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{{Short description|1987 Indian special operation}} | {{Short description|1987 Indian special operation}} | ||
{{Use dmy dates|date=August | {{Use dmy dates|date=August 2020}} | ||
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===An uneasy truce=== | ===An uneasy truce=== | ||
The signing of the [[Indo-Sri-Lankan accord]] on 29 July 1987<ref name=USDS>{{cite web|url=https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5249.htm |title=Background Note: Sri Lanka. |publisher=U.S. Dept. of State |date=6 April 2011 |access-date=12 October | The signing of the [[Indo-Sri-Lankan accord]] on 29 July 1987<ref name=USDS>{{cite web|url=https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5249.htm |title=Background Note: Sri Lanka. |publisher=U.S. Dept. of State |date=6 April 2011 |access-date=12 October 2011}}</ref> brought a temporary truce to the [[Sri Lankan Civil War]]. Under the terms of the agreement,<ref name=iclq>{{Cite journal |doi = 10.1093/iclqaj/37.3.551|title = Ethnic Politics and Constitutional Reform: The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord|journal = International and Comparative Law Quarterly|volume = 37|issue = 3|pages = 551–587|year = 1988|last1 = Marasinghe|first1 = M. L.}}</ref><ref name=atimes>{{cite web|url=http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/DD13Df02.html |archive-url=https://archive.today/20021001211331/http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/DD13Df02.html |url-status=unfit |archive-date=1 October 2002 |title=Sri Lanka: The Untold Story Chapter 35: Accord turns to discord |work=Asia Times|access-date=12 October 2011}}</ref> | ||
[[Colombo]] agreed to a devolution of power to the provinces the Sri Lankan troops were to withdraw to their barracks in the north, the Tamil rebels were to disarm.<ref name= TamilNation>[http://www.tamilnation.org/intframe/india/88saty.htm New Delhi & the Tamil Struggle. The Indo Sri Lanka Agreement. Satyendra N. Tamil Nation]{{dead link|date=October | [[Colombo]] agreed to a devolution of power to the provinces the Sri Lankan troops were to withdraw to their barracks in the north, the Tamil rebels were to disarm.<ref name= TamilNation>[http://www.tamilnation.org/intframe/india/88saty.htm New Delhi & the Tamil Struggle. The Indo Sri Lanka Agreement. Satyendra N. Tamil Nation]{{dead link|date=October 2011}}</ref> Also, on the request of President [[J. R. Jayewardene]], India was to send a contingent, the [[IPKF]], to Northern Sri Lanka as a [[peacekeeping]] force.<ref name= dixitrediff>{{cite web|url=http://in.rediff.com/news/2000/mar/24lanka.htm |title=J N Dixit (ex-Indian Ambassador to Colombo) speaking to Rediff.com |publisher=In.rediff.com |access-date=12 October 2011}}</ref> | ||
The LTTE, who had enjoyed support from India till then<ref name=fo>{{cite web|url=http://www.fas.org/irp/world/india/raw/ |title=Research and Analysis Wing |publisher=Fas.org |access-date=12 October 2011 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060901094318/http://www.fas.org/irp/world/india/raw/ |archive-date=1 September 2006 }}</ref> however, agreed to the truce only reluctantly. The Tigers had rejected the Provincial Council framework as inadequate and [[Prabhakaran]] had protested against the Indian military intervention.<ref name= TN>[http://www.tamilnation.org/intframe/india/90ltte.htm New Delhi & the Tamil Struggle- An Amoral Role. A Post Mortem on the Indian Intervention. Tamilnation.org]{{dead link|date=October | The LTTE, who had enjoyed support from India till then<ref name=fo>{{cite web|url=http://www.fas.org/irp/world/india/raw/ |title=Research and Analysis Wing |publisher=Fas.org |access-date=12 October 2011 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060901094318/http://www.fas.org/irp/world/india/raw/ |archive-date=1 September 2006 }}</ref> however, agreed to the truce only reluctantly. The Tigers had rejected the Provincial Council framework as inadequate and [[Prabhakaran]] had protested against the Indian military intervention.<ref name= TN>[http://www.tamilnation.org/intframe/india/90ltte.htm New Delhi & the Tamil Struggle- An Amoral Role. A Post Mortem on the Indian Intervention. Tamilnation.org]{{dead link|date=October 2011}}</ref> The Tigers resisted the spread of what was deemed India's self-serving aim of binding Sri Lanka into India's geo political sphere of Influence,<ref name= TN/> as well as a sympathy for Sri Lanka's ruling Sinhala community in India outside the support-base in [[Tamil Nadu]].<ref name= TN/> With the induction of the Indian troops, the Tigers initially complied by surrendering arms along the terms of the truce. However, the LTTE [[boycott]]ed the elections that were held in October and November 1988 along the lines outlined in the accord.<ref name= assalgat>{{cite web|url=http://in.rediff.com/news/2000/mar/25lanka.htm |title=The day the elected government was in place, the military role of the IPKF was over. Lt. Gen A S Kalkat, speaking to rediff.com |publisher=In.rediff.com |access-date=12 October 2011}}</ref> The opposition to the induction of Indian troops soon flared into active confrontation. The Indian administration had not expected opposition from the Tigers<ref name= dixitrediff/> and was initially taken unaware. The support for Tamil Nationalism in India also raised the spectre to the Indian Govt. of a possible situation of Tamil [[secession]]ist movement in Tamil Nadu<ref name=TN/><ref name=JCR>[http://www.tamilnation.org/intframe/india/jaincommission/vol5/ch1sec6.html Jain Commission Interim Report.Growth of Sri Lankan Tamil Militancy in Tamil Nadu.Chapter I – Phase II (1987–1988)]{{dead link|date=October 2011}}</ref> However, faced with growing diligence from her erstwhile partner, India adopted a strategy of aiding alternative Tamil power bases, including the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front,<ref name= GenHK>{{cite web|url=http://in.rediff.com/news/2000/mar/31lanka.htm |title=Shoot Prabhakaran, shoot Mahathiah!. Gen Harikat Singh speaking to Josy Joseph on the IPKF role. |publisher=In.rediff.com |access-date=12 October 2011}}</ref> which had emerged strongly in the November 1988 elections, and at the same time continue negotiations with the LTTE.<ref name=GenHK/> | ||
===Peace by any means=== | ===Peace by any means=== | ||
The incident that marked the turning point of Indo-LTTE relationship occurred in early October. On 4 October 1987, the [[Sri Lankan Navy]] captured an LTTE boat off [[Point Pedro]] with seventeen Tigers, including some high-profile leaders of the movement, on board.<ref name= UTHR>{{cite web|url=http://www.uthr.org/BP/volume2/Chapter1.htm |title=Background to the Breakdown of the Accord. |publisher=University Teachers for Human Rights |location=Jaffna, Sri Lanka |date=1 October 1989 |access-date=12 October | The incident that marked the turning point of Indo-LTTE relationship occurred in early October. On 4 October 1987, the [[Sri Lankan Navy]] captured an LTTE boat off [[Point Pedro]] with seventeen Tigers, including some high-profile leaders of the movement, on board.<ref name= UTHR>{{cite web|url=http://www.uthr.org/BP/volume2/Chapter1.htm |title=Background to the Breakdown of the Accord. |publisher=University Teachers for Human Rights |location=Jaffna, Sri Lanka |date=1 October 1989 |access-date=12 October 2011}}</ref> The Colombo govt alleged the boat was involved in smuggling arms across the [[Palk Strait]]s and on the grounds denied immunity to these captured Tiger rebels.<ref name= UTHR/> The LTTE denied this claiming the rebels movement were in accordance with the truce, being in the process of transferring documents for shifting the Tigers Headquarters from [[Madras]] to Jaffna. The Sri Lankan government intended to bring a number of the rebels captured, including [[Pulendran]], [[Kumarappa]] and others, to trial in Colombo for allegedly masterminding the massacre of a hundred and fifty civilians.<ref name= UTHR/> The Tigers, who were at the time still in negotiation with the Indian authorities, appealed for enforcement of protection by the [[IPKF]]. The rebels were at this time in IPKF custody at [[Jaffna Airport|Palali]] Airbase pending transfer to Sri Lankan authorities. Although the Indian authorities insist that they had explained the possible repercussions<ref name= GenHK/> of such an action on the fragile truce and exerted considerable pressure on the Sinhalese authorities to desist from proceeding,<ref name=UTHR/> ultimately the IPKF withdrew allowing the Sri Lankan forces to proceed with transferring the captured rebels to Colombo. The detainees however, attempted [[mass suicide]] by swallowing [[cyanide]]- a common LTTE practice when faced imminent capture.{{citation needed|date=October 2011}} The night of 5 October saw large scale slaughter of Sri Lankan people who had returned to Jaffna,<ref name=UTHR/> including eight troops of the Sri Lankan Army who were at the time being held hostages by the LTTE. These coincided by armed confrontations between the Tiger Cadres and the Indian Troops in and around Jaffna.<ref name= UTHR/> On 8 October, the LTTE carried out a number of mortar attacks and ambushes on the IPKF.<ref>{{cite news|title=Tamil Armed Resistance & the Law |url=http://www.tamilnation.org/tamileelam/armedstruggle/ipkf.htm |work=Tamil Nation }}</ref> | ||
The deterioration of the situation put the Indian government into a position of having to enforce peace in Jaffna by force. The Indian government had already been accused of inaction in the face of a failing accord.<ref name=UTHR/> It was declared on 9 October that the IPKF was to launch a terminal campaign against the LTTE. | The deterioration of the situation put the Indian government into a position of having to enforce peace in Jaffna by force. The Indian government had already been accused of inaction in the face of a failing accord.<ref name=UTHR/> It was declared on 9 October that the IPKF was to launch a terminal campaign against the LTTE. | ||
==Prelude== | ==Prelude== | ||
The Indian intelligence reports received on 10 October indicated that the a Tigers' meeting was to be held at Kokuvil in the [[Jaffna University]] campus on the night of 11 October. Intelligence further indicated the meeting was to be attended by a number of high-profile Tiger leaders, including [[Velupillai Prabhakaran]], [[Mahattaya|Gopalaswamy Mahendraraja]] (''alias'' Mahattaya), as well as the LTTE local commanders.<ref name=BS>{{cite web |url=http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1987IPKF/Chapter3.html |title=Descent into Danger. The Jaffna University Helidrop. |publisher=Bharat-rakshak.com |date=20 October 1987 |access-date=12 October 2011 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110609123127/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1987IPKF/Chapter3.html |archive-date=9 June | The Indian intelligence reports received on 10 October indicated that the a Tigers' meeting was to be held at Kokuvil in the [[Jaffna University]] campus on the night of 11 October. Intelligence further indicated the meeting was to be attended by a number of high-profile Tiger leaders, including [[Velupillai Prabhakaran]], [[Mahattaya|Gopalaswamy Mahendraraja]] (''alias'' Mahattaya), as well as the LTTE local commanders.<ref name=BS>{{cite web |url=http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1987IPKF/Chapter3.html |title=Descent into Danger. The Jaffna University Helidrop. |publisher=Bharat-rakshak.com |date=20 October 1987 |access-date=12 October 2011 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110609123127/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1987IPKF/Chapter3.html |archive-date=9 June 2011}}</ref> The Indian Army was aware even before this that the LTTE had been using the University as their operational headquarters. The Indian Forces had already prepared for a Special Helicopter Borne Operation against Jaffna University. With these reports, Gen Harikat Singh- [[General Officer Commanding|GOC]] [[54th Infantry Division (India)|54 Infantry Division]], took the decision to use the window offered by this meeting to capture the LTTE leadership<ref name=rediffintHK>{{cite web|url=http://in.rediff.com/news/2000/apr/01lanka.htm |title=Nobody sounded even a Last Post for our dead in Colombo. Gen Harikat Singh to Josy Joseph. |publisher=In.rediff.com |access-date=12 October 2011}}</ref>—a move that was expected to leave the rebel movement directionless in the face of the impending assault on the LTTE strongholds by the IPKF.<ref name=BS/> | ||
The final plan tasked a hundred and twenty commandos from the [[Para Commandos (India)|10th Paracommando]] group and three hundred and sixty troops from the [[Sikh Light Infantry|13th Sikh LI]] for the mission. The Para Commandos and the delta company of 13 Sikh LI were to be helidropped into the University Football ground in three waves of four helicopters. The rest of the Sikh LI contingent was to advance on the ground to link up with the heliborne troops. To minimise exposure to ground-fire, [[fast-roping]] was ruled out and the decision was made to assign the first wave of the Paras with the additional responsibility as [[Pathfinders (military)|pathfinder]]s to mark the drop-zone.<ref name=BS/> The operation was to use four [[Mil Mi-8|Mi-8s]] flying from Palay airfield, two from the [[No.109 HU]], and one each from the [[No.107 HU]] and the [[No.112 HU]]. The Mi-8s had provisions for fitting rocket pods; this was deemed not necessary since the IPKF did not anticipate any significant resistance from the ground. A [[Sri Lankan Air Force]] [[Bell 212|Bell]] [[Helicopter gunship|gunship]] was detailed to carry out a diversionary strike west of the drop-zone across the railway tracks, which the Indian troops were under strict orders not to exceed.<ref name=BS/> | The final plan tasked a hundred and twenty commandos from the [[Para Commandos (India)|10th Paracommando]] group and three hundred and sixty troops from the [[Sikh Light Infantry|13th Sikh LI]] for the mission. The Para Commandos and the delta company of 13 Sikh LI were to be helidropped into the University Football ground in three waves of four helicopters. The rest of the Sikh LI contingent was to advance on the ground to link up with the heliborne troops. To minimise exposure to ground-fire, [[fast-roping]] was ruled out and the decision was made to assign the first wave of the Paras with the additional responsibility as [[Pathfinders (military)|pathfinder]]s to mark the drop-zone.<ref name=BS/> The operation was to use four [[Mil Mi-8|Mi-8s]] flying from Palay airfield, two from the [[No.109 HU]], and one each from the [[No.107 HU]] and the [[No.112 HU]]. The Mi-8s had provisions for fitting rocket pods; this was deemed not necessary since the IPKF did not anticipate any significant resistance from the ground. A [[Sri Lankan Air Force]] [[Bell 212|Bell]] [[Helicopter gunship|gunship]] was detailed to carry out a diversionary strike west of the drop-zone across the railway tracks, which the Indian troops were under strict orders not to exceed.<ref name=BS/> | ||
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==Operation== | ==Operation== | ||
Unknown to the Indian intelligence, the Tigers had intercepted Indian radio communications, had advanced knowledge of the operation, and had correctly identified the landing ground. Jaffna University had been turned into a fortress. Several 0.50 calibre machineguns had been moved to the north of the football field, and Tiger cadres had laid an ambush for the Indian troops.<ref name=BS/><ref name=TARL>[http://www.tamilnation.org/tamileelam/armedstruggle/ipkf.htm Tamil Armed Resistance & the Law Tamil Nation]{{dead link|date=October | Unknown to the Indian intelligence, the Tigers had intercepted Indian radio communications, had advanced knowledge of the operation, and had correctly identified the landing ground. Jaffna University had been turned into a fortress. Several 0.50 calibre machineguns had been moved to the north of the football field, and Tiger cadres had laid an ambush for the Indian troops.<ref name=BS/><ref name=TARL>[http://www.tamilnation.org/tamileelam/armedstruggle/ipkf.htm Tamil Armed Resistance & the Law Tamil Nation]{{dead link|date=October 2011}}</ref> | ||
===First insertion - The Bravo Team, 10 Para Commando=== | ===First insertion - The Bravo Team, 10 Para Commando=== | ||
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Lt Col. [[Dalvir Singh]] had to take over the command of both the SF troops as well as the Tank troops from thereon,<ref>{{cite book |last1=Gautam Das |first1=Mrinal K.Gupta-Ray |title=Srilanka Misadventure India's Military Peace-keeping Campaign, 1987-1990 |date=2008 |publisher=Har-Anand Publications |isbn=9788124113639 |pages=109,110}}</ref> even though he had never operated a tank prior to that.<ref> Lt Col Dalvir Singh, who had never operated tanks had to take over command and direct them as they continued to fight their way into Jaffna. After two days of heavy fighting since the operation was launched Lt Col Dalvir Singh managed to link up with his beleaguered assault team and bring them back to Palaly. India's Special Forces: History and Future of Indian Special Forces</ref> The 4/5 Gorkhas and ground detachment of the 13 Sikh LI had linked up by this time. The besieged Para commandos were successfully extricated after 2 days of fighting by Lt. Col.[[Dalvir Singh]] and the rescue team. <ref>{{cite book |last1=Katoch |first1=Prakash Chand |title=India's Special Forces: History and Future of Indian Special Forces |date=2013 |publisher=Vij Books India |edition=Kindle}}</ref> | Lt Col. [[Dalvir Singh]] had to take over the command of both the SF troops as well as the Tank troops from thereon,<ref>{{cite book |last1=Gautam Das |first1=Mrinal K.Gupta-Ray |title=Srilanka Misadventure India's Military Peace-keeping Campaign, 1987-1990 |date=2008 |publisher=Har-Anand Publications |isbn=9788124113639 |pages=109,110}}</ref> even though he had never operated a tank prior to that.<ref> Lt Col Dalvir Singh, who had never operated tanks had to take over command and direct them as they continued to fight their way into Jaffna. After two days of heavy fighting since the operation was launched Lt Col Dalvir Singh managed to link up with his beleaguered assault team and bring them back to Palaly. India's Special Forces: History and Future of Indian Special Forces</ref> The 4/5 Gorkhas and ground detachment of the 13 Sikh LI had linked up by this time. The besieged Para commandos were successfully extricated after 2 days of fighting by Lt. Col.[[Dalvir Singh]] and the rescue team. <ref>{{cite book |last1=Katoch |first1=Prakash Chand |title=India's Special Forces: History and Future of Indian Special Forces |date=2013 |publisher=Vij Books India |edition=Kindle}}</ref> | ||
Both Lt. Col.[[Dalvir Singh]],<ref>{{cite web |title=LT. COL. DALVIR SINGH- VIR CHAKRA |url=https://www.gallantryawards.gov.in/Awardee/dalvir-singh |website=Gallantry Awards |publisher=Govt of India |access-date=23 December | Both Lt. Col.[[Dalvir Singh]],<ref>{{cite web |title=LT. COL. DALVIR SINGH- VIR CHAKRA |url=https://www.gallantryawards.gov.in/Awardee/dalvir-singh |website=Gallantry Awards |publisher=Govt of India |access-date=23 December 2020}}</ref> as well as Major Anil Kaul,<ref>{{cite web |title=MAJ ANIL KAUL- VIR CHAKRA |url=https://www.gallantryawards.gov.in/Awardee/anil-kaul |website=Gallantry Awards |publisher=Govt of India |access-date=23 December 2020}}</ref> was awarded [[Vir Chakra]] for their courage and leadership. | ||
===Delta Company, 13 Sikh LI=== | ===Delta Company, 13 Sikh LI=== | ||
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==Aftermath== | ==Aftermath== | ||
Following the operation, the Indian army awarded 10 gallantry medals.<ref>[https://fountainink.in/reportage/a-short-hot-day-in-kokkuvil A short, hot day in Kokkuvil]</ref> Major Birendra Singh of the Sikh LI was posthumously awarded the [[Vir Chakra]] on the Republic Day of 1988.<ref>[http://gallantryawards.gov.in/Awardee/birendra-singh MAJ BIRENDRA SINGH]</ref> Lt. Col. [[Dalvir Singh]], the Commanding Officer of 10 [[Para SF]] who volunteered and led the rescue mission, was awarded Vir Chakra for "conspicuous courage and valiant leadership".<ref>{{cite web |title=LT COL DALVIR SINGH VIR CHAKRA |url=https://www.gallantryawards.gov.in/Awardee/dalvir-singh |website=GallantryAwards.gov.in |publisher=Ministry of Defence India |access-date=8 December | Following the operation, the Indian army awarded 10 gallantry medals.<ref>[https://fountainink.in/reportage/a-short-hot-day-in-kokkuvil A short, hot day in Kokkuvil]</ref> Major Birendra Singh of the Sikh LI was posthumously awarded the [[Vir Chakra]] on the Republic Day of 1988.<ref>[http://gallantryawards.gov.in/Awardee/birendra-singh MAJ BIRENDRA SINGH]</ref> Lt. Col. [[Dalvir Singh]], the Commanding Officer of 10 [[Para SF]] who volunteered and led the rescue mission, was awarded Vir Chakra for "conspicuous courage and valiant leadership".<ref>{{cite web |title=LT COL DALVIR SINGH VIR CHAKRA |url=https://www.gallantryawards.gov.in/Awardee/dalvir-singh |website=GallantryAwards.gov.in |publisher=Ministry of Defence India |access-date=8 December 2020}}</ref> Major Anil Kaul of the 65 Armoured Regiment, was also awarded the Vir Chakra for his actions, having lost his right eye and left hand. He retired from the army a Colonel, having his career effected by his wounds.<ref>[https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/disabled-veterans-fight-for-their-rights-1711958 'We Just Followed Orders': Disabled Army Veterans Fight For Rights]</ref> The lone survivor Sepoy Gora Singh was later promoted to the rank of Naik. Every year, on 11 October, 13 Sikh Light infantry conducts Ardas after bhog of the Akhand Paath in memory of the men and officers of 13 Sikh Light infantry who were killed in the Jaffna University helidrop.{{Cn|date=February 2022}} | ||
==See also== | ==See also== | ||