30172869 |journal=Asian Affairs |volume=32 |issue=2 |pages=69–85 |doi=10.3200/AAFS.32.2.69-86 |jstor=30172869 |s2cid=153883722 |issn=0092-7678}}</ref>
* 1990: [[Barin uprising]]<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Dreyer |first=June Teufel |date=2005 |title=China's Vulnerability to Minority Separatism |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/30172869 |journal=Asian Affairs |volume=32 |issue=2 |pages=69–85 |doi=10.3200/AAFS.32.2.69-86 |jstor=30172869 |s2cid=153883722 |issn=0092-7678 |access-date=10 December 2022 |archive-date=10 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221210200845/https://www.jstor.org/stable/30172869 |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref>
* 1995–1996: [[Third Taiwan Strait Crisis]]<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Qimao |first=Chen |date=1996 |title=The Taiwan Strait Crisis: Its Crux and Solutions |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2645635 |journal=Asian Survey |volume=36 |issue=11 |pages=1055–1066 |doi=10.2307/2645635 |jstor=2645635 |issn=0004-4687}}</ref>
* 1995–1996: [[Third Taiwan Strait Crisis]]<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Qimao |first=Chen |date=1996 |title=The Taiwan Strait Crisis: Its Crux and Solutions |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2645635 |journal=Asian Survey |volume=36 |issue=11 |pages=1055–1066 |doi=10.2307/2645635 |jstor=2645635 |issn=0004-4687 |access-date=10 December 2022 |archive-date=10 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221210200843/https://www.jstor.org/stable/2645635 |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref>
* 1997: [[People's Liberation Army Hong Kong Garrison|PLA establishes Hong Kong Garrison]]
* 2007–present: [[UNIFIL]] peacekeeping operations in [[Lebanon]]<ref name="Rowland-2022" />
* 1999: [[People's Liberation Army Macau Garrison|PLA establishes Macau Garrison]]
* 2009–present: [[Piracy in Somalia|Anti-piracy operations]] in the [[Gulf of Aden]]<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Henry |first=Jérôme |date=November 2016 |title=China's Military Deployments in the Gulf of Aden: Anti-Piracy and Beyond |url=https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/chinas_military_deployments_in_the_gulf_of_aden_anti-piracy_and_beyond_0.pdf |journal=Notes de l'Ifri |issue=89 |access-date=10 December 2022 |archive-date=13 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221113165347/https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/chinas_military_deployments_in_the_gulf_of_aden_anti-piracy_and_beyond_0.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref>
* 2007–present: [[UNIFIL]] peacekeeping operations in [[Lebanon]]<ref name=":10" />
* 2014: Search and rescue efforts for [[Malaysia Airlines Flight 370]]<ref>{{Cite news |last=Torode |first=Greg |date=13 March 2014 |title=A nervous region eyes robust Chinese response to missing Malaysian plane |work=[[Reuters]] |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-airlines-china-response-anal/a-nervous-region-eyes-robust-chinese-response-to-missing-malaysian-plane-idUSBREA2C0XE20140313 |access-date=10 December 2022 |archive-date=10 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221210200842/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-airlines-china-response-anal/a-nervous-region-eyes-robust-chinese-response-to-missing-malaysian-plane-idUSBREA2C0XE20140313 |url-status=live }}</ref>
* 2009–present: [[Piracy in Somalia|Anti-piracy operations]] in the [[Gulf of Aden]]<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Henry |first=Jérôme |date=November 2016 |title=China's Military Deployments in the Gulf of Aden: Anti-Piracy and Beyond |url=https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/chinas_military_deployments_in_the_gulf_of_aden_anti-piracy_and_beyond_0.pdf |journal=Notes de l'Ifri |issue=89}}</ref>
* 2014: [[UN]] peacekeeping operations in [[Mali War|Mali]]<ref>{{Cite web |title=Troop and police contributors |url=https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors |access-date=2021-10-29 |website=United Nations Peacekeeping |language=en |archive-date=30 June 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190630060533/https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors |url-status=live }}</ref>
* 2014: Search and rescue efforts for [[Flight MH370]]<ref>{{Cite news |last=Torode |first=Greg |date=13 March 2014 |title=A nervous region eyes robust Chinese response to missing Malaysian plane |work=[[Reuters]] |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-airlines-china-response-anal/a-nervous-region-eyes-robust-chinese-response-to-missing-malaysian-plane-idUSBREA2C0XE20140313}}</ref>
* 2015: [[UNMISS]] peacekeeping operations in [[South Sudan]]<ref name="UNwho">{{cite web |title=UNMISS Fact Sheet |url=https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unmiss |access-date=22 December 2017 |publisher=UNMISS |archive-date=23 April 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210423064759/https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unmiss |url-status=live }}</ref>
* 2014: [[UN]] peacekeeping operations in [[Northern Mali conflict|Mali]]<ref>{{Cite web |title=Troop and police contributors |url=https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors |access-date=2021-10-29 |website=United Nations Peacekeeping |language=en}}</ref>
* 2020–2021: [[2020–2021 China–India skirmishes|China–India skirmishes]]<ref name="Tellis-2020">{{Cite report |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_Himalayan-Border-Standoffs.pdf |title=Hustling in the Himalayas: The Sino-Indian Border Confrontation |last=Tellis |first=Ashley J. |date=June 2020 |quote=These efforts to bring new territorial enclaves under Chinese control are occurring simultaneously at several different locations, such as on the northern bank of the Pangong Tso, at Hot Springs, and in the Galwan Valley, places that all lie astride the LAC in eastern Ladakh |access-date=29 June 2020 |website=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |archive-date=18 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210218135503/https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_Himalayan-Border-Standoffs.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref>
* 2015: [[UNMISS]] peacekeeping operations in [[South Sudan]]<ref name="UNwho">{{cite web |title=UNMISS Fact Sheet |url=https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unmiss |access-date=22 December 2017 |publisher=UNMISS}}</ref>
As of at least early 2024, China has not fought a war since 1979 and has only fought relatively minor conflicts since.<ref name=":13" />{{Rp|page=72}}
* 2020–present: [[2020–2022 China–India skirmishes|China–India skirmishes]]<ref name=":60">{{Cite report |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_Himalayan-Border-Standoffs.pdf |title=Hustling in the Himalayas: The Sino-Indian Border Confrontation |last=Tellis |first=Ashley J. |date=June 2020 |quote=These efforts to bring new territorial enclaves under Chinese control are occurring simultaneously at several different locations, such as on the northern bank of the Pangong Tso, at Hot Springs, and in the Galwan Valley, places that all lie astride the LAC in eastern Ladakh |access-date=29 June 2020 |website=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace}}</ref>


== Organization ==
== Organization ==
[[File:China's military leadership organizational chart - page 46 - Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China (2023).png|thumb|Organizational chart of the People's Liberation Army]]
[[File:ChinaDOD.jpg|thumb|The CMC is ceremonially housed in the [[Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China|Ministry of National Defense]] compound ("August 1st Building").]]
The PLA is a component of the armed forces of China, which also includes the PAP, the reserves, and the [[Militia (China)|militia]].{{sfn|Pollpeter|Allen|2012|p=50}} The armed forces are controlled by the CCP under the doctrine of "[[the Party commands the gun]]".{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=521}} The PLA and the PAP have the largest [[People's Liberation Army and People's Armed Police delegation to the National People's Congress|delegation]] in the [[National People's Congress]] (NPC), which are elected by servicemember election committees of top-level military subdivisions, including the PLA's theater commands and service branches.<ref name=":102">{{Cite web |last=Wei |first=Changhao |date=2022-03-29 |title=Explainer: How Seats in China's National People's Congress Are Allocated |url=https://npcobserver.com/2022/03/explainer-how-seats-in-chinas-national-peoples-congress-are-allocated/ |access-date=2024-03-10 |website=NPC Observer |language=en-US |archive-date=10 March 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240310192345/https://npcobserver.com/2022/03/explainer-how-seats-in-chinas-national-peoples-congress-are-allocated/ |url-status=live }}</ref> At the [[14th National People's Congress]]; the joint delegation has 281 deputies—over 9% of the total—all of whom are CCP members.<ref>{{Cite news |date=25 February 2024 |title=中华人民共和国第十四届全国人民代表大会代表名单 |trans-title=List of Deputies to the 14th National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China |url=http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2023/0225/c1001-32630907.html |access-date=23 July 2024 |work=[[People's Daily]] |archive-date=26 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230426071927/http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2023/0225/c1001-32630907.html |url-status=live }}</ref>


=== National military command ===
=== Central Military Commission ===
The state military system upholds the principle of the CCP's absolute leadership over the armed forces. The party and the State jointly established the CMC that carries out the task of supreme military leadership over the armed forces. The [[1954 Constitution of the People's Republic of China|1954 Constitution]] stated that the State President directs the armed forces and made the State President the chairman of the National Defense Commission. The National Defense Commission is an advisory body and does not hold any actual power over the armed forces.
{{Main|Central Military Commission (China)}}


On 28 September 1954, the Central Committee of the CCP re-established the CMC as the commanding organ of the PLA.{{citation needed|date=November 2022}} From that time onward, the current system of a joint system of party and state leadership of the military was established. The Central Committee of the CCP leads in all military affairs. The State President directs the state military forces and the development of the military forces which is managed by the State Council.
The PLA is governed by the Central Military Commission (CMC); under the arrangement of "[[one institution with two names]]", there exists a state CMC and a Party CMC, although both commissions have identical personnel, organization and function, and effectively work as a single body.<ref name="Liu-2022">{{Cite news |last=Liu |first=Zhen |date=18 October 2022 |title=What is China's Central Military Commission and why is it so powerful? |work=[[South China Morning Post]] |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3196360/what-chinas-central-military-commission-and-why-it-so-powerful |access-date=18 September 2023 |archive-date=20 September 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230920032753/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3196360/what-chinas-central-military-commission-and-why-it-so-powerful |url-status=live }}</ref> The only difference in membership between the two occurs for a few months every five years, during the period between a [[National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party|Party National Congress]], when Party CMC membership changes, and the next ensuing National People's Congress, when the state CMC changes.<ref>The Political System of the People's Republic of China. Chief Editor Pu Xingzu, Shanghai, 2005, Shanghai People's Publishing House. {{ISBN|7-208-05566-1}} Chapter 11, the State Military System, pp. 369–392.</ref>


To ensure the absolute leadership of the CCP over the armed forces, every level of the party committee in the military forces implements the principles of [[democratic centralism]].{{citation needed|date=November 2022}} In addition, division-level and higher units establish political commissars and political organizations, ensuring that the branch organizations are in line. These systems combined the party organization with the military organization to achieve the party's leadership and administrative leadership. This is seen as the key guarantee to the absolute leadership of the CCP over the military.
The CMC is composed of a [[Chairman of the Central Military Commission (China)|chairman]], [[Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission|vice chairpersons]] and regular members. The chairman of the CMC is the commander-in-chief of the PLA, with the post generally held by the [[paramount leader]] of China; since 1989, the post has generally been held together with the [[General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party|CCP general secretary]].{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=521}}<ref name="Liu-2022" /><ref>{{cite web |title=Xi Jinping Has a New Title: Commander-in-Chief of the People's Liberation Army |url=https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/xi-jinping-has-a-new-title-commander-in-chief-of-the-peoples-liberation-army/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211006042951/https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/xi-jinping-has-a-new-title-commander-in-chief-of-the-peoples-liberation-army/ |archive-date=6 October 2021 |access-date=2021-09-30 |website=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]]}}</ref> Per the [[chairman responsibility system]], the CMC chairman exercises absolute control over the CMC and the overall military.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Ji|first=You|date=2026-01-14|title=Chinese Communist Party Endeavors to Institutionalize Armed Power: Civilian Control of China's Central Military Commission|journal=[[The China Journal]]|pages=000|doi=10.1086/738762|issn=1324-9347}}</ref> Unlike in other countries, the [[Ministry of National Defense (China)|Ministry of National Defense]] and its [[Minister of National Defense (China)|Minister]] do not have command authority, largely acting as diplomatic liaisons of the CMC, insulating the PLA from external influence.{{sfn|Pollpeter|Allen|2012|p=101}} However, except for the current incumbent, Admiral [[Dong Jun]], the Minister has always been a member of the CMC.<ref name="Liu-2022" />


In October 2014 the ''[[People's Liberation Army Daily]]'' reminded readers of the [[Gutian Congress]], which stipulated the basic principle of CCP control of the military, and called for vigilance as "[f]oreign hostile forces preach the nationalization and de-politicization of the military, attempting to muddle our minds and drag our military out from under the Party's flag."<ref>[http://www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2014-10/27/content_91241.htm 在弘扬古田会议精神中铸牢军魂, ''Zài hóngyáng gǔtián huìyì jīngshén zhōng zhù láo jūn hún''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141102234543/http://www.chinamil.com.cn/jfjbmap/content/2014-10/27/content_91241.htm |date=2 November 2014 }} ''[[People's Liberation Army Daily|PLA Daily]]'' 27 October 2014</ref>
{{center|'''The Membership of the Central Military Commission'''}}


[[File:ChinaDOD.jpg|thumb|The CMC is ceremonially housed in the [[Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China|Ministry of National Defense]] compound ("August 1st Building")]]
; Chairman:
* [[Xi Jinping]] (also [[General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party|General Secretary]], [[President of China|President]] and [[Commander-in-chief]] of Joint Battle Command)


=== Leadership ===
; Vice Chairmen:
The leadership by the CCP is a fundamental principle of the Chinese military command system. The PLA reports not to the [[State Council of the People's Republic of China|State Council]] but rather to two Central Military Commissions, one belonging to the state and one belonging to the CCP.
* General [[Zhang Youxia]]
* General [[Zhang Shengmin]]  


In practice, the two central military commissions usually do not contradict each other because their membership is usually identical. Often, the only difference in membership between the two occurs for a few months every five years, during the period between a party congress, when Party CMC membership changes, and the next ensuing [[National People's Congress]], when the state CMC changes. The CMC carries out its responsibilities as authorised by the Constitution and National Defense Law.<ref>The Political System of the People's Republic of China. Chief Editor Pu Xingzu, Shanghai, 2005, Shanghai People's Publishing House. {{ISBN|7-208-05566-1}} Chapter 11, the State Military System, pp. 369–392.</ref>
; Members
* Chief of the [[Joint Staff Department (China)|Joint Staff Department]] (JSD) – General [[Liu Zhenli (general)|Liu Zhenli]]
* Secretary of the [[Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Central Military Commission|Commission for Discipline Inspection]] – General [[Zhang Shengmin]]


The leadership of each type of military force is under the leadership and management of the corresponding part of the Central Military Commission of the CCP Central Committee. Forces under each military branch or force such as the subordinate forces, academies and schools, scientific research and engineering institutions and logistical support organisations are also under the leadership of the CMC. This arrangement has been especially useful as China over the past several decades has moved increasingly towards military organisations composed of forces from more than one military branch.
Previously, the PLA was governed by four general departments; the General Political, the General Logistics, the General Armament, and the General Staff Departments. These were abolished in 2016 under the [[2015 People's Republic of China military reform|military reforms]] undertaken by Xi Jinping, replaced with 15 new functional departments directly reporting to the CMC:<ref name="Lague-2019">{{Cite news |last1=Lague |first1=David |last2=Lim |first2=Benjamin Kang |date=23 April 2019 |title=How China is replacing America as Asia's military titan |work=[[Reuters]] |url=https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-army-xi/ |access-date=10 January 2020 |archive-date=21 January 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210121184056/https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-army-xi/ |url-status=live }}</ref>


In September 1982, to meet the needs of modernisation and to improve coordination in the command of forces including multiple service branches and to strengthen unified command of the military, the CMC ordered the abolition of the leadership organisation of the various military branches. Today, the PLA has an air force, navy and second artillery leadership organs.
# [[General Office of the Central Military Commission|General Office]]
# [[Joint Staff Department (China)|Joint Staff Department]]
# [[Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission|Political Work Department]]
# [[Logistic Support Department of the Central Military Commission|Logistic Support Department]]
# [[Equipment Development Department of the Central Military Commission|Equipment Development Department]]
# [[Training and Administration Department of the Central Military Commission|Training and Administration Department]]
# [[National Defense Mobilization Department of the Central Military Commission|National Defense Mobilization Department]]
# [[Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Central Military Commission|Discipline Inspection Commission]]
# [[Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Central Military Commission|Politics and Legal Affairs Commission]]
# [[Science and Technology Commission of the Central Military Commission|Science and Technology Commission]]
# [[Office for Strategic Planning of the Central Military Commission|Office for Strategic Planning]]
# [[Office for Reform and Organizational Structure]]
# [[Office for International Military Cooperation of the Central Military Commission|Office for International Military Cooperation]]
# [[Audit Office of the Central Military Commission|Audit Office]]
# [[Agency for Offices Administration of the Central Military Commission|Agency for Offices Administration]]


In 1986, the People's Armed Forces Department, except in some border regions, was placed under the joint leadership of the PLA and the local authorities.{{citation needed|date=November 2022}} Although the local party organizations paid close attention to the People's Armed Forces Department, as a result of some practical problems, the CMC decided that from 1 April 1996, the People's Armed Forces Department would once again fall under the jurisdiction of the PLA.{{citation needed|date=November 2022}}
Included among the 15 departments are three commissions. The CMC Discipline Inspection Commission is charged with rooting out corruption.


According to the [[Constitution of the People's Republic of China]], the CMC is composed of the following: the chairman, Vice-chairmen and Members. The [[Chairman of the Central Military Commission (China)|Chairman of the Central Military Commission]] has overall responsibility for the commission.
=== Political control ===
{{Further|The Party commands the gun}}
[[File:Z-8_with_the_flag_of_CPC_at_PRC70_(20191001104359).jpg|thumb|The People's Liberation Army raising the [[Emblem and flag of the Chinese Communist Party|flag of the Chinese Communist Party]] during a military parade marking the [[70th anniversary of the People's Republic of China]] on 1 October 2019.]]
The CCP maintains absolute control over the PLA.{{sfn|Pollpeter|Allen|2012|pp=84–85}} It requires the PLA to undergo political education, instilling [[Ideology of the Chinese Communist Party|CCP ideology]] in its members.<ref name=":2" /> Additionally, China maintains a [[political commissar]] system.<ref name=":0">{{Cite news |last1=Torode |first1=Greg |last2=Tian |first2=Yew Lun |date=2023-09-20 |title=Li Shangfu: Who is China's missing defence minister and how important is he? |language=en |work=[[Reuters]] |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-military-hierarchy-under-spotlight-after-defence-minister-disappears-2023-09-18/ |access-date=2023-09-24 |archive-date=24 September 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230924210237/https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-military-hierarchy-under-spotlight-after-defence-minister-disappears-2023-09-18/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Regiment-level and higher units maintain CCP committees and political commissars ({{zh|c=政治委员 or 政委}}).<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":1">{{Cite web |title=军事制度 |trans-title=Military System |url=http://www1.china.com.cn/ch-zhengzhi/zhengzhi7.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070613170026/http://www1.china.com.cn/ch-zhengzhi/zhengzhi7.htm |archive-date=13 June 2007 |access-date=7 November 2023 |website=[[China Internet Information Center]]}}</ref> Additionally, battalion-level and company-level units respectively maintain political directors and political instructors.<ref name=":3">{{Cite web |last1=Allen |first1=Kenneth |last2=Chao |first2=Brian |last3=Kinsella |first3=Ryan |date=4 March 2013 |title=China's Military Political Commissar System in Comparative Perspective |url=https://www.jamestown.org/program/chinas-military-political-commissar-system-in-comparative-perspective |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201021223644/https://www.jamestown.org/program/chinas-military-political-commissar-system-in-comparative-perspective/ |archive-date=21 October 2020 |access-date=7 November 2023 |website=[[Jamestown Foundation]]}}</ref> The political commissars are officially equal to commanders in status.<ref name=":2">{{Cite news |date=6 November 2023 |title=Xi Jinping is obsessed with political loyalty in the PLA |url=https://www.economist.com/special-report/2023/11/06/xi-jinping-is-obsessed-with-political-loyalty-in-the-pla |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231107161451/https://www.economist.com/special-report/2023/11/06/xi-jinping-is-obsessed-with-political-loyalty-in-the-pla |archive-date=7 November 2023 |access-date=2023-11-07 |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |issn=0013-0613}}</ref> The political commissars are officially responsible for the implementation of party committee decisions, instilling and maintaining party discipline, providing political education, and working with other components of the political work system.<ref name=":3" />


{{center|'''The Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party and the Central Military Commission of the People's Republic of China'''}}
Key decisions in the PLA are generally made in the CCP committees throughout the military.<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":33">{{Cite web |last1=Allen |first1=Kenneth |last2=Chao |first2=Brian |last3=Kinsella |first3=Ryan |date=4 March 2013 |title=China's Military Political Commissar System in Comparative Perspective |url=https://www.jamestown.org/program/chinas-military-political-commissar-system-in-comparative-perspective |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201021223644/https://www.jamestown.org/program/chinas-military-political-commissar-system-in-comparative-perspective/ |archive-date=21 October 2020 |access-date=7 November 2023 |website=[[Jamestown Foundation]]}}</ref> As a rule, the political commissar serves as the party committee secretary while the commander serves as the deputy secretary.<ref name=":3" /> Political commissars report to higher-level party committees, rather than military commanders.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Yuwen |first=Deng |date=2025-11-12 |title=Why Are China’s Generals So Quiet as Xi Purges Them? |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/10/30/xi-purges-china-military-pla-ccp-power-control/ |access-date=2025-11-06 |website=Foreign Policy |language=en-US}}</ref> Due to the CCP's system of absolute control, non-CCP [[List of political parties in China|political parties]] and groups and organizations except the [[Communist Youth League of China]] are not allowed to establish organizations or have members in the PLA. Additionally, only the CCP is allowed to appoint the leading cadres at all levels of the PLA.<ref name=":1" />


; Chairman:
=== Grades ===
* [[Xi Jinping]] (also [[General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party|General Secretary]], [[President of the People's Republic of China|President]] and [[Commander-in-chief]] of Joint Battle Command)
{{main|Grades of the armed forces of China}}


; Vice Chairmen:
Grades determine the [[command hierarchy]] from the CMC to the platoon level. Entities command lower-graded entities, and coordinate with like-graded entities.{{sfn|Pollpeter|Allen|2012|p=16}} An organization's grade impacts the resources allocated to it.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Cunningham |first=Fiona S. |title=Under the Nuclear Shadow: China's Information-Age Weapons in International Security |date=2025 |publisher=[[Princeton University Press]] |isbn=978-0-691-26103-4 |location= |doi=10.1515/9780691261782 |jstor=jj.16040335}}</ref>{{Rp|page=89}} Since 1988, all organizations, billets, and officers in the PLA have a grade.{{sfn|Pollpeter|Allen|2012|p=18}}
* General [[Zhang Youxia]]  
* General [[He Weidong]]


; Members:
[[Civil–military relations]] within the wider state bureaucracy is also influenced by grades. The grading systems used by the armed forces and the government are parallel, making it easier for military entities to identify the civilian entities they should coordinate with.{{sfn|Pollpeter|Allen|2012|p=16}} An officer's authority, eligibility for billets, pay, and retirement age is determined by grade.{{sfn|Kaufman|Mackenzie|2009|pp=73-74}}{{sfn|Pollpeter|Allen|2012|p=16}} Career progression includes lateral transfers between billets of the same grade, but which are not considered promotions.{{sfn|Pollpeter|Allen|2012|p=17}}{{sfn|Kaufman|Mackenzie|2009|p=73}} An officer retiring to the civil service has their grade translated to the civil grade system;{{sfn|Pollpeter|Allen|2012|p=16}} their grade continues to progress and draw retirement benefits through the civil system rather than the armed forces.{{sfn|Kaufman|Mackenzie|2009|p=74}}
* Minister of National Defense – General [[Li Shangfu]]
* Chief of the [[Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission|Joint staff]] – General [[Liu Zhenli (general)|Liu Zhenli]]
* Director of the [[Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission|Political Work Department]] – Admiral [[Miao Hua]]
* Secretary of the [[Central Commission for Discipline Inspection]] – General [[Zhang Shengmin]]


=== Central Military Commission ===
Historically, an officer's grade — or position ({{zh|s=职务等级|p=zhiwu dengji}}<ref name="jt_wuthnow_saunders_2021-03-16">{{Cite web |last1=Wuthnow |first1=Joel |last2=Saunders |first2=Phillip C. |date=16 March 2021 |title=A New Step Forward in PLA Professionalization |url=https://jamestown.org/program/a-new-step-forward-in-pla-professionalization/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240622160617/https://jamestown.org/program/a-new-step-forward-in-pla-professionalization/ |archive-date=22 June 2024 |access-date=22 June 2024 |website=[[Jamestown Foundation]] |language=en}}</ref>) — was more important than their ''[[Ranks of the People's Liberation Army Ground Force|rank]]'' ({{zh|s=军衔|p=junxian}}<ref name="jt_wuthnow_saunders_2021-03-16"/>).{{sfn|Pollpeter|Allen|2012|p=16}} Historically, time-in-grade and time-in-rank requirements<ref name="jamestown_allen_2010-07-22">{{Cite web |last1=Allen |first1=Kenneth |title=Assessing the PLA's Promotion Ladder to CMC Member Based on Grades vs. Ranks – Part 1 |url=https://jamestown.org/program/assessing-the-plas-promotion-ladder-to-cmc-member-based-on-grades-vs-ranks-part-1/ |access-date=2024-05-12 |language=en-US |archive-date=2024-05-11 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240511105015/https://jamestown.org/program/assessing-the-plas-promotion-ladder-to-cmc-member-based-on-grades-vs-ranks-part-1/ |website=The Jamestown Foundation |date=22 July 2010 |url-status=live }}</ref> and promotions were not synchronized;{{sfn|Pollpeter|Allen|2012|p=17}} multiple ranks were present in each grade{{sfn|Pollpeter|Allen|2012|p=19}} with all having the same authority.{{sfn|Kaufman|Mackenzie|2009|p=74}} Rank was mainly a visual aid to roughly determine relative position when interacting with Chinese and foreign personnel.{{sfn|Pollpeter|Allen|2012|p=16}} PLA etiquette preferred addressing personnel by position rather than by rank.{{sfn|Kaufman|Mackenzie|2009|p=77}} Reforms to a more rank-centric system began in 2021.<ref name="jt_wuthnow_saunders_2021-03-16"/> In 2023, a revised grade structure associated one rank per grade, with some ranks spanning multiple grades.<ref name="dalate_cs_grades">{{Cite web |script-title=zh:中国公务员的级别和职级 |trans-title=Chinese civil service grades and ranks |url=http://www.dltdjw.gov.cn/ywgz/gwygl/202303/t20230309_3357858.html |date=9 March 2023 |access-date=2024-06-14 |website=Dalate Banner Party Building Network |archive-date=2024-06-14 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240614215401/http://www.dltdjw.gov.cn/ywgz/gwygl/202303/t20230309_3357858.html |url-status=live |language=zh}}</ref>
{{Main|Central Military Commission (China)}}
{{Unreferenced section|date=November 2022}}
In December 1982, the fifth National People's Congress revised the state constitution to state that the State Central Military Commission (CMC) leads all the armed forces of the state. The chairman of the State CMC is chosen and removed by the full NPC while the other members are chosen by the NPC standing committee. However, the CMC of the Central Committee of the CCP remained the party organization that directly commands the military and all the other armed forces.


In actual practice, the party CMC, after consultation with the democratic parties, proposes the names of the State CMC members of the NPC so that these people after going through the legal processes can be elected by the NPC to the State Central Military Commission (CMC). That is to say, the CMC of the Central Committee and the CMC of the State are one group and one organisation. However, looking at it organizationally, these two CMCs are subordinate to two different systems – the party system and the state system.
=== Operational control ===
[[File:Map of Theatres of PLA en.svg|thumb|right|upright=1.6|The five theatre commands of the PLA<ref>{{cite web |title=Considerations for replacing Military Area Commands with Theater Commands |url=https://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/pla-daily-commentary/2016-02/03/content_6888459.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180223031932/http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/pla-daily-commentary/2016-02/03/content_6888459.htm |archive-date=23 February 2018 |access-date=13 January 2019 |website=People's Liberation Army}}</ref>]]
{{Main|Theater command}}


Therefore, the armed forces are under the absolute leadership of the CCP and are also the armed forces of the state. This is a unique joint leadership system that reflects the origin of the PLA as the military branch of the CCP. It only became the national military when the People's Republic of China was established in 1949.
Operational control of combat units is divided between the service headquarters and domestic geographically based [[Theater command|theatre commands]].


By convention, the chairman and vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) are civilian members of the CCP, but they are not necessarily the heads of the civilian government. Both Jiang Zemin and Deng Xiaoping retained the office of chairman even after relinquishing their other positions. All of the other members of the CMC are uniformed active military officials. Unlike other nations, the [[Minister of National Defense of the People's Republic of China|Minister of National Defense]] is not the head of the military but is usually a vice-chairman of the CMC.
Theatre commands are multi-service ("joint") organizations that are broadly responsible for [[Military strategy|strategy]], [[Military operation plan|plans]], [[Military tactics|tactics]], and [[Military policy|policy]] specific to their assigned [[area of responsibility]]. In wartime, they will likely have full control of subordinate units; in peacetime, units also report to their service headquarters.{{sfn|ATP 7-100.3: Chinese Tactics|2021|p=2-4}} Force-building is the responsibility of the services and the CMC.{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=235}} The five theatre commands, in order of stated significance are:{{sfn|ATP 7-100.3: Chinese Tactics|2021|pp=2-5 - 2-6}}


=== 2016 military reforms ===
* [[Eastern Theater Command]]
{{Main|2015 People's Republic of China military reform|Military-civil fusion}}
* [[Southern Theater Command]]
 
* [[Western Theater Command]]
On 1 January 2016, the CMC released guidelines<ref>{{cite web |title=China releases guideline on military reform |url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-01/01/c_134970353.htm |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160306171739/http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-01/01/c_134970353.htm |archive-date=6 March 2016 |access-date=9 February 2016 |website=[[Xinhua]]}}</ref> on deepening national defense and military reform, about a month after Xi Jinping called for an overhaul of the military administration and command system.{{cn|date=April 2023}}
* [[Northern Theater Command]]
* [[Central Theater Command]]


On 11 January 2016, the PLA was restructured and a joint staff department directly attached to the CMC.{{cn|date=April 2023}} The previous four general headquarters of the PLA were disbanded. They were divided into 15 functional departments instead — an expansion from the domain of the General Office, which is now a single department within the Central Military Commission.{{cn|date=April 2023}}
The service headquarters retain operational control in some areas within China and outside of China. For example, army headquarters controls or is responsible for the [[PLA Beijing Garrison|Beijing Garrison]], the [[Tibet Military District]], the [[Xinjiang Military District]],{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=355}} and border and coastal defences. The counterpiracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden are controlled by navy headquarters.{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=715}} The JSD nominally controls operations beyond China's periphery,{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=714}} but in practice this seems to apply only to army operations.{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=137}} Services and theater commands have the same grade. The overlap of areas or units of responsibility may create disputes requiring CMC arbitration.{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=137}}


# General Office ({{Zh|labels=no|s=办公厅}})
As part of the 2015 reforms, military regions were replaced by theatre commands in 2016.{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=61}} Military regions were − uinlike the theatre commands − army-centric{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=146}} peacetime administrative organizations,{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=234}} and joint wartime commands were created on-demand by the army-dominated General Staff Department.{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=234}}
# Joint Staff Department ({{Zh|labels=no|s=联合参谋部}})
# Political Work Department ({{Zh|labels=no|s=政治工作部}})
# Logistic Support Department ({{Zh|labels=no|s=后勤保障部}})
# Equipment Development Department ({{Zh|labels=no|s=装备发展部}})
# Training and Administration Department ({{Zh|labels=no|s=训练管理部}})
# National Defense Mobilization Department ({{Zh|labels=no|s=国防动员部}})
# Discipline Inspection Commission ({{Zh|labels=no|s=纪律检查委员会}})
# Politics and Legal Affairs Commission ({{Zh|labels=no|s=政法委员会}})
# Science and Technology Commission ({{Zh|labels=no|s=科学技术委员会}})
# Office for Strategic Planning ({{Zh|labels=no|s=战略规划办公室}})
# Office for Reform and Organizational Structure ({{Zh|labels=no|s=改革和编制办公室}})
# Office for International Military Cooperation ({{Zh|labels=no|s=国际军事合作办公室}})
# Audit Office ({{Zh|labels=no|s=审计署}})
# Agency for Offices Administration ({{Zh|labels=no|s=机关事务管理总局}})


Included among the 15 departments are three commissions. The CMC Discipline Inspection Commission is charged with rooting out corruption.
=== Organization table ===
{{familytree/start}}
{{familytree/start}}
{{familytree | | | | | | | | | | | | |jw| | | | | | | | |jw = '''Central Military Commission'''}}
{{familytree | | | | | | | | | | | | |jw| | | | | | | | |jw = '''Central Military Commission'''}}
{{familytree | |,|-|-|-|-|-|v|-|-|-|-|-|+|-|-|-|-|-|v|-|-|-|-|-|.| }}
{{familytree | |,|-|-|-|-|-|v|-|-|-|-|-|+|-|-|-|-|-|v|-|-|-|-|-|.| }}
{{familytree |ju| | | |yx| | | |yt| | | |yz| | | |yy|ju = '''Departments''' |yx = '''Commissions''' |yt = '''Offices'''|yz = '''Forces Directly under the CMC'''|yy = '''Research institutes'''}}
{{familytree |ju| | | |yx| | | |yt| | | |yz| | | |yy|ju = '''Departments''' |yx = '''Commissions''' |yt = '''Offices'''|yz = '''Arms'''|yy = '''Research institutes'''}}
{{familytree |ju| | | |yx| | | |yt| | | |yz| | | |yy|ju = [[General Office of the Central Military Commission|General Office]] |yx = [[Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Central Military Commission|Discipline Inspection Commission]] |yt = [[Office for Strategic Planning of the Central Military Commission|Office for Strategic Planning]]|yz = Joint Logistic Support Force<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2016-09/13/content_7257668.htm |title=China establishes Joint Logistic Support Force - China Military |access-date=17 January 2021 |archive-date=22 January 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210122051958/http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2016-09/13/content_7257668.htm |url-status=dead }}</ref>|yy = [[PLA Academy of Military Science|Academy of Military Science]]}}
{{familytree |ju| | | |yx| | | |yt| | | |yz| | | |yy|ju = [[General Office of the Central Military Commission|General Office]] |yx = [[Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Central Military Commission|Discipline Inspection Commission]] |yt = [[Office for Strategic Planning of the Central Military Commission|Office for Strategic Planning]]|yz = [[People's Liberation Army Aerospace Force|Aerospace Force]]|yy = [[PLA Academy of Military Science|Academy of Military Science]]}}
{{familytree |ju| | | |yx| | | |yt| | | | |!| | | | |yy|ju = [[Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission|Joint Staff Department]] |yx = Politics and Legal Affairs Commission |yt = [[Office for Reform and Organizational Structure]]|yy = [[PLA National Defence University|National Defence University]]}}
{{familytree |ju| | | |yx| | | |yt| | | |yz| | | |yy|ju = [[Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission|Joint Staff Department]] |yx = [[Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Central Military Commission|Politics and Legal Affairs Commission]] |yt = [[Office for Reform and Organizational Structure]]|yz = [[People's Liberation Army Cyberspace Force|Cyberspace Force]]|yy = [[PLA National Defence University|National Defence University]]}}
{{familytree |ju| | | |yx| | | |yt| | | | |!| | | | |yy|ju = [[Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission|Political Work Department]] |yx = Science and Technology Commission |yt = [[Office for International Military Cooperation of the Central Military Commission|Office for International Military Cooperation]]|yy = [[National University of Defense Technology]]}}
{{familytree |ju| | | |yx| | | |yt| | | |yz| | | |yy|ju = [[Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission|Political Work Department]] |yx = [[Science and Technology Commission of the Central Military Commission|Science and Technology Commission]] |yt = [[Office for International Military Cooperation of the Central Military Commission|Office for International Military Cooperation]]|yz = [[People's Liberation Army Information Support Force|Information Support Force]]|yy = [[National University of Defense Technology]]}}
{{familytree |ju| | | | |!| | | | |yt| | | | |!| | | | | |!| |ju = [[Logistic Support Department of the Central Military Commission|Logistic Support Department]] |yt = [[Audit Office of the Central Military Commission|Audit Office]]}}
{{familytree |ju| | | | |!| | | | |yt| | | |yz| | | | |!|ju = [[Logistic Support Department of the Central Military Commission|Logistic Support Department]] |yt = [[Audit Office of the Central Military Commission|Audit Office]]|yz = [[People's Liberation Army Joint Logistics Support Force|Joint Logistics Support Force]]<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2016-09/13/content_7257668.htm |title=China establishes Joint Logistic Support Force - China Military |access-date=17 January 2021 |archive-date=22 January 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210122051958/http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2016-09/13/content_7257668.htm |url-status=dead }}</ref>}}
{{familytree |ju| | | | |!| | | | |yt| | | | |!| | | | | |!| |ju = [[Equipment Development Department of the Central Military Commission|Equipment Development Department]] |yt = [[Agency for Offices Administration of the Central Military Commission|Agency for Offices Administration]]}}
{{familytree |ju| | | | |!| | | | |yt| | | | |!| | | | | |!| |ju = [[Equipment Development Department of the Central Military Commission|Equipment Development Department]] |yt = [[Agency for Offices Administration of the Central Military Commission|Agency for Offices Administration]]}}
{{familytree |ju| | | | |!| | | | | |!| | | | | |!| | | | | |!| |ju = [[Training and Administration Department of the Central Military Commission|Training and Administration Department]]}}
{{familytree |ju| | | | |!| | | | | |!| | | | | |!| | | | | |!| |ju = [[Training and Administration Department of the Central Military Commission|Training and Administration Department]]}}
{{familytree |ju| | | | |!| | | | | |!| | | | | |!| | | | | |!| |ju = [[National Defense Mobilization Department of the Central Military Commission|National Defense Mobilization Department]]}}
{{familytree |ju| | | | |!| | | | | |!| | | | | |!| | | | | |!| |ju = [[National Defense Mobilization Department of the Central Military Commission|National Defense Mobilization Department]]}}
{{familytree | |)|-|-|-|-|-|^|-|-|-|-|-|^|-|-|-|-|-|^|-|-|-|-|-|(| }}
{{familytree | |)|-|-|-|-|-|^|-|-|-|-|-|^|-|-|-|-|-|^|-|-|-|-|-|(| }}
{{familytree |ju| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |yt| |ju = '''[[Theater commands of the People's Liberation Army|Theater commands]]''' |yt = '''Service Branches'''}}
{{familytree |ju| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |yt| |ju = '''[[Theater commands of the People's Liberation Army|Theatre commands]]''' |yt = '''Service Branches'''}}
{{familytree |ju| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |yt| |ju = Eastern Theater Command |yt = PLA Ground Force}}
{{familytree |ju| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |yt| |ju = [[Eastern Theater Command]] |yt = [[People's Liberation Army Ground Force|PLA Ground Force]]}}
{{familytree |ju| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |yt| |ju = Western Theater Command |yt = PLA Navy}}
{{familytree |ju| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |yt| |ju = [[Western Theater Command]] |yt = [[People's Liberation Army Navy|PLA Navy]]}}
{{familytree |ju| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |yt| |ju = Southern Theater Command |yt = PLA Air Force}}
{{familytree |ju| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |yt| |ju = [[Southern Theater Command]] |yt = [[People's Liberation Army Air Force|PLA Air Force]]}}
{{familytree |ju| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |yt| |ju = Northern Theater Command |yt = PLA Rocket Force}}
{{familytree |ju| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |yt| |ju = [[Northern Theater Command]] |yt = [[People's Liberation Army Rocket Force|PLA Rocket Force]]}}
{{familytree |ju| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |yt| |ju = Central Theater Command |yt = PLA Strategic Support Force}}
{{familytree |ju| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |!| |ju = [[Central Theater Command]]}}
{{familytree | |`|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|v|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|'| }}
{{familytree | |`|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|v|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|'| }}
{{familytree | | | | | | | | | | | | |yt| | | | | | | | |yt = '''People's Liberation Army'''}}
{{familytree | | | | | | | | | | | | |yt| | | | | | | | |yt = '''People's Liberation Army'''}}
{{familytree/end}}
{{familytree/end}}


=== Theater commands ===
=== Academic institutions ===
{{Main|Theater commands of the People's Liberation Army}}
{{Main|Academic institutions of the armed forces of China}}
 
[[File:Map of Theatres of PLA en.svg|thumb|right|upright=1.6|The five theater commands of the PLA<ref>{{cite web |url = https://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/pla-daily-commentary/2016-02/03/content_6888459.htm |title = Considerations for replacing Military Area Commands with Theater Commands |website = english.chinamil.com.cn |access-date = 13 January 2019 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20180223031932/http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/pla-daily-commentary/2016-02/03/content_6888459.htm |archive-date = 23 February 2018 |url-status = live }}</ref>]]
 
Until 2016, China's territory was divided into seven [[PLA Military Region|military regions]], but they were reorganized into five theater commands in early 2016. This reflects a change in their concept of operations from primarily ground-oriented to mobile and coordinated movement of all services.<ref>[http://asia.nikkei.com/Features/China-up-close/Xi-declares-victory-over-old-rivals-Jiang-Hu Xi declares victory over old rivals Jiang, Hu] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160227075325/http://asia.nikkei.com/Features/China-up-close/Xi-declares-victory-over-old-rivals-Jiang-Hu |date=27 February 2016 }} Asia Nikkei Asian Review, 11 Feb 2016</ref> The five new theatre commands, in order of stated significance are:
* [[Eastern Theater Command]]
* [[Southern Theater Command]]
* [[Western Theater Command]]
* [[Northern Theater Command]]
* [[Central Theater Command]]<ref name=":02">{{Cite book |url=https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN33195-ATP_7-100.3-000-WEB-1.pdf |title=Army Techniques Publication 7-100.3: Chinese Tactics |publisher=Headquarters, United States Army |year=2021 |isbn=9798457607118 |location=Washington, D.C. |pages=34}}</ref>
 
The PLA [[garrison]]s in Hong Kong and Macau both come under the Southern Theater Command.{{Cn|date=December 2022}}


The military reforms have also introduced a major change in the areas of responsibility. Rather than separately commanding their troops, service branches are now primarily responsible for administrative tasks (like equipping and maintaining the troops). It is the theater commands now that have the command authority. This should, in theory, facilitate the implementation of joint operations across all service branches.<ref>"2.12 The military and politics," in: [[Sebastian Heilmann]], editor, [{{cite web |url=https://www.merics.org/en/about-us/merics-analysis/chinas-political-system/ |title=China's Political System - Publications - About us - Mercator Institute for China Studies |access-date=11 May 2017 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170323234015/https://www.merics.org/en/about-us/merics-analysis/chinas-political-system/ |archive-date=23 March 2017 |df=dmy-all }} China''<nowiki/>'s Political System'']'','' Lanham, Boulder, New York, London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers (2017)   {{ISBN|978-1442277342}}</ref>
There are two academic institutions directly subordinate to the CMC, the [[People's Liberation Army National Defense University|National Defense University]] and the [[National University of Defense Technology]], and they are considered the two top military education institutions in China. There are also 35 institutions affiliated to the PLA's branches and arms, and 7 institutions affiliated to the People's Armed Police.<ref>{{Cite web |last1=Allen |first1=Kenneth |last2=Chen |first2=Minzhi |date=2019 |title=The People's Liberation Army's 37 Academic Institutions |url=https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/Other-Topics/2020-06-11%20PLA%20Academic_Institutions.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240703122915/https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/Other-Topics/2020-06-11%20PLA%20Academic_Institutions.pdf |archive-date=3 July 2024 |access-date=2024-05-14 |website=[[Air University (United States)|Air University]]}}</ref>
 
Coordination with civilian national security groups such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is achieved primarily by the leading groups of the CCP. Particularly important are the leading groups on foreign affairs, which include those dealing with Taiwan.{{Cn|date=December 2022}}
 
===Ranks===
{{Main|Ranks of the People's Liberation Army Ground Force|Ranks of the People's Liberation Army Navy|Ranks of the People's Liberation Army Air Force|People's Liberation Army rank insignia}}
 
====Officers====
{| style="border:1px solid #8888aa; background:#f7f8ff; padding:5px; font-size:95%; margin:0 12px 12px 0;"
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Armies/OF/Blank}}
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Armies/OF/People's Republic of China}}
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Navies/OF/People's Republic of China}}
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Air Forces/OF/People's Republic of China}}
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Air Forces/OF/People's Republic of China (PLARF)}}
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Air Forces/OF/People's Republic of China (PLASSF)}}
|}


====Other ranks====
=== People's Armed Forces Department ===
{| style="border:1px solid #8888aa; background:#f7f8ff; padding:5px; font-size:95%; margin:0 12px 12px 0;"
{{Excerpt|People's Armed Forces Department|only=paragraph|paragraphs=1}}
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Armies/OR/Blank}}
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Armies/OR/People's Republic of China}}
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Navies/OR/People's Republic of China}}
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Air Forces/OR/People's Republic of China}}
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Air Forces/OR/People's Republic of China (PLARF)}}
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Air Forces/OR/People's Republic of China (PLASSF)}}
|}


== Service branches ==
== Service branches ==
The PLA encompasses five main service branches ({{Zh|s=军种|p=jūnzhǒng}}): the Ground Force, the Navy, the Air Force, the Rocket Force, and the Strategic Support Force. Following the 200,000 troop reduction announced in 2003, the total strength of the PLA has been reduced from 2.5&nbsp;million to just under 2.3&nbsp;million. Further reforms will see an additional 300,000 personnel reduction from its current strength of 2.28&nbsp;million personnel. The reductions will come mainly from non-combat ground forces, which will allow more funds to be diverted to naval, air, and strategic missile forces.  This shows China's shift from ground force prioritisation to emphasising air and naval power with high-tech equipment for offensive roles over disputed coastal territories.<ref name="areas">[http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0000911699 China plans military reform to enhance its readiness] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140102191059/http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0000911699 |date=2 January 2014 }} – The-Japan-news.com, 2 January 2014</ref>
The PLA consists of four [[Military branch|services]] ([[People's Liberation Army Ground Force|Ground Force]], [[People's Liberation Army Navy|Navy]], [[People's Liberation Army Air Force|Air Force]], and [[People's Liberation Army Rocket Force|Rocket Force]]) and four arms ([[People's Liberation Army Aerospace Force|Aerospace Force]], [[People's Liberation Army Cyberspace Force|Cyberspace Force]], [[People's Liberation Army Information Support Force|Information Support Force]], and [[People's Liberation Army Joint Logistics Support Force|Joint Logistics Support Force]]).<ref name=":6" />


In recent years, the PLA has paid close attention to the performance of US forces in [[War in Afghanistan (2001–2021)|Afghanistan]] and [[Iraq War|Iraq]]. As well as learning from the success of the US military in [[network-centric warfare]], joint operations, [[C4ISTAR|C4ISR]], and [[High tech|hi-tech]] [[weapon]]ry, the PLA is also studying unconventional tactics that could be used to exploit the vulnerabilities of a more technologically advanced enemy. This has been reflected in the two parallel guidelines for the PLA ground forces development. While speeding up the process of introducing new technology into the force and retiring the older equipment, the PLA has also emphasized [[asymmetric warfare]], including exploring new methods of using existing equipment to defeat a technologically superior enemy.{{citation needed|date=November 2022}}
=== Services ===
The PLA maintains four services ({{Zh|s=军种|p=jūnzhǒng}}): the Ground Force, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Rocket Force. Following the 200,000 and 300,000 personnel reduction announced in 2003 and 2005 respectively, the total strength of the PLA has been reduced from 2.5&nbsp;million to around 2&nbsp;million.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Wong |first1=Edward |last2=Perlez |first2=Jane |last3=Buckley |first3=Chris |date=2 September 2015 |title=China Announces Cuts of 300,000 Troops at Military Parade Showing Its Might |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/03/world/asia/beijing-turns-into-ghost-town-as-it-gears-up-for-military-parade.html |url-status=live |url-access=limited |access-date=10 January 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150902221802/http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/03/world/asia/beijing-turns-into-ghost-town-as-it-gears-up-for-military-parade.html |archive-date=2 September 2015 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> The reductions came mainly from non-combat ground forces, which would allow more funds to be diverted to naval, air, and strategic missile forces. This shows China's shift from ground force prioritization to emphasizing air and naval power with high-tech equipment for offensive roles over [[Territorial disputes of the People's Republic of China|disputed territories]], particularly in the [[Territorial disputes in the South China Sea|South China Sea]].<ref name="areas">[http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0000911699 China plans military reform to enhance its readiness] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140102191059/http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0000911699 |date=2 January 2014 }} – The-Japan-news.com</ref>


In addition to the four main service branches, the PLA is supported by two [[Paramilitary forces of China|paramilitary organizations]]: the People's Armed Police (including the [[China Coast Guard]], CCG) and the [[Militia (China)|Militia]] (including the [[People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia|maritime militia]]).{{citation needed|date=November 2022}}
==== Ground Force ====
 
=== Ground Force (PLAGF) ===
[[File:ZTZ-99A tank 20170902.jpg|thumb|A [[Type 99 tank|Type 99A]] main battle tank in service with the PLAGF]]
[[File:ZTZ-99A tank 20170902.jpg|thumb|A [[Type 99 tank|Type 99A]] main battle tank in service with the PLAGF]]
{{Main|People's Liberation Army Ground Force}}
{{Main|People's Liberation Army Ground Force}}


The PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) is the largest of the PLA's five services with 975,000 active duty personnel, approximately half of the PLA's total manpower of around 2 million personnel.<ref name="IISS2020_p260">[[International Institute for Strategic Studies]]: The Military Balance 2020, p. 260.</ref> The PLAGF is organized into twelve active duty group armies sequentially numbered from the [[71st Group Army]] to the [[83rd Group Army]] which are distributed to each of the PRC's five theatre commands, receiving two to three group armies per command. In wartime, numerous PLAGF [[Military reserve force|reserve]] and [[paramilitary]] units may be mobilized to augment these active group armies. The PLAGF reserve component comprises approximately 510,000 personnel divided into thirty infantry and twelve anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) divisions. The PLAGF is led by Commander [[Liu Zhenli (general)|Liu Zhenli]] and Political Commissar [[Qin Shutong]].<ref>{{cite news |author1=Jia Nan ({{lang|zh|贾楠}}) |date=5 July 2021 |script-title=zh:4人晋升上将! |language=zh |work=Sina |url=https://news.sina.com.cn/c/2021-07-05/doc-ikqcfnca5103262.shtml |access-date=6 July 2021}}</ref><ref>{{Cite tweet|number=1484601987002150913|user=wenluomo|title=General Qin Shutong, Political Commissar of PLA Ground Forces; Admiral Yuan Huazhi, Political Commissar, PLAN; General Li Yuchao, Commander of PLA Rocket Force & General Zhang Hongbing, Political Commissar of People's Armed Police Force.|author=文罗摩|date=21 January 2022}}</ref>
The PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) is the largest of the PLA's five services with 960,000 active duty personnel, approximately half of the PLA's total manpower of around 2 million personnel.{{Sfn|The International Institute for Strategic Studies|2025|p=240}} The PLAGF is organized into twelve active duty group armies sequentially numbered from the [[71st Group Army]] to the [[83rd Group Army]] which are distributed to each of the PRC's five theatre commands, receiving two to three group armies per command. In wartime, numerous PLAGF [[Military reserve force|reserve]] and [[paramilitary]] units may be mobilized to augment these active group armies. The PLAGF [[People's Liberation Army Reserve Force|reserve]] component comprises approximately 510,000 personnel divided into thirty infantry and twelve anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) divisions. The PLAGF is led by Commander [[Li Qiaoming]] and Political Commissar [[Chen Hui (general)]].<ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-12-24 |title=China names Chen Hui to lead army political work amid PLA personnel shake-up |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3292178/china-names-chen-hui-lead-pla-ground-force-political-work-amid-personnel-shake |access-date=2025-12-13 |website=South China Morning Post |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2023-01-04 |title=China promotes General Li Qiaoming to commander of PLA ground force |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3205548/china-promotes-general-li-qiaoming-commander-pla-ground-force |access-date=2025-12-13 |website=South China Morning Post |language=en}}</ref>
 
While much of the PLA Ground Force was being reduced over the past few years, technology-intensive elements such as [[special operations forces]] (SOF), [[army aviation]], [[surface-to-air missile]]s (SAMs), and electronic warfare units have all experienced rapid expansion. The latest operational [[military doctrine|doctrine]] of the PLA ground forces highlights the importance of information technology, [[electronic warfare|electronic]] and [[information warfare]], and long-range [[precision strike]]s in future warfare. The older generation telephone/radio-based command, control, and communications (C3) systems are being replaced by an integrated battlefield information networks featuring local/wide-area networks ([[LAN]]/[[Wide area network|WAN]]), [[satellite communications]], [[unmanned aerial vehicle]] (UAV)-based [[surveillance]] and reconnaissance systems, and mobile [[command and control]] centers.<ref>{{cite web |url = http://www.sinodefence.com/army/default.asp |title = Chinese Ground Forces |publisher = SinoDefence.com |access-date = 12 February 2010 |url-status = dead |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20131104200224/http://www.sinodefence.com/army/default.asp |archive-date = 4 November 2013 }}</ref>{{Unreliable source?|date=November 2022}}


=== Navy (PLAN) ===
==== Navy ====
[[File:Maritime Interdiction Operations at RIMPAC 2016 160718-N-CA112-003.jpg|thumb|A PLAN [[destroyer]] conducting maritime interdiction operations at [[Exercise RIMPAC#RIMPAC 2016|RIMPAC 2016]]]]
[[File:Maritime Interdiction Operations at RIMPAC 2016 160718-N-CA112-003.jpg|thumb|A PLAN [[destroyer]] conducting maritime interdiction operations at [[Exercise RIMPAC#RIMPAC 2016|RIMPAC 2016]]]]
{{Main|People's Liberation Army Navy}}
{{Main|People's Liberation Army Navy}}


Until the early 1990s, the PLA Navy (PLAN) performed a subordinate role to the [[People's Liberation Army Ground Force|PLA Ground Force]] (PLAGF). Since then it has undergone rapid modernisation. The 300,000 strong PLAN is organised into three major fleets: the [[North Sea Fleet]] headquartered at [[Qingdao]], the [[East Sea Fleet]] headquartered at [[Ningbo]], and the [[South Sea Fleet]] headquartered in [[Zhanjiang]].<ref>{{Cite news |last=Chi-yuk |first=Choi |date=27 May 2013 |title=PLA Navy's three fleets meet in South China Sea for rare show of force |work=[[South China Morning Post]] |url=http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-05/03/content_8022441.htm}}</ref> Each fleet consists of a number of [[surface ship]], [[submarine]], [[naval air force]], [[coastal defence and fortification|coastal defence]], and [[marine (military)|marine]] units.<ref name="Studies20202">{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=7VNAzQEACAAJ|title=The Military Balance 2020|author=International Institute for Strategic Studies|date=14 February 2020|publisher=Routledge|isbn=9780367466398|page=261|access-date=29 December 2020|archive-date=23 April 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220423054736/https://www.google.co.uk/books/edition/The_Military_Balance_2020/7VNAzQEACAAJ?hl=en|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite report |url=https://www.oni.navy.mil/Portals/12/Intel%20agencies/China_Media/2015_PLA_NAVY_PUB_Print_Low_Res.pdf?ver=2015-12-02-081233-733 |title=The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century |date=2 December 2015 |publisher=[[Office of Naval Intelligence]] |location=Washington, D.C.}}</ref>
Until the early 1990s, the PLA Navy (PLAN) performed a subordinate role to the [[People's Liberation Army Ground Force|PLA Ground Force]] (PLAGF). Since then it has undergone rapid modernisation. The 300,000 strong PLAN is organized into three major fleets: the [[North Sea Fleet]] headquartered at [[Qingdao]], the [[East Sea Fleet]] headquartered at [[Ningbo]], and the [[South Sea Fleet]] headquartered in [[Zhanjiang]].<ref>{{Cite news |last=Chi-yuk |first=Choi |date=27 May 2013 |title=PLA Navy's three fleets meet in South China Sea for rare show of force |work=[[South China Morning Post]] |url=http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-05/03/content_8022441.htm |access-date=10 December 2022 |archive-date=10 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221210200844/http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-05/03/content_8022441.htm |url-status=live }}</ref> Each fleet consists of a number of [[surface ship]], [[submarine]], [[naval air force]], [[coastal defence and fortification|coastal defence]], and [[marine (military)|marine]] units.<ref>{{Cite report |url=https://www.oni.navy.mil/Portals/12/Intel%20agencies/China_Media/2015_PLA_NAVY_PUB_Print_Low_Res.pdf?ver=2015-12-02-081233-733 |title=The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century |date=2 December 2015 |publisher=[[Office of Naval Intelligence]] |location=Washington, D.C. |access-date=10 December 2022 |archive-date=10 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221210200842/https://www.oni.navy.mil/Portals/12/Intel%20agencies/China_Media/2015_PLA_NAVY_PUB_Print_Low_Res.pdf?ver=2015-12-02-081233-733 |url-status=live }}</ref>{{Sfn|The International Institute for Strategic Studies|2025|p=240}}


The navy includes a 25,000 strong [[People's Liberation Army Marine Corps|Marine Corps]] (organised into seven brigades), a 26,000 strong [[People's Liberation Army Naval Air Force|Naval Aviation Force]] operating several hundred attack helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft.<ref name="Studies20204">{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=7VNAzQEACAAJ |title=The Military Balance 2020 |author=International Institute for Strategic Studies |date=14 February 2020 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=9780367466398 |pages=263–264 |access-date=29 December 2020 |archive-date=15 February 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220215065258/https://www.google.co.uk/books/edition/The_Military_Balance_2020/7VNAzQEACAAJ?hl=en |url-status=live }}</ref> As part of its overall programme of naval modernisation, the PLAN is in the stage of developing a [[blue water navy]].<ref>{{Cite news |last=Farley |first=Robert |date=10 November 2021 |title=Does China Qualify as Having a True Blue Water Navy? |work=[[The National Interest]] |url=https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/does-china-qualify-having-true-blue-water-navy-195958}}</ref> In November 2012, then Party General Secretary Hu Jintao reported to the CCP's [[18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party|18th National Congress]] his desire to "enhance our capacity for exploiting marine resource and build China into a strong maritime power".<ref>{{cite web|url = https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2018/07/03/china-launches-two-destroyers/|title = China launches two destroyers with tech similar to US Navy's Aegis system|date = 3 July 2018|access-date = 6 July 2018}}</ref> According to the United States [[United States Department of Defense|Department of Defense]], the PLAN has numerically the largest navy in the world.<ref>{{Cite book |last= |first= |url=https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF |title=Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2020 Annual Report to Congress |date=2021-07-09 |publisher=[[U.S. Department of Defense]] |language=en}}</ref> The PLAN is led by Commander [[Dong Jun]] and Political Commissar [[Yuan Huazhi]].<ref>{{cite news |date=6 September 2021 |script-title=zh:习近平今再晋升5名上将 |language=zh |work=rfi.fr |url=https://www.rfi.fr/cn/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD/20210906-%E4%B9%A0%E8%BF%91%E5%B9%B3%E4%BB%8A%E5%86%8D%E6%99%8B%E5%8D%875%E5%90%8D%E4%B8%8A%E5%B0%86 |access-date=7 September 2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |author1=Mei Changwei ({{lang|zh|梅常伟}}) |date=21 January 2022 |script-title=zh:中央军委举行晋升上将军衔警衔仪式 习近平颁发命令状并向晋衔的军官警官表示祝贺 |language=zh |work=news.cn |url=http://www.news.cn/politics/leaders/2022-01/21/c_1128288122.htm |url-status=bot: unknown |access-date=21 January 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220121131533/http://www.news.cn/politics/leaders/2022-01/21/c_1128288122.htm |archive-date=21 January 2022}}</ref>
The navy includes a 25,000 strong [[People's Liberation Army Marine Corps|Marine Corps]] (organised into seven brigades), a 18,000 strong [[People's Liberation Army Naval Air Force|Naval Aviation Force]] operating several hundred attack helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft.{{Sfn|The International Institute for Strategic Studies|2025|p=244}} As part of its overall programme of naval modernisation, the PLAN is in the stage of developing a [[blue water navy]].<ref>{{Cite news |last=Farley |first=Robert |date=10 November 2021 |title=Does China Qualify as Having a True Blue Water Navy? |work=[[The National Interest]] |url=https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/does-china-qualify-having-true-blue-water-navy-195958 |access-date=10 December 2022 |archive-date=11 February 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240211032859/https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/does-china-qualify-having-true-blue-water-navy-195958 |url-status=live }}</ref> In November 2012, then Party General Secretary Hu Jintao reported to the CCP's [[18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party|18th National Congress]] his desire to "enhance our capacity for exploiting marine resource and build China into a strong maritime power".<ref>{{cite web |date=3 July 2018 |title=China launches two destroyers with tech similar to US Navy's Aegis system |url=https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2018/07/03/china-launches-two-destroyers/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220215065312/https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2018/07/03/china-launches-two-destroyers/ |archive-date=15 February 2022 |access-date=6 July 2018 |website=[[Defense News]]}}</ref> According to the United States [[United States Department of Defense|Department of Defense]], the PLAN has numerically the largest navy in the world.<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF |title=Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2020 Annual Report to Congress |date=2021-07-09 |publisher=[[U.S. Department of Defense]] |language=en |access-date=13 November 2022 |archive-date=9 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220709194903/https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF |url-status=live }}</ref> The PLAN is led by Commander [[Hu Zhongming]] and Political Commissar is currently vacant.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2025-09-07 |title=CMSI Note 16: Confirmed: ADM Yuan Huazhi Removed as the PLAN’s Political Commissar |url=https://nosi.org/2025/09/07/cmsi-note-16-confirmed-adm-yuan-huazhi-removed-as-the-plans-political-commissar/ |access-date=2025-12-13 |website=Naval Open Source Intelligence |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Dahm |first=Mike |date=2023-12-28 |title=Who’s Hu, the New PLAN Commander |url=https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/december/whos-hu-new-plan-commander |access-date=2025-12-13 |website=[[USNI News]] |language=en}}</ref>


=== Air Force (PLAAF) ===
==== Air Force ====
[[File:J-20 at Airshow China 2016.jpg|thumb|A [[Chengdu J-20]] [[Fifth-generation jet fighter|5th generation]] stealth fighter]]
[[File:J-20 at Airshow China 2016.jpg|thumb|A [[Chengdu J-20]] [[Fifth-generation jet fighter|5th generation]] stealth fighter]]
{{Main|People's Liberation Army Air Force}}
{{Main|People's Liberation Army Air Force}}


The 395,000 strong People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is organised into five Theater Command Air Forces (TCAF) and 24 air divisions.<ref name="Studies20185">{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=AyqdtAEACAAJ|title=The Military Balance 2018|author=International Institute for Strategic Studies|date=14 February 2018|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-85743-955-7|pages=249–259|access-date=13 October 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190323085707/https://books.google.com/books?id=AyqdtAEACAAJ|archive-date=23 March 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> The largest operational units within the Aviation Corps is the air division, which has 2 to 3 aviation regiments, each with 20 to 36 aircraft. The surface-to-air missile (SAM) Corps is organised into SAM [[division (military)|divisions]] and [[brigade]]s. There are also three airborne [[15th Airborne Corps|divisions]] manned by the PLAAF. [[J-XX]] and [[XXJ]] are names applied by Western intelligence agencies to describe programs by the People's Republic of China to develop one or more [[Fifth generation jet fighter|fifth-generation]] [[fighter aircraft]].<ref name="JDW">Chang 2002</ref><ref name="miltech">Coniglio 2006, P.44</ref> The PLAAF is led by Commander [[Chang Dingqiu]] and Political Commissar [[Guo Puxiao]].<ref>{{cite news |author1=Marcus, Clay |author2=Rod, Lee |date=24 September 2021 |title=Star General Chang Dingqiu Takes Command of China's Air Force |work=[[The Diplomat]] |url=https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/star-general-chang-dingqiu-takes-command-of-chinas-air-force/ |access-date=9 October 2021}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=22 January 2022 |title=[军事报道]张又侠在出席中央军委纪委扩大会议时强调 坚决贯彻全面从严治党战略方针 深入做好新时代军队纪检监察工作 |language=zh |trans-title=[Military Report] Zhang Youxia, when attending the enlarged meeting of the Disciplinary Commission of the Central Military Commission, emphasized that we must resolutely implement the strategic policy of strictly governing the party in an all-round way and do a good job in the military discipline inspection and supervision work in the new era. |work=<nowiki>[[China Central Television]</nowiki> |url=https://tv.cctv.com/2022/01/22/VIDEGvAYf6VkuhyfCN3YHBPZ220122.shtml |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220122134924/https://tv.cctv.com/2022/01/22/VIDEGvAYf6VkuhyfCN3YHBPZ220122.shtml |archive-date=22 January 2022}}</ref>
The 403,000 strong People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) was organized into five Theatre Command Air Forces (TCAF) and 24 air divisions.{{Sfn|The International Institute for Strategic Studies|2025|p=240}} {{As of|2024}}, the system has been changed into 11 [[Grades of the People's Liberation Army|Corps Deputy-grade]] "Bases" controlling air brigades.<ref name=":10" /> Divisions have been mostly converted to brigades,<ref name=":10">{{Cite book |last=Trevethan |first=Lawrence |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1082606.pdf |title="Brigadization" of the PLA Air Force |date=2018 |website=Defense Technical Information Center |publisher=China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI) |isbn=978-1718721159 |pages=1–3 |access-date=2024-05-16 |archive-date=3 September 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230903134547/https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1082606.pdf |url-status=live}}</ref> although some (specifically the Bomber divisions, and some of the special mission units){{Sfn|The International Institute for Strategic Studies|2025|p=240}} remain operational as divisions. The largest operational units within the Aviation Corps is the air division, which has 2 to 3 aviation regiments, each with 20 to 36 aircraft. An Air Brigade has from 24 to 50 aircraft.<ref>{{Cite web |date=August 2022 |title=The Dragon's Wing: The People's Liberation Army Air Force's Strategy > Air University (AU) > Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs Article Display |url=https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3111108/the-dragons-wing-the-peoples-liberation-army-air-forces-strategy/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220822012050/https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3111108/the-dragons-wing-the-peoples-liberation-army-air-forces-strategy/ |archive-date=22 August 2022 |access-date=2024-05-16 |website=[[Air University (United States)|Air University]]}}</ref>
 
The surface-to-air missile (SAM) Corps is organized into SAM [[division (military)|divisions]] and [[brigade]]s. There are also three airborne [[15th Airborne Corps|divisions]] manned by the PLAAF. [[J-XX]] and XXJ are names applied by Western intelligence agencies to describe programs by the People's Republic of China to develop one or more [[Fifth generation jet fighter|fifth-generation]] [[fighter aircraft]].<ref name="JDW">Chang 2002</ref><ref name="miltech">Coniglio 2006, P.44</ref> The PLAAF is led by Commander [[Chang Dingqiu]] and Political Commissar [[Guo Puxiao]].<ref>{{cite news |author1=Marcus, Clay |author2=Rod, Lee |date=24 September 2021 |title=Star General Chang Dingqiu Takes Command of China's Air Force |work=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]] |url=https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/star-general-chang-dingqiu-takes-command-of-chinas-air-force/ |access-date=9 October 2021 |archive-date=27 September 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210927091518/https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/star-general-chang-dingqiu-takes-command-of-chinas-air-force/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=22 January 2022 |title=[军事报道]张又侠在出席中央军委纪委扩大会议时强调 坚决贯彻全面从严治党战略方针 深入做好新时代军队纪检监察工作 |trans-title=[Military Report] Zhang Youxia, when attending the enlarged meeting of the Disciplinary Commission of the Central Military Commission, emphasized that we must resolutely implement the strategic policy of strictly governing the party in an all-round way and do a good job in the military discipline inspection and supervision work in the new era. |url=https://tv.cctv.com/2022/01/22/VIDEGvAYf6VkuhyfCN3YHBPZ220122.shtml |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220122134924/https://tv.cctv.com/2022/01/22/VIDEGvAYf6VkuhyfCN3YHBPZ220122.shtml |archive-date=22 January 2022 |work=[[China Central Television]] |language=zh}}</ref>


=== Rocket Force (PLARF) ===
==== Rocket Force ====
[[File:China Announces Troop Cuts at WWII Parade (screenshot) 20159180736.JPG|thumb|DF-21Ds at the [[2015 China Victory Day Parade|2015 Victory Parade]]]]
[[File:China Announces Troop Cuts at WWII Parade (screenshot) 20159180736.JPG|thumb|DF-21Ds at the [[2015 China Victory Day Parade|2015 Victory Parade]]]]
{{Main|People's Liberation Army Rocket Force}}
{{Main|People's Liberation Army Rocket Force}}


The People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) is the main strategic missile force of the PLA and consists of at least 120,000 personnel.<ref name="Studies20206">{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=7VNAzQEACAAJ|author=International Institute for Strategic Studies|title=The Military Balance 2020|date=14 February 2020|publisher=Routledge|isbn=9780367466398|page=259|access-date=29 October 2020|archive-date=15 February 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220215065258/https://www.google.co.uk/books/edition/The_Military_Balance_2020/7VNAzQEACAAJ?hl=en|url-status=live}}</ref> It controls China's [[nuclear weapon|nuclear]] and conventional [[strategic missile]]s.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Lee |first1=Roderick |last2=Béraud-Sudreau |first2=Lucie |last3=Brewster |first3=David |last4=Cairns |first4=Christopher |last5=Ellis |first5=R. Evan |last6=Herlevi |first6=April |last7=Nantulya |first7=Paul |last8=Nouwens |first8=Meia |last9=Pincus |first9=Rebecca |last10=Wuthnow |first10=Joel |date=2022 |title=PLA Rocket Force as a Service: New Team Player or Increasingly Irrelevant? |journal=Enabling a More Externally Focused and Operational Pla 2020 Pla Conference Papers |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep42811.12 |pages=133–154}}</ref> China's total nuclear arsenal size is estimated to be between 100 and 400 thermonuclear warheads. The PLARF is organised into bases sequentially numbered from 61 through 67, wherein the first six are operational and allocated to the nation's theater commands while Base 67 serves as the PRC's central [[nuclear weapon]]s storage facility.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Kristensen |first1=Hans M. |last2=Korda |first2=Matt |date=2021-11-02 |title=Chinese nuclear weapons, 2021 |journal=Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists |language=en |volume=77 |issue=6 |pages=318–336 |doi=10.1080/00963402.2021.1989208 |bibcode=2021BuAtS..77f.318K |s2cid=244118657 |issn=0096-3402|doi-access=free }}</ref> The PLARF is led by Command [[Li Yuchao]] and Political Commissar [[Xu Zhongbo]].<ref>{{Cite tweet|number=1507404795144982537|user=@conanwhatisbest|title=More on Li Yuchao's promotion to PLARF commander: Li previously commanded Base 63, a primarily nuclear Base. General wisdom was that the PLARF has traditionally emphasized conventional force officers for senior promotion. Evidence of a shift in priorities toward nuclear force?|author=Ma Xiu|date=25 March 2022}}</ref><ref>{{Cite report |url=https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/PLARF/2022-10-24%20PLARF%20Organization.pdf |title=PLA Rocket Force Organization |last=Xiu |first=Ma |date=24 October 2022 |publisher=[[China Aerospace Studies Institute]]}}</ref>
The People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) is the main strategic missile force of the PLA and consists of at least 125,000 personnel.{{Sfn|The International Institute for Strategic Studies|2025|p=240}} It controls China's [[Nuclear weapons of China|nuclear]] and conventional [[strategic missile]]s.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Lee |first1=Roderick |last2=Béraud-Sudreau |first2=Lucie |last3=Brewster |first3=David |last4=Cairns |first4=Christopher |last5=Ellis |first5=R. Evan |last6=Herlevi |first6=April |last7=Nantulya |first7=Paul |last8=Nouwens |first8=Meia |last9=Pincus |first9=Rebecca |last10=Wuthnow |first10=Joel |date=2022 |title=PLA Rocket Force as a Service: New Team Player or Increasingly Irrelevant? |chapter=PLA Rocket Force as a Service |journal=Enabling a More Externally Focused and Operational Pla 2020 Pla Conference Papers |chapter-url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep42811.12 |pages=133–154 |access-date=10 December 2022 |archive-date=10 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221210200840/https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep42811.12 |url-status=live }}</ref> China's total nuclear arsenal size is estimated to be between 100 and 400 thermonuclear warheads. The PLARF is organized into bases sequentially numbered from 61 through 67, wherein the first six are operational and allocated to the nation's theatre commands while Base 67 serves as the PRC's central [[nuclear weapon]]s storage facility.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Kristensen |first1=Hans M. |last2=Korda |first2=Matt |date=2021-11-02 |title=Chinese nuclear weapons, 2021 |journal=[[Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists]] |language=en |volume=77 |issue=6 |pages=318–336 |bibcode=2021BuAtS..77f.318K |doi=10.1080/00963402.2021.1989208 |issn=0096-3402 |s2cid=244118657 |doi-access=}}</ref> The PLARF is led by Commander Vacant and Political Commissar [[Xu Xisheng]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Erickson |first=Andrew |last2=Sharman |first2=Christopher |date=2025-11-13 |title=CMSI Note 17: Replacement Removed: VADM/General Wang Houbin—Naval Star Turned Rocket Force Commander’s Terminal Trajectory |url=https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-notes/17 |journal=CMSI Notes}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2023-07-31 |title=China unveils new PLA Rocket Force chief in wake of corruption scandal |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3229515/china-unveils-new-pla-rocket-force-leadership-after-former-commanders-snared-corruption-scandal |access-date=2025-12-13 |website=[[South China Morning Post]] |language=en}}</ref>
 
=== Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) ===
{{Main|People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force}}
[[File:Tianwen-1 launch 02.jpg|thumb|A space launch from the [[Wenchang Space Launch Site]]]]
 
Founded on 31 December 2015 as part of the first wave of reforms of the PLA, the People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) was established as the newest and latest branch of the PLA. Personnel numbers are estimated at 175,000.<ref name="Studies20206" /> Initial announcements regarding the Strategic Support Force did not provide much detail, but Yang Yujun of the Chinese Ministry of Defense described it as an integration of all current combat support forces including but limited to space, cyber, electronic and intelligence branches. Additionally, commentators have speculated that the new service branch will include high-tech operations forces such as space, [[cyberspace]] and electronic warfare operations units, independent of other branches of the military.<ref name=boldstep>{{cite web |url = https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/china-takes-bold-steps-toward-military-reform |title = China Takes Bold Steps Toward Military Reform |website = Stratfor |access-date = 31 March 2016 |archive-date = 26 May 2020 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20200526131100/https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/china-takes-bold-steps-toward-military-reform |url-status = live }}</ref>
 
[[Yin Zhuo]], rear admiral of the [[People's Liberation Army Navy]] and member of the eleventh [[Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference|Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)]] said that "the major mission of the [[People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force|PLA Strategic Support Force]] is the provision of support to the combat operations so that the PLA can gain regional advantages in the aerospace, space, network and electromagnetic space warfare and ensure integrated operations in the conduction of US joint warfare style operations."<ref>{{cite web |url = http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/pla-daily-commentary/2016-01/06/content_6846500.htm |title = Expert: PLA Strategic Support Force a key force to win wars – China Military Online |last = Yao |first = Jianing |website = english.chinamil.com.cn |access-date = 31 March 2016 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20160505212340/http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/pla-daily-commentary/2016-01/06/content_6846500.htm |archive-date = 5 May 2016 |url-status = live }}</ref>


== Conscription and terms of service ==
=== Arms ===
The PLA maintains four arms ({{Zh|s=兵种|p=}}): the [[People's Liberation Army Aerospace Force|Aerospace Force]], the [[People's Liberation Army Cyberspace Force|Cyberspace Force]], the [[People's Liberation Army Information Support Force|Information Support Force]], and the [[People's Liberation Army Joint Logistics Support Force|Joint Logistics Support Force]]. The four-arm system was established on 19 April 2024.<ref name=":6">{{Cite web |title=Chinese PLA embraces a new system of services and arms: Defence spokesperson |url=http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/CHINA_209163/TopStories_209189/16302105.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240420125715/http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/CHINA_209163/TopStories_209189/16302105.html#:~:text=There%20are%20four%20services%2C%20namely%20the%20Army%2C%20the%20Navy%2C%20the%20Air%20Force%20and%20the%20Rocket%20Force%2C%20and%20four%20arms%2C%20including%20the%20Aerospace%20Force%2C%20the%20Cyberspace%20Force%2C%20the%20Information%20Support%20Force%20and%20the%20Joint%20Logistics%20Support%20Force. |archive-date=20 April 2024 |access-date=2024-04-20 |website=People's Liberation Army}}</ref>


== Personnel ==
=== Recruitment and terms of service ===
{{Main|Conscription in China}}
{{Main|Conscription in China}}


Technically, military service with the PLA is obligatory for all Chinese citizens. In practice, mandatory [[military service]] has not been implemented since 1949 as the People's Liberation Army has been able to recruit sufficient numbers voluntarily.<ref name=Kang2015>{{cite news |url = http://www.cna.com.tw/news/newsworld/201504020004-1.aspx |title = 解放軍地位高 農夫搶當兵 |trans-title = The PLA is respected, peasants are scrambling to join the army |agency=Central News Agency (Republic of China) |author=Kang Shi-ren (康世人) |date=2 April 2015 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20170203162818/http://www.cna.com.tw/news/newsworld/201504020004-1.aspx |archive-date=3 February 2017 }}</ref> All 18-year-old males have to register themselves with the government authorities, in a way similar to the [[Selective Service System]] of the United States. In practice, registering does not mean that the person doing so must join the People's Liberation Army.{{citation needed|date=August 2022}}
The PLA began as an all-volunteer force. In 1955, as part of an effort to modernize the PLA, the first ''Military Service Law'' created a system of compulsory [[military service]].<ref name=":4">{{Cite web |last=Allen |first=Kenneth |date=January 14, 2022 |title=The Evolution of the PLA's Enlisted Force: Conscription and Recruitment (Part One) |url=https://jamestown.org/program/the-evolution-of-the-plas-enlisted-force-conscription-and-recruitment-part-one/ |access-date=2024-02-11 |website=[[Jamestown Foundation]] |language=en-US |quote=Following the setback of the Cultural Revolution, in the late 1970s, the PLA embarked on an ambitious program to modernize many aspects of the military, including education, training, and recruitment. Conscripts and volunteers were combined into a single system that allowed conscripts who fulfilled their service obligation to stay in the military as volunteer soldiers for a total of 16 years. |archive-date=16 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230416185858/https://jamestown.org/program/the-evolution-of-the-plas-enlisted-force-conscription-and-recruitment-part-one/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Since the late 1970s, the PLA has been a hybrid force that combines conscripts and volunteers.<ref name=":4" /><ref>{{Cite news |date=November 6, 2023 |title=China is struggling to recruit enough highly skilled troops |url=https://www.economist.com/special-report/2023/11/06/china-is-struggling-to-recruit-enough-highly-skilled-troops |url-access=subscription |access-date=2024-02-11 |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |issn=0013-0613 |quote=In the late 1970s it adopted the current hybrid system of volunteers and conscripts. |archive-date=10 February 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240210060539/https://www.economist.com/special-report/2023/11/06/china-is-struggling-to-recruit-enough-highly-skilled-troops |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name=":5">{{Cite web |last1=Allen |first1=Kenneth W. |last2=Corbett |first2=Thomas |last3=Taylor A. |first3=Lee |last4=Xiu |first4=Ma |date=November 3, 2022 |title=Personnel of the People's Liberation Army |url=https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2022-11/Personnel_Peoples_Liberation_Army.pdf |access-date=2024-02-11 |website=[[United States–China Economic and Security Review Commission]] |page=23 |archive-date=16 December 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231216095328/https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2022-11/Personnel_Peoples_Liberation_Army.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> Conscripts who fulfilled their service obligation can stay in the military as volunteer soldiers for a total of 16 years.<ref name=":4" /><ref name=":5" /> [[De jure|''De jur''e]], military service with the PLA is obligatory for all Chinese citizens. However, mandatory military service has not been enacted in China since 1949.<ref>{{cite web |last=Wang |first=Amber |date=30 April 2022 |title=The new rules China hopes will build more professional soldiers |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3176096/new-rules-china-hopes-will-build-more-professional-soldiers |website=[[South China Morning Post]] |access-date=15 April 2024 |archive-date=22 July 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240722173807/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3176096/new-rules-china-hopes-will-build-more-professional-soldiers |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="times_2301">{{cite magazine |date=6 January 2023 |title=Taiwan Is Extending Conscription. Here's How Its Military Compares to Other Countries |url=https://time.com/6245036/taiwan-conscription-military-comparison/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230108050220/https://time.com/6245036/taiwan-conscription-military-comparison/ |archive-date=8 January 2023 |access-date=8 January 2023 |magazine=[[Time (magazine)|Time]]}}</ref> Due to the effect of the [[one-child policy]], over 70 percent of the PLA and 80 percent of its combat troops come from one-child households, according to [[Liu Mingfu]] of the [[People's Liberation Army National Defense University|National Defense University]].<ref>{{Cite news |last=Chan |first=Minnie |date=5 February 2014 |title=Soldiers of the one-child era: are they too weak to fulfill Beijing's military ambitions? |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1421451/soldiers-one-child-era-are-they-too-weak-fulfill-beijings-military |access-date=11 July 2025 |work=[[South China Morning Post]]}}</ref>


Article 55 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China prescribes [[conscription]] by stating: "It is a sacred duty of every citizen of the People's Republic of China to defend his or her motherland and resist invasion. It is an honoured obligation of the citizens of the People's Republic of China to perform military service and to join the [[militia]] forces."<ref>
===Women and ethnic minorities===
[[s:Constitution of the People's Republic of China|Constitution of the People's Republic of China]]
{{anchor|Women in the People's Liberation Army}}
</ref> The 1984 Military Service Law spells out the legal basis of conscription, describing military service as a duty for "all citizens without distinction of race . . . and religious creed". This law has not been amended since it came into effect. Technically, those 18–22 years of age enter selective compulsory military service, with a 24-month service obligation. In reality, numbers of registering personals are enough to support all military posts in China, creating "volunteer conscription".<ref>{{cite news |url = http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-01/11/c_1120290676.htm |title = 今年征兵准备工作全面展开 国防部征兵办公室下发通知确保高质量完成征兵任务 (The Preparation of Conscription in This Year Has Begun. Ministry of Defence Announced That the Conscription should be finished in high quality) |agency = Xinhua News Agency |date = 11 January 2016 |access-date = 17 June 2018 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20171001213757/http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-01/11/c_1120290676.htm |archive-date = 1 October 2017 |url-status = live }}</ref>{{better source needed|date=December 2022}}
{{anchor|Ethnic minorities in the People's Liberation Army}}
[[File:Военная делегация из Китая посетила Военную академию Генерального штаба ВС РФ.png|thumb|Female Colonel of the [[People's Liberation Army Joint Logistics Support Force|Joint Logistics Support Force]]]]
Women participated extensively in [[unconventional warfare]], including in combat positions, in the [[Chinese Red Army]] during the [[Chinese Communist Revolution|revolutionary period]], Chinese Civil War (1927–1949) and the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945).<ref name="lixiaolin_1993">{{cite journal |last=Li |first=Xiaolin |date=1993 |title=Chinese Women in the People's Liberation Army: Professionals or Quasi-Professionals? |url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/45346560 |journal=[[Armed Forces & Society]] |volume=20 |issue=1 |pages=69–83 |doi=10.1177/0095327X9302000105 |jstor=45346560 |url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref name="kania_2016">{{cite journal |last=Kania |first=Elsa |date=4 October 2016 |title=Holding Up Half the Sky? (Part 1)—The Evolution of Women's Roles in the PLA |url=https://jamestown.org/program/holding-half-sky-part-1-evolution-womens-roles-pla/ |url-status=live |journal=China Brief |publisher=[[Jamestown Foundation]] |volume=16 |issue=15 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240401171605/https://jamestown.org/program/holding-half-sky-part-1-evolution-womens-roles-pla/ |archive-date=1 April 2024 |access-date=1 April 2024}}</ref> After the establishment of the People's Republic of China, along with the People's Liberation Army (PLA)'s transition toward the conventional military organization, the role of women in the armed forces gradually reduced to support, medical, and logistics roles.<ref name="lixiaolin_1993" /> It was considered a prestigious choice for women to join the military. Serving in the military opens up opportunities for education, training, higher status, and relocation to cities after completing the service. During the Cultural Revolution, military service was regarded as a privilege and a method to avoid the [[Down to the Countryside Movement]].<ref name="lixiaolin_1993" />


Residents of the [[special administrative regions of China|Special administrative regions]], [[Hong Kong]] and [[Macau]], are exempted from joining the military.
In the 1980s, the PLA underwent large-scale demobilization amid the [[reform and opening up]], and women were discharged back to civilian society for economic development while the exclusion of women in the military expanded.<ref name="lixiaolin_1993" /> In the 1990s, the PLA revived the recruitment of female personnel in regular [[military formation]]s but primarily focused on non-combat roles at specialized positions.<ref name="lixiaolin_1993" /> Most women were trained in areas such as academic/engineering, [[Combat medic|medics]], [[Military communications|communications]], intelligence, cultural work, and administrative work, as these positions conform to the traditional gender roles. Women in the PLA were more likely to be cadets and officers instead of enlisted soldiers because of their specializations.<ref name="lixiaolin_1993" /> The military organization still preserved some female combat units as public exemplars of social equality.<ref name="lixiaolin_1993" /><ref name="kania_2016" />


== Departments ==
Both enlisted and cadet women personnel underwent the same [[Military recruit training|basic training]] as their male counterparts in the PLA, but many of them serve in predominantly female [[Military organization|organizations]]. Due to ideological reasons, the regulation governing the segregation of sex in the PLA is prohibited, but a quasi-segregated arrangement for women's organizations is still applied through considerations of convenience.<ref name="lixiaolin_1993" /> Women were likelier to hold commanding positions in female-heavy organizations such as medical, logistic, research, and political work units, but sometimes in combat units during peacetime.<ref name="lixiaolin_1993" /> In PLAAF, women traditionally pilot transport aircraft or serve as crew members.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/2841996/females-in-the-pla-air-force/ |title=Females in the PLA Air Force |website=China Aerospace Studies Institute |date=15 November 2021 |first=Kenneth |last=W. Allen |access-date=1 April 2024 |archive-date=1 April 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240401164601/https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/2841996/females-in-the-pla-air-force/#:~:text=Historically%2C%20females%20in%20the%20PLAAF,units%2C%20and%20the%20Airborne%20Corps. |url-status=live }}</ref> There had been a small number of high-ranking female officials in the PLA since 1949, but the advancement of position had remained relatively uncommon.<ref name="lixiaolin_1993" /><ref name="kania_2016" /> In the 2010s, women were increasingly serving in combat roles, in mixed-gender organizations alongside their male counterparts, and to the same physical standard.<ref name="kania_2016" />


=== Joint Staff Department ===
The military actively promotes opportunities for women in the military, such as celebrating [[International Women's Day]] for the members of the armed forces, publicizing the number of firsts for female officers and enlisted personnel, including deployments with peacekeeping forces or serving on PLA Navy's first aircraft carrier, announcing female military achievements in state media, and promoting female special forces through news reports or popular media.<ref name="kania_2016" /> PLA does not publish detailed gender composition of its armed forces, but the [[Jamestown Foundation]] estimated approximately 5% of the active military force in China is female.<ref name="kaniaallen_2016">{{cite journal |last1=Kania |first1=Elsa |last2=Allen |first2=Kenneth |date=26 October 2016 |title=Holding Up Half the Sky? (Part 2)—The Evolution of Women's Roles in the PLA |url=https://jamestown.org/program/holding-half-sky-part-2-evolution-womens-roles-pla/ |url-status=live |journal=China Brief |publisher=[[Jamestown Foundation]] |volume=16 |issue=16 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240401171607/https://jamestown.org/program/holding-half-sky-part-2-evolution-womens-roles-pla/ |archive-date=1 April 2024 |access-date=1 April 2024}}</ref>
{{Main|Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission}}
{{Unreferenced section|date=August 2022}}
The [[Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission|Joint Staff Department]] carries out staff and operational functions for the PLA and had major responsibility for implementing military modernisation plans. Headed by the chief of the joint staff (formerly chief of the general staff), the department serves as the headquarters for the entire PLA and contained directorates for the five armed services: Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy, Rocket Forces and Support Forces.


The Joint Staff Department included functionally organised subdepartments for [[military operation|operations]], [[military training|training]], [[intelligence (information gathering)|intelligence]], [[mobilisation]], [[surveying]], [[communications]] and politics. The departments for [[artillery]], [[armour]]ed units, quartermaster units and joint forces engineering units were later dissolved, with the former two forming now part of the Ground Forces. The engineering formations are now split amongst the service branches and the quartermaster formations today form part of the Joint Logistics Forces.
National unity and territorial integrity are central themes of the Chinese Communist Revolution. The Chinese Red Army and the succeeding PLA actively recruited [[Ethnic minorities in China|ethnic minorities]]. During the Chinese Civil War, Mongol cavalry units were formed. During the Korean War, as many as 50,000 ethnic Koreans in China volunteered to join the PLA. PLA's recruitment of minorities generally correlates to state policies. During the early years, minorities were given preferential treatment, with special attention given to recruitment and training. In the 1950s, ethnic Mongols accounted for 52% of all officers in [[Inner Mongolia]] military region. During the [[Great Leap Forward]] and Cultural Revolution, armed forces emphasized "socialist culture", assimilation policies, and the construction of common identities between soldiers of different ethnicities.<ref name="Heaton_1977">{{cite journal |last=William R. |first=Heaton |date=1977 |title=The Minorities and the Military in China |url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/45346013. |journal=[[Armed Forces & Society]] |volume=3 |issue=2 |pages=325–342 |doi=10.1177/0095327X7700300211 |jstor=45346013 |url-access=subscription}}</ref>


Navy Headquarters controls the [[North Sea Fleet]], [[East Sea Fleet]], and [[South Sea Fleet]]. Air Force Headquarters generally exercised control through the commanders of the five theater commands. [[Nuclear force]]s were directly subordinate to the Joint Staff Department through the Rocket Forces commander and political commissar. Conventional main, regional, and [[militia]] units were controlled administratively by the theater commanders, but the Joint Staff Department in Beijing could assume direct operational control of any main-force unit at will.
For ethnic minority cadets and officials, overall development follows national policies. Typically, minority officers hold officer positions in their home regions. Examples included over 34% of the battalion and regimental cadres in [[Yi people|Yi]] autonomous region militia were of the Yi ethnicity, and 45% of the militia cadres in Tibetan local militia were of Tibetan ethnicity. Ethnical minorities achieved high-ranking positions in the PLA, and the percentage of appointments appears to follow the ratio of the Chinese population composition.<ref name="Heaton_1977" /> Prominent figures included ethnic Mongol general [[Ulanhu]], who served in high-ranking roles in the Inner Mongolian region and as vice president of China, and [[Saifuddin Azizi]], a [[Lieutenant General]] and an ethnic [[Uyghurs|Uyghur]] who served in the [[CCP Central Committee]].<ref name="Heaton_1977" /> There were a few instances of ethnic distrust within the PLA, with one prominent example being the defection of [[Margub Iskhakov]], an ethnic [[Muslim]] [[Tatars|Tatar]] PLA general, to the [[Soviet Union]] in the 1960s. However, his defection largely contributed to his disillusion with the failed Great Leap Forward policies, instead of his ethnic background.<ref name="ziyang_2017">{{cite web |last=Yang |first=Zi |date=9 September 2017 |title=Ethnicity factors strongly in PLA promotions |url=https://asiatimes.com/2017/09/racism-always-determine-pla-promotions/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240401164602/https://asiatimes.com/2017/09/racism-always-determine-pla-promotions/ |archive-date=1 April 2024 |access-date=1 April 2024 |website=[[Asia Times]]}}</ref> In modern times, ethnic representation is most visible among junior-ranking officers. Only a few minorities reach the highest-ranking positions.<ref name="ziyang_2017" />


Thus, broadly speaking, the Joint Staff Department exercises operational control of the main forces, and the theater commanders controlled as always the regional forces and, indirectly, the militia. The post of principal intelligence official in the top leadership of the Chinese military has been taken up by several people of several generations, from Li Kenong in the 1950s to Xiong Guangkai in the late 1990s; and their public capacity has always been assistant to the deputy chief of staff or assistant to the chief of staff.
===Rank structure ===
{{Main|Ranks of the People's Liberation Army Ground Force|Ranks of the People's Liberation Army Navy|Ranks of the People's Liberation Army Air Force|People's Liberation Army rank insignia}}


Ever since the CCP officially established the system of "theater commands" for its army in the 2010s as a successor to the "major military regions" policy of the 1950s, the [[intelligence agencies]] inside the Army have, after going through several major evolutions, developed into the present three major military intelligence setups:
====Officers====
# The central level is composed of the Second and Third Departments under the Joint Staff Headquarters and the Liaison Department under the Political Work Department.
{| style="border:1px solid #8888aa; background:#f7f8ff; padding:5px; font-size:95%; margin:0 12px 12px 0;"
# At the Theater Command level intelligence activities consist of the Second Bureau established at the same level as the Operation Department under the headquarters, and the Liaison Department established under the Political Work Department.
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Armies/OF/Blank}}
# The third system includes several communications stations directly established in the garrison areas of all the theater commands by the Third Department of the Joint Staff Headquarters.
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Armies/OF/People's Republic of China}}
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Navies/OF/People's Republic of China}}
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Air Forces/OF/People's Republic of China}}
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Air Forces/OF/People's Republic of China (PLARF)}}
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Air Forces/OF/People's Republic of China (PLASSF)}}
|}


The Second Bureau under the headquarters and the Liaison Department under the Political Work Departments of the theater commands are only subjected to the "professional leadership" of their "counterpart" units under the Central Military Commission (CMC) and are still considered the direct subordinate units of the major military region organizationally. Those entities whose names include the word "institute", all [[research institute]]s under the charge of the Second and the Third Departments of the Joint Staff Headquarters, including other research organs inside the Army, are at least of the establishment size of brigade level. Among the deputy commanders of a major [[Theater commands of the People's Liberation Army|Theater command]] in China, there is always one who is assigned to take charge of intelligence work, and the intelligence agencies under his charge are directly affiliated to the headquarters and the political department of the corresponding theater command.
====Other ranks====
 
{| style="border:1px solid #8888aa; background:#f7f8ff; padding:5px; font-size:95%; margin:0 12px 12px 0;"
The Conference on Strengthening Intelligence Work was held from 3 September 1996 – 18 September 1996 at the Xishan Command Center of the [[Ministry of State Security of the People's Republic of China|Ministry of State Security]] and the General Staff Department. Chi Haotian delivered a report entitled "Strengthen Intelligence Work in a New International Environment To Serve the Cause of Socialist Construction." The report emphasised the need to strengthen the following four aspects of intelligence work:
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Armies/OR/Blank}}
* Efforts must be made to strengthen understanding of the special nature and role of intelligence work, as well as an understanding of the close relationship between strengthening intelligence work on the one hand, and of the [[Four Modernizations]] of the motherland, the reunification of the motherland, and opposition to hegemony and power politics on the other.
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Armies/OR/People's Republic of China}}
* The United States and the West have all along been engaged in infiltration, intervention, sabotage, and intelligence gathering against China on the political, economic, military, and ideological fronts. The response must strengthen the struggle against their infiltration, intervention, sabotage, and intelligence gathering.
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Navies/OR/People's Republic of China}}
* Consolidating intelligence departments and training a new generation of intelligence personnel who are politically reliable, honest and upright in their ways, and capable of mastering professional skills, the art of struggle, and advanced technologies.
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Air Forces/OR/People's Republic of China}}
* Strengthening the work of organising intelligence in two international industrial, commercial, and financial ports—Hong Kong and Macau.
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Air Forces/OR/People's Republic of China (PLARF)}}
 
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Air Forces/OR/People's Republic of China (PLASSF)}}
Although the four aspects emphasised by Chi Haotian appeared to be defensive measures, they were both defensive and offensive in nature.
|}
 
==== Second Department ====
{{unreferenced section |date = March 2014 }}
 
The Second Department of the Joint Staff Headquarters is responsible for collecting [[military intelligence]]. Activities include [[military attaché]]s at Chinese embassies abroad, clandestine special agents sent to foreign countries to collect military information, and the analysis of information publicly published in foreign countries. This section of the PLA Joint Staff Headquarters act in a similar capacity to its civilian counterpart the [[Ministry of State Security (China)|Ministry of State Security]].
 
The Second Department oversees military [[human intelligence (espionage)|human intelligence]] (HUMINT) collection, widely exploits [[Open Source Intelligence|open source (OSINT) materials]], fuses HUMINT, [[signals intelligence]] (SIGINT), and [[imagery intelligence]] data, and disseminates finished intelligence products to the CMC and other consumers. Preliminary fusion is carried out by the Second Department's Analysis Bureau which mans the National Watch Center, the focal point for national-level indications and warning. In-depth analysis is carried out by regional bureaus. Although traditionally the Second Department of the Joint Staff Department was responsible for military intelligence, it is beginning to increasingly focus on [[Science, technology and society|scientific and technological]] intelligence in the military field, following the example of Russian agencies in stepping up the work of collecting scientific and technological information.
 
The research institute under the Second Department of the Joint Staff Headquarters is publicly known as the Institute for International Strategic Studies; its internal classified publication "Foreign Military Trends" ({{lang-zh|外军动态}}, {{transliteration|zh|Wai Jun Dongtai}}) is published every 10 days and transmitted to units at the division level.
 
The PLA Institute of International Relations at [[Nanjing]] comes under the Second Department of the Joint Staff Department and is responsible for training [[military attaché]]s, assistant military attachés and associate military attachés as well as [[secret agent]]s to be posted abroad. It also supplies officers to the military intelligence sections of various [[military region]]s and [[group armies]]. The institute was formed from the PLA "793" [[Foreign Language]] Institute, which moved from [[Zhangjiakou]] after the Cultural Revolution and split into two institutions at [[Luoyang]] and Nanjing.
 
The Institute of International Relations was known in the 1950s as the School for Foreign Language Cadres of the Central Military Commission (CMC), with the current name being used since 1964. The training of intelligence personnel is one of several activities at the institute. While all graduates of the [[Moscow Institute of International Relations]] were employed by the [[KGB]], only some graduates of the Beijing Institute of International Relations are employed by the Ministry of State Security.
 
The former Institute of International Relations, since being renamed the [[Foreign Affairs College]], is under the administration of the [[Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China|Ministry of Foreign Affairs]] and is not involved in secret intelligence work. The former Central Military Commission (CMC) foreign language school had foreign faculty members who were either CCP sympathizers or were members of foreign communist parties. But the present Institute of International Relations does not hire foreign teachers, to avoid the danger that its students might be recognised when sent abroad as clandestine agents.
 
Those engaged in professional work in military academies under the Second Department of the Joint Staff Headquarters usually have a chance to go abroad, either for advanced studies or as [[military officer]]s working in the military attaché's office of Chinese embassies in foreign countries. People working in the military attaché's office of embassies are usually engaged in collecting military information under the cover of "military diplomacy". As long as they refrain from directly [[subversion (politics)|subversive]] activities, they are considered as well-behaved "military diplomats".
 
Some bureaus under the Second Department are responsible for espionage in different regions, of which the First Bureau is responsible for collecting information in the Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and [[Macau]], and also in Taiwan. Agents are dispatched by the Second Department to companies and other local corporations to gain cover.
 
The "Autumn Orchid" intelligence group assigned to Hong Kong and Macau in the mid-1980s mostly operated in the mass media, political, industrial, commercial, and religious circles, as well as in universities and colleges. The "Autumn Orchid" intelligence group was mainly responsible for the following three tasks:
* Finding out and keeping abreast of the political leanings of officials of the Hong Kong and Macau governments, as well as their views on major issues, through social contact with them and information provided by them.
* Keeping abreast of the developments of foreign governments' political organs in Hong Kong, as well as of foreign financial, industrial, and commercial organisations.
* Finding out and having a good grasp of the local media's sources of information on political, military, economic, and other developments on the mainland, and deliberately releasing false political or military information to the media to test the outside response.
 
The "Autumn Orchid" intelligence group was awarded a Citation for Merit, Second Class, in December 1994. It was further awarded another Citation for Merit, Second Class, in 1997. Its current status is not publicly known. During the 2008 Chinese New Year celebration CCTV held for Chinese diplomatic establishments, the head of the Second Department of the Joint Headquarters was revealed for the first time to the public: the current head was [[Major General]] Yang Hui ({{lang-zh|杨晖}}).
 
==== Third Department ====
{{unreferenced section |date = March 2014}}
 
The Third Department of the Joint Staff Department is responsible for monitoring the [[telecommunications]] of foreign armies and producing finished intelligence based on the military information collected.
 
The [[military communications|communications]] stations established by the Third Department of the Joint Staff Headquarters are not subject to the [[jurisdiction]] of the provincial [[military district]] and the major theater command of where they are based. The communications stations are entirely the agencies of the Third Department of the Joint Staff Headquarters which have no affiliations to the provincial military district and the military region of where they are based. The personnel composition, budgets, and establishment of these communications stations are entirely under the jurisdiction of the Third Department of the General PLA General Staff Headquarters and are not related at all with local troops.
 
China maintains the most extensive [[SIGINT]] network of all the countries in the Asia-Pacific region. As of the late 1990s, SIGINT systems included several dozen ground stations, half a dozen ships, truck-mounted systems, and airborne systems. Third Department headquarters is in the vicinity of the GSD First Department (Operations Department), AMS, and NDU complex in the hills northwest of the [[Summer Palace]]. As of the late 1990s, the Third Department was allegedly manned by approximately 20,000 personnel, with most of their linguists trained at the Luoyang Institute of Foreign Languages.
 
Ever since the 1950s, the Second and Third Departments of the Joint Staff Headquarters have established several institutions of secondary and [[higher education|higher learning]] for bringing up "special talents". The PLA Foreign Language Institute at Luoyang comes under the Third Department of the Joint Staff Department and is responsible for training [[foreign language]] officers for the monitoring of foreign [[military intelligence]]. The institute was formed from the PLA "793" Foreign Language Institute, which moved from Zhangjiakou after the Cultural Revolution and split into two institutions at Luoyang and Nanjing.
 
Though the distribution order they received upon graduation indicated the "Joint Staff Headquarters", many of the graduates of these schools found themselves being sent to all parts of the country, including remote and uninhabited backward mountain areas. The reason is that the monitoring and control stations under the Third Department of the PLA General Staff Headquarters are scattered in every corner of the country.
 
The communications stations located in the [[Shenzhen]] base of the [[PLA Hong Kong Garrison]] started their work long ago. In normal times, these two communications stations report directly to the Central Military Commission (CMC) and the Joint Staff Headquarters. Units responsible for coordination are the communications stations established in the garrison provinces of the military regions by the Third Department of the PLA General Staff Headquarters.
 
By taking direct command of [[military communications]] stations based in all parts of the country, the CCP Central Military Commission (CMC) and the Joint Staff Headquarters can not only ensure a successful [[interception]] of enemy [[radio communications]], but can also make sure that none of the wire or [[wireless communication]]s and contacts among major military regions can escape the detection of these communications stations, thus effectively attaining the goal of imposing direct supervision and control over all the theater commands, all provincial [[military district]]s, and all [[group armies]].
 
===== Monitoring stations =====
{{unreferenced section |date = March 2014}}
 
China's main SIGINT effort is in the Third Department of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission (CMC), with additional capabilities, primarily domestic, in the [[Ministry of State Security (China)|Ministry of State Security]] (MSS). SIGINT stations, therefore, are scattered through the country, for domestic as well as international interception. Prof. Desmond Ball, of the [[Australian National University]], described the largest stations as the main Technical Department SIGINT net control station on the northwest outskirts of Beijing, and the large complex near [[Lake Khanka|Lake Kinghathu]] in the extreme northeast corner of China.
 
As opposed to other [[Great power|major powers]], China focuses its SIGINT activities on its region rather than the world. Ball wrote, in the eighties, that China had several dozen SIGINT stations aimed at the Soviet Union, Japan, Taiwan, Southeast Asia and India, as well as internally. Of the stations apparently targeting Russia, there are sites at Jilemutu and [[Jixi]] in the northeast, and at [[Erenhot|Erlian]] and [[Hami City|Hami]] near the Mongolian border. Two Russian-facing sites in [[Xinjiang]], at [[Qitai County|Qitai]] and [[Korla]] may be operated jointly with resources from the US [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]'s Office of SIGINT Operations, probably focused on missile and space activity.
 
Other stations aimed at South and Southeast Asia are on a net controlled by [[Chengdu]], Sichuan. There is a large facility at Dayi, and, according to Ball, "numerous" small posts along the Indian border. Other significant facilities are located near [[Shenyang]], near [[Jinan]] and in Nanjing and Shanghai. Additional stations are in the [[Fujian]] and [[Guangdong]] military districts opposite Taiwan.
 
On [[Hainan Island]], there is a naval SIGINT facility that monitors the South China sea, and a ground station targeting US and Russian satellites. China also has ship and aircraft platforms in this area, under the [[South Sea Fleet]] headquarters at [[Zhanjiang]] immediately north of the island. Targeting here seems to have an [[ELINT]] as well as [[COMINT]] flavor. There are also truck-mounted mobile ground systems, as well as ship, aircraft, and limited satellite capability. There are at least 10 intelligence-gathering [[Auxiliaries|auxiliary]] vessels.
 
As of the late nineties, the Chinese did not appear to be trying to monitor the [[United States Pacific Command]] to the same extent as does Russia. In future, this had depended, in part, on the status of Taiwan.
 
==== Fourth Department ====
{{Main|Fourth Department of the General Staff Headquarters Department}}{{Unreferenced section|date=November 2022}}
The Fourth Department (ECM and Radar) of the Joint Staff Headquarters Department has the [[electronic intelligence]] (ELINT) portfolio within the PLA's SIGINT apparatus. This department is responsible for [[electronic countermeasures]], requiring them to collect and maintain databases on electronic signals. 25 ELINT receivers are the responsibility of the Southwest Institute of Electronic Equipment (SWIEE). Among the wide range of SWIEE ELINT products is a new KZ900 airborne ELINT pod. The GSD 54th Research Institute supports the ECM Department in the development of digital ELINT signal processors to analyze parameters of radar pulses.
 
=== Special forces ===
{{Main|People's Liberation Army Special Operations Forces}}
[[File:140716-G-HN254-571 (14714332244).jpg|thumb|A PLA Navy Special Operations Forces marine during a maritime operations exercise in [[RIMPAC]] 2014.]]
China's special ground force is called PLASF ([[People's Liberation Army Special Operations Forces]]). Typical units include consist of highly trained soldiers, a team commander, assistant commander, sniper, spotter, machine-gun support, bomber, and a pair of assault groups.{{cn|date=December 2022}} China's counter-terrorism unit members are drawn from the public security apparatus rather than the military. The name of such units change frequently. As of 2020, it is known as the Immediate Action Unit (IAU).<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-7_lfNx76GcC&q=china+Immediate+Action+Unit&pg=PA232|title=China's Security State: Philosophy, Evolution, and Politics|last=Guo|first=Xuezhi|date=2012-08-29|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-107-02323-9|language=en|access-date=2 November 2020|archive-date=15 February 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220215065258/https://books.google.com/books?id=-7_lfNx76GcC&q=china+Immediate+Action+Unit&pg=PA232|url-status=live}}</ref>
 
China has reportedly developed a force capable of carrying out long-range airborne operations, long-range reconnaissance, and amphibious operations. Formed in China's Guangzhou military region and known by the nickname "South Blade", the force supposedly receives army, air force, and naval training, including flight training, and is equipped with "hundreds of high-tech devices", including global-positioning satellite systems. All force members officers are military staff college graduates, and 60 percent are said to have university degrees.
 
Soldiers are reported to be cross-trained in various specialties, and training encompassing a wide range of operating environments. It is far from clear whether this unit is considered operational by the Chinese. It is also not clear how such a force would be employed. Among the missions stated missions include: "responding to contingencies in various regions" and "cooperating with other services in attacks on islands".
 
According to the limited reporting, the organisation appears to be in a phase of testing and development and may constitute an experimental unit. While no size for the force has been revealed, there have been Chinese media claims that "over 4,000 soldiers of the force are all-weather and versatile fighters and parachutists who can fly airplanes and drive terrain vehicles and amphibious boats".{{Citation needed |date = December 2009}}
 
=== Other branches ===
* The Third Department and the Navy co-operate on shipborne intelligence collection platforms.
* PLAAF Sixth Research Institute: Air Force SIGINT collection is managed by the PLAAF Sixth Research Institute in Beijing.


== Weapons and equipment ==
== Weapons and equipment ==
According to the [[United States Department of Defense]], China is developing kinetic-energy weapons, high-powered lasers, high-powered [[microwave|microwave weapon]]s, [[Particle beam#Military|particle-beam weapon]]s, and [[electromagnetic pulse]] weapons with its increase of military fundings.<ref>The Standard, 5 March 2008, Volume 1, No. 134, Major jump in military spending, Alarm raised over cyber, space advance, ''the Pentagon said in a report. . . . "The PLA is also exploring satellite jammers, kinetic-energy weapons, high-powered lasers, high-powered microwave weapons, particle-beam weapons, and electromagnetic pulse weapons for counterspace application", it said, adding it was not clear if the cyber intrusions were backed by the military.''</ref>
According to the [[United States Department of Defense]], China is developing kinetic-energy weapons, high-powered lasers, high-powered [[microwave|microwave weapon]]s, [[Particle beam#Military|particle-beam weapon]]s, and [[electromagnetic pulse]] weapons with its increase of military fundings.<ref>The Standard, 5 March 2008, Volume 1, No. 134, Major jump in military spending, Alarm raised over cyber, space advance, ''the Pentagon said in a report. "The PLA is also exploring satellite jammers, kinetic-energy weapons, high-powered lasers, high-powered microwave weapons, particle-beam weapons, and electromagnetic pulse weapons for counterspace application", it said, adding it was not clear if the cyber intrusions were backed by the military.''</ref>


The PLA has said of reports that its modernisation is dependent on sales of advanced technology from American allies, senior leadership have stated "Some have politicized China's normal commercial cooperation with foreign countries, damaging our reputation." These contributions include advanced European diesel engines for Chinese warships, military helicopter designs from Eurocopter, French anti-submarine sonars and helicopters,<ref>{{cite news |url = http://in.reuters.com/article/us-breakout-submarines-special-report-idINBRE9BI0PD20131219 |title = Chinese military's secret to success: European engineering |last1 = Lague |first1 = David |date = 19 December 2013 |work = Reuters |access-date = 20 December 2013 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20131220211323/http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/12/19/us-breakout-submarines-special-report-idINBRE9BI0PD20131219 |archive-date = 20 December 2013 |url-status = live }}</ref> Australian technology for the [[Houbei class missile boat]],<ref>Lague, David. [https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-military-technology-idUSBRE84U1HG20120531 "Insight: From a ferry, a Chinese fast-attack boat."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211116153056/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-military-technology-idUSBRE84U1HG20120531 |date=16 November 2021 }} Reuters, 31 May 2012.</ref> and Israeli supplied American missile, laser and aircraft technology.<ref name="G">{{cite web |title = U.S. up in arms over Sino-Israeli ties |url = http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FL21Ak01.html |date = 21 December 2004 |work = [[Asia Times]] |access-date = 11 June 2008 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20080516232241/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FL21Ak01.html |archive-date = 16 May 2008 |url-status = unfit }}</ref>
Responding to reports that its modernisation is dependent on sales of advanced technology from American allies, PLA senior leadership have stated: "Some have politicized China's normal commercial cooperation with foreign countries, damaging our reputation." These contributions include advanced European diesel engines for Chinese warships, military helicopter designs from Eurocopter, French anti-submarine sonars and helicopters,<ref>{{cite news |url = http://in.reuters.com/article/us-breakout-submarines-special-report-idINBRE9BI0PD20131219 |title = Chinese military's secret to success: European engineering |last1 = Lague |first1 = David |date = 19 December 2013 |work = Reuters |access-date = 20 December 2013 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20131220211323/http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/12/19/us-breakout-submarines-special-report-idINBRE9BI0PD20131219 |archive-date = 20 December 2013 |url-status = dead }}</ref> Australian technology for the [[Houbei class missile boat]],<ref>Lague, David. [https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-military-technology-idUSBRE84U1HG20120531 "Insight: From a ferry, a Chinese fast-attack boat."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211116153056/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-military-technology-idUSBRE84U1HG20120531 |date=16 November 2021 }} Reuters, 31 May 2012.</ref> and Israeli supplied American missile, laser and aircraft technology.<ref name="G">{{cite web |title = U.S. up in arms over Sino-Israeli ties |url = http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FL21Ak01.html |date = 21 December 2004 |work = [[Asia Times]] |access-date = 11 June 2008 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20080516232241/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FL21Ak01.html |archive-date = 16 May 2008 |url-status = unfit }}</ref>


According to the [[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]]'s data, China became the world's third largest exporter of major arms in 2010–14, an increase of 143 percent from the period 2005–2009.<ref>{{cite web |title = The United States leads upward trend in arms exports, Asian and Gulf states arms imports up, says SIPRI |url = http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2015/at-march-2015 |website = sipri.org |date = 16 March 2015 |publisher = [[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]] (SIPRI) |access-date = 18 March 2015 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20160409121211/http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2015/at-march-2015 |archive-date = 9 April 2016 |url-status = live }}</ref> SIPRI also calculated that China surpassed Russia to become the world's second largest arms exporter by 2020.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2020/new-sipri-data-reveals-scale-chinese-arms-industry|title=New SIPRI data reveals scale of Chinese arms industry|date=27 January 2020|website=[[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]]|access-date=27 January 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200127055352/https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2020/new-sipri-data-reveals-scale-chinese-arms-industry|archive-date=27 January 2020|url-status=live}}</ref>
According to the [[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]]'s data, China became the world's third largest exporter of major arms in 2010–14, an increase of 143 percent from the period 2005–2009.<ref>{{cite web |title = The United States leads upward trend in arms exports, Asian and Gulf states arms imports up, says SIPRI |url = http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2015/at-march-2015 |website = sipri.org |date = 16 March 2015 |publisher = [[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]] (SIPRI) |access-date = 18 March 2015 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20160409121211/http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2015/at-march-2015 |archive-date = 9 April 2016 |url-status = live }}</ref> SIPRI also calculated that China surpassed Russia to become the world's second largest arms exporter by 2020.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2020/new-sipri-data-reveals-scale-chinese-arms-industry|title=New SIPRI data reveals scale of Chinese arms industry|date=27 January 2020|website=[[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]]|access-date=27 January 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200127055352/https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2020/new-sipri-data-reveals-scale-chinese-arms-industry|archive-date=27 January 2020|url-status=live}}</ref>
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China's share of global arms exports hence increased from 3 to 5 percent. China supplied major arms to 35 states in 2010–14. A significant percentage (just over 68 percent) of Chinese exports went to three countries: Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. China also exported major arms to 18 African states. Examples of China's increasing global presence as an arms supplier in 2010–14 included deals with Venezuela for armoured vehicles and transport and trainer aircraft, with Algeria for three frigates, with Indonesia for the supply of hundreds of anti-ship missiles and with Nigeria for the supply of several unmanned combat aerial vehicles.<ref name="auto"/>
China's share of global arms exports hence increased from 3 to 5 percent. China supplied major arms to 35 states in 2010–14. A significant percentage (just over 68 percent) of Chinese exports went to three countries: Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. China also exported major arms to 18 African states. Examples of China's increasing global presence as an arms supplier in 2010–14 included deals with Venezuela for armoured vehicles and transport and trainer aircraft, with Algeria for three frigates, with Indonesia for the supply of hundreds of anti-ship missiles and with Nigeria for the supply of several unmanned combat aerial vehicles.<ref name="auto"/>


Following rapid advances in its arms industry, China has become less dependent on arms imports, which decreased by 42 percent between 2005–2009 and 2010–14. Russia accounted for 61 percent of Chinese arms imports, followed by France with 16 percent and Ukraine with 13 per cent. Helicopters formed a major part of Russian and French deliveries, with the French designs produced under licence in China.<ref name="auto"/>
Following rapid advances in its arms industry, China has become less dependent on arms imports, which decreased by 42 percent between 2005–09 and 2010–14. Russia accounted for 61 percent of Chinese arms imports, followed by France with 16 percent and Ukraine with 13 per cent. Helicopters formed a major part of Russian and French deliveries, with the French designs produced under licence in China.<ref name="auto"/>


Over the years, China has struggled to design and produce effective engines for combat and transport vehicles. It continued to import large numbers of engines from Russia and Ukraine in 2010–14 for indigenously designed combat, advanced trainer and transport aircraft, and naval ships. It also produced British-, French- and German-designed engines for combat aircraft, naval ships and armoured vehicles, mostly as part of agreements that have been in place for decades.<ref name="auto">{{cite web |title=Trends in International Arms Transfer, 2014 |url=http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=495 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150319023856/http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=495 |archive-date=19 March 2015 |access-date=18 March 2015 |website=[[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]] |publisher= |ref=SIPRI Fact Sheet, March 2015}}</ref>
Over the years, China has struggled to design and produce effective engines for combat and transport vehicles. It continued to import large numbers of engines from Russia and Ukraine in 2010–14 for indigenously designed combat, advanced trainer and transport aircraft, and naval ships. It also produced British-, French- and German-designed engines for combat aircraft, naval ships and armoured vehicles, mostly as part of agreements that have been in place for decades.<ref name="auto">{{cite web |title=Trends in International Arms Transfer, 2014 |url=http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=495 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150319023856/http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=495 |archive-date=19 March 2015 |access-date=18 March 2015 |website=[[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]] |publisher= |ref=SIPRI Fact Sheet, March 2015}}</ref>


In August 2021, China tested a nuclear-capable [[Hypersonic flight|hypersonic missile]] that circled the globe before speeding towards its target.<ref>{{cite news |title=Biden airs hypersonic missile fears as probable ambassador labels China 'untrustworthy' |url=https://www.dw.com/en/biden-airs-hypersonic-missile-fears-as-probable-ambassador-labels-china-untrustworthy/a-59568428 |work=Deutsche Welle |date=20 October 2021 |access-date=24 October 2021 |archive-date=28 October 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211028041828/https://www.dw.com/en/biden-airs-hypersonic-missile-fears-as-probable-ambassador-labels-china-untrustworthy/a-59568428 |url-status=live }}</ref> The ''Financial Times'' reported that "the test showed that China had made astounding progress on hypersonic weapons and was far more advanced than U.S. officials realized."<ref>{{cite news |title=China successfully tested hypersonic weapon in August: report |url=https://www.space.com/china-hypersonic-weapon-test-august |work=[[Space.com]] |date=17 October 2021 |access-date=24 October 2021 |archive-date=24 October 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211024180017/https://www.space.com/china-hypersonic-weapon-test-august |url-status=live }}</ref> During the [[Exercise Zapad-81]] in 2021 with Russian forces, most of the gear were novel Chinese arms such as the [[Shaanxi KJ-500|KJ-500 airborne early warning and control aircraft]], [[Chengdu J-20|J-20]] and [[Shenyang J-16|J-16 fighters]], [[Xi'an Y-20|Y-20 transport planes]], and surveillance and combat drones.<ref>Bonny Lin, Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, ''et.al.'' China Power Project. (2023). "How Deep Are China-Russia Military Ties?". [https://chinapower.csis.org/china-russia-military-cooperation-arms-sales-exercises/ Center for Strategic and International Studies website] Retrieved 7 August 2023.</ref> Another joint forces exercise took place in August 2023 near Alaska.<ref>Michael R. Gordon and Nancy A. Youssef. (6 Aug 2023). "Russia and China Sent Large Naval Patrol Near Alaska". [https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-and-china-sent-large-naval-patrol-near-alaska-127de28b Wall Street Journal website] Retrieved 7 August 2023.</ref>
In August 2021, China tested a nuclear-capable [[Hypersonic flight|hypersonic missile]] that circled the globe before speeding towards its target.<ref>{{cite news |title=Biden airs hypersonic missile fears as probable ambassador labels China 'untrustworthy' |url=https://www.dw.com/en/biden-airs-hypersonic-missile-fears-as-probable-ambassador-labels-china-untrustworthy/a-59568428 |work=Deutsche Welle |date=20 October 2021 |access-date=24 October 2021 |archive-date=28 October 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211028041828/https://www.dw.com/en/biden-airs-hypersonic-missile-fears-as-probable-ambassador-labels-china-untrustworthy/a-59568428 |url-status=live }}</ref> The ''Financial Times'' reported that "the test showed that China had made astounding progress on hypersonic weapons and was far more advanced than U.S. officials realized."<ref>{{cite news |title=China successfully tested hypersonic weapon in August: report |url=https://www.space.com/china-hypersonic-weapon-test-august |work=[[Space.com]] |date=17 October 2021 |access-date=24 October 2021 |archive-date=24 October 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211024180017/https://www.space.com/china-hypersonic-weapon-test-august |url-status=live }}</ref> During the [[Zapad 2021]] joint strategic exercise, most of the gear comprised novel Chinese arms such as the [[Shaanxi KJ-500|KJ-500 airborne early warning and control aircraft]], [[Chengdu J-20|J-20]] and [[Shenyang J-16|J-16 fighters]], [[Xi'an Y-20|Y-20 transport planes]], and surveillance and combat drones.<ref>[[Bonny Lin]], Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, ''et.al.'' China Power Project. (2023). "How Deep Are China-Russia Military Ties?". [https://chinapower.csis.org/china-russia-military-cooperation-arms-sales-exercises/ Center for Strategic and International Studies website] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230807132132/https://chinapower.csis.org/china-russia-military-cooperation-arms-sales-exercises/ |date=7 August 2023 }} Retrieved 7 August 2023.</ref> Another joint forces exercise took place in August 2023 near Alaska.<ref>Michael R. Gordon and Nancy A. Youssef. (6 Aug 2023). "Russia and China Sent Large Naval Patrol Near Alaska". [https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-and-china-sent-large-naval-patrol-near-alaska-127de28b Wall Street Journal website] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230807132130/https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-and-china-sent-large-naval-patrol-near-alaska-127de28b |date=7 August 2023 }} Retrieved 7 August 2023.</ref>
 
On 24 September 2024, the PLARF performed its first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test over the Pacific Ocean since the early 1980s.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Davidson |first=Helen |date=2024-09-25 |title=China test launches intercontinental ballistic missile for first time in decades |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/sep/25/china-missile-test-icbm-pla-rocket-force |access-date=2024-09-25 |work=[[The Guardian]] |language=en-GB |issn=0261-3077}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-09-25 |title=China conducts rare public test launch of intercontinental ballistic missile |url=https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/china/china-icbm-test-ballistic-missile-launch-b2618502.html |access-date=2024-09-25 |website=[[The Independent]] |language=en |archive-date=25 September 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240925222921/https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/china/china-icbm-test-ballistic-missile-launch-b2618502.html |url-status=live }}</ref>


=== Cyberwarfare ===
=== Cyberwarfare ===
{{Main|Cyberwarfare by China}}
{{Main|Cyberwarfare and China}}


There is a belief in the Western military doctrines that the PLA have already begun engaging countries using cyber-warfare.<ref>{{cite news |last=Gorman |first=Siobhan |date=8 April 2009 |title=Electricity Grid in U.S. Penetrated By Spies |work=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123914805204099085 |url-status=live |access-date=1 April 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150108232759/http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123914805204099085 |archive-date=8 January 2015}}</ref> There has been a significant increase in the number of presumed Chinese military initiated cyber events from 1999 to the present day.<ref>{{citation |first = Bryan |last = Krekel |title = Capability of the People's Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation |publisher = [[Northrop Grumman]] |year = 2009 |url = http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2009/NorthropGrumman_PRC_Cyber_Paper_FINAL_Approved%20Report_16Oct2009.pdf |url-status = dead |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20110203052113/http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2009/NorthropGrumman_PRC_Cyber_Paper_FINAL_Approved%20Report_16Oct2009.pdf |archive-date = 3 February 2011 }}</ref>
There is a belief in the Western military doctrines that the PLA have already begun engaging countries using cyber-warfare.<ref>{{cite news |last=Gorman |first=Siobhan |date=8 April 2009 |title=Electricity Grid in U.S. Penetrated By Spies |work=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123914805204099085 |url-status=live |access-date=1 April 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150108232759/http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123914805204099085 |archive-date=8 January 2015}}</ref> There has been a significant increase in the number of presumed Chinese military initiated cyber events from 1999 to the present day.<ref>{{citation |first = Bryan |last = Krekel |title = Capability of the People's Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation |publisher = [[Northrop Grumman]] |year = 2009 |url = http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2009/NorthropGrumman_PRC_Cyber_Paper_FINAL_Approved%20Report_16Oct2009.pdf |url-status = dead |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20110203052113/http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2009/NorthropGrumman_PRC_Cyber_Paper_FINAL_Approved%20Report_16Oct2009.pdf |archive-date = 3 February 2011 }}</ref>
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Cyberwarfare has gained recognition as a valuable technique because it is an asymmetric technique that is a part of [[Chinese information operations and information warfare|information operations and information warfare]]. As is written by two PLAGF Colonels, [[Qiao Liang (writer)|Qiao Liang]] and [[Wang Xiangsui]] in the book ''[[Unrestricted Warfare]]'', "Methods that are not characterized by the use of the force of arms, nor by the use of military power, nor even by the presence of casualties and bloodshed, are just as likely to facilitate the successful realization of the war's goals, if not more so.<ref>{{citation |last1=Qiao |first1=Liang |last2=Wang |first2 = Xiangsui |title = Unrestricted Warfare |year=1999 |url = http://www.terrorism.com/documents/unrestricted.pdf |publisher = PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House via [[Foreign Broadcast Information Service]] |url-status=dead |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20000815214700/http://www.terrorism.com/documents/unrestricted.pdf |archive-date = 15 August 2000 }}</ref>
Cyberwarfare has gained recognition as a valuable technique because it is an asymmetric technique that is a part of [[Chinese information operations and information warfare|information operations and information warfare]]. As is written by two PLAGF Colonels, [[Qiao Liang (writer)|Qiao Liang]] and [[Wang Xiangsui]] in the book ''[[Unrestricted Warfare]]'', "Methods that are not characterized by the use of the force of arms, nor by the use of military power, nor even by the presence of casualties and bloodshed, are just as likely to facilitate the successful realization of the war's goals, if not more so.<ref>{{citation |last1=Qiao |first1=Liang |last2=Wang |first2 = Xiangsui |title = Unrestricted Warfare |year=1999 |url = http://www.terrorism.com/documents/unrestricted.pdf |publisher = PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House via [[Foreign Broadcast Information Service]] |url-status=dead |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20000815214700/http://www.terrorism.com/documents/unrestricted.pdf |archive-date = 15 August 2000 }}</ref>


While China has long been suspected of [[cyber spying]], on 24 May 2011 the PLA announced the existence of having 'cyber capabilities'.<ref>Beech, Hannah. [http://globalspin.blogs.time.com/2011/05/27/meet-chinas-newest-soldiers-an-online-blue-army/ "Meet China's Newest Soldiers: An Online Blue Army."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110527183833/http://globalspin.blogs.time.com/2011/05/27/meet-chinas-newest-soldiers-an-online-blue-army/ |date=27 May 2011 }} ''Time'', 27 May 2011.</ref>
While China has long been suspected of [[cyber spying]], on 24 May 2011 the PLA announced the existence of having 'cyber capabilities'.<ref>Beech, Hannah. [https://world.time.com/2011/05/27/meet-chinas-newest-soldiers-an-online-blue-army/ "Meet China's Newest Soldiers: An Online Blue Army."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240927020105/https://world.time.com/2011/05/27/meet-chinas-newest-soldiers-an-online-blue-army/ |date=27 September 2024 }} ''[[time (magazine)|Time]]'', 27 May 2011.</ref>


In February 2013, the media named "Comment Crew" as a hacker military faction for China's People's Liberation Army.<ref>{{cite news |url = https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/technology/chinas-army-is-seen-as-tied-to-hacking-against-us.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 |newspaper = The New York Times |first = David E. |last = Sanger |title = China's Army Is Seen as Tied to Hacking Against U.S |date = 18 February 2013 |access-date = 28 February 2017 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20170310124107/http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/technology/chinas-army-is-seen-as-tied-to-hacking-against-us.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 |archive-date = 10 March 2017 |url-status = live }}</ref> In May 2014, a Federal [[Grand Jury]] in the United States indicted five [[PLA Unit 61398|Unit 61398]] officers on criminal charges related to cyber attacks on private companies based in the United States after alleged investigations by the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]] who exposed their identities in collaboration with US intelligence agencies such as the CIA.<ref>[https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-cyber-espionage-against-us-corporations-and-labor "U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for Cyber Espionage . . . "] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151203185110/http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-cyber-espionage-against-us-corporations-and-labor |date=3 December 2015 }}, 19 May 2014, justice.gov</ref><ref>[https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/20/us/us-to-charge-chinese-workers-with-cyberspying.html "5 in China Army Face U.S. Charges of Cyberattacks"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170519141057/https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/20/us/us-to-charge-chinese-workers-with-cyberspying.html |date=19 May 2017 }}, 19 May 2014, NY Times</ref>
In February 2013, the media named "Comment Crew" as a hacker military faction for China's People's Liberation Army.<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/technology/chinas-army-is-seen-as-tied-to-hacking-against-us.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 |newspaper=[[The New York Times]] |first=David E. |last=Sanger |title=China's Army Is Seen as Tied to Hacking Against U.S |date=18 February 2013 |access-date=28 February 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170310124107/http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/technology/chinas-army-is-seen-as-tied-to-hacking-against-us.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 |archive-date=10 March 2017 |url-status=live}}</ref> In May 2014, a Federal [[Grand Jury]] in the United States indicted five [[PLA Unit 61398|Unit 61398]] officers on criminal charges related to cyber attacks on private companies based in the United States after alleged investigations by the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]] who exposed their identities in collaboration with US intelligence agencies such as the CIA.<ref>[https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-cyber-espionage-against-us-corporations-and-labor "U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for Cyber Espionage . . . "] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151203185110/http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-cyber-espionage-against-us-corporations-and-labor |date=3 December 2015 }}, 19 May 2014, justice.gov</ref><ref>[https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/20/us/us-to-charge-chinese-workers-with-cyberspying.html "5 in China Army Face U.S. Charges of Cyberattacks"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170519141057/https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/20/us/us-to-charge-chinese-workers-with-cyberspying.html |date=19 May 2017 }}, 19 May 2014, NY Times</ref>


In February 2020, the United States government indicted members of China's People's Liberation Army for the [[2017 Equifax data breach]], which involved hacking into Equifax and plundering sensitive data as part of a massive heist that also included stealing trade secrets, though the CCP denied these claims.<ref name="cbs china deny">{{cite web | url = https://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-denies-responsibility-in-equifax-breach-after-doj-charges-four-military-members/ | title = Data from Equifax credit hack could "end up on the black market," expert warns | date = February 11, 2020 | access-date = February 11, 2020 | work = [[CBS News]] | archive-date = 2 July 2020 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20200702012248/https://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-denies-responsibility-in-equifax-breach-after-doj-charges-four-military-members/ | url-status = live }}</ref><ref name="WSJ Indicted">{{cite web | url = https://www.wsj.com/articles/four-members-of-china-s-military-indicted-for-massive-equifax-breach-11581346824 | title = Four Members of China's Military Indicted Over Massive Equifax Breach | date = February 11, 2020 | access-date = April 28, 2020 | work = [[The Wall Street Journal]] | archive-date = 29 May 2020 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20200529205316/https://www.wsj.com/articles/four-members-of-china-s-military-indicted-for-massive-equifax-breach-11581346824 | url-status = live }}</ref>
In February 2020, the United States government indicted members of China's People's Liberation Army for the [[2017 Equifax data breach]], which involved hacking into Equifax and plundering sensitive data as part of a massive heist that also included stealing trade secrets, though the CCP denied these claims.<ref name="cbs china deny">{{cite news |url=https://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-denies-responsibility-in-equifax-breach-after-doj-charges-four-military-members/ |title=Data from Equifax credit hack could "end up on the black market," expert warns |date=February 11, 2020 |access-date=February 11, 2020 |work=[[CBS News]] |archive-date=2 July 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200702012248/https://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-denies-responsibility-in-equifax-breach-after-doj-charges-four-military-members/ |url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="WSJ Indicted">{{cite news |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/four-members-of-china-s-military-indicted-for-massive-equifax-breach-11581346824 |title=Four Members of China's Military Indicted Over Massive Equifax Breach |date=February 11, 2020 |access-date=April 28, 2020 |work=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |archive-date=29 May 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200529205316/https://www.wsj.com/articles/four-members-of-china-s-military-indicted-for-massive-equifax-breach-11581346824 |url-status=live}}</ref>


=== Nuclear capabilities ===
=== Nuclear capabilities ===
{{Main|China and weapons of mass destruction|People's Liberation Army Rocket Force}}
{{Main|Nuclear weapons of China}}


[[File:Medium and Intercontinental Range Ballistic Missiles.png|thumb|upright=1.35|The range of [[People's Liberation Army Rocket Force|the PLA Rocket Force's]] medium and intercontinental ballistic missiles (2006)]]
[[File:Medium and Intercontinental Range Ballistic Missiles.png|thumb|upright=1.35|The range of [[People's Liberation Army Rocket Force|the PLA Rocket Force's]] medium and intercontinental ballistic missiles (2006)]]


In 1955, China decided to proceed with a [[nuclear weapons]] program. The decision was made after the United States threatened the use of nuclear weapons against China should it take action against [[Quemoy]] and [[Matsu (islands)|Matsu]], coupled with the lack of interest of the Soviet Union for using its nuclear weapons in defense of China.{{citation needed|date=November 2022}}
The first of [[List of nuclear weapons tests of China|China's nuclear weapons tests]] took place in 1964, and its [[Test No. 6|first hydrogen bomb test]] occurred in 1967 at [[Lop Nur]]. Tests continued until 1996, when the country signed the [[Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty]] (CTBT), but did not ratify it.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Borger |first=Julian |author-link=Julian Borger |date=2020-04-16 |title=China may have conducted low-level nuclear test, US claims |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/16/china-may-have-conducted-low-level-nuclear-test-us-report-claims |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230529174223/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/16/china-may-have-conducted-low-level-nuclear-test-us-report-claims |archive-date=May 29, 2023 |access-date=2023-05-29 |work=[[The Guardian]] |language=en-GB |issn=0261-3077}}</ref>
 
After their first [[Project 596|nuclear test]] (China claims minimal Soviet assistance before 1960) on 16 October 1964, China was the first state to pledge [[no-first-use]] of nuclear weapons. On 1 July 1966, the Second Artillery Corps, as named by Premier Zhou Enlai, was formed. In 1967, China [[Chinese nuclear test No. 6|tested]] a fully functional [[hydrogen bomb]], only 32 months after China had made its first fission device. China thus produced the shortest fission-to-fusion development known in history.


China became a major international arms exporter during the 1980s. Beijing joined the Middle East arms control talks, which began in July 1991 to establish global guidelines for conventional arms transfers, and later announced that it would no longer participate because of the US decision to sell 150 [[F-16]]A/B aircraft to Taiwan on 2 September 1992.
The number of nuclear warheads in China's arsenal remains a state secret.<ref name=":9">{{Cite journal |last1=Kristensen |first1=Hans M. |author-link=Hans M. Kristensen |last2=Korda |first2=Matt |last3=Johns |first3=Eliana |last4=Knight |first4=Mackenzie |date=2024-01-02 |title=Chinese nuclear weapons, 2024 |journal=[[Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists]] |language=en |volume=80 |issue=1 |pages=49–72 |doi=10.1080/00963402.2023.2295206 |issn=0096-3402 |doi-access=free|bibcode=2024BuAtS..80a..49K }}</ref> There are varying estimates of the size of China's arsenal. The ''[[Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists]]'' and [[Federation of American Scientists]] estimated in 2024 that China has a stockpile of approximately 438 nuclear warheads,<ref name=":9" /><ref name=":32">{{Cite web |date=March 31, 2023 |title=Status of World Nuclear Forces |url=https://fas.org/initiative/status-world-nuclear-forces/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230529182756/https://fas.org/initiative/status-world-nuclear-forces/ |archive-date=May 29, 2023 |access-date=2023-05-29 |website=[[Federation of American Scientists]] |language=en-US}}</ref> while the [[United States Department of Defense]] put the estimate at more than 500 operational nuclear warheads,<ref name=":8">{{Cite news |last=Feng |first=Emily |date=October 19, 2023 |title=New Pentagon report claims China now has over 500 operational nuclear warheads |url=https://www.npr.org/2023/10/19/1207156597/new-pentagon-report-claims-china-now-has-over-500-operational-nuclear-warheads |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231020031121/https://www.npr.org/2023/10/19/1207156597/new-pentagon-report-claims-china-now-has-over-500-operational-nuclear-warheads |archive-date=October 20, 2023 |access-date=October 19, 2023 |work=[[NPR]]}}</ref> making it the [[List of countries with nuclear weapons#Estimated worldwide nuclear stockpiles|third-largest]] in the world.


It joined the [[International Atomic Energy Agency]] (IAEA) in 1984 and pledged to abstain from further atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons in 1986. China acceded to the nuclear [[Non-Proliferation Treaty]] (NPT) in 1992 and supported its indefinite and unconditional extension in 1995. [[List of nuclear weapons tests of China|Nuclear weapons tests by China]] ceased in 1996, when it signed the [[Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty]] and agreed to seek an international ban on the production of fissile nuclear weapons material.
China's policy has traditionally been one of [[no first use]] while maintaining a deterrent retaliatory force targeted for [[countervalue]] targets.<ref name=":22">{{Cite journal |last1=Kristensen |first1=Hans M. |author-link=Hans M. Kristensen |last2=Korda |first2=Matt |last3=Reynolds |first3=Eliana |date=2023-03-04 |title=Chinese nuclear weapons, 2023 |journal=[[Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists]] |language=en |volume=79 |issue=2 |pages=108–133 |bibcode=2023BuAtS..79b.108K |doi=10.1080/00963402.2023.2178713 |issn=0096-3402 |doi-access=free}}</ref> According to a 2023 study by the [[National Defense University (Washington, D.C.)|National Defense University]], China's nuclear doctrine has historically leaned toward maintaining a secure [[Second strike|second-strike]] capability.<ref>{{Cite web |last1=Logan |first1=David C |last2=Saunders |first2=Philip C. |date=July 26, 2023 |title=Discerning the Drivers of China's Nuclear Force Development: Models, Indicators, and Data |url=https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/3471053/discerning-the-drivers-of-chinas-nuclear-force-development-models-indicators-an/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230930001818/https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/3471053/discerning-the-drivers-of-chinas-nuclear-force-development-models-indicators-an/ |archive-date=September 30, 2023 |access-date=2023-09-16 |website=[[National Defense University Press]] |language=en-US}}</ref>
 
In 1996, China committed{{Clarify|date=November 2022}} to assisting unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.{{citation needed|date=November 2022}} China attended the May 1997 meeting of the NPT Exporters (Zangger) Committee as an observer and became a full member in October 1997. The [[Zangger Committee]] is a group that meets to list items that should be subject to IAEA inspections if exported by countries, which have, as China has signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In September 1997, China issued detailed nuclear export control regulations.
 
China began implementing regulations{{Which|date=November 2022}} establishing controls over nuclear-related [[dual-use]] items in 1998.{{citation needed|date=November 2022}} China also has decided not to engage in new nuclear cooperation with [[Iran]] (even under safeguards) and will complete existing cooperation, which is not of proliferation concern, within a relatively short period. Based on significant, tangible progress with China on nuclear nonproliferation, President [[Bill Clinton|Clinton]] in 1998 took steps to bring into force the 1985 US-China Agreement on Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation.{{citation needed|date=November 2022}}
 
Beijing has deployed a modest ballistic missile force, including land and sea-based intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles ([[ICBM]]s). It was estimated in 2007 that China has about 100–160 liquid-fuelled ICBMs capable of striking the United States with approximately 100–150 [[IRBM]]s able to strike Russia or Eastern Europe, as well as several hundred tactical [[SRBM]]s with ranges between 300 and 600&nbsp;km.<ref name="2007annualreport p19">{{Cite web |date=2007 |title=Military Power of the People's Republic of China |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA468606.pdf |access-date=2022-11-13 |website=[[U.S. Department of Defense]] |pages=19–20 |language=en}}</ref> Currently, the Chinese nuclear stockpile is estimated to be between 50 and 75 land and sea based ICBMs.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_China_Report_FINAL.pdf |title=Annual Report to Congress - Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China |access-date=23 June 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150113120816/http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_china_report_final.pdf |archive-date=13 January 2015}}</ref>
 
China's nuclear program has historically followed a doctrine of [[minimal deterrence]], which involves having the minimum force needed to deter an aggressor from launching a first strike. The current efforts of China appear to be aimed at maintaining a survivable nuclear force by, for example, using solid-fuelled ICBMs in silos rather than liquid-fuelled missiles. China's 2006 published deterrence policy states that they will "uphold the principles of counterattack in self-defense and limited development of nuclear weapons", but "has never entered, and will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any country". It goes on to describe that China will never undertake a first strike, or use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state or zone.<ref name="2007annualreport p19" />
 
In 2007, however, the United States' Department of Defense suggested that the Chinese position may be ambiguous, and nuclear weapons may be used both to deter conventional strikes/invasions on the Chinese mainland or as an international political tool – limiting the extent to which other nations can coerce China politically, an inherent, often inadvertent phenomenon in international relations as regards any state with nuclear capabilities.<ref name="2007annualreport p19" />


=== Space ===
=== Space ===
{{See also|ASAT program of China}}
{{See also|ASAT program of China}}
Having witnessed the crucial role of space to United States military success in the [[Gulf War]], China continues to view space as a critical domain in both conflict and international [[strategic competition]].<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal |last=Cheng |first=Dean |date=2012 |title=China's military role in space |url=https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-06_Issue-1/Cheng.pdf |journal=[[Strategic Studies Quarterly]] |volume=6 |issue=1 |pages=55–77 |via=[[Air University (United States Air Force)|Air University]]}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=July 2019 |title=China's National Defense in the New Era |url=https://www.andrewerickson.com/2019/07/full-text-of-defense-white-paper-chinas-national-defense-in-the-new-era-english-chinese-versions/ |website=Andrew S. Erickson: China analysis from original sources}}</ref> The PLA operates a various satellite constellations performing [[Reconnaissance satellite|reconnaissance]], [[Satellite navigation|navigation]], [[Communications satellite|communication]], and [[Anti-satellite weapon|counterspace]] functions.<ref name="Clark">{{Cite web |last=Clark |first=Stephen |date=29 January 2021 |title=China launches military spy satellite trio into orbit |url=https://spaceflightnow.com/2021/01/29/china-launches-military-spy-satellite-trio-into-orbit/#:~:text=China%20uses%20the%20Yaogan%20name,are%20the%20Yaogan%2031%20satellites. |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221023185527/https://spaceflightnow.com/2021/01/29/china-launches-military-spy-satellite-trio-into-orbit/ |archive-date=23 October 2022 |website=Spaceflight Now}}</ref><ref name="op_china">{{cite news |date=27 December 2011 |title=China GPS rival Beidou starts offering navigation data |publisher=BBC |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-16337648 |url-status=live |access-date=20 June 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120203001904/http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-16337648 |archive-date=3 February 2012}}</ref><ref name=":9">{{Cite news |last=Bruce |first=Leo |date=26 November 2021 |title=China successfully launches tactical military communications satellite |work=[[NASA]] Spaceflight |url=https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2021/11/china-launches-military-satellite/}}</ref><ref name=":8">{{Cite report |url=https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Dickinson04.20.2021.pdf |title=United States Space Command Presentation to the Senate Armed Services Committee U.S. Senate |last=Dickinson |first=General James H. |date=21 April 2021}}</ref>
Having witnessed the crucial role of space to United States military success in the [[Gulf War]], China continues to view space as a critical domain in both conflict and international [[strategic competition]].<ref name="Cheng-2012">{{Cite journal |last=Cheng |first=Dean |date=2012 |title=China's military role in space |url=https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-06_Issue-1/Cheng.pdf |journal=[[Strategic Studies Quarterly]] |volume=6 |issue=1 |pages=55–77 |via=[[Air University (United States Air Force)|Air University]] |access-date=19 November 2022 |archive-date=19 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221119013057/https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-06_Issue-1/Cheng.pdf |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=July 2019 |title=China's National Defense in the New Era |url=https://www.andrewerickson.com/2019/07/full-text-of-defense-white-paper-chinas-national-defense-in-the-new-era-english-chinese-versions/ |website=Andrew S. Erickson: China analysis from original sources |access-date=19 November 2022 |archive-date=19 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221119013056/https://www.andrewerickson.com/2019/07/full-text-of-defense-white-paper-chinas-national-defense-in-the-new-era-english-chinese-versions/ |url-status=live }}</ref> The PLA operates a various satellite constellations performing [[Reconnaissance satellite|reconnaissance]], [[Satellite navigation|navigation]], [[Communications satellite|communication]], and [[Anti-satellite weapon|counterspace]] functions.<ref name="Clark">{{Cite web |last=Clark |first=Stephen |date=29 January 2021 |title=China launches military spy satellite trio into orbit |url=https://spaceflightnow.com/2021/01/29/china-launches-military-spy-satellite-trio-into-orbit/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221023185527/https://spaceflightnow.com/2021/01/29/china-launches-military-spy-satellite-trio-into-orbit/ |archive-date=23 October 2022 |website=Spaceflight Now}}</ref><ref name="op_china">{{cite news |date=27 December 2011 |title=China GPS rival Beidou starts offering navigation data |publisher=BBC |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-16337648 |url-status=live |access-date=20 June 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120203001904/http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-16337648 |archive-date=3 February 2012}}</ref><ref name="Bruce-2021">{{Cite news |last=Bruce |first=Leo |date=26 November 2021 |title=China successfully launches tactical military communications satellite |work=[[NASA]] Spaceflight |url=https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2021/11/china-launches-military-satellite/ |access-date=19 November 2022 |archive-date=19 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221119013109/https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2021/11/china-launches-military-satellite/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Dickinson-2021a">{{Cite report |url=https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Dickinson04.20.2021.pdf |title=United States Space Command Presentation to the Senate Armed Services Committee U.S. Senate |last=Dickinson |first=General James H. |date=21 April 2021 |access-date=19 November 2022 |archive-date=26 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220826005031/https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Dickinson04.20.2021.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> Planners at PLA's National Defense University project China's space actions as retaliatory or preventative, following conditions like an attack on a Chinese satellite, an attack on China, or the interruption of a PLA amphibious landing.<ref name=":Li">{{Cite book |last=Li |first=Xiaobing |title=China under Xi Jinping: A New Assessment |publisher=[[Leiden University Press]] |year=2024 |isbn=9789087284411 |editor-last=Fang |editor-first=Qiang |pages=266 |chapter=Beijing's Military Power and East Asian-Pacific Hot Spots |jstor=jj.15136086 |editor-last2=Li |editor-first2=Xiaobing}}</ref> According to this approach, PLA planners assume that the country must have the capacity for retaliation and second-strike capability against a powerful opponent.<ref name=":Li" /> PLA planners envision a limited space war and therefore seek to identify weak but critical nodes in other space systems.<ref name=":Li" />
 
Significant components of the PLA's space-based reconnaissance include Jianbing (vanguard) satellites with [[Front organization|cover names]] [[Yaogan]] ({{Zh|c=遥感|l=remote sensing|labels=no}}) and [[Gaofen]] ({{Zh|s=高分|labels=no|l=high resolution}}).<ref name="Clark"/><ref>{{Cite tweet|number=1379969927378051075|user=planet4589|title=The Jianbing-7 03 radar satellite, cover name Yaogan 18, reentered at 0035 UTC Apr 7 over the South Atlantic.  It was launched in Oct 2013, operated until Feb 2019, and had its orbit lowered from Apr-Jul 2020; it underwent uncontrolled decay since 2020 Jul 7.|author=Jonathan McDowell|date=7 April 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220703072008/https://twitter.com/planet4589/status/1379969927378051075|archive-date=3 July 2022|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Jones |first=Andrew |date=22 November 2021 |title=China launches new Gaofen-11 high resolution spy satellite to match U.S. capabilities |work=[[SpaceNews]] |url=https://spacenews.com/china-launches-new-gaofen-11-high-resolution-spy-satellite-to-match-u-s-capabilities/}}</ref> These satellites collect [[Electro-optical sensor|electro-optical]] (EO) imagery to collect a literal representation of a [[Targeting (warfare)|target]], [[Synthetic-aperture radar|synthetic aperture radar]] (SAR) imagery to penetrate the cloudy climates of [[South China|southern China]],<ref name=":12">{{Cite web |date=12 November 2007 |title=JianBing 5 (YaoGan WeiXing 1/3) Synthetic Aperture Radar |url=http://www.sinodefence.com/strategic/spacecraft/jianbing5.asp |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080421185528/http://www.sinodefence.com/strategic/spacecraft/jianbing5.asp |archive-date=21 April 2008 |access-date=18 May 2022 |website=Sino Defense}}</ref> and [[electronic intelligence]] (ELINT) to provide targeting intelligence on adversarial ships.<ref>{{Cite web |date=20 September 2016 |title=The Chinese Maritime Surveillance System |url=https://satelliteobservation.net/2016/09/20/the-chinese-maritime-surveillance-system/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220317214541/https://satelliteobservation.net/2016/09/20/the-chinese-maritime-surveillance-system/ |archive-date=17 March 2022 |website=SatelliteObservation.net}}</ref><ref name=":72">{{Cite journal |last=Blizzard |first=Timothy J. |year=2016 |title=The PLA, A2/AD and the ADF: Lessons for Future Maritime Strategy |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/26465599 |journal=Security Challenges |volume=12 |issue=3 |pages=69–70 |jstor=26465599 |via=JSTOR}}</ref> The PLA also leverages a restricted, high-performance service of the country's BeiDou [[Positioning system|positioning, navigation, and timing]] (PNT) satellites for its forces and [[Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance|intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance]] (ISR) platforms.<ref>{{cite web |year=2012 |title=Precise orbit determination of Beidou Satellites with precise positioning |url=http://earth.scichina.com:8080/sciDe/EN/abstract/abstract507876.shtml |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130617060128/http://earth.scichina.com:8080/sciDe/EN/abstract/abstract507876.shtml |archive-date=17 June 2013 |access-date=26 June 2013 |work=Science China}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Dotson |first=John |date=15 July 2020 |title=The Beidou Satellite Network and the "Space Silk Road" in Eurasia |url=https://jamestown.org/program/the-beidou-satellite-network-and-the-space-silk-road-in-eurasia/ |access-date=2020-07-16 |newspaper=Jamestown |language=en-US}}</ref> For secure communications, the PLA uses the Zhongxing and Fenghuo series of satellites which enable secure data and voice transmission over [[C band (IEEE)|C-band]], [[Ku band|Ku-band]], and [[Ultra high frequency|UHF]].<ref name=":9" /> PLA deployment of anti-satellite and counterspace satellites including those of the [[Shijian]] and [[Shiyan]] series have also brought significant concern from western nations.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Smith |first=Marcia |date=19 August 2013 |title=Surprise Chinese Satellite Maneuvers Mystify Western Experts |work=SpacePolicyOnline |url=https://spacepolicyonline.com/news/surprise-chinese-satelllite-maneuvers-mystify-western-experts/}}</ref><ref name=":82">{{Cite report |url=https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Dickinson04.20.2021.pdf |title=United States Space Command Presentation to the Senate Armed Services Committee U.S. Senate |last=Dickinson |first=General James H. |date=21 April 2021}}</ref><ref name=":222">{{Cite news |last=Jones |first=Andrew |date=27 January 2022 |title=China's Shijian-21 towed dead satellite to a high graveyard orbit |work=[[SpaceNews]] |url=https://spacenews.com/chinas-shijian-21-spacecraft-docked-with-and-towed-a-dead-satellite/}}</ref>
 
The PLA also plays a significant role in the [[Chinese space program]].<ref name=":1" /> To date, all the participants have been selected from members of the PLA Air Force.<ref name=":1" /> China became the third country in the world to have sent a man into space by its own means with the flight of [[Yang Liwei]] aboard the [[Shenzhou 5]] spacecraft on 15 October 2003,<ref>{{Cite news |last=Yardley |first=Jim |date=15 October 2003 |title=China Sends a Man Into Orbit, Entering the U.S.-Russian Club |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/15/world/china-sends-a-man-into-orbit-entering-the-us-russian-club.html}}</ref> the flight of [[Fei Junlong]] and [[Nie Haisheng]] aboard [[Shenzhou 6]] on 12 October 2005,<ref>{{Cite news |last=Mali |first=Tariq |date=18 October 2005 |title=Shenzhou 6 Taikonauts Achieve Firsts for China |work=[[SpaceNews]] |url=https://spacenews.com/shenzhou-6-taikonauts-achieve-firsts-china/}}</ref> and [[Zhai Zhigang]], [[Liu Boming (astronaut)|Liu Boming]], and [[Jing Haipeng]] aboard [[Shenzhou 7]] on 25 September 2008.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Jones |first=Andrew |date=7 November 2021 |title=China's Shenzhou 13 crew takes its first spacewalk, the country's 1st by a female astronaut |work=[[Space.com]] |url=https://www.space.com/china-shenzhou-13-first-female-spacewalk}}</ref>


The PLA started the development of an anti-ballistic and anti-satellite system in the 1960s, code named Project 640, including ground-based lasers and anti-satellite missiles.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Stokes |first=Mark A. |url=https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1148&context=monographs |title=China's Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States |date=1999 |publisher=DIANE Publishing |isbn=978-1-4289-1197-0 |language=en}}</ref> On 11 January 2007, China conducted a successful [[2007 Chinese anti-satellite missile test|test]] of an [[anti-satellite missile]], with an SC-19 class KKV.<ref name="channelnewsasia.com">[http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/253580/1/.html China plays down fears after satellite shot down] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110929015038/http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/253580/1/.html |date=29 September 2011 }}, [[Agence France-Presse|AFP]] via [[MediaCorp Channel NewsAsia|Channelnewsasia]], 20 January 2007</ref>
Significant components of the PLA's space-based reconnaissance include Jianbing (vanguard) satellites with cover names [[Yaogan]] ({{Zh|c=遥感|l=remote sensing|labels=no}}) and [[Gaofen]] ({{Zh|s=高分|labels=no|l=high resolution}}).<ref name="Clark"/><ref>{{Cite news |last=Jones |first=Andrew |date=22 November 2021 |title=China launches new Gaofen-11 high resolution spy satellite to match U.S. capabilities |work=[[SpaceNews]] |url=https://spacenews.com/china-launches-new-gaofen-11-high-resolution-spy-satellite-to-match-u-s-capabilities/ |access-date=19 November 2022 |archive-date=11 February 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240211032728/https://spacenews.com/china-launches-new-gaofen-11-high-resolution-spy-satellite-to-match-u-s-capabilities/ |url-status=live }}</ref> These satellites collect [[Electro-optical sensor|electro-optical]] (EO) imagery to collect a literal representation of a [[Targeting (warfare)|target]], [[Synthetic-aperture radar|synthetic aperture radar]] (SAR) imagery to penetrate the cloudy climates of [[South China|southern China]],<ref name="Sino Defense-2007">{{Cite web |date=12 November 2007 |title=JianBing 5 (YaoGan WeiXing 1/3) Synthetic Aperture Radar |url=http://www.sinodefence.com/strategic/spacecraft/jianbing5.asp |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080421185528/http://www.sinodefence.com/strategic/spacecraft/jianbing5.asp |archive-date=21 April 2008 |access-date=18 May 2022 |website=Sino Defense}}</ref> and [[electronic intelligence]] (ELINT) to provide targeting intelligence on adversarial ships.<ref>{{Cite web |date=20 September 2016 |title=The Chinese Maritime Surveillance System |url=https://satelliteobservation.net/2016/09/20/the-chinese-maritime-surveillance-system/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220317214541/https://satelliteobservation.net/2016/09/20/the-chinese-maritime-surveillance-system/ |archive-date=17 March 2022 |website=SatelliteObservation.net}}</ref><ref name="Blizzard-2016">{{Cite journal |last=Blizzard |first=Timothy J. |year=2016 |title=The PLA, A2/AD and the ADF: Lessons for Future Maritime Strategy |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/26465599 |journal=Security Challenges |volume=12 |issue=3 |pages=69–70 |jstor=26465599 |access-date=19 November 2022 |archive-date=19 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221119013105/https://www.jstor.org/stable/26465599 |url-status=live }}</ref> The PLA also leverages a restricted, high-performance service of the country's BeiDou [[Positioning system|positioning, navigation, and timing]] (PNT) satellites for its forces and [[Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance|intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance]] (ISR) platforms.<ref>{{cite web |year=2012 |title=Precise orbit determination of Beidou Satellites with precise positioning |url=http://earth.scichina.com:8080/sciDe/EN/abstract/abstract507876.shtml |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130617060128/http://earth.scichina.com:8080/sciDe/EN/abstract/abstract507876.shtml |archive-date=17 June 2013 |access-date=26 June 2013 |work=Science China}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Dotson |first=John |date=15 July 2020 |title=The Beidou Satellite Network and the 'Space Silk Road' in Eurasia |url=https://jamestown.org/program/the-beidou-satellite-network-and-the-space-silk-road-in-eurasia/ |access-date=2020-07-16 |newspaper=Jamestown |language=en-US |archive-date=16 July 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200716094445/http://jamestown.org/program/the-beidou-satellite-network-and-the-space-silk-road-in-eurasia/ |url-status=live }}</ref> For secure communications, the PLA uses the Zhongxing and Fenghuo series of satellites which enable secure data and voice transmission over [[C band (IEEE)|C-band]], [[Ku band|Ku-band]], and [[Ultra high frequency|UHF]].<ref name="Bruce-2021" /> PLA deployment of anti-satellite and counterspace satellites including those of the [[Shijian]] and [[Shiyan]] series have also brought significant concern from western nations.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Smith |first=Marcia |date=19 August 2013 |title=Surprise Chinese Satellite Maneuvers Mystify Western Experts |work=SpacePolicyOnline |url=https://spacepolicyonline.com/news/surprise-chinese-satelllite-maneuvers-mystify-western-experts/ |access-date=19 November 2022 |archive-date=28 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221128213524/https://spacepolicyonline.com/news/surprise-chinese-satelllite-maneuvers-mystify-western-experts/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Dickinson-2021a"/><ref name="Jones-2022">{{Cite news |last=Jones |first=Andrew |date=27 January 2022 |title=China's Shijian-21 towed dead satellite to a high graveyard orbit |work=[[SpaceNews]] |url=https://spacenews.com/chinas-shijian-21-spacecraft-docked-with-and-towed-a-dead-satellite/ |access-date=19 November 2022 |archive-date=3 February 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230203142431/https://spacenews.com/chinas-shijian-21-spacecraft-docked-with-and-towed-a-dead-satellite/ |url-status=live }}</ref>


The PLA has tested two types of hypersonic space vehicles, the Shenglong Spaceplane and a new one built by [[Chengdu Aircraft Corporation]]. Only a few pictures have appeared since it was revealed in late 2007. Earlier, images of the [[High-enthalpy Shock Waves Laboratory]] [[wind tunnel]] of the [[Chinese Academy of Sciences|CAS]] [[Key Laboratory of high-temperature gas dynamics]] (LHD) were published in the Chinese media. Tests with speeds up to Mach 20 were reached around 2001.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://lhd.imech.cas.cn/kyzb/201307/t20130723_116736.html |title=氢氧爆轰驱动激波高焓风洞 |publisher=中国科学院高温气体动力学重点实验室 |date=17 March 2005 |access-date=16 April 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304002515/http://lhd.imech.cas.cn/kyzb/201307/t20130723_116736.html |archive-date=4 March 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="strategycenter.net">{{cite web
The PLA also plays a significant role in the [[Chinese space program]].<ref name="Cheng-2012" /> To date, all the participants have been selected from members of the PLA Air Force.<ref name="Cheng-2012" /> China became the third country in the world to have sent a man into space by its own means with the flight of [[Yang Liwei]] aboard the [[Shenzhou 5]] spacecraft on 15 October 2003,<ref>{{Cite news |last=Yardley |first=Jim |date=15 October 2003 |title=China Sends a Man Into Orbit, Entering the U.S.–Russian Club |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/15/world/china-sends-a-man-into-orbit-entering-the-us-russian-club.html |access-date=19 November 2022 |archive-date=19 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221119013057/https://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/15/world/china-sends-a-man-into-orbit-entering-the-us-russian-club.html |url-status=live }}</ref> the flight of [[Fei Junlong]] and [[Nie Haisheng]] aboard [[Shenzhou 6]] on 12 October 2005,<ref>{{Cite news |last=Mali |first=Tariq |date=18 October 2005 |title=Shenzhou 6 Taikonauts Achieve Firsts for China |work=[[SpaceNews]] |url=https://spacenews.com/shenzhou-6-taikonauts-achieve-firsts-china/ |access-date=19 November 2022 |archive-date=11 February 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240211032741/https://spacenews.com/shenzhou-6-taikonauts-achieve-firsts-china/ |url-status=live }}</ref> and [[Zhai Zhigang]], [[Liu Boming (taikonaut)|Liu Boming]], and [[Jing Haipeng]] aboard [[Shenzhou 7]] on 25 September 2008.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Jones |first=Andrew |date=7 November 2021 |title=China's Shenzhou 13 crew takes its first spacewalk, the country's 1st by a female astronaut |work=[[Space.com]] |url=https://www.space.com/china-shenzhou-13-first-female-spacewalk |access-date=19 November 2022 |archive-date=7 November 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211107191224/https://www.space.com/china-shenzhou-13-first-female-spacewalk |url-status=live }}</ref>
|url         = http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.247/pub_detail.asp
|title      = PLA and U.S. Arms Racing in the Western Pacific
|access-date  = 20 June 2012
|last        = Fisher, Jr.
|first      = Richard
|publisher  = International Assessment and Strategy Center
|date       = 29 June 2011
|quote      = It is also possible that during this decade the PLA Navy could deploy initial railgun and laser weapons. It is known that the PLA has invested heavily in both technologies.
|url-status    = dead
|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20140131161229/http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.247/pub_detail.asp
|archive-date = 31 January 2014
|df          = dmy-all
}}</ref>


== Budget and expenditure ==
The PLA started the development of an anti-ballistic and anti-satellite system in the 1960s, code named Project 640, including ground-based lasers and anti-satellite missiles.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Stokes |first=Mark A. |url=https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1148&context=monographs |title=China's Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States |date=1999 |publisher=Diane Publishing |isbn=978-1-4289-1197-0 |language=en |access-date=19 November 2022 |archive-date=12 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221112034405/https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1148&context=monographs |url-status=live }}</ref> On 11 January 2007, China conducted a successful [[2007 Chinese anti-satellite missile test|test]] of an [[anti-satellite missile]], with an SC-19 class KKV.<ref name="channelnewsasia.com">[http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/253580/1/.html China plays down fears after satellite shot down] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110929015038/http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/253580/1/.html |date=29 September 2011 }}, [[Agence France-Presse|AFP]] via [[MediaCorp Channel NewsAsia|Channelnewsasia]], 20 January 2007</ref>
{{Main|Military budget of the People's Republic of China}}
{| class="wikitable floatright"
|+ Official budget
! Publication<br/>date
! Value<br/>(billions of {{USD}})
|-
| March 2000 || 14.6{{cn|date=December 2022}}
|-
| March 2001 || 17.0{{cn|date=December 2022}}
|-
| March 2002 || 20.0{{cn|date=December 2022}}
|-
| March 2003 || 22.0{{cn|date=December 2022}}
|-
| March 2004 || 24.6{{cn|date=December 2022}}
|-
| March 2005 || 29.9{{cn|date=December 2022}}
|-
| March 2006 || 35.0{{cn|date=December 2022}}
|-
| March 2007 || 44.9{{cn|date=December 2022}}
|-
| March 2008 || 58.8<ref>{{Cite news|url = https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/04/world/asia/04iht-military.2.10691808.html|title = China increases military spending|newspaper = The New York Times|date = 4 March 2008|last1 = Lague|first1 = David|access-date = 10 February 2020|archive-date = 26 November 2020|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20201126013813/https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/04/world/asia/04iht-military.2.10691808.html|url-status = live}}</ref>
|-
| March 2009 || 70.0{{cn|date=December 2022}}
|-
| March 2010 || 76.5<ref name="military-spending">{{cite web|url = https://chinapower.csis.org/military-spending/|title = What does China really spend on its military?|date = 28 December 2015|access-date = 15 August 2018|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20180816061738/https://chinapower.csis.org/military-spending/|archive-date = 16 August 2018|url-status = live}}</ref>
|-
| March 2011 || 90.2<ref name="military-spending"/>
|-
| March 2012 || 103.1<ref name="military-spending"/>
|-
| March 2013 || 116.2<ref name="military-spending"/>
|-
| March 2014 || 131.2<ref name="military-spending"/>
|-
| March 2015 || 142.4<ref name="military-spending"/>
|-
| March 2016 || 143.7<ref name="military-spending"/>
|-
| March 2017 || 151.4<ref name="military-spending"/>
|-
| March 2018 || 165.5<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/china-defence-spending-increase-190304053554047.html | title=China says defence spending increase to be 'appropriate' &#124; News &#124; al Jazeera | access-date=13 May 2019 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190513053946/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/china-defence-spending-increase-190304053554047.html | archive-date=13 May 2019 | url-status=live }}</ref>
|-
| March 2019 || 177.6<ref>{{cite web | url=https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/china-sets-date-for-two-sessions-in-latest-move-toward-post-covid-normal/ | title=China Sets Date for 'Two Sessions' in Latest Move Toward Post-COVID Normal | access-date=6 May 2020 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200505200816/https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/china-sets-date-for-two-sessions-in-latest-move-toward-post-covid-normal/ | archive-date=5 May 2020 | url-status=live }}</ref>
|-
| May 2020 || 183.5<ref>{{cite web|url = https://chinapower.csis.org/military-spending/#:~:text=In%20May%202020%2C%20China%20announced,1.189%20trillion%20(%24172.1%20billion).&text=This%20follows%20a%20recent%20trend,spending%20fall%20to%20single%20digits.|title = What Does China Really Spend on its Military?|date = 28 December 2015|access-date = 15 August 2018|archive-date = 16 August 2018|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20180816061738/https://chinapower.csis.org/military-spending/#:~:text=In%20May%202020%2C%20China%20announced,1.189%20trillion%20(%24172.1%20billion).&text=This%20follows%20a%20recent%20trend,spending%20fall%20to%20single%20digits.|url-status = live}}</ref>
|-
| March 2021 || 209.4<ref name="janes_budget_2021">{{cite web |last1=Grevatt |first1=Jon |last2=Andrew |first2=MacDonald |title=China announces 6.8% increase in 2021 defence budget |url=https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/china-announces-68-increase-in-2021-defence-budget-0503 |website=Janes |date=5 March 2021 |access-date=28 April 2021 |archive-date=28 April 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210428181241/https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/china-announces-68-increase-in-2021-defence-budget-0503 |url-status=live }}</ref>
|-
| March 2022 || 229.4<ref name="budget_2022">{{cite web |author=Yew Lun Tian |title=China plans 7.1% defence spending rise this year, outpacing GDP target |url=https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/china-defence-spending-rise-outpace-gdp-target-this-year-2022-03-05/ |website=Reuters |date=5 March 2022 |access-date=5 March 2022 |archive-date=5 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220305040743/https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/china-defence-spending-rise-outpace-gdp-target-this-year-2022-03-05/ |url-status=live }}</ref>
|}
Military spending for the People's Liberation Army has grown about 10 percent annually over the last 15 years.<ref name="2007annualreport p25">2007 Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China. p. 25.</ref> The [[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]] (SIPRI) estimated China's military expenditure for 2013 to US$188.5bn.<ref>{{cite web |title=SIPRI Military Expenditure Database |url=http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160513023650/http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database |archive-date=13 May 2016 |access-date=18 March 2015 |website=[[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]] |publisher=}}</ref> China's military budget for 2014 according to [[Janes Information Services]], a defense industry consulting and analysis company, will be US$148bn,<ref>{{cite news |last=Ramzy |first=Austin |date=4 February 2014 |title=Middle East, Russia and China fuel 2014 global defense spending surge: report |work=[[The Washington Times]] |url=http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/feb/4/middle-east-russia-and-china-fuel-2014-global-defe/ |url-status=live |access-date=24 February 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140224004822/http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/feb/4/middle-east-russia-and-china-fuel-2014-global-defe/ |archive-date=24 February 2014}}</ref> which is the [[List of countries by military expenditures|second largest]] in the world. The [[United States military budget]] for 2014 in comparison, is US$574.9bn,<ref>{{cite news |last=Lawrence |first=Dune |date=3 February 2014 |title=China to Ramp Up Military Spending |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/03/china-to-ramp-up-military-spending/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=1 |url-status=live |access-date=24 February 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140312020455/http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/03/china-to-ramp-up-military-spending/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=1 |archive-date=12 March 2014}}</ref> which is down from a high of US$664.3bn in 2012.


According to SIPRI, China became the world's third-largest exporter of major arms in 2010–2014, an increase of 143 per cent from the period 2005–2009. China supplied major arms to 35 states in 2010–2014. A significant percentage (just over 68 per cent) of Chinese exports went to three countries: Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. China also exported major arms to 18 African states. Examples of China's increasing global presence as an arms supplier in 2010–2014 included deals with Venezuela for armored vehicles and transport and trainer aircraft, with Algeria for three frigates, with Indonesia for the supply of hundreds of anti-ship missiles and with Nigeria for the supply of several unmanned combat aerial vehicles. Following rapid advances in its domestic arms industry, China has become less dependent on arms imports, which decreased by 42 per cent between 2005–2009 and 2010–2014.<ref name="auto" />
The PLA has tested two types of hypersonic space vehicles, the Shenglong Spaceplane and a new one built by [[Chengdu Aircraft Corporation]]. Only a few pictures have appeared since it was revealed in late 2007. Earlier, images of the High-enthalpy Shock Waves Laboratory [[wind tunnel]] of the [[Chinese Academy of Sciences|CAS]] Key Laboratory of high-temperature gas dynamics (LHD) were published in the Chinese media. Tests with speeds up to Mach 20 were reached around 2001.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://lhd.imech.cas.cn/kyzb/201307/t20130723_116736.html |title=氢氧爆轰驱动激波高焓风洞 |publisher=中国科学院高温气体动力学重点实验室 |date=17 March 2005 |access-date=16 April 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304002515/http://lhd.imech.cas.cn/kyzb/201307/t20130723_116736.html |archive-date=4 March 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="strategycenter.net">{{cite web |last=Fisher, Jr. |first=Richard |date=29 June 2011 |title=PLA and U.S. Arms Racing in the Western Pacific |url=http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.247/pub_detail.asp |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140131161229/http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.247/pub_detail.asp |archive-date=31 January 2014 |access-date=20 June 2012 |website=[[International Assessment and Strategy Center]] |publisher= |quote=It is also possible that during this decade the PLA Navy could deploy initial railgun and laser weapons. It is known that the PLA has invested heavily in both technologies. |df=dmy-all}}</ref>


China's rise in military spending come at a time when there are tensions along the South China Sea with territorial disputes involving the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan, as well as escalating tensions between China and Japan involving the disputed [[Senkaku Islands]]. Former-United States Secretary of Defense [[Robert Gates]] has urged China to be more transparent about its military capabilities and intentions.<ref>[https://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gFVKfVEoZkFhnNFrEqRsKbqkQsfA "US, China need transparent military ties: Gates."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090603034303/http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gFVKfVEoZkFhnNFrEqRsKbqkQsfA |date=3 June 2009 }} Agence France-Presse, 30 May 2009.</ref><ref>[https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/amid-development-of-stealth-fighter-aircraft-carrier-china-insists-its-military-not-a-threat/2011/06/13/AGLmKiSH_story.html "Amid development of stealth fighter, aircraft carrier, China insists its military not a threat."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190323085737/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/amid-development-of-stealth-fighter-aircraft-carrier-china-insists-its-military-not-a-threat/2011/06/13/AGLmKiSH_story.html |date=23 March 2019 }} Associated Press, 13 June 2011.</ref> The years 2018 and 2019 both saw significant budget increases as well. China announced 2018's budget as 1.11&nbsp;trillion yuan (US$165.5bn), an 8.1% increase on 2017, and 2019's budget as 1.19&nbsp;trillion yuan (US$177.61bn), an increase of 7.5 per cent on 2018.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Shepherd |first1=Christian |last2=Martina |first2=Michael |date=4 March 2018 |title=China boosts defense spending, rattling its neighbors' nerves |work=[[Reuters]] |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-parliament-defence/china-says-its-moderate-defense-spending-rises-are-no-threat-idUSKCN1GG072 |url-status=live |access-date=9 May 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190509101323/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-parliament-defence/china-says-its-moderate-defense-spending-rises-are-no-threat-idUSKCN1GG072 |archive-date=9 May 2019}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/05/china-defense-budget-slowing-growth-in-2019-military-spending-.html|title=China's defense spending is growing more slowly. But that doesn't mean military tensions are easing|date=5 March 2019|last=Olsen|first=Kelly|access-date=9 May 2019|publisher=[[CNBC]]|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190420145706/https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/05/china-defense-budget-slowing-growth-in-2019-military-spending-.html|archive-date=20 April 2019|url-status=live}}</ref>
== Budget ==
{{Main|Military budget of China}}


Budget figures are published on the website of the State Council via a document named 'Central and Local Budgets' followed by the preceding year of the publication.
China's official military budget for 2025 was at 1.78 trillion yuan (US$246 billion), which is an increase of 7.2% over the last year.<ref name=":25">{{Cite news |last1=Chen |first1=Laurie |last2=Torode |first2=Greg |date=5 March 2025 |title=China maintains defence spending increase at 7.2% amid roiling geopolitical tensions |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-maintains-defence-spending-increase-72-2025-03-05/ |access-date=5 March 2025 |work=[[Reuters]]}}</ref> The [[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]] (SIPRI) estimated that China's military expenditure was US$314&nbsp;billion in 2024, the second-largest in the world after the United States and accounting for [[List of countries by military expenditures|12 percent of the world's defence expenditures]].'''''<ref name="SIPRI-2020"/>'''''
[[File:Military Expenditures by Country 2019.svg|500px|thumb|center|A pie chart showing global [[List of countries by military expenditures|military expenditures]] by country for 2019, in US$ billions, according to SIPRI]]
{{Military spending top 25 countries}}
{{clear}}
{{clear}}


== Commercial activities ==
== Symbols ==
[[File:Wuhan - No 6907 Factory of PLA of China - 4138.jpg|thumb|PLA Factory No. 6907, [[Wuhan]]. The white characters on the blue sign roughly translate to: "Secret/Classified Area, Do Not Enter Unless Invited."]]


===Historical===
=== Anthem ===
Until the mid-1990s the PLA had extensive commercial enterprise holdings in non-military areas, particularly real estate. Almost all of these holdings were supposedly spun off in the mid-1990s. In most cases, the management of the companies remained unchanged, with the PLA officers running the companies simply retiring from the PLA to run the newly formed private holding companies.<ref name="scmp1884377">{{cite web |last1=Chan |first1=Minnie |last2=Zhen |first2=Liu |date=28 November 2015 |title=China's President Xi Jinping wants 'PLA Inc' to stop its song and dance, plans end for profit-making activities |url=http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1884377/xi-wants-pla-inc-return-its-proper-role |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151128195832/http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1884377/xi-wants-pla-inc-return-its-proper-role |archive-date=28 November 2015 |access-date=28 November 2015 |website=[[South China Morning Post]]}}</ref>
{{Main|Military Anthem of the People's Liberation Army}}


The history of PLA involvement in commercial enterprises began in the 1950s and 1960s.{{citation needed|date=November 2022}} Because of the socialist [[state-owned]] system and from a desire for military self-sufficiency, the PLA created a network of enterprises such as farms, guest houses, and factories intended to financially support its own needs. One unintended side effect of the Deng-era economic reforms was that many of these enterprises became very profitable.{{citation needed|date=November 2022}}
For example, a military guest house intended for soldier recreation could be easily converted into a profitable hotel for civilian use. Two main factors increased PLA commercial involvement in the 1990s. One was that running profitable companies decreased the need for the state to fund the military from the [[government budget]]. The second was that in an environment where legal rules were unclear and political connections were important, PLA influence was very useful.{{Citation needed |date = October 2008}}
By the early 1990s party officials and high military officials were becoming increasingly alarmed at the military's commercial involvement for several reasons. The military's involvement in commerce was seen to adversely affect military readiness and spread corruption. Further, there was great concern that having an independent source of funding would lead to decreased loyalty to the CCP. The result of this was an effort to spin off the PLA's commercial enterprises into private companies managed by former PLA officers, and to reform military [[procurement]] from a system in which the PLA directly controls its sources of supply to a contracting system more akin to those of Western countries. The separation of the PLA from its commercial interests was largely complete by 2000. It was met with very little resistance, as the spinoff was arranged in such a way that few lost out.<ref name=scmp1884377/>
== Anthem ==
[[File:Оркестр Народно-освободительной армии Китая.jpg|thumb|The [[Central Military Band of the People's Liberation Army of China]] at the [[Great Hall of the People]]. The band is a common performer of the military anthem of the PLA at ceremonial protocol events.]]
[[File:Оркестр Народно-освободительной армии Китая.jpg|thumb|The [[Central Military Band of the People's Liberation Army of China]] at the [[Great Hall of the People]]. The band is a common performer of the military anthem of the PLA at ceremonial protocol events.]]
{{listen |filename=|title=Military Anthem of the People's Liberation Army|description=Introduction of the March of the PLA (instrumental)}}
The March of the Chinese People's Liberation Army was adopted as the military anthem by the Central Military Commission on 25 July 1988.<ref>{{Cite web |date=25 July 2021 |title=1988年7月25日,中央軍事委員會決定將《中國人民解放軍進行曲》,定為中國人民解放軍的軍歌。 |trans-title=July 25, 1988: March of the Chinese People's Liberation Army is designate as the military song of the People's Liberation Army |url=https://www.ourchinastory.com/zh/2070/%E3%80%8A%E4%B8%AD%E5%9C%8B%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0%91%E8%A7%A3%E6%94%BE%E8%BB%8D%E9%80%B2%E8%A1%8C%E6%9B%B2%E3%80%8B%E5%AE%9A%E7%82%BA%E8%A7%A3%E6%94%BE%E8%BB%8D%E8%BB%8D%E6%AD%8C |website=Our China Story |language=zh |access-date=10 December 2022 |archive-date=10 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221210200842/https://www.ourchinastory.com/zh/2070/%E3%80%8A%E4%B8%AD%E5%9C%8B%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0%91%E8%A7%A3%E6%94%BE%E8%BB%8D%E9%80%B2%E8%A1%8C%E6%9B%B2%E3%80%8B%E5%AE%9A%E7%82%BA%E8%A7%A3%E6%94%BE%E8%BB%8D%E8%BB%8D%E6%AD%8C |url-status=live }}</ref> The lyrics of the anthem were written by composer [[Gong Mu]] (real name: Zhang Yongnian; [[Chinese language|Chinese]]: 张永年) and the music was composed by Korea-born Chinese composer [[Zheng Lücheng]].<ref>{{Cite news |date=16 July 2010 |title=军歌歌词是怎样变迁的?那些"飘扬的旗帜" |language=zh |trans-title=How did the lyrics of military songs change? Those "Flags Waving" |work=[[China News Service]] |url=https://www.chinanews.com.cn/cul/2010/07-16/2406888.shtml |access-date=10 December 2022 |archive-date=10 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221210200841/https://www.chinanews.com.cn/cul/2010/07-16/2406888.shtml |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last1=Lee |first1=Lily Xiao Hong |url=https://archive.org/details/isbn_0765600439 |title=Biographical Dictionary of Chinese Women, Volume II |last2=Wiles |first2=Sue |date=2015-01-28 |publisher=[[Routledge]] |isbn=978-1-317-51562-3 |edition=0 |pages=145 |language=en |doi=10.4324/9781315719313 |quote="... situation of their conflicting nationalities by returning to China, where Zheng Lücheng took out Chinese citizenship. ... PRC, Zheng Lücheng was active in his work as a composer; he wrote the music for the Western-style opera Cloud Gazing."}}</ref>
 
The military anthem of the PLA is the [[Military Anthem of the People's Liberation Army]] ({{zh |s = 中国人民解放军军歌 |t = 中國人民解放軍軍歌 |p = Zhōngguó Rénmín Jiěfàngjūn Jūngē }}) (Chinese People's Liberation Army Song). The Central Military Commission (CMC) adopted the song as the official anthem on 25 July 1988.<ref>{{Cite web |date=25 July 2021 |title=1988年7月25日,中央軍事委員會決定將《中國人民解放軍進行曲》,定為中國人民解放軍的軍歌。 |trans-title=July 25, 1988: March of the Chinese People's Liberation Army is designate as the military song of the People's Liberation Army |url=https://www.ourchinastory.com/zh/2070/%E3%80%8A%E4%B8%AD%E5%9C%8B%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0%91%E8%A7%A3%E6%94%BE%E8%BB%8D%E9%80%B2%E8%A1%8C%E6%9B%B2%E3%80%8B%E5%AE%9A%E7%82%BA%E8%A7%A3%E6%94%BE%E8%BB%8D%E8%BB%8D%E6%AD%8C |website=Our China Story |language=zh}}</ref> The lyrics of the anthem were written by composer [[Gong Mu]] (real name: Zhang Yongnian; [[Chinese language|Chinese]]: 张永年) and the music was composed by Korea born Chinese composer [[Zheng Lücheng]].<ref>{{Cite news |date=16 July 2010 |title=军歌歌词是怎样变迁的?那些"飘扬的旗帜" |language=zh |trans-title=How did the lyrics of military songs change? Those "Flags Waving" |work=[[China News Service]] |url=https://www.chinanews.com.cn/cul/2010/07-16/2406888.shtml}}</ref><ref>Biographical Dictionary of Chinese Women - Volume 2 - Page 145 Lily Xiao Hong Lee, A. D. Stefanowska, Sue Wiles - 2003 "... situation of their conflicting nationalities by returning to China, where Zheng Lücheng took out Chinese citizenship. ... PRC, Zheng Lücheng was active in his work as a composer; he wrote the music for the Western-style opera Cloud Gazing."</ref>
 
== Flag and insignia ==
{{Main|Flag of the People's Liberation Army}}


=== Flag and insignia ===
{{Main|Emblem of the People's Liberation Army|Flag of the People's Liberation Army}}


The PLA's insignia consists of a roundel with a red star bearing the two [[Chinese character|Chinese characters]] "{{lang|zh|八一}}"(literally "eight-one"), referring to the [[Nanchang uprising]] which began on 1 August 1927 (first day of the eighth month) and symbolic as the CCP's founding of the PLA.<ref>{{cite news |last=Wu |first=Fei |date=2009-10-01 |title=Military Parade Marks Anniversary |publisher=China Daily |agency=Xinhua |url=http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/60th/2009-10/01/content_8759348.htm |accessdate=2009-11-04}}</ref> The inclusion of the two characters ("{{lang|zh|八一}}") is symbolic of the party's revolutionary history carrying strong emotional connotations of the political power which it shed blood to obtain. The flag of the Chinese People's Liberation Army is the war flag of the People's Liberation Army; the layout of the flag has a golden star at the top left corner and "{{lang|zh|八一}}" to the right of the star, placed on a red field. Each service branch also has its flags: The top {{frac|5|8}} of the flags is the same as the PLA flag; the bottom {{frac|3|8}} are occupied by the colors of the branches.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.diyifanwen.com/fanwen/bayijianjunjie/143152262.html|title=81 Flag and Other Signs|language=zh|access-date=2009-11-04|archive-date=1 December 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181201134106/https://www.diyifanwen.com/fanwen/bayijianjunjie/143152262.html|url-status=live}}</ref>
The PLA's insignia consists of a roundel with a red star bearing the two [[Chinese character]]s "{{lang|zh|八一}}"(literally "eight-one"), referring to the [[Nanchang uprising]] which began on 1 August 1927 (first day of the eighth month) and symbolic as the CCP's founding of the PLA.<ref>{{cite news |last=Wu |first=Fei |date=2009-10-01 |title=Military Parade Marks Anniversary |publisher=China Daily |agency=Xinhua |url=http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/60th/2009-10/01/content_8759348.htm |accessdate=2009-11-04 |archive-date=9 October 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191009092009/http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/60th/2009-10/01/content_8759348.htm |url-status=live }}</ref> The inclusion of the two characters ("{{lang|zh|八一}}") is symbolic of the party's revolutionary history carrying strong emotional connotations of the political power which it shed blood to obtain. The flag of the Chinese People's Liberation Army is the war flag of the People's Liberation Army; the layout of the flag has a golden star at the top left corner and "{{lang|zh|八一}}" to the right of the star, placed on a red field. Each service branch also has its flags: The top {{frac|5|8}} of the flags is the same as the PLA flag; the bottom {{frac|3|8}} are occupied by the colors of the branches.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.diyifanwen.com/fanwen/bayijianjunjie/143152262.html|title=81 Flag and Other Signs|language=zh|access-date=2009-11-04|archive-date=1 December 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181201134106/https://www.diyifanwen.com/fanwen/bayijianjunjie/143152262.html|url-status=live}}</ref>


The flag of the Ground Forces has a forest green bar at the bottom. The naval ensign has stripes of blue and white at the bottom. The Air Force uses a sky blue bar. The Rocket Force uses a yellow bar at the bottom. The forest green represents the earth, the blue and white stripes represent the seas, the sky blue represents the air and the yellow represents the flare of missile launching.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-06/23/content_1542456.htm|title=Flag, Emblem and Song of the People's Liberation Army|date=2004-06-23|work=Xinhua Net News|publisher=Xinhua|language=zh|access-date=2009-11-04|archive-date=11 July 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160711142438/http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-06/23/content_1542456.htm|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0701/c1011-28516063.html|title=Uniform of Rocket Force|date=2016-07-01|work=People's Daily|language=zh|access-date=2016-07-06|archive-date=4 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201104131431/http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0701/c1011-28516063.html|url-status=live}}</ref>
The flag of the Ground Forces has a forest green bar at the bottom. The naval ensign has stripes of blue and white at the bottom. The Air Force uses a sky blue bar. The Rocket Force uses a yellow bar at the bottom. The forest green represents the earth, the blue and white stripes represent the seas, the sky blue represents the air and the yellow represents the flare of missile launching.<ref>{{cite web |date=2004-06-23 |title=Flag, Emblem and Song of the People's Liberation Army |url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-06/23/content_1542456.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160711142438/http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-06/23/content_1542456.htm |archive-date=11 July 2016 |access-date=2009-11-04 |work=[[Xinhua News Agency]] |publisher= |language=zh}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |date=2016-07-01 |title=Uniform of Rocket Force |url=http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0701/c1011-28516063.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201104131431/http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0701/c1011-28516063.html |archive-date=4 November 2020 |access-date=2016-07-06 |work=[[People's Daily]] |language=zh}}</ref>


<gallery class="center" widths="120">
<gallery class="center" widths="120">
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== See also ==
== See also ==
{{Portal|China|Communism|War}}
{{Portal|China|Communism}}
* [[2015 People's Republic of China military reform]]
* [[Outline of the Chinese Civil War]]
* [[Chinese information operations and information warfare]]
* [[Outline of the military history of the People's Republic of China]]
* [[Macao Garrison]]
* ''[[Military Power of the People's Republic of China]]''
* [[Republic of China Armed Forces]]
* [[Republic of China Armed Forces]]
* [[Timeline of the Cox Report controversy]]
* [[Type 07]]


== References ==
== References ==
Line 704: Line 525:


===Works cited===
===Works cited===
* {{Cite book |url=https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN33195-ATP_7-100.3-000-WEB-1.pdf |title=Army Techniques Publication 7-100.3: Chinese Tactics |publisher=Headquarters, United States Army |year=2021 |isbn=9798457607118 |location=Washington, D.C. |ref={{sfnref|ATP 7-100.3: Chinese Tactics|2021}}}}
* {{cite book |last1=Goldstein |first1=Melvyn C. |title=The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama |date=1997 |publisher=University of California Press |isbn=978-0-520-21254-1 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3gFKI09MWuUC |language=en}}
* {{cite book |last1=Goldstein |first1=Melvyn C. |title=The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama |date=1997 |publisher=University of California Press |isbn=978-0-520-21254-1 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3gFKI09MWuUC |language=en}}
* {{cite book |author=The International Institute for Strategic Studies |title=The Military Balance 2022 |date=14 February 2022 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-000-62003-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=vOFeEAAAQBAJ |language=en}}
*{{cite book |title=The Military Balance 2025 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=olpEEQAAQBAJ |author1=International Institute for Strategic Studies |author-link1=International Institute for Strategic Studies |date=12 February 2025 |publisher=[[Routledge]] |location=London |isbn=978-1-003-63076-0 |doi=10.4324/9781003630760 |ref=IISS2025}}
* {{cite report |last1=Kaufman |first1=Alison A. |last2=Mackenzie |first2=Peter W. |date=2009 |title=The Culture of the Chinese People's Liberation Army |url=https://publicintelligence.net/mcia-pla-culture-study/ |publisher=Marine Corps Intelligence Activity |access-date=2024-06-23 |archive-date=2024-06-23 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240623194841/https://publicintelligence.net/mcia-pla-culture-study/ |url-status=live }}
* {{cite report |editor1-last=Pollpeter |editor1-first=Kevin |editor2-last=Allen |editor2-first=Kenneth W. |date=14 June 2012 |title=The PLA as Organization v2.0 |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1082742 |publisher=China Aerospace Studies Institute }}
* {{cite book |editor1-last=Saunders |editor1-first=Phillip C. |editor2-last=Ding |editor2-first=Arthur S. |editor3-last=Scobell |editor3-first=Andrew |editor4-last=Yang |editor4-first=Andrew N.D. |editor5-last=Joel |editor5-first=Wuthnow |title=Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms |url=https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Publications/Books/Chairman-Xi-Remakes-the-PLA/ |date=2019 |publisher=National Defense University Press |location=Washington, D.C. |isbn=978-1070233420 |ref={{harvid|Saunders et al.|2019}}}}
* {{Cite book |author=[[International Institute for Strategic Studies]] |title=The Military Balance 2025 |date=2025 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-041-04967-8 |location=London |ref = {{SfnRef|The International Institute for Strategic Studies|2025}} }}


== Further reading ==
== Further reading ==
Line 716: Line 542:
* {{Cite book |last=Fravel |first=M. Taylor |title=Active Defense: China's Military Strategy Since 1949 |publisher=[[Princeton University Press]] |year=2019 |isbn=9780691210339 |language=en}}
* {{Cite book |last=Fravel |first=M. Taylor |title=Active Defense: China's Military Strategy Since 1949 |publisher=[[Princeton University Press]] |year=2019 |isbn=9780691210339 |language=en}}
* {{Cite book |last=Li |first=Xiaobing |title=A History of the Modern Chinese Army |publisher=[[University Press of Kentucky]] |year=2007 |isbn=9780813172248 |edition= |language=en}}
* {{Cite book |last=Li |first=Xiaobing |title=A History of the Modern Chinese Army |publisher=[[University Press of Kentucky]] |year=2007 |isbn=9780813172248 |edition= |language=en}}
* {{Cite book |last1=Whitson |first1=William W. |title=The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927-71 |last2=Huang |first2=Zhenxia |last3=Chên-hsia |first3=Huang |publisher=[[Greenwood Publishing Group|Praeger]] |year=1973 |isbn=978-0333150535 |language=en}}
* {{Cite book |last1=Whitson |first1=William W. |title=The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927–71 |last2=Huang |first2=Zhenxia |last3=Chên-hsia |first3=Huang |publisher=[[Greenwood Publishing Group|Praeger]] |year=1973 |isbn=978-0333150535 |language=en}}


=== Present-day ===
=== Present-day ===


* {{Cite book |url=https://media.defense.gov/2022/Nov/29/2003122279/-1/-1/1/2022-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF |title=2022 Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China |publisher=[[United States Department of Defense]] |year=2022 |location=Arlington, Virginia |language=en}} (China Military Power Report, Annual Report to [[United States Congress|Congress]])
* {{Cite book |url=https://media.defense.gov/2025/Dec/23/2003849070/-1/-1/1/ANNUAL-REPORT-TO-CONGRESS-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2025.PDF |title=2025 Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China |publisher=[[United States Department of Defense]] |year=2025 |location=Arlington, Virginia |language=en}} ([[China Military Power Report]], Annual Report to [[United States Congress|Congress]])
* {{Cite book |last1=Chase |first1=Michael S. |title=China's Incomplete Military Transformation: Assessing the Weaknesses of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) |last2=Jeffery |first2=Engstrom |last3=Cheung |first3=Tai Ming |last4=Gunness |first4=Kristen A. |last5=Harold |first5=Scott |last6=Puska |first6=Susan |last7=Berkowitz |first7=Samuel K. |publisher=[[RAND Corporation]] |year=2015 |isbn=9780833088307 |language=en}}
* {{Cite book |last1=Chase |first1=Michael S. |url=https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR893.html |title=China's Incomplete Military Transformation: Assessing the Weaknesses of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) |last2=Jeffery |first2=Engstrom |last3=Cheung |first3=Tai Ming |last4=Gunness |first4=Kristen A. |last5=Harold |first5=Scott |last6=Puska |first6=Susan |last7=Berkowitz |first7=Samuel K. |publisher=[[RAND Corporation]] |year=2015 |isbn=9780833088307 |language=en}}
* {{Cite book |last=Fisher |first=Richard D. |title=China's Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach |publisher=[[Greenwood Publishing Group|Praeger Security International]] |year=2008 |isbn=9780275994860 |language=en}}
* {{Cite book |last=Fisher |first=Richard D. |url=https://archive.org/details/chinasmilitarymo0000fish |title=China's Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach |publisher=[[Greenwood Publishing Group|Praeger Security International]] |year=2008 |isbn=9780275994860 |language=en}}
* {{Cite book |last1=Kamphausen |first1=Roy |title=Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan |last2=Lai |first2=David |last3=Scobell |first3=Andrew |year=2009 |isbn=9781304886385 |language=en}}
* {{Cite book |last1=Kamphausen |first1=Roy |url=https://www.nbr.org/publication/beyond-the-strait-pla-missions-other-than-taiwan/ |title=Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan |last2=Lai |first2=David |last3=Scobell |first3=Andrew |year=2009 |publisher=[[Strategic Studies Institute]] |isbn=9781304886385 |language=en}}
* {{Cite report |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1082742.pdf |title=The PLA as Organization v2.0 |last1=Pollpeter |first1=Kevin |last2=Allen |first2=Kenneth W. |date=14 June 2012}}
 
== External links ==
 
* {{Official website}} {{In language|en}}
* {{Official website|http://www.81.cn}} {{In language|zh}}
{{s-start}}
{{s-start}}
{{s-bef |before = [[Eighth Route Army]] and [[New Fourth Army]] }}
{{s-bef |before = [[Eighth Route Army]] and [[New Fourth Army]] }}
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{{Second Sino-Japanese War}}
{{Second Sino-Japanese War}}
}}
}}
{{Asian topic
{{Military of Asia}}
|title  = Armies in Asia
|suffix = Army
|countries_only=yes |UK_only=yes
}}
{{authority control}}
{{authority control}}


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[[Category:History of the Chinese Communist Party]]
[[Category:History of the Chinese Communist Party]]
[[Category:Politics of China]]
[[Category:Politics of China]]
[[Category:Military units and formations established in 1947]]
[[Category:Military of China| ]]

Latest revision as of 00:29, 17 March 2026


People's Liberation Army
中国人民解放军
Flag of the People's Liberation Army
The characters are "八一", referencing August 1.
Motto为人民服务
("Serve the People")
Founded1 August 1927; 99 years ago (1927-08-01)
Nanchang uprising
Current form10 October 1947; 78 years ago (1947-10-10)
Service branchesServices
Arms
HeadquartersAugust First Building, Fuxing Road, Haidian, Beijing
Website{{URL|example.com|optional display text}}
Leadership
Governing bodyCentral Military Commission
CMC leadershipChairman:
Xi Jinping
Vice Chairman:
General Zhang Shengmin
Minister of National Defense Admiral Dong Jun
Director of the Political Work DepartmentVacant
Chief of the Joint Staff DepartmentVacant
Secretary of Discipline Inspection Commission General Zhang Shengmin
Manpower
Military age18
ConscriptionInactive since 1949 (Law dictates a hybrid system of conscripts and volunteers)[1]
Active personnel2,035,000 (2025)[2] (ranked 1st)
Reserve personnel510,000 (2025)[2]
Expenditures
BudgetUS$314 billion (2024)[3]
(ranked 2nd)
Percent of GDP1.7% (2024)[3]
Industry
Domestic suppliers
Foreign suppliers Historical:
Annual imports$14.858 billion
(2010–2021)[5]
Annual exports$18.121 billion
(2010–2021)[5]
Related articles
History
Ranks
Chinese People's Liberation Army
Script error: No such module "Infobox multi-lingual name".

Template:Politics of China

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is the military wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the primary armed forces of the People's Republic of China (PRC). It consists of four servicesGround Force, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force—and four arms—Aerospace Force, Cyberspace Force, Information Support Force, and Joint Logistics Support Force. It operates under the CCP's absolute control and is led by the Central Military Commission (CMC) with its chairman as commander-in-chief.

The PLA can trace its origins during the Republican era to the left-wing units of the National Revolutionary Army (NRA) of the Kuomintang (KMT), when they broke away in 1927 in an uprising against the nationalist government as the Chinese Red Army before being reintegrated into the NRA as units of New Fourth Army and Eighth Route Army during the Second Sino-Japanese War. The two NRA communist units were reconstituted as the PLA in 1947. Since 1949, the PLA has used nine different military strategies, which it calls "strategic guidelines". The most important came in 1956, 1980, and 1993. Politically, the PLA and the paramilitary People's Armed Police (PAP) have the largest delegation in the National People's Congress (NPC); the joint delegation currently has 281 deputies—over 9% of the total—all of whom are CCP members.

The PLA is not a traditional nation-state military. It is the armed wing of the CCP and controlled by the party, not by the state. The PLA's primary mission is the defense of the party and its interests. The PLA is the guarantor of the party's survival and rule, and the party prioritizes maintaining control and the loyalty of the PLA. According to Chinese law, the party has absolute control over the armed forces and the CMC exercises supreme military command; the party and state CMCs are practically a single body by membership. Since 1989, the CCP general secretary has also been the CMC Chairman; this grants significant political power as the only member of the Politburo Standing Committee with direct responsibilities for the armed forces. The Ministry of National Defense has no command authority; it is the PLA's interface with state and foreign entities and insulates the PLA from external influence.

Today, the majority of military units around the country are assigned to one of five theatre commands by geographical location. In addition to wartime arrangements, the PLA is also involved in the peacetime operations of other components of the armed forces. This is particularly visible in maritime territorial disputes where the navy is heavily involved in the planning, coordination and execution of operations by the PAP's China Coast Guard. The PLA is the world's largest military force (not including paramilitary or reserve forces) and has the second largest defence budget in the world. China's military expenditure was US$314 billion in 2024, accounting for 12 percent of the world's defence expenditures. It is also one of the fastest modernizing militaries in the world, and has been termed as a potential military superpower, with significant regional defence and rising global power projection capabilities.[6][2]

Mission[edit | edit source]

The PLA's primary mission is the defense of the CCP and its interests.[7] It is the guarantor of the party's survival and rule,[7][8] and the party prioritizes maintaining control and the loyalty of the PLA.[8]

In 2004, paramount leader Hu Jintao stated the mission of the PLA as:[9]

  • Consolidate the rule of the CCP
  • Ensure sovereignty, territorial integrity, internal security and national development of the People's Republic of China
  • Safeguard the country's interests
  • Help maintain world peace

China describes its military posture as active defense, defined in a 2015 state white paper as "We will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked."[10](p41)

History[edit | edit source]

Early history[edit | edit source]

In 1925, the CCP's Central Military Department, was renamed the Central Military Commission.[11]Template:Reference page It was first led by Zhang Guotao who was replaced by Zhou Enlai in 1926 as head of the CMC.[11]Template:Reference page At the time of the First United Front, the CMC was not a unified military command structure but was more of an administrative liaison with other armed communist groups.[11]Template:Reference page

The CCP founded its military wing on 1 August 1927 during the Nanchang uprising, beginning the Chinese Civil War. Communist elements of the National Revolutionary Army rebelled under the leadership of Zhu De, He Long, Ye Jianying, Zhou Enlai, and other leftist elements of the Kuomintang (KMT) after the Shanghai massacre in 1927.[12] They were then known as the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, or simply the Red Army.[13] In 1934 and 1935, the Red Army survived several campaigns led against it by Chiang Kai-Shek's Kuomintang and engaged in the Long March.[14]

During the Second Sino-Japanese War from 1937 to 1945, the CCP's military forces were nominally integrated into the National Revolutionary Army of the Republic of China, forming two main units, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army.[15] During this time, these two military groups primarily employed guerrilla tactics, generally avoiding large-scale battles with the Japanese, and at the same time consolidating by recruiting KMT troops and paramilitary forces behind Japanese lines into their forces.[16]

After the Japanese surrender in 1945, the CCP continued to use the National Revolutionary Army unit structures, until the decision was made in February 1947 to merge the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army.[15] On October 10, 1947, the "Manifesto of the Chinese People's Liberation Army" was published, renaming the new million-strong force the People's Liberation Army (PLA).[17][18][19][20] The reorganization was completed by late 1948. The PLA eventually won the Chinese Civil War, establishing the People's Republic of China in 1949.[21]

Establishment of the People's Republic of China[edit | edit source]

PLA troops entering Beijing in 1949 during the Chinese Civil War
Chinese troops gathered on a T-34/85 or a Type 58 medium tank leaving North Korea in 1958, 5 years after the Korean War ended with an armistice (a ceasefire) in 1953. The banner in the background of the picture bears a slogan (in Chinese) which declares "The Friendship And Unity of the North Korean And Chinese Peoples Are Always Steadfast And Strong!"
Marshal Lin Biao surveying the soldiers during the 10th-anniversary military parade in 1959

After the establishment of the PRC, the PLA underwent a drastic reorganization, with the establishment of the Air Force leadership structure in November 1949, followed by the Navy leadership structure the following April.[22][23]

In this early period, the People's Liberation Army overwhelmingly consisted of peasants.[24] Its treatment of soldiers and officers was egalitarian[24] and formal ranks were not adopted until 1955.[25] As a result of its egalitarian organization, the early PLA overturned strict traditional hierarchies that governed the lives of peasants.[24] As sociologist Alessandro Russo summarizes, the peasant composition of the PLA hierarchy was a radical break with Chinese societal norms and "overturned the strict traditional hierarchies in unprecedented forms of egalitarianism[.]"[24] During the 1950s, the PLA with Soviet assistance began to transform itself from a peasant army into a modern one.[26]

In the PRC's early years, the PLA was a dominant foreign policy institution in the country.[27](p17) Since 1949, China has used nine different military strategies, which the PLA calls "strategic guidelines". The most important came in 1956, 1980, and 1993.[28]

In November 1950, some units of the PLA under the name of the People's Volunteer Army intervened in the Korean War as United Nations forces under General Douglas MacArthur approached the Yalu River.[29] Under the weight of this offensive, Chinese forces drove MacArthur's forces out of North Korea and captured Seoul, but were subsequently pushed back south of Pyongyang north of the 38th Parallel.[29] The war also catalyzed the rapid modernization of the PLAAF.[30]

In 1962, the PLA Ground Force also fought India in the Sino-Indian War.[31][32] In a series of border clashes in 1967 with Indian troops, the PLA suffered heavy numerical and tactical losses.[33][34][35]

Before the Cultural Revolution, military region commanders tended to remain in their posts for long periods. The longest-serving military region commanders were Xu Shiyou in the Nanjing Military Region (1954–74), Yang Dezhi in the Jinan Military Region (1958–74), Chen Xilian in the Shenyang Military Region (1959–73), and Han Xianchu in the Fuzhou Military Region (1960–74).[36] In the early days of the Cultural Revolution, the PLA abandoned the use of the military ranks that it had adopted in 1955.[25] The Central Military Commission had deemed that ranks were an expression of bourgeois right and hierarchy which led to individualist attitudes, inequality, and a sense of disunity.[37]Template:Reference page

The establishment of a professional military force equipped with modern weapons and doctrine was the last of the Four Modernizations announced by Zhou Enlai and supported by Deng Xiaoping.[38][39] In keeping with Deng's mandate to reform, the PLA has demobilized millions of men and women since 1978 and has introduced modern methods in such areas as recruitment and manpower, strategy, and education and training.[40] In 1979, the PLA fought Vietnam over a border skirmish in the Sino-Vietnamese War where both sides claimed victory.[41] However, western analysts generally agree that Vietnam handily outperformed the PLA.[36]

During the Sino-Soviet split, strained relations between China and the Soviet Union resulted in bloody border clashes and mutual backing of each other's adversaries.[42] China and Afghanistan had neutral relations with each other during the King's rule.[43] When the pro-Soviet Afghan Communists seized power in Afghanistan in 1978, relations between China and the Afghan communists quickly turned hostile.[44] The Afghan pro-Soviet communists supported China's enemies in Vietnam and blamed China for supporting Afghan anticommunist militants.[44] China responded to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by supporting the Afghan mujahidin and ramping up their military presence near Afghanistan in Xinjiang.[44] China acquired military equipment from the United States to defend itself from Soviet attacks.[45]

The PLA Ground Force trained and supported the Afghan Mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan War, moving its training camps for the mujahideen from Pakistan into China itself.[46] Hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of anti-aircraft missiles, rocket launchers, and machine guns were given to the Mujahideen by the Chinese.[47] Chinese military advisors and army troops were also present with the Mujahideen during training.[45]

Since 1980[edit | edit source]

In 1981, the PLA conducted its largest military exercise in North China since the founding of the People's Republic.[28][48]

In the late 1980s, the central government had increasing expenditures and limited revenue.[49](p43) The central government encouraged its agencies and encouraged local governments to expand their services and pursue revenues.[49](p43) The PLA established businesses including hotels and restaurants.[49](p43) The PLA gained more autonomy and permission to engage in commercial activities in exchange for a reduced role in political affairs and limited budgets;[50] the military was downsized to free resources for economic development.[51] The lack of oversight, ineffective self-regulation, and Jiang Zemin's and Hu Jintao's lack of close personal ties to the PLA[50] led to systemic corruption that persisted through the late-2010s.[52] Jiang's attempt to divest the PLA of its commercial interests was only partially successful, as many were still run by close associates of PLA officers.[50] Corruption lowered readiness and proficiency,[53] was a barrier to modernization and professionalization,[54] and eroded party control.[8] The 2010s anti-corruption campaigns and military reforms under Xi Jinping from the early-2010s were in part executed to address these problems.[55][56]

Following the PLA's suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre, ideological correctness was temporarily revived as the dominant theme in Chinese military affairs.[57] Reform and modernization have today resumed their position as the PLA's primary objectives, although the armed forces' political loyalty to the CCP has remained a leading concern.[58][59]

Beginning in the 1980s, the PLA tried to transform itself from a land-based power centered on a vast ground force to a smaller, more mobile, high-tech one capable of mounting operations beyond its borders.[28] The motivation for this was that a massive land invasion by Russia was no longer seen as a major threat, and the new threats to China are seen to be a declaration of independence by Taiwan, possibly with assistance from the United States, or a confrontation over the Spratly Islands.[60]

In 1985, the PLA changed from being constantly prepared to "hit early, strike hard, and to fight a nuclear war" to developing the military in an era of peace.[28] The PLA reoriented itself to modernization, improving its fighting ability, and becoming a world-class force. Deng Xiaoping stressed that the PLA needed to focus more on quality rather than on quantity.[60]

The decision of the Chinese government in 1985 to reduce the size of the military by one million was completed by 1987. Staffing in military leadership was cut by about 50 percent. During the Ninth Five Year Plan (1996–2000) the PLA was reduced by a further 500,000. The PLA had also been expected to be reduced by another 200,000 by 2005. The PLA has focused on increasing mechanization and informatization to be able to fight a high-intensity war.[60]

The PLA Honor Guard in Beijing, 2007

Former CMC chairman Jiang in 1990 called on the military to "meet political standards, be militarily competent, have a good working style, adhere strictly to discipline, and provide vigorous logistic support" (Chinese: 政治合格、军事过硬、作风优良、纪律严明、保障有力; pinyin: zhèngzhì hégé, jūnshì guòyìng, zuòfēng yōuliáng, jìlǜ yánmíng, bǎozhàng yǒulì).[61] The 1991 Gulf War provided the Chinese leadership with a stark realization that the PLA was an oversized, almost-obsolete force.[62][63] The USA's sending of two aircraft carrier groups to the vicinity of Taiwan during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis prompted Jiang to order a ten-year PLA modernization program.[64]

People's Liberation Army on Red Square in Moscow during the Victory Day parade on 9 May 2025

The possibility of a militarized Japan has also been a continuous concern to the Chinese leadership since the late 1990s.[65] In addition, China's military leadership has been reacting to and learning from the successes and failures of the United States Armed Forces during the Kosovo War,[66] the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan,[67] the 2003 invasion of Iraq,[68] and the Iraqi insurgency.[68] All these lessons inspired China to transform the PLA from a military based on quantity to one based on quality. Chairman Jiang Zemin officially made a "revolution in military affairs" (RMA) part of the official national military strategy in 1993 to modernize the Chinese armed forces.[69]

A goal of the RMA is to transform the PLA into a force capable of winning what it calls "local wars under high-tech conditions" rather than a massive, numbers-dominated ground-type war.[69] Chinese military planners call for short decisive campaigns, limited in both their geographic scope and their political goals. In contrast to the past, more attention is given to reconnaissance, mobility, and deep reach. This new vision has shifted resources towards the navy and air force. The PLA is also actively preparing for space warfare and cyber-warfare.[70][71][72]

In 2002, the PLA began holding military exercises with militaries from other countries.[73](p242) From 2018 to 2023, more than half of these exercises have focused on military training other than war, generally antipiracy, or antiterrorism exercises involving combatting non-state actors.[73](p242) In 2009, the PLA held its first military exercise in Africa, a humanitarian and medical training practice conducted in Gabon.[73](p242)

For the past 10 to 20 years, the PLA has acquired some advanced weapons systems from Russia, including Sovremenny-class destroyers,[74] Sukhoi Su-27[75] and Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines.[76] It has also started to produce several new classes of destroyers and frigates including the Type 052D class guided-missile destroyer.[77][78] In addition, the PLAAF has designed its very own Chengdu J-10 fighter aircraft[79] and a new stealth fighter, the Chengdu J-20.[80] The PLA launched the new Jin class nuclear submarines on 3 December 2004 capable of launching nuclear warheads that could strike targets across the Pacific Ocean[81] and have three aircraft carriers, with the latest, the Fujian, launched in 2022.[82][83][84]

From 2014 to 2015, the PLA deployed 524 medical staff on a rotational basis to combat the Ebola virus outbreak in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau.[73](p245) As of 2023, this was the PLA's largest medical assistance mission in another country.[73](p245)

China re-organized its military from 2015 to 2016. In 2015, the PLA formed new units including the PLA Ground Force, the PLA Rocket Force, and the PLA Strategic Support Force.[85] In 2016, the CMC replaced the four traditional military departments with a number of new bodies.[86](pp288–289) China replaced its system of seven military regions with newly established Theater Commands: Northern, Southern, Western, Eastern, and Central.[86](p289) In the prior system, operations were segmented by military branch and region.[86](p289) In contrast, each Theater Command is intended to function as a unified entity with joint operations across different military branches.[86](p289)

The PLA on 1 August 2017 marked its 90th anniversary.[87] Before the big anniversary it mounted its biggest parade yet and the first outside of Beijing, held in the Zhurihe Training Base in the Northern Theater Command (within the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region).[88]

In December 2023, Reuters reported a military leadership purge after high-ranking generals were ousted from the National People's Congress.[89] Prior to 2017, over sixty generals were investigated and sacked.[90]

Overseas deployments and UN peacekeeping operations[edit | edit source]

In addition to its Support Base in Djibouti, the PLA operates a base in Tajikistan and a listening station in Cuba.[91][92] The Espacio Lejano Station in Argentina is operated by a PLA unit.[93][94] The PLAN has also undertaken rotational deployments of its warships at the Ream Naval Base in Cambodia.[95][96]

The People's Republic of China has sent the PLA to various hotspots as part of China's role as a prominent member of the United Nations.[97] Such units usually include engineers and logistical units and members of the paramilitary People's Armed Police and have been deployed as part of peacekeeping operations in Lebanon,[98][99] the Republic of the Congo,[98] Sudan,[100] Ivory Coast,[101] Haiti,[102][103] and more recently, Mali and South Sudan.[98][104]

Engagements[edit | edit source]

As of at least early 2024, China has not fought a war since 1979 and has only fought relatively minor conflicts since.[10](p72)

Organization[edit | edit source]

Organizational chart of the People's Liberation Army
The CMC is ceremonially housed in the Ministry of National Defense compound ("August 1st Building").

The PLA is a component of the armed forces of China, which also includes the PAP, the reserves, and the militia.[128] The armed forces are controlled by the CCP under the doctrine of "the Party commands the gun".[8] The PLA and the PAP have the largest delegation in the National People's Congress (NPC), which are elected by servicemember election committees of top-level military subdivisions, including the PLA's theater commands and service branches.[129] At the 14th National People's Congress; the joint delegation has 281 deputies—over 9% of the total—all of whom are CCP members.[130]

Central Military Commission[edit | edit source]

The PLA is governed by the Central Military Commission (CMC); under the arrangement of "one institution with two names", there exists a state CMC and a Party CMC, although both commissions have identical personnel, organization and function, and effectively work as a single body.[131] The only difference in membership between the two occurs for a few months every five years, during the period between a Party National Congress, when Party CMC membership changes, and the next ensuing National People's Congress, when the state CMC changes.[132]

The CMC is composed of a chairman, vice chairpersons and regular members. The chairman of the CMC is the commander-in-chief of the PLA, with the post generally held by the paramount leader of China; since 1989, the post has generally been held together with the CCP general secretary.[8][131][133] Per the chairman responsibility system, the CMC chairman exercises absolute control over the CMC and the overall military.[134] Unlike in other countries, the Ministry of National Defense and its Minister do not have command authority, largely acting as diplomatic liaisons of the CMC, insulating the PLA from external influence.[135] However, except for the current incumbent, Admiral Dong Jun, the Minister has always been a member of the CMC.[131]

The Membership of the Central Military Commission
Chairman
Vice Chairmen
Members

Previously, the PLA was governed by four general departments; the General Political, the General Logistics, the General Armament, and the General Staff Departments. These were abolished in 2016 under the military reforms undertaken by Xi Jinping, replaced with 15 new functional departments directly reporting to the CMC:[136]

  1. General Office
  2. Joint Staff Department
  3. Political Work Department
  4. Logistic Support Department
  5. Equipment Development Department
  6. Training and Administration Department
  7. National Defense Mobilization Department
  8. Discipline Inspection Commission
  9. Politics and Legal Affairs Commission
  10. Science and Technology Commission
  11. Office for Strategic Planning
  12. Office for Reform and Organizational Structure
  13. Office for International Military Cooperation
  14. Audit Office
  15. Agency for Offices Administration

Included among the 15 departments are three commissions. The CMC Discipline Inspection Commission is charged with rooting out corruption.

Political control[edit | edit source]

The People's Liberation Army raising the flag of the Chinese Communist Party during a military parade marking the 70th anniversary of the People's Republic of China on 1 October 2019.

The CCP maintains absolute control over the PLA.[137] It requires the PLA to undergo political education, instilling CCP ideology in its members.[138] Additionally, China maintains a political commissar system.[139] Regiment-level and higher units maintain CCP committees and political commissars (Chinese: 政治委员 or 政委).[139][140] Additionally, battalion-level and company-level units respectively maintain political directors and political instructors.[141] The political commissars are officially equal to commanders in status.[138] The political commissars are officially responsible for the implementation of party committee decisions, instilling and maintaining party discipline, providing political education, and working with other components of the political work system.[141]

Key decisions in the PLA are generally made in the CCP committees throughout the military.[138][142] As a rule, the political commissar serves as the party committee secretary while the commander serves as the deputy secretary.[141] Political commissars report to higher-level party committees, rather than military commanders.[143] Due to the CCP's system of absolute control, non-CCP political parties and groups and organizations except the Communist Youth League of China are not allowed to establish organizations or have members in the PLA. Additionally, only the CCP is allowed to appoint the leading cadres at all levels of the PLA.[140]

Grades[edit | edit source]

Grades determine the command hierarchy from the CMC to the platoon level. Entities command lower-graded entities, and coordinate with like-graded entities.[144] An organization's grade impacts the resources allocated to it.[145](p89) Since 1988, all organizations, billets, and officers in the PLA have a grade.[146]

Civil–military relations within the wider state bureaucracy is also influenced by grades. The grading systems used by the armed forces and the government are parallel, making it easier for military entities to identify the civilian entities they should coordinate with.[144] An officer's authority, eligibility for billets, pay, and retirement age is determined by grade.[147][144] Career progression includes lateral transfers between billets of the same grade, but which are not considered promotions.[148][149] An officer retiring to the civil service has their grade translated to the civil grade system;[144] their grade continues to progress and draw retirement benefits through the civil system rather than the armed forces.[150]

Historically, an officer's grade — or position (Chinese: 职务等级; pinyin: zhiwu dengji[151]) — was more important than their rank (Chinese: 军衔; pinyin: junxian[151]).[144] Historically, time-in-grade and time-in-rank requirements[152] and promotions were not synchronized;[148] multiple ranks were present in each grade[153] with all having the same authority.[150] Rank was mainly a visual aid to roughly determine relative position when interacting with Chinese and foreign personnel.[144] PLA etiquette preferred addressing personnel by position rather than by rank.[154] Reforms to a more rank-centric system began in 2021.[151] In 2023, a revised grade structure associated one rank per grade, with some ranks spanning multiple grades.[155]

Operational control[edit | edit source]

The five theatre commands of the PLA[156]

Operational control of combat units is divided between the service headquarters and domestic geographically based theatre commands.

Theatre commands are multi-service ("joint") organizations that are broadly responsible for strategy, plans, tactics, and policy specific to their assigned area of responsibility. In wartime, they will likely have full control of subordinate units; in peacetime, units also report to their service headquarters.[157] Force-building is the responsibility of the services and the CMC.[158] The five theatre commands, in order of stated significance are:[159]

The service headquarters retain operational control in some areas within China and outside of China. For example, army headquarters controls or is responsible for the Beijing Garrison, the Tibet Military District, the Xinjiang Military District,[160] and border and coastal defences. The counterpiracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden are controlled by navy headquarters.[161] The JSD nominally controls operations beyond China's periphery,[162] but in practice this seems to apply only to army operations.[163] Services and theater commands have the same grade. The overlap of areas or units of responsibility may create disputes requiring CMC arbitration.[163]

As part of the 2015 reforms, military regions were replaced by theatre commands in 2016.[164] Military regions were − uinlike the theatre commands − army-centric[165] peacetime administrative organizations,[166] and joint wartime commands were created on-demand by the army-dominated General Staff Department.[166]

Organization table[edit | edit source]

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Academic institutions[edit | edit source]

There are two academic institutions directly subordinate to the CMC, the National Defense University and the National University of Defense Technology, and they are considered the two top military education institutions in China. There are also 35 institutions affiliated to the PLA's branches and arms, and 7 institutions affiliated to the People's Armed Police.[167]

People's Armed Forces Department[edit | edit source]

page-not-found

Service branches[edit | edit source]

The PLA consists of four services (Ground Force, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force) and four arms (Aerospace Force, Cyberspace Force, Information Support Force, and Joint Logistics Support Force).[168]

Services[edit | edit source]

The PLA maintains four services (Chinese: 军种; pinyin: jūnzhǒng): the Ground Force, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Rocket Force. Following the 200,000 and 300,000 personnel reduction announced in 2003 and 2005 respectively, the total strength of the PLA has been reduced from 2.5 million to around 2 million.[169] The reductions came mainly from non-combat ground forces, which would allow more funds to be diverted to naval, air, and strategic missile forces. This shows China's shift from ground force prioritization to emphasizing air and naval power with high-tech equipment for offensive roles over disputed territories, particularly in the South China Sea.[170]

Ground Force[edit | edit source]

A Type 99A main battle tank in service with the PLAGF

The PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) is the largest of the PLA's five services with 960,000 active duty personnel, approximately half of the PLA's total manpower of around 2 million personnel.[2] The PLAGF is organized into twelve active duty group armies sequentially numbered from the 71st Group Army to the 83rd Group Army which are distributed to each of the PRC's five theatre commands, receiving two to three group armies per command. In wartime, numerous PLAGF reserve and paramilitary units may be mobilized to augment these active group armies. The PLAGF reserve component comprises approximately 510,000 personnel divided into thirty infantry and twelve anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) divisions. The PLAGF is led by Commander Li Qiaoming and Political Commissar Chen Hui (general).[171][172]

Navy[edit | edit source]

A PLAN destroyer conducting maritime interdiction operations at RIMPAC 2016

Until the early 1990s, the PLA Navy (PLAN) performed a subordinate role to the PLA Ground Force (PLAGF). Since then it has undergone rapid modernisation. The 300,000 strong PLAN is organized into three major fleets: the North Sea Fleet headquartered at Qingdao, the East Sea Fleet headquartered at Ningbo, and the South Sea Fleet headquartered in Zhanjiang.[173] Each fleet consists of a number of surface ship, submarine, naval air force, coastal defence, and marine units.[174][2]

The navy includes a 25,000 strong Marine Corps (organised into seven brigades), a 18,000 strong Naval Aviation Force operating several hundred attack helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft.[175] As part of its overall programme of naval modernisation, the PLAN is in the stage of developing a blue water navy.[176] In November 2012, then Party General Secretary Hu Jintao reported to the CCP's 18th National Congress his desire to "enhance our capacity for exploiting marine resource and build China into a strong maritime power".[177] According to the United States Department of Defense, the PLAN has numerically the largest navy in the world.[178] The PLAN is led by Commander Hu Zhongming and Political Commissar is currently vacant.[179][180]

Air Force[edit | edit source]

A Chengdu J-20 5th generation stealth fighter

The 403,000 strong People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) was organized into five Theatre Command Air Forces (TCAF) and 24 air divisions.[2] As of 2024, the system has been changed into 11 Corps Deputy-grade "Bases" controlling air brigades.[181] Divisions have been mostly converted to brigades,[181] although some (specifically the Bomber divisions, and some of the special mission units)[2] remain operational as divisions. The largest operational units within the Aviation Corps is the air division, which has 2 to 3 aviation regiments, each with 20 to 36 aircraft. An Air Brigade has from 24 to 50 aircraft.[182]

The surface-to-air missile (SAM) Corps is organized into SAM divisions and brigades. There are also three airborne divisions manned by the PLAAF. J-XX and XXJ are names applied by Western intelligence agencies to describe programs by the People's Republic of China to develop one or more fifth-generation fighter aircraft.[183][184] The PLAAF is led by Commander Chang Dingqiu and Political Commissar Guo Puxiao.[185][186]

Rocket Force[edit | edit source]

DF-21Ds at the 2015 Victory Parade

The People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) is the main strategic missile force of the PLA and consists of at least 125,000 personnel.[2] It controls China's nuclear and conventional strategic missiles.[187] China's total nuclear arsenal size is estimated to be between 100 and 400 thermonuclear warheads. The PLARF is organized into bases sequentially numbered from 61 through 67, wherein the first six are operational and allocated to the nation's theatre commands while Base 67 serves as the PRC's central nuclear weapons storage facility.[188] The PLARF is led by Commander Vacant and Political Commissar Xu Xisheng.[189][190]

Arms[edit | edit source]

The PLA maintains four arms (Chinese: 兵种): the Aerospace Force, the Cyberspace Force, the Information Support Force, and the Joint Logistics Support Force. The four-arm system was established on 19 April 2024.[168]

Personnel[edit | edit source]

Recruitment and terms of service[edit | edit source]

The PLA began as an all-volunteer force. In 1955, as part of an effort to modernize the PLA, the first Military Service Law created a system of compulsory military service.[1] Since the late 1970s, the PLA has been a hybrid force that combines conscripts and volunteers.[1][191][192] Conscripts who fulfilled their service obligation can stay in the military as volunteer soldiers for a total of 16 years.[1][192] De jure, military service with the PLA is obligatory for all Chinese citizens. However, mandatory military service has not been enacted in China since 1949.[193][194] Due to the effect of the one-child policy, over 70 percent of the PLA and 80 percent of its combat troops come from one-child households, according to Liu Mingfu of the National Defense University.[195]

Women and ethnic minorities[edit | edit source]

Female Colonel of the Joint Logistics Support Force

Women participated extensively in unconventional warfare, including in combat positions, in the Chinese Red Army during the revolutionary period, Chinese Civil War (1927–1949) and the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945).[196][197] After the establishment of the People's Republic of China, along with the People's Liberation Army (PLA)'s transition toward the conventional military organization, the role of women in the armed forces gradually reduced to support, medical, and logistics roles.[196] It was considered a prestigious choice for women to join the military. Serving in the military opens up opportunities for education, training, higher status, and relocation to cities after completing the service. During the Cultural Revolution, military service was regarded as a privilege and a method to avoid the Down to the Countryside Movement.[196]

In the 1980s, the PLA underwent large-scale demobilization amid the reform and opening up, and women were discharged back to civilian society for economic development while the exclusion of women in the military expanded.[196] In the 1990s, the PLA revived the recruitment of female personnel in regular military formations but primarily focused on non-combat roles at specialized positions.[196] Most women were trained in areas such as academic/engineering, medics, communications, intelligence, cultural work, and administrative work, as these positions conform to the traditional gender roles. Women in the PLA were more likely to be cadets and officers instead of enlisted soldiers because of their specializations.[196] The military organization still preserved some female combat units as public exemplars of social equality.[196][197]

Both enlisted and cadet women personnel underwent the same basic training as their male counterparts in the PLA, but many of them serve in predominantly female organizations. Due to ideological reasons, the regulation governing the segregation of sex in the PLA is prohibited, but a quasi-segregated arrangement for women's organizations is still applied through considerations of convenience.[196] Women were likelier to hold commanding positions in female-heavy organizations such as medical, logistic, research, and political work units, but sometimes in combat units during peacetime.[196] In PLAAF, women traditionally pilot transport aircraft or serve as crew members.[198] There had been a small number of high-ranking female officials in the PLA since 1949, but the advancement of position had remained relatively uncommon.[196][197] In the 2010s, women were increasingly serving in combat roles, in mixed-gender organizations alongside their male counterparts, and to the same physical standard.[197]

The military actively promotes opportunities for women in the military, such as celebrating International Women's Day for the members of the armed forces, publicizing the number of firsts for female officers and enlisted personnel, including deployments with peacekeeping forces or serving on PLA Navy's first aircraft carrier, announcing female military achievements in state media, and promoting female special forces through news reports or popular media.[197] PLA does not publish detailed gender composition of its armed forces, but the Jamestown Foundation estimated approximately 5% of the active military force in China is female.[199]

National unity and territorial integrity are central themes of the Chinese Communist Revolution. The Chinese Red Army and the succeeding PLA actively recruited ethnic minorities. During the Chinese Civil War, Mongol cavalry units were formed. During the Korean War, as many as 50,000 ethnic Koreans in China volunteered to join the PLA. PLA's recruitment of minorities generally correlates to state policies. During the early years, minorities were given preferential treatment, with special attention given to recruitment and training. In the 1950s, ethnic Mongols accounted for 52% of all officers in Inner Mongolia military region. During the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, armed forces emphasized "socialist culture", assimilation policies, and the construction of common identities between soldiers of different ethnicities.[200]

For ethnic minority cadets and officials, overall development follows national policies. Typically, minority officers hold officer positions in their home regions. Examples included over 34% of the battalion and regimental cadres in Yi autonomous region militia were of the Yi ethnicity, and 45% of the militia cadres in Tibetan local militia were of Tibetan ethnicity. Ethnical minorities achieved high-ranking positions in the PLA, and the percentage of appointments appears to follow the ratio of the Chinese population composition.[200] Prominent figures included ethnic Mongol general Ulanhu, who served in high-ranking roles in the Inner Mongolian region and as vice president of China, and Saifuddin Azizi, a Lieutenant General and an ethnic Uyghur who served in the CCP Central Committee.[200] There were a few instances of ethnic distrust within the PLA, with one prominent example being the defection of Margub Iskhakov, an ethnic Muslim Tatar PLA general, to the Soviet Union in the 1960s. However, his defection largely contributed to his disillusion with the failed Great Leap Forward policies, instead of his ethnic background.[201] In modern times, ethnic representation is most visible among junior-ranking officers. Only a few minorities reach the highest-ranking positions.[201]

Rank structure[edit | edit source]

Officers[edit | edit source]

Template:Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Armies/OF/BlankTemplate:Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Armies/OF/People's Republic of ChinaTemplate:Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Navies/OF/People's Republic of ChinaTemplate:Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Air Forces/OF/People's Republic of ChinaTemplate:Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Air Forces/OF/People's Republic of China (PLARF)Template:Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Air Forces/OF/People's Republic of China (PLASSF)

Other ranks[edit | edit source]

Template:Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Armies/OR/People's Republic of ChinaTemplate:Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Navies/OR/People's Republic of ChinaTemplate:Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Air Forces/OR/People's Republic of ChinaTemplate:Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Air Forces/OR/People's Republic of China (PLARF)Template:Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Air Forces/OR/People's Republic of China (PLASSF)
Equivalent
NATO code
OR-9 OR-8 OR-7 OR-6 OR-5 OR-4 OR-3 OR-2 OR-1

Weapons and equipment[edit | edit source]

According to the United States Department of Defense, China is developing kinetic-energy weapons, high-powered lasers, high-powered microwave weapons, particle-beam weapons, and electromagnetic pulse weapons with its increase of military fundings.[202]

Responding to reports that its modernisation is dependent on sales of advanced technology from American allies, PLA senior leadership have stated: "Some have politicized China's normal commercial cooperation with foreign countries, damaging our reputation." These contributions include advanced European diesel engines for Chinese warships, military helicopter designs from Eurocopter, French anti-submarine sonars and helicopters,[203] Australian technology for the Houbei class missile boat,[204] and Israeli supplied American missile, laser and aircraft technology.[205]

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's data, China became the world's third largest exporter of major arms in 2010–14, an increase of 143 percent from the period 2005–2009.[206] SIPRI also calculated that China surpassed Russia to become the world's second largest arms exporter by 2020.[207]

China's share of global arms exports hence increased from 3 to 5 percent. China supplied major arms to 35 states in 2010–14. A significant percentage (just over 68 percent) of Chinese exports went to three countries: Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. China also exported major arms to 18 African states. Examples of China's increasing global presence as an arms supplier in 2010–14 included deals with Venezuela for armoured vehicles and transport and trainer aircraft, with Algeria for three frigates, with Indonesia for the supply of hundreds of anti-ship missiles and with Nigeria for the supply of several unmanned combat aerial vehicles.[208]

Following rapid advances in its arms industry, China has become less dependent on arms imports, which decreased by 42 percent between 2005–09 and 2010–14. Russia accounted for 61 percent of Chinese arms imports, followed by France with 16 percent and Ukraine with 13 per cent. Helicopters formed a major part of Russian and French deliveries, with the French designs produced under licence in China.[208]

Over the years, China has struggled to design and produce effective engines for combat and transport vehicles. It continued to import large numbers of engines from Russia and Ukraine in 2010–14 for indigenously designed combat, advanced trainer and transport aircraft, and naval ships. It also produced British-, French- and German-designed engines for combat aircraft, naval ships and armoured vehicles, mostly as part of agreements that have been in place for decades.[208]

In August 2021, China tested a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile that circled the globe before speeding towards its target.[209] The Financial Times reported that "the test showed that China had made astounding progress on hypersonic weapons and was far more advanced than U.S. officials realized."[210] During the Zapad 2021 joint strategic exercise, most of the gear comprised novel Chinese arms such as the KJ-500 airborne early warning and control aircraft, J-20 and J-16 fighters, Y-20 transport planes, and surveillance and combat drones.[211] Another joint forces exercise took place in August 2023 near Alaska.[212]

On 24 September 2024, the PLARF performed its first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test over the Pacific Ocean since the early 1980s.[213][214]

Cyberwarfare[edit | edit source]

There is a belief in the Western military doctrines that the PLA have already begun engaging countries using cyber-warfare.[215] There has been a significant increase in the number of presumed Chinese military initiated cyber events from 1999 to the present day.[216]

Cyberwarfare has gained recognition as a valuable technique because it is an asymmetric technique that is a part of information operations and information warfare. As is written by two PLAGF Colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui in the book Unrestricted Warfare, "Methods that are not characterized by the use of the force of arms, nor by the use of military power, nor even by the presence of casualties and bloodshed, are just as likely to facilitate the successful realization of the war's goals, if not more so.[217]

While China has long been suspected of cyber spying, on 24 May 2011 the PLA announced the existence of having 'cyber capabilities'.[218]

In February 2013, the media named "Comment Crew" as a hacker military faction for China's People's Liberation Army.[219] In May 2014, a Federal Grand Jury in the United States indicted five Unit 61398 officers on criminal charges related to cyber attacks on private companies based in the United States after alleged investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation who exposed their identities in collaboration with US intelligence agencies such as the CIA.[220][221]

In February 2020, the United States government indicted members of China's People's Liberation Army for the 2017 Equifax data breach, which involved hacking into Equifax and plundering sensitive data as part of a massive heist that also included stealing trade secrets, though the CCP denied these claims.[222][223]

Nuclear capabilities[edit | edit source]

The range of the PLA Rocket Force's medium and intercontinental ballistic missiles (2006)

The first of China's nuclear weapons tests took place in 1964, and its first hydrogen bomb test occurred in 1967 at Lop Nur. Tests continued until 1996, when the country signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), but did not ratify it.[224]

The number of nuclear warheads in China's arsenal remains a state secret.[225] There are varying estimates of the size of China's arsenal. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and Federation of American Scientists estimated in 2024 that China has a stockpile of approximately 438 nuclear warheads,[225][226] while the United States Department of Defense put the estimate at more than 500 operational nuclear warheads,[227] making it the third-largest in the world.

China's policy has traditionally been one of no first use while maintaining a deterrent retaliatory force targeted for countervalue targets.[228] According to a 2023 study by the National Defense University, China's nuclear doctrine has historically leaned toward maintaining a secure second-strike capability.[229]

Space[edit | edit source]

Having witnessed the crucial role of space to United States military success in the Gulf War, China continues to view space as a critical domain in both conflict and international strategic competition.[230][231] The PLA operates a various satellite constellations performing reconnaissance, navigation, communication, and counterspace functions.[232][233][234][235] Planners at PLA's National Defense University project China's space actions as retaliatory or preventative, following conditions like an attack on a Chinese satellite, an attack on China, or the interruption of a PLA amphibious landing.[236] According to this approach, PLA planners assume that the country must have the capacity for retaliation and second-strike capability against a powerful opponent.[236] PLA planners envision a limited space war and therefore seek to identify weak but critical nodes in other space systems.[236]

Significant components of the PLA's space-based reconnaissance include Jianbing (vanguard) satellites with cover names Yaogan (遥感; 'remote sensing') and Gaofen (高分; 'high resolution').[232][237] These satellites collect electro-optical (EO) imagery to collect a literal representation of a target, synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery to penetrate the cloudy climates of southern China,[238] and electronic intelligence (ELINT) to provide targeting intelligence on adversarial ships.[239][240] The PLA also leverages a restricted, high-performance service of the country's BeiDou positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) satellites for its forces and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms.[241][242] For secure communications, the PLA uses the Zhongxing and Fenghuo series of satellites which enable secure data and voice transmission over C-band, Ku-band, and UHF.[234] PLA deployment of anti-satellite and counterspace satellites including those of the Shijian and Shiyan series have also brought significant concern from western nations.[243][235][244]

The PLA also plays a significant role in the Chinese space program.[230] To date, all the participants have been selected from members of the PLA Air Force.[230] China became the third country in the world to have sent a man into space by its own means with the flight of Yang Liwei aboard the Shenzhou 5 spacecraft on 15 October 2003,[245] the flight of Fei Junlong and Nie Haisheng aboard Shenzhou 6 on 12 October 2005,[246] and Zhai Zhigang, Liu Boming, and Jing Haipeng aboard Shenzhou 7 on 25 September 2008.[247]

The PLA started the development of an anti-ballistic and anti-satellite system in the 1960s, code named Project 640, including ground-based lasers and anti-satellite missiles.[248] On 11 January 2007, China conducted a successful test of an anti-satellite missile, with an SC-19 class KKV.[249]

The PLA has tested two types of hypersonic space vehicles, the Shenglong Spaceplane and a new one built by Chengdu Aircraft Corporation. Only a few pictures have appeared since it was revealed in late 2007. Earlier, images of the High-enthalpy Shock Waves Laboratory wind tunnel of the CAS Key Laboratory of high-temperature gas dynamics (LHD) were published in the Chinese media. Tests with speeds up to Mach 20 were reached around 2001.[250][251]

Budget[edit | edit source]

China's official military budget for 2025 was at 1.78 trillion yuan (US$246 billion), which is an increase of 7.2% over the last year.[252] The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimated that China's military expenditure was US$314 billion in 2024, the second-largest in the world after the United States and accounting for 12 percent of the world's defence expenditures.[3] Template:Military spending top 25 countries

Symbols[edit | edit source]

Anthem[edit | edit source]

The Central Military Band of the People's Liberation Army of China at the Great Hall of the People. The band is a common performer of the military anthem of the PLA at ceremonial protocol events.

The March of the Chinese People's Liberation Army was adopted as the military anthem by the Central Military Commission on 25 July 1988.[253] The lyrics of the anthem were written by composer Gong Mu (real name: Zhang Yongnian; Chinese: 张永年) and the music was composed by Korea-born Chinese composer Zheng Lücheng.[254][255]

Flag and insignia[edit | edit source]

The PLA's insignia consists of a roundel with a red star bearing the two Chinese characters "八一"(literally "eight-one"), referring to the Nanchang uprising which began on 1 August 1927 (first day of the eighth month) and symbolic as the CCP's founding of the PLA.[256] The inclusion of the two characters ("八一") is symbolic of the party's revolutionary history carrying strong emotional connotations of the political power which it shed blood to obtain. The flag of the Chinese People's Liberation Army is the war flag of the People's Liberation Army; the layout of the flag has a golden star at the top left corner and "八一" to the right of the star, placed on a red field. Each service branch also has its flags: The top ​58 of the flags is the same as the PLA flag; the bottom ​38 are occupied by the colors of the branches.[257]

The flag of the Ground Forces has a forest green bar at the bottom. The naval ensign has stripes of blue and white at the bottom. The Air Force uses a sky blue bar. The Rocket Force uses a yellow bar at the bottom. The forest green represents the earth, the blue and white stripes represent the seas, the sky blue represents the air and the yellow represents the flare of missile launching.[258][259]

See also[edit | edit source]

References[edit | edit source]

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Preceded by
Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army
Armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party
1 November 1948 – present
Incumbent

Template:People's Liberation Army

Template:Military of Asia