Central Monitoring System: Difference between revisions

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{{Use dmy dates|date=October 2022}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=October 2019}}
{{Use Indian English|date=October 2022}}
{{Use Indian English|date=October 2019}}
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{{multiple issues|
{{condense|date=March 2022}}
{{condense|date=March 2014}}
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[[File:Pre cms.jpg|thumb|The interconnection between LEA and Telecom Operators prior to CMS]]
[[File:Pre cms.jpg|thumb|The interconnection between LEA and Telecom Operators prior to CMS]]
[[File:Post cms block diagram.jpg|thumb|The interconnection between TERM Cell, LEA and Telecom Operators post CMS setup]]
[[File:Post cms block diagram.jpg|thumb|The interconnection between TERM Cell, LEA and Telecom Operators post CMS setup]]
The Indian Government set up the Centralized Monitoring System (CMS) to automate the process of government-approved Lawful Interception & Monitoring of telecommunications. The Cabinet Committee on Security  approved the project of CMS with government funding of [[Indian rupee|INR]] 400 Crores{{Clarify|reason=|date=September 2022}}. Pilot trials have been completed and the system is anticipated to be progressively implemented from the end of the financial year.<ref>{{Cite web
The Indian Government set up the Centralized Monitoring System (CMS) to automate the process of government-approved Lawful Interception & Monitoring of telecommunications. The Cabinet Committee on Security  approved the project of CMS with government funding of [[Indian rupee|INR]] 400 Crores{{Clarify|reason=|date=September 2019}}. Pilot trials have been completed and the system is anticipated to be progressively implemented from the end of the financial year.<ref>{{Cite web
| url = http://164.100.47.192/Loksabha/Questions/QResult15.aspx?qref=24560&lsno=16
| url = http://164.100.47.192/Loksabha/Questions/QResult15.aspx?qref=24560&lsno=16
| title = LOK SABHA UNSTARRED QUESTION NO 595 ANSWERED ON 02.12.2015
| title = LOK SABHA UNSTARRED QUESTION NO 595 ANSWERED ON 02.12.2015
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==System details==
==System details==
{{unreferenced section|date=December 2022}}
{{unreferenced section|date=December 2017}}
Earlier the provisioning of Interception of the Telephone was being done by the Telecom operators on the basis of duly authorized order by the competent authority in accordance with 419A telephone rule. Traditionally, the Law Enforcement Agency was approaching the various telecom companies based on the numbering scheme of the target telephone number. In CMS setup there is no change in the Interception authorization order envisaged in 419A telephone rule except that now the [[Law Enforcement]] Agency will go to only TERM Cell for any interception order provisioning irrespective of telephone numbering scheme. There is no change in the existing LIS / LIM system in the telecom network. The TERM Cell who are the field unit of DOT and carries the enforcement and regulation of licensing conditions in the field will be sole authority to provision the interception orders but interception orders will be obtained by Law Enforcement Agencies in according to the 419A telephone rule.
Earlier the provisioning of Interception of the Telephone was being done by the Telecom operators on the basis of duly authorized order by the competent authority in accordance with 419A telephone rule. Traditionally, the Law Enforcement Agency was approaching the various telecom companies based on the numbering scheme of the target telephone number. In CMS setup there is no change in the Interception authorization order envisaged in 419A telephone rule except that now the [[Law Enforcement]] Agency will go to only TERM Cell for any interception order provisioning irrespective of telephone numbering scheme. There is no change in the existing LIS / LIM system in the telecom network. The TERM Cell who are the field unit of DOT and carries the enforcement and regulation of licensing conditions in the field will be sole authority to provision the interception orders but interception orders will be obtained by Law Enforcement Agencies in according to the 419A telephone rule.


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==Media reaction==
==Media reaction==
''[[Business Standard]]'' criticised the fact that a warrant need not be obtained.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/india-s-digital-battleground-113062101013_1.html|title=India's digital battleground|last=Shukla|first=Ajai|date=21 June 2013|work=[[Business Standard]]|accessdate=7 December 2022}}</ref> ''[[Firstpost]]'' criticised the lack of information from the government about the project and the lack of a legal recourse for a citizen whose personal details were misused or leaked.<ref name="firstpost1"/> ''[[The Hindu]]'' also criticised the lack of information available about the system.<ref name="thehindu2">{{cite web|author=Deepa Kurup |url=http://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/technology/in-the-dark-about-indias-prism/article4817903.ece |title=In the dark about 'India's Prism' |work=The Hindu |date=2013-06-16 |accessdate=2013-07-14}}</ref>
''[[Business Standard]]'' criticised the fact that a warrant need not be obtained.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/india-s-digital-battleground-113062101013_1.html|title=India's digital battleground|last=Shukla|first=Ajai|date=21 June 2013|work=[[Business Standard]]|accessdate=7 December 2014}}</ref> ''[[Firstpost]]'' criticised the lack of information from the government about the project and the lack of a legal recourse for a citizen whose personal details were misused or leaked.<ref name="firstpost1"/> ''[[The Hindu]]'' also criticised the lack of information available about the system.<ref name="thehindu2">{{cite web|author=Deepa Kurup |url=http://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/technology/in-the-dark-about-indias-prism/article4817903.ece |title=In the dark about 'India's Prism' |work=The Hindu |date=2013-06-16 |accessdate=2013-07-14}}</ref>


''[[The Indian Express]]'' criticised the introduction of the system in the absence of accountability and "any reasonably effective safeguards" to protect privacy.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.indianexpress.com/news/way-to-watch/1133737/0 |title=Way to watch |publisher=Indian Express |date=2013-06-26 |accessdate=2013-07-14}}</ref> ''[[The Times of India]]'' criticised the introduction of CMS without public debate or Parliamentary accountability. The paper also felt that Indian privacy laws were "lax",<ref name="indiatimes3"/> and "far worse than American law on these matters".<ref name="indiatimes3">{{cite web|url=http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-06-13/news/39952596_1_nsa-india-us-homeland-security-dialogue-national-security-letters |title=Indian surveillance laws & practices far worse than US|publisher=The Economic Times |date=2013-06-18 |accessdate=2013-07-14}}</ref>
''[[The Indian Express]]'' criticised the introduction of the system in the absence of accountability and "any reasonably effective safeguards" to protect privacy.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.indianexpress.com/news/way-to-watch/1133737/0 |title=Way to watch |publisher=Indian Express |date=2013-06-26 |accessdate=2013-07-14}}</ref> ''[[The Times of India]]'' criticised the introduction of CMS without public debate or Parliamentary accountability. The paper also felt that Indian privacy laws were "lax",<ref name="indiatimes3"/> and "far worse than American law on these matters".<ref name="indiatimes3">{{cite web|url=http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-06-13/news/39952596_1_nsa-india-us-homeland-security-dialogue-national-security-letters |title=Indian surveillance laws & practices far worse than US|publisher=The Economic Times |date=2013-06-18 |accessdate=2013-07-14}}</ref>
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Meenakshi Ganguly, the [[South Asia]] director of [[Human Rights Watch]], felt that the move toward extensive "surveillance capabilities enabled by digital communications" suggests that governments are now "casting the net wide, enabling intrusions into private lives". Ganguly also felt that increasing surveillance around the world was an attempt by governments to "grapple with the power of social media that can enable spontaneous street protests".<ref name="autogenerated1"/>
Meenakshi Ganguly, the [[South Asia]] director of [[Human Rights Watch]], felt that the move toward extensive "surveillance capabilities enabled by digital communications" suggests that governments are now "casting the net wide, enabling intrusions into private lives". Ganguly also felt that increasing surveillance around the world was an attempt by governments to "grapple with the power of social media that can enable spontaneous street protests".<ref name="autogenerated1"/>


[[Praveen Swami]], strategic affairs editor of [[Network 18|Network18]], felt that "There is also the argument that the threat of a cyber attack is deliberately overplayed&nbsp;... it is far-fetched. So there is a need for balance".<ref name="business-standard1">{{cite web|url=http://www.business-standard.com/article/beyond-business/india-s-digital-battleground-113062101013_1.html |title=India's digital battleground |publisher=Business Standard |date=2013-06-21 |accessdate=2013-07-14}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|author=Cynthia Wong |url=https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/07/india-new-monitoring-system-threatens-rights |title=India: New Monitoring System Threatens Rights |publisher=[[Human Rights Watch]] |date=2013-06-07 |accessdate=2013-07-14}}</ref> Pawan Sinha, a human rights teacher at Delhi University, believes that bypassing courts was "really very dangerous" and could be "easily misused".<ref name="reuters1"/>
[[Praveen Swami]], strategic affairs editor of [[Network 18|Network18]], felt that "There is also the argument that the threat of a cyber attack is deliberately overplayed&nbsp;... it is far-fetched. So there is a need for balance".<ref name="business-standard1">{{cite news|url=http://www.business-standard.com/article/beyond-business/india-s-digital-battleground-113062101013_1.html |title=India's digital battleground |newspaper=Business Standard India |publisher=Business Standard |date=2013-06-21 |accessdate=2013-07-14|last1=Shukla |first1=Ajai }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|author=Cynthia Wong |url=https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/07/india-new-monitoring-system-threatens-rights |title=India: New Monitoring System Threatens Rights |publisher=[[Human Rights Watch]] |date=2013-06-07 |accessdate=2013-07-14}}</ref> Pawan Sinha, a human rights teacher at Delhi University, believes that bypassing courts was "really very dangerous" and could be "easily misused".<ref name="reuters1"/>


Anja Kovacs of the Internet Democracy Project, and a fellow at the New Delhi-based Centre for Internet and Society, felt that there was "a growing discrepancy and power imbalance between citizens and the state" and that in the Indian scenario, there were "no checks and balances in place".<ref name="autogenerated1">{{cite web|last=Trivedi |first=Anjani |url=http://world.time.com/2013/06/30/in-india-prism-like-surveillance-slips-under-the-radar/#ixzz2YpWhRsrB |title=In India, Prism-like Surveillance Slips Under the Radar |publisher=Time |date=2013-06-30 |accessdate=2013-07-14}}</ref>
Anja Kovacs of the Internet Democracy Project, and a fellow at the New Delhi-based Centre for Internet and Society, felt that there was "a growing discrepancy and power imbalance between citizens and the state" and that in the Indian scenario, there were "no checks and balances in place".<ref name="autogenerated1">{{cite web|last=Trivedi |first=Anjani |url=http://world.time.com/2013/06/30/in-india-prism-like-surveillance-slips-under-the-radar/#ixzz2YpWhRsrB |title=In India, Prism-like Surveillance Slips Under the Radar |publisher=Time |date=2013-06-30 |accessdate=2013-07-14}}</ref>