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'''Mithyātva''' means "false belief", and an important concept in [[Jainism]] and [[Hinduism]].<ref name=jljaini>JL Jaini (Editor: FW Thomas), Outlines of Jainism, Jain Literature Society, Cambridge University Press Archive, page 94</ref> Disappearance (''nivrtti'') is the necessary presupposition of ''mithyatva'' because what is falsely perceived ceases to exist with the dawn of right knowledge. ''Mithyātva'', states [[Jayatirtha]], cannot be easily defined as 'indefinable', 'non-existent', 'something other than real', 'which cannot be proved, produced by [[Avidya (Hinduism)|avidya]] or as its effect', or as 'the nature of being perceived in the same locus along with its own absolute non-existence'.<ref>{{cite book|title=History of Dvaita School of Vedanta and its Literature|author=B.N.Krishnamurti Sharma|year=2000|publisher=Motilal Banarsidass|page=167|isbn=9788120815759|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=FVtpFMPMulcC&q=mithyatva&pg=PA260}}</ref>

Mithyātva is a concept in [[Jainism]] distinguishing right knowledge from false knowledge, and parallels the concepts of ''[[Avidya (Hinduism)|Avidya]]'' in the [[Vedanta]] school of Hinduism, ''Aviveka'' in its [[Samkhya]] school, and ''Maya'' in [[Buddhism]].<ref name=jljaini48>JL Jaini (Editor: FW Thomas), Outlines of Jainism, Jain Literature Society, Cambridge University Press Archive, page 48-58</ref>

The opposite of ''mithyātva'' (false belief) is ''samyaktva'' (right belief).<ref name=robertwilliams47>Robert Williams (1998), Jaina Yoga: A Survey of the Mediaeval Śrāvakācāras, Motilal Banarsidass, {{ISBN|978-8120807754}}, page 47</ref>

==Hinduism==
{{Hindu philosophy}}

{{see also|Avidya (Hinduism)|Ātman (Hinduism)|Maya (illusion)}}
Mithyātva is a concept found in some schools of Hinduism. Other concepts in Hinduism, similar in meaning to mithyātva, include the concepts of ''[[Avidya (Hinduism)|Avidya]]'' in the [[Vedanta]] school of Hinduism, ''Aviveka'' in its [[Samkhya]] school.<ref name=jljaini48/>

Ignorance begets ''aviveka'' (lack of correct, discriminative knowledge) states Samkhya school of Hinduism. One engages in deeds, good and bad, due to ''aviveka'', earns ''punya'' or becomes a victim of sin and is reborn.<ref>{{cite book|title=Message of the Puranas|author=B.B.Paliwal|date=December 2005|publisher=Diamond Pocket Books|page=212|isbn=9788128811746|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=TGyzMJYZn-0C&q=avivek&pg=PA212}}</ref> Aviveka also means lack of reason or imprudence or indiscretion. Avidya is related concept in Vedanta school of Hinduism. Avidya and aviveka give ''dukkha'' i.e. suffering.

[[Madhusudanah]] in his ''Advaita-siddhi'' gives five definitions of ''mithyātva'' which term is derived from ''mithya'' meaning false or indeterminable. False is something that appears and is later negated or contradicted; the unreal is never an object of experience, the concept of unreal is self-contradictory. Falsity is defined as – not being the locus of either reality or unreality, it is distinct from both reality and unreality. In practice, ''mithyātva'' has three means, – a) that which does not exist in three divisions of time, past, present and future; b) that which is removable by knowledge; and c) that which is identical with the object of sublation. Whereas ''mithya'' is other than real but not real, ''mithyātva'' is identical with sublatability.<ref>{{cite book|title=Perceiving in Advaita Vedanta|author=Bina Gupta|year=1995|publisher=Motilal Banarsidass|pages=131–132|isbn=9788120812963|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=w-AE8tEDMYYC&q=mithyatva&pg=PA132}}</ref> ''Mithyatva'' may also be understood as that which is negated even where it is found to exist. The followers of the Advaita School contend that the world-appearance is negated by Brahman-knowledge and hence it is illusory. To the followers of [[Vishishtadvaita]]vada, ''mithya'' is the apprehension of an object as different from its own nature.<ref>{{cite book|title=Tattvamuktakalpa|author=S.M.Srinivasa Chari|year=1988|publisher=Motilal Banarsidass|pages=261–263|isbn=9788120802667|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=un1i5icdpdoC&q=mithyatva&pg=PA263}}</ref>

The Advaita School considers ''mithyātva'' to mean falsity of the world. Disappearance (''nivrtti'') is the necessary presupposition of ''mithyātva'' because what is falsely perceived ceases to exist with the dawn of right knowledge. But, ''mithya'' or falsity, or ''mithyātva'' or falsity of the world, cannot be easily defined as indefinable or non-existent or something other than real or which cannot be proved or produced by ''avidya'' (or as its effect) or as the nature of being perceived in the same locus along with its own absolute non-existence. The opponents of the ''Advaita'' do not accept the contention that [[Ātman(Hinduism)|Atman]] is simply consciousness and cannot be the substratum of knowledge, and they insist that existence as the logical concomitant of the absence of non-existence and vice versa, with these two being mutually exclusive predicates, must be admitted. The opposite of unreality must be reality.<ref>{{cite book|title=History of Dvaita School of Vedanta and its Literature|author=B.N.Krishnamurti Sharma|year=2000|publisher=Motilal Banarsidass|page=167|isbn=9788120815759|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=FVtpFMPMulcC&q=mithyatva&pg=PA260}}</ref>

According to ''Advaita'' anything which is both cognized and sublated is ''mithya''. ''Mithyātva'' is negated even where it is found. The illusoriness of the world is itself illusory. Once Brahman-knowledge arises both the cognizer and the cognized disappear.<ref>{{cite book|title=The Seven Great Untenables:Sapta-viddha Anupapatti|author=John A. Grimes|year=1990|publisher=Motilal Banarsidass|pages=60–62|isbn=9788120806825|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=QWcgAxQnSAwC&q=mithyatva+in+Advaita&pg=PA60}}</ref>

The proof of unreality is impermanence, the permanent one is the Sole Reality. ''Mithyātva'' is apparent reality; at the level of ultimate truth, when, through the understanding of the mithyātva of all limiting adjuncts (upadhis) of name and form i.e., those that pertain to the individual body-mind (''tvam'') and as well to the lordship of [[Brahman]] (''tat''), everything is seen to be not an other to pure Awareness, the distinctions of [[Jiva]] and [[Ishvara]] no longer apply, and it is the ''param Brahman'', the very essential of the Lord Itself, that is the final reality. In ''Advaita'' the method to reveal the unreality (''mithyātva'') of things involves the idea of change and permanence i.e. what deviates and what persists.<ref>{{cite book|title=The Method of Early Vedanta|author=Michael Commins|year=2000|publisher=Motilal Banarsidass|page=260|isbn=9788120817227|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=sx12hxoFVqwC&q=mithyatva+in+Advaita&pg=PA260}}</ref>

''Mithyātva'' means 'illusoriness'. ''[[Advaita]]'' maintains that Brahman alone is real, the plurality of the universe is because the universe is illusory, the universe can be cognized; whatever that is cognized is illusory. The universe is different from the real as well as the real, the universe is indeterminable. ''Vedanta Desika'' refutes this contention because there is no such entity which is neither real nor unreal. The universe which is different from Brahman is inseparably related to Brahman.<ref>{{cite book|title=Advaita and Visistadvaita:A Study based on Vedanta Desika's Satadusani|author=S.M.Srinivasa Chari|year=1999|publisher=Motilal Banarsidass|page=100|isbn=9788120815353|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=r1zNxV2zBPsC&q=mithyatva+in+Advaita&pg=PA100}}</ref> [[Badarayana]] ([[Brahma Sutra]] III.ii.28) declares that between the ''Jiva'' and Brahman there is difference as well as non-difference like the relation of light to its substratum or source on account of both being luminous, one being limited and the other all-pervading, the all-pervading is real and immortal. Rishi Damano Yamayana ([[Rig Veda]] X.xvi.4) insists that all should know about that part of the body which is immortal; the immortal part of the body is the [[Ātman (Buddhism)|Atman]] or [[Brahman]], it is called a part because without it there cannot be life in one's body.<ref>{{cite book|title=The Illumination of Knowledge|author=Ravinder Kumar Soni|year=2008|publisher=GBD Books|pages=76, 90|isbn=9788188951208|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=dXZJXwAACAAJ}}</ref> [[Vācaspati Miśra|Vacaspati]] of the ''Bhamati'' school states that whereas illusion conceals, ''mithyātva'' signifies 'concealment', the real nature of the cognized object is concealed resulting in non-apprehension of difference between the real and the unreal objects. Padmapada of the ''Vivarna'' school adds to the sense of concealment the sense of inexpressibility, thus hinting at the sublatability of illusion.<ref>{{cite book|title=Bhamati and Vivarna Schools of Advaita Vedanta:A Critical Approach|author=Pulasth Soobah Roodumam|year=2002|publisher=Motilal Banarsidass|page=116|isbn=9788120818903|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=2pU2ZQB2wUYC&q=mithyatva+in+Advaita&pg=PA116}}</ref> If the term ''anirvacaniya'' is defined by the ''Advaita'' as the nature of being different from ''sat'' and ''asat'' in essence, which is the nature of ''mithyātva'', then the element of difference must be real. Even though Jayatirtha states that there is no bar on the validity of the experience of difference, but the fact remains that difference cannot be an attribute of objects. [[Madhavacharya of Sringeri|Madhavacharya]] concludes that difference is not something that falls outside the content of an object or what is generally considered to constitute its essence which in perception is the sum total of its distinction from others. The perception of an object is the same as the perception of its difference from all others.<ref>{{cite book|title=A Treasury of Mahyana Sutras|author=Chen-chi Chang|year=1991|publisher=Motilal Banarsidass|isbn=9788120809369|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=aktdBheKI-IC&q=mithyatva+in+Advaita&pg=PR16}}</ref>

==Buddhism==
{{see also|Maya (Buddhist mental factor)}}
''Mithyātva'' is not a common term in Buddhism, but where mentioned implies deceit. The more common term used is Maya. Mithyātva, according to ''Abhidharmakosa'', means rebirth in the hells or as an animal or as a ''preta''.<ref>{{cite book|title=The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom|author=Edward Conze|date=24 January 1985|publisher=University of California Press|page=514|isbn=9780520053212|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=XKTmmaScCGcC&q=mithyatva+in+Buddhism&pg=PA514}}</ref> ''Ratnagotravibhagha'' terms ''mithyātva'' as the state of evil.<ref>{{cite book|title=Pruning the Bodhi tree:The Storm Over Critical Buddhism|author=Jamie Hubbard|date=July 1997|publisher=University of Hawaii Press|page=199|isbn=9780824819491|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=AjlCz4xm1gIC&q=mithyatva+in+Buddhism&pg=PA199}}</ref>

==Jainism==
{{Jain philosophy}}

Mithyātva is an important concept on false knowledge in Jainism.<ref>JL Jaini (Editor: FW Thomas), Outlines of Jainism, Jain Literature Society, Cambridge University Press Archive, pages 48-64, 94-95</ref> The Jaina scholar [[Hemachandra]] defined mithyātva as "belief in false divinities, false gurus and false scriptures".<ref name=robertwilliams47/>

[[Jainism]] describes seven types of beliefs - ''mithyātva'', ''sasvadana-samyaktva'', ''mishra-mithyatva'', ''kashopashmika-samyaktva'', ''aupshamika-samyaktva'', ''vedak-samyaktva'' and ''kshayik-samyaktva''. ''Mithyātva'', meaning false or wrong belief, is the soul's original and beginning less state of deluded world-view, at which stage the soul is in a spiritual slumber, unaware of its own bondage.<ref>{{cite book|title=Encyclopaedia of Oriental Philosophy|publisher=Global Vision Publishing House|page=329|isbn=9788182201132|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ZgNHE-48jNcC&q=types+of+mithyatva&pg=PA329 }}</ref>

''Mithyātva'' or "false belief, delusion" are of five kinds in Jainism, according to one classification:<ref name=jljaini/><ref>P. M. Joseph (1997), Jainism in South India, International School of Dravidian Linguistics, {{ISBN|978-8185692234}}, page 415</ref><ref>{{cite book|title=Dravya Samgraha of Nemichandra Siddhanta Chakravartti|author=Nemicandrasiddhantacakravartin|year=1989|publisher=Motilal Banarsidass|pages=74–75|isbn=9788120806344|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=svi0gpwC-5sC&q=mithyatva&pg=PA75}}</ref>
#''Ekanta'' (one sided belief, not considering other sides or aspects for truth),
#''Viparita'' (belief in the opposite of what is right),
#''Vinaya'' (universally accepting all right or wrong belief/religion without examining them, attending only to conduct),
#''Samsaya'' (when there is doubt whether a course is right or wrong, unsettled belief, skepticism), and
#''Ajnana'' (indifference to right or wrong belief).

[[Śvētāmbara|Svetambara]] Jains classify categories of false belief under ''mithyātva'' differently: ''Abhigrahika'' (belief limited to their own scriptures that they can defend, but refusing to study and analyse other scriptures); ''Anabhigrahika'' (belief that equal respect must be shown to all gods, teachers, scriptures); ''Abhiniviseka'' (belief of those who can discern but refuse to do so from preconceptions); ''Samsayika'' (state of hesitation or uncertainty between various conflicting, inconsistent beliefs); and ''Anabhogika'' (innate, default beliefs that a person has not thought through on one's own).<ref name=robertwilliams48>Robert Williams (1998), Jaina Yoga: A Survey of the Mediaeval Śrāvakācāras, Motilal Banarsidass, {{ISBN|978-8120807754}}, pages 47-48</ref>

[[Digambara]] Jains classify categories of false belief under ''mithyātva'' into seven: ''Ekantika'' (absolute, one sided belief), ''Samsayika'' (uncertainty, doubt whether a course is right or wrong, unsettled belief, skepticism), ''Vainayika'' (belief that all gods, gurus and scriptures are alike), ''Grhita'' (belief derived purely from habits or default, no self analysis), ''Viparita'' (belief that true is false, false is true, everything is relative or acceptable), ''Naisargika'' (belief that living beings are devoid of consciousness and cannot discern right from wrong), ''Mudha-drsti'' (belief that violence and anger can tarnish or damage thoughts, divine, guru or [[dharma]]).<ref name=robertwilliams48/>

Mithyātva is one of three things, in Jainism, that are harmful stimuli and that distract a person from attaining right belief and correct knowledge. The other two things that distract, are ''[[Maya (Illusion)|Maya]]'' (deceit), and ''Nidana'' (hankering after fame and worldly pleasures).<ref>Robert Williams (1998), Jaina Yoga: A Survey of the Mediaeval Śrāvakācāras, Motilal Banarsidass, {{ISBN|978-8120807754}}, page 50</ref>

One Jaina text lists 28 kinds of ''mohaniya'' (deluding) ''karmas'' that prevent the true perception of reality and the purity of the soul, the ''darsana mohaniya karman'' which function to prevent a soul's insight into its own nature and therefore, deemed destructive, are ''mithyātva karman''. The term, ''mithyātva'', meaning 'perversity', is generally used to denote the idea of ''avidya'' along with ''mithyadarsana'' or ''mithyadrsti'' (wrong view), ''darsanamoha'' (delusion of vision), ''moha'' (delusion) etc.;. The state of ''mithyatva'' is manifested as a fundamental tendency to see things other than as they really are (Tattva Sutra 8:9).<ref>{{cite book|title=Harmless Souls|author=W.J. Johnson|year=1995|publisher=Motilal Banarsidass|pages= 150–151|isbn=9788120813090|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=vw8OUSfQbV4C&q=mithyatva&pg=PA150}}</ref> Passions such as Aversion (dvesa) and Attachment (raga), which are also called pursuers from the limitless past (anantanubandhi), operate in conjunction with mithyatva.<ref>{{cite book|title=The Jain Path of Purification|author=Padmanabh S. Jiaini|year=1998|publisher=Motilal Banarsidass|pages=118–119|isbn=9788120815780|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=wE6v6ahxHi8C&q=mithyatva&pg=PA118}}</ref> ''Mithyātva'' is the one-sided or perverted world-view which generates new layers of ''karma'' and considered in Jainism as the root of human arrogance.<ref>{{cite book|title=Many-Sided wisdom|year=2010|publisher=John Hunt Publishing Co.|page=90|isbn=9781846942778|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=zoxR-LdZy0MC&q=mithyatva&pg=PA90}}</ref>

==References==
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{{Jainism topics}}
{{Hindudharma}}
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{{Indian philosophy|state=collapsed}}

[[Category:Hindu philosophical concepts]]
[[Category:Buddhist philosophical concepts]]
[[Category:Jain philosophical concepts]]

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Mithyātva - Revision history

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