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{{More citations needed|date=April 2022}} | {{More citations needed|date=April 2022}} | ||
{{Use British English|date= April | {{Use British English|date= April 2020}} | ||
{{short description|Long-range raiding force of the Army of India during WW2}} | {{short description|Long-range raiding force of the Army of India during WW2}} | ||
{{Infobox military unit | {{Infobox military unit | ||
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As the members of the first expedition were making their way back to India, a second long range penetration unit, [[111th Indian Infantry Brigade]] was being formed.<ref name=Masters135>Masters 2002, p. 135.</ref> Popularly known as ''The Leopards'',<ref name=Masters135/> the brigade was raised by General Wavell without the knowledge of Wingate, who was still in Burma and who was known to have a strong dislike for the Indian Army, its diverse troop formations, and its British officers in particular. Wavell personally selected the commander of 111th Brigade, Brigadier [[Walter David Alexander Lentaigne|Joe Lentaigne]].<ref name=Masters135/> | As the members of the first expedition were making their way back to India, a second long range penetration unit, [[111th Indian Infantry Brigade]] was being formed.<ref name=Masters135>Masters 2002, p. 135.</ref> Popularly known as ''The Leopards'',<ref name=Masters135/> the brigade was raised by General Wavell without the knowledge of Wingate, who was still in Burma and who was known to have a strong dislike for the Indian Army, its diverse troop formations, and its British officers in particular. Wavell personally selected the commander of 111th Brigade, Brigadier [[Walter David Alexander Lentaigne|Joe Lentaigne]].<ref name=Masters135/> | ||
Wavell intended to use two Chindit brigades alternately during 1944. While one brigade was operating behind Japanese lines for two to three months at a time, the other would be resting in India, while training for and planning the next operation. However, Wingate returned from Quebec with authority to implement far more ambitious plans for the second expedition, which required that the force be greatly expanded to a strength of six brigades. Wingate refused to use [[British Indian Army|Indian Army]] formations in this force, because he maintained that their training in long-range penetration techniques would take longer and their maintenance by air would be difficult due to the varied dietary requirements of different Gurkha and Indian [[caste]]s and religions,<ref>Callahan 1978, p. 101.</ref> although he had little choice but to accept 111th Brigade, and two Gurkha battalions in 77th brigade. Since large numbers of trained British infantry were required, three brigades (the [[British 14th Infantry Brigade|14th]], [[British 16th Infantry Brigade|16th]] and [[British 23rd Infantry Brigade|23rd]]) were added to the Chindits by breaking up the experienced [[British 70th Infantry Division]], much against the wishes of Lieutenant General [[William Slim, 1st Viscount Slim|William Slim]] and other commanders, who wished to use the division in a conventional role.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://chindits.wordpress.com/2011/04/16/the-chindits-1944/|title=In 1944 – The Second & Last Expedition|date=16 April 2011|publisher=Hermes' wings|access-date=27 December | Wavell intended to use two Chindit brigades alternately during 1944. While one brigade was operating behind Japanese lines for two to three months at a time, the other would be resting in India, while training for and planning the next operation. However, Wingate returned from Quebec with authority to implement far more ambitious plans for the second expedition, which required that the force be greatly expanded to a strength of six brigades. Wingate refused to use [[British Indian Army|Indian Army]] formations in this force, because he maintained that their training in long-range penetration techniques would take longer and their maintenance by air would be difficult due to the varied dietary requirements of different Gurkha and Indian [[caste]]s and religions,<ref>Callahan 1978, p. 101.</ref> although he had little choice but to accept 111th Brigade, and two Gurkha battalions in 77th brigade. Since large numbers of trained British infantry were required, three brigades (the [[British 14th Infantry Brigade|14th]], [[British 16th Infantry Brigade|16th]] and [[British 23rd Infantry Brigade|23rd]]) were added to the Chindits by breaking up the experienced [[British 70th Infantry Division]], much against the wishes of Lieutenant General [[William Slim, 1st Viscount Slim|William Slim]] and other commanders, who wished to use the division in a conventional role.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://chindits.wordpress.com/2011/04/16/the-chindits-1944/|title=In 1944 – The Second & Last Expedition|date=16 April 2011|publisher=Hermes' wings|access-date=27 December 2015}}</ref> A sixth brigade was added to the force by taking a brigade (the 3rd (West African) Infantry Brigade) from the [[British 81st (West Africa) Division]].<ref>Rooney 1992, pp. 112 & 116.</ref> | ||
At Quebec, Wingate had also succeeded in obtaining a "private" air force for the Chindits, the [[1st Air Commando Group]], mainly consisting of [[United States Army Air Forces|USAAF]] aircraft. The Chindits were greatly encouraged by having aircraft on which they could call immediately for supply drops, casualty evacuation and air support. Other welcome American aid was the [[K-ration|"K" Ration]] pack which, although it provided insufficient calories for prolonged active operations, was far better than the equivalent British or Indian ration pack.<ref>Masters (1961), p.139</ref> | At Quebec, Wingate had also succeeded in obtaining a "private" air force for the Chindits, the [[1st Air Commando Group]], mainly consisting of [[United States Army Air Forces|USAAF]] aircraft. The Chindits were greatly encouraged by having aircraft on which they could call immediately for supply drops, casualty evacuation and air support. Other welcome American aid was the [[K-ration|"K" Ration]] pack which, although it provided insufficient calories for prolonged active operations, was far better than the equivalent British or Indian ration pack.<ref>Masters (1961), p.139</ref> | ||
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The forces for the second Chindit operation were called ''Special Force'', officially '''3rd Indian Infantry Division''', or ''Long Range Penetration Groups'',<ref>Rooney 1992, pp. 110 & 115.</ref> but the nickname, the Chindits, had already stuck. | The forces for the second Chindit operation were called ''Special Force'', officially '''3rd Indian Infantry Division''', or ''Long Range Penetration Groups'',<ref>Rooney 1992, pp. 110 & 115.</ref> but the nickname, the Chindits, had already stuck. | ||
The new Chindit force commenced training in [[Gwalior]]. Men were trained in crossing rivers, [[demolitions]] and [[bivouacking]]. Calvert and Fergusson, both newly promoted to Brigadier, took command of two of the brigades, and were responsible for much of the training program and the development of tactical planning.{{Cn|date=December | The new Chindit force commenced training in [[Gwalior]]. Men were trained in crossing rivers, [[demolitions]] and [[bivouacking]]. Calvert and Fergusson, both newly promoted to Brigadier, took command of two of the brigades, and were responsible for much of the training program and the development of tactical planning.{{Cn|date=December 2019}} Wingate himself was absent for much of the training period, first being out of the country to attend the Quebec Conference and then struck ill with typhoid from drinking bad water in North Africa on his return.<ref>Rooney 1992, pp. 116–117.</ref> | ||
===Plans=== | ===Plans=== | ||
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On 24 March, Wingate flew to [[Imphal]] to confer with air force commanders. On the return journey, the USAAF [[North American B-25 Mitchell|B-25]] bomber in which he was flying is believed to have flown into a thunderstorm and crashed in the jungle-covered mountains. All aboard were killed. | On 24 March, Wingate flew to [[Imphal]] to confer with air force commanders. On the return journey, the USAAF [[North American B-25 Mitchell|B-25]] bomber in which he was flying is believed to have flown into a thunderstorm and crashed in the jungle-covered mountains. All aboard were killed. | ||
Slim, the commander of the Fourteenth Army which had loose operational control over Special Force, selected Brigadier Lentaigne to be Wingate's replacement after conferring with Brigadier Derek Tulloch, Wingate's Chief of Staff. Lentaigne was judged to be the most balanced and experienced commander in the force; he had been an instructor at the Staff College at [[Quetta]], had led a Gurkha battalion with distinction during the gruelling retreat from Burma in 1942 and had commanded a Chindit brigade in the field (albeit for only a few weeks, but none of the other brigade commanders had more experience). As an officer of Gurkha troops, he had a similar outlook and background to Slim. The other Chindit brigade commanders were unknown quantities, mostly without staff qualifications, some of whom had never even commanded a battalion-sized unit in combat before 1944, and Wingate's staff officers lacked the necessary combat experience.<ref>Allen 1984, pp.348–351; summary from {{harvnb|Tulloch|1972|p={{page needed|date=August | Slim, the commander of the Fourteenth Army which had loose operational control over Special Force, selected Brigadier Lentaigne to be Wingate's replacement after conferring with Brigadier Derek Tulloch, Wingate's Chief of Staff. Lentaigne was judged to be the most balanced and experienced commander in the force; he had been an instructor at the Staff College at [[Quetta]], had led a Gurkha battalion with distinction during the gruelling retreat from Burma in 1942 and had commanded a Chindit brigade in the field (albeit for only a few weeks, but none of the other brigade commanders had more experience). As an officer of Gurkha troops, he had a similar outlook and background to Slim. The other Chindit brigade commanders were unknown quantities, mostly without staff qualifications, some of whom had never even commanded a battalion-sized unit in combat before 1944, and Wingate's staff officers lacked the necessary combat experience.<ref>Allen 1984, pp.348–351; summary from {{harvnb|Tulloch|1972|p={{page needed|date=August 2016}}}}.</ref> The force's second-in-command, Major General [[George William Symes]], was bypassed by Slim and formally protested and asked to be relieved.<ref>Allen 1984, pp. 350–351.</ref> In selecting Lentaigne, Slim did not take into account the tensions between those Chindit commanders and staff who were closely associated with Wingate, and Lentaigne, who had a classical "line" officer's background and had been critical of Wingate's methods and techniques.<ref>Allen 1984, p. 122.</ref> | ||
===The move north=== | ===The move north=== | ||
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The views of the majority of the post-war British military establishment were made succinctly by Slim (commander of the Fourteenth Army), when he wrote "... the Chindits, gave a splendid example of courage and hardihood. Yet I came firmly to the conclusion that such formations, trained, equipped and mentally adjusted for one kind of operation were wasteful. They did not give, militarily, a worth-while return for the resources in men, materiel and time that they absorbed. ... [Special forces] were usually formed by attracting the best men ... The result of these methods was undoubtedly to lower the quality of the rest of the Army".<ref name="Slim 1956, pp. 546–549.">Slim 1956, pp. 546–549.</ref> He makes several other arguments against special forces, about the danger of ordinary battalions thinking that some tasks could only be performed by special forces, and that special forces can only stay in the field for relatively short periods compared to regular battalions. He sums up that "Anything, whatever the short cuts to victory it may promise, which thus weakens the Army spirit is dangerous".<ref name="Slim 1956, pp. 546–549."/> To underline his point he suggests that "This cult of special forces is as sensible as to form a Royal Corps of Tree Climbers and say that no soldier, who does not wear its green hat with a bunch of oak leaves stuck in it should be expected to climb a tree".<ref name="Slim 1956, pp. 546–549."/> He does acknowledge the need for small units to stir up trouble in the enemy's rear area but does not make it clear if he is talking about [[V Force]] or the actions of Force 136.<ref name="Slim 1956, pp. 546–549."/> | The views of the majority of the post-war British military establishment were made succinctly by Slim (commander of the Fourteenth Army), when he wrote "... the Chindits, gave a splendid example of courage and hardihood. Yet I came firmly to the conclusion that such formations, trained, equipped and mentally adjusted for one kind of operation were wasteful. They did not give, militarily, a worth-while return for the resources in men, materiel and time that they absorbed. ... [Special forces] were usually formed by attracting the best men ... The result of these methods was undoubtedly to lower the quality of the rest of the Army".<ref name="Slim 1956, pp. 546–549.">Slim 1956, pp. 546–549.</ref> He makes several other arguments against special forces, about the danger of ordinary battalions thinking that some tasks could only be performed by special forces, and that special forces can only stay in the field for relatively short periods compared to regular battalions. He sums up that "Anything, whatever the short cuts to victory it may promise, which thus weakens the Army spirit is dangerous".<ref name="Slim 1956, pp. 546–549."/> To underline his point he suggests that "This cult of special forces is as sensible as to form a Royal Corps of Tree Climbers and say that no soldier, who does not wear its green hat with a bunch of oak leaves stuck in it should be expected to climb a tree".<ref name="Slim 1956, pp. 546–549."/> He does acknowledge the need for small units to stir up trouble in the enemy's rear area but does not make it clear if he is talking about [[V Force]] or the actions of Force 136.<ref name="Slim 1956, pp. 546–549."/> | ||
Others, like Sir [[Robert Grainger Ker Thompson|Robert Thompson]], an ex-Chindit, have asserted that the idea behind the Chindits was a sound one but that they were just badly handled and used in operations for which they were not properly equipped or trained, for example in static defence.{{citation needed|date=August | Others, like Sir [[Robert Grainger Ker Thompson|Robert Thompson]], an ex-Chindit, have asserted that the idea behind the Chindits was a sound one but that they were just badly handled and used in operations for which they were not properly equipped or trained, for example in static defence.{{citation needed|date=August 2016}} A third view is that, despite the relatively insignificant losses that the Chindits were able to inflict, their [[propaganda]] value in 1943, at a time when the Army was on the defensive, was a morale boost to the people of India and Britain, and helping to dispel the image of Japanese invincibility.<ref>Brayley 2002, pp. 19–20.</ref> It has been hard to reach a consensus on any of these issues due to the partisan nature of the discussions surrounding Wingate. | ||
It has also been argued that the Chindits contributed to the overall success of the Allied armies in Burma through the innovations in air supply techniques and organisation that their operations required.<ref name=Brayley20>Brayley 2002, p. 20.</ref> The Allied air forces were later to use these tactics to supply increasingly large forces that were cut off by the enemy, or were operating independently of road or rail lines of communication. Conversely, it has been argued that the apparent success of the Chindits led some Japanese commanders to believe that they could employ their own incursion tactics on a much larger scale, and that when they came to implement such tactics during the Chindwin offensive of early 1944, lacking the necessary air support that had enabled the Allies to be successful, the result was disastrous and ultimately led to defeat at both Kohima and Imphal, and later on the plains of Burma in 1945.<ref name=Brayley20/> | It has also been argued that the Chindits contributed to the overall success of the Allied armies in Burma through the innovations in air supply techniques and organisation that their operations required.<ref name=Brayley20>Brayley 2002, p. 20.</ref> The Allied air forces were later to use these tactics to supply increasingly large forces that were cut off by the enemy, or were operating independently of road or rail lines of communication. Conversely, it has been argued that the apparent success of the Chindits led some Japanese commanders to believe that they could employ their own incursion tactics on a much larger scale, and that when they came to implement such tactics during the Chindwin offensive of early 1944, lacking the necessary air support that had enabled the Allies to be successful, the result was disastrous and ultimately led to defeat at both Kohima and Imphal, and later on the plains of Burma in 1945.<ref name=Brayley20/> | ||
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Three of the Brigade commanders on ''Operation Thursday'' (two of whom had also served in the first Chindit expedition) subsequently wrote autobiographies, which contained their comments on the Chindits' concept and practice of operations. [[Bernard Fergusson, Baron Ballantrae|Bernard Fergusson]], originally an enthusiastic supporter of Wingate, later came to feel that Wingate lacked both consistency and flexibility in his plans, which contributed to Fergusson's long, pointless march from Ledo and his defeat at Indaw. John Masters, who was a friend of Lentaigne, felt that the Chindits' mobility was sacrificed in holding fixed defensive positions or attacking strong Japanese positions, without the necessary support. In criticism of the whole Chindit concept, he pointed out that the Chindit force had the infantry strength of two and a half line divisions but without supporting arms, had the fighting strength of less than one.<ref>Masters (1961), p.140</ref> Michael Calvert, who was closest to Wingate, remained a defender of Wingate and his methods. | Three of the Brigade commanders on ''Operation Thursday'' (two of whom had also served in the first Chindit expedition) subsequently wrote autobiographies, which contained their comments on the Chindits' concept and practice of operations. [[Bernard Fergusson, Baron Ballantrae|Bernard Fergusson]], originally an enthusiastic supporter of Wingate, later came to feel that Wingate lacked both consistency and flexibility in his plans, which contributed to Fergusson's long, pointless march from Ledo and his defeat at Indaw. John Masters, who was a friend of Lentaigne, felt that the Chindits' mobility was sacrificed in holding fixed defensive positions or attacking strong Japanese positions, without the necessary support. In criticism of the whole Chindit concept, he pointed out that the Chindit force had the infantry strength of two and a half line divisions but without supporting arms, had the fighting strength of less than one.<ref>Masters (1961), p.140</ref> Michael Calvert, who was closest to Wingate, remained a defender of Wingate and his methods. | ||
The [[77th Brigade (United Kingdom)|77th Brigade]], raised in 2015 to engage in propaganda for the army, was named in tribute to the Chindits.<ref name=GuardJan15>{{cite news |url=https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jan/31/british-army-facebook-warriors-77th-brigade|title=British army creates team of Facebook warriors|author=Ewan MacAskill|work=[[The Guardian]]|date=31 January 2015|access-date=31 January | The [[77th Brigade (United Kingdom)|77th Brigade]], raised in 2015 to engage in propaganda for the army, was named in tribute to the Chindits.<ref name=GuardJan15>{{cite news |url=https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jan/31/british-army-facebook-warriors-77th-brigade|title=British army creates team of Facebook warriors|author=Ewan MacAskill|work=[[The Guardian]]|date=31 January 2015|access-date=31 January 2015}}</ref> | ||
==See also== | ==See also== | ||
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* {{cite book|last1=Cole|first1=Howard|title=Formation Badges of World War 2. Britain, Commonwealth and Empire|date=1973|publisher=Arms and Armour Press|location=London}} | * {{cite book|last1=Cole|first1=Howard|title=Formation Badges of World War 2. Britain, Commonwealth and Empire|date=1973|publisher=Arms and Armour Press|location=London}} | ||
* {{cite book |last=Masters |first=John |author-link=John Masters |title=The Road Past Mandalay |publisher=Cassel |location=London |year=2002 |orig-year=1961 |isbn=0-304-36157-7}} | * {{cite book |last=Masters |first=John |author-link=John Masters |title=The Road Past Mandalay |publisher=Cassel |location=London |year=2002 |orig-year=1961 |isbn=0-304-36157-7}} | ||
* {{cite book |author=Captain Herring |title=Operational Report of Dah Force |publisher=Imperial War Museum |page=1 }}{{full citation needed|date=August | * {{cite book |author=Captain Herring |title=Operational Report of Dah Force |publisher=Imperial War Museum |page=1 }}{{full citation needed|date=August 2016}} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Prasad |first1=S. N. |first2=K.D. |last2=Bhargava |first3=P.N. |last3=Khera |year=1958 |url=http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/India/Burma1/ |series=Official History of Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War |title=The Reconquest of Burma, volume 1: June 1942-June 1944 |location=Calcutta |publisher=Combined Inter-Services Historical Section (India & Pakistan) |oclc=255287142 |editor-first=Bisheshwar |editor-last=Prasad }} | * {{cite book |last1=Prasad |first1=S. N. |first2=K.D. |last2=Bhargava |first3=P.N. |last3=Khera |year=1958 |url=http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/India/Burma1/ |series=Official History of Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War |title=The Reconquest of Burma, volume 1: June 1942-June 1944 |location=Calcutta |publisher=Combined Inter-Services Historical Section (India & Pakistan) |oclc=255287142 |editor-first=Bisheshwar |editor-last=Prasad }} | ||
* {{cite book |last=Rooney |first=David |title=Burma Victory: Imphal and Kohima, March 1944 to May 1945 |year=1992 |publisher=Cassell |location=London |isbn= 0-304-35457-0}} | * {{cite book |last=Rooney |first=David |title=Burma Victory: Imphal and Kohima, March 1944 to May 1945 |year=1992 |publisher=Cassell |location=London |isbn= 0-304-35457-0}} | ||