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[[File:China India CIA map border disputes.jpg|thumb|330px|Line of Actual Control between China and India (map by the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]])]] | [[File:China India CIA map border disputes.jpg|thumb|330px|Line of Actual Control between China and India (map by the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]])]] | ||
[[File:Kashmir Region November 2019.jpg|thumb|330px|The western portion of the Line of Actual Control, separating the Eastern Ladakh and Aksai Chin. In the southern [[Demchok sector|Demchok region]], only two claim lines are shown (map by the CIA)]] | [[File:Kashmir Region November 2019.jpg|thumb|330px|The western portion of the Line of Actual Control, separating the [[Leh District|Eastern Ladakh]] and [[Aksai Chin]]. In the southern [[Demchok sector|Demchok region]], only two claim lines are shown (map by the CIA)]] | ||
The '''Line of Actual Control''' ('''LAC''') is a notional [[demarcation line]]<ref> | The '''Line of Actual Control''' ('''LAC''') is a notional [[demarcation line]]<ref> | ||
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</ref><ref name="The Hindu LAC"> | </ref><ref name="The Hindu LAC"> | ||
Ananth Krishnan, [https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/line-of-actual-control-india-china-the-line-of-actual-contest/article31822311.ece Line of Actual Control | India-China: the line of actual contest], 13 June 2020: "In contrast, the alignment of the LAC has never been agreed upon, and it is has neither been delineated nor demarcated. There is no official map in the public domain that depicts the LAC. It can best be thought of as an idea, reflecting the territories that are, at present, under the control of each side, pending a resolution of the boundary dispute." | Ananth Krishnan, [https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/line-of-actual-control-india-china-the-line-of-actual-contest/article31822311.ece Line of Actual Control | India-China: the line of actual contest], 13 June 2020: "In contrast, the alignment of the LAC has never been agreed upon, and it is has neither been delineated nor demarcated. There is no official map in the public domain that depicts the LAC. It can best be thought of as an idea, reflecting the territories that are, at present, under the control of each side, pending a resolution of the boundary dispute." | ||
</ref> that separates Indian-controlled territory from Chinese-controlled territory in the [[Sino-Indian border dispute]].<ref name=IE> | </ref><ref> | ||
{{harvp|Torri, India 2020|2020|p=384}}: "An unending source of friction and tension between China and India has been the undefined nature of the LAC... Connecting the points effectively held by either China or India, the two governments have ''notionally'' drawn the segments making up the LAC. I write "notionally" because the resulting line has not been mutually demarcated on the ground; on the contrary, in some sectors the militaries of the nation notionally claiming that area as part of the territory under their actual control have never set foot on it, or have done so only temporarily, or only recently." | |||
</ref> | |||
that separates Indian-controlled territory from Chinese-controlled territory in the [[Sino-Indian border dispute]].<ref name=IE> | |||
Sushant Singh, [https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/line-of-actual-control-where-it-is-located-and-where-india-and-china-differ-6436436/ Line of Actual Control (LAC): Where it is located, and where India and China differ], The Indian Express, 1 June 2020. | Sushant Singh, [https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/line-of-actual-control-where-it-is-located-and-where-india-and-china-differ-6436436/ Line of Actual Control (LAC): Where it is located, and where India and China differ], The Indian Express, 1 June 2020. | ||
</ref> The term is said to have been used by [[Zhou Enlai]] in a 1959 letter to [[Jawaharlal Nehru]].<ref name=Hoffman/> It subsequently referred to the line formed after the [[Sino-Indian War|1962 Sino-Indian War]] and is part of the [[Sino-Indian border dispute]].<ref> | </ref> The term is said to have been used by [[Zhou Enlai]] in a 1959 letter to [[Jawaharlal Nehru]].<ref name=Hoffman/> It subsequently referred to the line formed after the [[Sino-Indian War|1962 Sino-Indian War]] and is part of the [[Sino-Indian border dispute]].<ref> | ||
{{Cite web |url=https://www.ibtimes.com/line-actual-control-china-india-again-squabbling-over-disputed-himalayan-border-1236401 |title=Line Of Actual Control: China And India Again Squabbling Over Disputed Himalayan Border |date=3 May 2013 |website=International Business Times |access-date=26 February 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180930231842/https://www.ibtimes.com/line-actual-control-china-india-again-squabbling-over-disputed-himalayan-border-1236401 |archive-date=30 September 2018 |url-status=live}} | {{Cite web |url=https://www.ibtimes.com/line-actual-control-china-india-again-squabbling-over-disputed-himalayan-border-1236401 |title=Line Of Actual Control: China And India Again Squabbling Over Disputed Himalayan Border |date=3 May 2013 |website=International Business Times |access-date=26 February 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180930231842/https://www.ibtimes.com/line-actual-control-china-india-again-squabbling-over-disputed-himalayan-border-1236401 |archive-date=30 September 2018 |url-status=live}} | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
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* the eastern sector between [[Arunachal Pradesh]] on the Indian side and the Tibet autonomous region on the Chinese side. This sector generally follows the [[McMahon Line]].{{efn|The border between [[Sikkim]] and Tibet is an agreed border, dating back to the 1890 [[Convention of Calcutta]].}} | * the eastern sector between [[Arunachal Pradesh]] on the Indian side and the Tibet autonomous region on the Chinese side. This sector generally follows the [[McMahon Line]].{{efn|The border between [[Sikkim]] and Tibet is an agreed border, dating back to the 1890 [[Convention of Calcutta]].}} | ||
The term "line of actual control" originally referred only to the boundary in the western sector after the [[Sino-Indian War|1962 Sino-Indian War]], but during the 1990s came to refer to the entire de facto border.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Wheeler|first=Travis|title=Off Ramps from Confrontation in Southern Asia|publisher=[[Stimson Center]]|year=2019|isbn=|location=|pages= | The term "line of actual control" originally referred only to the boundary in the western sector after the [[Sino-Indian War|1962 Sino-Indian War]], but during the 1990s came to refer to the entire de facto border.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Wheeler|first=Travis|title=Off Ramps from Confrontation in Southern Asia|publisher=[[Stimson Center]]|year=2019|isbn=|location=|pages=113–114|chapter=Clarify and Respect the Line of Actual Control}}</ref> | ||
==Overview== | ==Overview== | ||
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Zhou responded that the LAC was "basically still the line of actual control as existed between the Chinese and Indian sides on 7 November 1959. To put it concretely, in the eastern sector it coincides in the main with the so-called McMahon Line, and in the western and middle sectors it coincides in the main with the traditional customary line which has consistently been pointed out by China."<ref> | Zhou responded that the LAC was "basically still the line of actual control as existed between the Chinese and Indian sides on 7 November 1959. To put it concretely, in the eastern sector it coincides in the main with the so-called McMahon Line, and in the western and middle sectors it coincides in the main with the traditional customary line which has consistently been pointed out by China."<ref> | ||
{{cite web|date=1962|title=Chou's Latest Proposals|url=http://www.osaarchivum.org/files/holdings/300/8/3/text/10-3-106.shtml|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110717201203/http://www.osaarchivum.org/files/holdings/300/8/3/text/10-3-106.shtml|archive-date=17 July 2011|via=Open Society Archives}} | {{cite web|date=1962|title=Chou's Latest Proposals|url=http://www.osaarchivum.org/files/holdings/300/8/3/text/10-3-106.shtml|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110717201203/http://www.osaarchivum.org/files/holdings/300/8/3/text/10-3-106.shtml|archive-date=17 July 2011|via=[[Blinken Open Society Archives]]}} | ||
</ref>{{Sfnp|Menon, Choices|2016|p=Chapter 1(section: The India-China Border)}} | </ref>{{Sfnp|Menon, Choices|2016|p=Chapter 1(section: The India-China Border)}} | ||
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== Evolution of the LAC == | == Evolution of the LAC == | ||
=== 1956 and 1960 claim lines === | === 1956 and 1960 claim lines === | ||
{{See also|Sino–Indian Agreement 1954|label 1=1954 Agreement}}[[File:Chinese claim lines in Ladakh - map by CIA.png|thumb|right|280px|The 1956 and 1960 claim lines of China in the western sector, map by the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]]] | {{See also|Sino–Indian Agreement 1954|label 1=1954 Agreement}} | ||
[[File:Chinese claim lines in Ladakh - map by CIA.png|thumb|right|280px|Map 1: The 1956 and 1960 claim lines of China in the western sector, map by the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]]] | |||
{{expand section|date=September 2020}} | {{expand section|date=September 2020}} | ||
=== LAC of 7 November 1959 === | === LAC of 7 November 1959 === | ||
[[File:Aksai Chin Sino-Indian border map.png|thumb|280px| | [[File:Aksai Chin Sino-Indian border map.png|thumb|280px|Map 2: This Indian map shows various lines, including the red line, representing India's view of the position in 1959, and the blue line, representing the position prior to the 1962 war.]] | ||
The date of 7 November 1959, on which the Chinese premier [[Zhou En-lai]] alluded to the concept of "line of actual control",<ref name="Hoffman" /> achieved a certain sanctity in Chinese nomenclature. Scholars state that Chinese maps had | The date of 7 November 1959, on which the Chinese premier [[Zhou En-lai]] alluded to the concept of "line of actual control",<ref name="Hoffman" /> achieved a certain sanctity in Chinese nomenclature. But there was no line defined in 1959. Scholars state that Chinese maps had shown a steadily advancing line in the western sector of the Sino-Indian boundary, each of which was identified as "the line of actual control as of 7 November 1959".<ref> | ||
{{harvnb|Fisher|1964|p=738}}: 'For India, the determination of the line from which the Chinese were to withdraw was of crucial importance since in this sector Chinese maps over the years had shown steadily advancing claims, with quite different lines each identified as "the line of actual control as of 7 November 1959".' | {{harvnb|Fisher|1964|p=738}}: 'For India, the determination of the line from which the Chinese were to withdraw was of crucial importance since in this sector Chinese maps over the years had shown steadily advancing claims, with quite different lines each identified as "the line of actual control as of 7 November 1959".' | ||
</ref><ref> | </ref><ref> | ||
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</ref> | </ref> | ||
On 24 October 1962, after the initial thrust of the Chinese forces in the [[Sino-Indian War]], the Chinese premier [[Zhou En-lai]] wrote to the heads of ten | On 24 October 1962, after the initial thrust of the Chinese forces in the [[Sino-Indian War]], the Chinese premier [[Zhou En-lai]] wrote to the heads of ten African and Asian nations outlining his proposals for peace, a fundamental tenet of which was that both sides should undertake not to cross the "line of actual control".{{sfnp|Whiting, Chinese calculus of deterrence|1975|pp=123–124}} This letter was accompanied by certain maps which again identified the "line of actual control as of 7 November 1959". Margaret Fisher calls it the "line of actual control as of 7 November 1959" ''as published in November 1962''.<ref name="Fisher">{{harvnb|Fisher|1964|pp=738–739}}</ref><ref> | ||
{{cite journal |last1=Karackattu |first1=Joe Thomas |title=The Corrosive Compromise of the Sino-Indian Border Management Framework: From Doklam to Galwan |journal=Asian Affairs |volume=51 |issue=3 |year=2020 |pages=590–604 |issn=0306-8374 |doi=10.1080/03068374.2020.1804726|s2cid=222093756 }} See Fig. 1, p. 592 | {{cite journal |last1=Karackattu |first1=Joe Thomas |title=The Corrosive Compromise of the Sino-Indian Border Management Framework: From Doklam to Galwan |journal=Asian Affairs |volume=51 |issue=3 |year=2020 |pages=590–604 |issn=0306-8374 |doi=10.1080/03068374.2020.1804726|s2cid=222093756 }} See Fig. 1, p. 592 | ||
</ref> Scholar Stephen Hoffmann states that the line represented not any position held by the Chinese on 7 November 1959, but rather incorporated the gains made by the Chinese army before and after the massive attack on 20 October 1962. In some cases, it went beyond the territory the Chinese army had reached.{{sfnp|Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis|1990|p=225}} | </ref> Scholar Stephen Hoffmann states that the line represented not any position held by the Chinese on 7 November 1959, but rather incorporated the gains made by the Chinese army before and after the massive attack on 20 October 1962. In some cases, it went beyond the territory the Chinese army had reached.{{sfnp|Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis|1990|p=225}} | ||
India's understanding of the 1959 line passed through Haji Langar, Shamal Lungpa and Kongka La (the red line shown on | India's understanding of the 1959 line passed through Haji Langar, Shamal Lungpa and Kongka La (the red line shown on Map 2).<ref> | ||
[https://www.claudearpi.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/1963-Chinese-Agression-in-Maps.pdf Chinese Aggression in Maps: Ten maps, with an introduction and explanatory notes], Publications Division, Government of India, 1963. Map 2. | [https://www.claudearpi.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/1963-Chinese-Agression-in-Maps.pdf Chinese Aggression in Maps: Ten maps, with an introduction and explanatory notes], Publications Division, Government of India, 1963. Map 2. | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
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</ref> it was apparently acceptable as the line from which the Chinese would undertake to withdraw 20 kilometres.<ref name=Fisher/> Despite the non-acceptance by India of the Chinese proposals, the Chinese did withdraw 20 kilometres from this line, and henceforth continued to depict it as the "line of actual control of 1959".{{sfnp|Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis|1990|loc=Map 6: "India's forward policy, a Chinese view", p. 105}} | </ref> it was apparently acceptable as the line from which the Chinese would undertake to withdraw 20 kilometres.<ref name=Fisher/> Despite the non-acceptance by India of the Chinese proposals, the Chinese did withdraw 20 kilometres from this line, and henceforth continued to depict it as the "line of actual control of 1959".{{sfnp|Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis|1990|loc=Map 6: "India's forward policy, a Chinese view", p. 105}} | ||
In December 1962, representatives of six | In December 1962, representatives of six African and Asian nations met in [[Colombo]] to develop peace proposals for India and China. Their proposals formalised the Chinese pledge of 20-kilometre withdrawal and the same line was used, labelled as "the line from which the Chinese forces will withdraw 20 km."{{sfnp|Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis|1990|p=226}}<ref>[http://www.claudearpi.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Aksai-Chin.jpg ''ILLUSTRATION DES PROPOSITIONS DE LA CONFERENCE DE COLOMBO - SECTEUR OCCIDENTAL''], claudearpi.net, retrieved 1 October 2020. "''Ligne au dela de la quelle les forces Chinoises se retirent de 20 km. selon les propositions de la Conférence de Colombo'' (Line beyond which the Chinese forces will withdraw 20 km. according to the proposals of the Colombo Conference)"</ref> | ||
This line was essentially forgotten by both sides till 2013, | This line was essentially forgotten by both sides till 2013, when the Chinese PLA revived it during its [[2013 Depsang incursion|Depsang incursion]] as a new border claim.<ref> | ||
{{harvp|Gupta, The Himalayan Face-off|2014|loc=Introduction}}: "While the Indian Army asked the PLA to withdraw to its original positions as per the 1976 border patrolling agreement, the PLA produced a map, which was part of the annexure to a letter written by Zhou to Nehru and the Conference of African-Asian leaders in November 1959 [''sic''; the correct date is November 1962], to buttress its case that the new position was well within the Chinese side of the LAC." | {{harvp|Gupta, The Himalayan Face-off|2014|loc=Introduction}}: "While the Indian Army asked the PLA to withdraw to its original positions as per the 1976 border patrolling agreement, the PLA produced a map, which was part of the annexure to a letter written by Zhou to Nehru and the Conference of African-Asian leaders in November 1959 [''sic''; the correct date is November 1962], to buttress its case that the new position was well within the Chinese side of the LAC." | ||
</ref>{{efn|The claimed line in this location is "new" in that it is well beyond the 1956 and 1960 claim lines of China, the latter having been called the "traditional customary boundary". It is said to be 19 km beyond it, in Indian estimation.}} | </ref>{{efn|The claimed line in this location is "new" in that it is well beyond the 1956 and 1960 claim lines of China, the latter having been called the "traditional customary boundary". It is said to be 19 km beyond it, in Indian estimation.}} | ||
=== Line separating the forces before 8 September 1962 === | === Line separating the forces before 8 September 1962 === | ||
At the end of the 1962 war, India demanded that the Chinese withdraw to their | At the end of the 1962 war, India demanded that the Chinese withdraw to their positions on 8 September 1962 (the blue line in Map 2).<ref name=indermalhotra /> | ||
=== 1993 agreement === | === 1993 agreement === | ||
{{Main|Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement, 1993}} | {{Main|Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement, 1993}} | ||
<!--This first paragraph backgrounder is needed and is important. Please do not remove fully. Shorten if needed.--> | |||
Political relations following the 1962 war only saw signs of improvement towards the later 1970s and 80s. Ties had remained strained until then also because of Chinese attraction to Pakistan during India Pakistan wars in 1965 and 1971.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Li|first=Zhang|date=September 2010|title=China-India Relations: Strategic Engagement and Challenges|url=https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/asievisions34zhangli.pdf|access-date=16 February 2021|website=www.ifri.org|publisher=[[Institut français des relations internationales]]: Center for Asian Studies|isbn=9782865927746}}</ref> Restored ambassadorial relations in 1976, a visit of the Indian Prime Minister to China in 1988, a visit of the Chinese Premier to India in 1992 and then a visit of Indian President to China in 1992 preceded the 1993 agreement.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web|last=|first=|date=2 February 2002|title=The Relations between China and India|url=http://in.china-embassy.org/eng/sgxw/zygx/t61475.htm|access-date=2021-02-16|website=Embassy of the People's Republic Of China in India}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|last=Weidong|first=H.E. Sun|others=Sun Weidong is the Chinese Ambassador to India. Content is sponsored.|date=2020-03-31|title=70 Years of Diplomatic Relations between China and India [1950-2020]|language=en-IN|work=The Hindu|url=https://www.thehindu.com/brandhub/70-years-of-diplomatic-relations-between-china-and-india-1950-2020/article31219737.ece|access-date=2021-02-16|issn=0971-751X}}</ref> Prior to the 1993 agreement, a trade agreement was signed in 1984, followed by a cultural cooperation agreement in 1988.<ref name=":0" /><ref>{{Cite web|last=|first=|date=23 December 1988|title=Sino-Indian Joint Press Communique|url=https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t15800.shtml|access-date=2021-02-16|website=Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China}}</ref> | Political relations following the 1962 war only saw signs of improvement towards the later 1970s and 80s. Ties had remained strained until then also because of Chinese attraction to Pakistan during India Pakistan wars in 1965 and 1971.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Li|first=Zhang|date=September 2010|title=China-India Relations: Strategic Engagement and Challenges|url=https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/asievisions34zhangli.pdf|access-date=16 February 2021|website=www.ifri.org|publisher=[[Institut français des relations internationales]]: Center for Asian Studies|isbn=9782865927746}}</ref> Restored ambassadorial relations in 1976, a visit of the Indian Prime Minister to China in 1988, a visit of the Chinese Premier to India in 1992 and then a visit of Indian President to China in 1992 preceded the 1993 agreement.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web|last=|first=|date=2 February 2002|title=The Relations between China and India|url=http://in.china-embassy.org/eng/sgxw/zygx/t61475.htm|access-date=2021-02-16|website=Embassy of the People's Republic Of China in India}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|last=Weidong|first=H.E. Sun|others=Sun Weidong is the Chinese Ambassador to India. Content is sponsored.|date=2020-03-31|title=70 Years of Diplomatic Relations between China and India [1950-2020]|language=en-IN|work=The Hindu|url=https://www.thehindu.com/brandhub/70-years-of-diplomatic-relations-between-china-and-india-1950-2020/article31219737.ece|access-date=2021-02-16|issn=0971-751X}}</ref> Prior to the 1993 agreement, a trade agreement was signed in 1984, followed by a cultural cooperation agreement in 1988.<ref name=":0" /><ref>{{Cite web|last=|first=|date=23 December 1988|title=Sino-Indian Joint Press Communique|url=https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t15800.shtml|access-date=2021-02-16|website=Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China}}</ref> | ||
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| zoom = 5 <!--(1=whole world, 18=a street)--> | | zoom = 5 <!--(1=whole world, 18=a street)--> | ||
| nolabels = 1 | | nolabels = 1 | ||
| caption = Northern and middle sector. <small>Red dots represent [[File:Red pog.svg|10px]] sensitive and disputed locations, and locations of [[Differing perceptions of the Line of Actual Control|differing perceptions]], on the LAC— such as [[Depsang Plains|Depsang]], area of [[Kongka Pass]], north of [[Chang Chenmo River|Kugrang River]], north and south [[Pangong Tso]], [[Spanggur Tso|Spanggur Gap]], opposite [[Dumchele]], [[Demchok sector]], [[Kaurik]], [[Tashigang]], [[Barahoti]]..</small><ref name=":LAClocations" /><ref name=":LAClocations1" /><ref name=":LAClocations2" /> | | caption = Northern and middle sector. <small>Red dots represent [[File:Red pog.svg|10px]] sensitive and disputed locations, and locations of [[Differing perceptions of the Line of Actual Control|differing perceptions]], on the LAC— such as [[Depsang Plains|Depsang]], area of [[Kongka Pass]], north of [[Chang Chenmo River|Kugrang River]], north and south [[Pangong Tso]], [[Spanggur Tso|Spanggur Gap]], opposite [[Dumchele]], [[Demchok sector]], [[Kaurik]], [[Tashigang, Himachal Pradesh|Tashigang]], [[Barahoti]]..</small><ref name=":LAClocations" /><ref name=":LAClocations1" /><ref name=":LAClocations2" /> | ||
| coord = {{coord|33.450|79.058}} | | coord = {{coord|33.450|79.058}} | ||
| mark-coord = {{coord|35.4444|78.0300}} |label =North Samar Lungpa |label-pos = left | mark-size = 8| mark = Red pog.svg | mark-title = North of Samar Lungpa | mark-description= | label-size = 10 |label-angle= | | mark-coord = {{coord|35.4444|78.0300}} |label =North Samar Lungpa |label-pos = left | mark-size = 8| mark = Red pog.svg | mark-title = North of Samar Lungpa | mark-description= | label-size = 10 |label-angle= | ||
| Line 167: | Line 172: | ||
| mark-coord24= {{coord|28.9458|95.3285}}| caption24 =Dibang Valley |label24= Dibang |label-pos24 = bottom| mark-size24 =8| mark24 = Red pog.svg | label-color24 = | mark-title24= Dibang Valley | mark-description24=| label-size24 = 10|label-offset-y24=-3 | | mark-coord24= {{coord|28.9458|95.3285}}| caption24 =Dibang Valley |label24= Dibang |label-pos24 = bottom| mark-size24 =8| mark24 = Red pog.svg | label-color24 = | mark-title24= Dibang Valley | mark-description24=| label-size24 = 10|label-offset-y24=-3 | ||
}} | }} | ||
In article 10 of the 1996 border agreement, both sides agreed to the exchange of maps to help clarify the alignment of the LAC.<ref>{{Cite web|date=1996|title=Agreement between India and China on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas|url=https://peacemaker.un.org/chinaindiaconfidenceagreement96#:~:text=This%20agreement%20provides%20for%20border,levels%20in%20the%20border%20areas.|access-date=2021-02-27|website=peacemaker.un.org}}</ref> It was only in 2001 when the first in-depth discussion would take place with regard to the central/middle sectors.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Dixit|first=J. N.|author-link=Jyotindra Nath Dixit|date=17 July 2001|title=Talks Know No Boundaries|url=https://www.telegraphindia.com/opinion/talks-know-no-boundaries/cid/927070|access-date=2021-02-27|website=Telegraph India}}</ref><ref name=":62">{{Cite web|last=Pandey|first=Utkarsh|date=16 December 2020|title=The India-China Border Question: An Analysis of International Law and State Practices|url=https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-india-china-border-question/|access-date=2021-02-27|website=ORF|language=en-US}}</ref> Maps of Sikkim were exchanged, resulting in the "Memorandum on Expanding Border Trade".<ref name=":62"/><ref>{{Cite web|title=Documents signed between India and China during Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to China (June 23, 2003)|url=https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/7692|access-date=2021-02-27|website=www.mea.gov.in}}</ref> However the process of exchange of maps soon collapsed in 2002–2003 when other sectors were brought up.<ref>{{Cite web|last=|first=|date=29 November 2002|others=PTI|title=India, China exchange maps to resolve border dispute|url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/bengaluru/india-china-exchange-maps-to-resolve-border-dispute/articleshow/29781150.cms|access-date=2021-02-27|website=The Times of India|language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|last=Joshi|first=Manoj|date=8 June 2020|title=Indo-China row signals breakdown of confidence building measures|url=https://www.orfonline.org/research/indo-china-row-signals-breakdown-of-confidence-building-measures-67469/|access-date=2021-02-27|website=ORF|language=en-US}}</ref> [[Shivshankar Menon]] writes that a drawback of the process of exchanging maps as a starting point to clarify the LAC was that it gave both sides an "incentive to exaggerate their claims of where the LAC lay".{{ | In article 10 of the 1996 border agreement, both sides agreed to the exchange of maps to help clarify the alignment of the LAC.<ref>{{Cite web|date=1996|title=Agreement between India and China on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas|url=https://peacemaker.un.org/chinaindiaconfidenceagreement96#:~:text=This%20agreement%20provides%20for%20border,levels%20in%20the%20border%20areas.|access-date=2021-02-27|website=peacemaker.un.org}}</ref> It was only in 2001 when the first in-depth discussion would take place with regard to the central/middle sectors.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Dixit|first=J. N.|author-link=Jyotindra Nath Dixit|date=17 July 2001|title=Talks Know No Boundaries|url=https://www.telegraphindia.com/opinion/talks-know-no-boundaries/cid/927070|access-date=2021-02-27|website=Telegraph India}}</ref><ref name=":62">{{Cite web|last=Pandey|first=Utkarsh|date=16 December 2020|title=The India-China Border Question: An Analysis of International Law and State Practices|url=https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-india-china-border-question/|access-date=2021-02-27|website=ORF|language=en-US}}</ref> Maps of Sikkim were exchanged, resulting in the "Memorandum on Expanding Border Trade".<ref name=":62"/><ref>{{Cite web|title=Documents signed between India and China during Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to China (June 23, 2003)|url=https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/7692|access-date=2021-02-27|website=www.mea.gov.in}}</ref> However the process of exchange of maps soon collapsed in 2002–2003 when other sectors were brought up.<ref>{{Cite web|last=|first=|date=29 November 2002|others=PTI|title=India, China exchange maps to resolve border dispute|url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/bengaluru/india-china-exchange-maps-to-resolve-border-dispute/articleshow/29781150.cms|access-date=2021-02-27|website=The Times of India|language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|last=Joshi|first=Manoj|date=8 June 2020|title=Indo-China row signals breakdown of confidence building measures|url=https://www.orfonline.org/research/indo-china-row-signals-breakdown-of-confidence-building-measures-67469/|access-date=2021-02-27|website=ORF|language=en-US}}</ref> [[Shivshankar Menon]] writes that a drawback of the process of exchanging maps as a starting point to clarify the LAC was that it gave both sides an "incentive to exaggerate their claims of where the LAC lay".{{Sfnp|Menon, Choices|2016|p=21 (ebook)}} | ||
On 30 July 2020, the Chinese Ambassador to India stated that China was not in favour of clarifying the LAC anymore as it would create new disputes.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Krishnan|first=Ananth|date=2020-07-30|title=Clarifying LAC could create new disputes: Chinese envoy|language=en-IN|work=The Hindu|url=https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/clarifying-lac-could-create-new-disputes-chinese-envoy/article32232724.ece|access-date=2021-02-18|issn=0971-751X}}</ref> Similar viewpoints have been aired in India that China will keep the boundary dispute alive for as long as it can be used against India.{{Sfn|Menon|2016|p=32–34}} On the other hand there have been voices which say that clarifying the LAC would be beneficial for both countries.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Wheeler|first=Travis|date=2019-05-10|title=Clarify and Respect the Line of Actual Control|url=https://www.stimson.org/2019/clarify-and-respect-line-actual-control/|access-date=2021-02-18|website=Stimson Center|language=en-US}}</ref> | On 30 July 2020, the Chinese Ambassador to India stated that China was not in favour of clarifying the LAC anymore as it would create new disputes.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Krishnan|first=Ananth|date=2020-07-30|title=Clarifying LAC could create new disputes: Chinese envoy|language=en-IN|work=The Hindu|url=https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/clarifying-lac-could-create-new-disputes-chinese-envoy/article32232724.ece|access-date=2021-02-18|issn=0971-751X}}</ref> Similar viewpoints have been aired in India that China will keep the boundary dispute alive for as long as it can be used against India.{{Sfn|Menon, Choices|2016|p=32–34}} On the other hand, there have been voices which say that clarifying the LAC would be beneficial for both countries.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Wheeler|first=Travis|date=2019-05-10|title=Clarify and Respect the Line of Actual Control|url=https://www.stimson.org/2019/clarify-and-respect-line-actual-control/|access-date=2021-02-18|website=Stimson Center|language=en-US}}</ref> | ||
== Patrol points == | == Patrol points == | ||
In the 1970s, India's [[China Study Group]] identified patrol points to which Indian forces would patrol. This was a better representation of how far India could patrol towards its perceived LAC and delimited India's limits of actual control.<ref name=":03" /><ref name=":12" /> These periodic patrols were performed by both sides, and often crisscrossed.{{Sfn|Menon, Choices|2016|p=Chapter 1: Pacifying the Border. The 1993 Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement with China}} | |||
Patrolling Points were identified by India's [[China Study Group]] in the 1970s to optimize patrolling effectiveness and resource utilization along the disputed and non-demarcarted China–India border at a time when border infrastructure was weak. Instead of patrolling the entire border which was more than 3000km long, troops would just be required to patrol up to the patrolling points. Over time, as infrastructure, resources and troop capability improved and increased, the patrolling points were revised. The concept of patrol points came about well before India officially accepted the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Patrolling points give a more realistic on–ground guide of India's limits of actual control.<ref name=":03">{{Cite web|last=Subramanian|first=Nirupama|last2=Kaushik|first2=Krishn|date=2020-09-20|title=Month before standoff, China blocked 5 patrol points in Depsang|url=https://indianexpress.com/article/india/month-before-standoff-china-blocked-5-patrol-points-in-depsang-6602896/|access-date=2020-09-27|website=The Indian Express|language=en}}</ref><ref name=":12">{{Cite web|last=Singh|first=Sushant|date=2020-07-13|title=Patrolling Points: What do these markers on the LAC signify?|url=https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-what-do-patrolling-points-pps-on-lac-signify-6496840/|access-date=2020-09-27|website=The Indian Express|language=en}}</ref><ref name=":2">{{Cite web|date=2020-07-09|title=India-China LAC Standoff: Know what are patrolling points and what do they signify|url=https://www.financialexpress.com/defence/india-china-lac-standoff-know-what-are-patrolling-points-and-what-do-they-signify/2018462/|access-date=2020-09-27|website=The Financial Express|language=en-US}}</ref> | |||
Most patrolling points are close to the LAC. However, in the [[Depsang Plains|Depsang plains]], the patrolling points are said to remain well inside in LAC, despite having been revised a number of times. Former Army officers have said that patrolling points provide a better on-the-ground picture of India's limits of control.<ref name=":03" /> Based on location, the periodicity of visiting patrolling points can vary greatly from a few weeks to a couple of months.<ref name=":2" /> In some cases, the patrolling points are well-known landmarks such as mountain peaks or passes. In other cases, the pattrolling points are numbered, PP-1, PP-2 etc.<ref name=":12" /> There are over 65 patrolling points stretching from the [[Karakoram]] to [[Chumar]].<ref name=":3">{{Cite news|last=Singh|first=Vijaita|date=2020-09-18|title=LAC standoff {{!}} 10 patrolling points in eastern Ladakh blocked by Chinese People’s Liberation Army, says senior official|language=en-IN|work=The Hindu|url=https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-china-lac-standoff-10-patrolling-points-in-eastern-ladakh-blocked-by-pla/article32642782.ece|access-date=2020-09-27|issn=0971-751X}}</ref> | |||
The patrolling points within the LAC and the patrol routes that join them are known as ''''limits of patrolling'''<nowiki/>'. Some army officers call this the "LAC within the LAC" or the '''actual LAC'''. The various patrol routes to the limits of patrolling are called the ''''lines of patrolling'''<nowiki/>'.<ref name=":03" /> | |||
During the [[2020 China–India skirmishes]] | During the [[2020 China–India skirmishes]], the patrolling points under dispute included PPs 10 to 13, 14, 15, 17, and 17A.<ref name=":12" /> On 18 September 2020, an article in ''The Hindu'' wrote that "since April, Indian troops have been denied access to PPs numbered 9, 10, 11, 12, 12A, 13, 14, 15, 17, 17A."<ref name=":3" /> | ||
=== List of numbered patrol points === | === List of numbered patrol points === | ||
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* PP16 — between Hot Spring and [[Gogra, Chang Chenmo Valley|Gogra]] in the [[Chang Chenmo River|Chang Chenmo River valley]] | * PP16 — between Hot Spring and [[Gogra, Chang Chenmo Valley|Gogra]] in the [[Chang Chenmo River|Chang Chenmo River valley]] | ||
* PP17 and PP17A — in Gogra, 17A is Gogra Post<ref name=":12" /> | * PP17 and PP17A — in Gogra, 17A is Gogra Post<ref name=":12" /> | ||
* PP18 to PP23 — southeast of Gogra, from Chang Chemo River tributary along third stream | * PP18 to PP23 — southeast of Gogra, from the Chang Chemo River tributary along the third stream towards [[Pangong Tso]] | ||
== Border terminology == | == Border terminology == | ||
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;[[Border Personnel Meeting point]]: BPMs are locations the LAC where the armies of both countries hold meetings to resolve border issues and improve relations. | ;[[Border Personnel Meeting point]]: BPMs are locations the LAC where the armies of both countries hold meetings to resolve border issues and improve relations. | ||
;Boundary: The "line between two states that marks the limits of sovereign jurisdiction" or "a line agreed upon by both states and normally delineated on maps and demarcated on the ground by both sides" as explained by [[Shivshankar Menon|S Menon]].{{Sfn|Menon|2016|p=3–4 (ebook) |loc=Chapter 1: Pacifying the Border. The 1993 Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement with China}} | ;Boundary: The "line between two states that marks the limits of sovereign jurisdiction" or "a line agreed upon by both states and normally delineated on maps and demarcated on the ground by both sides" as explained by [[Shivshankar Menon|S Menon]].{{Sfn|Menon, Choices|2016|p=3–4 (ebook) |loc=Chapter 1: Pacifying the Border. The 1993 Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement with China}} | ||
;Border: "A zone between the two states, nations, or civilizations. It is frequently also an area where peoples, nations, and cultures intermingle and are in contact with one another" as explained by [[Shivshankar Menon|S Menon]].{{Sfn|Menon|2016|p=3–4 (ebook)|loc=Chapter 1: Pacifying the Border. The 1993 Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement with China}} | ;Border: "A zone between the two states, nations, or civilizations. It is frequently also an area where peoples, nations, and cultures intermingle and are in contact with one another" as explained by [[Shivshankar Menon|S Menon]].{{Sfn|Menon, Choices|2016|p=3–4 (ebook)|loc=Chapter 1: Pacifying the Border. The 1993 Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement with China}} | ||
|small=80%|gap=}} | |small=80%|gap=}} | ||
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* {{citation |last=Gupta |first=Shishir |title=The Himalayan Face-Off: Chinese Assertion and the Indian Riposte |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=7Ig5AwAAQBAJ |year=2014 |publisher=Hachette India |isbn=978-93-5009-606-2 |ref={{sfnref|Gupta, The Himalayan Face-off|2014}}}} | * {{citation |last=Gupta |first=Shishir |title=The Himalayan Face-Off: Chinese Assertion and the Indian Riposte |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=7Ig5AwAAQBAJ |year=2014 |publisher=Hachette India |isbn=978-93-5009-606-2 |ref={{sfnref|Gupta, The Himalayan Face-off|2014}}}} | ||
* {{citation |last=Hoffmann |first=Steven A. |title=India and the China Crisis |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=BpSRwC5_EPUC |year=1990 |publisher=University of California Press |isbn=978-0-520-06537-6 |ref={{sfnref|Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis|1990}}}} | * {{citation |last=Hoffmann |first=Steven A. |title=India and the China Crisis |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=BpSRwC5_EPUC |year=1990 |publisher=University of California Press |isbn=978-0-520-06537-6 |ref={{sfnref|Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis|1990}}}} | ||
*{{citation|last=Menon|first=Shivshankar|title=Choices: Inside the Making of India's Foreign Policy|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GduACwAAQBAJ|year=2016|publisher=Brookings Institution Press|isbn=978-0-8157-2911-2|ref={{sfnref|Menon, Choices|2016}}}} | * {{citation |last=Menon |first=Shivshankar |title=Choices: Inside the Making of India's Foreign Policy |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GduACwAAQBAJ |year=2016 |publisher=Brookings Institution Press |isbn=978-0-8157-2911-2 |ref={{sfnref|Menon, Choices|2016}}}} | ||
* {{citation |last=Torri |first=Michelguglielmo |year=2020 |title=India 2020: Confronting China, Aligning with the US |journal=Asia Maior |volume=XXXI |url=https://www.asiamaior.org/the-journal/asia-maior-vol-xxxi-2020/india-2020-confronting-china-aligning-with-the-us.html |id={{ProQuest|2562568306}} |ref={{sfnref|Torri, India 2020|2020}}}} | |||
* {{citation |last=Whiting |first=Allen Suess |title=The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Dl3fAAAAMAAJ |year=1975 |publisher=University of Michigan Press |isbn=978-0-472-96900-5 |ref={{sfnref|Whiting, Chinese calculus of deterrence|1975}}}} | * {{citation |last=Whiting |first=Allen Suess |title=The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Dl3fAAAAMAAJ |year=1975 |publisher=University of Michigan Press |isbn=978-0-472-96900-5 |ref={{sfnref|Whiting, Chinese calculus of deterrence|1975}}}} | ||
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{{Borders of China}} | {{Borders of China}} | ||
{{Borders of India}} | {{Borders of India}} | ||
{{Coord missing|Jammu and Kashmir|China}} | {{Coord missing|Jammu and Kashmir|China}} | ||