Operation Pawan - Revision history

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	{{Short description\|Part of the Sri Lankan Civil War}}		{{Short description\|Part of the Sri Lankan Civil War}}
	{{Use dmy dates\|date=October ~~2022~~}}		{{Use dmy dates\|date=October 2019}}
	{{Use Indian English\|date=October ~~2022~~}}		{{Use Indian English\|date=October 2019}}
	{{Infobox military conflict		{{Infobox military conflict
	\| conflict = Operation Pawan		\| conflict = Operation Pawan
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	===Battle for Jaffna===		===Battle for Jaffna===
	As the battle for Jaffna progressed, the IPKF advance came under intense and vicious opposition from the Tigers. Fighting in built-up and an as-yet unevacuated Jaffna, the Indian High Command insisted that the slow advance was, in addition to Tiger resistance, more a result of reluctance on the part of the IPKF to use heavy weaponry to clear LTTE defenses.<ref name=Dagmar/> Furthermore, all the approach roads had been laced with Claymore mines or explosives by the Tigers in its years of fighting with the Sri Lankan army.<ref name="BPoppaw"/> The Tigers also made extensive use of [[Improvised explosive device\|IED]]s (improvised explosive devices)<ref name="BPoppaw"/> which could be remotely detonated from over a kilometer away. During this time Eastern Command of the [[Indian Navy]], supported by the [[Indian Coast Guard\|Coast Guard]], was key in establishing a {{convert\|300\|mi\|km}} long blockade around northern Sri Lanka from October 1987 to disrupt the Tigers' supply and communication routes.<ref name="Navy">{{cite web\|title=Operation Pawan\|url=http://indiannavy.nic.in/pawan.htm\|url-status=dead\|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20051001130821/http://indiannavy.nic.in/pawan.htm\|archive-date=1 October 2005\|access-date=1 February ~~2022~~}}</ref> It was at about this time that the [[MARCOS]] forces (Marine Commandos) of the Indian Navy first went into action. Detachments of the IMSF (Indian Marine Special Forces, as the MARCOS was then known), along with a battalion of the 340th Independent Brigade of the [[Indian Army]], provided beach [[reconnaissance]] around Jaffna and [[Batticaloa]].		As the battle for Jaffna progressed, the IPKF advance came under intense and vicious opposition from the Tigers. Fighting in built-up and an as-yet unevacuated Jaffna, the Indian High Command insisted that the slow advance was, in addition to Tiger resistance, more a result of reluctance on the part of the IPKF to use heavy weaponry to clear LTTE defenses.<ref name=Dagmar/> Furthermore, all the approach roads had been laced with Claymore mines or explosives by the Tigers in its years of fighting with the Sri Lankan army.<ref name="BPoppaw"/> The Tigers also made extensive use of [[Improvised explosive device\|IED]]s (improvised explosive devices)<ref name="BPoppaw"/> which could be remotely detonated from over a kilometer away. During this time Eastern Command of the [[Indian Navy]], supported by the [[Indian Coast Guard\|Coast Guard]], was key in establishing a {{convert\|300\|mi\|km}} long blockade around northern Sri Lanka from October 1987 to disrupt the Tigers' supply and communication routes.<ref name="Navy">{{cite web\|title=Operation Pawan\|url=http://indiannavy.nic.in/pawan.htm\|url-status=dead\|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20051001130821/http://indiannavy.nic.in/pawan.htm\|archive-date=1 October 2005\|access-date=1 February 2007}}</ref> It was at about this time that the [[MARCOS]] forces (Marine Commandos) of the Indian Navy first went into action. Detachments of the IMSF (Indian Marine Special Forces, as the MARCOS was then known), along with a battalion of the 340th Independent Brigade of the [[Indian Army]], provided beach [[reconnaissance]] around Jaffna and [[Batticaloa]].
	The 340th Brigade was one of the first IPKF units to be deployed, and served until operations in the [[Trincomalee]] area were complete. The IMSF, at this time, also provided security patrols along the coast road west of Jaffna until the 41st Brigade took charge in November.		The 340th Brigade was one of the first IPKF units to be deployed, and served until operations in the [[Trincomalee]] area were complete. The IMSF, at this time, also provided security patrols along the coast road west of Jaffna until the 41st Brigade took charge in November.

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	===Culmination===		===Culmination===
	Ultimately, however, after two weeks of bitter fighting the IPKF had wrested control of Jaffna and other major cities from the LTTE, but operations were to continue well into November, with major operations coming to an end with the fall of Jaffna Fort on 28 November.<ref name=Dagmar/> Throughout the duration of Operation Pawan, the casualties suffered by the IPKF had been put at between 600 <ref name=dixitrediff>{{cite web\|url=http://in.rediff.com/news/2000/mar/24lanka.htm\|title=J N Dixit (ex-Indian Ambassador to Colombo) speaking to Rediff.com\|publisher=In.rediff.com\|access-date=7 October 2014\|url-status=live\|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140329212552/http://in.rediff.com/news/2000/mar/24lanka.htm\|archive-date=29 March ~~2022~~}}</ref> and 1,200.{{ref\|1}}{{ref\|2}} In addition to the LTTE's defensive operations alluded to above, the IPKF's problems were compounded by the fact that the Tigers, using classic [[guerrilla]] tactics, blended in with the local population. The IPKF also came face-to-face with [[child soldier]]s of the LTTE, something it had not expected.<ref name="BPoppaw"/>		Ultimately, however, after two weeks of bitter fighting the IPKF had wrested control of Jaffna and other major cities from the LTTE, but operations were to continue well into November, with major operations coming to an end with the fall of Jaffna Fort on 28 November.<ref name=Dagmar/> Throughout the duration of Operation Pawan, the casualties suffered by the IPKF had been put at between 600 <ref name=dixitrediff>{{cite web\|url=http://in.rediff.com/news/2000/mar/24lanka.htm\|title=J N Dixit (ex-Indian Ambassador to Colombo) speaking to Rediff.com\|publisher=In.rediff.com\|access-date=7 October 2014\|url-status=live\|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140329212552/http://in.rediff.com/news/2000/mar/24lanka.htm\|archive-date=29 March 2014}}</ref> and 1,200.{{ref\|1}}{{ref\|2}} In addition to the LTTE's defensive operations alluded to above, the IPKF's problems were compounded by the fact that the Tigers, using classic [[guerrilla]] tactics, blended in with the local population. The IPKF also came face-to-face with [[child soldier]]s of the LTTE, something it had not expected.<ref name="BPoppaw"/>

	This was only the beginning of the IPKF's three-year campaign to neutralize the LTTE. By the time Jaffna fell, the LTTE had merely exfiltrated out of the town, moving south to the jungles of [[Vavuniya]]. Its hardcore fighters moved to the safety of the jungle by skirting the Jaffna coast from Point Pedro to Elephant Pass, sheltered by the criss-cross of waterways in the impenetrable Nittkaikulam jungle. In the Jaffna sector, although the LTTE had shifted out of the town itself, it nevertheless harassed the 54th Division's efforts to consolidate its positions using IEDs and anti-personnel mines. In turn, the IPKF was able to disrupt the LTTE's activities with regular raids that led to the capture of large caches of rebel weaponry.<ref name="BSJUNG"/> Brig. Manjit Singh was later replaced by Brig. J.S. Dhillon, under whom the 54th underwent considerable modifications of its operations routine. Small, highly mobile units became the staple of the 54th's operations.<ref name="BSJUNG"/>		This was only the beginning of the IPKF's three-year campaign to neutralize the LTTE. By the time Jaffna fell, the LTTE had merely exfiltrated out of the town, moving south to the jungles of [[Vavuniya]]. Its hardcore fighters moved to the safety of the jungle by skirting the Jaffna coast from Point Pedro to Elephant Pass, sheltered by the criss-cross of waterways in the impenetrable Nittkaikulam jungle. In the Jaffna sector, although the LTTE had shifted out of the town itself, it nevertheless harassed the 54th Division's efforts to consolidate its positions using IEDs and anti-personnel mines. In turn, the IPKF was able to disrupt the LTTE's activities with regular raids that led to the capture of large caches of rebel weaponry.<ref name="BSJUNG"/> Brig. Manjit Singh was later replaced by Brig. J.S. Dhillon, under whom the 54th underwent considerable modifications of its operations routine. Small, highly mobile units became the staple of the 54th's operations.<ref name="BSJUNG"/>

	The IPKF at this point still consisted mostly of an overstretched 54th Division. Following the Jaffna operation, the 36th Infantry Division, along with two additional brigades, took over the [[Vavuniya]] sector and the [[Trincomalee]]-[[Batticaloa]] axis. This relieved the 54th Division which, led by Brig. Singh, could now focus on consolidating the Jaffna sector.<ref name="BSJUNG">{{cite book \|last1=Correspondent (Super User) \|title=Operation Pawan \|chapter=Shifting to Jungles \|date=October 2006 \|publisher=Bharat Rakshak - Indian Army & Land Forces \|url=http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/ARMY/history/1987ipkf/297-shifting-to-jungles.html \|access-date=18 July 2021 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190820111843/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/ARMY/history/1987ipkf/297-shifting-to-jungles.html \|archive-date=20 August ~~2022~~}}</ref> The 4th Mountain Division and the 57th Infantry Division were deployed still later in February 1988 to take charge of [[Vanni (Sri Lanka)\|Vanni]] and Batticaloa from the 36th.		The IPKF at this point still consisted mostly of an overstretched 54th Division. Following the Jaffna operation, the 36th Infantry Division, along with two additional brigades, took over the [[Vavuniya]] sector and the [[Trincomalee]]-[[Batticaloa]] axis. This relieved the 54th Division which, led by Brig. Singh, could now focus on consolidating the Jaffna sector.<ref name="BSJUNG">{{cite book \|last1=Correspondent (Super User) \|title=Operation Pawan \|chapter=Shifting to Jungles \|date=October 2006 \|publisher=Bharat Rakshak - Indian Army & Land Forces \|url=http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/ARMY/history/1987ipkf/297-shifting-to-jungles.html \|access-date=18 July 2021 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190820111843/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/ARMY/history/1987ipkf/297-shifting-to-jungles.html \|archive-date=20 August 2019}}</ref> The 4th Mountain Division and the 57th Infantry Division were deployed still later in February 1988 to take charge of [[Vanni (Sri Lanka)\|Vanni]] and Batticaloa from the 36th.

	==Criticism==		==Criticism==
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	==Aftermath==		==Aftermath==
	Prime Minister of India [[Rajiv Gandhi]] was [[assassination of Rajiv Gandhi\|assassinated]] as a fallout of Operation Pawan by LTTE.<ref name="Kaarthikeyan">{{Cite book\|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ZCnjCQAAQBAJ\|title=The Rajiv Gandhi Assassination: The Investigation\|isbn=9788120793088\|last1=Kaarthikeyan\|first1=D. R.\|date=23 June ~~2022~~}}</ref>		Prime Minister of India [[Rajiv Gandhi]] was [[assassination of Rajiv Gandhi\|assassinated]] as a fallout of Operation Pawan by LTTE.<ref name="Kaarthikeyan">{{Cite book\|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ZCnjCQAAQBAJ\|title=The Rajiv Gandhi Assassination: The Investigation\|isbn=9788120793088\|last1=Kaarthikeyan\|first1=D. R.\|date=23 June 2015}}</ref>

	==See also==		==See also==

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{{Short description|Part of the Sri Lankan Civil War}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=October 2019}}
{{Use Indian English|date=October 2019}}
{{Infobox military conflict
| conflict = Operation Pawan
| partof = [[Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War]]
| image =
| caption =
| date = 11–25 October 1987
| place = [[Jaffna Peninsula]], [[Sri Lanka]]
| result = Indian victory <br>[[IPKF]] occupation of Jaffna<br> LTTE relocates HQ to Vanni
| combatant1 = {{flag|India}}
*[[Indian Peace Keeping Force]]
| combatant2 = {{Flagicon image|Tamil Eelam Flag.svg|15px}} [[Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam]]
| commander1 = [[Rajiv Gandhi]]<br>[[R.I.S. Kahlon]]
| commander2 = [[Velupillai Prabhakaran]]
| units1 =
| units2 =
| strength1 = 50,000
| strength2 = unknown
| casualties1 = 350+ killed,1,100+ wounded<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/special-report/story/19880131-indian-armys-action-against-ltte-developes-into-countrys-longest-war-since-independence-769020-2013-11-21|title = Indian Army's action against LTTE developes into country's longest war since Independence}}</ref>
| casualties2 = 600 killed<br>200 captured
| campaignbox =
{{Campaignbox Indian Peace Keeping Force}}
{{Campaignbox Sri Lankan Civil War}}
}}
'''Operation Pawan''' ({{lang-hi|ऑपरेशन पवन}} ''Ŏparēśan Pavan'', lit. "Operation Wind") was the code name assigned to the operation by the [[Indian Peace Keeping Force]] (IPKF) to take control of [[Jaffna]] from the [[Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam]] (LTTE), better known as the Tamil Tigers, in late 1987 to enforce the disarmament of the LTTE as a part of the [[Indo-Sri Lanka Accord]]. In brutal fighting lasting about three weeks, the IPKF took control of the [[Jaffna Peninsula]] from the LTTE, something that the [[Sri Lanka Army|Sri Lankan Army]] had tried but failed to do. Supported by [[Indian Army]] tanks, helicopter gunships and heavy artillery, the IPKF routed the LTTE at the cost of 214 soldiers and Officers.<ref name="BPoppaw"/>{{notinsource|date=July 2021|reason=This source gives no specifics of casualty numbers.}}

==Background==
{{Main|Sri Lankan Civil War|Eelam War I|Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War}}
The [[Tamil Tigers]] had fought to establish a [[Tamil people|Tamil]] homeland, separate from [[Sri Lanka]], in the northern and eastern portion of Ceylon (Tamil Eelam). This effort led to a series of armed conflicts with the [[Sri Lankan military]]. In the late 1980s [[India]], feeling considerable pressure from its Tamil nationals, began to intervene on both a diplomatic and military basis. Negotiations led to the [[Indo-Sri Lanka Accord]], signed in [[Colombo]] on 29 July 1987, under which the Sri Lankan government agreed to give the nation's provinces more power and autonomy and withdraw its troops to their barracks. The Tamil rebels were to surrender their arms as well.<ref name="IFP">{{cite book|last1=Ghosh|first1=Anjali|title=India's Foreign Policy|date=2009|publisher=Pearson Education India|location=Delhi|isbn=978-8131710258|page=83}}</ref>

Most Tamil groups, including the Tigers, had not participated in the talks. Only reluctantly did they agree to surrender their arms to the Indian Peace-Keeping Force as provided by the Accord. Even so, many rebels did not surrender their weapons, and the situation quickly flared into active confrontation. The Tigers declared their intent to continue armed struggle for an independent Tamil Eelam and refused to disarm. The IPKF soon found itself engaged in a bloody police action against the Tigers, which culminated in the rebels being cornered on the [[Jaffna Peninsula]], at the northern end of the island. The IPKF set out to complete its mission of disarming the LTTE by taking Jaffna by force.<ref name="IFP" />

==The Operation==
By 7 October, the Chief of Army Staff (CoAS) had issued directives to the IPKF, laying down its operational parameters. It was to:

*Seize/destroy LTTE radio and TV transmission equipment in the Jaffna Peninsula
*Seize or jam the LTTE communications network
*Carry out raids on LTTE camps, caches and strongpoints
*Detain and interrogate personnel manning LTTE offices in the East to gain information. In case of resistance, force to be used.
*Actions to further consolidate the hold of the IPKF in the region

The first IPKF operation was launched on 9 October 1987. Code-named Operation Pawan ([[Hindi language|Hindi]] for Wind), it was expected to neutralize LTTE operational capability in and around Jaffna. This included the capture or neutralization of the LTTE's chain of command<ref name=rediffintHK>[http://in.rediff.com/news/2000/apr/01lanka.htm "Nobody sounded even a Last Post for our dead in Colombo"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120208124719/http://in.rediff.com/news/2000/apr/01lanka.htm |date=2012-02-08 }} Gen. Harikat Singh to Josy Joseph. rediff.com</ref> which was expected to leave the rebel movement directionless in the face of the impending assault on the LTTE strongholds by the IPKF.

On the nights of 9 and 10 October, the IPKF raided and captured the LTTE radio station at Tavadi and the TV station at [[Kokkuvil]], while the printing presses of two LTTE-sponsored newspapers were destroyed. These operations also led to the capture of nearly 200 Tiger rebels.<ref name="SLIaad">{{cite book |last1=Pillarisetti |first1=Jagan |title=IAF History: The Sri Lankan Interlude 1987-90 |date=November 2009 |publisher=Bharat Rakshak |url=http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/history/1987ipkf/1023-chapter02.html#gsc.tab=0 |access-date=18 July 2021 |chapter=Chapter 2: Accord, Airlift and Discord |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200809095412if_/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/history/1987ipkf/1023-chapter02.html#gsc.tab=0 |archive-date=9 August 2020 |language=en-gb}}</ref> In retaliation, the LTTE ambushed a [[Central Reserve Police Force]] (CRPF) convoy near Tellipallai, killing four Jawans, as well as an IPKF post at Tellipallai with automatic weapons and mortar fire on an IPKF post. Later that day the Tigers ambushed a 10 Para Commando jeep on patrol, killing all five occupants.

On 10 October the Indian 91st Brigade, consisting of three battalions and led by Brig. J. Ralli, also began its push into Jaffna.<ref name="BPoppaw"/><ref name=Dagmar>"The Tamil Militants-Before the Accord and After" Hellmann-Rajanayagam D. ''Pacific Affairs'', Vol. 61, No. 4. (Winter, 1988–1989), pp. 603–619</ref>

===The Jaffna University Helidrop===
{{Main|Jaffna University Helidrop}}
The first battle signalling the real beginning of Operation Pawan was the [[Jaffna University Helidrop|heliborne assault]] on the Jaffna University headquarters of the LTTE by a detachment of Indian [[Para (Special Forces)]] and [[Sikh Light Infantry]] soldiers on the night of 12 October. This was planned as a quick commando raid to capture the top LTTE leadership and local commanders who, according to Indian intelligence, were supposed to be in the building at the time and was thus expected to cut short the battle for Jaffna.<ref name="SLIdid">{{cite book |last1=Pillarisetti |first1=Jagan |title=IAF History: The Sri Lankan Interlude 1987-90 |date=November 2009 |publisher=Bharat Rakshak |url=http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/history/1987ipkf/1024-chapter03.html#gsc.tab=0 |access-date=18 July 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210305060751if_/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1987IPKF/1024-Chapter03.html#gsc.tab=0 |archive-date=5 March 2021 |language=en-gb |chapter=Chapter 3: Descent Into Danger - The Jaffna University Helidrop}}</ref> The plan was to land 17 commandos from the 10th battalion of the [[Parachute Regiment (India)|Parachute Regiment]] to secure the football field. A second wave was to follow with a platoon (30 troops) from the 13th battalion of the Sikh Light Infantry. The heliborne troops were to link up with the 4th battalion of [[5 Gorkha Rifles (Frontier Force)]] of 72 Brigade and the Sikh Light Infantry troops advancing on the ground.<ref name="BPoppaw"/>

The operation ended in disaster as the LTTE, having intercepted IPKF radio transmissions, set up an ambush. The helidropped troops came under intense fire from LTTE positions, forcing the [[Mil Mi-8]] helicopters to abandon the insertion midway through the operation. During the ensuing battle, which lasted throughout the night, 29 of the 30 Sikh Light Infantry troops and 2 of the 17 commandos were killed in action before detachments of the [[65th Armoured Regiment (India)|65th Armoured Regiment]] were able to extract the commandos from their defensive positions.<ref name="BPoppaw">{{cite book |last1=Correspondent (Super User) |title=Operation Pawan |date=October 2006 |publisher=Bharat Rakshak: Indian Army & Land Forces |url=http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/ARMY/history/1987ipkf/296-operation-pawan.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190913123917/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/ARMY/history/1987ipkf/296-operation-pawan.html |archive-date=13 September 2019 |access-date=18 July 2021 |chapter=The Battle for Jaffna}}</ref> After the Sikh Light Infantry platoon's [[signaller]] was shot by LTTE snipers early on in the battle, the unit lost contact with the Indian High Command at [[Palay Air Base]]. The sole survivor of the platoon, Sepoy Gora Singh, was taken prisoner by the LTTE under the command of Pawan Kashyap. It was not until his subsequent release during the conflict that the fate of the unit was known.<ref name="BPoppaw"/>

===Battle for Jaffna===
As the battle for Jaffna progressed, the IPKF advance came under intense and vicious opposition from the Tigers. Fighting in built-up and an as-yet unevacuated Jaffna, the Indian High Command insisted that the slow advance was, in addition to Tiger resistance, more a result of reluctance on the part of the IPKF to use heavy weaponry to clear LTTE defenses.<ref name=Dagmar/> Furthermore, all the approach roads had been laced with Claymore mines or explosives by the Tigers in its years of fighting with the Sri Lankan army.<ref name="BPoppaw"/> The Tigers also made extensive use of [[Improvised explosive device|IED]]s (improvised explosive devices)<ref name="BPoppaw"/> which could be remotely detonated from over a kilometer away. During this time Eastern Command of the [[Indian Navy]], supported by the [[Indian Coast Guard|Coast Guard]], was key in establishing a {{convert|300|mi|km}} long blockade around northern Sri Lanka from October 1987 to disrupt the Tigers' supply and communication routes.<ref name="Navy">{{cite web|title=Operation Pawan|url=http://indiannavy.nic.in/pawan.htm|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20051001130821/http://indiannavy.nic.in/pawan.htm|archive-date=1 October 2005|access-date=1 February 2007}}</ref> It was at about this time that the [[MARCOS]] forces (Marine Commandos) of the Indian Navy first went into action. Detachments of the IMSF (Indian Marine Special Forces, as the MARCOS was then known), along with a battalion of the 340th Independent Brigade of the [[Indian Army]], provided beach [[reconnaissance]] around Jaffna and [[Batticaloa]].
The 340th Brigade was one of the first IPKF units to be deployed, and served until operations in the [[Trincomalee]] area were complete. The IMSF, at this time, also provided security patrols along the coast road west of Jaffna until the 41st Brigade took charge in November.

On 15/16 October the IPKF stopped its advance to stabilize the front. Palay, the major operations headquarters for the [[54th Infantry Division (India)|54th Infantry Division]], was also secured from Tiger attacks. At this time the [[Indian Air Force]] undertook a massive airlift to reinforce the 91st with three brigades and heavy equipment, including [[T-72]] tanks and [[BMP-1|BMP-1 fighting vehicles]]. Air traffic controllers worked round the clock to fly in troops and equipment. [[Indian Airlines]] is said to have contributed to the airlift, using its [[Boeing 737]]s to deliver troops.<ref name="BPoppaw"/> This short interval also saw the introduction of [[Mil Mi-8|Mi-8]] medium helicopters and the first use of the [[Mi-25]] gunships of [[No. 125 Sqn]], along with [[HAL Cheetah]] light helicopters. By end of October the IAF had flown 2200 tactical transport and 800 helicopter sorties.<ref name="BPoppaw"/>

Now reinforced, the IPKF resumed the battle for Jaffna. The tanks and armored fighting vehicles are said to have been effective protection against [[anti-personnel mine]]s.<ref name="BPoppaw"/> However, even with this defense the IPKF advance was torturous in the face of the Tigers' sniper fire. They would take up positions on rooftops, in trees and even in [[coconut]] [[Arecaceae|palm]]s. Equipped with powerful [[Telescopic sight|telescopic infrared sight]]s, they were able to selectively take out officers and radiomen, inflicting a heavy toll and bringing the advance to a grinding halt. Helicopters flying below 2000 feet were also vulnerable, with at least five being shot at and damaged before the Mi-25s took up their offensive role. The IPKF adapted quickly, with its officers taking off the pips of their ranks, wearing [[slouch hat]]s and carrying oversize back packs. However, as the advance got bogged down, the battalions, instead of maneuvering around the defenders, were forced to commit more troops under orders from [[New Delhi]].<ref name="BPoppaw"/> In addition, the LTTE increasingly began to deploy [[anti-tank mine]]s, taking a further heavy toll on IPKF forces. A frustrated IPKF cut off the power to Jaffna in an attempt to counter this.<ref name="BPoppaw"/> IPKF communication lines were extensively mined by the LTTE, which further compounded the sometimes perilous situations that the Indian troops faced. It was not before the IMSF commandos broke out of the besieged Jaffna port and cleared the heavily mined Navanturai Coastal Road that a crucial link-up between 1 [[Maratha Light Infantry]] in Jaffna fort and the advancing troops of 41st Brigade could be established that secured the Nallur area.<ref name="BPoppaw"/> On 21 October the commandos conducted a successful amphibious raid against an LTTE base at [[Gurunagar]].<ref name="SpecOps">[http://www.specialoperations.com/Foreign/India/MCF.htm India. Marine Commando Force] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120705041432/http://www.specialoperations.com/Foreign/India/MCF.htm |date=2012-07-05 }} Special Operations.Com</ref> It was also toward the end of the Jaffna campaign that the IPKF started the use of Mi-25s for close air support<ref name="SLIcroc">{{cite book |last1=Pillarisetti |first1=Jagan |title=IAF History: The Sri Lankan Interlude 1987-90 |publisher=Bharat Rakshak |date=October 2009 |url=http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/history/1987ipkf/1026-chapter05.html |access-date=18 July 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200809074019if_/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/history/1987ipkf/1026-chapter05.html#gsc.tab=0 |archive-date=9 August 2020 |language=en-gb |chapter=Chapter 5: Crocodiles into the Attack - Mi-25s of 125 Heli Squadron}}</ref> when they flew against LTTE positions in Chavakacheri village on 23 October 1987.

===Culmination===
Ultimately, however, after two weeks of bitter fighting the IPKF had wrested control of Jaffna and other major cities from the LTTE, but operations were to continue well into November, with major operations coming to an end with the fall of Jaffna Fort on 28 November.<ref name=Dagmar/> Throughout the duration of Operation Pawan, the casualties suffered by the IPKF had been put at between 600 <ref name=dixitrediff>{{cite web|url=http://in.rediff.com/news/2000/mar/24lanka.htm|title=J N Dixit (ex-Indian Ambassador to Colombo) speaking to Rediff.com|publisher=In.rediff.com|access-date=7 October 2014|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140329212552/http://in.rediff.com/news/2000/mar/24lanka.htm|archive-date=29 March 2014}}</ref> and 1,200.{{ref|1}}{{ref|2}} In addition to the LTTE's defensive operations alluded to above, the IPKF's problems were compounded by the fact that the Tigers, using classic [[guerrilla]] tactics, blended in with the local population. The IPKF also came face-to-face with [[child soldier]]s of the LTTE, something it had not expected.<ref name="BPoppaw"/>

This was only the beginning of the IPKF's three-year campaign to neutralize the LTTE. By the time Jaffna fell, the LTTE had merely exfiltrated out of the town, moving south to the jungles of [[Vavuniya]]. Its hardcore fighters moved to the safety of the jungle by skirting the Jaffna coast from Point Pedro to Elephant Pass, sheltered by the criss-cross of waterways in the impenetrable Nittkaikulam jungle. In the Jaffna sector, although the LTTE had shifted out of the town itself, it nevertheless harassed the 54th Division's efforts to consolidate its positions using IEDs and anti-personnel mines. In turn, the IPKF was able to disrupt the LTTE's activities with regular raids that led to the capture of large caches of rebel weaponry.<ref name="BSJUNG"/> Brig. Manjit Singh was later replaced by Brig. J.S. Dhillon, under whom the 54th underwent considerable modifications of its operations routine. Small, highly mobile units became the staple of the 54th's operations.<ref name="BSJUNG"/>

The IPKF at this point still consisted mostly of an overstretched 54th Division. Following the Jaffna operation, the 36th Infantry Division, along with two additional brigades, took over the [[Vavuniya]] sector and the [[Trincomalee]]-[[Batticaloa]] axis. This relieved the 54th Division which, led by Brig. Singh, could now focus on consolidating the Jaffna sector.<ref name="BSJUNG">{{cite book |last1=Correspondent (Super User) |title=Operation Pawan |chapter=Shifting to Jungles |date=October 2006 |publisher=Bharat Rakshak - Indian Army & Land Forces |url=http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/ARMY/history/1987ipkf/297-shifting-to-jungles.html |access-date=18 July 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190820111843/http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/ARMY/history/1987ipkf/297-shifting-to-jungles.html |archive-date=20 August 2019}}</ref> The 4th Mountain Division and the 57th Infantry Division were deployed still later in February 1988 to take charge of [[Vanni (Sri Lanka)|Vanni]] and Batticaloa from the 36th.

==Criticism==
India's foreign intelligence agency [[Research and Analysis Wing]] trained the [[LTTE]] to keep a check on [[Sri Lanka]], which had helped [[Pakistan]] in the [[Indo-Pakistani wars and conflicts|Indo-Pakistani War]] by allowing Pakistani ships to refuel at Sri Lankan ports. When [[Prime Minister of India]] [[Rajiv Gandhi]] sent the [[Indian Peace Keeping Force]] (IPKF) in 1987 to restore normalcy in the region, the disastrous efforts of the IPKF was blamed on the lack of co-ordination between the IPKF and RAW. Its most obvious manifestation was the [[Jaffna University Helidrop|Heliborne assault on LTTE HQ]] in the [[Jaffna University]] campus in the opening stages of Operation Pawan. The site was chosen without any consultation with the RAW and the dropping [[paratroopers]] became easy targets for the LTTE, and a number of Indian soldiers were killed.<ref>Sachi Sri Kantha. [http://www.sangam.co/articles/view/?id=287 The RAW Factor] last visited on 9.4.07</ref><ref>[http://nesohr.org/human-rights-reports/StatisticsOnCiviliansAffectedByWar.pdf?PHPSESSID=8204ff9bfa58e205f71a95c3899f8835 nesohr.org] {{webarchive|url=https://archive.today/20120723133708/http://nesohr.org/human-rights-reports/StatisticsOnCiviliansAffectedByWar.pdf?PHPSESSID=8204ff9bfa58e205f71a95c3899f8835 |date=2012-07-23 }}</ref><ref>R&AW created a terrorist organisation to stop Sri Lanka from developing quickly economically and forging ties with other nations in the West or China. RAW funded and armed the terrorists to wreak havoc in the country. Breaking with the Past By Shirin R. Tahir-Kheli, p54.</ref>

==Aftermath==
Prime Minister of India [[Rajiv Gandhi]] was [[assassination of Rajiv Gandhi|assassinated]] as a fallout of Operation Pawan by LTTE.

==See also==
*[[List of Sri Lankan Civil War battles]]
*[[Thileepan]]
*[[Annai Poopathy]]
*[[Jaffna hospital massacre]]
*[[1989 Valvettiturai massacre]]

==References==
{{Reflist}}

==Sources==
{{Refbegin}}

*{{Citation
| surname1 = Chattopadhyaya
| given1 = Haraprasad
| year = 1994
| title = Ethnic Unrest in Modern Sri Lanka: An Account of Tamil-Sinhalese Race Relations
| publisher = M.D. Publications Pvt Ltd.
| isbn = 81-85880-52-2}}
{{Refend}}

{{Authority control}}

{{Coord missing|Sri Lanka}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Operation Pawan}}
[[Category:Conflicts in 1987]]
[[Category:1987 in Sri Lanka]]
[[Category:1987 in India]]
[[Category:Battles of the Indian Peace Keeping Force|Pawan]]
[[Category:Rajiv Gandhi administration]]
[[Category:Operations involving Indian special forces]]
[[Category:Aerial operations and battles involving India]]