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{{Short description|Indian military operation | {{Short description|1961 Indian military operation}} | ||
{{About|the Indian annexation of Goa|the conquest by Portugal in 1510|Portuguese conquest of Goa}} | {{About|the Indian annexation of Goa|the conquest by Portugal in 1510|Portuguese conquest of Goa}} | ||
{{Redirect|Operation Vijay (1961)|the 1999 Indian operation|Kargil War}} | {{Redirect|Operation Vijay (1961)|the 1999 Indian operation|Kargil War}} | ||
{{See also|Annexation of Dadra and Nagar Haveli}} | {{See also|Annexation of Dadra and Nagar Haveli}} | ||
{{Use dmy dates|date=October 2022}} | |||
{{Use dmy dates|date=October | {{Use Indian English|date=October 2022}} | ||
{{Use Indian English|date=October | |||
{{Infobox military conflict | {{Infobox military conflict | ||
| conflict = Annexation of Goa | | conflict = Annexation of Goa | ||
| date = 17–19 December 1961 | | date = 17–19 December 1961<br />({{Age in years, months, weeks and days|month1=12|day1=17|year1=1961|month2=12|day2=19|year2=1961}}) | ||
| place = {{ublist|class=nowrap|style=line-height:1.25em; |[[Goa, Daman and Diu]], [[Portuguese India]] |{{small|(incl. [[Arabian Sea|surrounding sea]] and airspace)}}}} | | place = {{ublist|class=nowrap|style=line-height:1.25em; |[[Goa, Daman and Diu]], [[Portuguese India]] |{{small|(incl. [[Arabian Sea|surrounding sea]] and airspace)}}}} | ||
| result = Indian victory | | result = Indian victory | ||
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| combatant1 = {{flag|India}} | | combatant1 = {{flag|India}} | ||
| combatant2 = {{flagicon|Portugal}} [[Estado Novo (Portugal)|Portugal]] | | combatant2 = {{flagicon|Portugal}} [[Estado Novo (Portugal)|Portugal]] | ||
| commander1 = {{flagicon image|Flag of the President of India (1950–1971).svg}} [[Rajendra Prasad]]<br /><small>([[President of India]])</small> | {{Flag|Portuguese India}} | ||
| commander2 = {{ublist|class=nowrap |{{flagicon|Portugal}} [[Américo Tomás]] <br /><small>([[President of Portugal]])</small>|{{flagicon|Portugal}} [[António de Oliveira Salazar| | | commander1 = {{ublist|class=nowrap |{{flagicon image|Flag of the President of India (1950–1971).svg}} [[Rajendra Prasad]]<br /><small>([[President of India]])</small>|{{flagicon image|Flag of India.svg}} [[Jawaharlal Nehru]]<br /><small>([[Prime Minister of India]])</small>|{{flagicon image|Flag of the Ministry of Defence of India.svg}} [[V. K. Krishna Menon]]<br /><small>([[Minister of Defence (India)|Minister of Defence]])</small>|{{flagicon image|Naval_Ensign_of_India_(1950–2001).svg}} [[Vice Admiral (India)|VAdm]] [[R. D. Katari]]<br /><small>([[Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee]] and <br>[[Chief of the Naval Staff (India)|Chief of the Naval Staff]])</small>|{{flagicon image|Flag of Indian Army.svg}} [[General (India)|Gen.]] [[Pran Nath Thapar|P. N. Thapar]]<br /><small>([[Chief of the Army Staff (India)|Chief of the Army Staff]])</small>|{{flagicon image|Air_Force_Ensign_of_India.svg}} [[Air Marshal (India)|AM]] [[Aspy Engineer|A. M. Engineer]]<br /><small>([[Chief of the Air Staff (India)|Chief of the Air Staff]])</small>|{{flagicon image|Flag_of_Indian_Lieutenant_Generals,_Army_Headquarters.svg}} [[Lieutenant General (India)|Lt. Gen.]] [[Jayanto Nath Chaudhuri|J. N. Chaudhuri]]<br /><small>(GOC-in-C, [[Southern Command (India)|Southern Command]])</small>|{{flagicon image|Rear_Admiral_of_the_Indian_Navy_rank_flag.svg}} [[Rear admiral (India)|Rear admiral]] [[Bhaskar Sadashiv Soman|B. S. Soman]]<br /><small>([[Flag Officer Commanding Western Fleet|Flag Officer Commanding Indian Fleet]])</small>|{{flagicon image|Flag of Indian Air Vice Marshal 1950-1980.svg}} [[Air vice-marshal|AVM]] [[Erlic Pinto]]<br /><small>(AOC-in-C, [[Western Air Command|Operational Command]])</small>|{{flagicon image|Flag of Indian Army.svg}} [[Major general|Maj. Gen.]] [[K. P. Candeth]]<br/><small>(GOC, [[17th Infantry Division (India)|17th Infantry Division]]}} | ||
| commander2 = {{ublist|class=nowrap |{{flagicon|Portugal}} [[Américo Tomás]] <br /><small>([[President of Portugal]])</small>|{{flagicon|Portugal}} [[António de Oliveira Salazar|António Salazar]] <br /><small>([[Prime Minister of Portugal]])</small>|{{flagicon|Portugal}} [[Adriano Moreira]]<br /><small>(Minister of the Overseas Provinces)</small> |{{flagicon|Portugal}} [[Manuel António Vassalo e Silva|M. A. Vassalo e Silva]]<br /><small>([[Governor-General#Portuguese|Governor-General]])</small>}} | |||
| strength1 = 45,000 [[infantry]]<br />1 [[light aircraft carrier]]<br />2 [[cruisers]]<br />1 [[destroyer]]<br />8 [[frigates]]<br />4 [[minesweepers]]<br />20 [[English Electric Canberra|Canberra]] medium bombers<br />6 [[de Havilland Vampire|Vampire]] fighters<br />6 [[Dassault Ouragan|Toofani]] fighter-bombers<br />6 [[Hawker Hunter|Hunter]] multi-role aircraft<br />4 [[Dassault Mystère IV|Mystère]] fighter-bombers | | strength1 = 45,000 [[infantry]]<br />1 [[light aircraft carrier]]<br />2 [[cruisers]]<br />1 [[destroyer]]<br />8 [[frigates]]<br />4 [[minesweepers]]<br />20 [[English Electric Canberra|Canberra]] medium bombers<br />6 [[de Havilland Vampire|Vampire]] fighters<br />6 [[Dassault Ouragan|Toofani]] fighter-bombers<br />6 [[Hawker Hunter|Hunter]] multi-role aircraft<br />4 [[Dassault Mystère IV|Mystère]] fighter-bombers | ||
| strength2 = 3,500 military personnel<br />1 [[frigate]]<br />3 inshore [[patrol boat]]s | | strength2 = 3,500 military personnel<br />1 [[frigate]]<br />3 inshore [[patrol boat]]s | ||
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| casualties2 = {{ublist|class=nowrap |30 killed<ref name="Major K C Praval">{{Cite book |last=Praval |first=Major K.C. |title=Indian Army after Independence |publisher=Lancer |year=2009 |isbn=978-1-935501-10-7 |location=New Delhi |pages=214}}</ref> |57 wounded<ref name="Major K C Praval" />|1 frigate disabled<ref name="Major K C Praval" /><ref name="areamilitar.net" /> |4,668 captured<ref>Castanheira, José Pedro (8 December 2001). "Passagem para a Índia" [Passage to India]. Revista. Expresso (in Portuguese) (Paço d'Arcos). Archived from the original on 8 December 2001. Retrieved 20 December 2015.</ref>}} | | casualties2 = {{ublist|class=nowrap |30 killed<ref name="Major K C Praval">{{Cite book |last=Praval |first=Major K.C. |title=Indian Army after Independence |publisher=Lancer |year=2009 |isbn=978-1-935501-10-7 |location=New Delhi |pages=214}}</ref> |57 wounded<ref name="Major K C Praval" />|1 frigate disabled<ref name="Major K C Praval" /><ref name="areamilitar.net" /> |4,668 captured<ref>Castanheira, José Pedro (8 December 2001). "Passagem para a Índia" [Passage to India]. Revista. Expresso (in Portuguese) (Paço d'Arcos). Archived from the original on 8 December 2001. Retrieved 20 December 2015.</ref>}} | ||
| casus = After [[Indian Independence Act 1947|Indian Independence]] from the United Kingdom and the subsequent [[Partition of India and Pakistan]], pockets in the [[Konkan region]] known as "[[Portuguese India]]" were among the last colonies in Asia. They included the areas of Goa, [[Damaon]], [[Silvassa]], [[Diu]], and as well as the [[Anjidiva Island]] on the west coast of the [[Indian peninsula]]. India claimed the Portuguese territories by military power means after the [[Salazar dictatorship]] of Portugal refused to leave. | | casus = After [[Indian Independence Act 1947|Indian Independence]] from the United Kingdom and the subsequent [[Partition of India and Pakistan]], pockets in the [[Konkan region]] known as "[[Portuguese India]]" were among the last colonies in Asia. They included the areas of Goa, [[Damaon]], [[Silvassa]], [[Diu]], and as well as the [[Anjidiva Island]] on the west coast of the [[Indian peninsula]]. India claimed the Portuguese territories by military power means after the [[Salazar dictatorship]] of Portugal refused to leave. | ||
| image = IN- | | image = IN-GDD.svg | ||
| image_size = 300px | | image_size = 300px | ||
| caption = Location of the state of [[Goa]] in present-day [[India]] | | caption = Location of the Union Territory of [[Daman and Diu]] and state of [[Goa]] in present-day [[India]] | ||
}} | }} | ||
{{Portuguese colonial campaigns}} | {{Portuguese colonial campaigns}} | ||
The '''Annexation of Goa''' was the process in which the [[India|Republic of India]] annexed ''{{lang|pt|[[Estado da | The '''Annexation of Goa''' was the process in which the [[India|Republic of India]] annexed ''{{lang|pt|[[Estado da Índia]]}}'', the then [[Portuguese India]]n territories of [[Goa, Daman and Diu]], starting with the armed action carried out by the [[Indian Armed Forces]] in December 1961. In India, this action is referred to as the "'''Liberation of Goa'''". In [[Portugal]], it is referred to as the "'''Invasion of Goa'''". [[Jawaharlal Nehru]] had hoped that the popular movement in Goa and the pressure of world public opinion would force the Portuguese Goan authorities to grant it independence but since it did not have any effect, he decided to take it by force.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/the-liberation-of-goa/article22339624.ece|title = The liberation of Goa|newspaper = The Hindu|date = January 2018|last1 = Davar|first1 = Praveen}}</ref> | ||
The "armed action" was code named '''Operation Vijay''' (meaning "Victory" in Sanskrit) by the Indian Armed Forces. It involved air, sea and land strikes for over 36 hours, and was a decisive victory for India, ending 451 years of rule by Portugal over its remaining [[Portuguese India|exclaves in India]]. The engagement lasted two days, and twenty-two Indians and thirty Portuguese were killed in the fighting.<ref name="Major K C Praval" /> The brief conflict drew a mixture of worldwide praise and condemnation. In India, the action was seen as a liberation of historically Indian territory, while Portugal viewed it as an aggression against its national soil and citizens. | |||
Following the end of Portuguese rule in 1961, Goa was placed under military administration headed by [[Kunhiraman Palat Candeth]] as lieutenant governor.<ref>{{Cite web |date=10 July 2003 |title=Obituary of Lt-Gen K. P. Candeth |website=[[Independent.co.uk]] |url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/lt-gen-k-p-candeth-36784.html |access-date=29 January | Following the end of Portuguese rule in 1961, Goa was placed under military administration headed by [[Kunhiraman Palat Candeth]] as lieutenant governor.<ref>{{Cite web |date=10 July 2003 |title=Obituary of Lt-Gen K. P. Candeth |website=[[Independent.co.uk]] |url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/lt-gen-k-p-candeth-36784.html |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220507/https://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/lt-gen-k-p-candeth-36784.html |archive-date=7 May 2022 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |access-date=29 January 2022}}{{cbignore}}</ref> On 8 June 1962, military rule was replaced by civilian government when the Lieutenant Governor nominated an informal [[Goa Legislative Assembly|Consultative Council]] of 29 nominated members to assist him in the administration of the territory.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://goaassembly.gov.in/goa-legislative-assembly-infrastructure_1.php |title=Infrastructure | Goa Legislative Assembly |access-date=29 January 2018 |archive-date=11 January 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130111181918/http://goaassembly.gov.in/goa-legislative-assembly-infrastructure_1.php |url-status=dead }}</ref> | ||
==Background== | ==Background== | ||
After India's independence from the [[British Empire]] in August 1947, Portugal continued to hold a handful of [[exclave]]s on the Indian subcontinent—the districts of [[Goa]], [[Daman and Diu]] and [[Dadra and Nagar Haveli]]—collectively known as the ''[[Estado da Índia]]''. Goa, Daman and Diu covered an area of around {{convert|1540|sqmi|km2}} and held a population of 637,591.<ref>Numbers from 1955, thus excluding Dadra and Nagar-Haveli. The bulk (547,448) was in Goa (composed of the districts of Old and New Goa, Bardez, Mormugão and Salsete, and the offshore island of Anjediva), the remainder in Dammam (69,005) and Diu (21,138). See Kay (1970) ''Salazar and Modern Portugal'', New York: Hawthorn, p. 295.</ref> The Goan [[diaspora]] was estimated at 175,000 (about 100,000 within the Indian Union, mainly in Bombay).<ref name="Kay">H. Kay (1970) ''Salazar and Modern Portugal'', New York: Hawthorn.</ref> Religious distribution was 61% Hindu, | After India's independence from the [[British Empire]] in August 1947, Portugal continued to hold a handful of [[exclave]]s on the Indian subcontinent—the districts of [[Goa]], [[Daman and Diu]] and [[Dadra and Nagar Haveli]]—collectively known as the ''[[Estado da Índia]]''. Goa, Daman and Diu covered an area of around {{convert|1540|sqmi|km2}} and held a population of 637,591.<ref>Numbers from 1955, thus excluding Dadra and Nagar-Haveli. The bulk (547,448) was in Goa (composed of the districts of Old and New Goa, Bardez, Mormugão and Salsete, and the offshore island of Anjediva), the remainder in Dammam (69,005) and Diu (21,138). See Kay (1970) ''Salazar and Modern Portugal'', New York: Hawthorn, p. 295.</ref> The Goan [[diaspora]] was estimated at 175,000 (about 100,000 within the Indian Union, mainly in Bombay).<ref name="Kay">H. Kay (1970) ''Salazar and Modern Portugal'', New York: Hawthorn.</ref> Religious distribution was 61% Hindu, 37% Christian (mostly Catholic) and 2% Muslim.<ref name="Kay" /> The economy was primarily based on agriculture, although the 1940s and 1950s saw a boom in mining—principally [[iron ore]] and some [[manganese]].<ref name="Kay" /> | ||
===Local resistance to Portuguese rule=== | ===Local resistance to Portuguese rule=== | ||
{{Main|Goa Liberation Movement}} | {{Main|Goa Liberation Movement}} | ||
Resistance to Portuguese rule in Goa in the 20th century was pioneered by [[Tristão de Bragança Cunha]], a French-educated Goan engineer who founded the Goa Congress Committee in Portuguese India in 1928. Cunha released a booklet called 'Four hundred years of Foreign Rule', and a pamphlet, 'Denationalisation of Goa', intended to sensitise Goans to the oppression of Portuguese rule. Messages of solidarity were received by the Goa Congress Committee from leading figures in the Indian independence movement including [[Rajendra Prasad]], [[Jawaharlal Nehru]] and [[Subhas Chandra Bose]]. On 12 October 1938, Cunha with other members of the Goa Congress Committee met Subhas Chandra Bose, the President of the [[Indian National Congress]], and on his advice, opened a Branch Office of the Goa Congress Committee at 21, Dalal Street, [[Mumbai|Bombay]]. The Goa Congress was also made affiliate to the Indian National Congress and Cunha was selected as its first President.<ref name="Frank">Prof. Frank D'Souza, " | Resistance to Portuguese rule in Goa in the 20th century was pioneered by [[Tristão de Bragança Cunha]], a French-educated Goan engineer who founded the Goa Congress Committee in Portuguese India in 1928. Cunha released a booklet called 'Four hundred years of Foreign Rule', and a pamphlet, 'Denationalisation of Goa', intended to sensitise Goans to the oppression of Portuguese rule. Messages of solidarity were received by the Goa Congress Committee from leading figures in the Indian independence movement including [[Rajendra Prasad]], [[Jawaharlal Nehru]] and [[Subhas Chandra Bose]]. On 12 October 1938, Cunha with other members of the Goa Congress Committee met Subhas Chandra Bose, the President of the [[Indian National Congress]], and on his advice, opened a Branch Office of the Goa Congress Committee at 21, Dalal Street, [[Mumbai|Bombay]]. The Goa Congress was also made affiliate to the Indian National Congress and Cunha was selected as its first President.<ref name="Frank">Prof. Frank D'Souza, "Frankly Speaking, The Collected Writings of Prof. Frank D'Souza" Editor-in-chief Mgr. Benny Aguiar, published by the Prof. Frank D'Souza Memorial Committee, Bombay 1987. {{Cite web |title=Tristao de Braganza Cunha Saturday, September 26, 1998 |url=http://www.goacom.com/culture/biographies/tristao.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090923182300/http://www.goacom.com/culture/biographies/tristao.html |archive-date=23 September 2009 |access-date=2010-07-20}}</ref> | ||
In June 1946, Ram Manohar Lohia, an Indian Socialist leader, entered Goa on a visit to his friend, | In June 1946, Ram Manohar Lohia, an Indian Socialist leader, entered Goa on a visit to his friend, [[Juliao Menezes]], a nationalist leader, who had founded the Gomantak Praja Mandal in Bombay and edited the weekly newspaper ''Gomantak''. Cunha and other leaders were also with him.<ref name="Frank" /> [[Ram Manohar Lohia]] advocated the use of non-violent [[Gandhism|Gandhian]] techniques to oppose the government.<ref name="goacom_lambert_m">[http://www.goacom.com/culture/history/history4.html Goa's Freedom Movement] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120214125132/http://www.goacom.com/culture/history/history4.html |date=14 February 2012 }} By: Lambert Mascarenhas</ref> On 18 June 1946, the Portuguese government disrupted a protest against the suspension of civil liberties in [[Panaji]] (then spelt 'Panjim') organised by Lohia, Cunha and others including Purushottam Kakodkar and Laxmikant Bhembre in defiance of a ban on public gatherings, and arrested them.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Kamat Research Database – Goa's Freedom Struggle |url=http://www.kamat.com/database/content/goa_freedom/ |access-date=8 May 2022}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=On Rammanohar Lohia's 99th Birth Anniversary |url=http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article1247.html |access-date=8 May 2022}}</ref> There were intermittent mass demonstrations from June to November. | ||
In addition to non-violent protests, armed groups such as the Azad Gomantak Dal (The Free Goa Party) and the United Front of Goans conducted violent attacks aimed at weakening Portuguese rule in Goa.<ref>{{Cite web |title=A Liberation From Lies By Prabhakar Sinari |url=http://www.countercurrents.org/comm-sinari061103.htm |access-date=9 November 2009 |publisher=Countercurrents.org}}</ref> The [[Government of India|Indian government]] supported the establishment of armed groups like the Azad Gomantak Dal, giving them full financial, logistic and armament support. The armed groups acted from bases situated in Indian territory and under cover of Indian police forces. The Indian government—through these armed groups—attempted to destroy economic targets, telegraph and telephone lines, road, water and rail transport, in order to impede economic activity and create conditions for a general uprising of the population.<ref>Francisco Monteiro, Chronology of Freedom Struggle Activities Unleashed by the Indian Union Against the Territories of Goa, Damão and Diu [http://www.colaco.net/1/India-ter.htm] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150923205346/http://www.colaco.net/1/India-ter.htm |date=23 September | In addition to non-violent protests, armed groups such as the Azad Gomantak Dal (The Free Goa Party) and the United Front of Goans conducted violent attacks aimed at weakening Portuguese rule in Goa.<ref>{{Cite web |title=A Liberation From Lies By Prabhakar Sinari |url=http://www.countercurrents.org/comm-sinari061103.htm |access-date=9 November 2009 |publisher=Countercurrents.org}}</ref> The [[Government of India|Indian government]] supported the establishment of armed groups like the Azad Gomantak Dal, giving them full financial, logistic and armament support. The armed groups acted from bases situated in Indian territory and under cover of Indian police forces. The Indian government—through these armed groups—attempted to destroy economic targets, telegraph and telephone lines, road, water and rail transport, in order to impede economic activity and create conditions for a general uprising of the population.<ref>Francisco Monteiro, Chronology of Freedom Struggle Activities Unleashed by the Indian Union Against the Territories of Goa, Damão and Diu [http://www.colaco.net/1/India-ter.htm] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150923205346/http://www.colaco.net/1/India-ter.htm|date=23 September 2022}}</ref> A Portuguese army officer stationed with the army in Goa, Captain Carlos Azaredo, stated in 2001 in the Portuguese newspaper ''[[Expresso (newspaper)|Expresso]]'': "To the contrary to what is being said, the most evolved guerrilla warfare which our Armed Forces encountered was in Goa. I know what I'm talking about, because I also fought in Angola and in Guiné. In 1961 alone, until December, around 80 policemen died. The major part of the freedom fighters of Azad Gomantak Dal were not Goans. Many had fought in the [[British Army]], under [[Bernard Law Montgomery, 1st Viscount Montgomery of Alamein|General Montgomery]], against the [[Afrika Korps|Germans]]."<ref name="Azaredo">{{Cite news |last=Castanheira |first=José Pedro |date=8 December 2001 |title=Passagem para a Índia |language=pt |trans-title=Passage to India |work=Expresso |department=Revista |location=Paço d'Arcos |url=http://semanal.expresso.pt/revista/artigos/interior.asp?edicao=1519&id_artigo=ES44188 |access-date=20 December 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20011209004006/http://semanal.expresso.pt/revista/artigos/interior.asp?edicao=1519&id_artigo=ES44188 |archive-date=9 December 2001}}</ref> | ||
===Diplomatic efforts to resolve Goa dispute=== | ===Diplomatic efforts to resolve Goa dispute=== | ||
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[[File:Administrative map of Goa.png|thumb|Goa, Western India]] | [[File:Administrative map of Goa.png|thumb|Goa, Western India]] | ||
On 27 February 1950, the Government of India asked the Portuguese government to open negotiations about the future of Portuguese colonies in India.<ref name="ReferenceA">{{Cite web |title=Operação Vijay 18 a 19/12/1961 |url=http://www.supergoa.com/pt/40anos/vijay.asp |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080226040732/https://www.supergoa.com/pt/40anos/vijay.asp |archive-date=26 February 2008 |language=pt}}</ref> Portugal asserted that its territory on the Indian subcontinent was not a colony but part of metropolitan Portugal and hence its transfer was non-negotiable, and that India had no rights to this territory because the Republic of India did not exist at the time when Goa came under Portuguese rule.<ref>Goa was first recognised as equal to the metropolis in the Royal Charter of 1518, and affirmed in subsequent legislation. The term 'province' was first used in 1576, and the term 'overseas provinces' used in virtually all legislation and constitutions thereafter, e.g. Art.1–3 & Art. | On 27 February 1950, the Government of India asked the Portuguese government to open negotiations about the future of Portuguese colonies in India.<ref name="ReferenceA">{{Cite web |title=Operação Vijay 18 a 19/12/1961 |url=http://www.supergoa.com/pt/40anos/vijay.asp |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080226040732/https://www.supergoa.com/pt/40anos/vijay.asp |archive-date=26 February 2008 |language=pt}}</ref> Portugal asserted that its territory on the Indian subcontinent was not a colony but part of metropolitan Portugal and hence its transfer was non-negotiable, and that India had no rights to this territory because the Republic of India did not exist at the time when Goa came under Portuguese rule.<ref>Goa was first recognised as equal to the metropolis in the Royal Charter of 1518, and affirmed in subsequent legislation. The term 'province' was first used in 1576, and the term 'overseas provinces' used in virtually all legislation and constitutions thereafter, e.g. Art. 1–3 & Art. 162–64 of 1822 Constitution [http://www.arqnet.pt/portal/portugal/liberalismo/const822.html online], 1826 constitution [http://www.arqnet.pt/portal/portugal/liberalismo/carta826.html online], Art. I & Title X of the constitution of 1838 [http://www.arqnet.pt/portal/portugal/liberalismo/const838.html online], Title V of the Republican constitution of 1911 [http://www.arqnet.pt/portal/portugal/liberalismo/const911.html online] and the 1932 Constitution of the Estado Novo.</ref> When the Portuguese government refused to respond to subsequent aide-mémoires in this regard, the Indian government, on 11 June 1953, withdrew its diplomatic mission from Lisbon.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Goa's Freedom Movement |url=http://www.goacom.com/culture/history/history4.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120214125132/http://www.goacom.com/culture/history/history4.html |archive-date=14 February 2012 |access-date=2012-03-14}} Lambert Mascarenhas, "Goa's Freedom Movement," excerpted from Henry Scholberg, Archana Ashok Kakodkar and Carmo Azevedo, Bibliography of Goa and the Portuguese in India New Delhi, Promilla (1982)</ref> | ||
By 1954, the Republic of India instituted visa restrictions on travel from Goa to India which paralysed transport between Goa and other exclaves like Daman, Diu, Dadra and Nagar Haveli.<ref name="ReferenceA" /> Meanwhile, the Indian Union of Dockers had, in 1954, instituted a boycott on shipping to Portuguese India.<ref>Sankar Ghose (1993) ''Jawaharlal Nehru: A biography''. Mumbai: Allied. p.283</ref> Between 22 July and 2 August 1954, armed activists attacked and forced the surrender of Portuguese forces stationed in Dadra and Nagar Haveli.<ref>P.W. Prabhakar (2003) ''Wars, proxy-wars and terrorism: post independent India'' New Delhi: Mittal, p.39</ref> | By 1954, the Republic of India instituted visa restrictions on travel from Goa to India which paralysed transport between Goa and other exclaves like Daman, Diu, Dadra and Nagar Haveli.<ref name="ReferenceA" /> In the same year, India instituted sanctions on Portugal with the aim of the annexation of Goa into India, the sanction would remain until 1961.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Hufbauer |first1=Gary Clyde |url=https://www.google.co.uk/books/edition/Economic_Sanctions_Reconsidered/g-uzlJDD7DwC?hl=en |title=Economic Sanctions Reconsidered |last2=Schott |first2=Jeffrey J. |last3=Elliott |first3=Kimberly |publisher=Peterson Institute for International Economics |year=2007 |location=Washington |pages=21 |isbn=978-0881325362 |language=en}}</ref> Meanwhile, the Indian Union of Dockers had, in 1954, instituted a boycott on shipping to Portuguese India.<ref>Sankar Ghose (1993) ''Jawaharlal Nehru: A biography''. Mumbai: Allied. p. 283</ref> Between 22 July and 2 August 1954, armed activists attacked and forced the surrender of Portuguese forces stationed in Dadra and Nagar Haveli.<ref>P.W. Prabhakar (2003) ''Wars, proxy-wars and terrorism: post independent India'' New Delhi: Mittal, p. 39</ref> | ||
On 15 August 1955, 3000–5000 unarmed Indian activists<ref>Sankar Ghose (1993) ''Jawaharlal Nehru: A biography''. Mumbai: Allied. p.282</ref> attempted to enter Goa at six locations and were violently repulsed by Portuguese police officers, resulting in the deaths of between 21<ref>"Indian Volunteers Invade Goa; 21 Die; Unarmed Indians March into Goa", ''New York Times'', 15 August 1955</ref> and 30<ref>Christophe Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India, Published by Columbia University Press, 1998</ref> people.<ref>{{Cite magazine |date=29 August 1955 |title=India: Force & Soul Force |url=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,823878,00.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081215050523/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,823878,00.html |url-status=dead |archive-date=15 December 2008 |access-date=8 May 2015 |magazine=[[Time (magazine)|Time]]}}</ref> The news of the incident built public opinion in India against the presence of the Portuguese in Goa.<ref>{{Cite web |last= | On 15 August 1955, 3000–5000 unarmed Indian activists<ref>Sankar Ghose (1993) ''Jawaharlal Nehru: A biography''. Mumbai: Allied. p. 282</ref> attempted to enter Goa at six locations and were violently repulsed by Portuguese police officers, resulting in the deaths of between 21<ref>"Indian Volunteers Invade Goa; 21 Die; Unarmed Indians March into Goa", ''New York Times'', 15 August 1955</ref> and 30<ref>Christophe Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India, Published by Columbia University Press, 1998</ref> people.<ref>{{Cite magazine |date=29 August 1955 |title=India: Force & Soul Force |url=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,823878,00.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081215050523/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,823878,00.html |url-status=dead |archive-date=15 December 2008 |access-date=8 May 2015 |magazine=[[Time (magazine)|Time]]}}</ref> The news of the incident built public opinion in India against the presence of the Portuguese in Goa.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Lambert Mascarenhas |title=Ancient Goan History – GOACOM – Goa – India – Information and Services in Goa. Goa News, Goa Konkani News, Goa Sunaparant News, Goan Konakani News, Goa Video News, Goa Yellow Pages |url=http://www.goacom.com/culture/history/history4.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120214125132/http://www.goacom.com/culture/history/history4.html |archive-date=14 February 2012 |access-date=8 May 2022}}</ref> On 1 September 1955, India shut its consul office in Goa.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Francisco Monteiro – India supported banditry in Goa |url=http://www.colaco.net/1/India-ter.htm |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150923205346/http://www.colaco.net/1/India-ter.htm |archive-date=23 September 2015 |access-date=8 May 2015 |df=dmy-all}}</ref> | ||
In 1956, the Portuguese ambassador to France, Marcello Mathias, along with Portuguese Prime Minister [[António de Oliveira Salazar]], argued in favour of a referendum in Goa to determine its future. This proposal was however rejected by the Ministers for Defence and Foreign Affairs. The demand for a referendum was repeated by presidential candidate General [[Humberto Delgado]] in 1957.<ref name="ReferenceA" /> | In 1956, the Portuguese ambassador to France, Marcello Mathias, along with Portuguese Prime Minister [[António de Oliveira Salazar]], argued in favour of a referendum in Goa to determine its future. This proposal was however rejected by the Ministers for Defence and Foreign Affairs. The demand for a referendum was repeated by presidential candidate General [[Humberto Delgado]] in 1957.<ref name="ReferenceA" /> | ||
Prime Minister Salazar, alarmed by India's hinted threats at armed action against Portugal's presence in Goa, first asked the United Kingdom to mediate, then protested through [[Brazil]] and eventually asked the [[United Nations Security Council]] to intervene.<ref name="ComradesatOdds">{{harvp|Rotter|2000|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uPx4vb99RUoC&pg=PA185 185]}}</ref> [[Mexico]] offered the Indian government its influence in Latin America to bring pressure on the Portuguese to relieve tensions.<ref>{{cite letter |publication-place=Washington, D.C. |date=8 December 1961 |department=[[Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs]] |publisher=[[United States Department of State]] |editor1-first=Phillips |editor1-last=Talbot |subject=1962. Re Delhi 1611 Dept, Lisbon 606 Dept. Assistant Secretary Talbot called in Ambassador Nehru to discuss Goa morning eighth. He said current situation re Goa has caused Portuguese Government to express deep concern to US. Within USG queries also have been coming to Talbot as to whether GOI would use force to settle issue (Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India) |first1=Dean |last1=Rusk |author1-link=Dean Rusk |first2=Rogers B. |last2=Horgan |recipient=[[John Kenneth Galbraith]] |language=English |url=https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/46453.htm |id=Department of State, Central Files, 753D.00/12 | Prime Minister Salazar, alarmed by India's hinted threats at armed action against Portugal's presence in Goa, first asked the United Kingdom to mediate, then protested through [[Brazil]] and eventually asked the [[United Nations Security Council]] to intervene.<ref name="ComradesatOdds">{{harvp|Rotter|2000|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uPx4vb99RUoC&pg=PA185 185]}}</ref> [[Mexico]] offered the Indian government its influence in Latin America to bring pressure on the Portuguese to relieve tensions.<ref>{{cite letter |publication-place=Washington, D.C. |date=8 December 1961 |department=[[Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs]] |publisher=[[United States Department of State]] |editor1-first=Phillips |editor1-last=Talbot |subject=1962. Re Delhi 1611 Dept, Lisbon 606 Dept. Assistant Secretary Talbot called in Ambassador Nehru to discuss Goa morning eighth. He said current situation re Goa has caused Portuguese Government to express deep concern to US. Within USG queries also have been coming to Talbot as to whether GOI would use force to settle issue (Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India) |first1=Dean |last1=Rusk |author1-link=Dean Rusk |first2=Rogers B. |last2=Horgan |recipient=[[John Kenneth Galbraith]] |language=English |url=https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/46453.htm |id=Department of State, Central Files, 753D.00/12 – 561 |access-date=29 August 2021 }}</ref> Meanwhile, [[Krishna Menon]], India's defence minister and head of India's UN delegation, stated in no uncertain terms that India had not "abjured the use of force" in Goa.<ref name=ComradesatOdds/> The US ambassador to India, [[John Kenneth Galbraith]], requested the Indian government on several occasions to resolve the issue peacefully through mediation and consensus rather than armed conflict.<ref>US Department of State, Central Files, 753D.00/12 – 1161 [https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/46453.htm] Document 68</ref><ref>US Department of State, Central Files, 753D.00/12 – 1261 [https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/46453.htm] Document 69</ref> | ||
On 24 November 1961, ''Sabarmati'', a passenger boat passing between the Indian port of [[Kochi]] and the Portuguese-held island of [[Anjadip Island|Anjidiv]], was fired upon by Portuguese ground troops, resulting in the death of a passenger and injuries to the [[chief engineer]]. The action was precipitated by Portuguese fears that the boat carried a military [[landing operation|landing party]] intent on storming the island.<ref name="autogenerated3">{{Cite book |last=Couto |first=Francisco Cabral |title=O fim do Estado Português da Índia 1961: um testemunho da invasão |date=2006 |publisher=[[Tribuna da História]] |isbn=978- | On 24 November 1961, ''Sabarmati'', a passenger boat passing between the Indian port of [[Kochi]] and the Portuguese-held island of [[Anjadip Island|Anjidiv]], was fired upon by Portuguese ground troops, resulting in the death of a passenger and injuries to the [[chief engineer]]. The action was precipitated by Portuguese fears that the boat carried a military [[landing operation|landing party]] intent on storming the island.<ref name="autogenerated3">{{Cite book |last=Couto |first=Francisco Cabral |title=O fim do Estado Português da Índia 1961: um testemunho da invasão |date=2006 |publisher=[[Tribuna da História]] |isbn=978-9728799533 |editor-last=Pissarra |editor-first=José V. |location=Lisbon |pages=22–102 |trans-title=Remembering the Fall of Portuguese India in 1961}}</ref> The incidents lent themselves to fostering widespread public support in India for military action in Goa. | ||
Eventually, on 10 December, nine days prior to the armed action, code named Operation Vijay, Nehru stated to the press: "Continuance of Goa under Portuguese rule is an impossibility".<ref name=ComradesatOdds/> The American response was to warn India that if and when India's armed action in Goa was brought to the UN security council, it could expect no support from the US delegation.<ref>US Department of State, Central Files, 753D.00/12 – 1461 [https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/46453.htm] Document 72</ref> | Eventually, on 10 December, nine days prior to the armed action, code named Operation Vijay, Nehru stated to the press: "Continuance of Goa under Portuguese rule is an impossibility".<ref name=ComradesatOdds/> The American response was to warn India that if and when India's armed action in Goa was brought to the UN security council, it could expect no support from the US delegation.<ref>US Department of State, Central Files, 753D.00/12 – 1461 [https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/46453.htm] Document 72</ref> | ||
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[[Dadra, Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu|Dadra]] and [[Nagar Haveli]] were two Portuguese landlocked exclaves of the [[Daman district, India|Daman district]], totally surrounded by Indian territory. The connection between the exclaves and the coastal territory of Daman had to be made by crossing about {{convert|20|km}} of Indian territory. Dadra and Nagar Haveli did not have any Portuguese military garrison, but only police forces. | [[Dadra, Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu|Dadra]] and [[Nagar Haveli]] were two Portuguese landlocked exclaves of the [[Daman district, India|Daman district]], totally surrounded by Indian territory. The connection between the exclaves and the coastal territory of Daman had to be made by crossing about {{convert|20|km}} of Indian territory. Dadra and Nagar Haveli did not have any Portuguese military garrison, but only police forces. | ||
The Indian government started to develop isolation actions against Dadra and Nagar Haveli already in 1952, including the creation of impediments to the transit of persons and goods between the two landlocked enclaves and Daman;<ref>{{cite book |title=Wars, Proxy-wars and Terrorism: Post Independent India |via=[[Google Books]] |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=qYK0BhcgwaQC |publication-place=[[New Delhi]], [[India]] |first=Peter Wilson |last=Prabhakar |editor1-first=Naurang |editor1-last=Rai |publisher=Mittle Publications |isbn= | The Indian government started to develop isolation actions against Dadra and Nagar Haveli already in 1952, including the creation of impediments to the transit of persons and goods between the two landlocked enclaves and Daman;<ref>{{cite book |title=Wars, Proxy-wars and Terrorism: Post Independent India |via=[[Google Books]] |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=qYK0BhcgwaQC |publication-place=[[New Delhi]], [[India]] |first=Peter Wilson |last=Prabhakar |editor1-first=Naurang |editor1-last=Rai |publisher=Mittle Publications |isbn=978-8170998907 |year=2003 |edition=1st |chapter=3. Liberation of Goa, Daman and Diu |page=39 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=qYK0BhcgwaQC&pg=PA39 }}</ref> the use of these [[economic warfare]] tactics by India caused a deep economic depression in Goa with subsequent hardship for the inhabitants and, in attempt to remedy the situation and with land travel precluded, Salazar established a new airline to communicate the enclaves of [[Portuguese India]] with its ports.<ref name=teotonio>{{cite book |series=Goa University Publication Series |editor1-link=Teotonio de Souza |editor1-first=Teotonio R. |editor1-last=de Souza |editor2-first=B. Sheik |editor2-last=Ali |volume=II |title=Goa Through The Ages: An Economic history, volume 2 |publication-place=New Delhi |publisher=[[Goa University]]; Concept Publishing Company |edition=2nd |chapter=Chapter 11: The Economic Scene in Goa (1926–1961) |page=276 |first=Silvia M. |last=de Mendonça-Noronha |year=1990 |isbn=978-8170222590 |via=[[Google Books]] |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=dwYDPnEjTb4C&pg=PA276 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=dwYDPnEjTb4C }}</ref> In July 1954, pro-Indian forces, including members of organisations like the United Front of Goans, the National Movement Liberation Organisation, the [[Communist Party of India]], the [[Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh]] and the Azad Gomantak Dal, with the support of Indian Police forces, began to launch assaults against Dadra and Nagar Haveli. On the night of 22 July, UFG forces stormed the small Dadra police station, killing Police Sergeant Aniceto do Rosário and Constable António Fernandes, who resisted the attack. On 28 July, RSS forces took Naroli police station.<ref name="lele" /> | ||
Meanwhile, the Portuguese authorities asked the Indian Government for permission to cross the Indian territory with reinforcements to Dadra and Nagar Haveli, but no permission was given.<ref>{{cite book |title=Blueprint To Bluewater: The Indian Navy | Meanwhile, the Portuguese authorities asked the Indian Government for permission to cross the Indian territory with reinforcements to Dadra and Nagar Haveli, but no permission was given.<ref>{{cite book |title=Blueprint To Bluewater: The Indian Navy 1951–65 |first=Satyindra |last=Singh |date=1992 |url=http://indiannavy.nic.in/bptobw.pdf |edition=1st |language=English |isbn=978-8170621485 |publisher=Lancer International |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060706083838/http://indiannavy.nic.in/bptobw.pdf |archive-date=6 July 2006 |publication-place=[[New Delhi]], [[India]]}}</ref> Surrounded and prevented from receiving reinforcements by the Indian authorities, the Portuguese Administrator and police forces in Nagar Haveli eventually surrendered to the Indian police forces on 11 August 1954. Portugal appealed to the [[International Court of Justice]], which, in a decision dated 12 April 1960,<ref>[http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/32/4521.pdf "Case Concerning Right of Passage Over Indian Territory"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111220044651/http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/32/4521.pdf |date=20 December 2011 }}</ref> stated that Portugal had sovereign rights over the territories of Dadra and Nagar Haveli but India had the right to deny passage to armed personnel of Portugal over Indian territories. Therefore, the Portuguese authorities could not legally pass through Indian territory. | ||
==Events preceding the hostilities== | ==Events preceding the hostilities== | ||
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# Support to advancing ground troops. | # Support to advancing ground troops. | ||
The [[Indian Navy]] deployed two warships—the [[INS Rajput (D141)|INS ''Rajput'']], an 'R' Class destroyer, and {{INS|Kirpan|1959|6}}, a [[Blackwood class frigate|Blackwood class]] anti-submarine frigate—off the coast of Goa. The actual attack on Goa was delegated to four task groups: a Surface Action Group comprising five ships: ''[[INS Mysore (C60)|Mysore]]'', {{INS|Trishul|F143|2}}, ''[[INS Betwa (1959)|Betwa]]'', ''[[INS Beas (1958)|Beas]]'' and ''[[INS Cauvery|Cauvery]]''; a Carrier Group of five ships: ''[[INS Delhi (1948)|Delhi]]'', {{INS|Kuthar|F146|2}}, ''Kirpan'', {{INS|Khukri|F149|2}} and ''Rajput'' centred on the light aircraft carrier ''[[INS Vikrant ( | The [[Indian Navy]] deployed two warships—the [[INS Rajput (D141)|INS ''Rajput'']], an 'R' Class destroyer, and {{INS|Kirpan|1959|6}}, a [[Blackwood class frigate|Blackwood class]] anti-submarine frigate—off the coast of Goa. The actual attack on Goa was delegated to four task groups: a Surface Action Group comprising five ships: ''[[INS Mysore (C60)|Mysore]]'', {{INS|Trishul|F143|2}}, ''[[INS Betwa (1959)|Betwa]]'', ''[[INS Beas (1958)|Beas]]'' and ''[[INS Cauvery|Cauvery]]''; a Carrier Group of five ships: ''[[INS Delhi (1948)|Delhi]]'', {{INS|Kuthar|F146|2}}, ''Kirpan'', {{INS|Khukri|F149|2}} and ''Rajput'' centred on the light aircraft carrier ''[[INS Vikrant (1961)|Vikrant]]''; a Mine Sweeping Group consisting of mine sweepers including ''[[INS Karwar|Karwar]]'', ''[[INS Kakinada|Kakinada]]'', ''[[INS Cannonore|Cannonore]]'' and ''[[INS Bimilipatan|Bimilipatan]]'', and a Support Group which consisted of ''[[INS Dharini|Dharini]]''.<ref name="BR-Kore">{{Cite web |last=Kore |first=V.S. |title=Liberation of Goa: Role Of The Indian Navy |url=http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NAVY/History/1950s/Kore.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130204131726/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NAVY/History/1950s/Kore.html |archive-date=4 February 2013 |access-date=12 June 2014 |website=Bharat Rakshak}}</ref> | ||
===Portuguese mandate=== | ===Portuguese mandate=== | ||
In March 1960, [[Ministry of National Defence (Portugal)|Portuguese Defence Minister]] General [[Júlio Botelho Moniz]] told Prime Minister Salazar that a sustained Portuguese campaign against decolonisation would create for the army "a suicide mission in which we could not succeed". His opinion was shared by Army Minister Colonel [[Afonso Magalhães de Almeida Fernandes]], by the Army under secretary of State Lieutenant-Colonel [[Francisco da Costa Gomes]] and by other top officers.<ref name="books.google.co.in">{{Cite book |last=Porch |first=Douglas |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ncoOAAAAQAAJ&q=salazar+goa+sacrifice+troops&pg=PA36 |title=The Portuguese Armed Forces and the Revolution |date= | In March 1960, [[Ministry of National Defence (Portugal)|Portuguese Defence Minister]] General [[Júlio Botelho Moniz]] told Prime Minister Salazar that a sustained Portuguese campaign against decolonisation would create for the army "a suicide mission in which we could not succeed". His opinion was shared by Army Minister Colonel [[Afonso Magalhães de Almeida Fernandes]], by the Army under secretary of State Lieutenant-Colonel [[Francisco da Costa Gomes]] and by other top officers.<ref name="books.google.co.in">{{Cite book |last=Porch |first=Douglas |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ncoOAAAAQAAJ&q=salazar+goa+sacrifice+troops&pg=PA36 |title=The Portuguese Armed Forces and the Revolution |date=1977 |isbn=978-0856643910 |access-date=8 May 2022}}</ref> | ||
Ignoring this advice, Salazar sent a message to Governor General [[Manuel António Vassalo e Silva]] in Goa on 14 December, in which he ordered the Portuguese forces in Goa to fight to the last man: "Do not expect the possibility of truce or of Portuguese prisoners, as there will be no surrender rendered because I feel that our soldiers and sailors can be either victorious or dead."<ref name="supergoa.com">{{Cite web |last=Constantino Hermanns Xavier |date=18 December 2006 |title=Invasão de Goa, Damão e Diu foi há 45 anos |url=http://www.supergoa.com/pt/read/news_noticia.asp?c_news=603 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150924111816/http://www.supergoa.com/pt/read/news_noticia.asp?c_news=603 |archive-date=24 September 2015 |language=pt |quote=Não prevejo a possibilidade de tréguas, nem prisioneiros portugueses, como não haverá navios rendidos, pois sinto que apenas pode haver soldados e marinheiros vitoriosos ou mortos}}</ref> Salazar asked Vassalo e Silva to hold out for at least eight days, within which time he hoped to gather international support against the Indian invasion. Vassalo e Silva disobeyed Salazar to avoid the unnecessary loss of human lives and surrendered the day after the Indian invasion.<ref name="supergoa.com" /> | Ignoring this advice, Salazar sent a message to Governor General [[Manuel António Vassalo e Silva]] in Goa on 14 December, in which he ordered the Portuguese forces in Goa to fight to the last man: "Do not expect the possibility of truce or of Portuguese prisoners, as there will be no surrender rendered because I feel that our soldiers and sailors can be either victorious or dead."<ref name="supergoa.com">{{Cite web |last=Constantino Hermanns Xavier |date=18 December 2006 |title=Invasão de Goa, Damão e Diu foi há 45 anos |url=http://www.supergoa.com/pt/read/news_noticia.asp?c_news=603 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150924111816/http://www.supergoa.com/pt/read/news_noticia.asp?c_news=603 |archive-date=24 September 2015 |language=pt |quote=Não prevejo a possibilidade de tréguas, nem prisioneiros portugueses, como não haverá navios rendidos, pois sinto que apenas pode haver soldados e marinheiros vitoriosos ou mortos}}</ref> Salazar asked Vassalo e Silva to hold out for at least eight days, within which time he hoped to gather international support against the Indian invasion. Vassalo e Silva disobeyed Salazar to avoid the unnecessary loss of human lives and surrendered the day after the Indian invasion.<ref name="supergoa.com" /> | ||
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Portuguese military preparations began in 1954, following the Indian economic blockade, the beginning of the anti-Portuguese attacks in Goa and the annexation of Dadra and Nagar Haveli. Three light infantry battalions (one each sent from Portugal, Angola and Mozambique) and support units were transported to Goa, reinforcing a locally raised battalion and increasing the Portuguese military presence there from almost nothing to 12,000 men.<ref name="Azaredo" /> Other sources state that, at the end of 1955, Portuguese forces in India represented a total of around 8,000 men (Europeans, Africans and Indians), including 7,000 in the land forces, 250 in the naval forces, 600 in the police and 250 in the Fiscal Guard, split between the districts of Goa, Daman and Diu.<ref name="Alves Lopes" /> Following the annexation of Dadra and Nagar Haveli, the Portuguese authorities markedly strengthened the garrison of Portuguese India, with units and personnel sent from the [[Metropole]] and from the Portuguese African provinces of [[Portuguese Angola|Angola]] and [[Portuguese Mozambique|Mozambique]]. | Portuguese military preparations began in 1954, following the Indian economic blockade, the beginning of the anti-Portuguese attacks in Goa and the annexation of Dadra and Nagar Haveli. Three light infantry battalions (one each sent from Portugal, Angola and Mozambique) and support units were transported to Goa, reinforcing a locally raised battalion and increasing the Portuguese military presence there from almost nothing to 12,000 men.<ref name="Azaredo" /> Other sources state that, at the end of 1955, Portuguese forces in India represented a total of around 8,000 men (Europeans, Africans and Indians), including 7,000 in the land forces, 250 in the naval forces, 600 in the police and 250 in the Fiscal Guard, split between the districts of Goa, Daman and Diu.<ref name="Alves Lopes" /> Following the annexation of Dadra and Nagar Haveli, the Portuguese authorities markedly strengthened the garrison of Portuguese India, with units and personnel sent from the [[Metropole]] and from the Portuguese African provinces of [[Portuguese Angola|Angola]] and [[Portuguese Mozambique|Mozambique]]. | ||
The Portuguese forces were organised as the Armed Forces of the State of India (FAEI, ''Forças Armadas do Estado da Índia''), under a unified command headed by General [[Paulo Bénard Guedes]], who combined the civil role of Governor-General with the military role of Commander-in-Chief. Guedes ended his commission in 1958, with General Vassalo e Silva being appointed to replace him in both the civil and military roles.<ref name="Alves Lopes">{{Cite book |last=Lopes (2007) |first=José Alves |title=Estado Português da Índia – Rememoração Pessoal |publisher=Revista Militar |location=Lisboa}}</ref> | The Portuguese forces were organised as the Armed Forces of the State of India (FAEI, ''Forças Armadas do Estado da Índia''), under a unified command headed by General [[Paulo Bénard Guedes]], who combined the civil role of Governor-General with the military role of Commander-in-Chief. Guedes ended his commission in 1958, with General Vassalo e Silva being appointed to replace him in both the civil and military roles.<ref name="Alves Lopes">{{Cite book |last=Lopes (2007) |first=José Alves |title=Estado Português da Índia – Rememoração Pessoal |publisher=Revista Militar |location=Lisboa}}{{ISBN?}}</ref> | ||
The Portuguese government and military commands were, however, well aware that even with this effort to strengthen the garrison of Goa, the Portuguese forces would never be sufficient to face a conventional attack from the overwhelmingly stronger Indian Armed Forces. The Portuguese government hoped however to politically deter the Indian government from attempting a military aggression through the showing of a strong will to fight and to sacrifice to defend Goa.<ref name="Alves Lopes" /> | The Portuguese government and military commands were, however, well aware that even with this effort to strengthen the garrison of Goa, the Portuguese forces would never be sufficient to face a conventional attack from the overwhelmingly stronger Indian Armed Forces. The Portuguese government hoped however to politically deter the Indian government from attempting a military aggression through the showing of a strong will to fight and to sacrifice to defend Goa.<ref name="Alves Lopes" /> | ||
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====Navy==== | ====Navy==== | ||
The naval component of the FAEI were the Naval Forces of the State of India (FNEI, ''Forças Navais do Estado da Índia''), headed by the Naval Commander of Goa, Commodore Raúl Viegas Ventura. The only significant [[Portuguese Navy]] warship present in Goa at the time of invasion was the [[aviso|sloop]] [[NRP Afonso de Albuquerque|NRP ''Afonso de Albuquerque'']].<ref>{{Cite web |title=Portuguese Navy 1875 |url=http://www.battleships-cruisers.co.uk/portuguese_navy.htm |access-date=9 November 2009 |publisher=Battleships-cruisers.co.uk}}</ref> It was armed with four 120 mm guns capable of two shots per minute, and four automatic rapid-firing guns. In addition to the sloop, the Portuguese Naval Forces had three light [[patrol boat]]s (''lanchas de fiscalização''), each armed with a 20 mm Oerlikon gun, one based in each of Goa, Daman and Diu. There were also five [[merchant marine]] ships in Goa.<ref name="invasao6">{{Cite web |title=A invasão: Damão e Diu |url=http://www.areamilitar.net/analise/analise.aspx?NrMateria=52&p=6 |access-date=8 May 2015 |website=ÁreaMilitar}}</ref> An attempt by Portugal to send naval warships to Goa to reinforce its marine defences was foiled when President [[Gamal Abdel Nasser|Nasser]] of [[Egypt]] denied the ships access to the [[Suez Canal]].<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=cpfVVXV3-t4C&pg=PA219 |title=India's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century |publisher=Kalpaz Publications |year=2006 |isbn= | The naval component of the FAEI were the Naval Forces of the State of India (FNEI, ''Forças Navais do Estado da Índia''), headed by the Naval Commander of Goa, Commodore Raúl Viegas Ventura. The only significant [[Portuguese Navy]] warship present in Goa at the time of invasion was the [[aviso|sloop]] [[NRP Afonso de Albuquerque|NRP ''Afonso de Albuquerque'']].<ref>{{Cite web |title=Portuguese Navy 1875 |url=http://www.battleships-cruisers.co.uk/portuguese_navy.htm |access-date=9 November 2009 |publisher=Battleships-cruisers.co.uk}}</ref> It was armed with four 120 mm guns capable of two shots per minute, and four automatic rapid-firing guns. In addition to the sloop, the Portuguese Naval Forces had three light [[patrol boat]]s (''lanchas de fiscalização''), each armed with a 20 mm Oerlikon gun, one based in each of Goa, Daman and Diu. There were also five [[merchant marine]] ships in Goa.<ref name="invasao6">{{Cite web |title=A invasão: Damão e Diu |url=http://www.areamilitar.net/analise/analise.aspx?NrMateria=52&p=6 |access-date=8 May 2015 |website=ÁreaMilitar}}</ref> An attempt by Portugal to send naval warships to Goa to reinforce its marine defences was foiled when President [[Gamal Abdel Nasser|Nasser]] of [[Egypt]] denied the ships access to the [[Suez Canal]].<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=cpfVVXV3-t4C&pg=PA219 |title=India's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century |publisher=Kalpaz Publications |year=2006 |isbn=8178355000 |editor-last=Chopra |editor-first=V. D. |page=219}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Spokane Daily Chronicle - Google News Archive Search |url=https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1338&dat=19611223&id=LQ4zAAAAIBAJ&pg=6593,5399334 |website=news.google.com}}</ref><ref>Egypt and India, A study of political and cultural relations, 1947–1964; Zaki Awad, El Sayed Mekkawi, [http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/14518/3/03_preface.pdf Preface] page i/.</ref> | ||
====Ground forces==== | ====Ground forces==== | ||
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===Indian reconnaissance operations=== | ===Indian reconnaissance operations=== | ||
Indian [[reconnaissance]] operations had commenced on 1 December, when two [[Leopard class frigate]]s, the INS ''Betwa'' and the INS ''Beas'', undertook linear patrolling of the Goa coast at a distance of {{convert|8|mi|km|0}}. By 8 December, the [[Indian Air Force]] had commenced baiting missions and fly-bys to lure out Portuguese air defences and fighters.{{citation needed|date=May | Indian [[reconnaissance]] operations had commenced on 1 December, when two [[Leopard class frigate]]s, the INS ''Betwa'' and the INS ''Beas'', undertook linear patrolling of the Goa coast at a distance of {{convert|8|mi|km|0}}. By 8 December, the [[Indian Air Force]] had commenced baiting missions and fly-bys to lure out Portuguese air defences and fighters.{{citation needed|date=May 2022}} | ||
On 17 December, a tactical reconnaissance flight conducted by Squadron Leader I. S. Loughran in a [[de Havilland Vampire|Vampire NF54 Night Fighter]] over Dabolim Airport in Goa was met with five rounds fired from a ground anti-aircraft gun. The aircraft took evasive action by drastically dropping altitude and escaping out to sea. The anti-aircraft gun was later recovered near the [[Air Traffic Control|ATC building]] with a round jammed in its breech.<ref name="BR-Goa-03">{{Cite web |last=Loughran |first=I.S. |title=Four Sorties Over Goa |url=http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1961Goa/1014-Loughran.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130204131730/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1960s/Goa03.html |archive-date=4 February 2013 |access-date=12 June 2014 |website=Bharat Rakshak}}</ref> | On 17 December, a tactical reconnaissance flight conducted by Squadron Leader I. S. Loughran in a [[de Havilland Vampire|Vampire NF54 Night Fighter]] over Dabolim Airport in Goa was met with five rounds fired from a ground anti-aircraft gun. The aircraft took evasive action by drastically dropping altitude and escaping out to sea. The anti-aircraft gun was later recovered near the [[Air Traffic Control|ATC building]] with a round jammed in its breech.<ref name="BR-Goa-03">{{Cite web |last=Loughran |first=I.S. |title=Four Sorties Over Goa |url=http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1961Goa/1014-Loughran.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130204131730/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1960s/Goa03.html |archive-date=4 February 2013 |access-date=12 June 2014 |website=Bharat Rakshak}}</ref> | ||
The Indian light aircraft carrier [[INS Vikrant ( | The Indian light aircraft carrier [[INS Vikrant (1961)|INS ''Vikrant'']] was deployed {{convert|75|mi|km}} from the coast of Goa to head off a possible amphibious operation on Goa and deter any foreign military intervention. | ||
==Commencement of hostilities== | ==Commencement of hostilities== | ||
===Military actions in Goa=== | ===Military actions in Goa=== | ||
====Ground attack on Goa: North and North East sectors==== | ====Ground attack on Goa: North and North East sectors==== | ||
<!-- Deleted image removed: [[File:Liberation cheer.jpg|thumb|Indian troops being greeted by supporters as they march through the streets of Panaji shortly after the Portuguese retreat]] --> | |||
On 11 December 1961, [[17th Infantry Division (India)|17th Infantry Division]] and attached troops of the Indian Army were ordered to advance into Goa to capture Panaji and Mormugão. The main thrust on Panaji was to be made by the [[50th Parachute Brigade (India)|50th Para Brigade Group]], led by Brigadier [[Sagat Singh]] from the north. Another thrust was to be carried out by [[63rd Indian Infantry Brigade]] from the east. A [[Feint|deceptive thrust]], in company strength, was to be made from the south along the Majali-Canacona-Margao axis.<ref name="BR-OpVijay">{{Cite web |last=Chakravorty |first=B.C. |title=Operation Vijay |url=http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/History/1961Goa/262-Operation-Vijay.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140331145027/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/History/1961Goa/262-Operation-Vijay.html |archive-date=31 March 2014 |access-date=12 June 2014 |website=Bharat Rakshak}}</ref> | On 11 December 1961, [[17th Infantry Division (India)|17th Infantry Division]] and attached troops of the Indian Army were ordered to advance into Goa to capture Panaji and Mormugão. The main thrust on Panaji was to be made by the [[50th Parachute Brigade (India)|50th Para Brigade Group]], led by Brigadier [[Sagat Singh]] from the north. Another thrust was to be carried out by [[63rd Indian Infantry Brigade]] from the east. A [[Feint|deceptive thrust]], in company strength, was to be made from the south along the Majali-Canacona-Margao axis.<ref name="BR-OpVijay">{{Cite web |last=Chakravorty |first=B.C. |title=Operation Vijay |url=http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/History/1961Goa/262-Operation-Vijay.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140331145027/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/History/1961Goa/262-Operation-Vijay.html |archive-date=31 March 2014 |access-date=12 June 2014 |website=Bharat Rakshak}}</ref> | ||
Although the 50th Para Brigade was charged with merely assisting the main thrust conducted by the 17th Infantry, its units moved rapidly across minefields, roadblocks and four riverine obstacles to be the first to reach Panaji.<ref name="Mohan2001">{{Cite journal |last=Mohan |first=P. V. S. Jagan |date=November–December 2001 |title=Remembering Sagat Singh (1918–2001) |url=http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE4-3/jagan.html |url-status=dead |journal=[[Bharat Rakshak Monitor]] |volume=4 |issue=3 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130204131720/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE4-3/jagan.html |archive-date=4 February 2013 |access-date=12 June | Although the 50th Para Brigade was charged with merely assisting the main thrust conducted by the 17th Infantry, its units moved rapidly across minefields, roadblocks and four riverine obstacles to be the first to reach Panaji.<ref name="Mohan2001">{{Cite journal |last=Mohan |first=P. V. S. Jagan |date=November–December 2001 |title=Remembering Sagat Singh (1918–2001) |url=http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE4-3/jagan.html |url-status=dead |journal=[[Bharat Rakshak Monitor]] |volume=4 |issue=3 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130204131720/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE4-3/jagan.html |archive-date=4 February 2013 |access-date=12 June 2022}}</ref> | ||
Hostilities at Goa began at 09:45 on 17 December 1961, when a unit of Indian troops attacked and occupied the town of Maulinguém in the north east, killing two Portuguese soldiers. The Portuguese 2nd EREC (''esquadrão de reconhecimento''—[[armoured reconnaissance|reconnaissance]] squadron), stationed near Maulinguém, asked for permission to engage the Indians, but permission was refused at about 13:45.<ref name="invasao5">{{Cite web |title=17 / 18 / 19 de Dezembro: A invasão (Território de Goa) |url=http://www.areamilitar.net/analise/analise.aspx?NrMateria=52&p=5 |access-date=8 May 2015 |website=ÁreaMilitar}}</ref> During the afternoon of the 17th, the Portuguese command issued instructions that all orders to defending troops would be issued directly by headquarters, bypassing the local command outposts. This led to confusion in the chain of command.<ref name="invasao5" /> At 02:00 on 18 December, the 2nd EREC was sent to the town of Doromagogo to support the withdrawal of police forces present in the area, and were attacked by Indian Army units on their return journey.<ref name="invasao5" /> | Hostilities at Goa began at 09:45 on 17 December 1961, when a unit of Indian troops attacked and occupied the town of Maulinguém in the north east, killing two Portuguese soldiers. The Portuguese 2nd EREC (''esquadrão de reconhecimento''—[[armoured reconnaissance|reconnaissance]] squadron), stationed near Maulinguém, asked for permission to engage the Indians, but permission was refused at about 13:45.<ref name="invasao5">{{Cite web |title=17 / 18 / 19 de Dezembro: A invasão (Território de Goa) |url=http://www.areamilitar.net/analise/analise.aspx?NrMateria=52&p=5 |access-date=8 May 2015 |website=ÁreaMilitar}}</ref> During the afternoon of the 17th, the Portuguese command issued instructions that all orders to defending troops would be issued directly by headquarters, bypassing the local command outposts. This led to confusion in the chain of command.<ref name="invasao5" /> At 02:00 on 18 December, the 2nd EREC was sent to the town of Doromagogo to support the withdrawal of police forces present in the area, and were attacked by Indian Army units on their return journey.<ref name="invasao5" /> | ||
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At 05:30, Portuguese troops left their barracks at Ponda in central Goa and marched towards the town of Usgão, in the direction of the advancing eastern column of the Indian 2nd Para Maratha, which was under the command of Major Dalip Singh Jind and included tanks of the [[7th Light Cavalry|Indian 7th Cavalry]]. At 09:00, these Portuguese troops reported that Indian troops had already covered half the distance to the town of Ponda.<ref name="invasao5" /> | At 05:30, Portuguese troops left their barracks at Ponda in central Goa and marched towards the town of Usgão, in the direction of the advancing eastern column of the Indian 2nd Para Maratha, which was under the command of Major Dalip Singh Jind and included tanks of the [[7th Light Cavalry|Indian 7th Cavalry]]. At 09:00, these Portuguese troops reported that Indian troops had already covered half the distance to the town of Ponda.<ref name="invasao5" /> | ||
By 10:00, Portuguese forces of the 1st EREC, faced with the advancing 2nd Sikh Light Infantry, began a south-bound withdrawal to the town of Mapuca where, by 12:00, they came under the risk of being surrounded by Indian forces. At 12:30, the 1st EREC began a retreat, making their way through the Indian forces, with their [[armoured car (military)|armoured cars]] firing ahead to cover the withdrawal of the personnel carrier vehicles. This unit relocated by ferry further south to the capital city of Panaji.<ref name="invasao5" /> At 13:30, just after the retreat of the 2nd EREC, the Portuguese destroyed the bridge at Banastarim, cutting off all road links to Panaji. | By 10:00, Portuguese forces of the 1st EREC, faced with the advancing 2nd Sikh Light Infantry, began a south-bound withdrawal to the town of Mapuca where, by 12:00, they came under the risk of being surrounded by Indian forces. At 12:30, the 1st EREC began a retreat, making their way through the Indian forces, with their [[armoured car (military)|armoured cars]] firing ahead to cover the withdrawal of the personnel carrier vehicles. This unit relocated by ferry further south to the capital city of Panaji.<ref name="invasao5" /> At 13:30, just after the retreat of the 2nd EREC, the Portuguese destroyed the bridge at Banastarim, cutting off all road links to Panaji. | ||
By 17:45, the forces of the 1st EREC and the 9th ''[[Caçadores]]'' Company of the Portuguese Battlegroup North had completed their ferry crossing of the [[Mandovi River]] to Panaji, just minutes ahead of the arrival of the Indian armoured forces.<ref name="invasao5" /> The Indian tanks had reached Betim, just across the Mandovi River from Panaji, without encountering any opposition. The 2nd Sikh Light Infantry joined it by 21:00, crossing over mines and demolished bridges en route. In the absence of orders, the unit stayed at Betim for the night. | By 17:45, the forces of the 1st EREC and the 9th ''[[Caçadores]]'' Company of the Portuguese Battlegroup North had completed their ferry crossing of the [[Mandovi River]] to Panaji, just minutes ahead of the arrival of the Indian armoured forces.<ref name="invasao5" /> The Indian tanks had reached Betim, just across the Mandovi River from Panaji, without encountering any opposition. The 2nd Sikh Light Infantry joined it by 21:00, crossing over mines and demolished bridges en route. In the absence of orders, the unit stayed at Betim for the night. | ||
At 20:00, a Goan by the name of Gregório Magno Antão crossed the Mandovi River from Panaji and delivered a ceasefire offer letter from Major Acácio Tenreiro of the Portuguese Army to Major Shivdev Singh Sidhu, the commanding officer of the [[7th Light Cavalry|Indian 7th Cavalry]] camped there. The letter read: "The Military Commander of the City of Goa states that he wishes to parley with the commander of the army of the Indian Union with respect to the surrender. Under these conditions, the Portuguese troops must immediately cease fire and the Indian troops do likewise in order to prevent the slaughter of the population and the destruction of the city."<ref>{{Cite web |last=Castro |first=Paul |date=19 June 2011 |title=Archive of Goan Writing in Portuguese: Telo de Mascarenhas | At 20:00, a Goan by the name of Gregório Magno Antão crossed the Mandovi River from Panaji and delivered a ceasefire offer letter from Major Acácio Tenreiro of the Portuguese Army to Major Shivdev Singh Sidhu, the commanding officer of the [[7th Light Cavalry|Indian 7th Cavalry]] camped there. The letter read: "The Military Commander of the City of Goa states that he wishes to parley with the commander of the army of the Indian Union with respect to the surrender. Under these conditions, the Portuguese troops must immediately cease fire and the Indian troops do likewise in order to prevent the slaughter of the population and the destruction of the city."<ref>{{Cite web |last=Castro |first=Paul |date=19 June 2011 |title=Archive of Goan Writing in Portuguese: Telo de Mascarenhas – A carta de Rendição (1974) |url=http://archiveofgoanwritinginportuguese.blogspot.com/2011/06/telo-de-mascarenhas-carta-de-rendicao.html |website=Archive of Goan Writing in Portuguese}}</ref> | ||
The same night Major Shivdev Singh Sidhu with a force of the 7th Cavalry decided to take [[Fort Aguada]] and obtain its surrender, after receiving information that a number of supporters of the Indian Republic were held prisoners there. However, the Portuguese defenders of the fort had not yet received orders to surrender and responded by opening fire on the Indian forces, Major Sidhu and Captain Vinod Sehgal being killed in the firefight.<ref name="BR-OpVijay" /> | The same night Major Shivdev Singh Sidhu with a force of the 7th Cavalry decided to take [[Fort Aguada]] and obtain its surrender, after receiving information that a number of supporters of the Indian Republic were held prisoners there. However, the Portuguese defenders of the fort had not yet received orders to surrender and responded by opening fire on the Indian forces, Major Sidhu and Captain Vinod Sehgal being killed in the firefight.<ref name="BR-OpVijay" /> | ||
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====Advance from the east==== | ====Advance from the east==== | ||
{{Unreferenced section|date=May | {{Unreferenced section|date=May 2022}} | ||
Meanwhile, in the east, the [[63rd Indian Infantry Brigade]] advanced in two columns. The right column, consisting of the [[Bihar Regiment|2nd Bihar Battalion]], and the left column, consisting of the [[Sikh Regiment|3rd Sikh Battalion]], linked up at the border town of Mollem and then advanced by separate routes on Ponda. By nightfall, the 2nd Bihar had reached the town of Candeapur, while the 3rd Sikh had reached Darbondara. Although neither column had encountered any resistance, their further progress was hampered because all bridges spanning the river had been destroyed. | Meanwhile, in the east, the [[63rd Indian Infantry Brigade]] advanced in two columns. The right column, consisting of the [[Bihar Regiment|2nd Bihar Battalion]], and the left column, consisting of the [[Sikh Regiment|3rd Sikh Battalion]], linked up at the border town of Mollem and then advanced by separate routes on Ponda. By nightfall, the 2nd Bihar had reached the town of Candeapur, while the 3rd Sikh had reached Darbondara. Although neither column had encountered any resistance, their further progress was hampered because all bridges spanning the river had been destroyed. | ||
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====Storming of Anjidiv Island==== | ====Storming of Anjidiv Island==== | ||
{{unreferenced section|date=May | {{unreferenced section|date=May 2022}} | ||
[[Anjidiv Island|Anjidiv]] was a small 1.5 km<sup>2</sup> island of Portuguese India, then almost uninhabited, belonging to the District of Goa, although off the coast of the Indian state of [[Karnataka]]. On the island stood the ancient [[Fort Anjediva|Anjidiv Fort]], defended by a platoon of Goan soldiers of the Portuguese Army. | [[Anjidiv Island|Anjidiv]] was a small 1.5 km<sup>2</sup> island of Portuguese India, then almost uninhabited, belonging to the District of Goa, although off the coast of the Indian state of [[Karnataka]]. On the island stood the ancient [[Fort Anjediva|Anjidiv Fort]], defended by a platoon of Goan soldiers of the Portuguese Army. | ||
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====Ground attack on Daman==== | ====Ground attack on Daman==== | ||
[[Daman district, India|Daman]], approximately 72 km<sup>2</sup> in area, is at the south end of [[Gujarat]] bordering [[Maharashtra]], approximately 193 km north of Bombay. The countryside is broken and interspersed with marsh, salt pans, streams, paddy fields, coconut and palm groves. The river Daman Ganga splits the capital city of [[Daman, Daman and Diu|Daman]] (Damão in Portuguese) into halves—Nani Daman (''Damão Pequeno'') and Moti Daman (''Damão Grande''). The strategically important features were Daman Fort (fortress of São Jerónimo) and the air control tower of [[Daman Airport]].<ref name="shore">{{Cite news |last=Shorey |first=Anil |date=21 February 1999 |title=The forgotten battles of Daman and Diu |work=[[The Tribune (Chandigarh)|The Tribune]] |url=http://www.tribuneindia.com/1999/99feb21/sunday/head3.htm |access-date=8 May | [[Daman district, India|Daman]], approximately 72 km<sup>2</sup> in area, is at the south end of [[Gujarat]] bordering [[Maharashtra]], approximately 193 km north of Bombay. The countryside is broken and interspersed with marsh, salt pans, streams, paddy fields, coconut and palm groves. The river Daman Ganga splits the capital city of [[Daman, Daman and Diu|Daman]] (Damão in Portuguese) into halves—Nani Daman (''Damão Pequeno'') and Moti Daman (''Damão Grande''). The strategically important features were Daman Fort (fortress of São Jerónimo) and the air control tower of [[Daman Airport]].<ref name="shore">{{Cite news |last=Shorey |first=Anil |date=21 February 1999 |title=The forgotten battles of Daman and Diu |work=[[The Tribune (Chandigarh)|The Tribune]] |url=http://www.tribuneindia.com/1999/99feb21/sunday/head3.htm |access-date=8 May 2022}}</ref> | ||
The Portuguese garrison in Daman was headed by Major António José da Costa Pinto (combining the roles of District Governor and military commander), with 360 soldiers of the Portuguese Army, 200 policemen and about 30 customs officials under him. The army forces consisted of two companies of ''[[caçadores]]'' (light infantry) and an artillery battery, organised as the battlegroup "[[Constantino de Bragança]]". The artillery battery was armed with 87.6 mm guns, but these had insufficient and old ammunition. The Portuguese also placed a 20 mm anti-aircraft gun ten days before the invasion to protect the artillery. Daman had been secured with small minefields and defensive shelters had been built.<ref name="invasao6" /> | The Portuguese garrison in Daman was headed by Major António José da Costa Pinto (combining the roles of District Governor and military commander), with 360 soldiers of the Portuguese Army, 200 policemen and about 30 customs officials under him. The army forces consisted of two companies of ''[[caçadores]]'' (light infantry) and an artillery battery, organised as the battlegroup "[[Constantino de Bragança]]". The artillery battery was armed with 87.6 mm guns, but these had insufficient and old ammunition. The Portuguese also placed a 20 mm anti-aircraft gun ten days before the invasion to protect the artillery. Daman had been secured with small minefields and defensive shelters had been built.<ref name="invasao6" /> | ||
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====Naval action at Daman==== | ====Naval action at Daman==== | ||
{{unreferenced section|date=May | {{unreferenced section|date=May 2022}} | ||
Like the ''Vega'' in Diu, the patrol boat NRP ''Antares''—based at Daman under the command of 2nd Lieutenant Abreu Brito—was ordered to sail out and fight the imminent Indian invasion. The boat stayed in position from 07:00 on 18 December and remained a mute witness to repeated air strikes followed by ground invasion until 19:20, when it lost all communications with land. | Like the ''Vega'' in Diu, the patrol boat NRP ''Antares''—based at Daman under the command of 2nd Lieutenant Abreu Brito—was ordered to sail out and fight the imminent Indian invasion. The boat stayed in position from 07:00 on 18 December and remained a mute witness to repeated air strikes followed by ground invasion until 19:20, when it lost all communications with land. | ||
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===Military actions in Diu=== | ===Military actions in Diu=== | ||
====Ground attack on Diu==== | ====Ground attack on Diu==== | ||
[[Diu, India|Diu]] is a 13.8 km by 4.6 km island (area about 40 km<sup>2</sup>) at the south tip of Gujarat. The island is separated from the mainland by a narrow channel running through a swamp. The channel could only be used by fishing boats and small craft. No bridges crossed the channels at the time of hostilities. The Portuguese garrison in Diu was headed by Major Fernando de Almeida e Vasconcelos (district governor and military commander), with around 400 soldiers and police officers, organised as the battlegroup "António da Silveira".<ref name="bhargava">Gp Capt Kapil Bhargava (Retd), Operations at Diu: The One Day War, Bharatrakshak.com [http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1961Goa/1013-Diu.html]</ref> | [[Diu, India|Diu]] is a 13.8 km by 4.6 km island (area about 40 km<sup>2</sup>) at the south tip of Gujarat. The island is separated from the mainland by a narrow channel running through a swamp. The channel could only be used by fishing boats and small craft. No bridges crossed the channels at the time of hostilities. The Portuguese garrison in Diu was headed by Major Fernando de Almeida e Vasconcelos (district governor and military commander), with around 400 soldiers and police officers, organised as the battlegroup "António da Silveira".<ref name="bhargava">Gp Capt Kapil Bhargava (Retd), Operations at Diu: The One Day War, Bharatrakshak.com [http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1961Goa/1013-Diu.html]</ref> | ||
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====The Diu air raids==== | ====The Diu air raids==== | ||
[[File:Dassault MD 450 Ouragan 02.jpg|thumb|A [[Dassault Ouragan|MD450 Ouragan]] on display at the [[Royal Museum of the Armed Forces and Military History]] (Brussels | [[File:Dassault MD 450 Ouragan 02.jpg|thumb|A [[Dassault Ouragan|MD450 Ouragan]] on display at the [[Royal Museum of the Armed Forces and Military History]] (Brussels, Belgium). Similar aircraft in service with the Indian Air Force, locally known as Toofani, formed the backbone of the air strikes on Diu.]] | ||
The Indian air operations in the Diu Sector were entrusted to the Armaments Training Wing led by Wg Cdr Micky Blake. The first air attacks were made at dawn on 18 December and were aimed at destroying Diu's fortifications facing the mainland. Throughout the rest of the day, the Air Force had at least two aircraft in the air at any time, giving close support to advancing Indian infantry. During the morning, the air force attacked and destroyed Diu Airfield's ATC as well as parts of [[Diu Fort]]. On orders from Tactical Air Command located at Pune, a sortie of two [[Dassault Ouragan|Toofanis]] attacked and destroyed the airfield runway with 4 1000 lb Mk 9 bombs. A second sortie aimed at the runway and piloted by Wg Cdr Blake himself was aborted when Blake detected what he reported as people waving white flags. In subsequent sorties, [[Palamadai Muthuswamy Ramachandran|PM Ramachandran]] of the Indian Air Force attacked and destroyed the Portuguese ammunition dump as well a patrol boat [[Portuguese Navy#The Overseas wars|N.R.P. Vega]] that attempted to escape from Diu. | The Indian air operations in the Diu Sector were entrusted to the Armaments Training Wing led by Wg Cdr Micky Blake. The first air attacks were made at dawn on 18 December and were aimed at destroying Diu's fortifications facing the mainland. Throughout the rest of the day, the Air Force had at least two aircraft in the air at any time, giving close support to advancing Indian infantry. During the morning, the air force attacked and destroyed Diu Airfield's ATC as well as parts of [[Diu Fort]]. On orders from Tactical Air Command located at Pune, a sortie of two [[Dassault Ouragan|Toofanis]] attacked and destroyed the airfield runway with 4 1000 lb Mk 9 bombs. A second sortie aimed at the runway and piloted by Wg Cdr Blake himself was aborted when Blake detected what he reported as people waving white flags. In subsequent sorties, [[Palamadai Muthuswamy Ramachandran|PM Ramachandran]] of the Indian Air Force attacked and destroyed the Portuguese ammunition dump as well a patrol boat [[Portuguese Navy#The Overseas wars|N.R.P. Vega]] that attempted to escape from Diu. | ||
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====Naval action at Diu==== | ====Naval action at Diu==== | ||
The Indian cruiser INS ''Delhi'' was anchored off the coast of Diu and fired a barrage from its 6-inch guns at the Portuguese occupied Diu Fortress. The Commanding Officer of the Indian Air Force operating in the area reported that some of the shells fired from the '' | The Indian cruiser INS ''Delhi'' was anchored off the coast of Diu and fired a barrage from its 6-inch guns at the Portuguese occupied Diu Fortress. The Commanding Officer of the Indian Air Force operating in the area reported that some of the shells fired from the ''Delhi'' were bouncing off the beach and exploding on the Indian mainland. However, no casualties were reported from this. | ||
At 04:00 on 18 December, the Portuguese patrol boat NRP ''Vega'' encountered the '' | At 04:00 on 18 December, the Portuguese patrol boat NRP ''Vega'' encountered the ''Delhi'' around {{convert|12|mi|km}} off the coast of Diu, and was attacked with heavy machine gun fire. Staying out of range, the boat had no casualties and minimal damage, the boat withdrew to the port at Diu. | ||
At 07:00, news was received that the Indian invasion had commenced, and the commander of the ''Vega'', 2nd Lt Oliveira e Carmo was ordered to sail out and fight until the last round of ammunition. At 07:30 the crew of the ''Vega'' spotted two Indian aircraft led by Flt. Lt. PM Ramachandran on patrol missions and opened fire on them with the ship's 20mm Oerlikon gun. In retaliation the Indian aircraft attacked the ''Vega'' twice, killing the captain and the gunner and forcing the rest of the crew to abandon the boat and swim ashore, where they were taken prisoners of war.<ref name="bharat-rakshak.com">{{Cite web |title=The Liberation of Goa: 1961 |url=http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1960s/Goa02.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131120034108/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1960s/Goa02.html |archive-date=20 November 2013 |access-date=8 May 2015 |df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/history/1961goa/1352-p-m-#gsc.tab=0|title=The sinking of N.R.P.Vega | At 07:00, news was received that the Indian invasion had commenced, and the commander of the ''Vega'', 2nd Lt Oliveira e Carmo was ordered to sail out and fight until the last round of ammunition. At 07:30 the crew of the ''Vega'' spotted two Indian aircraft led by Flt. Lt. PM Ramachandran on patrol missions and opened fire on them with the ship's 20mm Oerlikon gun. In retaliation the Indian aircraft attacked the ''Vega'' twice, killing the captain and the gunner and forcing the rest of the crew to abandon the boat and swim ashore, where they were taken prisoners of war.<ref name="bharat-rakshak.com">{{Cite web |title=The Liberation of Goa: 1961 |url=http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1960s/Goa02.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131120034108/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1960s/Goa02.html |archive-date=20 November 2013 |access-date=8 May 2015 |df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/history/1961goa/1352-p-m-#gsc.tab=0|title=The sinking of N.R.P. Vega – a first person narrative|work=bharat-rakshak.com|access-date=8 September 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200908044733/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/history/1961goa/1352-p-m-|archive-date=8 September 2020|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> | ||
==UN attempts at ceasefire== | ==UN attempts at ceasefire== | ||
On 18 December, a Portuguese request was made to the UN [[Security Council]] for a debate on the conflict in Goa. The request was approved when the bare minimum of seven members supported the request (the US, UK, France, Turkey, Chile, Ecuador, and Nationalist China), two opposed (the Soviet Union and Ceylon), and two abstained (the [[United Arab Republic]] and Liberia).<ref name="Keesing" /> | On 18 December, a Portuguese request was made to the UN [[Security Council]] for a debate on the conflict in Goa. The request was approved when the bare minimum of seven members supported the request (the US, UK, France, Turkey, Chile, Ecuador, and Nationalist China), two opposed (the Soviet Union and Ceylon), and two abstained (the [[United Arab Republic]] and Liberia).<ref name="Keesing" /> | ||
Opening the debate, Portugal's delegate, Vasco Vieira Garin, said that Portugal had consistently shown her peaceful intentions by refraining from any counter-action to India's numerous "provocations" on the Goan border. Garin also stated that Portuguese forces, though "vastly outnumbered by the invading forces," were putting up "stiff resistance" and "fighting a delaying action and destroying communications in order to halt the advance of the enemy." In response, India's delegate, Jha said that the "elimination of the last vestiges of colonialism in India" was an "article of faith" for the Indian people, "Security Council or no Security Council." He went on to describe Goa, Daman, and Diu as "an inalienable part of India unlawfully occupied by Portugal."<ref name="Keesing" /> | Opening the debate, Portugal's delegate, Vasco Vieira Garin, said that Portugal had consistently shown her peaceful intentions by refraining from any counter-action to India's numerous "provocations" on the Goan border. Garin also stated that Portuguese forces, though "vastly outnumbered by the invading forces," were putting up "stiff resistance" and "fighting a delaying action and destroying communications in order to halt the advance of the enemy." In response, India's delegate, C. S. Jha said that the "elimination of the last vestiges of colonialism in India" was an "article of faith" for the Indian people, "Security Council or no Security Council." He went on to describe Goa, Daman, and Diu as "an inalienable part of India unlawfully occupied by Portugal."<ref name="Keesing" /> | ||
In the ensuing debate, the US delegate, Adlai Stevenson, strongly criticised India's use of force to resolve her dispute with Portugal, stressing that such resort to violent means was against the charter of the UN. He stated that condoning such acts of armed forces would encourage other nations to resort to similar solutions to their own disputes, and would lead to the death of the United Nations. In response, the Soviet delegate, [[Valerian Zorin]], argued that the Goan question was wholly within India's domestic jurisdiction and could not be considered by the Security Council. He also drew attention to Portugal's disregard for UN resolutions calling for the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.<ref name="Keesing" /> | In the ensuing debate, the US delegate, Adlai Stevenson, strongly criticised India's use of force to resolve her dispute with Portugal, stressing that such resort to violent means was against the charter of the UN. He stated that condoning such acts of armed forces would encourage other nations to resort to similar solutions to their own disputes, and would lead to the death of the United Nations. In response, the Soviet delegate, [[Valerian Zorin]], argued that the Goan question was wholly within India's domestic jurisdiction and could not be considered by the Security Council. He also drew attention to Portugal's disregard for UN resolutions calling for the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.<ref name="Keesing" /> | ||
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==Portuguese surrender== | ==Portuguese surrender== | ||
Despite his orders from [[Lisbon]], Governor General [[Manuel António Vassalo e Silva]] took stock of the numerical superiority of the Indian troops, as well as the food and ammunition supplies available to his forces and took the decision to surrender. He later described his orders to destroy Goa as "''um sacrifício inútil''" (a useless sacrifice).{{Citation needed|date = June | By the evening of 18 December, most of Goa had been overrun by advancing Indian forces, and a large party of more than two thousand Portuguese soldiers had taken position at the military base at Alparqueiros at the entrance to the port town of Vasco da Gama. Per the Portuguese strategy code named ''Plano Sentinela'' the defending forces were to make their last stand at the harbour, holding out against the Indians until Portuguese naval reinforcements could arrive. Orders delivered from the Portuguese President called for a [[scorched earth]] policy—that Goa was to be destroyed before it was given up to the Indians.<ref>{{Cite web |title=The Church in Goa |url=http://www.goacom.com/culture/history/church.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120402200720/http://www.goacom.com/culture/history/church.html |archive-date=2 April 2012 |access-date=9 November 2009 |publisher=Goacom.com}}</ref> Canadian political scientist Antonio Rangel Bandeira has argued that the sacrifice of Goa was an elaborate public relations stunt calculated to rally support for Portugal's wars in Africa.<ref name="books.google.co.in" />{{page needed|date=March 2022}} | ||
Despite his orders from [[Lisbon]], Governor General [[Manuel António Vassalo e Silva]] took stock of the numerical superiority of the Indian troops, as well as the food and ammunition supplies available to his forces and took the decision to surrender. He later described his orders to destroy Goa as "''um sacrifício inútil''" (a useless sacrifice).{{Citation needed|date = June 2022}} | |||
In a communication to all Portuguese forces under his command, he stated, "Having considered the defence of the Peninsula of Mormugão ... from aerial, naval and ground fire of the enemy and ... having considered the difference between the forces and the resources ... the situation does not allow myself to proceed with the fight without great sacrifice of the lives of the inhabitants of Vasco da Gama, I have decided with ... my patriotism well present, to get in touch with the enemy ... I order all my forces to cease-fire."<ref name="autogenerated4">{{Cite web |title=Peaceful and quickly over |url=http://www.indianexpress.com/res/web/pIe/ie/daily/19981224/35850184.html |access-date=9 November 2009 |publisher=Indianexpress.com}}</ref> | In a communication to all Portuguese forces under his command, he stated, "Having considered the defence of the Peninsula of Mormugão ... from aerial, naval and ground fire of the enemy and ... having considered the difference between the forces and the resources ... the situation does not allow myself to proceed with the fight without great sacrifice of the lives of the inhabitants of Vasco da Gama, I have decided with ... my patriotism well present, to get in touch with the enemy ... I order all my forces to cease-fire."<ref name="autogenerated4">{{Cite web |title=Peaceful and quickly over |url=http://www.indianexpress.com/res/web/pIe/ie/daily/19981224/35850184.html |access-date=9 November 2009 |publisher=Indianexpress.com}}</ref> | ||
The official Portuguese surrender was conducted in a formal ceremony held at | The official Portuguese surrender was conducted in a formal ceremony held at 20:30 hours on 19 December when Governor General Manuel António Vassalo e Silva signed the instrument of surrender bringing to an end 451 years of Portuguese Rule in Goa. In all, 4,668 personnel were taken prisoner by the Indians—a figure which included military and civilian personnel, Portuguese, Africans and Goan.<ref name="Azaredo" /> | ||
Upon the surrender of the Portuguese governor general, Goa, Daman and Diu was declared a federally administered Union Territory placed directly under the President of India, and Major-General K. P. Candeth was appointed as its military governor. The war had lasted two days, and had cost 22 Indian and 30 Portuguese lives. | Upon the surrender of the Portuguese governor general, Goa, Daman and Diu was declared a federally administered Union Territory placed directly under the President of India, and Major-General K. P. Candeth was appointed as its military governor. The war had lasted two days, and had cost 22 Indian and 30 Portuguese lives. | ||
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==Portuguese actions post-hostilities== | ==Portuguese actions post-hostilities== | ||
When they received news of the fall of Goa, the Portuguese government formally severed all diplomatic links with India and refused to recognise the incorporation of the seized territories into the Indian Republic. An offer of Portuguese citizenship was instead made to all Goan natives who wished to emigrate to Portugal rather than remain under Indian rule. This was amended in 2006 to include only those who had been born before 19 December 1961. Later, in a show of defiance, Prime Minister Salazar's government offered a reward of US$10,000 for the capture of Brigadier Sagat Singh, the commander of the [[maroon beret]]s of India's parachute regiment who were the first troops to enter Panaji, Goa's capital.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Datta |first=Rakesh |date=26 June 2005 |title=Not all generals are leaders |work=[[The Tribune (Chandigarh)|The Tribune]] |url=http://www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20050626/spectrum/book3.htm |access-date=9 November | When they received news of the fall of Goa, the Portuguese government formally severed all diplomatic links with India and refused to recognise the incorporation of the seized territories into the Indian Republic. An offer of Portuguese citizenship was instead made to all Goan natives who wished to emigrate to Portugal rather than remain under Indian rule. This was amended in 2006 to include only those who had been born before 19 December 1961. Later, in a show of defiance, Prime Minister Salazar's government offered a reward of US$10,000 for the capture of Brigadier Sagat Singh, the commander of the [[maroon beret]]s of India's parachute regiment who were the first troops to enter Panaji, Goa's capital.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Datta |first=Rakesh |date=26 June 2005 |title=Not all generals are leaders |work=[[The Tribune (Chandigarh)|The Tribune]] |url=http://www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20050626/spectrum/book3.htm |access-date=9 November 2022}}</ref> | ||
Lisbon went virtually into mourning, and Christmas celebrations were extremely muted. Cinemas and theatres shut down as tens of thousands of Portuguese marched in a silent parade from Lisbon's city hall to the cathedral, escorting the relics of St. [[Francis Xavier]].<ref>{{Cite magazine |date=29 December 1961 |title=India: End of an Image |url=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,827193-2,00.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111120143937/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,827193-2,00.html |url-status=dead |archive-date=20 November 2011 |access-date=8 May 2015 |magazine=Time}}</ref> | Lisbon went virtually into mourning, and Christmas celebrations were extremely muted. Cinemas and theatres shut down as tens of thousands of Portuguese marched in a silent parade from Lisbon's city hall to the cathedral, escorting the relics of St. [[Francis Xavier]].<ref>{{Cite magazine |date=29 December 1961 |title=India: End of an Image |url=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,827193-2,00.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111120143937/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,827193-2,00.html |url-status=dead |archive-date=20 November 2011 |access-date=8 May 2015 |magazine=Time}}</ref> | ||
Salazar, while addressing the Portuguese National Assembly on 3 January 1962, invoked the principle of national sovereignty, as defined in the legal framework of the Constitution of the Estado Novo. "We can not negotiate, not without denying and betraying our own, the cession of national territory and the transfer of populations that inhabit them to foreign sovereigns," said Salazar.<ref>[http://www.supergoa.com/pt/40anos José Manuel Barroso, Só soldados vitoriosos ou mortos, 2 January 2001] {{dead link|date=March | Salazar, while addressing the Portuguese National Assembly on 3 January 1962, invoked the principle of national sovereignty, as defined in the legal framework of the Constitution of the Estado Novo. "We can not negotiate, not without denying and betraying our own, the cession of national territory and the transfer of populations that inhabit them to foreign sovereigns," said Salazar.<ref>[http://www.supergoa.com/pt/40anos José Manuel Barroso, Só soldados vitoriosos ou mortos, 2 January 2001] {{dead link|date=March 2022}}</ref> He went on to state that the UN's failure to halt aggression against Portugal, showed that effective power in the U.N. had passed to the Communist and Afro-Asian countries. Salazar also accused Britain of delaying for a week her reply to Portugal's request to be allowed the use of certain airfields. "Had it not been for this delay," he said, "we should certainly have found alternative routes and we could have rushed to India reinforcements in men and material for a sustained defence of the territory."<ref name="Keesing" /> | ||
Hinting that Portugal would yet be vindicated, Salazar went on to state that "difficulties will arise for both sides when the programme of the Indianization of Goa begins to clash with its inherent culture ... It is therefore to be expected that many Goans will wish to escape to Portugal from the inevitable consequences of the invasion."<ref name="Keesing" /> | Hinting that Portugal would yet be vindicated, Salazar went on to state that "difficulties will arise for both sides when the programme of the Indianization of Goa begins to clash with its inherent culture ... It is therefore to be expected that many Goans will wish to escape to Portugal from the inevitable consequences of the invasion."<ref name="Keesing" /> | ||
In the months after the conflict, the Portuguese Government used broadcasts on [[Rádio e Televisão de Portugal|Emissora Nacional]], the Portuguese national radio station, to urge Goans to resist and oppose the Indian administration. An effort was made to create clandestine resistance movements in Goa, and within Goan diaspora communities across the world to use general resistance and armed rebellion to weaken the Indian presence in Goa. The campaign had the full support of the Portuguese government with the ministries of defence, foreign affairs, army, navy and finance involved. A plan was chalked out called the 'Plano Gralha' covering Goa, Daman and Diu, which called for paralysing port operations at Mormugao and Bombay by planting bombs in some of the ships anchored at the ports.<ref>{{Cite news |last=<!--Staff writer(s); no by-line.--> |date=19 December 2011 |title=Records show colonizers were not done with Goa |work=The Times of India |location=Panaji |url=http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/goa/Records-show-colonizers-were-not-done-with-Goa/articleshow/11162999.cms |access-date=6 January | In the months after the conflict, the Portuguese Government used broadcasts on [[Rádio e Televisão de Portugal|Emissora Nacional]], the Portuguese national radio station, to urge Goans to resist and oppose the Indian administration. An effort was made to create clandestine resistance movements in Goa, and within Goan diaspora communities across the world to use general resistance and armed rebellion to weaken the Indian presence in Goa. The campaign had the full support of the Portuguese government with the ministries of defence, foreign affairs, army, navy and finance involved. A plan was chalked out called the 'Plano Gralha' covering Goa, Daman and Diu, which called for paralysing port operations at Mormugao and Bombay by planting bombs in some of the ships anchored at the ports.<ref>{{Cite news |last=<!--Staff writer(s); no by-line.--> |date=19 December 2011 |title=Records show colonizers were not done with Goa |work=The Times of India |location=Panaji |url=http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/goa/Records-show-colonizers-were-not-done-with-Goa/articleshow/11162999.cms |access-date=6 January 2022}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Xavier |first=Constantino |date=3 May 2014 |title=Lost in delusion |work=The Goan |url=http://www.thegoan.net/View-From-Afar/Lost-in-delusion/Column-Post/00473.html#.U_oc_flLpfs |url-status=dead |access-date=8 May 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140704151803/http://www.thegoan.net/View-From-Afar/Lost-in-delusion/Column-Post/00473.html |archive-date=4 July 2022}}</ref> | ||
On 20 June 1964, [[Casimiro Monteiro]], a Portuguese [[PIDE]] agent of Goan descent, along with Ismail Dias, a Goan settled in Portugal, executed a series of bombings in Goa.<ref>{{Cite web |title=PressDisplay.com | On 20 June 1964, [[Casimiro Monteiro]], a Portuguese [[PIDE]] agent of Goan descent, along with Ismail Dias, a Goan settled in Portugal, executed a series of bombings in Goa.<ref>{{Cite web |title=PressDisplay.com |url=http://www.pressdisplay.com/pressdisplay/viewer.aspx?noredirect=true&bookmarkid=LNDP1YIXVM48 |website=www.pressdisplay.com}}</ref> | ||
Relations between India and Portugal thawed only in 1974, when, following an [[Carnation Revolution#Decolonisation|anti-colonial military coup d'état]] and the fall of the [[Estado Novo (Portugal)|authoritarian rule]] in [[Lisbon]], Goa was finally recognised as part of India, and steps were taken to re-establish diplomatic relations with India. On 31 December 1974, a treaty was signed between India and Portugal with the Portuguese recognising full sovereignty of India over Goa, Daman, Diu, Dadra and Nagar Haveli.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Treaty Between the Government of India and the Government of the Republic of Portugal On Recognition of India's Sovereignty Over Goa, Daman, Diu, Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Related Matters [1974] INTSer 53 |url=http://www.commonlii.org/in/other/treaties/INTSer/1974/53.html |access-date=8 May | Relations between India and Portugal thawed only in 1974, when, following an [[Carnation Revolution#Decolonisation|anti-colonial military coup d'état]] and the fall of the [[Estado Novo (Portugal)|authoritarian rule]] in [[Lisbon]], Goa was finally recognised as part of India, and steps were taken to re-establish diplomatic relations with India. On 31 December 1974, a treaty was signed between India and Portugal with the Portuguese recognising full sovereignty of India over Goa, Daman, Diu, Dadra and Nagar Haveli.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Treaty Between the Government of India and the Government of the Republic of Portugal On Recognition of India's Sovereignty Over Goa, Daman, Diu, Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Related Matters [1974] INTSer 53 |url=http://www.commonlii.org/in/other/treaties/INTSer/1974/53.html |access-date=8 May 2022}}</ref> In 1992, [[President of Portugal|Portuguese President]] [[Mário Soares]] became the first Portuguese head of state to visit Goa after its annexation by India, following [[President of India|Indian President]] [[Ramaswamy Venkataraman]]'s visit to Portugal in 1990.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Bhargava |first=ed. S.C. Bhatt, Gopal K. |title=India. |publisher=Kalpaz publ. |year=2005 |isbn=8178353938 |location=Delhi |pages=453}}</ref> | ||
== | ==Prisoners of war== | ||
After they surrendered, the Portuguese soldiers were interned by the Indian Army at their own military camps at [[Navelim]], [[Fort Aguada|Aguada]], [[Pondá]] and [[Alparqueiros]] under harsh conditions which included sleeping on cement floors and hard manual labour.<ref name=autogenerated3 /> By January 1962, most prisoners of war had been transferred to the newly established camp at [[Ponda, Goa|Ponda]] where conditions were substantially better.<ref name=autogenerated3 /> | After they surrendered, the Portuguese soldiers were interned by the Indian Army at their own military camps at [[Navelim]], [[Fort Aguada|Aguada]], [[Pondá]] and [[Alparqueiros]] under harsh conditions which included sleeping on cement floors and hard manual labour.<ref name=autogenerated3 /> By January 1962, most prisoners of war had been transferred to the newly established camp at [[Ponda, Goa|Ponda]] where conditions were substantially better.<ref name=autogenerated3 /> | ||
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[[Air Marshal]] [[Subramaniam Raghavendran|S Raghavendran]], who met some of the captured Portuguese soldiers, wrote in his memoirs several years later "I have never seen such a set of troops looking so miserable in my life. Short, not particularly well built and certainly very unsoldierlike."<ref>Air Marshal S Raghavendran, 'Eye Witness to the Liberation of Goa', para 8, Bharatrakshak.com, [http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1961Goa/1050-Raghavendran.html]</ref> | [[Air Marshal]] [[Subramaniam Raghavendran|S Raghavendran]], who met some of the captured Portuguese soldiers, wrote in his memoirs several years later "I have never seen such a set of troops looking so miserable in my life. Short, not particularly well built and certainly very unsoldierlike."<ref>Air Marshal S Raghavendran, 'Eye Witness to the Liberation of Goa', para 8, Bharatrakshak.com, [http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1961Goa/1050-Raghavendran.html]</ref> | ||
In one incident, recounted by Lieutenant Francisco Cabral Couto (now retired general), on 19 March 1962 some of the prisoners tried to escape the Ponda camp in a garbage truck. The attempt was foiled, and the Portuguese officers in charge of the escapees were threatened with court martial and execution by the Indians. This situation was defused by the timely intervention of Ferreira da Silva, a [[Society of Jesus|Jesuit]] military chaplain.<ref name=autogenerated3 /><ref>{{Cite book |last=de Morais |first=Carlos Alexandre |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=7yxuAAAAMAAJ&q=972-33-1134-8 |title=A queda da Índia Portuguesa: crónica da invasão e do cativeiro |publisher=Editorial Estampa |year=1995 |isbn= | In one incident, recounted by Lieutenant Francisco Cabral Couto (now retired general), on 19 March 1962 some of the prisoners tried to escape the Ponda camp in a garbage truck. The attempt was foiled, and the Portuguese officers in charge of the escapees were threatened with court martial and execution by the Indians. This situation was defused by the timely intervention of Ferreira da Silva, a [[Society of Jesus|Jesuit]] military chaplain.<ref name=autogenerated3 /><ref>{{Cite book |last=de Morais |first=Carlos Alexandre |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=7yxuAAAAMAAJ&q=972-33-1134-8 |title=A queda da Índia Portuguesa: crónica da invasão e do cativeiro |publisher=Editorial Estampa |year=1995 |isbn=9723311348 |location=Lisbon}}</ref> Following the foiled escape attempt, Captain Carlos Azeredo (now retired general) was beaten with rifle butts by four Indian soldiers while a gun was pointed at him, on the orders of Captain Naik, the 2nd Camp Commander. The beating was in retaliation for Azeredo's telling Captain Naik to "Go to Hell", and was serious enough to make him lose consciousness and cause severe [[contusion]]s. Captain Naik was later punished by the Indian Army for violating the [[Geneva Convention]].<ref name="Azaredo" /> | ||
During the internment of the Portuguese prisoners of war at various camps around Goa, the prisoners were visited by large numbers of Goans—described by Captain Azeredo as "Goan friends, acquaintances, or simply anonymous persons"—who offered the internees cigarettes, biscuits, tea, medicines and money. This surprised the Indian military authorities, who first limited the visits to twice a week, and then only to representatives of the Red Cross.<ref name="Azaredo" /> | During the internment of the Portuguese prisoners of war at various camps around Goa, the prisoners were visited by large numbers of Goans—described by Captain Azeredo as "Goan friends, acquaintances, or simply anonymous persons"—who offered the internees cigarettes, biscuits, tea, medicines and money. This surprised the Indian military authorities, who first limited the visits to twice a week, and then only to representatives of the Red Cross.<ref name="Azaredo" /> | ||
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The captivity lasted for six months "thanks to the stupid stubbornness of Lisbon" (according to Capt. Carlos Azeredo). The Portuguese Government insisted that the prisoners be repatriated by Portuguese aircraft—a demand that was rejected by the Indian Government who instead insisted on aircraft from a neutral country. The negotiations were delayed even further when Salazar ordered the detention of 1200 [[Indians in Mozambique]] allegedly as a bargaining chip in exchange for Portuguese prisoners.<ref name="Azaredo" /> | The captivity lasted for six months "thanks to the stupid stubbornness of Lisbon" (according to Capt. Carlos Azeredo). The Portuguese Government insisted that the prisoners be repatriated by Portuguese aircraft—a demand that was rejected by the Indian Government who instead insisted on aircraft from a neutral country. The negotiations were delayed even further when Salazar ordered the detention of 1200 [[Indians in Mozambique]] allegedly as a bargaining chip in exchange for Portuguese prisoners.<ref name="Azaredo" /> | ||
By May 1962, most of the prisoners had been repatriated—being first flown to [[Karachi]], [[Pakistan]], in chartered French aircraft, and then sent off to Lisbon by three ships: ''Vera Cruz'', ''Pátria'' and ''Moçambique''.<ref>{{Cite web |last=AEIOU |title=AEIOU.pt |url=http://historiaeciencia.weblog.com.pt/arquivo/049503.html |access-date=8 May | By May 1962, most of the prisoners had been repatriated—being first flown to [[Karachi]], [[Pakistan]], in chartered French aircraft, and then sent off to Lisbon by three ships: ''Vera Cruz'', ''Pátria'' and ''Moçambique''.<ref>{{Cite web |last=AEIOU |title=AEIOU.pt |url=http://historiaeciencia.weblog.com.pt/arquivo/049503.html |access-date=8 May 2022}}</ref> On arrival at the [[Tagus|Tejo]] in Portugal, returning Portuguese servicemen were taken into custody by [[military police]] at gunpoint without immediate access to their families who had arrived to receive them. Following intense questioning and interrogations, the officers were charged with direct insubordination on having refused to comply with directives not to surrender to the Indians. On 22 March 1963, the governor general, the military commander, his chief of staff, one naval captain, six majors, a sub lieutenant and a sergeant were [[cashiering|cashiered]] by the council of ministers for cowardice and expelled from military service. Four captains, four lieutenants and a lieutenant commander were suspended for six months.<ref name="books.google.co.in" /> | ||
Ex-governor Manuel António Vassalo e Silva had a hostile reception when he returned to Portugal. He was subsequently [[court martial]]ed for failing to follow orders, expelled from the military and sent into exile. He returned to Portugal only in 1974, after the fall of the regime, and was given back his military status. He was later able to conduct a state visit to Goa, where he was given a warm reception.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Dossier Goa – A Recusa Do Sacrifício Inútil Summary |url=http://www.shvoong.com/books/469174-dossier-goa-recusa-sacrif%C3%ADcio-in%C3%BAtil/ |access-date=9 November 2009 |publisher=Shvoong.com}}</ref> | Ex-governor Manuel António Vassalo e Silva had a hostile reception when he returned to Portugal. He was subsequently [[court martial]]ed for failing to follow orders, expelled from the military and sent into exile. He returned to Portugal only in 1974, after the fall of the regime, and was given back his military status. He was later able to conduct a state visit to Goa, where he was given a warm reception.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Dossier Goa – A Recusa Do Sacrifício Inútil Summary |url=http://www.shvoong.com/books/469174-dossier-goa-recusa-sacrif%C3%ADcio-in%C3%BAtil/ |access-date=9 November 2009 |publisher=Shvoong.com}}</ref> | ||
==International | ==International reactions== | ||
===Support=== | ===Support=== | ||
====African states==== | ====African states==== | ||
Before the invasion the press speculated about international reaction to military action and recalled the recent charge by African nations that India was "too soft" on Portugal and was thus "dampening the enthusiasm of freedom fighters in other countries".<ref name=ComradesatOdds/> Many [[Africa]]n countries, themselves former European colonies, reacted positively to the capture of Goa by the Indians. [[Ghana Broadcasting Corporation|Radio Ghana]] termed it as the "Liberation of Goa" and went on to state that the people of [[Ghana]] would "long for the day when our downtrodden brethren in [[Portuguese Angola|Angola]] and other Portuguese territories in Africa are liberated." [[Adelino Gwambe]], the leader of the [[National Democratic Union of Mozambique|Mozambique National Democratic Union]] stated: "We fully support the use of force against Portuguese butchers."<ref name=ComradesatOdds/> | Before the invasion the press speculated about international reaction to military action and recalled the recent charge by African nations that India was "too soft" on Portugal and was thus "dampening the enthusiasm of freedom fighters in other countries".<ref name=ComradesatOdds/> Many [[Africa]]n countries, themselves former European colonies, reacted positively to the capture of Goa by the Indians. [[Ghana Broadcasting Corporation|Radio Ghana]] termed it as the "Liberation of Goa" and went on to state that the people of [[Ghana]] would "long for the day when our downtrodden brethren in [[Portuguese Angola|Angola]] and other Portuguese territories in Africa are liberated." [[Adelino Gwambe]], the leader of the [[National Democratic Union of Mozambique|Mozambique National Democratic Union]] stated: "We fully support the use of force against Portuguese butchers."<ref name=ComradesatOdds/> | ||
Also in 1961<!--before or after Goa?-->, the tiny Portuguese [[enclave]] of [[Fort of São João Baptista de Ajudá]] was annexed by the [[Republic of Dahomey]] (now Benin). Portugal recognised the annexation in 1975.{{Citation needed|date = June | Also in 1961<!--before or after Goa?-->, the tiny Portuguese [[enclave]] of [[Fort of São João Baptista de Ajudá]] was annexed by the [[Republic of Dahomey]] (now Benin). Portugal recognised the annexation in 1975.{{Citation needed|date = June 2022}} | ||
====Soviet Union==== | ====Soviet Union==== | ||
The future leader of the [[Soviet Union]], [[Leonid Brezhnev]], who was touring India at the time of the war, made several speeches applauding the Indian action. In a farewell message, he urged Indians to ignore [[Western world|Western]] indignation as it came "from those who are accustomed to strangle the peoples striving for independence ... and from those who enrich themselves from colonialist plunder". [[Nikita Khrushchev]], the de facto Soviet leader, telegraphed Nehru stating that there was "unanimous acclaim" from every Soviet citizen for "Friendly India". The USSR had earlier vetoed a [[UN security council]] resolution condemning the Indian annexation of Goa.<ref>[https://books.google.com/books?id=vTEge1JWK8oC&pg=PA29&lpg=PA29&dq=Goa+vetoes+USSR#v=snippet&q=%22deploring%20India%27s%20police%20action%20was%20vetoed%20by%20the%20USSR%22&f=false India-USSR Relations 1947–71: (From Ambivalence to Steadfastness) PART-I], Shri Ram Sharma, Shri Ram Sharma, Discovery Publishing House, 1999 | The future leader of the [[Soviet Union]], [[Leonid Brezhnev]], who was touring India at the time of the war, made several speeches applauding the Indian action. In a farewell message, he urged Indians to ignore [[Western world|Western]] indignation as it came "from those who are accustomed to strangle the peoples striving for independence ... and from those who enrich themselves from colonialist plunder". [[Nikita Khrushchev]], the de facto Soviet leader, telegraphed Nehru stating that there was "unanimous acclaim" from every Soviet citizen for "Friendly India". The USSR had earlier vetoed a [[UN security council]] resolution condemning the Indian annexation of Goa.<ref>[https://books.google.com/books?id=vTEge1JWK8oC&pg=PA29&lpg=PA29&dq=Goa+vetoes+USSR#v=snippet&q=%22deploring%20India%27s%20police%20action%20was%20vetoed%20by%20the%20USSR%22&f=false India-USSR Relations 1947–71: (From Ambivalence to Steadfastness) PART-I], Shri Ram Sharma, Shri Ram Sharma, Discovery Publishing House, 1999, {{ISBN|978-8171414864}}</ref><ref>[https://www.forbes.com/2011/01/26/forbes-india-fifty-years-after-liberation-fron-portuguese-rule-tourism-boom-returns.html Saude, Goa], Prince Mathews Thomas Thomas, 01.26.11, 06:00 PM EST, Fifty years after its liberation from Portuguese rule, this tiny tourist state is rethinking its future again.</ref><ref>[https://books.google.com/books?id=nE0EAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA60&lpg=PA60&dq=India+Goa+veto+USSR+indian+express#v=onepage&q=%22U.S.%2C%20over%20the%20Soviet%20Veto%22&f=false ''Life'']. 5 January 1962, Vol. 52, No. 1, {{ISSN|0024-3019}}.</ref> | ||
====Arab states==== | ====Arab states==== | ||
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===Condemnation=== | ===Condemnation=== | ||
====United States==== | ====United States==== | ||
The United States' official reaction to the annexation of Goa was delivered by [[Adlai Stevenson II|Adlai Stevenson]] in the [[United Nations Security Council]], where he condemned the armed action of the [[Indian government]] and demanded that all Indian forces be unconditionally withdrawn from Goan soil. | The United States' official reaction to the annexation of Goa was delivered by [[Adlai Stevenson II|Adlai Stevenson]] in the [[United Nations Security Council]], where he condemned the armed action of the [[Indian government]] and demanded that all Indian forces be unconditionally withdrawn from Goan soil. | ||
To express its displeasure with the Indian action in Goa, the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee attempted, over the objections of President [[John F. Kennedy]], to cut the 1962 foreign aid appropriation to India by 25 percent.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Changing Perceptions | To express its displeasure with the Indian action in Goa, the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee attempted, over the objections of President [[John F. Kennedy]], to cut the 1962 foreign aid appropriation to India by 25 percent.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Changing Perceptions of India in the U.S. Congress|url=http://sga.myweb.uga.edu/readings/changing_perceptions_of_india.htm |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091210050251/http://sga.myweb.uga.edu/readings/changing_perceptions_of_india.htm |archive-date=10 December 2009 |access-date=9 November 2009 |publisher=Sga.myweb.uga.edu}}</ref> | ||
Referring to the perception, especially in the West, that India had previously been lecturing the world about the virtues of nonviolence, President Kennedy told the Indian ambassador to the US, "You spend the last fifteen years preaching morality to us, and then you go ahead and act the way any normal country would behave ... People are saying, the preacher has been caught coming out of the brothel."<ref>[https://books.google.com/books?id=zcylFXH9_z8C India and the United States: Estranged Democracies, 1941–1991] By Dennis Kux Published by | Referring to the perception, especially in the West, that India had previously been lecturing the world about the virtues of nonviolence, President Kennedy told the Indian ambassador to the US, "You spend the last fifteen years preaching morality to us, and then you go ahead and act the way any normal country would behave ... People are saying, the preacher has been caught coming out of the brothel."<ref>[https://books.google.com/books?id=zcylFXH9_z8C India and the United States: Estranged Democracies, 1941–1991] By Dennis Kux Published by Diane Publishing, 1993, {{ISBN|978-0788102790}}, p. 198</ref> | ||
In an article titled "India, The Aggressor", ''The New York Times'' on 19 December 1961, stated "With his invasion of Goa Prime Minister Nehru has done irreparable damage to India's good name and to the principles of international morality."<ref>[https://www.nytimes.com/1961/12/19/archives/india-the-aggressor.html?sq=With%2520his%2520invasion%2520of%2520Goa%2520Prime%2520Minister%2520Nehru%2520has%2520done%2520irreparable%2520damage%2520to%2520India%27s%2520good%2520name%2520and%2520to%2520the%2520principles%2520of%2520international%2520morality&scp=1&st=cse "India, the Aggressor"], ''The New York Times'', | In an article titled "India, The Aggressor", ''The New York Times'' on 19 December 1961, stated "With his invasion of Goa Prime Minister Nehru has done irreparable damage to India's good name and to the principles of international morality."<ref>[https://www.nytimes.com/1961/12/19/archives/india-the-aggressor.html?sq=With%2520his%2520invasion%2520of%2520Goa%2520Prime%2520Minister%2520Nehru%2520has%2520done%2520irreparable%2520damage%2520to%2520India%27s%2520good%2520name%2520and%2520to%2520the%2520principles%2520of%2520international%2520morality&scp=1&st=cse "India, the Aggressor"], ''The New York Times'', p. 32, 19 December 1961</ref> | ||
''[[Life (magazine)|Life International]]'', in its issue dated 12 February 1962, carried an article titled "Symbolic pose by Goa's Governor" in which it expressed its vehement condemnation of the military action. | ''[[Life (magazine)|Life International]]'', in its issue dated 12 February 1962, carried an article titled "Symbolic pose by Goa's Governor" in which it expressed its vehement condemnation of the military action. | ||
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Commonwealth Relations Secretary, [[Duncan Sandys]] told the [[House of Commons of the United Kingdom|House of Commons]] on 18 December 1961 that while the UK Government had long understood the desire of the Indian people to incorporate Goa, Daman, and Diu in the Indian Republic, and their feeling of impatience that the Portuguese Government had not followed the example of Britain and France in relinquishing their Indian possessions, he had to "make it plain that H.M. Government deeply deplores the decision of the Government of India to use military force to attain its political objectives." | Commonwealth Relations Secretary, [[Duncan Sandys]] told the [[House of Commons of the United Kingdom|House of Commons]] on 18 December 1961 that while the UK Government had long understood the desire of the Indian people to incorporate Goa, Daman, and Diu in the Indian Republic, and their feeling of impatience that the Portuguese Government had not followed the example of Britain and France in relinquishing their Indian possessions, he had to "make it plain that H.M. Government deeply deplores the decision of the Government of India to use military force to attain its political objectives." | ||
The Leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons [[Hugh Gaitskell]] of the Labour Party also expressed "profound regret" that India should have resorted to force in her dispute with Portugal, although the Opposition recognised that the existence of Portuguese colonies on the Indian mainland had long been an anachronism and that Portugal should have abandoned them long since in pursuance of the example set by Britain and France. Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations, Sir [[Patrick Dean]], stated in the UN that Britain had been "shocked and dismayed" at the outbreak of hostilities.<ref name="Keesing">{{Cite web |title=International Reactions to Indian Attack on Goa | The Leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons [[Hugh Gaitskell]] of the Labour Party also expressed "profound regret" that India should have resorted to force in her dispute with Portugal, although the Opposition recognised that the existence of Portuguese colonies on the Indian mainland had long been an anachronism and that Portugal should have abandoned them long since in pursuance of the example set by Britain and France. Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations, Sir [[Patrick Dean (diplomat)|Patrick Dean]], stated in the UN that Britain had been "shocked and dismayed" at the outbreak of hostilities.<ref name="Keesing">{{Cite web |title=International Reactions to Indian Attack on Goa – Soviet Veto of Western Cease-fire Resolution in security Council |url=https://web.stanford.edu/group/tomzgroup/pmwiki/uploads/1074-1962-03-KS-b-RCW.pdf |publisher=Keesing's Worldwide, LLC}}</ref> | ||
====Netherlands==== | ====Netherlands==== | ||
A Foreign Ministry spokesman in [[The Hague]] regretted that India, "of all countries," had resorted to force to gain her ends, particularly as India had always championed the principles of the U.N. Charter and consistently opposed the use of force to achieve national purposes. Fears were expressed in the Dutch Press lest the Indian attack on Goa might encourage Indonesia to make a similar attack on [[Western New Guinea|West New Guinea]].<ref name="Keesing" /> On 27 December 1961, Dutch ambassador to the United States, Herman Van Roijen asked the US Government if their military support in the form of the USN's [[United States Seventh Fleet|7th Fleet]] would be forthcoming in case of such an attack.<ref> | A Foreign Ministry spokesman in [[The Hague]] regretted that India, "of all countries," had resorted to force to gain her ends, particularly as India had always championed the principles of the U.N. Charter and consistently opposed the use of force to achieve national purposes. Fears were expressed in the Dutch Press lest the Indian attack on Goa might encourage Indonesia to make a similar attack on [[Western New Guinea|West New Guinea]].<ref name="Keesing" /> On 27 December 1961, Dutch ambassador to the United States, Herman Van Roijen asked the US Government if their military support in the form of the USN's [[United States Seventh Fleet|7th Fleet]] would be forthcoming in case of such an attack.<ref>Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia, Document 219. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d219</ref> | ||
====Brazil==== | ====Brazil==== | ||
The Brazilian government's reaction to the annexation of Goa was one of staunch solidarity with Portugal, reflecting earlier statements by Brazilian presidents that their country stood firmly with Portugal anywhere in the world and that ties between Brazil and Portugal were built on ties of blood and sentiment. Former Brazilian President [[Juscelino Kubitschek]], and long time friend and supporter of Portuguese PM Salazar, stated to Indian PM Nehru that "Seventy Million Brazilians could never understand, nor accept, an act of violence against Goa."<ref>[https://books.google.com/books?id=0-4uEqrWC00C&lpg=PA108&vq=%22brazilian%20pain%22&pg=PA108#v=onepage&q=%22against%20Goa%22&f=false ''Hotel Tropico: Brazil and the Challenge of African Decolonization, 1950–1980''], Jerry Dávila, | The Brazilian government's reaction to the annexation of Goa was one of staunch solidarity with Portugal, reflecting earlier statements by Brazilian presidents that their country stood firmly with Portugal anywhere in the world and that ties between Brazil and Portugal were built on ties of blood and sentiment. Former Brazilian President [[Juscelino Kubitschek]], and long time friend and supporter of Portuguese PM Salazar, stated to Indian PM Nehru that "Seventy Million Brazilians could never understand, nor accept, an act of violence against Goa."<ref>[https://books.google.com/books?id=0-4uEqrWC00C&lpg=PA108&vq=%22brazilian%20pain%22&pg=PA108#v=onepage&q=%22against%20Goa%22&f=false ''Hotel Tropico: Brazil and the Challenge of African Decolonization, 1950–1980''], Jerry Dávila, p. 27</ref> In a speech in Rio de Janeiro on 10 June 1962, Brazilian congressman [[Gilberto Freyre]] commented on the annexation of Goa by declaring that "a Portuguese wound is Brazilian pain".<ref>[https://books.google.com/books?id=0-4uEqrWC00C&lpg=PA108&vq=%22brazilian%20pain%22&pg=PA108#v=snippet&q=%22brazilian%20pain%22&f=false ''Hotel Tropico: Brazil and the Challenge of African Decolonization, 1950–1980''], Jerry Dávila, p. 108</ref> | ||
Shortly after the conflict, the new Brazilian ambassador to India, Mário Guimarães, stated to the Portuguese ambassador to Greece that it was "necessary for the Portuguese to comprehend that the age of colonialism is over". Guimarães dismissed the Portuguese ambassador's argument that [[Portuguese Empire|Portuguese colonialism]] was based on | Shortly after the conflict, the new Brazilian ambassador to India, Mário Guimarães, stated to the Portuguese ambassador to Greece that it was "necessary for the Portuguese to comprehend that the age of colonialism is over". Guimarães dismissed the Portuguese ambassador's argument that [[Portuguese Empire|Portuguese colonialism]] was based on race-mixing and the creation of multiracial societies, stating that this was "not enough of a reason to prevent independence".<ref>[https://books.google.com/books?id=0-4uEqrWC00C&lpg=PA108&vq=%22brazilian%20pain%22&pg=PA114#v=snippet&q=%22not%20enough%20of%20a%20reason%20to%20prevent%20independence%22&f=false ''Hotel Tropico: Brazil and the Challenge of African Decolonization, 1950–1980''], Jerry Dávila, p. 114</ref> | ||
====Pakistan==== | ====Pakistan==== | ||
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"The lesson from the Indian action on Goa is of practical interest on the question of [[Kashmir]]. Certainly the people of Kashmir could draw inspiration from what the Indians are reported to have stated in the leaflets they dropped ... on Goa. The leaflets stated that it was India's task to ‘defend the honour and security of the Motherland from which the people of Goa had been separated far too long' and which the people of Goa, largely by their own efforts could again make their own. We hope the Indians will apply the same logic to Kashmir. Now the Indians can impress their electorate with having achieved military glory. The mask is off. Their much-proclaimed theories of non-violence, secularism, and democratic methods stand exposed."<ref name="Keesing" /> | "The lesson from the Indian action on Goa is of practical interest on the question of [[Kashmir]]. Certainly the people of Kashmir could draw inspiration from what the Indians are reported to have stated in the leaflets they dropped ... on Goa. The leaflets stated that it was India's task to ‘defend the honour and security of the Motherland from which the people of Goa had been separated far too long' and which the people of Goa, largely by their own efforts could again make their own. We hope the Indians will apply the same logic to Kashmir. Now the Indians can impress their electorate with having achieved military glory. The mask is off. Their much-proclaimed theories of non-violence, secularism, and democratic methods stand exposed."<ref name="Keesing" /> | ||
In a letter to the US | In a letter to the US president on 2 January 1962, Pakistani President General [[Ayub Khan (Field Marshal)|Ayub Khan]] stated: "My Dear President, The forcible taking of Goa by India has demonstrated what we in Pakistan have never had any illusions about—that India would not hesitate to attack if it were in her interest to do so and if she felt that the other side was too weak to resist."<ref>[https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d83 Letter From President Ayub to President Kennedy], Rawalpindi, 2 January 1962.</ref> | ||
===Ambivalence=== | ===Ambivalence=== | ||
====People's Republic of China==== | ====People's Republic of China==== | ||
In an official statement issued on 19 December, the [[Government of the People's Republic of China|Chinese government]] stressed its "resolute support" for the struggle of the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America against "imperialist colonialism". However, the Hong Kong Communist newspaper ''[[Ta Kung Pao]]'' described the attack on Goa as "a desperate attempt by Mr. Nehru to regain his sagging prestige among the Afro-Asian nations." The ''Ta Kung Pao'' article – published before the statement from the Chinese Government – conceded that Goa was legitimately part of Indian territory and that the Indian people were entitled to take whatever measures were necessary to recover it. At the same time, however, the paper ridiculed Mr. Nehru for choosing "the world's tiniest imperialist country" to achieve his aim and asserted that "internal unrest, the failure of Nehru's anti-China campaign, and the forthcoming election forced him to take action against Goa to please the Indian people."<ref name="Keesing" /> | In an official statement issued on 19 December, the [[Government of the People's Republic of China|Chinese government]] stressed its "resolute support" for the struggle of the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America against "imperialist colonialism". However, the Hong Kong Communist newspaper ''[[Ta Kung Pao]]'' described the attack on Goa as "a desperate attempt by Mr. Nehru to regain his sagging prestige among the Afro-Asian nations." The ''Ta Kung Pao'' article – published before the statement from the Chinese Government – conceded that Goa was legitimately part of Indian territory and that the Indian people were entitled to take whatever measures were necessary to recover it. At the same time, however, the paper ridiculed Mr. Nehru for choosing "the world's tiniest imperialist country" to achieve his aim and asserted that "internal unrest, the failure of Nehru's anti-China campaign, and the forthcoming election forced him to take action against Goa to please the Indian people."<ref name="Keesing" /> | ||
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The [[Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Goa and Daman|Roman Catholic Archbishop of Goa and Daman]] and [[Patriarch of the East Indies]] was always a Portuguese-born cleric; at the time of the annexation, José Vieira Alvernaz was archbishop, and days earlier Dom [[José Pedro da Silva]] had been nominated by the [[Holy See]] as [[coadjutor bishop]] with right to succeed Alvernaz. After the annexation, Silva remained in Portugal and was never consecrated; in 1965 he became [[Roman Catholic Diocese of Viseu|bishop of Viseu]] in Portugal. Alvernaz retired to the [[Azores]] but remained titular Patriarch until resigning in 1975 after Portuguese recognition of the 1961 annexation. | The [[Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Goa and Daman|Roman Catholic Archbishop of Goa and Daman]] and [[Patriarch of the East Indies]] was always a Portuguese-born cleric; at the time of the annexation, José Vieira Alvernaz was archbishop, and days earlier Dom [[José Pedro da Silva]] had been nominated by the [[Holy See]] as [[coadjutor bishop]] with right to succeed Alvernaz. After the annexation, Silva remained in Portugal and was never consecrated; in 1965 he became [[Roman Catholic Diocese of Viseu|bishop of Viseu]] in Portugal. Alvernaz retired to the [[Azores]] but remained titular Patriarch until resigning in 1975 after Portuguese recognition of the 1961 annexation. | ||
Although the Vatican did not voice its reaction to the annexation of Goa, it delayed the appointment of a native head of the Goan Church until the inauguration of the [[Second Vatican Council]] in Rome, when Msgr [[Francisco Xavier da Piedade Rebelo]] was consecrated Bishop and [[Vicar Apostolic]] of Goa in 1963.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=de Souza |first=Teotonio R. |date=December 1986 |title=Unless Ye Become Like Children... |url=http://www.goacom.com/the-catholic-church-in-goa |journal=[[Goa Today]]}}</ref><ref>Teotonio R. de Souza, Goa to Me, New Delhi: Concept Publ. Co., 1994 ({{ISBN| | Although the Vatican did not voice its reaction to the annexation of Goa, it delayed the appointment of a native head of the Goan Church until the inauguration of the [[Second Vatican Council]] in Rome, when Msgr [[Francisco Xavier da Piedade Rebelo]] was consecrated Bishop and [[Vicar Apostolic]] of Goa in 1963.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=de Souza |first=Teotonio R. |date=December 1986 |title=Unless Ye Become Like Children... |url=http://www.goacom.com/the-catholic-church-in-goa |journal=[[Goa Today]]}}</ref><ref>Teotonio R. de Souza, ''Goa to Me'', New Delhi: Concept Publ. Co., 1994 ({{ISBN|8170225043}}) {{Cite web |title=Goacom – Timelines |url=http://www.goacom.com/culture/biographies/tdesbio.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110517122848/http://www.goacom.com/culture/biographies/tdesbio.html |archive-date=17 May 2011 |access-date=2 February 2010 |df=dmy}}</ref> His was succeeded by [[Raul Nicolau Gonçalves]] in 1972, who became the first native-born Patriarch in 1978.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Costa |first=Cosme Jose |date=21 December 2014 |title=Reminiscences Of Goa's Liberation |url=http://www.heraldgoa.in/Review/Reminiscences-Of-Goa%E2%80%99s-Liberation/82454.html |access-date=30 September 2015 |website=[[O Heraldo]] |location=Goa}}</ref> | ||
==Legality== | ==Legality== | ||
Upon independence in 1947 India had accorded recognition to the Portuguese sovereignty over Goa. After invading Goa India's case was built around the illegality of colonial acquisitions. This argument was correct according to the legal norms of the twentieth century, but did not hold to the standards of sixteenth century international law. India gained sympathy from much of the international community, but this did not, however, signify any legal support for the invasion.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Peter Malanczuk |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uwiIAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA156 |title=Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law |date= | Upon independence in 1947 India had accorded recognition to the Portuguese sovereignty over Goa. After invading Goa India's case was built around the illegality of colonial acquisitions. This argument was correct according to the legal norms of the twentieth century, but did not hold to the standards of sixteenth century international law. India gained sympathy from much of the international community, but this did not, however, signify any legal support for the invasion.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Peter Malanczuk |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uwiIAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA156 |title=Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law |date= 2002 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1134833887 |pages=156– |quote=Portugal acquired Goa by conquest in the sixteenth century, and India recognized the Portuguese title after becoming independent in 1947. However, in the Security Council debates which followed the invasion, India argued that Portugal's title was void because it was based on colonial conquest. Such a view is correct under twentieth century notions of international law, but hardly under sixteenth-century notions. The sympathies of most of the members of the United Nations lay with India, and neither the Security Council nor the General Assembly condemned India's actions. But this does not necessarily mean that they thought India's action was legally justified.}}</ref> The [[Supreme Court of India]] recognised the validity of the annexation and rejected the continued applicability of the law of occupation. In a treaty with retroactive effect, Portugal recognised Indian sovereignty in 1974.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Andrew Clapham |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0IGhCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1465 |title=The 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commentary |last2=Paola Gaeta |last3=Marco Sassòli |date= 2015 |publisher=OUP Oxford |isbn=978-0191003523 |pages=1465– |quote=In the case of the annexation of Goa by India in 1961, the Supreme Court of India held that the annexation was valid and the law of occupation no longer applicable. In 1974, Portugal recognized the Indian sovereignty over Goa by a treaty with retroactive effect.}}</ref> Under the ''[[jus cogens]]'' rule forceful annexations including the annexation of Goa are held as illegal since they have taken place after the UN Charter came into force. A later treaty can not justify it.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Alina Kaczorowska-Ireland |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=2fQjCQAAQBAJ&pg=PA268 |title=Public International Law |date=2015 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1317936411 |pages=268– |quote=It is submitted that in the light of the jus cogens rule prohibiting the threat or use of force any annexation which has taken place after the entry into force of the UN Charter e.g. the annexation of Tibet by China in 1951, the annexation of Hyderabad by India in 1948, the annexation of Goa (despite the fact that Portugal relinquished its claim and recognised the sovereignty of India over Goa by a treaty) should be regarded as illegal and thus without any effect under international law. Such fundamental illegality can neither be justified by the subsequent conclusion of a peace treaty nor by the application of the doctrine of historic consolidation.}}</ref> Sharon Korman argues that the principle of self-determination may bend the rule to accommodate the new reality but it will not change the illegal aspect of the original annexation.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Sharon Korman |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ueDO1dJyjrUC&pg=PA275 |title=The Right of Conquest: The Acquisition of Territory by Force in International Law and Practice |date= 1996 |publisher=Clarendon Press |isbn=978-0191583803 |pages=275– |quote=It may therefore be argued that the recognition of India's annexation of Goa involved the bending of a principle (the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by the use of force) to accommodate a reality which was regarded as being, on the whole, beneficial, even if this situation originated in illegality. But it did not involve the abandonment of the legal principle prohibiting the acquisition of territory by force-even in respect of territories defined as colonies. The conclusion that India's successful annexation of Goa cannot be taken to indicate the existence of a legal right of reconquest in cases where a former colony seeks to recover what it considers to be its pre-colonial frontiers is reinforced-even more strongly and conclusively-by the practice of states in connection with Argentina's attempted conquest or reconquest of the Faulkland islands.}}</ref> | ||
==See also== | ==See also== | ||
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==References== | ==References== | ||
=== Citations === | === Citations === | ||
{{Reflist|2}} | {{Reflist|2}} | ||
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* {{Citation |last=Fernandes |first=Aureliano |title=Political Transition in Post-Colonial Societies: Goa in Perspective |url=http://www.persee.fr/doc/luso_1257-0273_2000_num_7_1_1381 |journal=Lusotopie |volume=7 |year=2000 |issue=1 |pages=341–358}} | * {{Citation |last=Fernandes |first=Aureliano |title=Political Transition in Post-Colonial Societies: Goa in Perspective |url=http://www.persee.fr/doc/luso_1257-0273_2000_num_7_1_1381 |journal=Lusotopie |volume=7 |year=2000 |issue=1 |pages=341–358}} | ||
* Gopal, Sarvepalli. ''Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography Vol. 3: 1956–1964'' (Harvard University Press, 1984) pp 190–203. | * Gopal, Sarvepalli. ''Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography Vol. 3: 1956–1964'' (Harvard University Press, 1984) pp 190–203. | ||
* Heimsath, Charles H. and Surjit Mansingh. ''A Diplomatic History of Modern India'' (1971) pp 324–339. | * Heimsath, Charles H. and Surjit Mansingh. ''A Diplomatic History of Modern India'' (1971) pp 324–339. | ||
* {{Citation |last=Newman |first=Robert S. |title=Goa: The Transformation of an Indian Region |date=Autumn 1984 |url=http://www.revistas.usp.br/viaatlantica/article/view/119337 |journal=Pacific Affairs |volume=57 |issue=3 |pages=429–449 |doi=10.2307/2759068 |jstor=2759068|s2cid=155219732 }} | |||
* {{Citation |last=Newman |first=Robert S. |title=Goa: The Transformation of an Indian Region |date=Autumn 1984 |url=http://www.revistas.usp.br/viaatlantica/article/view/119337 |journal=Pacific Affairs |volume=57 |issue=3 |pages=429–449 |doi=10.2307/2759068 |jstor=2759068}} | * Pöllath, Moritz. "‘Far away from the Atlantic...': Goa, West New Guinea and NATO's out-of-area policy at Bandung 1955." ''Journal of Transatlantic Studies'' 11.4 (2013): 387–402. | ||
* Pöllath, Moritz. "‘Far away from the Atlantic...': Goa, West New Guinea and NATO's out-of-area policy at Bandung 1955." ''Journal of Transatlantic Studies'' 11.4 (2013): | |||
* {{Citation |last=Rubinoff |first=Arthur G. |title=Political Integration in Goa |work=Journal of Developing Societies |volume=11 |issue=1 |year=1995 |id={{ProQuest|1307824129}} |pages=36–60}} | * {{Citation |last=Rubinoff |first=Arthur G. |title=Political Integration in Goa |work=Journal of Developing Societies |volume=11 |issue=1 |year=1995 |id={{ProQuest|1307824129}} |pages=36–60}} | ||