Minimal deterrence - Revision history

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			{{Short description\|Minimum weapons needed to deter an adversary}}
			{{Conflict resolution sidebar}}
	In [[nuclear strategy]], '''minimal deterrence''', also known as '''minimum deterrence''' and '''finite deterrence''', is an application of [[deterrence theory]] in which a state possesses no more [[nuclear weapons]] than is necessary to deter an adversary from attacking.<ref name="KristensenNorrisOelrich-p21">Kristensen, Norris and Oelrich 2009, 21</ref> Pure minimal deterrence is a doctrine of [[no first use]], holding that the only mission of nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear adversary by making the cost of a [[Pre-emptive nuclear strike\|first strike]] unacceptably high.<ref name="KristensenNorrisOelrich-p21" /> To present a credible deterrent, there must be the assurance that any attack would trigger a retaliatory strike.<ref>Lieber and Press 2006, 37</ref> In other words, minimal deterrence requires rejecting a [[counterforce]] strategy in favor of pursuing survivable force that can be used in a [[countervalue]] [[second strike]].		In [[nuclear strategy]], '''minimal deterrence''', also known as '''minimum deterrence''' and '''finite deterrence''', is an application of [[deterrence theory]] in which a state possesses no more [[nuclear weapons]] than is necessary to deter an adversary from attacking.<ref name="KristensenNorrisOelrich-p21">Kristensen, Norris and Oelrich 2009, 21</ref> Pure minimal deterrence is a doctrine of [[no first use]], holding that the only mission of nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear adversary by making the cost of a [[Pre-emptive nuclear strike\|first strike]] unacceptably high.<ref name="KristensenNorrisOelrich-p21" /> To present a credible deterrent, there must be the assurance that any attack would trigger a retaliatory strike.<ref>Lieber and Press 2006, 37</ref> In other words, minimal deterrence requires rejecting a [[counterforce]] strategy in favor of pursuing survivable force that can be used in a [[countervalue]] [[second strike]].

	While the [[United States]] and the [[Soviet Union]] each developed robust first- and second-strike capabilities during the [[Cold War]], the [[People's Republic of China]] pursued a doctrine of minimal nuclear deterrence. Assuming that decision-makers make cost-benefit analyses when deciding to use force, China's doctrine calls for acquiring a nuclear arsenal only large enough to destroy an adversary's "strategic points" in such a way that the expected costs of a first strike outweigh the anticipated benefits.<ref>Ross 2002, 56</ref> [[India]] has also adopted this strategy, which they term [[Minimum Credible Deterrence]].<ref>Feickert and Kronstadt 2003, 9</ref>		While the [[United States]] and the [[Soviet Union]] each developed robust first- and second-strike capabilities during the [[Cold War]], the [[People's Republic of China]] pursued a doctrine of minimal nuclear deterrence. Assuming that decision-makers make cost-benefit analyses when deciding to use force, China's doctrine calls for acquiring a nuclear arsenal only large enough to destroy an adversary's "strategic points" in such a way that the expected costs of a first strike outweigh the anticipated benefits.<ref>Ross 2002, 56</ref> [[India]] has also adopted this strategy, which they term [[Minimum Credible Deterrence]].<ref>Feickert and Kronstadt 2003, 9</ref>

	The "[[N-deterrence\|minimum credible deterrence]]" (also known as N-deterrence) policy of Pakistan is a defence and [[Strategic studies\|strategic]] principle on which the country's [[Pakistan and weapons of mass destruction\|nuclear weapons program]] is based. This doctrine is not a part of the [[Nuclear doctrine of Pakistan\|nuclear doctrine]], which is designed for the use of the atomic weapons in a full-scale [[declared war]] if the conditions of the doctrine are surpassed. Instead, the policy of the Minimum Credible Deterrence falls under minimal deterrence as an inverse to the [[Mutually assured destruction\|Mutually Assured Destruction]] (MAD), which is widely regarded as designed to dissuade India from taking any military actions against Pakistan, as it did during the [[Indo-Pakistani War of 1971]]. Pakistan refuses to adopt a [[no first use]] policy, while [[India]] and [[China]] have adopted no first use policies. Pakistan's foreign minister [[Shamshad Ahmad]] had warned that if Pakistan is ever invaded or attacked, it will use "any weapon in its arsenal" to defend itself.		The "[[N-deterrence\|minimum credible deterrence]]" (also known as N-deterrence) policy of Pakistan is a defence and [[Strategic studies\|strategic]] principle on which the country's [[Pakistan and weapons of mass destruction\|nuclear weapons program]] is based. This doctrine is not a part of the [[Nuclear doctrine of Pakistan\|nuclear doctrine]], which is designed for the use of the atomic weapons in a full-scale [[declared war]] if the conditions of the doctrine are surpassed. Instead, the policy of the Minimum Credible Deterrence falls under minimal deterrence as an inverse to the [[Mutually assured destruction\|Mutually Assured Destruction]] (MAD), which is widely regarded as designed to dissuade India from taking any military actions against Pakistan, as it did during the [[Indo-Pakistani War of 1971]].

	Minimal deterrence represents one way of solving the [[security dilemma]] and avoiding an [[arms race]]. Decision-makers often feel pressured to expand their arsenals when they perceive them to be vulnerable to an adversary's first strike, especially when both sides seek to achieve the advantage.<ref>Freedman 2003, 178</ref> Eliminating this perceived vulnerability reduces the incentive to produce more and advanced weapons. For example, the United States’ nuclear force exceeds the requirements of minimal deterrence, and is structured to strike numerous targets in multiple countries and to have the ability to conduct successful counterforce strikes with high confidence.<ref>Kristensen, Norris and Oelrich 2009, 8</ref> In response to this, China continues to modernize its nuclear forces because its leaders are concerned about the survivability of their arsenal in the face of the United States’ advances in strategic reconnaissance, precision strike, and [[missile defense]].<ref>Blair 2009, 23</ref>		Minimal deterrence represents one way of solving the [[security dilemma]] and avoiding an [[arms race]]. Decision-makers often feel pressured to expand their arsenals when they perceive them to be vulnerable to an adversary's first strike, especially when both sides seek to achieve the advantage.<ref>Freedman 2003, 178</ref> Eliminating this perceived vulnerability reduces the incentive to produce more and advanced weapons. For example, the United States’ nuclear force exceeds the requirements of minimal deterrence, and is structured to strike numerous targets in multiple countries and to have the ability to conduct successful counterforce strikes with high confidence.<ref>Kristensen, Norris and Oelrich 2009, 8</ref> In response to this, China continues to modernize its nuclear forces because its leaders are concerned about the survivability of their arsenal in the face of the United States’ advances in strategic reconnaissance, precision strike, and [[missile defense]].<ref>Blair 2009, 23</ref>
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	==See also==		==See also==
	* [[Nuclear peace]]		* [[Nuclear peace]]
	* [[Deterrence ~~(disambiguation)~~\|Deterrence]]		* [[Deterrence theory\|Deterrence]]

	==Notes==		==Notes==
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	*Feickert, Andrew, and K Alan Kronstadt. "[http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/RL32115.pdf Missile Proliferation and the Strategic Balance in South Asia]." [[Congressional Research Service]]. October 17, 2003. Accessed August 1, 2010.		*Feickert, Andrew, and K Alan Kronstadt. "[http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/RL32115.pdf Missile Proliferation and the Strategic Balance in South Asia]." [[Congressional Research Service]]. October 17, 2003. Accessed August 1, 2010.
	*[[Lawrence Freedman\|Freedman, Lawrence]]. ''The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy''. 3rd Edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.		*[[Lawrence Freedman\|Freedman, Lawrence]]. ''The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy''. 3rd Edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
	*Kristensen, Hans M, Robert S Norris, and Ivan Oelrich. "[~~http~~://www.fas.org/pubs/_pages/occ_pap7.html From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons]." ''[[Federation of American Scientists]]''. April 2009. Accessed July 31, 2010.		*Kristensen, Hans M, Robert S Norris, and Ivan Oelrich. "[https://www.fas.org/pubs/_pages/occ_pap7.html From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons]." ''[[Federation of American Scientists]]''. April 2009. Accessed July 31, 2010.
	*Lieber, Keir A, and Daryl G Press. "The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy." ''[[International Security (journal)\|International Security]]'' 30, no. 4 (Spring 2006): 7-44.		*Lieber, Keir A, and Daryl G Press. "The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy." ''[[International Security (journal)\|International Security]]'' 30, no. 4 (Spring 2006): 7-44.
	*McVadon, Eric A. "[~~http~~://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/written_testimonies/05_09_15wrts/mcvadon.pdf Recent Trends in China’s Military Modernization]." [~~http~~://www.uscc.gov/ ''U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission'']. September 15, 2005. Accessed August 1, 2010.		*McVadon, Eric A. "[https://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/written_testimonies/05_09_15wrts/mcvadon.pdf Recent Trends in China’s Military Modernization]." [https://www.uscc.gov/ ''U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission'']. September 15, 2005. Accessed August 1, 2010.
	*[[Barry Nalebuff\|Nalebuff, Barry]]. "Minimal Nuclear Deterrence." ''[[Journal of Conflict Resolution]]'' 32, no. 3 (September 1988): 411–425.		*[[Barry Nalebuff\|Nalebuff, Barry]]. "Minimal Nuclear Deterrence." ''[[Journal of Conflict Resolution]]'' 32, no. 3 (September 1988): 411–425.
	*[[Robert S. Ross\|Ross, Robert S]]. "Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and U.S.-China Relations." ''[[International Security (journal)\|International Security]]'' 27, no. 2 (Fall 2002): 48–85.		*[[Robert S. Ross\|Ross, Robert S]]. "Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and U.S.-China Relations." ''[[International Security (journal)\|International Security]]'' 27, no. 2 (Fall 2002): 48–85.
	*Stout, Mark. "[https://web.archive.org/web/20100420092220/http://www.au.af.mil/au/aunews/archive/2010/0507/Articles0507/Stout0507.htm Minimal Deterrence Makes Minimal Sense (And Here’s Why)]." [http://www.au.af.mil/au/aunews/ ''The Wright Stuff'']. April 1, 2010. Accessed August 1, 2010.		*Stout, Mark. "[https://web.archive.org/web/20100420092220/http://www.au.af.mil/au/aunews/archive/2010/0507/Articles0507/Stout0507.htm Minimal Deterrence Makes Minimal Sense (And Here’s Why)]." [https://web.archive.org/web/20061005021438/http://www.au.af.mil/au/aunews/ ''The Wright Stuff'']. April 1, 2010. Accessed August 1, 2010.

	{{DEFAULTSORT:Minimal Deterrence}}		{{DEFAULTSORT:Minimal Deterrence}}
	[[Category:Nuclear strategy]]		[[Category:Nuclear strategy]]

Ajay Kumar: Created a new article

2023-09-19T13:16:44Z

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In [[nuclear strategy]], '''minimal deterrence''', also known as '''minimum deterrence''' and '''finite deterrence''', is an application of [[deterrence theory]] in which a state possesses no more [[nuclear weapons]] than is necessary to deter an adversary from attacking.<ref name="KristensenNorrisOelrich-p21">Kristensen, Norris and Oelrich 2009, 21</ref> Pure minimal deterrence is a doctrine of [[no first use]], holding that the only mission of nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear adversary by making the cost of a [[Pre-emptive nuclear strike|first strike]] unacceptably high.<ref name="KristensenNorrisOelrich-p21" /> To present a credible deterrent, there must be the assurance that any attack would trigger a retaliatory strike.<ref>Lieber and Press 2006, 37</ref> In other words, minimal deterrence requires rejecting a [[counterforce]] strategy in favor of pursuing survivable force that can be used in a [[countervalue]] [[second strike]].

While the [[United States]] and the [[Soviet Union]] each developed robust first- and second-strike capabilities during the [[Cold War]], the [[People's Republic of China]] pursued a doctrine of minimal nuclear deterrence. Assuming that decision-makers make cost-benefit analyses when deciding to use force, China's doctrine calls for acquiring a nuclear arsenal only large enough to destroy an adversary's "strategic points" in such a way that the expected costs of a first strike outweigh the anticipated benefits.<ref>Ross 2002, 56</ref> [[India]] has also adopted this strategy, which they term [[Minimum Credible Deterrence]].<ref>Feickert and Kronstadt 2003, 9</ref>

The "[[N-deterrence|minimum credible deterrence]]" (also known as N-deterrence) policy of Pakistan is a defence and [[Strategic studies|strategic]] principle on which the country's [[Pakistan and weapons of mass destruction|nuclear weapons program]] is based. This doctrine is not a part of the [[Nuclear doctrine of Pakistan|nuclear doctrine]], which is designed for the use of the atomic weapons in a full-scale [[declared war]] if the conditions of the doctrine are surpassed. Instead, the policy of the Minimum Credible Deterrence falls under minimal deterrence as an inverse to the [[Mutually assured destruction|Mutually Assured Destruction]] (MAD), which is widely regarded as designed to dissuade India from taking any military actions against Pakistan, as it did during the [[Indo-Pakistani War of 1971]]. Pakistan refuses to adopt a [[no first use]] policy, while [[India]] and [[China]] have adopted no first use policies. Pakistan's foreign minister [[Shamshad Ahmad]] had warned that if Pakistan is ever invaded or attacked, it will use "any weapon in its arsenal" to defend itself.

Minimal deterrence represents one way of solving the [[security dilemma]] and avoiding an [[arms race]]. Decision-makers often feel pressured to expand their arsenals when they perceive them to be vulnerable to an adversary's first strike, especially when both sides seek to achieve the advantage.<ref>Freedman 2003, 178</ref> Eliminating this perceived vulnerability reduces the incentive to produce more and advanced weapons. For example, the United States’ nuclear force exceeds the requirements of minimal deterrence, and is structured to strike numerous targets in multiple countries and to have the ability to conduct successful counterforce strikes with high confidence.<ref>Kristensen, Norris and Oelrich 2009, 8</ref> In response to this, China continues to modernize its nuclear forces because its leaders are concerned about the survivability of their arsenal in the face of the United States’ advances in strategic reconnaissance, precision strike, and [[missile defense]].<ref>Blair 2009, 23</ref>

One disadvantage of minimal deterrence is that it requires an accurate understanding of the level of damage an adversary finds unacceptable, especially if that understanding changes over time so that a previously credible deterrent is no longer credible.<ref>Stout 2010</ref> A minimal deterrence strategy must also account for the nuclear firepower that would be "lost" or "neutralized" during an adversary's counterforce strike.<ref>Freedman 2003, 195</ref> Additionally, a minimal deterrence capability may embolden a state when it confronts a superior nuclear power, as has been observed in the relationship between China and the United States.<ref>McVadon 2005, 6</ref> Finally, while pursuing minimal deterrence during arms negotiations allows states to make reductions without becoming vulnerable, further reductions may be undesirable once minimal deterrence is reached because they will increase a state's vulnerability and provide an incentive for an adversary to secretly expand its nuclear arsenal.<ref>Nalebuff 1988, 424</ref>

==See also==
* [[Nuclear peace]]
* [[Deterrence (disambiguation)|Deterrence]]

==Notes==
{{Reflist|30em}}

==References==
*[[Dennis C. Blair|Blair, Dennis C]]. "[https://web.archive.org/web/20101214112747/http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20090212_testimony.pdf Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]." [http://www.dni.gov/ ''Office of the Director of National Intelligence'']. February 12, 2009. Accessed August 1, 2010.
*Feickert, Andrew, and K Alan Kronstadt. "[http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/RL32115.pdf Missile Proliferation and the Strategic Balance in South Asia]." [[Congressional Research Service]]. October 17, 2003. Accessed August 1, 2010.
*[[Lawrence Freedman|Freedman, Lawrence]]. ''The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy''. 3rd Edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
*Kristensen, Hans M, Robert S Norris, and Ivan Oelrich. "[http://www.fas.org/pubs/_pages/occ_pap7.html From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons]." ''[[Federation of American Scientists]]''. April 2009. Accessed July 31, 2010.
*Lieber, Keir A, and Daryl G Press. "The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy." ''[[International Security (journal)|International Security]]'' 30, no. 4 (Spring 2006): 7-44.
*McVadon, Eric A. "[http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/written_testimonies/05_09_15wrts/mcvadon.pdf Recent Trends in China’s Military Modernization]." [http://www.uscc.gov/ ''U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission'']. September 15, 2005. Accessed August 1, 2010.
*[[Barry Nalebuff|Nalebuff, Barry]]. "Minimal Nuclear Deterrence." ''[[Journal of Conflict Resolution]]'' 32, no. 3 (September 1988): 411–425.
*[[Robert S. Ross|Ross, Robert S]]. "Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and U.S.-China Relations." ''[[International Security (journal)|International Security]]'' 27, no. 2 (Fall 2002): 48–85.
*Stout, Mark. "[https://web.archive.org/web/20100420092220/http://www.au.af.mil/au/aunews/archive/2010/0507/Articles0507/Stout0507.htm Minimal Deterrence Makes Minimal Sense (And Here’s Why)]." [http://www.au.af.mil/au/aunews/ ''The Wright Stuff'']. April 1, 2010. Accessed August 1, 2010.

{{DEFAULTSORT:Minimal Deterrence}}
[[Category:Nuclear strategy]]