Bengal famine of 1943: Difference between revisions

{{Use British English|date=April 2017}}

{{Use dmy dates|date=October 2020}}

The '''Bengal famine of 1943''' was a [[famine in India|famine]] in the [[Bengal Presidency|Bengal province]] of [[British Raj|British India]] (present-day [[Bangladesh]], [[West Bengal]], [[Odisha]]  and eastern India) during [[World War II]]. An estimated 800,000 to 3.8 million Bengalis perished,{{efn-ua|name=estimates|The estimates do not include Orissa. There has been a wide range of estimates since the famine. See {{harvtxt|Maharatna|1996|pp=214–231}}, especially table 5.1 on page 215, for a review of the data. {{harvtxt|Devereux|2000|p=6}} suggested a range of 2.1–3 million, deriving the lower figure from {{harvtxt|Dyson|Maharatna|1991}} and the upper from [[Amartya Sen]]'s "widely quoted figure of 3 million".{{sfn|Devereux|2000|p=5}} Sen estimated between 2.7 and 3 million deaths for the period 1943–1946.<ref>{{harvnb|A. Sen|1980|p=202}}; {{harvnb|A. Sen|1981a|p=201}}.</ref>{{pb}}

Contemporaneous estimates included, in 1945, that of the Famine Inquiry Commission – appointed in 1944 by the Government of India and chaired by Sir John Woodhead – of around 1.5 million famine-related deaths out of Bengal's population of 60.3 million.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|pp=109–110}} That figure covered January 1943 to June 1944.{{sfn|Greenough|1982|p=300}} K. P. Chattopadhyay, a [[University of Calcutta]] anthropologist, estimated in 1944 that 3.5 million famine-related deaths had occurred in 1943; this was widely believed at the time, but subsequently rejected by many scholars as too high ({{harvnb|Greenough|1982|pp=300–301}}; {{harvnb|Dyson|Maharatna|1991|p=281}}).&nbsp;}} out of a population of 60.3 million, from [[starvation]], [[malaria]] and other diseases aggravated by [[malnutrition]], [[population displacement]], unsanitary conditions and lack of [[health care]] due to a combination of factors, including government policies, war-time disruption of food distribution, and high cyclones and floods. Millions were impoverished as the crisis overwhelmed large segments of the economy and catastrophically disrupted the social fabric. Eventually, families disintegrated; men sold their small farms and left home to look for work or to join the [[British Indian Army]], and women and children became homeless migrants, often travelling to [[Kolkata|Calcutta]] or other large cities in search of organised relief.{{sfnm|1a1=Famine Inquiry Commission|1y=1945a|1p=67|2a1=Greenough|2y=1980|2pp=227–228}} Some scholars characterise the famine as [[Anthropogenic hazard|anthropogenic]] (man-made),{{sfnm|1a1=A. Sen|1y=1976|2a1=A. Sen|2y=1981a|3a1=Ó Gráda|3y=2015|3p=90}} asserting that wartime [[Colonization|colonial]] policies exacerbated the crisis.<ref name="BBC 2020">{{cite web | last=Limaye | first=Yogita | title=Churchill's legacy leaves Indians questioning his hero status | website=BBC News | date=20 July 2020 | url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-53405121 | access-date=18 October 2022}}</ref> Others argue that the famine was the result of natural causes.{{sfnm|1a1=Bowbrick|1y=1986|2a1=Tauger|2y=2003}}

{{main|British Raj#Famines, epidemics, and public health}}

There are three [[Rice#Ecotypes and cultivars|seasonal rice crops]] in Bengal. By far the most important is the winter crop of ''aman'' rice. Sown in May and June and harvested in November and December, it produces about 70% of the total annual crop.{{sfnm|1a1=A. Sen|1y=1977|1p=36|2a1=Tauger|2y=2009|2pp=167–168}} Crucially, the [[#1942–1943: Shortfall and carryover|(debated) shortfall]] in rice production in 1942 occurred during the all-important ''aman'' harvest.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|pp=32–33}}

Structural changes in the credit market and land transfer rights pushed Bengal into recurring danger of famine and dictated which economic groups would suffer greatest hardship.{{sfnm|1a1=Mukherji|1y=1986|1p=PE-21|2a1=Iqbal|2y=2009|2pp=1346–1351}} The British Indian system of [[land tenure]], particularly in Bengal,{{sfn|Bekker|1951|pp=319, 326}} was very complex, with rights unequally divided among three diverse economic and social groups: traditional absentee large landowners or ''[[zamindar]]s''; the upper-tier "wealthy peasant" ''[[jotedar]]s''; and, at the lower socioeconomic level, the ''[[ryot]]'' (peasant) smallholders and dwarfholders, ''bargadars'' ([[sharecropper]]s), and agricultural labourers.{{sfn|Das|2008|p=60}} ''Zamindar'' and ''jotedar'' landowners were protected by law and custom,{{sfn|Cooper|1983|p=230}} but those who cultivated the soil, with small or no landholdings, suffered persistent and increasing losses of land rights and welfare. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the power and influence of the landowners fell and that of the ''jotedars'' rose. Particularly in less developed regions, ''jotedars'' gained power as grain or jute traders and, more importantly, by making loans to sharecroppers, agricultural labourers and ryots.{{sfnm|1a1=Ray|1a2=Ray|1y=1975|1p=84|2a1=Brennan|2a2=Heathcote|2a3=Lucas|2y=1984|2p=9}}{{efn-ua|"... a peasant [i.e., ryot] differs from a landless labourer in terms of ownership (since he owns land, which the labourer does not), the landless share-cropper differs from the landless labourer not in their respective ownerships, but in the way they can use the only resource they own, viz. labour power. The landless labourer will be employed in exchange for a wage, while the share-cropper will do the cultivation and own a part of the ''product'' [including especially rice]" {{harv|A. Sen|1981a|p=5}}.}} They gained power over their tenants using a combination of [[debt bondage]] through the transfer of debts and mortgages, and parcel-by-parcel land-grabbing.{{sfnm|1a1=Mukherji|1y=1986|2a1=S. Bose|2y=1982b|2pp=472–473}}

The fall of Burma brought Bengal close to the war front; its impact fell more strongly on Bengal than elsewhere in India.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=103}} Major urban areas, especially Calcutta, drew increasing numbers of workers into military industries and troops from many nations. Unskilled labourers from Bengal and nearby provinces were employed by military contractors, particularly for the construction of American and British airfields.{{sfn|Iqbal|2011|p=278}} Hundreds of thousands of American, British, Indian, and Chinese troops arrived in the province,{{sfn|J. Mukherjee|2015|pp=131–132}} straining domestic supplies and leading to scarcities across wide ranges of daily necessities.{{sfnm|1a1=Famine Inquiry Commission|1y=1945a|1pp=170–171|2a1=Greenough|2y=1980|2p=222|3a1=J. Mukherjee|3y=2015|3pp=40–41, 110, 191|4a1=De|4y=2006|4p=2}} The general inflationary pressures of a war-time economy caused prices to rise rapidly across the entire spectrum of goods and services.{{sfn|A. Sen|1981a|pp=50, 67–70}} Economist [[Utsa Patnaik]] writes of [[John Maynard Keynes]]'s deliberately inflationary policies, designed to reduce the consumption of the poor and move resources away from India's general population to finance war spending, leading to price increases that dramatically diminished people's consumption of food.{{sfn|Patnaik|2018|pp=33–34,38–39}} The rise in prices was "not disturbing" until 1941, when it became more alarming.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|pp=19–20}} Then in early 1943, the rate of inflation for foodgrains in particular took an [[#1942–43: Price chaos|unprecedented upward turn]].{{sfn|S. Bose|1990|p=715}}

The second prong, a "boat denial" policy, was designed to deny Bengali transport to any invading Japanese army. It applied to districts readily accessible via the Bay of Bengal and the larger rivers that flow into it. Implemented on 1 May after an initial registration period,{{sfnm|1a1=J. Mukherjee|1y=2015|1pp=63–65|2a1=De|2y=2006|2p=13}} the policy authorised the Army to confiscate, relocate or destroy any boats large enough to carry more than ten people, and allowed them to requisition other means of transport such as bicycles, bullock carts, and elephants.{{sfnm|1a1=A. Sen|1y=1977|1p=45|2a1=Bayly|2a2=Harper|2y=2005|2pp=284–285|3a1=Iqbal|3y=2011|3p=274|4a1=J. Mukherjee|4y=2015|4p=67|4ps=&nbsp;Instructions were given in May for the confiscation, destruction or removal of all mechanical transport – private cars, bicycles, carriages and bullock carts "not required for Military of Civil Defense purposes" –– the Victoria Memorial was "camouflaged" in cow dung, andplans were hatched to blow up as many as seventeen bridges in and around Calcutta.}} Under this policy, the Army confiscated approximately 45,000 rural boats,{{sfn|J. Mukherjee|2015|p=9}} severely disrupting river-borne movement of labour, supplies and food, and compromising the livelihoods of boatmen and fishermen.{{sfnm|1a1=Ó Gráda|1y=2009|1p=154|2a1=Brennan|2y=1988|2pp=542–543, ''note{{nbsp}}3''}} Leonard G. Pinnell, a British civil servant who headed the Bengal government's Department of Civil Supplies, told the Famine Commission that the policy "completely broke the economy of the fishing class".{{sfn|Mukerjee|2010|pp=98, 139}} Transport was generally unavailable to carry seed and equipment to distant fields or rice to the market hubs.{{sfnm|1a1=Iqbal|1y=2011|1p=272|2a1=S. Bose|2y=1990|2p=717}} Artisans and other groups who relied on boat transport to carry goods to market were offered no recompense; neither were rice growers nor the network of migratory labourers.{{sfn|De|2006|p=13}} The large-scale removal or destruction of rural boats caused a near-complete breakdown of the existing transport and administration infrastructure and market system for movement of rice paddy.{{sfnm|1a1=J. Mukherjee|1y=2015|1p=9|2a1=Pinnell|2y=1944|2p=5, "Army Proposal of 23 April submitted to Chief Civil Defence Commissioner, Bengal"|2ps=, as cited in {{harvnb|Greenough|1982|p=89}}}} No steps were taken to provide for the maintenance or repair of the confiscated boats,{{sfn|Iqbal|2011|p=276}} and many fishermen were unable to return to their trade.{{sfn|De|2006|p=13}} The Army took no steps to distribute food rations to make up for the interruption of supplies.{{sfn|Bayly|Harper|2005|pp=284–285}}

These policies had important political ramifications. The [[Indian National Congress]], among other groups, staged protests denouncing the denial policies for placing draconian burdens on Bengali peasants; these were part of a nationalist sentiment and outpouring that later peaked in the "Quit India" movement.{{sfnm|1a1=J. Mukherjee|1y=2015|1pp=67–74|2a1=Bhattacharya|2y=2013|2pp=21–23}} The policies' wider impact&nbsp;– the extent to which they compounded or even caused the famine to occur one year later&nbsp;– has been the subject of much [[#Historiography|discussion]].{{sfnm|1a1=J. Mukherjee|1y=2015|1pp=58–67|2a1=Iqbal|2y=2011}}

Many [[Presidencies and provinces of British India#Administration under the Crown (1858–1947)|Indian provinces]] and [[princely state]]s imposed inter-provincial trade barriers from mid-1942, preventing trade in domestic rice. Anxiety and soaring rice prices, triggered by the fall of Burma,{{sfn|Knight|1954|p=270}} were one underlying reason for the trade barriers. Trade imbalances brought on by price controls were another.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=24}} The power to restrict inter-provincial trade was given to provincial governments in November 1941 under the [[Defence of India Act, 1939]].{{efn-ua|"On 29 November 1941 the central government conferred, by notification, concurrent powers on the provincial governments under the Defence of India Rules (DIR) to restrict/prohibit the movement of food grains and to requisition both food grains and any other commodity they considered necessary. With regard to food grains, the provincial governments had the power to restrict/stop, seize them and regulate their price, divert them from their usual channels of transportation and, as stated, their movement".{{harv|De|2006|p=8}}}} Provincial governments began setting up trade barriers that prevented the flow of foodgrains (especially rice) and other goods between provinces. These barriers reflected a desire to see that local populations were well fed, thus forestalling local emergencies.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|pp=17, 192}}

The loss of Burma reinforced the strategic importance of Calcutta as the hub of [[heavy industry]] and the main supplier of armaments and textiles for the entire Asian theatre.{{sfn|J. Mukherjee|2015|pp=47, 131}} To support its wartime mobilisation, the British Indian Government categorised the population into socioeconomic groups of "priority" and "non-priority" classes, according to their relative importance to the war effort.{{sfn|Bhattacharya|Zachariah|1999|p=77}} Members of the "priority" classes were largely composed of ''[[bhadralok]]s'', who were [[upper-class]] or [[bourgeois]] [[middle-class]], socially mobile, educated, urban, and sympathetic to Western values and modernisation. Protecting their interests was a major concern of both private and public relief efforts.{{sfnm|1a1=Greenough|1y=1982|pp=133–136|2a1=Brennan|2y=1988|2pp=559–560}} This placed the rural poor in direct competition for scarce basic supplies with workers in public agencies, war-related industries, and in some cases even politically well-connected middle-class agriculturalists.{{sfn|Bhattacharya|2002a|p=103}}

Bengal was affected by a series of natural disasters late in 1942. The winter rice crop was afflicted by a severe outbreak of fungal [[brown spot disease]], while, on 16–17 October a [[cyclone]] and three [[storm surge]]s ravaged croplands, destroyed houses and killing thousands, at the same time dispersing high levels of [[fungal spore]]s across the region and increasing the spread of the crop disease.{{sfn|Ó Gráda|2007|p=10}} The fungus reduced the crop yield even more than the cyclone.{{sfnm|1a1=Braund|1y=1944|2a1=Famine Inquiry Commission|2y=1945a|2p=32}} After describing the horrific conditions he had witnessed, the [[mycology|mycologist]] S.Y.{{nbsp}}Padmanabhan wrote that the outbreak was similar in impact to the [[potato blight]] that caused the Irish [[Great Famine (Ireland)|Great Famine]]: "Though administrative failures were immediately responsible for this human suffering, the principal cause of the short crop production of 1942 was the [plant] epidemic&nbsp;... nothing as devastating&nbsp;... has been recorded in plant pathological literature".{{sfn|Padmanabhan|1973|pp=11, 23|ps=, as cited in {{harvnb|Dyson|2018|p=185}}. Also cited in {{harvnb|Tauger|2003}}, {{harvnb|Tauger|2009|pp=176–179}}, and {{harvnb|Iqbal|2010}} among others.}}

{{Quotation|Corpses lay scattered over several thousand square miles of devastated land, 7,400 villages were partly or wholly destroyed, and standing flood waters remained for weeks in at least 1,600 villages. Cholera, dysentery and other water-borne diseases flourished. 527,000 houses and 1,900 schools were lost, over 1,000 square miles of the most fertile paddy land in the province was entirely destroyed, and the standing crop over an additional 3,000 square miles was damaged.{{sfn|J. Mukherjee|2015|pp=78–79}}}}

Experts' disagreement over political issues can be found in differing explanations of the War Cabinet's refusal to allocate funds to import grain. Lizzie Collingham holds the massive global dislocations of supplies caused by World War II virtually guaranteed that hunger would occur somewhere in the world, yet Churchill's animosity and perhaps racism toward Indians decided the exact location where famine would fall.{{sfn|Collingham|2012|p=153}} Similarly, Madhusree Mukerjee makes a stark accusation: "The War Cabinet's shipping assignments made in August 1943, shortly after Amery had pleaded for famine relief, show Australian wheat flour travelling to Ceylon, the Middle East, and Southern Africa – everywhere in the Indian Ocean but to India. Those assignments show a will to punish."{{sfn|Mukerjee|2010|pp=112–114; 273}} In contrast, Mark Tauger strikes a more supportive stance: "In the Indian Ocean alone from January 1942 to May 1943, the Axis powers sank 230 British and Allied merchant ships totalling 873,000 tons, in other words, a substantial boat every other day. British hesitation to allocate shipping concerned not only potential diversion of shipping from other war-related needs but also the prospect of losing the shipping to attacks without actually [bringing help to] India at all."{{sfn|Tauger|2009|p=193}} Peter Bowbrick elaborates further on the British government's delay in shipping food, stating that Linlithgow's request for food shipments in December 1942 was half-hearted and that it was made on the assumption that Bengal already had a food surplus but that it was being hoarded, which is why it was ignored by the British metropolitan government. Further delays after April 1943 stemmed from the refusal to divert ships away from the preparations for [[Operation Overlord]], whose failure would have been disastrous for the world and whose success was as a result prioritised above aid to India.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Bowbrick |first1=Peter |date=2 March 2022 |title=Falsehoods and myths in famine research: The Bengal famine and Daoud |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/jid.3635 |journal=Journal of International Development |pages=jid.3635 |doi=10.1002/jid.3635 |s2cid=247336051 |access-date=20 April 2022}}</ref> Historian [[James Holland (author)|James Holland]] writes that the reluctance of Churchill to divert shipping to India stemmed from his moral calculus concluding that potentially hindering crucial Allied military campaigns in [[Allied invasion of Sicily|Sicily]] and [[Allied invasion of Italy|Italy]] and delaying preparations for Operation Overlord by diverting merchant ships to India was too great a risk to undertake; Holland further noted that "ships could not be diverted from the far side of the Atlantic, for example, at the drop of a hat."{{sfn|Holland|2016|p=86}}

The rails had been repaired in August and pressure from the Government of India brought substantial supplies into Calcutta during September,{{sfn|Greenough|1982|p=136}} Linlithgow's final month as Viceroy. However, a second problem emerged: the Civil Supplies Department of Bengal was undermanned and under-equipped to distribute the supplies, and the resulting transportation bottleneck left very large piles of grain accumulating in the open air in several locations, including Calcutta's Botanical Garden.{{sfnm|1a1=Famine Inquiry Commission|1y=1945a|1pp=61–62|ps=, as cited in {{harvnb|Schneer|1947|p=176}}|2a1=Greenough|2y=1980|2p=214}} [[Field marshal (United Kingdom)|Field Marshal]] Archibald Wavell replaced Linlithgow that October, within two weeks he had requested military support for the transport and distribution of crucial supplies. This assistance was delivered promptly, including "a full [[Division (military)|division]] of... 15,000 [British] soldiers...military [[truck|lorries]] and the [[Royal Air Force]]" and distribution to even the most distant rural areas began on a large scale.{{sfnm|1a1=Famine Inquiry Commission|1y=1945a|1pp=62–63|2a1=J. Mukherjee|2y=2015|2pp=140–142}} In particular, grain was imported from [[the Punjab]], and medical resources{{sfn|J. Mukherjee|2015|p=141}} were made far more available.{{sfnm|1a1=Famine Inquiry Commission|1y=1945a|1pp=62–63, 75, 139–40|2a1=Brennan|2y=1988|2p=558}} Rank-and-file soldiers, who had sometimes fed the destitute from their rations (defying orders not to do so),{{sfn|Mukerjee|2010|p=194}} were held in esteem by Bengalis for the efficiency of their work in distributing relief.{{sfn|Khan|2015|p=215}} That December, the "largest [rice] paddy crop ever seen" in Bengal was harvested. According to Greenough, large amounts of land previously used for other crops had been switched to rice production. The price of rice began to fall.{{sfn|Greenough|1982|p=140}} Survivors of the famine and epidemics gathered the harvest themselves,{{sfn|Mukerjee|2010|p=213}} though in some villages there were no survivors capable of doing the work.{{sfn|Callahan|2011|p=323}} Wavell went on to make several other key policy steps, including promising that aid from other provinces would continue to feed the Bengal countryside, setting up a minimum rations scheme,{{sfn|Greenough|1982|p=140}} and (after considerable effort) prevailing upon Great Britain to increase international imports.{{sfn|J. Mukherjee|2015|p=194}} He has been widely praised for his decisive and effective response to the crisis.{{sfnm|1a1=Famine Inquiry Commission|1y=1945a|1pp=2, 106|2a1=J. Mukherjee|2y=2015|2pp=140–142}} All official food relief work ended in December 1943 and January 1944.{{sfn|Greenough|1982|pp=136–137}}

Calcutta's two leading English-language newspapers were ''The Statesman'' (at the time British-owned){{sfnm|1a1=A. Sen|1y=1977|1p=52, ''fourth footnote''|2a1=Ó Gráda|2y=2015|2p=42}} and ''[[Amrita Bazar Patrika]]'' (edited by independence campaigner [[Tushar Kanti Ghosh]]).{{sfn|Newspaper baron|2014}} In the early months of the famine, the government applied pressure on newspapers to "calm public fears about the food supply"{{sfn|Ó Gráda|2015|p=4}} and follow the official stance that there was no rice shortage. This effort had some success; ''The Statesman'' published editorials asserting that the famine was due solely to speculation and hoarding, while "berating local traders and producers, and praising ministerial efforts".{{sfn|Ó Gráda|2015|p=4}}{{efn-ua|''The Statesman'' was the only major newspaper that had acquiesced to (or been persuaded by) government pressure to present the Quit India movement in a negative light&nbsp;({{harvnb|Greenough|1983|p=355 ''note{{nbsp}}7''}};&nbsp;{{harvnb|Greenough|1999|p=43 ''note{{nbsp}}7''}}).}} News of the famine was also subject to strict war-time censorship&nbsp;– even use of the word "famine" was prohibited{{sfn|J. Mukherjee|2015|p=125}}&nbsp;– leading ''The Statesman'' later to remark that the UK government "seems virtually to have withheld from the British public knowledge that there was famine in Bengal at all".{{sfn|Ó Gráda|2015|p=57}}

Beginning in mid-July 1943 and more so in August, however, these two newspapers began publishing detailed and increasingly critical accounts of the depth and scope of the famine, its impact on society, and the nature of British, Hindu, and Muslim political responses.{{sfn|Ó Gráda|2015|p=43}} A turning point in news coverage came on 22 August 1943,<!-- specific date requested for use on WP:ODT --> when the editor of ''The Statesman'', [[Ian Stephens (editor)|Ian Stephens]], solicited and published a series of graphic photos of the victims. These made world headlines{{sfn|Ó Gráda|2015|p=57}} and marked the beginning of domestic and international consciousness of the famine.{{sfnm|1a1=J. Mukherjee|1y=2015|1p=125|2a1=Mukerjee|2y=2010|2p=261}} The next morning, "in [[Delhi]] second-hand copies of the paper were selling at several times the news-stand price,"{{sfn|J. Mukherjee|2015|p=125}} and soon "in [[Washington, D.C.|Washington]] the [[United States Department of State|State Department]] circulated them among policy makers".{{sfn|Mukerjee|2010|p=261}} In Britain, ''The Guardian'' called the situation "horrible beyond description".{{sfn|Vernon|2009|p=148}} The images had a profound effect and marked "for many, the beginning of the end of colonial rule".{{sfn|Vernon|2009|p=148}} Stephens' decision to publish them and to adopt a defiant editorial stance won accolades from many (including the Famine Inquiry Commission),{{sfnm|1a1=A. Sen|1y=1977|2a1=Ó Gráda|2y=2015|2p=42}} and has been described as "a singular act of journalistic courage without which many more lives would have surely been lost".{{sfn|J. Mukherjee|2015|p=125}} The publication of the images, along with Stephens' editorials, not only helped to bring the famine to an end by driving the British government to supply adequate relief to the victims,{{sfnm|1a1=A. Sen|1y=2011|1p=341|2a1=Schiffrin|2y=2014|2pp=177–179}} but also inspired Amartya Sen's influential contention that the presence of a free press prevents famines in democratic countries.{{sfn|Schiffrin|2014|p=177}} The photographs also spurred ''Amrita Bazar Patrika'' and the Indian Communist Party's organ, ''People's War'', to publish similar images; the latter would make photographer [[Sunil Janah]] famous.{{sfn|Ó Gráda|2015|p=42|ps=, ''note{{nbsp}}13''; p.{{nbsp}}77, ''note{{nbsp}}132''}} Women journalists who covered the famine included Freda Bedi reporting for Lahore's ''The Tribune'',{{sfn|J. Mukherjee|2015|p=173}} and [[Vasudha Chakravarti]] and [[Kalyani Bhattacharjee]], who wrote from a nationalist perspective.{{sfn|Siegel|2018|p=36}}

The famine has been portrayed in novels, films and art. The novel ''Ashani Sanket'' by [[Bibhutibhushan Bandyopadhyay]] is a fictional account of a young doctor and his wife in rural Bengal during the famine. It was adapted into a film of the same name (''[[Distant Thunder (1973 film)|Distant Thunder]]'') by director [[Satyajit Ray]] in 1973. The film is listed in ''The New York Times Guide to the Best 1,000 Movies Ever Made''.{{sfn|Best movies|2003}} Also well-known are the novel ''So Many Hungers!'' (1947) by [[Bhabani Bhattacharya]] and the 1980 film ''[[Akaler Shandhaney]]'' by [[Mrinal Sen]]. [[Ella Sen]]'s collection of stories based on reality, ''Darkening Days: Being a Narrative of Famine-Stricken Bengal'' recounts horrific events from a woman's point of view.{{sfn|Siegel|2018|p=37}}

The degree of crop shortfall in late 1942 and its impact in 1943 has dominated the [[historiography]] of the famine.{{sfn|Ó Gráda|2015|p=12}}{{efn-ua|See for example {{harvtxt|A. Sen|1977}}, {{harvtxt|A. Sen|1981a}}, {{harvtxt|A. Sen|1981b}}, {{harvtxt|Bowbrick|1986}}, {{harvtxt|Tauger|2003}}, {{harvtxt|Islam|2007a}} and {{harvtxt|Devereux|2001}}.}} The issue reflects a larger debate between two perspectives: one emphasises the importance of food availability decline&nbsp;(FAD) as a cause for famine, and another focuses on the [[Theories of famines#Failure of exchange entitlements|failure of exchange entitlements]] (FEE). The FAD explanation blames famine on crop failures brought on principally by crises such as drought, flood, or man-made devastation from war. The FEE account agrees that such external factors are in some cases important, but holds that famine is primarily the interaction between pre-existing "structural vulnerability" (such as poverty) and a shock event (such as war or political interference in markets) that disrupts the economic market for food. When these interact, some groups within society can become unable to purchase or acquire food even though sufficient supplies are available.{{sfn|Devereux|2000|pp=19–21}}

Both the FAD and the FEE perspectives would agree that Bengal experienced at least some grain shortage in 1943 due to the loss of imports from Burma, damage from the cyclone, and brown-spot infestation. However, the FEE analyses do not consider shortage the main factor,{{sfn|Islam|2007a|p=424}} while FAD-oriented scholars such as Peter Bowbrick hold that a sharp drop in the food supply was the pivotal determining factor.{{sfn|Bowbrick|1986|pp=111–114}} S.Y.{{nbsp}}Padmanabhan and later Mark Tauger, in particular, argue that the impact of [[Cochliobolus miyabeanus|brown-spot disease]] was vastly underestimated, both during the famine and in later analyses.{{sfnm|1a1=Padmanabhan|1y=1973|1pp=11, 23|2a1=Tauger|2y=2003|2pp=65–67}} The signs of crop infestation by the fungus are subtle; given the social and administrative conditions at the time, local officials would very likely have overlooked them.{{sfn|Tauger|2009|pp=178–179}}

Sen does not deny that British misgovernment contributed to the crisis, but sees the policy failure as a complete misunderstanding of the cause of the famine. This misunderstanding led to a wholly misguided emphasis on measuring non-existent food shortages rather than addressing the very real and devastating inflation-driven imbalances in exchange entitlements.{{sfn|A. Sen|1977|pp=52–53}} In stark contrast, although Cormac Ó Gráda notes that the exchange entitlements view of this famine is generally accepted,{{sfn|Ó Gráda|2015|p=90|ps=: "The 1943–44 famine has become paradigmatic as an 'entitlements famine,' whereby speculation born of greed and panic produced an 'artificial' shortage of rice, the staple food."}} he lends greater weight to the importance of a crop shortfall than does Sen, and goes on to largely reject Sen's emphasis on hoarding and speculation.{{sfnm|1a1=Ó Gráda|1y=2008|1pp=25–28|2a1=Ó Gráda|2y=2015|2p=90}} He does not stop there but emphasises a "lack of political will" and the pressure of wartime priorities that drove the British government and the provincial government of Bengal to make fateful decisions: the "denial policies", the use of heavy shipping for war supplies rather than food, the refusal to officially declare a state of famine, and the [[Balkanization|Balkanisation]] of grain markets through inter-provincial trade barriers.{{sfnm|1a1=Ó Gráda|1y=2015|1p=90|1ps=&nbsp;"...the lack of political will to divert foodstuffs from the war effort rather than [market] speculation... was mainly responsible for the famine"|2a1=Ó Gráda|2y=2008|2pp=20, 33}} On this view, these policies were designed to serve British military goals at the expense of Indian interests,{{sfn|Ó Gráda|2009|pp=190–191}} reflecting the War Cabinet's willingness to "supply the Army's needs and let the Indian people starve if necessary".{{sfnm|1a1=Wavell|1y=1973|1pp=68, 122|2a1=S. Bose|2y=1990|2pp=716–717}} Far from being accidental, these dislocations were fully recognised beforehand as fatal for identifiable Indian groups whose economic activities did not directly, actively, or adequately advance British military goals.{{sfn|J. Mukherjee|2015|pp=251–252}} The policies may have met their intended wartime goals, but only at the cost of large-scale dislocations in the domestic economy. The British government, this argument maintains, thus bears moral responsibility for the rural deaths.{{sfn|Ó Gráda|2010|p=39}} Auriol Law-Smith's discussion of contributing causes of the famine also lays blame on the British Government of India, primarily emphasising Viceroy Linlithgow's lack of political will to "infringe provincial autonomy" by using his authority to remove interprovincial barriers, which would have ensured the free movement of life-saving grain.{{sfn|Law-Smith|1989|p=64}} [[Utsa Patnaik|Patnaik]]'s view is that the famine occurred due to high prices which reduced food consumption of the general population. According to Patnaik, this was caused by the British government's "profit inflation" policies, which were designed to finance war spending.{{sfn|Patnaik|2018|p=33-34,38–39}}

A related argument, present since the days of the famine{{sfn|Greenough|1983|p=375}} but expressed at length by journalist [[Madhusree Mukerjee]], accuses key figures in the British government (particularly Prime Minister Winston Churchill){{sfn|Hickman|2008|pp=238–240}} of genuine antipathy toward Indians and [[Winston Churchill#Indian independence|Indian independence]], an antipathy arising mainly from a desire to protect [[imperialism|imperialist]] power but sourced from [[racism|racist]] attitudes towards Indian people.{{sfn|Mukerjee|2010|pp=274–275}} This is sometimes attributed to British anger over widespread Bengali nationalist sentiment and the perceived treachery of the violent [[Quit India]] uprising.{{sfnm|1a1=Mukerjee|1y=2010|1p=273|2a1=Bayly|2a2=Harper|2y=2005|2p=286|3a1=Collingham|3y=2012|3pp=144–145}} Several historians have critiqued this view,{{sfnm|1a1=Herman|1y=2010|2a1=Roy|2y=2019|2pp=129–130|3a1=Masani|3y=2020}} with [[Tirthankar Roy]] referring to it as "naive".{{sfn|Roy|2019|pp=129–130}} Instead, Roy attributes the delayed response to rivalry and misinformation spread about the famine within the local government, particularly by the Minister of Civil Supplies [[Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy]], who maintained there was no food shortage throughout the famine, while noting that there is little evidence of Churchill's views influencing War Cabinet policy.{{sfn|Roy|2019|pp=129–130}}

For its part, the report of the Famine Commission&nbsp;(its members appointed in 1944 by the British Government of India{{sfn|Islam|2007a|p=423}} and chaired by Sir John Woodhead, a former Indian Civil Service official in Bengal),{{sfn|Ó Gráda|2009|p=161}} absolved the British government from all major blame.{{sfnm|1a1=Siegel|1y=2018|1p=43|2a1=Ó Gráda|2y=2008|2p=24 ''note 78''}} It acknowledge some failures in its price controls and transportation efforts{{sfn|Siegel|2018|p=43}} and laid additional responsibility at the feet of unavoidable fate, but reserved its broadest and most forceful finger-pointing for local politicians in the (largely Muslim){{sfn|J. Mukherjee|2015|p=185}}{{failed verification|date=April 2020}}<!-- Mukherjee p. 185 is not about where the Famine Commission assigned blame. This originally cited Ó Gráda (2015) p. 39, but that citation has migrated into the footnote.}} -->{{efn-ua|For example, in the 1937 Bengal Congress elections, Hindus won only 60 out of a total of 250 seats ({{harvnb|Prayer|2001|p=141|ps=&nbsp;''n 122''}}). The provincial government of Bengal was essentially under Muslim control from 1937 until 1947, ({{harvnb|Fraser|2006|p=13}}) including the office of [[Prime Minister of Bengal]].}} provincial [[Prime Minister of Bengal|Government of Bengal]]:{{sfn|Ó Gráda|2015|p=39}} As it stated, "after considering all the circumstances, we cannot avoid the conclusion that it lay in the power of the Government of Bengal, by bold, resolute and well-conceived measures at the right time to have largely prevented the tragedy of the famine as it actually took place".{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|p=105}} For example, the position of the Famine Inquiry Commission with respect to charges that prioritised distribution aggravated the famine is that the Government of Bengal's lack of control over supplies was the more serious matter.{{sfn|Famine Inquiry Commission|1945a|pp=100–102}} Some sources allege that the Famine Commission deliberately declined to blame the UK or was even designed to do so;{{sfnm|1a1=Ó Gráda|1y=2009|1p=179|2a1=Rangasami|2y=1985|2ps=.&nbsp;Cited approvingly in {{harvnb|Osmani|1993}} and {{harvnb|Mukerjee|2014|p=71}}.}} however, Bowbrick defends the report's overall accuracy, stating it was undertaken without any preconceptions and twice describing it as excellent. Meanwhile, he repeatedly and rather forcefully favors its analyses over Sen's.{{sfn|Bowbrick|1985|pp=18, 53, 57|ps=: "In my opinion the Famine Commission wrote an excellent report. They sought the truth rather than evidence in favour of their [own] hypotheses. They entered into their study with no preconceived ideas as to whether it was a FAD or a distribution famine and they reached a conclusion that was not in accordance with the official view (p. 18)."}} British accusations that Indian officials were responsible began as early as 1943, as an editorial in ''The Statesman'' on 5 October noted disapprovingly.{{sfn|Ó Gráda|2015|p=57}}

* {{cite book |editor-last=Mansergh |editor-first=Nicholas | editor-link = Nicholas Mansergh |date=1971 |title=The Transfer of Power 1942–7, Vol. III: Reassertion of Authority, Gandhi's Fast and the Succession to the Viceroyalty, 21&nbsp;September 1942–12&nbsp;June 1943 |publisher=H.M.S.O.|location=London |url=http://www.dli.ernet.in/bitstream/handle/2015/461499/Constitutional-Relations.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170409111152/http://www.dli.ernet.in/bitstream/handle/2015/461499/Constitutional-Relations.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y |archive-date=9 April 2017}}

* {{cite book |editor-last1=Mansergh |editor-first1=Nicholas |editor-last2= Lumby|editor-first2=E. W. R. |date=1973 |title=The Transfer of Power 1942–7, Vol. IV: The Bengal Famine and the New Viceroyalty, 15&nbsp;June 1943–31&nbsp;August 1944 |oclc=228107872|isbn=0-11-580079-4|publisher=H.M.S.O.|location=London }}

* {{cite book |last1=Wavell |first1=Archibald Percival |author-link1=Archibald Wavell, 1st Earl Wavell |editor-last=Moon |editor-first=Penderel | editor-link = Penderel Moon |date=1973 |title=Wavell: The Viceroy's Journal |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://archive.org/details/99999990080835WavellTheViceroysJournal |isbn=0-19-211723-8 |oclc=905255837}}

* {{cite book|last=Bose|first=Sugata|title=Agrarian Bengal: Economy, Social Structure and Politics |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=fxXInQEACAAJ| year=1982a |publisher=Cambridge University Press| isbn=978-0-521-30448-1}}

* {{cite book |last=Churchill |first=Winston S. |title=The Hinge of Fate: World War II, Vol. IV |date=1986 |publisher=Mariner Books; Reissue edition |location=New York, NY |isbn=978-0-395-41058-5}}

* {{cite book |last1=Dewey |first1=Clive |chapter=''Patwari'' and ''Chaukidar'': Subordinate Officials and the Reliability of India's Agricultural Statistics |chapter-url=http://www.bowbrick.org.uk/Source%20documents%20Sen/Dewey%20Statistical%20reliability0001.pdf |date=1978 |editor-last1=Dewey |editor-first1=Clive |editor-last2=Hopkins |editor-first2=Anthony G. |title=The Imperial Impact: Studies in the Economic History of Africa and India |publisher=Athlone Press for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies |location = London, England |pages=280–314|isbn=0-485-17621-1 |oclc=959367752}}

* {{cite book |last=Ghosh |first=Kali Charan |title=Famines in Bengal, 1770–1943 |oclc=38146035 |year=1944 |location=Calcutta, India |publisher=Indian Associated Publishing Co. Ltd. |url=http://www.dli.ernet.in/handle/2015/34182 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170409111006/http://www.dli.ernet.in/handle/2015/34182 |archive-date=9 April 2017}}

* {{cite book |last=Mukherjee |first=Janam |title=Hungry Bengal: War, Famine and the End of Empire |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=iGuMCwAAQBAJ&q=hungry+bengal|date=2015 |publisher=Oxford University Press|location=New York, NY |isbn=978-0-19-061306-8 |ref=CITEREFJ. Mukherjee2015}}

* {{cite book |last=Ó Gráda |first=Cormac |title=Eating People Is Wrong, and Other Essays on Famine, Its Past, and Its Future |year=2015 |publisher=Princeton University Press |chapter='Sufficiency and Sufficiency and Sufficiency': Revisiting the Great Bengal Famine of 1943–44 |pages=38–91 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=FICSBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA39 |isbn=978-1-4008-6581-9}} An earlier and somewhat different version is available in a conference paper at [http://www.ucd.ie/t4cms/wp10_21.pdf UCD Centre for Economic Research (Working Paper Series)]. Retrieved 9 February 2016

* {{cite book |last= Sen |first=Amartya |author-link=Amartya Sen |editor=Eric J. Hobsbawm |title=Peasants in History: Essays in Honour of Daniel Thorner | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=XscsAAAAMAAJ | year=1980 |publisher=Published for Sameeksha Trust by Oxford University Press |chapter=Famine Mortality: A Study of the Bengal Famine of 1943 |isbn=0-19-561215-9|ref=CITEREFA. Sen1980}}

* {{cite book|last1=Sen |first1=Amartya |title=The Idea of Justice |publisher=Harvard University Press |location=Cambridge, MA |date=2011 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=OM4RBAAAQBAJ|isbn= 978-0-674-06047-0 |ref=CITEREFA. Sen2011}}

* {{Cite web |last=Herman |first=Arthur L. |author-link=Arthur L. Herman |date=2010 |title=Without Churchill, India's Famine Would Have Been Worse |url=https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/in-the-media/churchill-in-the-news/without-churchill-indias-famine-would-have-been-worse/ |access-date=2022-12-24 |website=International Churchill Society |language=en-US}}

* {{cite journal|last=Prayer|first=Mario|year=2001|title= The Gandhians of Bengal: nationalism, social reconstruction and cultural orientations 1920–1942 |journal=Revista studi degli orientali|volume=71| pages= 1–93, 95–161, 163–231, 233–297, 299–331, 333–363|jstor=41913060}}

* {{Cite web|url=https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1994-08-31-1994243041-story.html|title=Tushar Kanti Ghosh, 96, a newspaper baron...|author=<!-- Staff writer(s); no by-line. -->|website=The Baltimore Sun|date=31 August 1994 |language=en-US|access-date=2019-11-21|ref=CITEREFNewspaper baron2014}}