ErnestGuzzi186: improved formatting per standard format and corrected details

2026-02-14T10:42:43Z

improved formatting per standard format and corrected details

->Kautilya3: Reverted 1 edit by 2409:4063:2311:1E77:0:0:42B:D8A1 (talk): Unsourced edit

2021-12-10T14:32:34Z

Reverted 1 edit by 2409:4063:2311:1E77:0:0:42B:D8A1 (talk): Unsourced edit

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{{Use dmy dates|date=August 2016}}

{{Infobox military conflict
| conflict = Sumdorong Chu standoff
| partof =
| map_type = Tibet#India Arunachal Pradesh
| map_relief =
| coordinates = {{coord|27.7818|91.7813|display=inline, title}}
| date = 1986–1987
| place = [[Sumdorong Chu Valley]], [[McMahon Line]] (Indo-Tibetan border)
| territory =
| result = Standoff ended with status quo maintained Indian prime minister invited to Beijing
| combatant1 = [[Image:Flag of India.svg|22px]] [[India]]
| combatant2 = [[Image:Flag of the People's Republic of China.svg|22px]] [[China]]
| commander1 = [[Image:Flag of India.svg|22px]] [[President of India|President]] [[R. Venkataraman]] [[Image:Flag of India.svg|22px]] [[Prime Minister of India|Prime Minister]] [[Rajiv Gandhi]] [[Image:Flag of India.svg|22px]] [[General (India)|General]] [[Krishnaswamy Sundarji]]
| commander2 = {{Flagicon|China}} [[General Secretary of the Communist Party of China|General Secretary]] [[Zhao Ziyang]] {{Flagicon|China}} [[Chairman of the Central Military Commission (China)|Chairman]] [[Deng Xiaoping]] {{Flagicon|China}} [[Premier of the People's Republic of China|Premier]] [[Li Peng]] {{Flagicon|China}} [[President of the People's Republic of China|President]] [[Li Xiannian]]
| strength1 =
| strength2 =
| casualties1 =
| casualties2 =
| notes =
}}
[[File:Sumdorong-Chu.jpg|thumb|right|305px|Sumdorong Chu and vicinity]]

In 1986–87, a military standoff took place between India and China in the [[Sumdorong Chu Valley]] bordering the [[Tawang district]], [[Arunachal Pradesh]] and [[Cona County]], [[Tibet]]. It was initiated by China moving a company of troops to '''Wangdung''', a pasture to the south of Sumdorong Chu that India believed to be its territory. The Indian troops stood their ground on the neighbouring '''Longro La''' ridge{{Efn|Alternative spellings include '''Langro La''' and '''Lungro La'''.}} and both the sides moved a large number of troops to the border. The crisis was diffused after the visit of Indian External Affairs minister to Beijing in May 1987. The standoff was the first military confrontation along the disputed [[McMahon Line]] after the [[Sino-Indian War|1962 war]] and gave rise to fears of escalation. Subsequently, India and China formulated agreements for managing future border tensions.{{sfnp|Lintner, China's India War|2018|pp=210–211}}{{sfnp|Pardesi, Managing the Sumdorong Chu Crisis|2020|pp=537–538}}

==Background==
Since 1962, India had not returned to the site of its major defeat at Namka Chu, an east–west running stream which separates the Thag La ridge to the north and the Hathung La ridge to its south. India's efforts to occupy the Thag La ridge was the ''[[casus belli]]'' for the October 1962 Chinese military attack on India.

Because there were no other feasible defensive locations north of [[Tawang]], the Indian government had more or less decided that in the event of a new war, they would abandon the Tawang town and prepare for battle at the [[Se la pass|Se La pass]] to its south. However, after a 1980 review, it was decided by the military strategists that it was important to defend Tawang in a future conflict.<ref>[https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/cover-story/story/19980518-line-of-actual-control-remains-sore-point-between-india-and-china-826413-1998-05-18 Line of Actual Control remains sore point between India and China] ("LAC: Chequered Past", printed along with "George in China Shop"), India Today, 18 May 1998.</ref> The army made it clear that the only viable line of defence for Tawang would be along the Hathung La ridge.

In 1983, an Intelligence Bureau team went to the pasturage of Sumdorong Chu which is north-east of the confluence of the [[Namka Chu]] and [[Nyamjang Chu|Nyamjiang Chu]]. The intelligence team stayed through the summer and returned in winter. This procedure was followed for two years. In 1986, the Indian team found that the Chinese had preceded them and set up semi-permanent structures there and were not willing to budge.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web|last=Joshi|first=Manoj|author-link=Manoj Joshi (journalist)|date=3 July 2017|title=Operation Falcon: When General Sundarji took the Chinese by surprise|url=https://www.orfonline.org/research/operation-falcon-when-general-sundarji-took-the-chinese-by-surprise/|access-date=2020-10-10|website=ORF|language=en-US}}</ref>

Under the orders of General Sundarji and codenamed Operation Falcon, the Indians undertook an airlift of troops and vehicles to Zemithang from 18 to 20 October 1986. Taking up locations on multiple heights, including the Hathung La ridge, Indian troops were able to strategically occupy the high ground near Sumdorong Chu. This was followed by more mobilisation by both sides. China called for a flag meeting on 15 November. The standoff continued until May 1987.<ref name=":0" />

==Political context==
At the end of 1986, India granted statehood to [[Arunachal Pradesh]]. The Chinese government proceeded to protest. But the military movements in [[Tawang district|Tawang]], taken in conjunction with this political action were seen as a provocation by the Chinese. In early 1987 Beijing's tone became similar to that of 1962, and with the Indian Army refusing to stand down, Western diplomats predicted war.

The result was a thaw. Indian Foreign Minister [[Narayan Dutt Tiwari|N.D. Tiwari]] arrived in Beijing in May 1987 en route to [[Pyongyang]], [[North Korea]]. He carried with him messages from Indian leaders that there was no intention on New Delhi's part to aggravate the situation. The first formal flag meeting to discuss “ the freezing of the situation” since 1962, was held on the fifth of August 1987 at Bum La in the aftermath of the Wangdung affair.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.firstpost.com/world/sikkim-standoff-india-should-be-ready-for-long-haul-as-impasse-may-go-beyond-wangdung-incident-3775047.html|title=Sikkim standoff: India should be ready for long haul as impasse may go beyond Wangdung incident|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170710154644/http://www.firstpost.com/world/sikkim-standoff-india-should-be-ready-for-long-haul-as-impasse-may-go-beyond-wangdung-incident-3775047.html|archive-date=10 July 2017|df=dmy-all}}</ref> Both sides decided to take up talks with renewed urgency and the following year in 1988, Rajiv Gandhi visited Beijing, returning Zhou Enlai's '60s visit.<ref>Manoj Joshi, [https://web.archive.org/web/20060524151804/http://www.indiatodaygroup.com/itoday/22021999/obit.html "Warrior as a Scholar"], "India Today ".</ref>

==Operation Chequerboard==
'''Operation Chequerboard''' (or '''Checker Board''') was a high-altitude military exercise conducted by India along the [[China|Chinese]] border in North East [[India]] during the spring of 1987,<ref name=Perkovich/> in the midst of the Sumdorong Chu standoff.{{sfnp|Pardesi, Managing the Sumdorong Chu crisis|2020}} The exercise was conducted to test Indian military response in the Northeast Himalayan region and the [[United States|US]] and [[USSR|Soviet]] reaction to potential Sino-Indian tensions in the region. Scholar Manjeet Pardesi states that it was unclear whether the operation involved mere simulations or also field exercises.{{sfnp|Pardesi, Managing the Sumdorong Chu crisis|2020|loc=note 47, p. 549}} However it did serve the purpose of demonstrating to China the Indian resolve and its military preparedness.<ref>{{harvp|Pardesi, Managing the Sumdorong Chu crisis|2020|p=543}}: "China also noted Sundarji’s Operation Checker Board as well as the ease with [which] India had redeployed many troops from the western border with Pakistan (where they were equipped to fight in the plains) to Arunachal (where they were equipped to fight in the mountains)."</ref>

The exercise involved 10 divisions of the [[Indian Army]] and several [[Squadron (aviation)|squadrons]] of the [[Indian Air Force|IAF]] and a redeployment of troops at several places in North East India. The Indian Army moved 3 divisions to positions around Wangdung,<ref>[https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/cover-story/story/19880515-general-sundarji-leaves-behind-a-legacy-most-fiercely-disputed-in-the-history-of-the-army-797243-1988-05-15 Disputed Legacy], India Today, May 15, 1988.</ref> where they were supplied and maintained solely by air. These troop reinforcements were over and above the 50,000 troops already present across [[Arunachal Pradesh]].<ref>"Eye-witness in Tibet", Far Eastern Economic Review, June 4, 1987.</ref> The military exercise coincided with statements from India's Chief of Army Staff [[Krishnaswamy Sundarji]] that India recognizes the major boundary differences with China and Indian deployments are intended to give [[Beijing]] the benefit of the doubt.<ref name=Perkovich>George Perkovich, "Nuclear Capabilities Grow," [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=UDA9dUryS8EC&pg=PA289#v=onepage&q&f=false India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation] (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1999), p. 289.</ref>

[[General Vishwa Nath Sharma]] has said that Operation Chequerboard was nothing but only a telecom and headquarters exercise and that Sundarji didn't move any brigades and there was nothing on the ground. He further said that it was separately run by the [[Eastern Command (India)|Eastern Command]].

==Aftermath==
Both India and China realised the danger of an inadvertent conflict and, after initial posturing, a decision was made to de-escalate their deployments. The fallout from the standoff resulted in India and China restarting dialogue, which had been dormant since the 1962 war. After Rajiv Gandhi's 1988 visit, there was a hiatus of sorts because of political turmoil in India. But finally in 1993, the two countries signed an [[Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement, 1993|agreement]] to ensure peace along the LAC.

The agreement brought in an interesting concept of "mutual and equal security" where thinning of forces was envisaged, based on geographical and logistical considerations. However, its most important element was to have the two sides work out a mutually acceptable [[Line of Actual Control]]. As of now, the two sides have their own versions of the line and there are points, especially in the Sikkim-Bhutan-India trijunction, the Sumdorong Chu area and so on, where each other's claims continue to be disputed.

==See also==
*[[Sino-Indian border dispute]]
*[[Sino-Indian War]]
* Sino-Indian border clashes and standoffs: [[Nathu La and Cho La clashes|1967]], [[2013 Depsang standoff|2013]], [[2017 China–India border standoff|2017]], [[2020 China–India skirmishes|2020]]

==Notes==
{{notelist}}

==References==
{{reflist|30em}}

==Bibliography==
* {{cite journal |title=China and South Asia (July-September 1986) |journal=China Report |volume=23 |issue=1 |date=February 1987 |pages=113–139 |doi=10.1177/000944558702300111 |ref={{sfnref|China and South Asia|1987}}}}
* {{citation |last=Lintner |first=Bertil |title=China's India War: Collision Course on the Roof of the World |year=2018 |publisher=OUP India |isbn=978-0-19-909163-8 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-L9DDwAAQBAJ |ref={{sfnref|Lintner, China's India War|2018}}}}
* {{cite journal |last1=Pardesi |first1=Manjeet S. |title=Managing the 1986-87 Sino-Indian Sumdorong Chu Crisis |journal=India Review |volume=18 |issue=5 |year=2020 |pages=534–551 |issn=1473-6489 |doi=10.1080/14736489.2019.1703364 |ref={{sfnref|Pardesi, Managing the Sumdorong Chu crisis|2020}}}}

==Further reading==
* {{cite web |title=Dhola-Sadiya bridge not enough, China still miles ahead of India in infrastructure along LAC |url=http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/dhola-sadiya-bridge-not-enough-china-still-miles-ahead-of-india-in-infrastructure-along-lac/articleshow/58879677.cms}}
* Arjun Subramaniam, [https://theprint.in/opinion/for-operation-falcon-maj-gen-jimmy-asked-for-mules-but-army-chief-sundarji-gave-helicopters/421730/ For Operation Falcon, Maj Gen Jimmy asked for mules but Army chief Sundarji gave helicopters], The Print, 15 May 2020.
* Sushant Singh, [https://caravanmagazine.in/interview/general-v-n-sharma-indian-china-conflict-wangdung-tawang-1987-mcmahon-line Army HQ wanted me to withdraw from Wangdung in 1987 but I refused: Retired General VN Sharma], The Caravan, 22 September 2020.
* {{cite web|url=https://theprint.in/past-forward/sumdorong-chu-ladakh-like-india-china-face-off-which-took-9-yrs-to-end-but-without-violence/451517/|title=Sumdorong Chu, Ladakh-like India-China face-off which took 9 yrs to end but without violence}}

==External links==
* [http://mil.qianlong.com/37076/2009/11/02/3943@5239534.htm 1987中印边境冲突：印军最后时刻撤销攻击令 (1987 Sino-Indian skirmish military conflicts)] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091111110322/http://mil.qianlong.com/37076/2009/11/02/3943%405239534.htm |date=11 November 2009}}, Qianlong Military, 2 November 2009.
* [https://opentopomap.org/#map=14/27.78704/91.78039 Wangdung pasture] mapped on OpenTopoMap. Retrieved 26 October 2020.
* Ram Naidu, [https://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-miscellaneous/tp-others/border-with-china/article28055715.ece Border with China], The Hindu (letter to the editor), 22 November 2000.

{{China–India relations}}
{{Military of India}}
{{PRC conflicts}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Sino Indian skirmish, 1987}}
[[Category:Conflicts in 1987]]
[[Category:1987 in India|Sino-Indian Skirmish, 1987]]
[[Category:1987 in China]]
[[Category:Wars involving the People's Republic of China]]
[[Category:Wars involving India]]
[[Category:China–India military relations|1987 Sino Indian skirmish]]
[[Category:Battles and conflicts without fatalities]]
[[Category:Rajiv Gandhi administration]]

Sumdorong Chu standoff - Revision history

ErnestGuzzi186: improved formatting per standard format and corrected details

->Kautilya3: Reverted 1 edit by 2409:4063:2311:1E77:0:0:42B:D8A1 (talk): Unsourced edit