Annexation of Goa: Difference between revisions

| commander1        = {{ublist|class=nowrap |{{flagicon image|Flag of the President of India (1950–1971).svg}} [[Rajendra Prasad]]<br /><small>([[President of India]])</small>|{{flagicon image|Flag of India.svg}} [[Jawaharlal Nehru]]<br /><small>([[Prime Minister of India]])</small>|{{flagicon image|Flag of the Ministry of Defence of India.svg}} [[V. K. Krishna Menon]]<br /><small>([[Minister of Defence (India)|Minister of Defence]])</small>|{{flagicon image|Naval_Ensign_of_India_(1950–2001).svg}} [[Vice Admiral (India)|VAdm]] [[R. D. Katari]]<br /><small>([[Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee]] and <br>[[Chief of the Naval Staff (India)|Chief of the Naval Staff]])</small>|{{flagicon image|Flag of Indian Army.svg}} [[General (India)|Gen.]] [[Pran Nath Thapar|P. N. Thapar]]<br /><small>([[Chief of the Army Staff (India)|Chief of the Army Staff]])</small>|{{flagicon image|Air_Force_Ensign_of_India.svg}} [[Air Marshal (India)|AM]] [[Aspy Engineer|A. M. Engineer]]<br /><small>([[Chief of the Air Staff (India)|Chief of the Air Staff]])</small>|{{flagicon image|Flag_of_Indian_Lieutenant_Generals,_Army_Headquarters.svg}} [[Lieutenant General (India)|Lt. Gen.]] [[Jayanto Nath Chaudhuri|J. N. Chaudhuri]]<br /><small>(GOC-in-C, [[Southern Command (India)|Southern Command]])</small>|{{flagicon image|Rear_Admiral_of_the_Indian_Navy_rank_flag.svg}} [[Rear admiral (India)|Rear admiral]] [[Bhaskar Sadashiv Soman|B. S. Soman]]<br /><small>([[Flag Officer Commanding Western Fleet|Flag Officer Commanding Indian Fleet]])</small>|{{flagicon image|Flag of Indian Air Vice Marshal 1950-1980.svg}} [[Air vice-marshal|AVM]] [[Erlic Pinto]]<br /><small>(AOC-in-C, [[Western Air Command|Operational Command]])</small>|{{flagicon image|Flag of Indian Army.svg}} [[Major general|Maj. Gen.]] [[K. P. Candeth]]<br/><small>(GOC, [[17th Infantry Division (India)|17th Infantry Division]]}}

| strength1        = 45,000 [[infantry]]<br />1 [[light aircraft carrier]]<br />2 [[cruisers]]<br />1 [[destroyer]]<br />8 [[frigates]]<br />4 [[minesweepers]]<br />20 [[English Electric Canberra|Canberra]] medium bombers<br />6 [[de Havilland Vampire|Vampire]] fighters<br />6 [[Dassault Ouragan|Toofani]] fighter-bombers<br />6 [[Hawker Hunter|Hunter]] multi-role aircraft<br />4 [[Dassault Mystère IV|Mystère]] fighter-bombers

| strength2        = 3,500 military personnel<br />1 [[frigate]]<br />3 inshore [[patrol boat]]s

{{Main|Goa Liberation Movement}}

 

In addition to non-violent protests, armed groups such as the Azad Gomantak Dal (The Free Goa Party) and the United Front of Goans conducted violent attacks aimed at weakening Portuguese rule in Goa.<ref>{{Cite web |title=A Liberation From Lies By Prabhakar Sinari |url=http://www.countercurrents.org/comm-sinari061103.htm |access-date=9 November 2009 |publisher=Countercurrents.org}}</ref> The [[Government of India|Indian government]] supported the establishment of armed groups like the Azad Gomantak Dal, giving them full financial, logistic and armament support. The armed groups acted from bases situated in Indian territory and under cover of Indian police forces. The Indian government—through these armed groups—attempted to destroy economic targets, telegraph and telephone lines, road, water and rail transport, in order to impede economic activity and create conditions for a general uprising of the population.<ref>Francisco Monteiro, Chronology of Freedom Struggle Activities Unleashed by the Indian Union Against the Territories of Goa, Damão and Diu [http://www.colaco.net/1/India-ter.htm] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150923205346/http://www.colaco.net/1/India-ter.htm|date=23 September 2015}}</ref> A Portuguese army officer stationed with the army in Goa, Captain Carlos Azaredo, stated in 2001 in the Portuguese newspaper ''[[Expresso (newspaper)|Expresso]]'': "To the contrary to what is being said, the most evolved guerrilla warfare which our Armed Forces encountered was in Goa. I know what I'm talking about, because I also fought in Angola and in Guiné. In 1961 alone, until December, around 80 policemen died. The major part of the freedom fighters of Azad Gomantak Dal were not Goans. Many had fought in the [[British Army]], under [[Bernard Law Montgomery, 1st Viscount Montgomery of Alamein|General Montgomery]], against the [[Afrika Korps|Germans]]."<ref name="Azaredo">{{Cite news |last=Castanheira |first=José Pedro |date=8 December 2001 |title=Passagem para a Índia |language=pt |trans-title=Passage to India |work=Expresso |department=Revista |location=Paço d'Arcos |url=http://semanal.expresso.pt/revista/artigos/interior.asp?edicao=1519&id_artigo=ES44188 |access-date=20 December 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20011209004006/http://semanal.expresso.pt/revista/artigos/interior.asp?edicao=1519&id_artigo=ES44188 |archive-date=9 December 2001}}</ref>

By 1954, the Republic of India instituted visa restrictions on travel from Goa to India which paralysed transport between Goa and other exclaves like Daman, Diu, Dadra and Nagar Haveli.<ref name="ReferenceA" /> In the same year, India instituted sanctions on Portugal with the aim of the annexation of Goa into India, the sanction would remain until 1961.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Hufbauer |first1=Gary Clyde |url=https://www.google.co.uk/books/edition/Economic_Sanctions_Reconsidered/g-uzlJDD7DwC?hl=en |title=Economic Sanctions Reconsidered |last2=Schott |first2=Jeffrey J. |last3=Elliott |first3=Kimberly |publisher=Peterson Institute for International Economics |year=2007 |location=Washington |pages=21 |isbn=978-0881325362 |language=en}}</ref> Meanwhile, the Indian Union of Dockers had, in 1954, instituted a boycott on shipping to Portuguese India.<ref>Sankar Ghose (1993) ''Jawaharlal Nehru: A biography''. Mumbai: Allied. p. 283</ref> Between 22 July and 2 August 1954, armed activists attacked and forced the surrender of Portuguese forces stationed in Dadra and Nagar Haveli.<ref>P.W. Prabhakar (2003) ''Wars, proxy-wars and terrorism: post independent India'' New Delhi: Mittal, p. 39</ref>

[[Anjidiv Island|Anjidiv]] was a small 1.5&nbsp;km² island of Portuguese India, then almost uninhabited, belonging to the District of Goa, although off the coast of the Indian state of [[Karnataka]]. On the island stood the ancient [[Fort Anjediva|Anjidiv Fort]], defended by a platoon of Goan soldiers of the Portuguese Army.

Eventually at 12:50, after the ''Afonso'' had fired nearly 400 rounds at the Indians, hitting two of the Indian vessels, and had taken severe damage, the order was given to start abandoning ship. Under heavy fire directed at both the ship and the coast, non-essential crew including weapons staff left the ship and went ashore. They were followed at 13:10 by the rest of the crew, who, along with their injured commander, set fire to the ship and disembarked directly onto the beach. Following this, the commander was transferred by car to the hospital at Panaji. The NRP ''Afonso de Albuquerque'' lost 5 dead and 13 wounded in the battle.<ref name="areamilitar.net" />

On 18 December, a Portuguese request was made to the UN [[Security Council]] for a debate on the conflict in Goa. The request was approved when the bare minimum of seven members supported the request (the US, UK, France, Turkey, Chile, Ecuador, and Nationalist China), two opposed (the Soviet Union and Ceylon), and two abstained (the [[United Arab Republic]] and Liberia).<ref name="Keesing" />

This resolution received seven votes in favour (the four sponsors and Chile, Ecuador, and Nationalist China) and four against (the Soviet Union, Ceylon, Liberia, and the United Arab Republic). It was thus defeated by the Soviet veto. In a statement after the vote, Mr. Stevenson said that the "fateful" Goa debate could have been be "the first act of a drama" which could have ended in the death of the United Nations.<ref name="Keesing" />

The future leader of the [[Soviet Union]], [[Leonid Brezhnev]], who was touring India at the time of the war, made several speeches applauding the Indian action. In a farewell message, he urged Indians to ignore [[Western world|Western]] indignation as it came "from those who are accustomed to strangle the peoples striving for independence&nbsp;... and from those who enrich themselves from colonialist plunder". [[Nikita Khrushchev]], the de facto Soviet leader, telegraphed Nehru stating that there was "unanimous acclaim" from every Soviet citizen for "Friendly India". The USSR had earlier vetoed a [[UN security council]] resolution condemning the Indian annexation of Goa.<ref>[https://books.google.com/books?id=vTEge1JWK8oC&pg=PA29&lpg=PA29&dq=Goa+vetoes+USSR#v=snippet&q=%22deploring%20India%27s%20police%20action%20was%20vetoed%20by%20the%20USSR%22&f=false India-USSR Relations 1947–71: (From Ambivalence to Steadfastness) PART-I], Shri Ram Sharma, Shri Ram Sharma, Discovery Publishing House, 1999, {{ISBN|978-8171414864}}</ref><ref>[https://www.forbes.com/2011/01/26/forbes-india-fifty-years-after-liberation-fron-portuguese-rule-tourism-boom-returns.html Saude, Goa], Prince Mathews Thomas Thomas, 01.26.11, 06:00 PM EST, Fifty years after its liberation from Portuguese rule, this tiny tourist state is rethinking its future again.</ref><ref>[https://books.google.com/books?id=nE0EAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA60&lpg=PA60&dq=India+Goa+veto+USSR+indian+express#v=onepage&q=%22U.S.%2C%20over%20the%20Soviet%20Veto%22&f=false ''Life'']. 5 January 1962, Vol. 52, No. 1, {{ISSN|0024-3019}}.</ref>

The [[United Arab Republic]] expressed its full support for India's "legitimate efforts to regain its occupied territory". A [[Morocco|Moroccan]] Government spokesman said that "India has been extraordinarily patient and a non-violent country has been driven to violence by Portugal"; while [[Tunisia]]'s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Tunisia, Sadok Mokaddem expressed the hope that "the liberation of Goa will bring nearer the end of the Portuguese colonial regime in Africa." Similar expressions of support for India were forthcoming from other Arab countries.<ref name="Keesing" />

The Brazilian government's reaction to the annexation of Goa was one of staunch solidarity with Portugal, reflecting earlier statements by Brazilian presidents that their country stood firmly with Portugal anywhere in the world and that ties between Brazil and Portugal were built on ties of blood and sentiment. Former Brazilian President [[Juscelino Kubitschek]], and long time friend and supporter of Portuguese PM Salazar, stated to Indian PM Nehru that "Seventy Million Brazilians could never understand, nor accept, an act of violence against Goa."<ref>[https://books.google.com/books?id=0-4uEqrWC00C&lpg=PA108&vq=%22brazilian%20pain%22&pg=PA108#v=onepage&q=%22against%20Goa%22&f=false ''Hotel Tropico: Brazil and the Challenge of African Decolonization, 1950–1980''], Jerry Dávila, p. 27</ref> In a speech in Rio de Janeiro on 10 June 1962, Brazilian congressman [[Gilberto Freyre]] commented on the annexation of Goa by declaring that "a Portuguese wound is Brazilian pain".<ref>[https://books.google.com/books?id=0-4uEqrWC00C&lpg=PA108&vq=%22brazilian%20pain%22&pg=PA108#v=snippet&q=%22brazilian%20pain%22&f=false ''Hotel Tropico: Brazil and the Challenge of African Decolonization, 1950–1980''], Jerry Dávila, p. 108</ref>

Shortly after the conflict, the new Brazilian ambassador to India, Mário Guimarães, stated to the Portuguese ambassador to Greece that it was "necessary for the Portuguese to comprehend that the age of colonialism is over". Guimarães dismissed the Portuguese ambassador's argument that [[Portuguese Empire|Portuguese colonialism]] was based on race-mixing and the creation of multiracial societies, stating that this was "not enough of a reason to prevent independence".<ref>[https://books.google.com/books?id=0-4uEqrWC00C&lpg=PA108&vq=%22brazilian%20pain%22&pg=PA114#v=snippet&q=%22not%20enough%20of%20a%20reason%20to%20prevent%20independence%22&f=false ''Hotel Tropico: Brazil and the Challenge of African Decolonization, 1950–1980''], Jerry Dávila, p. 114</ref>

Upon independence in 1947 India had accorded recognition to the Portuguese sovereignty over Goa. After invading Goa India's case was built around the illegality of colonial acquisitions. This argument was correct according to the legal norms of the twentieth century, but did not hold to the standards of sixteenth century international law. India gained sympathy from much of the international community, but this did not, however, signify any legal support for the invasion.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Peter Malanczuk |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uwiIAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA156 |title=Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law |date= 2002 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1134833887 |pages=156– |quote=Portugal acquired Goa by conquest in the sixteenth century, and India recognized the Portuguese title after becoming independent in 1947. However, in the Security Council debates which followed the invasion, India argued that Portugal's title was void because it was based on colonial conquest. Such a view is correct under twentieth century notions of international law, but hardly under sixteenth-century notions. The sympathies of most of the members of the United Nations lay with India, and neither the Security Council nor the General Assembly condemned India's actions. But this does not necessarily mean that they thought India's action was legally justified.}}</ref> The [[Supreme Court of India]] recognised the validity of the annexation and rejected the continued applicability of the law of occupation. In a treaty with retroactive effect, Portugal recognised Indian sovereignty in 1974.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Andrew Clapham |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0IGhCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1465 |title=The 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commentary |last2=Paola Gaeta |last3=Marco Sassòli |date= 2015 |publisher=OUP Oxford |isbn=978-0191003523 |pages=1465– |quote=In the case of the annexation of Goa by India in 1961, the Supreme Court of India held that the annexation was valid and the law of occupation no longer applicable. In 1974, Portugal recognized the Indian sovereignty over Goa by a treaty with retroactive effect.}}</ref> Under the ''[[jus cogens]]'' rule forceful annexations including the annexation of Goa are held as illegal since they have taken place after the UN Charter came into force. A later treaty can not justify it.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Alina Kaczorowska-Ireland |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=2fQjCQAAQBAJ&pg=PA268 |title=Public International Law |date=2015 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1317936411 |pages=268– |quote=It is submitted that in the light of the jus cogens rule prohibiting the threat or use of force any annexation which has taken place after the entry into force of the UN Charter e.g. the annexation of Tibet by China in 1951, the annexation of Hyderabad by India in 1948, the annexation of Goa (despite the fact that Portugal relinquished its claim and recognised the sovereignty of India over Goa by a treaty) should be regarded as illegal and thus without any effect under international law. Such fundamental illegality can neither be justified by the subsequent conclusion of a peace treaty nor by the application of the doctrine of historic consolidation.}}</ref> Sharon Korman argues that the principle of self-determination may bend the rule to accommodate the new reality but it will not change the illegal aspect of the original annexation.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Sharon Korman |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ueDO1dJyjrUC&pg=PA275 |title=The Right of Conquest: The Acquisition of Territory by Force in International Law and Practice |date= 1996 |publisher=Clarendon Press |isbn=978-0191583803 |pages=275– |quote=It may therefore be argued that the recognition of India's annexation of Goa involved the bending of a principle (the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by the use of force) to accommodate a reality which was regarded as being, on the whole, beneficial, even if this situation originated in illegality. But it did not involve the abandonment of the legal principle prohibiting the acquisition of territory by force-even in respect of territories defined as colonies. The conclusion that India's successful annexation of Goa cannot be taken to indicate the existence of a legal right of reconquest in cases where a former colony seeks to recover what it considers to be its pre-colonial frontiers is reinforced-even more strongly and conclusively-by the practice of states in connection with Argentina's attempted conquest or reconquest of the Faulkland islands.}}</ref>