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Supercruise

2023-09-13T19:15:03Z

Soldier: Created supercruise

{{short description|Sustained supersonic flight of a supersonic aircraft}}

'''Supercruise''' is sustained [[supersonic]] flight of a [[supersonic aircraft]] without using [[afterburner]] (also known as "reheat"). Many supersonic [[military aircraft]] are not capable of supercruise and can maintain [[Mach number|Mach]] 1+ flight only in short bursts with afterburners. Aircraft such as the [[SR-71 Blackbird]] are designed to cruise at supersonic speed with afterburners enabled.

Some fighter jets are capable of supercruise but only at high altitudes and in a [[clean configuration]], so the term may imply "a significant increase in effective combat speed with a full weapons load over existing types".<ref name="defenceaviation_1">{{cite web |title=Supercruise |url=https://www.defenceaviation.com/supercruise/ |publisher=Defence Aviation |access-date=11 May 2021}}</ref> One of the pre-eminent military examples of supercruise is the [[Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor|F-22 Raptor]], for which supercruise was defined as "the ability to cruise at speeds of one and a half times the speed of sound or greater without the use of afterburner for extended periods in combat configuration."<ref name="fas1">{{cite web |title=F-22 demonstrates 'supercruise' for first time |url=https://man.fas.org/dod-101/sys/ac/docs/n19990721_991378.htm |website=Air Force News |publisher=Federation of American Scientists |access-date=6 March 2022 |date=21 July 1999}}</ref>

One of the best-known examples of an aircraft capable of supercruise was [[Concorde]]. Due to its long service as a commercial airliner, Concorde holds the record for the most time spent supersonic; more than all other aircraft combined.<ref name="janes">{{cite web|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20010307070744/http://www.janes.com/transport/news/jae/jae000725_1_n.shtml |archive-date=7 March 2001 |url=http://www.janes.com/transport/news/jae/jae000725_1_n.shtml|title=Defence & Security Intelligence & Analysis - IHS Jane's 360 |publisher=janes.com|access-date=6 March 2022}}</ref>

==History==
[[File:Lightning.inflight.arp.750pix.jpg|thumb|The [[English Electric Lightning]] was one of the first aircraft to exceed the speed of sound in level flight without using afterburning.]]
[[File:Concorde on Bristol.jpg|thumb|[[Concorde]] routinely supercruised most of the way over the [[Atlantic]], enabling it to travel from London and Paris to New York in just over three hours, a record which has yet to be surpassed by any other commercial aircraft.]]

A few early supersonic aircraft attained speeds just beyond the speed of sound without using afterburning.

On 3{{nbsp}}August 1954, a [[Nord Gerfaut|Gerfaut]] research aircraft powered by an [[SNECMA Atar 101]]D2A engine exceeded Mach{{nbsp}}1 in [[level flight]] without using afterburning.{{sfn|Gunston|2006|p=160}}<ref name="flightglobal">{{cite web|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150402104604/http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1956/1956%20-%200414.html |archive-date=2 April 2015 |url=http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1956/1956%20-%200414.html |title=1956 - 0414 - Flight Archive |publisher=flightglobal.com |access-date=6 March 2022 |quote=Despite the greater frontal area the Gerfaut remains a level-supersonic aeroplane without afterburning, although the engine is now so equipped. }}</ref>

The first production aircraft to exceed Mach{{nbsp}}1 in level flight without afterburning was the [[Lockheed F-104 Starfighter]] after its [[Wright J65|J65]] engine was replaced with a [[General Electric J79|J79]]. The maximum speed without afterburning was Mach{{nbsp}}1.05.{{sfn|Gunston|1975|p=193}}

The P.1 prototype of the [[English Electric Lightning]], powered by non-afterburning [[Armstrong Siddeley Sapphire]] engines, exceeded Mach{{nbsp}}1 on 11{{nbsp}}August 1954. A week previously, on 4{{nbsp}}August, the P.1, ''[[United Kingdom military aircraft serials|WG760]]'' flown by [[Roland Beamont]] on its [[maiden flight]], had unknowingly exceeded Mach{{nbsp}}1 in a climb.<ref name="flightglobal2">{{cite web|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160306095334/https://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1957/1957%20-%200541.html |archive-date=6 March 2016 |url=http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1957/1957%20-%200541.html|title=English Electric - Armstrong Siddeley - Rolls-Royce Avon - 1957 - 0541 - Flight Archive|publisher=flightglobal.com|access-date=6 March 2022}}</ref> During development testing at English Electric it was established that the Lightning had a stabilized speed capability in level flight, without afterburning, of about Mach{{nbsp}}1.2 and for the T.4 (2-seat trainer) 1.08.{{sfn|Beamont|1980|p=110-116}} Flying just above the speed of sound without using afterburning, although done by the contractor as part of some flight trials does not appear to have been relevant to the operational capability of the aircraft. Service trials established intercept profiles for subsonic and supersonic targets at different altitudes with subsonic cruising at a maximum of Mach{{nbsp}}0.95 with all supersonic speeds beyond subsonic cruise attained with afterburning.{{sfn|Caygill|2004|loc=fig. 1 & 2}}

All the [[Fairey Delta 2]] initial supersonic test flying to Mach{{nbsp}}1.1 was done without afterburning. Selecting the afterburner, which initially only had a maximum selection with no intermediate positions, would have caused an uncontrollable rapid acceleration to potentially hazardous speeds, ie too far beyond previously established flutter-free speeds.{{sfn|Twiss|2005|p=44}}

Only the [[supersonic transport]]s (SST), Concorde, and the second version of the Tu-144 (the [[Tu-144D]]) spent most of their time cruising at their design speeds without needing afterburning. Afterburning was added to Concorde for take-off to cope with weight increases that came after the initial design. It was also used to accelerate through the high-drag [[transonic]] speed range, not because the extra thrust was required, but because it was available and improved the operating economics. The redesigned Tu-144D used engines with no afterburners which, together with other improvements, increased the full payload range from {{cvt|3080|to|5330|km||}} (Concorde's operational range was {{cvt|6470|km|disp=or||}}).{{sfn|Gordon|Komissarov|Rigmant|2015|p=248}}

==Military use==
[[File:Qualitive variation of cd with mach number.png|thumb|right|Qualitative variation in Cd factor ([[drag coefficient]]) with [[Mach number]] (speed) for aircraft; supercruising above Mach{{nbsp}}2 is efficient.]]

The [[United States Air Force]] set supercruise as a core requirement for the [[Advanced Tactical Fighter]] program,<ref name="rand_1">{{cite web |author1=Mark A. Lorell |author2=Hugh P. Levaux |title=The Cutting Edge: A Half Century of US Fighter Aircraft R&D |url=https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/1998/MR939.pdf |publisher=RAND Corporation |access-date=6 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220128210048/https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/1998/MR939.pdf |archive-date=28 January 2022 |page=141 |url-status=live}}</ref> which resulted in the [[F-22 Raptor]]. The F-22 Raptor's supercruise capabilities are touted as a major performance advantage over other fighters, with supercruise being demonstrated exceeding Mach{{nbsp}}1.5.<ref name="f22-1">{{Cite web|url=https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104506/f-22-raptor/|title=F-22 Raptor|website=U.S. Air Force}}</ref><ref name="fas1" /> Supercruise capability provides advantages for [[Stealth technology|stealth]] aircraft because an afterburner plume reflects radar signals and creates a significant [[infrared signature]].<ref name="fighter-planes">{{cite web|url=http://www.fighter-planes.com/stealth.htm |title=Stealth design of airplanes / stealth aircraft |publisher=fighter-planes.com|access-date=2015-09-04}}</ref> Virtually all fighters prior to the F-22 cruise at Mach{{nbsp}}0.8–0.9 while carrying a normal weapons load.<ref name="defenceaviation_1" />

[[File:Lockheed Martin F-22A Raptor JSOH.jpg|thumb|The [[F-22 Raptor]] is capable of supercruise above Mach 1.5 (but is seen here with afterburners).]]
[[File:Dassault Rafale B 03.jpg|thumb|The [[Dassault Rafale]] is capable of supercruising with four missiles and a belly drop tank.<ref name="rafale1">{{cite web |title=FOX THREE |publisher=Dassault Aviation |access-date=3 March 2022 |url=http://www.dassault-aviation.com/fileadmin/user_upload/redacteur/AUTRES_DOCS/Fox_three/Fox_Three_nr_8.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071122095016/http://www.dassault-aviation.com/fileadmin/user_upload/redacteur/AUTRES_DOCS/Fox_three/Fox_Three_nr_8.pdf |archive-date=22 November 2007 |quote=More significantly, it can supercruise in dry power, even with four missiles and a belly drop tank.}}</ref>]]
[[File:Typhoon 5.jpg|thumb|The [[Eurofighter Typhoon]] is capable of supercruise at Mach 1.5.<ref name="ef1">{{Cite web|url=http://www.eurofighter.at/austria/td_lu.asp|title=Eurofighter Typhoon - Luftüberlegenheitsrolle |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090815004539/http://www.eurofighter.at/austria/td_lu.asp |archive-date=15 August 2009}}</ref>]]

There are a few engines in production that are designed to facilitate tactically significant supercruise:
* The [[Pratt & Whitney PW1120]] was used on the IAI Super Phantom 2000 that had supercruise capability.<ref name="Odyssey p289-90">Spick 1985, pp. 289-90.</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://home.att.net/~jbaugher1/f4_34.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080725082826/http://home.att.net/~jbaugher1/f4_34.html|url-status=dead|archive-date=July 25, 2008|title=Boeing "Super Phantom"|date=July 25, 2008}}</ref>
* The two [[Pratt & Whitney F119]] that power the F-22 Raptor make it the most capable supercruise-capable fighter aircraft in service. The F-22 Raptor can supercruise above Mach 1.5 without external stores.<ref name="af.mil">[http://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/135233/general-jumper-qualifies-in-fa-22-raptor/ General Jumper qualifies in F/A-22 Raptor], af.mil, January 13, 2005</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Majumdar |first1=Dave |title=Lockheed begins test flights of final Raptor |url=https://www.flightglobal.com/features/Lockheed-Martin-F-22-Raptor-Special/the-last-f22/ |website=Flightglobal |publisher=Reed Business Information |access-date=30 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150710032407/http://www.flightglobal.com/features/Lockheed-Martin-F-22-Raptor-Special/the-last-f22/ |archive-date=10 July 2015 |quote=The aircraft is capable of cruising at around Mach 1.8 without afterburners and has a top speed of around Mach 2.2. |url-status=usurped}}</ref><ref name="f22-1" />
* The [[Eurojet EJ200|EJ200]] engine built by [[EuroJet Turbo GmbH]] mounted in the [[Eurofighter Typhoon]]. It is capable of supercruising at Mach 1.5 with an air superiority missile load.<ref name="ef1" /> Typhoon pilots have stated that Mach 1.3 is attainable in combat configuration with external stores.<ref name="fighter-planes2">{{cite web|url=http://www.fighter-planes.com/info/eurofighter_ef2000.htm|title=EuroFighter Typhoon|publisher=fighter-planes.com|access-date=2015-09-04}}</ref>
* The [[General Electric F414#F414M|General Electric F414G]] in the [[JAS 39 Gripen|JAS 39 Gripen NG]] is designed for supercruise and has achieved Mach 1.2,<ref name="gripen1">{{cite web |type= press release |url= http://www.gripen.com/en/MediaRelations/News/2009/090121_gripen_supercruises.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091023061926/http://www.gripen.com/en/MediaRelations/News/2009/090121_gripen_supercruises.htm |archive-date= 23 October 2009 |url-status= unfit |title= Gripen Supercruises |access-date= 19 March 2022}}</ref> or Mach 1.1 with an air to air missile load.<ref name="gripen2">{{cite web |last1= Hoyle |first1= Craig |title= Saab's Demo aircraft to highlight Gripen NG capabilities |url= https://www.flightglobal.com/saabs-demo-aircraft-to-highlight-gripen-ng-capabilities/80008.article |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20210615220931/https://www.flightglobal.com/saabs-demo-aircraft-to-highlight-gripen-ng-capabilities/80008.article |archive-date= 15 June 2021 |website= FlightGlobal |access-date= 19 March 2022 |date= 25 April 2008}}</ref>
* The two [[Snecma M88]]s that power the [[Dassault Rafale]] enable the Rafale to supercruise with four missiles and a belly drop tank.<ref name="rafale1" />

Independently, Russia is working on Izdelje 30 (after AL31F and AL41F derivatives modifications, like 117S turbofan) and RD33MKRU Morskaja Osa; an all-new [[Saturn AL-41|AL-41]] engine with a complete redesign is underway to add supercruise ability to the [[Sukhoi Su-57]]. This has yet to bear fruit, but the stop-gap [[Saturn AL-31|117S]] engine, produced by this program, may achieve the supercruise goal already. While testing a [[Sukhoi Su-35|Su-35BM]] fighter equipped with these engines, it managed to accelerate past Mach 1 without using the afterburner, suggesting that it had supercruise capability. It has yet to be seen whether this will be possible with a combat load.<ref name="lenta">{{cite web|url=http://www.lenta.ru/articles/2008/07/04/su35/|title=О ходе испытаний нового российского истребителя Су-35БМ: Наука и техника: Lenta.ru|publisher=lenta.ru|access-date=2015-09-04}}</ref>

==Aircraft with supercruise ability==

{| class="wikitable sortable"
|-
! Aircraft !! Supercruise speed !! Production Year !! Service status
|-
| [[Dassault Rafale]]<ref name="rafale1" /> || Mach 1.40{{cn|date=March 2022}} || 1986 || In service
|-
| [[Eurofighter Typhoon]]<ref name="ef1" /> || Mach 1.50 || 1994 || In service
|-
| [[JAS 39 Gripen|Saab JAS-39E Gripen]]<ref name="gripen1" /> || Mach 1.10<ref name="gripen2" /> || 2019<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.flightglobal.com/fixed-wing/gripen-e-enters-serial-production-as-saab-targets-sales/131418.article | title=Gripen e enters serial production as Saab targets sales }}</ref>|| In service
|-
| [[General Dynamics F-16XL]]<ref>{{harvnb|Piccirillo|2014|p=202}}: "F-16XL-2 was also able to demonstrate limited supercruise performance by maintaining Mach 1.1 at an altitude of 20,000 feet in full military power without resorting to the use of afterburner."</ref> || Mach 1.1 || 1982 || Retired (prototype)
|-
| [[Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor]]<ref name="f22-1" /><ref name="fas1" /> || Mach 1.8|| 1996 || In service
|-
| [[Lockheed YF-22]]<ref name="yf-22-23">{{Cite web|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1991/04/24/business/air-force-chooses-lockheed-s-design-for-fighter-plane.html|title=Air Force Chooses Lockheed's Design for Fighter Plane|first=Richard W.|last=Stevenson|date=April 24, 1991|via=NYTimes.com}}</ref> || Mach 1.58{{sfn|Jenkins|Landis|2008|p=236}} || 1989 || Retired (prototype)
|-
| [[Northrop YF-23]]<ref name="yf-22-23"/> || Mach 1.72<ref name="test_pilot_interview">{{cite AV media |people=Paul Metz, Jim Sandberg |title=YF-23 DEM/VAL Presentation by Test Pilots Paul Metz and Jim Sandberg |date=27 August 2015 |publisher=Peninsula Seniors Production |location=Western Museum of Flight |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vpkv1ErWIf8 |access-date=}}</ref> || 1989 || Retired (prototype)
|-
| [[Concorde]]<ref>{{Citation |url = http://www.concordesst.com/powerplant.html |publisher = ConcordeSST |title = Powerplant}}—describes full cycle of Concorde's engine from takeoff to touchdown, including the turning off of reheat to begin supercruise at Mach 1.7.</ref> || Mach 2.02{{sfn|Schrader|1989|p=64}} || 1965 || Retired
|}

==See also==
* [[Index of aviation articles]]

==References==
===Citations===
{{Reflist}}

===Bibliography===
* {{Cite book |last=Schrader |first=Richard K |title=Concorde: The Full Story of the Anglo-French SST |location=Kent, UK |publisher=Pictorial Histories Pub. Co.|year=1989 |isbn=978-0-929521-16-9}}
* {{Cite book |last1=Jenkins |first1=Dennis R. |last2=Landis |first2=Tony R. |title=Experimental & Prototype U.S. Air Force Jet Fighters|location=Minnesota, US: Specialty Press |year=2008 |isbn=978-1-58007-111-6}}
* {{cite book |last=Gunston |first=Bill |title=The Development of Jet and Turbine Aero Engines |publisher=Haynes Publishing |year=2006 |isbn=1852606185 |edition=4th}}
* {{cite book |last1=Gunston |first1=Bill |title=Early supersonic fighters of the West |year=1975 |location=New York |isbn=978-0684144917}}
* {{cite book |last1=Beamont |first1=Roland |title=Testing years |date=1980 |publisher=I. Allen |location=London |isbn=978-0711010727}}
* {{cite book |last1=Goodall |first1=Jim |title=America's stealth fighters and bombers |year=1992 |publisher=Motorbooks International |location=Osceola, Wis. |isbn=978-0879386092}}
* {{cite book |last1=Caygill |first1=Peter |title=Lightning from the Cockpit: Flying the Supersonic Legend |date=2004 |publisher=Leo Cooper |location=Barnsley |isbn=1844150828}}
* {{cite book |last1=Twiss |first1=Peter |title=Faster Than the Sun |date=2005 |publisher=Grub Street |location=London |isbn=1904943373}}
* {{cite book |last1=Gordon |first1=Yefim |last2=Komissarov |first2=Dmitry |last3=Rigmant |first3=Vladimir |title=Tupolev Tu-144: The Soviet Supersonic Airliner |date=May 2015 |publisher=Schiffer Publishing Ltd. |location=Atglen, PA |isbn=9780764348945}}
* {{cite book |last1=Piccirillo |first1=Albert C. |title=Elegance in Flight: A comprehensive history of the F-16XL experimental prototype and its role in NASA flight research |date=2014 |publisher=NASA |location=Washington, D.C. |isbn=978-1-62683-022-6 |url=https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/elegance_in_flight.pdf |access-date=20 February 2023}}

[[Category:Jet engines]]

IAI Searcher

2023-09-13T19:12:26Z

Soldier: Created IAI Searcher|Searcher-II

{{Redirect|Forpost|the Russian rural locality|Forpost, Astrakhan Oblast}}

{|{{Infobox aircraft begin
|name=Searcher
|image=IAI-Searcher1.jpg
|caption=IAI Searcher in [[Tel Nof Airbase]], [[Israel]]
}}{{Infobox aircraft type
|type=Reconnaissance UAV
|national origin=Israel
|manufacturer=[[Israel Aircraft Industries|IAI]]
|designer=
|first flight=
|introduced=
• Searcher 1 - 1992<ref name=years>{{cite web|url=http://www.idf.il/1133-13389-he/Dover.aspx|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304063144/http://www.idf.il/1133-13389-he/Dover.aspx|url-status=dead|archive-date=4 March 2016|title=אתר צה"ל - צבא ההגנה לישראל : 40 שנה להקמת טייסת המל"טים הראשונה בחיל האוויר|date=4 March 2016}}</ref>
• Searcher 2 - 1998<ref name=years/>
|retired=
|status=
|primary user=
|more users=Sri lanka
|produced=
|number built=
|variants with their own articles=
}}
|}

The '''IAI Searcher''' (also known by the Hebrew name מרומית ''Meyromit'' - "[[Marsh tern]]",<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.janes.com/extracts/extract/juav/juav1299.html |title=Jane's Information Group |publisher=Janes.com |access-date=2012-11-18 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090501204512/http://www.janes.com/extracts/extract/juav/juav1299.html |archive-date=2009-05-01 |url-status=live }}</ref> or officially in Israel as the חוגלה ''Hugla'' - "[[Alectoris]]") is a reconnaissance [[UAV]] developed in [[Israel]] in the 1980s. In the following decade, it replaced the [[IMI Mastiff]] and [[IAI Scout]] UAVs then in service with the [[Israeli Army]].

==Design==

[[File:The Searcher MK-II (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) passes through the Rajpath during the 58th Republic Day Parade - 2007, in New Delhi on January 26, 2007.jpg|thumb|The Searcher MK-II (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) passes through the Rajpath during the 58th Republic Day Parade - 2007, in New Delhi on January 26, 2007]]

The Searcher looks almost identical to the [[IAI Scout|Scout]] and [[IAI Pioneer|Pioneer]], but is in fact scaled up and is well over twice the size of the Scout. The Searcher is powered by a {{Convert|35|kW|abbr=on|lk=on}} piston engine. The new design features updated avionics and sensor systems with greater flight endurance as well as increased redundancy for improved survivability. In addition to Israel, the system had been exported and is or was in use by [[Singapore]]<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.israeli-weapons.com/weapons/aircraft/uav/hermes_450/Hermes_450.html |title=Hermes 450 |publisher=Israeli-weapons.com |access-date=2012-11-18 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110606180717/http://www.israeli-weapons.com/weapons/aircraft/uav/hermes_450/Hermes_450.html |archive-date=2011-06-06 |url-status=live }}</ref> and [[Turkey]],<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=157438&bolum=100 |title=Israel to deliver two UAVs to Turkey in late November |website=www.todayszaman.com |access-date=17 January 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090608184550/http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=157438&bolum=100 |archive-date=8 June 2009 |url-status=dead}}</ref> as well as [[Thailand]], [[Russia]], [[India]], [[South Korea]], and [[Sri Lanka]].{{cn|date=July 2022}}

==Operational deployment==
More than 100 Searcher IIs are being operated by the [[Indian Air Force]] and the [[Indian Navy]].

It took part in the large-scale Russian-Belarusian exercise [[Zapad 2021|Zapad]] in September 2021.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://tass.com/defense/1337289|title = Strike drones, Terminator tank support vehicles assist in offensive at Zapad-2021 drill}}</ref>

On March 13, 2022, the [[Ministry of Defence (Russia)|Russian Ministry of Defence]] released video of the use of the updated Russian version in Ukraine.<ref>Miko Vranic. (15 March 2022). "Ukraine conflict: Russia employs Forpost-R UCAV". [https://www.janes.com/defence-news/defence/latest/ukraine-conflict-russia-employs-forpost-r-ucav Jane's website] Retrieved 18 March 2022.</ref>

== Crashes ==

10 June 2002 – Searcher Mark-II, operated by [[Indian Air Force]] for reconnaissance, was shot down by a [[Pakistan Air Force]] F-16B using [[AIM-9L]] Sidewinder at an altitude of 13,000 ft, after it was spotted by the mobile observation units.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.dawn.com/news/42399 |title=Spy plane an evidence of Indo-Israeli collaboration: PAF |date=11 June 2002 }}</ref>

11 July 2018 – A Russian ''"Forpost"'' UAV was found on 12 July in a field close to the village of Barqah, about 12 kilometres from the Israeli side of the Golan Heights (Syria) but none of the belligerents claimed the shot-down nor the loss.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.gettyimages.it/detail/fotografie-di-cronaca/rebel-fighter-inspects-what-purportedly-are-the-fotografie-di-cronaca/997056900#/rebel-fighter-inspects-what-purportedly-are-the-remains-of-a-syrian-picture-id997056900|title = A rebel fighter inspects what purportedly are the remains of a Syrian}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.gettyimages.it/detail/fotografie-di-cronaca/rebel-fighter-walks-near-what-purportedly-are-fotografie-di-cronaca/997056926#/rebel-fighter-walks-near-what-purportedly-are-the-remains-of-a-syrian-picture-id997056926|title = A rebel fighter walks near what purportedly are the remains of A}}</ref>

On 11 March 2022, a Russian ''"Forpost"'' UAV was shot down in [[Zhitomir Oblast]].<ref>{{cite web|url=https://zhitomir-online.com/2022/03/11/v-zhytomyrskoy-oblasty-byl-sbyt-rossyyskyy-bespylotnyk-forpost-foto.html|title=В Житомирской области был сбит российский беспилотник "Форпост". ФОТО|work=Zhitomir Online|date=11 March 2022|language=uk}}</ref>

==Operators==
[[File:Republic of Singapore Air Force IAI Searcher II Unmanned Aerial Vehicle at Henry Post Army Airfield, Fort Sill, Lawton, Oklahoma - 20091114.jpg|thumb|A [[Republic of Singapore Air Force]]'s IAI Searcher II at [[Henry Post Army Airfield]] ([[Fort Sill]], [[Oklahoma]]).]]
[[File:Форпост 02.jpg|thumb|Russian ''Forpost''.]]

*{{AZE}}<ref>{{cite web |url=http://news.az/articles/politics/57003 |title=List of ammunition purchased by Azerbaijan made public |publisher=News.Az |date=2012-03-27 |access-date=2012-11-18 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120330062654/http://www.news.az/articles/politics/57003 |archive-date=2012-03-30 |url-status=live }}</ref>
*{{CYP}}<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=19483|title=UAVS AND UCAVS: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION – Appendix III, Table 1|access-date=2013-01-01}}{{dead link|date=November 2017 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref>
*{{IND}}
*{{SRI}}
*{{ECU}}
*{{IDN}}
*{{CAN}} [[Canadian Security Intelligence Service]]
*{{ISR}}
*{{ROK}}
*{{RUS}} - as ''{{vanchor|Forpost}}'' (Форпост) licensed copy<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.defenseworld.net/news/13210/Russian_Force_Practice_Flying_Forpost__Orlan_10_Drones_In_Tajikistan#.V0mXqmh96Uk|title=Russian Force Practice Flying Forpost, Orlan-10 Drones In Tajikistan|website=www.defenseworld.net|date=18 June 2015 |access-date=2016-05-28|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160805215429/http://www.defenseworld.net/news/13210/Russian_Force_Practice_Flying_Forpost__Orlan_10_Drones_In_Tajikistan#.V0mXqmh96Uk|archive-date=2016-08-05|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/2018/august-2018-navy-naval-defense-news/6439-russian-navy-to-use-uav-for-cruise-and-anti-ship-missile-targeting.html|title=Russian Navy to Use UAV for Cruise and Anti-ship Missile Targeting|access-date=2018-08-21|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180822050016/http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/2018/august-2018-navy-naval-defense-news/6439-russian-navy-to-use-uav-for-cruise-and-anti-ship-missile-targeting.html|archive-date=2018-08-22|url-status=live}}</ref> with a 250 km range.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.armstrade.org/includes/periodics/news/2018/1001/122548950/detail.shtml|title=ЦАМТО / Новости / Олег Салюков в интервью "МК": в этом году соединения и воинские части СВ получат более 2500 новых основных образцов ВВСТ|website=www.armstrade.org|access-date=2018-10-01|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181001142421/http://www.armstrade.org/includes/periodics/news/2018/1001/122548950/detail.shtml|archive-date=2018-10-01|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/focus-analysis/naval-technology/7274-russian-naval-aviation-armed-with-drones-part-1.html|title = Russian naval aviation armed with drones (Part 1)}}</ref> 30 systems with 3 UAVs each.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.armstrade.org/includes/periodics/news/2017/1225/143544779/detail.shtml|title=ЦАМТО / Новости / Юрий Борисов: комплекс с БЛА "Форпост" с 2019 года будет производиться со 100-процентной локализацией|website=www.armstrade.org|access-date=2017-12-27|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171226231443/http://www.armstrade.org/includes/periodics/news/2017/1225/143544779/detail.shtml|archive-date=2017-12-26|url-status=live}}</ref> The fully domestic version Forpost-R made its first flight in late August 2019.<ref>Archived at [https://ghostarchive.org/varchive/youtube/20211205/cLu4rxpXWUU Ghostarchive]{{cbignore}} and the [https://web.archive.org/web/20210309053942/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cLu4rxpXWUU Wayback Machine]{{cbignore}}: {{cite web| url = https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cLu4rxpXWUU| title = Russia's New Forpost-R Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) : First Flight - Novo Drone Russo Forpost-R | website=[[YouTube]]}}{{cbignore}}</ref> 10 Forpost-R systems were ordered.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.janes.com/article/94155/russia-orders-upgraded-forpost-tactical-uav|title = Janes | Latest defence and security news}}</ref> Deliveries of the modified UCAVs with reconnaissance and strike capabilities started in 2020.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://armstrade.org/includes/periodics/news/2020/1221/160060981/detail.shtml|title=ЦАМТО / Новости / Сергей Шойгу: боевые возможности российской армии возросли на 13% в 2020 году}}</ref> Russia has decided to continue domestic production of the Forpost-R.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://tass.com/defense/1329483|title = Russia's top brass signs a host of deals on advanced weapons delivery to Russian troops}}</ref>
*{{SGP}} (retired; replaced by IAI Heron-1 in 2011)
*{{ESP}}
*{{THA}}<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.thaifighterclub.org/webboard.php?action=detailQuestion&questionid=16554&topic=%A4%B3%D0%E0%A8%E9%D2%CB%B9%E9%D2%B7%D5%E8%A2%CD%A7%A1%CD%A7%B7%D1%BE%E0%C3%D7%CD%20%E0%C2%D5%E8%C2%C1%AA%C1%CA%D2%B8%D4%B5%A1%D2%C3%BA%D4%B9%20UAV%20%E1%BA%BA%20Searcher%20II%20%A2%CD%A7%A1%CD%A7%B7%D1%BE%BA%A1 |title=คณะเจ้าหน้าที่ของกองทัพเรือ เยี่ยมชมสาธิตการบิน UAV แบบ Searcher II ของกองทัพบก |publisher=Thaifighterclub.org |access-date=2012-11-18}}</ref>

==Specifications==
[[File:IAI-Searcher2.jpg|thumb|The IAI Searcher II]]
[[File:Spanish Army - IAI Searcher II.jpg|thumb|A Spanish IAI Searcher Mk.II-J]]

===Searcher II MK3===
{{Aircraft specs
|prime units? = met
|ref= IAI Searcher II MK3<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.iai.co.il/p/searcher-mk-iii |title=Surveillance aircraft: the Searcher MK III a tactical UAS |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200414023523/https://www.iai.co.il/p/searcher-mk-iii |archive-date=2020-04-14 |url-status=live}}</ref>
|crew=Unmanned
|capacity=68 kg (150 lb) payload
|length m=5.85
|length ft=19
|length in=2
|span m=8.55
|span ft=28
|span in=0
|height m=1.25
|height ft=4
|height in=1
|gross weight kg=450
|more general=
*'''Payload:'''{{cvt|120|kg}}

|eng1 number=1
|eng1 name=[[Limbach L 550]]
|eng1 kw=35
|eng1 hp=47
|prop name= Born Propeller 120cm 3 blade adjustable pitch


|max speed mph=125
|max speed kts=110
|range km=350
|endurance=20 hours
|ceiling m=6100
|ceiling ft=21000
|more performance=
*'''Loiter speed:'''{{cvt|60|to|80|kn|order=flip}}
}}

==Forpost-R==
The Forpost-R is the designation for the Russian developed UCAV based on the IAI Searcher. In 2008, Russia had approached Israel to import drones following the [[Russo-Georgian War]], with Israel refusing to provide armed drones, an agreement was made to provide IAI Searchers MKII.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://mil.today/2019/Science42/ |title=UAV Forpost to Change Israeli Payload for Russian Systems}}</ref><ref>In 2012 a license was granted to Russia to produce the Searcher Mk II and light Bird Eye 400 domestically in Russia, with the designations changing to Forpost and Zastava respectively. Due to sanctions, in 2016 the licensing was revoked, and Israel stopped supplying parts. Russia continued its development domestically, under the name Forpost-R to produce an armed version capable of carrying armaments.</ref><ref name="janes.com">{{cite web |url=https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/ukraine-conflict-russia-employs-forpost-r-ucav |title=Ukraine conflict: Russia employs Forpost-R UCAV |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220315130942/https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/ukraine-conflict-russia-employs-forpost-r-ucav |archive-date=2022-03-15 |url-status=live}}</ref>

According to a YouTube video and information published by the Russian Ministry of Defense on March 13, 2022, Russian armed forces have used an armed version of the Forpost-R Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) to destroy a multiple launch rocket system from the Ukrainian army from an altitude of 3,000 m using guided missiles.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.armyrecognition.com/ukraine_-_russia_invasion_conflict_war/russia_uses_forpost-r_armed_drone_with_guided_missile_to_destroy_rocket_launcher_of_ukrainian_army.html | title=Russia uses Forpost-R armed drone with guided missile to destroy rocket launcher of Ukrainian army | Ukraine - Russia conflict war 2022 | analysis focus army defence military industry army }}</ref>

===Armaments (Forpost-R)===
* X-BPLA anti tank missile <ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.armyrecognition.com/ukraine_-_russia_invasion_conflict_war/russia_uses_forpost-r_armed_drone_with_guided_missile_to_destroy_rocket_launcher_of_ukrainian_army.amp.html |title=Russia uses Forpost-R armed drone with guided missile to destroy rocket launcher of Ukrainian army |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220320192126/https://www.armyrecognition.com/ukraine_-_russia_invasion_conflict_war/russia_uses_forpost-r_armed_drone_with_guided_missile_to_destroy_rocket_launcher_of_ukrainian_army.amp.html |archive-date=2022-03-20 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="janes.com"/>

==See also==
{{aircontent

|see also=
|related=
|similar aircraft=
*[[IAI Pioneer]]
*[[IAI Scout]]
|lists=
}}

==References==
{{Commons category|IAI Searcher}}
{{Reflist}}

This article contains material that originally came from the web article [https://web.archive.org/web/20110902194407/http://www.vectorsite.net/twuav.html ''Unmanned Aerial Vehicles''] by Greg Goebel, which exists in the Public Domain.

{{IAI aircraft}}

[[Category:IAI unmanned aerial vehicles|Searcher]]
[[Category:1980s Israeli military reconnaissance aircraft]]
[[Category:Single-engined pusher aircraft]]
[[Category:Twin-boom aircraft]]
[[Category:Unmanned military aircraft of Russia]]

Aérospatiale SA 315B Lama

2023-09-13T19:09:52Z

Soldier: Created Aérospatiale SA 315B Lama|HAL Cheetah

{|{{Infobox aircraft begin
|name = SA 315B Lama
|image = File:C-GAWW CZNL 2-13-2008 AerospatialeSA315B (cropped).jpg
|caption = An SA 315B Lama in flight
}}{{Infobox aircraft type
|type = [[Utility helicopter]]
|national origin = France
|manufacturer = [[Aérospatiale]]
|builder= [[Helibras]] [[Hindustan Aeronautics Limited]] (HAL)
|designer =
|first flight = 17 March 1969
|introduced = July 1971
|retired =
|status = In service
|primary user = [[Indian Army]]
|more users = [[Afghan Air Force]]
|number built =
|developed from = [[Aérospatiale Alouette II]]
|variants with their own articles =
}}
|}

The '''Aérospatiale SA 315B Lama''' is a French single-engined helicopter. It combines the lighter [[Aérospatiale Alouette II]] airframe with [[Aérospatiale Alouette III|Alouette III]] components and powerplant. The Lama possesses exceptional high altitude performance.

The helicopters have been [[Licensed production|built under licence]] by [[Hindustan Aeronautics Limited]] (HAL) in India, known as the '''Cheetah'''; HAL later developed an upgraded variant, powered by the [[Turbomeca TM 333]]-2M2 engine, which is known as the '''Cheetal'''. An armed version, marketed as the ''Lancer'', was also produced by HAL. It was also built under licence by [[Helibras]] in Brazil as the '''Gavião'''.

==Design and development==
The SA 315B Lama was originally designed to meet a [[Nepalese Army Air Service]] and [[Indian Air Force]] requirement for a rotorcraft capable of undertaking operations at ''hot and high'' conditions. Both countries possessed extreme mountain ranges in the form of the [[Himalayas]] in which even relatively powerful medium-sized helicopters could not be effectively operated within, thus there was an expressed desire for an aerial vehicle capable of operating in this challenging environment.<ref name = "king">Robinson, Skip. [https://www.verticalmag.com/features/the-mountain-king/ "The Mountain King."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161118102609/https://www.verticalmag.com/features/the-mountain-king/ |date=2016-11-18 }} ''Vertical'', 17 November 2016.</ref> To achieve the desired performance, Aerospatiale elected to combine elements of two existing popular helicopters in their inventory, the [[Aérospatiale Alouette II]] and the [[Aérospatiale Alouette III]] to produce a new rotorcraft specialised for high altitude performance. Specifically, the new helicopter, named ''[[Lama]]'', was equipped with the Alouette III's [[Turbomeca Artouste]] [[turboshaft]] powerplant and its dynamic systems, and was furnished with a reinforced version of the Alouette II's airframe.<ref>[https://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1975/1975%20-%201262.html "Aérospatiale SE 313B Alouette II."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151208082357/https://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1975/1975%20-%201262.html |date=2015-12-08 }} ''Flight International'', 17 July 1975. p. 84.</ref><ref name = "king"/>

On 17 March 1969, the first SA{{nbsp}}315B, powered by an Artouste IIB engine, undertook its [[maiden flight]].<ref name = "king"/> On 30 September 1970, the type received its [[airworthiness certificate]], and it was introduced to operational service in July 1971. Due to its favourable high altitude performance, the Lama quickly became popular with operators worldwide, often being deployed within mountainous environments.<ref name = "king"/> As with the Alouette series, the type can be fitted for various roles, such as light passenger transport, agricultural tasks, oil-and-gas exploration, aerial firefighting, and other specialised duties. The military variants of the Lama include liaison, observation, photography, air/sea rescue, transport and ambulance duties. The SA315B is particularly suited to mountainous areas due to its performance and can carry underslung loads of up to 1000 kg (2,205 lb). By December 1976, 191 Lamas had been ordered by 68 operators.<ref>[https://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1976/1976%20-%202792.html "SA.315B Lama."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151208080841/https://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1976/1976%20-%202792.html |date=2015-12-08 }} ''Flight International'', 27 November 1976. p. 1589.</ref>

[[File:Aerospatiale SA-315B Lama, Air Glaciers AN1174533.jpg|thumb|left|SA{{nbsp}}315B Lama, 2007]]

A significant number{{Clarify|reason=vague|date=April 2017}} of SA 315B Lamas were manufactured under licence in India by [[Hindustan Aeronautics Limited]] (HAL), under the name ''Cheetah''. More than three decades after production in India began, HAL was still receiving export orders for the original Cheetah.<ref name ="ET">[http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2009-06-10/news/28419314_1_hal-bags-cheetah-mn-order "HAL bags $10 mn order for Chetak, Cheetah from Namibia."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130526194901/http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2009-06-10/news/28419314_1_hal-bags-cheetah-mn-order |date=2013-05-26 }} ''Economic Times'', 10 June 2009.</ref> Along with the Alouette III, the Cheetah was a key product for HAL; experience from manufacturing the type aided in the later development of more advanced indigenous helicopters such as the [[HAL Dhruv]].<ref>Kjelgaard 1982, pp. 1772–1773.</ref> During the 1990s, HAL developed an armed light [[attack helicopter]] based upon the Cheetah, which was given the name ''Lancer''.<ref>[https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/high-hopes-195244/ "High hopes."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151208082449/https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/high-hopes-195244/ |date=2015-12-08 }} ''Flight International'', 15 March 2005.</ref><ref>[http://hal-india.com/Helicopter%20Complex/M__124 "Hindustan Aeronautics Limited - Helicopter Division Bangalore: Brief History."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161121105050/http://hal-india.com/Helicopter%20Complex/M__124 |date=2016-11-21 }} ''HAL'', Retrieved: 20 November 2016.</ref>

In 2006, HAL proposed a modernised variant to the Indian Army, designated as ''Cheetal'', the principal change of which was the adoption of a modern, more powerful Turbomeca TM 333-2M2 powerplant in the place of the Artouste; HAL promoting the Cheetal's capabilities for operating in high altitude environments, such as the [[Siachen Glacier]]. Other improvements include new warning indicates, a [[cockpit voice recorder]], [[flight monitoring system]], [[artificial horizon]], and modernised electronics. In 2006, an initial 10 Cheetals were ordered by the Indian Air Force.<ref>[http://www.hal-india.com/Product_Details.aspx?Mkey=54&lKey=&CKey=27 "Cheetal."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151208154124/http://www.hal-india.com/Product_Details.aspx?Mkey=54&lKey=&CKey=27 |date=2015-12-08 }} ''Hindustan Aeronautics Limited'', Retrieved: 30 November 2015.</ref><ref name = "ain cheetal 23"/> In February 2013, it was announced that the [[India]]n and [[Nepal]]ese Armies had signed a 300 crore (~US$55 million) contract for the urgent procurement of a further 20 Cheetals.<ref name = "ain cheetal 23">Mathews, Neelam. [http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2013-03-01/hals-cheetal-meets-indian-armys-urgent-needs "HAL’s Cheetal Meets Indian Army’s Urgent Needs."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151208053423/http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2013-03-01/hals-cheetal-meets-indian-armys-urgent-needs |date=2015-12-08 }} ''AIN Online'', 1 March 2013.</ref><ref>[http://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/army-hal-sign-rs-300-cr-deal-for-20-cheetal-choppers-113022100744_1.html "Army, HAL sign Rs 300 cr deal for 20 Cheetal choppers."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130928074857/http://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/army-hal-sign-rs-300-cr-deal-for-20-cheetal-choppers-113022100744_1.html |date=2013-09-28 }} ''Business Standard'', 21 February 2013.</ref>

==Operational history==
[[File:Aerospatiale_SA-315B_Lama,_Knaus_Helicopter_AN0402728.jpg|thumb|right|SA{{nbsp}}315B Lama, 2003]]

The Lama was developed specifically to provide a rotorcraft with exceptional high-altitude performance. In practice, the type found considerable use within regions that possessed extensive mountain ranges, such as [[South America]] and India, being capable of lifting loads and deploying personnel in areas that had been previously impossible to have otherwise achieved.<ref name = "king"/>

During 1969, a series of early demonstration flights involving the SA{{nbsp}}315B were performed in the Himalayas; during one such flight, a single rotorcraft carrying a crew of two and 120{{nbsp}}kg of fuel landed and then took off at what was then the highest altitude to be recorded, 7,500{{nbsp}}m (24,605{{nbsp}}ft). On 21 June 1972, a Lama with a single pilot ([[Jean Boulet]]) aboard established a helicopter absolute altitude record of 12,442{{nbsp}}m (40,814{{nbsp}}ft), a record which still stands as of June 2022.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Phelps |first=Mark |date=2022-06-21 |title=FAI Celebrates Anniversary Of 50-Year-Old Altitude Record |url=https://www.avweb.com/aviation-news/fai-celebrates-anniversary-of-50-year-old-altitude-record/ |access-date=2022-06-25 |website=AVweb |language=en-US}}</ref> During the same flight, the Lama's engine [[Flameout|flamed out]] at the peak altitude of the flight, which led to an inadvertent record being set for the longest ever [[Autorotation (helicopter)|autorotation]] after which the rotorcraft was brought to a safe unpowered landing.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://records.fai.org/rotorcraft/aircraft.asp?id=188 |title=Fédération Aéronautique Internationale (FAI) - Rotorcraft World Records |date=May 29, 2009 |website= |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090529032210/http://records.fai.org/rotorcraft/aircraft.asp?id=188 |archive-date=29 May 2009 |url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |title=Learning to Fly Helicopters |last=Randall Padfield |first=R. |chapter=Chapter 8 Autorotation |year=1992 |publisher=McGraw-Hill Professional |isbn=0-07-157724-6 |page=151 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=CSmVLrllpKUC&pg=PA151 |access-date=4 November 2010}}</ref><ref name = "king"/> Days before, the same pilot and aircraft had set a similar record at a higher weight.<ref name=alt10>"[http://www.fai.org/fai-record-file/?recordId=788 "FAI Record ID #788 - Altitude without payload. Class E-1c (Helicopters: take off weight 1000 to 1750 kg), turbine."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151208171611/http://www.fai.org/fai-record-file/?recordId=788 |date=2015-12-08 }} ''[[Fédération Aéronautique Internationale]] (FAI).'' Retrieved: 21 September 2014.</ref>

Following in the aftermath of the records set by the helicopter, a major order was placed by the Indian government in 1971. The Indian order included an arrangement for the indefinite licence production of the SA{{nbsp}}315B to be conducted by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) at their facility in Bangalore, India. The first Indian-assembled SA{{nbsp}}315B flew on 6 October 1972, with deliveries starting in December 1973; Indian-produced helicopters were given the name ''Cheetah''. Operated by both the Indian Air Force and the [[Army Aviation Corps (India)|Indian Army's Aviation Corps]], the Cheetah have proved capable, operating in difficult and remote areas such the mountainous [[Siachen]] region, and during times of conflict with neighbouring [[Pakistan]].<ref name ="ET"/> Cheetahs have also been operated for civil purposes, such as [[aerial application|aerial agriculture]].<ref>Kjelgaard 1982, p. 1774.</ref>

HAL-built Lamas have also been procured by neighbouring [[Nepal]] for military use. Sales have included a quantity of an armed variant, marketed as the ''HAL Lancer''; one batch was reportedly delivered to Nepal between June 2003 and September 2004. The sale of Lancers to Nepal encountered international controversy due to allegations that these rotorcraft have participated in combat operations against members of the [[Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist-Centre)|Communist Party of Nepal]] during the [[Nepalese Civil War]].<ref>[https://aser-asso.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/The-EU-Code-of-Conduct-fails-to-prevent-French-helicopters-being-produced-under-licence-in-India-and-transferred-to-Nepal-Amnesty-International-Septembre-2004.pdf "The EU Code of Conduct fails to prevent French Helicopters being produced under licence in India and transferred to Nepal."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161118225649/https://aser-asso.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/The-EU-Code-of-Conduct-fails-to-prevent-French-helicopters-being-produced-under-licence-in-India-and-transferred-to-Nepal-Amnesty-International-Septembre-2004.pdf |date=2016-11-18 }} ''Amnesty International'', September 2004.</ref>

[[File:Aerospatiale SA-315B Lama, Air Zermatt AN0316249.jpg|thumb|left|SA{{nbsp}}315B Lama, 2003]]
In addition to India, other countries have participated in licence production activities. In 1978, an export agreement was reached with Brazilian aircraft manufacturer [[Helibras]], under which it would perform domestic assembly of the Lama. Such Helibras-produced SA 315Bs were marketed under the designation ''Gavião'';<ref name = "Chant 348"/> several examples of which were successfully exported to neighboring Bolivia.

In later life, the Lama's commercial appeal waned in favour of the newer [[Eurocopter AS350 Écureuil]], which had lower maintenance requirements and was capable of higher speeds but incapable of equalling the Lama's high altitude performance.<ref name = "king"/> The type remained in commercial service into the 21st century, being only slowly retired as it typically continued to be adequate for its given tasks. According to Vertical Magazine, popular qualities of the Lama included its capable engine, favourable stability while hovering, and its ability to effectively convey payloads at altitude even during peak temperatures.<ref name = "king"/>

In 2009, due to issues with the newly introduced [[HAL Dhruv]] helicopter, the Indian Army increased operational usage of their older Cheetah/Cheetal rotorcraft to meet the temporary shortfall.<ref>{{cite web |first= Radhakrishna |last= Rao |url= http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2009/07/15/329681/indian-report-slams-performance-of-hals-dhruv-helicopter.html |title= Indian report slams performance of HAL's Dhruv helicopter |work= Flight International |date= 15 July 2009 |access-date= 18 March 2013 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20090718153700/http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2009/07/15/329681/indian-report-slams-performance-of-hals-dhruv-helicopter.html |archive-date= 18 July 2009 |url-status= live }}</ref> In September 2012, it was reported that an ever-decreasing amount of spare parts compatible with the Cheetah has led to the type's operators being required to cannibalise helicopters in order to provide components for others.<ref>Matthews, Neehlam, [http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/ain-defense-perspective/2012-09-14/spares-unavailability-threatens-indias-aging-helo-fleet "Spares Unavailability Threatens India’s Aging Helo Fleet."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121127215113/http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/ain-defense-perspective/2012-09-14/spares-unavailability-threatens-indias-aging-helo-fleet |date=2012-11-27 }} ''AIN Online'', 14 September 2012.</ref> In August 2016, it was reported that [[No. 114 Helicopter Unit, IAF|No. 114 Helicopter Unit]] were keen to introduce the upgraded Cheetal as a replacement for its existing Cheetah rotorcraft for continuous deployment on the [[Siachen Glacier]].<ref>[http://www.brahmand.com/news/Siachen-Pioneers-bets-on-Cheetal-helicopters/15074/1/13.html "'Siachen Pioneers' bets on Cheetal helicopters."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161118101015/http://www.brahmand.com/news/Siachen-Pioneers-bets-on-Cheetal-helicopters/15074/1/13.html |date=2016-11-18 }} ''Brahmand.com'', 17 August 2016.</ref>

==Variants==
;SA{{nbsp}}315B Lama: Derived from the SE 3150, it was designed for high altitude operations using a 650{{nbsp}}kW (870{{nbsp}}hp) Turbomeca Astazou IIIB turboshaft, derated to 410 kW (550shp). This derivative still holds the absolute altitude record for all types of helicopters since 1972: 12,442{{nbsp}}m.
;HB{{nbsp}}315B Gaviao: Brazilian licence-built version of the SA 315B Lama.<ref name = "Chant 348"/>
;HAL Cheetah: Indian licence-built version of the SA 315B Lama.<ref name = "Chant 348">Chant 2014, p. 348.</ref>
;HAL Lancer: Modified armed combat variant. Changes include composite armouring, toughened glass, and [[gun sight]]s. Armaments include two jettisonable weapons pods, each of which contains a single 12.7-mm machine gun and up to three 70-mm rockets.<ref>Anantha, Krishnan M. [http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/bangalore/Army-turns-to-HAL-for-Lancer-supply/articleshow/23864631.cms "Army turns to HAL for Lancer supply."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161227050743/http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/bangalore/Army-turns-to-HAL-for-Lancer-supply/articleshow/23864631.cms |date=2016-12-27 }} ''Times of India'', 3 January 2001.</ref><ref>[http://www.hal-india.com/Product_Details.aspx?Mkey=54&lKey=&CKey=90 "Lancer."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161118225437/http://www.hal-india.com/Product_Details.aspx?Mkey=54&lKey=&CKey=90 |date=2016-11-18 }} ''HAL'', Retrieved: 18 November 2016.</ref>
;HAL Cheetal: Modernised variant, fitted with the [[Turbomeca TM 333|Turbomeca TM333-2M2]].<ref>"First Flight of the HAL Cheetah Powered by Turbomeca's TM 333 2M2 Engine" ''Turbomeca'', 6 February 2003.</ref> Speed is increased to {{convert|210|kph|mph|abbr=on}} and range is increased to {{convert|560|km|mi|abbr=on}}.<ref name="cheetal">[http://www.armedforces-int.com/news/upgraded-hal-cheetal-helicopters-for-indian-army.html Upgraded HAL Cheetal Helicopters for Indian Army] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121221013833/http://www.armedforces-int.com/news/upgraded-hal-cheetal-helicopters-for-indian-army.html |date=2012-12-21 }} - Armedforces-International.com, December 19, 2012</ref>

==Operators==


[[File:Hélico F-GFCM.jpg|thumb|A Search-and-Rescue SA 315B Lama in [[Gréolières]], 2015]]
[[File:Argentina Air Force Aerospatiale SA-315B Lama Lofting-1.jpg|thumb|right| An [[Argentine Air Force]] Aerospatiale SA{{nbsp}}315 lifting off from [[Governor Francisco Gabrielli International Airport|Gabrielli International Airport]]]]

;{{AFG}}
*[[Afghan Air Force]]<ref>{{cite news|title=Afghan air force receives Cheetal helicopters|url=http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/afghan-air-force-receives-cheetal-helicopters-411690/|access-date=28 April 2015|agency=flightglobal.com|date=28 April 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150601134803/http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/afghan-air-force-receives-cheetal-helicopters-411690/|archive-date=1 June 2015|url-status=live}}</ref>
;{{ARG}}
*[[Argentine Air Force]]<ref name="WORLD AIR FORCES 2013">{{cite web |url= http://www.flightglobal.com/airspace/media/reports_pdf/emptys/101015/world-air-forces-2013.pdf |title= World Air Forces 2013 |publisher= Flightglobal Insight |year= 2013 |access-date= 14 March 2013 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20121216005935/http://www.flightglobal.com/airspace/media/reports_pdf/emptys/101015/world-air-forces-2013.pdf |archive-date= 16 December 2012 |url-status= live }}</ref>
*[[Argentine Army Aviation|Argentine Army]]<ref>{{cite web |url= http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1987/1987%20-%202490.html |title= World Air Forces 1987 pg. 40 |publisher= flightglobal.com |access-date= 14 March 2013 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20140108123516/http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1987/1987%20-%202490.html |archive-date= 8 January 2014 |url-status= live }}</ref>
;{{ECU}}
*[[Ecuadorian Army]]<ref name="WORLD AIR FORCES 2013"/>
;{{IND}}
*[[Indian Army]]<ref name="WORLD AIR FORCES 2013"/>
;{{NAM}}
*[[Namibian Air Force]]<ref name="WORLD AIR FORCES 2013"/>
;{{PAK}}
*[[Pakistan Army]]<ref name="WORLD AIR FORCES 2013"/>
;{{TOG}}
*[[Military of Togo|Togolese Air Force]]<ref name="WORLD AIR FORCES 2013"/>
[[File:Flama.jpg|thumb|A 1990-built Swiss-operated Lama]]

===Former operators===
;{{ANG}}
*[[People's Air and Air Defence Force of Angola|Angolan Air Defence Force]]<ref>{{cite web|url= http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1987/1987%20-%202488.html|title= World Air Forces 1987 pg. 38|publisher= flightglobal.com|access-date= 14 March 2013|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20130516141656/http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1987/1987%20-%202488.html|archive-date= 16 May 2013|url-status= live}}</ref>
;{{ARG}}
*[[Argentine National Gendarmerie|National Gendarmerie]]<ref>{{cite web|url= http://www.helis.com/database/modelorg/1144/|title= National Gendarmerie SA315|access-date= 14 March 2013|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20130129072213/http://www.helis.com/database/modelorg/1144|archive-date= 29 January 2013|url-status= live}}</ref>
;{{BOL}}
*[[Bolivian Air Force]]<ref>{{cite web|url= http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/2001/2001%20-%203766.html|title= World Air Forces 2001 pg. 38|publisher= flightglobal.com|access-date= 14 March 2013|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20140502094515/http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/2001/2001%20-%203766.html|archive-date= 2 May 2014|url-status= live}}</ref>
;{{CHI}}
*[[Chilean Army]]<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.helis.com/database/modelorg/642/|title=Ejercito de chile Alouette II|access-date=12 March 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304113541/http://www.helis.com/database/modelorg/642/|archive-date=4 March 2016|url-status=live}}</ref>
;{{ECU}}
*[[Ecuadorian Air Force]]<ref name=" World Air Forces 1987 pg. 51 ">{{cite web| title = World Air Forces 1987 pg. 51| url = http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1987/1987%20-%202501.html| access-date = 2013-03-14| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20130516133022/http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1987/1987%20-%202501.html| archive-date = 2013-05-16| url-status = live}}</ref>
;{{ESA}}
*[[Air Force of El Salvador]]<ref name=" World Air Forces 1987 pg. 51 "/>
;{{IND}}
*[[Indian Air Force]]<ref>{{cite web |url= http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1987/1987%20-%202510.html |title= World Air Forces 1987 pg. 60 |publisher= flightglobal.com |access-date= 14 March 2013 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20131205015054/http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1987/1987%20-%202510.html |archive-date= 5 December 2013 |url-status= live }}</ref>
[[File:Aerospatiale SA-315B Lama, Knaus Helicopter AN0440392.jpg|thumb|right| SA315B Lama lifting off from [[St Johann im Pongau]]]]
;{{MAR}}
*[[Royal Moroccan Gendarmerie]]<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1987/1987%20-%202523.html|title=World Air Forces 1987 pg. 73|publisher=flightglobal.com|access-date=14 March 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130521161300/http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1987/1987%20-%202523.html|archive-date=21 May 2013|url-status=live}}</ref>
;{{NPL}}
*[[Nepalese Army Air Service|Nepal Army]]<ref>{{cite web|url= http://www.flightglobal.com/airspace/media/reports_pdf/emptys/90190/world-air-forces-2011-2012.pdf|title= World Air Forces 2011 (pdf)|publisher= flightglobal.com|access-date= 14 March 2013|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20130509191652/http://www.flightglobal.com/airspace/media/reports_pdf/emptys/90190/world-air-forces-2011-2012.pdf|archive-date= 9 May 2013|url-status= live}}</ref>
;{{PER}}:
*[[Peruvian Army]]<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1987/1987%20-%202527.html|title=World Air Forces 1987 pg. 77|publisher=flightglobal.com|access-date=14 March 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130521150748/http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1987/1987%20-%202527.html|archive-date=21 May 2013|url-status=live}}</ref>

== Specifications (SA 315B Lama) ==
[[File:Hélicoptère de Hydro Québec.jpg|thumb|View of a SA{{nbsp}}315B Lama; note the three-bladed main rotor]]
{{Aircraft specs
|ref=Jane's All The World's Aircraft 1982–83<ref name="JAWA82 p50-1">Taylor 1982, pp. 50–51.</ref>
|prime units?=met
|crew=1
|capacity=4 passengers ''or'' 1,135{{nbsp}}kg (2,500{{nbsp}}lb) slung payload
|length m=10.24
|length ft=33
|length in=7.25
|rot number=1
|rot dia m=11.02
|rot dia ft=36
|rot dia in=1.75
|height m=3.09
|height ft=10
|height in=1.75
|rot area sqm=95.38
|rot area sqft=1,026
|empty weight kg=1,021
|empty weight lb=2,251
|gross weight kg=2,300
|gross weight lb=5,070
|eng1 number=1
|eng1 name=[[Turbomeca Artouste]] IIIB [[turboshaft]]
|eng1 kw=649
|eng1 hp=870
|eng1 note=derated to 410 kW (550 hp)
|max speed kmh=192
|max speed mph=119
|range km=515
|range miles=320
|ceiling m=5,400
|ceiling ft=17,715
|climb rate ms=5.5
|climb rate ftmin=1,080
}}

==See also==
{{Portal|Aviation|France}}
{{External media|topic= |width=21% |align=right |video1=[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W5P9FDvEfvI Footage of SA 315B Lamas performing aerobatic manoeuvres] |video2=[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SD9hhUtiOKI Video of Lama operations amongst mountainous terrain] |video3=[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AMsnOCPoJ80 A Lama performing several utility flights in the Alps]}}
{{Aircontent

|related=
* [[Aérospatiale Alouette II]]
* [[Aérospatiale Alouette III]]
|similar aircraft=
|lists=
* [[List of rotorcraft]]
|see also=

}}

==References==

===Citations===
{{Reflist}}

===Bibliography===
{{Refbegin}}
* {{cite journal |title= Airplane Magazine |volume= 1 |issue= 5 |page= 138 |publisher= Orbis Publishing Ltd |location= London |year= 1990 }}
* Chant, Chris. "A Compendium of Armaments and Military Hardware." ''Routledge'', 2014. {{ISBN|1-13464-668-2}}.
* Kjelgaard, Chris. [http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1982/1982%20-%202762.html "HAL spools up."] ''Flight International'', 18 December 1982.
* {{cite book |last=Taylor |first= John W. R.|author-link=John W. R. Taylor|title=Jane's All The World's Aircraft 1982–83 |year=1982 |publisher=Jane's Yearbooks |location=London |isbn= 0-7106-0748-2}}
{{Refend}}

==External links==
{{Commons category|Aérospatiale SA 315B Lama}}
* {{YouTube|id=g4ZiSRitcBE|title=LAMA SA 315B, the end of a giant|time=28m09s}}
* [http://hal-india.com/Product_Details.aspx?Mkey=54&lKey=&CKey=25 "HAL Cheetah."]
* [https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/EASA-TCDS-R.123_Airbus_Helicopters_SE3160--SA316B--SA316C--SA319B--SA315B-02-07012014_0.pdf "European Aviation Safety Agency Type Certificate: SE 3160, SA 316B, SA 316C, SA 319B, SA 315B."]

{{Alouette family}}
{{Sud/Aérospatiale aircraft}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Aerospatiale Lama}}
[[Category:1960s French military utility aircraft]]
[[Category:1960s French helicopters]]
[[Category:Aérospatiale aircraft]]
[[Category:Single-turbine helicopters]]
[[Category:Aircraft first flown in 1969]]

Airspace

2023-09-13T19:07:30Z

Soldier: Created airspace

{{Short description|Portion of the atmosphere controlled by a country}}
{{Distinguish|Aerospace|Outer space}}
{{Globalize|article|USA|2name=the United States|date=May 2017}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=September 2019}}

'''Airspace'''<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.faraim.org/aim/aim-4-03-14-129.html |title=AIM Chapter 3. Airspace |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140607005739/http://www.faraim.org/aim/aim-4-03-14-129.html |archive-date=7 June 2014}}</ref> is the portion of the atmosphere controlled by a [[country]] above its territory, including its [[territorial waters]] or, more generally, any specific three-dimensional portion of the atmosphere.<ref>{{cite book|title=A Dictionary of Aviation |first=David W. |last=Wragg |isbn=0-85045-163-9 |publisher=Frederick Fell, Inc. |publication-place=New York |date=1974 |edition=1st American |page=29}}</ref> It is not the same as [[outer space]] which is the expanse or space outside the Earth and [[aerospace]] which is the general term for Earth's atmosphere and the outer space within the planet's vicinity.
History:

== History for the Karman Line ==
Until the middle of the 20th century, which was considered the pioneering time of aviation, there were no fixed boundaries as to what was national airspace and when it became international airspace. Because of this, a kind of customary law applied at the time and most countries such as the United Kingdom or the United States considered airspace as international from about 13,000 feet. However, this only applied in times of peace and if it was to the advantage of the states, there was no clear demarcation of the airspace question until the 1950s when the Karman Line was defined, which is why an international time was assumed.

Within the United States:
* [[Controlled airspace]]<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.faraim.org/aim/aim-4-03-14-131.html |title=AIM Section 2. Controlled Airspace |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140607010704/http://www.faraim.org/aim/aim-4-03-14-131.html |archive-date=7 June 2014 }}</ref> exists where it is deemed necessary that [[air traffic control]] has some form of positive executive control over aircraft flying in that airspace (however, air traffic control does not necessarily control traffic operating under [[visual flight rules|visual flight rules (VFR)]]<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.faraim.org/aim/aim-4-03-14-707.html |title=Pilot/Controller Glossary – VISUAL FLIGHT RULES |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141218033959/http://www.faraim.org/aim/aim-4-03-14-707.html |archive-date=18 December 2014}}</ref> within this airspace).

Airspace may be further subdivided into a variety of areas and zones, including those where there are either restrictions on flying activities or complete prohibition of flying activities.

[[File:Airspace classes (United States).png|thumb|500px|Airspace classes in the United States]]

==Horizontal boundary==
[[File:US Overflight Fee Map.png|thumb|upright=2|alt=Map of approximately the Northern Hemisphere from Japan & New Guinea (left edge) to the middle of North Atlantic Ocean. The map shows yellow over the continental U.S. and Bahamas, Alaska (and much of the Bering Sea), and a yellow circle around Bermuda. Most of the Northern Pacific is colored blue along with a small section in the middle of the Gulf of Mexico, and the western half of the North Atlantic from roughly the latitude of Maine to the northern edge of the Leeward Islands (or Puerto Rico).|The [[Federal Aviation Administration]] (FAA) of the United States provides air traffic control services over U.S. territory and over international waters where it has been delegated such authority by the [[International Civil Aviation Organization]]. This map depicts [[Freedoms of the air#First freedom|overflight]] fee regions. The yellow regions are where the U.S. provides ''enroute'' ATC services (mostly over land territory). The blue regions are where the U.S. provides ''oceanic'' ATC services over international waters.]]

By international law, a state "has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory", which corresponds with the maritime definition of [[territorial waters]] as being 12 nautical miles (22.2 km) out from a nation's coastline.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/7300_cons.pdf | access-date=21 June 2019 | title=Convention on an International Civil Aviation }}</ref> Airspace not within any country's territorial limit is considered international, analogous to the "[[International waters|high seas]]" in maritime law.

However, a country may, by international agreement, assume responsibility for controlling parts of international airspace, such as those over the oceans. Such airspace in respect of which a country is responsible under the [[International Civil Aviation Organization]] (ICAO) for operational control is called a [[Flight information region|Flight Information Region]] (FIR). For a coastal state, the FIR consists of the airspace above its land and sea territory plus any international airspace in respect of which ICAO has assigned responsibility to that state.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://erpic.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/the-legal-principles-governing-the-control-of-national-airspace-and-flight-information-regions-and-their-application-to-the-eastern-mediterranean-2009.pdf | access-date=21 June 2019 | title=The Legal Principles Governing the Control of National Airspace and Flight Information Regions and their Application to the Eastern Mediterranean }}</ref>

For instance, the United States provides air traffic control services over a large part of the Pacific Ocean, even though the airspace is international.

==Vertical boundary==
There is no international agreement on the vertical extent of sovereign airspace,{{citation needed|date=June 2019}} with suggestions ranging from about {{convert|30|km|0|abbr=on}}—the extent of the highest aircraft and balloons—to about 160 km (100 mi)—approximately the lowest extent of short-term stable orbits. (The satellite Lixing-1 had a stable orbit with an apogee of 140 km (87 mi) for three days.)<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/lixing-1.htm|title=Lixing 1}}</ref> The [[Fédération Aéronautique Internationale]] has established the [[Kármán line]]—at an altitude of {{convert|100|km|0|abbr=on}}—as the boundary between the Earth's atmosphere and [[outer space]],<ref name="Dr. S. Sanz Fernández de Córdoba">{{cite web |first=Dr. S. |last=Sanz Fernández de Córdoba |date=2004-06-24 |title=The 100 km Boundary for Astronautics |url=https://www.fai.org/page/icare-boundary |access-date=28 December 2020 |publisher=Fédération aéronautique internationale }}</ref> while the United States considers anyone who has flown above {{convert|80|km|mi}} to be an [[astronaut]] {{citation needed|date=August 2021}}. Indeed, descending [[Space Shuttle]]s flew closer than {{convert|80|km|0|abbr=on}} over other nations, such as [[Canada]], without requesting permission first.<ref>{{cite web | url=http://inesap.org/bulletin20/bul20art08.htm| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080515202422/http://www.inesap.org/bulletin20/bul20art08.htm | archive-date=15 May 2008 | access-date=27 July 2007 |last=White | first= Robert E | title='Space Weapons Ban: Thoughts on a New Treaty}}</ref> Nonetheless, both the Kármán line and the U.S. definition are merely working benchmarks, without any real legal authority over matters of national sovereignty.

The boundary between public airspace and private [[air rights]] is defined by national or local law.

In the United States, the 1946 Supreme Court decision ''[[United States v. Causby]]'' overturned the [[common law]] doctrine that private property rights extend indefinitely upwards, instead ruling that they end 300 feet above the highest terrain (including buildings), the lower limit of the "public highway" defined by Congress in the [[Air Commerce Act of 1926]]. The [[Federal Aviation Administration]] regulates the construction and marking of structures taller than 200 feet near airports and 500 feet generally.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/faa-updates-airspace-obstructions-standards |title=FAA Updates Airspace Obstructions Standards |date=December 8, 2015}}</ref>

== Controlled airspace ==
{{Main|Controlled airspace}}
Controlled airspace is a generic term that covers the different classifications of airspace and defined dimensions within which air traffic control (ATC) service is provided in accordance with the airspace classification. Controlled airspace consists of:<ref name=":0">{{Cite web|title=Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge; FAA-H-8083-25A|last=Federal Aviation Administration|first=U.S. Department of Transportation|publisher=Flight Standard Services|year=2008|url=https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals/aviation/phak/media/pilot_handbook.pdf|pages=14–2 to 14–16|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170430154609/https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals/aviation/phak/media/pilot_handbook.pdf|archive-date=30 April 2017}} {{PD-notice}}</ref>
* Class A
* Class B
* Class C
* Class D
* Class E

=== Class A airspace ===
Class A airspace is generally the airspace from 18,000 feet (~3.4 miles, 5.5 km) [[mean sea level]] (MSL) up to and including [[flight level]] (FL) 600 (~11.4 miles, 18.3 km), including the airspace overlying the waters within 12 [[nautical mile]]s (NM) (~13.8 miles, 22.2 km) of the coast of the 48 contiguous states and Alaska. Unless otherwise authorized, all operation in Class A airspace is conducted under instrument flight rules (IFR).<ref name=":0" />

=== Class B airspace ===
Class B airspace is generally airspace from the surface to 10,000 feet MSL surrounding the nation's busiest airports in terms of airport operations or passenger enplanements. The configuration of each Class B airspace area is individually tailored, consists of a surface area and two or more layers (some Class B airspace areas resemble upside-down wedding cakes), and is designed to contain all published instrument procedures once an aircraft enters the airspace. An ATC clearance is required for all aircraft to operate in the area, and all aircraft that are so cleared receive separation services within the airspace.<ref name=":0" />

=== Class C airspace ===
Class C airspace is generally airspace from the surface to 4,000 feet above the airport elevation (charted in MSL) surrounding those airports that have an operational control tower, are serviced by a radar approach control, and have a certain number of IFR operations or passenger enplanements. Although the configuration of each Class C area is individually tailored, the airspace usually consists of a surface area with a five NM radius, an outer circle with a ten NM radius that extends from 1,200 feet to 4,000 feet above the airport elevation, and an outer area. Each aircraft must establish two-way radio communications with the ATC facility providing air traffic services prior to entering the airspace and thereafter maintain those communications while within the airspace.<ref name=":0" />

=== Class D airspace ===
Class D airspace is generally airspace from the surface to 2,500 feet above the airport elevation (charted in MSL) surrounding those airports that have an operational control tower. The configuration of each Class D airspace area is individually tailored and when instrument procedures are published, the airspace is normally designed to contain the procedures. Arrival extensions for instrument approach procedures (IAPs) may be Class D or Class E airspace. Unless otherwise authorized, each aircraft must establish two-way radio communications with the ATC facility providing air traffic services prior to entering the airspace and thereafter maintain those communications while in the airspace.<ref name=":0" />

=== Class E airspace ===
If the airspace is not Class A, B, C, or D, and is controlled airspace, then it is Class E airspace. Class E airspace extends upward from either the surface or a designated altitude to the overlying or adjacent controlled airspace. When designated as a surface area, the airspace is configured to contain all instrument procedures. Also in this class are federal airways, airspace beginning at either 700 or 1,200 feet above ground level (AGL) used to transition to and from the terminal or en route environment, and en route domestic and offshore airspace areas designated below 18,000 feet MSL. Unless designated at a lower altitude, Class E airspace begins at 14,500 MSL over the United States, including that airspace overlying the waters within 12 NM of the coast of the 48 contiguous states and Alaska, up to but not including 18,000 feet MSL, and the airspace above FL 600.<ref name=":0" /> Class E has control services available but VFR pilots are not required to make any contact with ATC unlike other controlled airspace.

== Uncontrolled airspace ==
{{Main|Uncontrolled airspace}}

=== Class G airspace ===
Uncontrolled airspace or Class G airspace is the portion of the airspace that has not been designated as Class A, B, C, D, or E. It is therefore designated uncontrolled airspace by the ATC. Class G airspace extends from the surface to the base of the overlying Class E airspace. Although ATC has no authority or responsibility to control air traffic, pilots should remember there are visual flight rules (VFR) minimums which apply to Class G airspace,<ref name=":0" /> and that flight over private property should not be presumed valid.

== Special use airspace ==
{{Main|Special use airspace}}
Special use airspace or special area of operation (SAO) is the designation for airspace in which certain activities must be confined, or where limitations may be imposed on aircraft operations that are not part of those activities. Certain special use airspace areas can create limitations on the mixed use of airspace. The special use airspace depicted on instrument charts includes the area name or number, effective altitude, time and weather conditions of operation, the controlling agency, and the chart panel location. On National Aeronautical Charting Group (NACG) en route charts, this information is available on one of the end panels.<ref name=":0" /> Special use airspace usually consists of:
* Prohibited areas
* Restricted areas
* Warning areas
* Military operation areas (MOAs)
* Alert areas
* Controlled firing areas (CFAs)

=== Prohibited areas ===
{{Main|Prohibited airspace}}
Prohibited areas contain airspace of defined dimensions within which the flight of aircraft is prohibited. Such areas are established for security or other reasons associated with the national welfare. Prohibited areas in the United States are published in the ''[[Federal Register]]'' and are depicted on aeronautical charts. The area is charted as a "P" followed by a number (e.g., P-49). Examples of prohibited areas include [[Camp David]] and the [[National Mall]] in Washington, D.C., where the [[White House]] and the [[United States Capitol Complex|Congressional buildings]] are located.<ref name=":0" />

=== Restricted areas ===
{{Main|Restricted airspace}}
Restricted areas are areas where operations are hazardous to nonparticipating aircraft and contain airspace within which the flight of aircraft, while not wholly prohibited, is subject to restrictions. Activities within these areas must be confined because of their nature, or limitations may be imposed upon aircraft operations that are not a part of those activities, or both. Restricted areas denote the existence of unusual, often invisible, hazards to aircraft (e.g., artillery firing, aerial gunnery, or guided missiles). IFR flights may be authorized to transit the airspace and are routed accordingly. Penetration of restricted areas without authorization from the using or controlling agency may be extremely hazardous to the aircraft and its occupants.<ref name=":0" /> ATC facilities apply the following procedures when aircraft are operating on an IFR clearance (including those cleared by ATC to maintain VFR on top) via a route which lies within joint-use restricted airspace:
# If the restricted area is not active and has been released to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the ATC facility allows the aircraft to operate in the restricted airspace without issuing specific clearance for it to do so.
# If the restricted area is active and has not been released to the FAA, the ATC facility issues a clearance which ensures the aircraft avoids the restricted airspace.
Restricted areas are charted with an "R" followed by a number (e.g., R-4401) and are depicted on the en route chart appropriate for use at the altitude or FL being flown. Restricted area information can be obtained on the back of the chart.

=== Warning areas ===
Warning areas are similar in nature to restricted areas; however, the United States government does not have sole jurisdiction over the airspace. A warning area is airspace of defined dimensions, extending from 12 NM outward from the coast of the United States, containing activity that may be hazardous to nonparticipating aircraft. The purpose of such areas is to warn nonparticipating pilots of the potential danger. A warning area may be located over domestic or international waters or both. The airspace is designated with a "W" followed by a number (e.g., W-237).<ref>{{Cite PHAK|year=2023|chapter=15|page=4}}</ref>

=== Military operation areas (MOAs) ===
{{Main|Military operations area}}
MOAs consist of airspace with defined vertical and lateral limits established for the purpose of separating certain military training activities from IFR traffic. Whenever an MOA is being used, nonparticipating IFR traffic may be cleared through an MOA if IFR separation can be provided by ATC. Otherwise, ATC reroutes or restricts nonparticipating IFR traffic. MOAs are depicted on sectional, VFR terminal area, and en route low altitude charts and are not numbered (e.g., "Camden Ridge MOA"). [Figure 14-5] However, the MOA is also further defined on the back of the sectional charts with times of operation, altitudes affected, and the controlling agency.<ref name=":0" />

=== Alert areas ===
Alert areas are depicted on aeronautical charts with an "A" followed by a number (e.g., A-211) to inform nonparticipating pilots of areas that may contain a high volume of pilot training or an unusual type of aerial activity. Pilots should exercise caution in alert areas. All activity within an alert area shall be conducted in accordance with regulations, without waiver, and pilots of participating aircraft, as well as pilots transiting the area, shall be equally responsible for collision avoidance.<ref name=":0" />

=== Controlled firing areas (CFAs) ===
CFAs contain activities, which, if not conducted in a controlled environment, could be hazardous to nonparticipating aircraft. The difference between CFAs and other special use airspace is that activities must be suspended when a spotter aircraft, radar, or ground lookout position indicates an aircraft might be approaching the area. There is no need to chart CFAs since they do not cause a nonparticipating aircraft to change its flightpath.<ref name=":0" />

== Other airspace areas ==
"Other airspace areas" is a general term referring to the majority of the remaining airspace.<ref name=":0" /> It includes:
* Local airport advisory
* Military training route (MTR)
* Temporary flight restriction (TFR)
* Parachute jump aircraft operations
* Published VFR routes
* Terminal radar service area (TRSA)
* National security area (NSA)

=== Local airport advisory (LAA) ===
{{See also|Airspace class (United States)#Airport advisory/information service area}}
A service provided by facilities, which are located on the landing airport, have a discrete ground-to-air communication frequency or the tower frequency when the tower is closed, automated weather reporting with voice broadcasting, and a continuous ASOS/AWOS data display, other continuous direct reading instruments, or manual observations available to the specialist.<ref name=":0" />

=== Military training routes (MTRs) ===
{{Main|Military training route}}
MTRs are routes used by military aircraft to maintain proficiency in tactical flying. These routes are usually established below 10,000 feet MSL for operations at speeds in excess of 250 knots. Some route segments may be defined at higher altitudes for purposes of route continuity. Routes are identified as IFR (IR), and VFR (VR), followed by a number. [Figure 14-7] MTRs with no segment above 1,500 feet AGL are identified by four number characters (e.g., IR1206, VR1207). MTRs that include one or more segments above 1,500 feet AGL are identified by three number characters (e.g., IR206, VR207). IFR low altitude en route charts depict all IR routes and all VR routes that accommodate operations above 1,500 feet AGL. IR routes are conducted in accordance with IFR regardless of weather conditions. VFR sectional charts depict military training activities such as IR, VR, MOA, restricted area, warning area, and alert area information.<ref name=":0" />

=== Temporary flight restrictions (TFR) ===
{{See also|Federal Aviation Regulations#Temporary flight restrictions}}
A flight data center (FDC) Notice to Airmen ([[NOTAM]]) is issued to designate a TFR. The NOTAM begins with the phrase "FLIGHT RESTRICTIONS" followed by the location of the temporary restriction, effective time period, area defined in statute miles, and altitudes affected. The NOTAM also contains the FAA coordination facility and telephone number, the reason for the restriction, and any other information deemed appropriate. The pilot should check the NOTAMs as part of flight planning.<ref name=":0" />

Some of the purposes for establishing a TFR are:
* Protect persons and property in the air or on the surface from an existing or imminent hazard.
* Provide a safe environment for the operation of disaster relief aircraft.
* Prevent an unsafe congestion of sightseeing aircraft above an incident or event, which may generate a high degree of public interest.
* Protect declared national disasters for humanitarian reasons in the State of Hawaii.
* Protect the President, Vice President, or other public figures.
* Provide a safe environment for space agency operations.
Since the events of September 11, 2001, the use of TFRs has become much more common. There have been a number of incidents of aircraft incursions into TFRs, which have resulted in pilots undergoing security investigations and certificate suspensions. It is a pilot's responsibility to be aware of TFRs in their proposed area of flight. One way to check is to visit the FAA website([https://web.archive.org/web/20140422101932/http://tfr.faa.gov/]), and verify that there is not a TFR in the area.<ref name=":0" />

=== Parachute jump aircraft operations ===
[[Parachuting|Parachute jump]] aircraft operations are published in the Airport/Facility Directory (A/FD). Sites that are used frequently are depicted on sectional charts.<ref name=":0" />

=== Published VFR routes ===
Published VFR routes are for transitioning around, under, or through some complex airspace. Terms such as VFR flyway, VFR corridor, Class B airspace VFR transition route, and terminal area VFR route have been applied to such routes. These routes are generally found on VFR terminal area planning charts.<ref name=":0" />

=== Terminal radar service areas (TRSAs) ===
{{Main|Terminal radar service area}}
TRSAs are areas where participating pilots can receive additional radar services. The purpose of the service is to provide separation between all IFR operations and participating VFR aircraft.<ref name=":0" />

The primary airport(s) within the TRSA become(s) Class D airspace. The remaining portion of the TRSA overlies other controlled airspace, which is normally Class E airspace beginning at 700 or 1,200 feet and established to transition to/from the en route/terminal environment. TRSAs are depicted on VFR sectional charts and terminal area charts with a solid black line and altitudes for each segment. The Class D portion is charted with a blue segmented line. Participation in TRSA services is voluntary; however, pilots operating under VFR are encouraged to contact the radar approach control and take advantage of TRSA service.<ref name=":0" />

=== National Security Areas (NSAs) ===
{{Main|National Security Area}}
NSAs consist of airspace of defined vertical and lateral dimensions established at locations where there is a requirement for increased security and safety of ground facilities. Flight in NSAs may be temporarily prohibited by regulation under the provisions of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 99, and prohibitions are disseminated via NOTAM. Pilots are requested to voluntarily avoid flying through these depicted areas.<ref name=":0" />

== See also ==
* [[Index of aviation articles]]
* [[Air sovereignty]]
* [[Airspace class]]
* [[Flyover rights]]
* [[United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea]]

== References ==
{{reflist}}

== External links ==
{{Wiktionary}}
{{commons category|Airspace}}
* [https://www.openflightmaps.org/ open flightmaps]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20130207075314/http://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/ATpubs/AIM/aim0301.html U.S. airspace, as described in the Aeronautical Information Manual]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20190624002456/http://airspacetechnology.com/ AirSpace Technology]
* [http://soaringweb.org/Airspace Worldwide Soaring Turnpoint Exchange: Airspace] (publicly contributed data)
* [http://3dairspace.org.uk Airspace data] in [[Google Earth]] Format (KML)
* {{cite news |url= http://aviationweek.com/connected-aerospace/airbus-proposes-blueprint-integrating-autonomous-aviation |title= Airbus Proposes Blueprint For Integrating Autonomous Aviation |date= 18 September 2018 |author= Graham Warwick |work= Aviation Week & Space Technology}}

{{Authority control}}

[[Category:Air traffic control]]
[[Category:General aviation]]

Volunteer military

2023-09-13T19:05:06Z

Soldier: Created volunteer military|volunteer army.

{{Short description|Military force which employs personnel on an exclusively volunteer basis}}
{{Multiple issues|
{{original research|date=March 2016}}
{{more footnotes|date=March 2016}}
}}

A '''volunteer military system''' or '''all volunteer military system''' ('''AVMS''') is a military service system that maintains the military only with applicants without compulsory conscription. A country may offer attractive pay and benefits through [[military recruitment]] to attract potential recruits. Many countries with volunteer militaries reserve the right to renew conscription in the event of an emergency.
The [[Indian Army]] is the world's largest standing volunteer army.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://inspire99.com/indian-army-largest-volunteer-army-in-the-world/|title=Indian Army : Largest Volunteer Army in The World|date=16 October 2014 |access-date=10 March 2023}}</ref>

In recent decades, the trend among numerous countries has been to move from conscription to all-volunteer military forces. One significant example is in [[France]], which has historically been [[Levée en masse|the first to introduce modern conscription]] and whose model was followed by many other countries in Europe and elsewhere around the world.

==Volunteer military==

{{div col|colwidth=22em}}
*{{flag|Albania}}
*{{flag|Antigua and Barbuda}}
*{{flag|Argentina}}
*{{flag|Australia}}
*{{flag|Bahamas}}
*{{flag|Bahrain}}
*{{flag|Bangladesh}}
*{{flag|Barbados}}
*{{flag|Belgium}}
*{{flag|Belize}}
*{{flag|Bermuda}}
*{{flag|Bhutan}}
*{{flag|Bosnia and Herzegovina}}
*{{flag|Botswana}}
*{{flag|Brunei}}
*{{flag|Bulgaria}}
*{{flag|Burundi}}
*{{flag|Cameroon}}
*{{flag|Canada}}
*{{flag|China}} (''de facto'', conscription not enforced)
*{{flag|Comoros}}
*{{flag|Congo}}
*{{flag|Croatia}}
*{{flag|Czech Republic}}
*{{flag|Democratic Republic of the Congo}}
*{{flag|Djibouti}}
*{{flag|Dominican Republic}}
*{{flag|Ecuador}}
*{{flag|Ethiopia}}
*{{flag|Fiji}}
*{{flag|France}}
*{{flag|Gabon}}
*{{flag|Gambia}}
*{{flag|Ghana}}
*{{flag|Germany}}
*{{flag|Guyana}}
*{{flag|Honduras}}
*{{flag|Hungary}}
*{{flag|India}}
*{{Flag|Indonesia}}
*{{flag|Iraq}}
*{{flag|Ireland}}
*{{flag|Italy}}
*{{flag|Jamaica}}
*{{flag|Japan}}
*{{flag|Jordan}}
*{{flag|Kenya}}
*{{flag|Lebanon}}
*{{flag|Lesotho}}
*{{flag|Liberia}}
*{{flag|Luxembourg}}
*{{flag|Madagascar}}
*{{flag|Malawi}}
*{{flag|Maldives}}
*{{flag|Malta}}
*{{flag|Malaysia}}
*{{flag|Morocco}}
*{{flag|Montenegro}}
*{{flag|Namibia}}
*{{flag|Nepal}}
*{{flag|Netherlands}}
*{{flag|New Zealand}}
*{{flag|Nicaragua}}
*{{flag|Nigeria}}
*{{flag|North Macedonia}}
*{{flag|Oman}}
*{{flag|Pakistan}}
*{{flag|Papua New Guinea}}
*{{flag|Peru}}
*{{flag|Philippines}}
*{{flag|Poland}}
*{{flag|Portugal}}
*{{flag|Qatar}}
*{{flag|Romania}}
*{{flag|Rwanda}}
*{{flag|Saint Kitts and Nevis}}
*{{flag|Saudi Arabia}}
*{{flag|Serbia}}
*{{flag|Seychelles}}
*{{flag|Sierra Leone}}
*{{flag|Slovakia}}
*{{flag|Slovenia}}
*{{flag|South Africa}}
*{{flag|Spain}}
*{{flag|Sri Lanka}}
*{{flag|Suriname}}
*{{flag|Swaziland}}
*{{flag|Tanzania}}
*{{flag|Timor-Leste}}
*{{flag|Tonga}}
*{{flag|Trinidad and Tobago}}
*{{flag|Uganda}}
*{{flag|United Kingdom}}
*{{flag|United States of America}}
*{{flag|Uruguay}}
*{{flag|Zambia}}
{{div col end}}

== See also ==
* [[Conscription]]
* [[Mercenary]]
* [[Military service]]
* [[Military volunteer]]
* [[United States Volunteers]]
* [[Volunteer Force (Great Britain)]]

== References ==
{{Reflist}}

== Further reading ==
* {{Cite journal |last1=Greenberg |first1=Greg A. |last2=Rosenheck |first2=Robert A. |last3=Desai |first3=Rani A. |date=2007-04-01 |title=Risk of Incarceration among Male Veterans and Nonveterans |journal=Armed Forces & Society |volume=33 |issue=3 |pages=337–350 |doi=10.1177/0095327x06296585 |s2cid=71798403 |issn=0095-327X}}
* {{Cite journal |last1=Gilroy |first1=Curtis L. |last2=Phillips |first2=Robert L. |last3=Blair |first3=John D. |date=1990-04-01 |title=The All-Volunteer Army: Fifteen Years Later |journal=Armed Forces & Society |volume=16 |issue=3 |pages=329–350 |doi=10.1177/0095327x9001600302 |s2cid=111290982 |issn=0095-327X}}
* {{Cite journal |last=Snyder |first=William P. |date=1984-04-01 |title=Officer Recruitment For the All-Volunteer Force: Trends and Prospects |journal=Armed Forces & Society |volume=10 |issue=3 |pages=401–425 |doi=10.1177/0095327x8401000304 |s2cid=146331397 |issn=0095-327X}}
* {{Cite journal |last1=Bachman |first1=Jerald G. |last2=Blair |first2=John D. |date=1975-10-01 |title="Citizen Force" or "Career Force"? |journal=Armed Forces & Society |volume=2 |issue=1 |pages=81–96 |doi=10.1177/0095327x7500200106 |issn=0095-327X|url=https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/67723/2/10.1177_0095327X7500200106.pdf |hdl=2027.42/67723 |s2cid=145111952 |hdl-access=free }}
* {{Cite journal |last1=McNown |first1=Robert F. |last2=Udis |first2=Bernard |last3=Ash |first3=Colin |date=1980-10-01 |title=Economic Analysis of the All-Volunteer Force |journal=Armed Forces & Society |volume=7 |issue=1 |pages=113–132 |doi=10.1177/0095327x8000700107 |s2cid=144570175 |issn=0095-327X}}
* {{Cite journal |last1=Janowitz |first1=Morris |last2=Moskos |first2=Charles C. |date=1979-01-01 |title=Five Years of the All-Volunteer Force: 1973-1978 |journal=Armed Forces & Society |volume=5 |issue=2 |pages=171–218 |doi=10.1177/0095327x7900500201 |s2cid=145704371 |issn=0095-327X}}

{{Authority control}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Volunteer Military}}
[[Category:Types of military forces]]

Russian Navy

2023-09-13T19:02:29Z

Soldier: Created Russian Navy

{{About|the modern navy formed in 1992|the navy from 1917 to 1991|Soviet Navy|the navy prior to 1917|Imperial Russian Navy|a history of all Russian navies|History of the Russian Navy}}
{{Short description|Naval arm of the Russian military}}
{{pp|small=yes}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=July 2020}}
{{Infobox military unit
| unit_name = Russian Navy
| native_name = {{plainlist|
* {{lang|ru|Военно-морской флот Российской Федерации}}
* {{lang|ru-Latn|Voyenno-morskoy flot Rossiyskoy Federatsii}}
}}
| image = Great emblem of the Russian Navy.svg
| image_size = 200px
| caption = Emblem of the Russian Navy
| dates = {{unbulletedlist|1696–1917|1992–present<ref name="Russian_Navy_birth_day">{{Cite web |title=History of the Russian Navy |url=http://www.neva.ru/EXPO96/book/book-cont.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160610083056/http://www.neva.ru/EXPO96/book/book-cont.html |archive-date=10 June 2016 |access-date=25 July 2016 |publisher=Russian Navy}}</ref>}}
| country = [[Russian Federation]]
| branch = [[Navy]]
| size = 160,000 active duty (2023)<ref>{{cite web |title=Russian Armed Forces: Military Modernization and Reforms |url=https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF11603.pdf |date=20 July 2020 |access-date=29 June 2022 |archive-date=4 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220804193945/http://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF11603.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> Approx. 370 active ships<ref name="IISS2014_p185">[[International Institute for Strategic Studies]]: The Military Balance 2014, p. 185.</ref>
| command_structure = [[Armed Forces of the Russian Federation]]
| garrison = [[Admiralty building, Saint Petersburg|Admiralty building]], [[Saint Petersburg]]
| garrison_label = Headquarters
| nickname =
| patron = [[Saint Andrew the Apostle]]<ref>[https://eng.hram.mil.ru/ ''Main Cathedral of Russian Armed Forces.''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190202095428/https://eng.hram.mil.ru/ |date=2 February 2019 }} Retrieved 2 February 2019.</ref>
| motto = "{{lang|ru|С нами Бог и Андреевский флаг!}}" (God and St. Andrew's flag are with us!)
| march = {{plainlist|
* Quick – "{{lang|ru|Экипаж—одна семья}}" ({{lang-en|The Crew—One Family}})
* Slow – "{{lang|ru|Гвардейский встречный марш Военно-морского флота}}" ({{Lang-en|Slow March of the Guards of the Navy}})
}}
| mascot =
| equipment = 1 [[Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov|aircraft carrier]] 2 [[Kirov-class battlecruiser|battlecruiser]]s 2 [[cruiser]]s 10 [[destroyer]]s 11 [[frigate]]s 80 [[corvette]]s 11 [[landing ship tank]]s 60 [[landing craft]] 18 special-purpose ships 4 [[patrol ship]]s 56 [[patrol boat]]s 45 [[mine countermeasures vessel]]s 8 special-purpose submarines 65 active [[Ballistic missile submarine|ballistic missile]]/[[Cruise missile submarine|cruise missile]] and [[attack submarine]]s<ref>{{Cite news |last=Mizokami |first=Kyle |date=19 April 2018 |title=Here Are All the Submarines of the Russian Navy in One Infographic |work=Popular Mechanics |url=https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a19863945/here-are-all-the-submarines-of-the-russian-navy-in-one-infographic/ |access-date=6 September 2020 |archive-date=6 August 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200806005737/https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a19863945/here-are-all-the-submarines-of-the-russian-navy-in-one-infographic/ |url-status=live }}</ref>
| equipment_label = [[List of active Russian Navy ships|Fleet]]
| battles = {{plainlist|
*[[Russo-Georgian War]]
*[[Piracy off the coast of Somalia|Anti-piracy operation in Gulf of Aden]]
*[[Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation|Annexation of Crimea]]|[[Syrian Civil War]]
*[[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine]]
}}
| anniversaries = [[Navy Day (Russia)|Navy Day]] (last Sunday in July) Submariner's Day (19 March) Surface Sailor's Day (20 October)
| decorations =
| battle_honours =
| website = {{official URL}}
| commander1 = {{Flagicon image|Flag of Russia's Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.svg|size=25px}} [[Admiral]] [[Nikolai Yevmenov]]
| commander1_label = [[Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy|Commander-in-Chief]]
| commander2 = {{Flagicon image|Flag of Russia's Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.svg|size=25px}} [[Admiral]] [[Aleksandr Nosatov]]
| commander2_label = First Deputy Commander-in-Chief
| commander3 = {{Flagicon image|Flag of Russia's Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.svg|size=25px}} [[Vice-Admiral]] [[Vladimir Lvovich Kasatonov|Vladimir Kasatonov]]
| commander3_label = Deputy Commander-in-Chief
| commander4 =
| commander4_label =
| notable_commanders = 
| identification_symbol = [[File:Naval Ensign of Russia.svg|125px|border]]
| identification_symbol_label = [[Ensign of the Russian Navy|Ensign]]
| identification_symbol_2 = [[File:Naval Jack of Russia.svg|125px|border]]
| identification_symbol_2_label = [[Naval jack|Jack]]
| identification_symbol_3 = [[File:Russia, Pendant of Naval 2000 (ships).svg|125px]]
| identification_symbol_3_label = [[Commissioning pennant|Pennant]]
| identification_symbol_4 = [[File:Naval sleeve badge of the Russian Federation-1.svg|125px]]
| identification_symbol_4_label = Patch
| identification_symbol_5 = [[File:Middle Emblem of the Russian Navy.svg|125px]]
| identification_symbol_5_label = Middle Emblem
| identification_symbol_6 = [[File:Small emblem of the Russian Navy.svg|125px]]
| identification_symbol_6_label = Insignia
}}

The '''Russian Navy''' ({{lang-ru|Военно-морской флот [ВМФ]|'''V'''oyenno-'''m'''orskoi '''f'''lot [VMF]|"Military Maritime Fleet"}}) is the [[Navy|naval arm]] of the [[Russian Armed Forces]]. It has existed in various forms since 1696; its present iteration was formed in January 1992 when it succeeded the Navy of the [[Commonwealth of Independent States]] (which had itself succeeded the [[Soviet Navy]] following the [[dissolution of the Soviet Union]] in late December 1991).

The [[Imperial Russian Navy]] was established by [[Peter the Great]] (Peter I) in October 1696. The symbols of the Russian Navy, the [[St. Andrew]]'s ensign (seen to the right), and most of its traditions were established personally by Peter I.

The Russian Navy possesses the vast majority of the former Soviet naval forces, and currently comprises the [[Northern Fleet]], the [[Pacific Fleet (Russia)|Pacific Fleet]], the [[Black Sea Fleet]], the [[Baltic Fleet]], the [[Caspian Flotilla]], the [[Permanent task force of the Russian Navy in the Mediterranean Sea|permanent task force in the Mediterranean]], [[Russian Naval Aviation|Naval Aviation]], and the Coastal Troops (consisting of the [[Russian Naval Infantry|Naval Infantry]] and the Coastal Missile and Artillery Troops).

The Russian Navy suffered severely with the [[collapse of the Soviet Union]] due to insufficient maintenance, lack of funding, and subsequent effects on the training of personnel and timely replacement of equipment. Another setback was attributed to Russia's domestic shipbuilding industry, which was in decline due to the absence of modern hardware and technology.

In 2013, a rise in gas and oil prices enabled a sort of renaissance of the Russian Navy due to increased available funds, which may have allowed Russia to begin "developing the capacity to modernize".<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Fedyszyn |first=Thomas R. |date=March 2013 |title=Renaissance of the Russian Navy? |url=http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-03/renaissance-russian-navy |url-status=live |journal=[[Proceedings (magazine)|Proceedings]] |publisher=[[United States Naval Institute]] |volume=138/3/1,309 |issn=0041-798X |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120730175841/http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-03/renaissance-russian-navy |archive-date=30 July 2012 |access-date=8 August 2012}}</ref> In August 2014, Defence Minister [[Sergei Shoigu]] said that Russian naval capabilities would be bolstered with new weapons and equipment within the next six years in response to the [[enlargement of NATO]] and the beginning of the [[Russo-Ukrainian War]].<ref name="reuters.com">[http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/aug/20/russia-vows-naval-expansion-to-counter-nato-move-i/ "Russia vows naval expansion to counter NATO; move in response to Ukraine tensions"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140821153357/http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/aug/20/russia-vows-naval-expansion-to-counter-nato-move-i/ |date=21 August 2014 }}, ''[[Washington Times]]'' (20 August 2014)</ref>{{Update inline|date=August 2022}}

==History==
{{Main|History of the Russian Navy}}
{{seealso|Soviet Navy|Imperial Russian Navy}}
{{Russian military}}
[[File:Admiralty SPB.jpg|left|thumb|The Russian Admiralty in [[St. Petersburg]] is famed for its gilded steeple topped by a golden weather-vane in the shape of a sailing ship.]] The 1991 [[dissolution of the Soviet Union]] led to a severe decline in the Russian Navy. [[Military budget of Russia|Defence expenditures]] were severely reduced. Many ships were scrapped or laid up as accommodation ships at naval bases, and the building program was essentially stopped. [[Sergey Gorshkov]]'s buildup during the Soviet period had emphasised ships over support facilities, but Gorshkov had also retained ships in service beyond their effective lifetimes, so a reduction had been inevitable in any event.<ref>CSRC B58</ref> The situation was exacerbated by the impractical range of vessel types which the Soviet [[Military–industrial complex|military-industrial complex]], with the support of the leadership, had forced on the navy—taking modifications into account, the Soviet Navy in the mid-1980s had nearly 250 different classes of ship.<ref>Captain First Rank S Topichev, 'What Fleet we had and how it should be reformed today', Morskoy sbornik (in Russian), No.12, 1996, p.13, cited in Greg Austin & Alexey Muraviev, ''The Armed Forces of Russia in Asia'', I.B. Tauris, London, 2000, p.209</ref>

The [[Kiev-class aircraft carrier|''Kiev-''class aircraft carrying cruisers]] and many other ships were prematurely retired, and the incomplete second [[Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier|''Admiral Kuznetsov''-class aircraft carrier]] ''[[Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning|Varyag]]'' was eventually sold to the [[China|People's Republic of China]] by Ukraine. Funds were only allocated for the completion of ships ordered prior to the collapse of the USSR, as well as for refits and repairs on fleet ships taken out of service since. However, the construction times for these ships tended to stretch out extensively: in 2003 it was reported that the [[Russian submarine Nerpa (K-152)|''Akula''-class submarine ''Nerpa'']] had been under construction for fifteen years.<ref>Foreword to ''[[Jane's Fighting Ships]] 2003–2004'', p. 80.</ref>

Storage of decommissioned nuclear submarines in ports near [[Murmansk]] became a significant issue, with the [[Bellona Foundation]] reporting details of lowered readiness. Naval support bases outside Russia, such as [[Cam Ranh Bay]] in Vietnam, were gradually closed, with the exception of the modest technical support base in [[Tartus]], [[Syria]] to support ships deployed to the Mediterranean. Naval Aviation declined as well from its height as [[Soviet Naval Aviation]], dropping from an estimated 60,000 personnel with some 1,100 combat aircraft in 1992 to 35,000 personnel with around 270 combat aircraft in 2006.<ref>[[IISS]] Military Balance, 1992–93 and 2006 editions</ref> In 2002, out of 584 naval aviation crews only 156 were combat ready, and 77 ready for night flying. Average annual flying time was 21.7 hours, compared to 24 hours in 1999.<ref>Mikhail Khodarenok, 'Chernyy god Rossiyskogo Flota', NVO, 23 February 2001, cited in Mikhail Tsypkin, 'Rudderless in a Storm, CSRC B58, December 2002</ref>

Training and readiness also suffered severely. In 1995, only two missile submarines at a time were being maintained on station, from the Northern and Pacific Fleets.<ref>''[[IISS]] Military Balance 1997/98'', p. 102.</ref> The decline culminated in the loss of the Oscar II-class submarine [[Russian submarine Kursk (K-141)|''Kursk'']] during the Northern Fleet summer exercise that was intended to back up the publication of a new naval doctrine.<ref>Foreword to ''[[Jane's Fighting Ships]] 2001–02'', p. 80.</ref> The exercise was to have culminated with the deployment of the ''Admiral Kuznetsov'' task group to the Mediterranean.{{citation needed|date=November 2013}}

As of February 2008, the Russian Navy had 44 nuclear submarines with 24 operational; 19 diesel-electric submarines, 16 operational; and 56 first and second rank surface combatants, 37 operational.<ref name="ReferenceB">Kommersant VLAST No.7(760) 25 February 2008</ref> Despite this improvement, the November [[K-152 Nerpa accident|2008 accident]] on board the {{sclass|Akula|submarine}} attack boat ''Nerpa'' during sea trials before lease to India represented a concern for the future.<ref>{{Cite web |title=The Next Arms Race – APAC 2020, the decade ahead |url=http://apac2020.the-diplomat.com/feature/the-next-arms-race/ |url-status=dead |archive-url=http://archive.wikiwix.com/cache/20110818205032/http://apac2020.the-diplomat.com/feature/the-next-arms-race/ |archive-date=18 August 2011 |access-date=14 December 2014 |website=The Diplomat}}</ref>

The strength and quality of the Russian Navy started to improve during the 2010s. In 2012, as part of an ambitious rebuilding effort, [[President of Russia|President]] [[Vladimir Putin]] announced a plan to build 51 modern ships and 24 submarines by 2020.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://jamestown.org/program/putin-pledges-billions-to-build-a-blue-water-navy/|title=Putin Pledges Billions to Build a Blue-Water Navy|website=Jamestown|access-date=16 January 2022|archive-date=16 January 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220116172737/https://jamestown.org/program/putin-pledges-billions-to-build-a-blue-water-navy/|url-status=live}}</ref> Of the 24 submarines, 16 were to be nuclear-powered.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Radyuhin |first=Vladimir |date=1 August 2012 |title=Russian Navy launches massive upgrade drive |work=The Hindu |url=http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article3707950.ece |url-status=live |access-date=1 August 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120928035907/http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article3707950.ece |archive-date=28 September 2012}}</ref> On 10 January 2013, the Russian Navy finally accepted its first new Borei-class SSBN ({{ship|Russian submarine|Yury Dolgorukiy|K-535|2}}) for service.<ref>{{Cite news |date=10 January 2013 |title=New Russian nuclear submarine goes into service {{!}} Reuters |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-submarine-idUSBRE9090YR20130110 |access-date=1 January 2022 |archive-date=10 March 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140310142340/http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/10/us-russia-submarine-idUSBRE9090YR20130110 |url-status=live }}</ref> A second Borei (''[[Russian submarine Alexander Nevsky (K-550)|Aleksandr Nevskiy]]'') was undergoing sea trials and entered service on 21 December 2013.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://russianships.info/eng/submarines/project_955.htm|title=Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines - Project 955|website=russianships.info|access-date=10 January 2022|archive-date=26 January 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220126151403/http://russianships.info/eng/submarines/project_955.htm|url-status=live}}</ref>

A third Borei-class boat ({{ship|Russian submarine|Vladimir Monomakh||2}}) was launched and began trials in early 2013, and was commissioned in late 2014.<ref>{{Cite web |last=LaGrone |first=Sam |date=11 December 2014 |title=Russia Accepts Third Borei-class Boomer |url=http://news.usni.org/2014/12/11/russia-accepts-third-borei-class-boomer/ |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141220090852/http://news.usni.org/2014/12/11/russia-accepts-third-borei-class-boomer/ |archive-date=20 December 2014 |access-date=19 December 2014 |publisher=USNI News}}</ref> As of early 2022, five Borei-class boats are in service, along with three {{sclass2|Yasen|submarine|0}} nuclear attack submarines. More vessels of these classes are building along with additional {{sclass2|Lada|submarine|5}} and [[Kilo-class submarine#Project 636.3 units|Improved-Kilo-class]] conventional attack submarines. The surface fleet is also being modernized, principally by introducing at least [[Future of the Russian Navy#Corvettes|six new classes of corvette/offshore patrol vessels]], a new class of frigate ([[Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate|the ''Admiral Gorshkov'' class]]), as well as new classes of amphibious ships and support vessels. As of 2019, total tonnage of Russian Navy stand at 1,216,547 tonnes.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Patton |first1=Keith |title=BATTLE FORCE MISSILES: THE MEASURE OF A FLEET |url=https://cimsec.org/battle-force-missiles-the-measure-of-a-fleet/ |website=CIMSEC |access-date=19 October 2021 |archive-date=8 April 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220408035951/https://cimsec.org/battle-force-missiles-the-measure-of-a-fleet/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

On 23 June 2021, Russian forces were involved in [[2021 Black Sea incident|an incident with a British Royal Navy ship]] in the waters of Crimea.

===Invasion of Ukraine===
[[File:Russian cruiser Moskva.jpg|thumb|left|[[Slava-class cruiser]] ''Moskva'', sunk in the [[Russian invasion of Ukraine]]]]
In 2022 the [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine#Naval conflict|Russian Navy took part in the invasion of Ukraine]], starting with the [[attack on Snake Island]] at the beginning of the war. The siege became infamous when the Ukrainian defenders told the {{ship|Russian cruiser|Moskva}}, flagship of the Black Sea; "[[Russian warship, go fuck yourself]]", before subsequently being captured by Russian forces. ''Moskva'' sunk on 14 April 2022 after a fire broke out and forced the crew to evacuate. The Ukrainian military reported that they hit the ship with [[R-360 Neptune|Neptune anti-ship missiles]], however the Russian military did not confirm this. The ship subsequently capsized and sank while the Russian Navy was attempting to tow her into port. The [[Sinking of the Moskva|sinking of ''Moskva'']] is the most significant Russian naval loss in action since World War II.<ref>{{Cite news |date=15 April 2022 |title=Russian warship: Moskva sinks in Black Sea |publisher=[[BBC News]] |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61114843 |access-date=15 April 2022 |archive-date=15 April 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220415092906/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61114843 |url-status=live }}</ref>

==Structure==
[[File:FrogmenExercise2017-08.jpg|thumb|A Naval Spetsnaz frogman]]{{Navies of Russia}}

Since 2012 the headquarters of the Russian Navy (Russian Navy Main Staff) is once again located in The Admiralty in [[Saint Petersburg]]. Russian naval manpower is a mixture of conscripts serving one-year terms and volunteers (Officers and Ratings). In 2006 the [[IISS]] assessed there were 142,000 personnel in the Russian Navy. This personnel number includes the Naval Infantry (Marines) and the Coastal Missile and Artillery Troops. As of 2008 the conscription term was reduced to one year and a major downsizing and reorganization were underway. In 2008, plans were announced to move the headquarters to the [[Admiralty building, Saint Petersburg|Admiralty building in St. Petersburg]], the historic location of the headquarters of the Imperial Russian Navy. The Navy Staff finally relocated there in November 2012.{{cn|date=February 2023}}

The Russian Navy is organised into four combat services - the Surface Forces, the Submarine Forces, the Naval Aviation and the Coastal Troops.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Структура : Министерство обороны Российской Федерации |url=https://structure.mil.ru/structure/forces/navy/structure.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180828001919/https://structure.mil.ru/structure/forces/navy/structure.htm |archive-date=28 August 2018 |access-date=9 October 2018 |website=structure.mil.ru}}</ref> Additionally the navy also includes support units afloat and ashore. It does not include special forces. The [[Russian commando frogmen|Naval Spetsnaz]] brigades are part of the [[GRU (Russian Federation)|Main Intelligence Directorate]] attached to the respective fleets and the Counter-Diversionary Forces and Assets (''ПДСС'') (which are units, protecting the Navy from incursions of enemy special forces) fall within the Coastal Forces.

During the Cold War the Soviet Armed Forces made the distinction between the various naval commands. The main fleets were the [[Northern Fleet|Northern]] and the [[Pacific Fleet (Russia)|Pacific Fleet]]. They were tasked with independent operations on the high seas and for that reason included strategic surface, submarine and air forces, including the country's naval nuclear deterrent. Due to the limited geography of the Baltic and the Black Seas the respective [[Baltic Fleet|Baltic]] and [[Black Sea Fleet]]s were given a more circumscribed role in support of adjacent ground formation (the Main Command of the Troops of the Western Direction in [[Legnica]] ([[Poland]]) and the Main Command of the Troops of the South-Western Direction in [[Chișinău]]).

These two fleets were armed with shorter-range weapon systems than the main fleets (diesel-electric submarines, [[Sukhoi Su-24]] fighter-bombers and a larger quantity of [[frigate]]s and [[corvette]]s). Due to the closed nature of the [[Caspian Sea]] (still connected to the Baltic and Black Seas through the [[Volga River]] and the system of rivers and canals and navigable for ships of corvette size) its [[Caspian Flotilla]] had an even more limited role than the Fleets and played a defensive role supporting the Main Command of the Troops of the Southern Direction in [[Baku]].

With the end of the [[Cold War]] a significant reduction in forces followed. Before the [[2008 Russian military reform]], the four fleets were ranked as equal in status to the six Military Districts. With the reform measures going into force the number of Military Districts was reduced and became new Joint Strategic Commands and the four fleets and one flotilla were subordinated to them with status equal to the Ground Forces and the Air Forces armies. Due to Russia's increased interests in the Arctic region and the importance of Russia's western/northwestern maritime defence the Northern Fleet, originally part of the Joint Strategic Command West (Western Military District), on 12 December 2014 became the basis for the newly formed fifth [[Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command (Russia)|Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command]].

=== Submarine and surface forces ===
[[File:Томск в Вилючинске.jpg|thumb|left|[[Oscar-class submarine|Oscar II class]] cruise missile submarine ''Tomsk'']]
The submarine and surface forces form the backbone of the Navy. The submarines form part of dedicated submarine squadrons and flotillas or part of squadrons and flotillas of mixed composition together with major surface combatants. The Russian Navy retains a rigid structure, whose levels of command could, according to military regulations, be directly equalled to the corresponding ground and air forces counterparts:
{| class="wikitable mw-collapsible mw-collapsed"
|+ Russian Navy organisation
! Part of
! Fleet unit
! Officer commanding
! Ground and air forces equivalent
! Officer commanding
! Notes
|-
| rowspan="3" |[[General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation]]
|'''Commander-in-Chief of the Navy'''
(''Главнокомандующий Военно-морским флотом Российской Федерации'')
|[[Admiral]]
|'''Commnader-in-Chief of the Land Forces'''

(''Главнокомандующий Сухопутными войсками Российской Федерации'')

'''Commander-in-Chief of the Aerospace Forces'''

(''Главнокомандующий Воздушно-космическими силами'' ''Российской Федерации'')

|[[Colonel general]]
|
|-
|'''Chief of Staff and First Deputy Commander of the Navy'''
''(Начальник штаба — первый заместитель Главнокомандующего ВМФ'')
|[[Vice admiral]]
|'''Chief of the Main Staff and First Deputy Commander of the Land Forces'''

(''Начальник Главного штаба Сухопутных войск — первый заместитель главнокомандующего Сухопутными войсками'')

'''Chief of the Main Staff and First Deputy Commander of the Aerospace Forces'''

(''Начальник Главного штаба — первый заместитель Главнокомандующего Воздушно-космическими силами'')
|[[Lieutenant general]]
|
|-
|'''Deputy Commander of the Navy'''
(''Заместитель Главнокомандующего ВМФ'')
|[[Vice admiral]] /

[[Lieutenant general]] (Marines and Naval Aviation)
|'''Deputy Commander of the Land Forces'''

(''Заместитель Главнокомандующего СВ'')

'''Deputy Commander of the Aerospace Forces'''

(''Заместитель Главнокомандующего ВКС'')
|[[Lieutenant general]]
|
|-
|[[Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command (Russia)|Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command]]
|'''Commander of the [[Northern Fleet]]'''
(''Командующий Северным флотом'')
| rowspan="2" |[[Admiral]]
| rowspan="2" |
* Military District
| rowspan="2" |[[Colonel general]]
|
|-
|[[Eastern Military District]]
|'''Commander of the [[Pacific Fleet (Russia)|Pacific Fleet]]'''

(''Командующий Тихоокеанским флотом'')
|
|-
|[[Western Military District]]
|'''Commander of the [[Baltic Fleet]]'''
(''Командующий Балтийским флотом'')
| rowspan="2" |[[Vice admiral]]
| rowspan="2" |
* Army
* Air Army
| rowspan="2" |[[Lieutenant general]]
|
|-
| rowspan="2" |[[Southern Military District]]
|'''Commander of the [[Black Sea Fleet]]'''

(''Командующий Черноморским флотом'')
|
|-
|'''Commander of the [[Caspian Flotilla]]'''
(''Командующий Каспийской флотилией'')
|[[Kontradmiral]]
|
* Army Corps
|[[Major general]]
|
|-
|Fleet
(''Флот'')
|'''Flotilla'''
(''Флотилия'')
|[[Kontradmiral]]
|Used to correspond to a ground forces or air forces ''Army''.
* Army Corps
* Air Force of a (specific) Fleet
|[[Major general]]
|Could be separate ''Flotilla'' or one forming part of a ''Fleet''. For example, the modern day [[Primorsky Krai|''Primorskaya'']] Mixed Forces Formation (formerly Mixed Forces Flotilla) of the [[Pacific Fleet (Russia)|Pacific Fleet]].
|-
|Fleet
(''Флот'')
|'''Operational Squadron'''
(''Оперативная эскадра'')
|[[Kontradmiral]]
|
* Army Corps
* Air Force of a (specific) Fleet
|[[Major general]]
|Naval Task Force. For example, the [[Permanent task force of the Russian Navy in the Mediterranean Sea]].
|-
|Fleet
(''Флот'')
|'''Squadron''' (ships)
(''Эскадра'')
|[[Kontradmiral]]
|
* Army Corps
* Air Force of a (specific) Fleet
|[[Major general]]
|A permanent formation, combining several divisions and brigades. Equal to an Army Corps.
|-
|Squadron (ships)
|'''Division''' of major ships
(''Дивизия кораблей'')
|[[Kontradmiral]]
|[[Division (military)|Division]]
|[[Major general]]
|For example, the [[Black Sea Fleet|Black Sea Fleet's]] 30th Surface Ships Division or the [[Northern Fleet|Northern Fleet's]] 7th Submarine Division.
|-
|Fleet
(''Флот'')
|'''Naval Base'''
(''Военно-морская база'')
|[[Kontradmiral]]
|[[Division (military)|Division]]
|[[Major general]]
|A Naval Base is a command of divisional level, which is subordinated to a Fleet or Flotilla. It provides berthing, supply and repair to the Fleet's main forces, as well as defence against conventional and asymmetric threats. For that reason it includes a Brigade of ships of at least one missile corvette division and one minesweeper division. The base also deploys counter-diversion combat divers and possibly a coastal defence ground formation of marines and coastal artillery. The Naval Base could include a main base location and one or more secondary locations, in which case the secondary locations would deploy a mixed division of corvettes/ fast attack craft and minesweepers.
|-
|Squadron (ships) /
Naval Base
|'''Brigade''' of ships

(''Бригада кораблей'')
|[[Kontradmiral]] /
[[Captain 1st rank]]
|[[Brigade]]
|[[Major general]] /
[[Colonel]]
|
* Submarine Boats Brigade (''Бригада'' ''подводных лодок'') includes diesel-electric submarines and is directly subordinated to a ''Fleet.''
* Landing Ships Brigade (''Бригада десантных кораблей'') includes large landing ships and is directly subordinated to a ''Fleet.''
* Waterborne Area Defence Ships Brigade (''Бригада кораблей охраны водного района'') normally includes an [[Anti-submarine warfare|ASW]] corvette division and a minesweepers division and is subordinated to a ''Naval Base''.
* Brigade of Ships in Construction or Repair (''Бригада строящихся и ремонтирующихся кораблей'') subordinated to a ''Naval Base''.
|-
|Division of major ships
(''Дивизия кораблей'')
|'''Division''' of warships of 2nd rank
(''Дивизион кораблей 2-го ранга'')
|[[Captain 1st Rank]]
|Regiment /

Air Regiment
|[[Colonel]]
|Increasingly out of use as in modern days warships 2nd class form ships brigades and ships divisions.
|-
|Division of major ships
(''Дивизия кораблей'') /

Brigade of ships

(''Бригада кораблей'')
|'''Division''' of warships of 3rd rank

(''Дивизион кораблей 3-го ранга'')
|[[Kapitan 2nd rank|Captain 2nd rank]]
|Separate Battalion /

Air Squadron
|[[Lieutenant colonel]]
|Division of corvettes.
|-
|Brigade of ships
(''Бригада кораблей'') /

Naval Base

(''Военно-морская база'')
|'''Division''' of warships of 4th rank
(''Дивизион кораблей 4-го ранга'')
|[[Lieutenant commander#Other countries|Captain 3rd rank]]
|Separate Battalion /

Air Squadron
|[[Major]]
|Division fast craft or minesweepers.
|-
|Brigade of ships
(''Бригада кораблей'') /

Naval Base

(''Военно-морская база'')
|'''Division''' of warships of 4th rank

(''Дивизион кораблей 4-го ранга'')
|[[Lieutenant commander#Other countries|Captain 3rd rank]] /

[[Captain lieutenant]]
|Separate Company / Separate Battery /

Air Flight
|[[Captain (military rank)|Captain]]
|In case of a division of small support craft of a naval base, such as tug boats, fire boats, courier launches etc.
|-
| colspan="6" |'''Individual ships'''
|-
|Division of major ships
(''Дивизия кораблей'') /

Brigade of ships

(''Бригада кораблей'')
|Warship 1st rank
|[[Captain 1st Rank]]
|Regiment /

Air Regiment
* The departments of the Ship's Company are called Combat Units (''Боевая часть'' (''БЧ'') and correspond to battalions)
|[[Colonel]]
|
* [[ballistic missile submarine]] (submarine nuclear missile cruiser of strategic purpose (''РПКСН''))
* [[attack submarine]] (nuclear submarine boat (''АПЛ''))
* aircraft carrier (heavy aviation-carrying cruiser (''ТАВКР''))
* nuclear battlecruiser (heavy nuclear missile cruiser (''ТАРКР''))
* missile cruiser (''РК'')
* large destroyer (guided missile destroyer 1st rank (''Эсм. УРО 1-го ранга''))
* large [[Anti-submarine warfare|ASW]] destroyer (''БПК'')
|-
|Brigade of ships
(''Бригада кораблей'')

/

Division of small ships

(''Дивизион кораблей'')
|Warship 2nd rank
|[[Kapitan 2nd rank|Captain 2nd rank]]
|Separate Battalion /

Air Squadron
* The departments of the Ship's Company are called Combat Units (''Боевая часть'' (''БЧ'') and correspond to companies)
|[[Lieutenant colonel]]
|
* diesel-electric submarine (''ДЭПЛ'')
* small destroyer (guided missile destroyer 2nd rank (''Эсм. УРО 2-го ранга''))
* missile frigate (guard ship (''СКР''))
* [[Anti-submarine warfare|ASW]] frigate (large [[Anti-submarine warfare|ASW]] ship 2nd rank (''БПК 2-го ранга''))
* offshore patrol vessel
* large landing ship (''БДК'')
|-
|Division of ships 3rd rank

(''Дивизион кораблей 3-го ранга'')
|Warship 3rd rank
|[[Lieutenant commander#Other countries|Captain 3rd rank]]
|Separate Battalion /

Air Squadron
* The departments of the Ship's Company are called Combat Units (''Боевая часть'' (''БЧ'') and correspond to platoons)
|[[Major]]
|
* missile corvette (small missile ship (''МРК''))
* [[Anti-submarine warfare|ASW]] corvette (small [[Anti-submarine warfare|ASW]] ship (''МПК''))
* coastal patrol vessel (small artillery ship (''МАК''))
* seagoing minesweeper (''МТ'')
* medium landing ship (''СДК'')
* small air cushion landing ship (''МДКВП'')
|-
|Division of ships 4th rank

(''Дивизион кораблей 4-го ранга'')
|Warship 4th rank
|[[Captain lieutenant]] /
[[Senior lieutenant]] /

[[Mladshij lejtenant|Lieutenant]]
|Platoon
|[[Captain (military rank)|Captain]] /
[[Senior lieutenant]] /

[[Lieutenant]]
|
* missile fast attack craft (missile cutter (''РКА''))
* gun fast attack craft (artillery cruiser (''АКА''))
* torpedo fast attack craft (torpedo cutter (''ТКА''))
* anti-submarine craft (guard cutter (''СКА''))
* coastal minesweeper (base minesweeper (''БТ''))
* minesweeping boat ([[Roadstead|roadstead minesweeper]] (''РТ''))
* landing craft (landing cutter (''ДКА''))
|}

===Coastal troops===
{{Main|Coastal Troops of the Russian Navy|Naval Infantry (Russia)}}
[[File:RIAN archive 711423 Vostok 2010 Strategic Exercise in Vladivostok.jpg|thumb|Russian Naval Infantry during the Vostok Strategic Exercise in the [[Vladivostok]] area, 2010]]
[[File:Russie Brest 2012 (4).JPG|thumb|Russian Naval Infantrymen]]

Coastal Troops include the Naval Infantry and the Coastal Missile and Artillery Troops.

The Russian Naval Infantry are the [[amphibious warfare|amphibious]] force of the Russian Navy and can trace their origins back to 1705, when [[Peter the Great]] issued a decree for an infantry [[regiment]] "of naval equipage". Since its formation it has seen action in the [[Napoleonic Wars]], the [[Crimean War]], the [[Russo-Japanese War]], the First and Second World Wars, and the Chechen and Georgian conflicts. Under the leadership of [[Sergey Gorshkov|Admiral Gorshkov]] during the Cold War, the Soviet Navy expanded the reach of the Naval Infantry and deployed it worldwide on numerous occasions, but since the [[dissolution of the Soviet Union]] its role has been greatly reduced.

The Soviet Naval Infantry and their Russian successors have a reputation as elite shock troops. For their black uniforms and ferocious performance in combat in the Black Sea and Baltic Sea regions during [[World War II]] they received the nickname "The Black Death" ([[German language|German]]: ''der schwarze Tod''). The Russian Naval Infantry is a mechanised force, organised in brigades, independent regiments and independent battalions. The 55th Naval Infantry Division of the Pacific Fleet has been disbanded in 2009 and replaced by two separate brigades. Each brigade has a tank battalion, a self-propelled artillery battalion, a self-propelled air defence battalion, mechanised marine infantry battalions, other support units and one Airborne Assault Naval Infantry Battalion (''десантно-штурмовой батальон морской пехоты''), parachute and [[air assault]] qualified, with the mission to spearhead amphibious landings.

The coastal defence troops of the Russian Navy are conventional mechanised brigades with the main task to prevent enemy amphibious landings. An example of coastal defence troops are those of the Baltic Fleet. With Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania declaring independence at the end of the Soviet Union the [[Baltic Military District]] practically disintegrated. The massive ground forces formations left landlocked in the [[Kaliningrad Oblast]] were transferred from the ground forces to naval command and control. The integration of naval infantry and coastal defence troops is a relatively new tendency from the 2010s in order to simplify the naval command structure and the new Arctic infantry brigades in formation under the [[Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command (Russia)|Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command]] fall within that process.

The coastal artillery troops also play a very important role for the Navy. The geography of the [[Barents Sea]], the [[Baltic Sea]], the [[Black Sea]] and the [[Sea of Okhotsk]] as well as the [[Caspian Sea]] makes the deployment of shore-based, anti-ship systems in an area-denying role very effective. They deploy [[K-300P Bastion-P]] supersonic [[Anti-ship cruise missile|ASCM]], [[3M-54 Kalibr]] cruise subsonic ASCM and [[A-222E Bereg-E 130mm coastal mobile artillery system]] as well as self-propelled [[surface-to-air missile]] systems.

The Naval Infantry and Coastal Troops are led by the Deputy Commander for Naval Infantry/Commandant of the Naval Infantry of the Russian Navy, [[Lieutenant general|Lieutenant General]] (NI) Aleksandr Kolpatsenko. Their motto is: "Where We Are, There is Victory!"

===Naval aviation===
{{Main|Russian Naval Aviation}}
[[File:Su27K (Su33) DD-SD-99-06153.jpg|thumb|A [[Sukhoi Su-33]] from the 279th Shipborne Fighter Aviation Regiment on ''[[Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov|Admiral Kuznetsov]]'''s flight deck]]
The first naval aviation units in Russia were formed from 1912 through 1914 as a part of the [[Baltic Fleet]] and the [[Black Sea Fleet]]. Since its formation, it has participated in the [[Russian Civil War]], [[World War II]] and in many other conflicts throughout Europe, the Middle East and Asia (''statement requires source citation''). During the Cold War the naval aviation pursued a policy of deploying large numbers of bombers in maritime strike roles to counter the [[United States Navy|U.S. Navy]]'s extensive fleet of aircraft carriers, by 1989 it operated over 1,000 fixed-wing aircraft with the majority being bombers such as the [[Tupolev Tu-22M|Tu-22M "Backfire"]] and the [[Tupolev Tu-16|Tu-16 "Badger"]].{{cn|date=February 2023}}

Since the fall of the Soviet Union however, it has been significantly reduced in size. The Tu-22Ms have been transferred to the Aerospace Forces and since then the combat arm of the Naval Aviation is built around [[Sukhoi Su-33]]s, [[Mikoyan MiG-29K]]s, with [[Sukhoi Su-30]]s and [[Sukhoi Su-34]]s replacing the obsolete [[Sukhoi Su-24]]s.

As of 2007, the Russian Naval Aviation consists of the following components:<ref name="AFM65">Air Forces Monthly, p. 65</ref>
* Naval missile-carrying aviation
* Shore-based [[Anti-submarine warfare|ASW]] aviation
* [[Attack aircraft|Attack]] (''Shturmovik'') aviation
* Shore-based [[fighter aircraft|fighter]] aviation
* [[Reconnaissance]] aviation
* Shipborne aviation (fighters and ASW aircraft)
* Auxiliary air units

== Ranks, rates and insignia ==
{{Main|Naval ranks and insignia of the Russian Federation}}

=== Officers ===
The following table of navy ranks illustrates those of the Russian Federation. The rank in [[Russian language|Russian]] is given first, followed by the [[English language|English]] transliteration.<ref name="Decree 531">[http://www.redstar.ru/2005/05/14_05/2_02.html Addenda to the Decree of the President of Russian Federation #531] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080608013323/http://www.redstar.ru/2005/05/14_05/2_02.html |date=2008-06-08 }}, ''[[Krasnaya Zvezda]]'', 19 May 2005</ref>

{| style="border:1px solid #8888aa; background:#f7f8ff; padding:5px; font-size:95%; margin:0 12px 12px 0;"
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Armed Forces/OF/Blank}}
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Navies/OF/Russia}}
|}

=== Warrant officers and ratings ===
Warrant officers{{refn|group=Note|Warrant officer ranks may be abolished soon,<ref>[http://lenta.ru/news/2008/10/23/ensign/ Вооруженные силы РФ останутся без прапорщиков] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140812210445/http://lenta.ru/news/2008/10/23/ensign/ |date=12 August 2014 }}, retrieved 15 November 2008.</ref> but the abolition began in 2009 in accordance with defense regulations, which were reversed in 2013.}} and rates of the Russian Navy'''<ref name="Decree 531" />'''
{| style="border:1px solid #8888aa; background:#f7f8ff; padding:5px; font-size:95%; margin:0 12px 12px 0;"
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Navies/OR/Blank}}
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Navies/OR/Russia}}
|}

==Equipment==
=== Ships and submarines ===
''See [[List of active Russian Navy ships]]''

===Aircraft===
{{Main list|List of active Russian military aircraft#Russian Naval Aviation}}

===Radars===

The Russian Navy uses Podsolnukh over-the-horizon surface wave radar for detection of ships. As of 2019, four radars have been delivered to the coasts of Caspian Sea, Okhotsk Sea, Sea of Japan<ref>{{Cite web |title=Russia's upgraded radar adapted for operating in Arctic |url=https://tass.com/defense/954140 |website=TASS |access-date=11 February 2022 |archive-date=11 February 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220211220916/https://tass.com/defense/954140 |url-status=live }}</ref> and Baltic Sea.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Russia deploys its modern over-the-horizon Podsolnukh radar systems to Far East, Baltic and Caspian Seas - News - Russian Aviation - RUAVIATION.COM |url=https://www.ruaviation.com/news/2019/10/31/14324/?h |website=www.ruaviation.com |access-date=20 February 2022 |archive-date=20 February 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220220164507/https://www.ruaviation.com/news/2019/10/31/14324/?h |url-status=live }}</ref>

== Military districts and fleets ==
The Russian Navy consists of four fleets and one flotilla with all of them subordinated to the newly formed Military Districts-Joint Operational Strategic Commands.

===Northern Military District – Northern Joint Strategic Command===
====Northern Fleet====
{{Main|Northern Fleet}}
[[File:Map of Northern Fleet bases.png|thumb|Major bases and headquarters of the Northern Fleet]]
[[File:Joint exercises of Northern and Black Sea fleets (2020-01-09) 02.jpg|thumb|Russian Navy sailors onboard the cruiser [[Russian cruiser Marshal Ustinov|''Marshal Ustinov'']] in a joint exercise of the [[Northern Fleet|Northern]] and [[Black Sea Fleet|Black Sea fleets]]]]

The Russian Northern Fleet, dating to 1733 but established as a modern formation in 1933, is headquartered at [[Severomorsk]] and spread around various bases in the greater [[Murmansk]] area. It is the main fleet of the Russian Navy and currently comprises<ref name="warfare.ru" />
*[[Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov|''Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov'']] aircraft carrier (1 in refit)
*[[Kirov-class battlecruiser|''Kirov''-class battlecruiser]] (2, including one in long-term refit/upgrade)
*[[Slava-class cruiser|''Slava''-class cruiser]] (1)
*[[Udaloy-class destroyer|''Udaloy II''-class destroyer]] (1)
*[[Udaloy-class destroyer|''Udaloy''-class destroyer]] (3)
*[[Sovremenny-class destroyer|''Sovremennyy''-class destroyer]] (1)
* [[Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate|''Admiral Gorshkov''-class frigate]] (2, plus one on sea trials in the Baltic)
* [[Grisha-class corvette]] (6)
* [[Nanuchka-class corvette]] (1)
*[[Borei-class submarine|''Dolgorukiy-''class submarine]] (2)
*[[Delta-class submarine|Delta IV-class submarine]] (5)
*[[Oscar-class submarine]] (2)
*[[Yasen-class submarine]] (2)
*[[Akula-class submarine|''Akula-''class submarine]] (6)
*[[Sierra-class submarine]] (2, plus 2 inactive/reserve)
*[[Victor-class submarine|Victor III-class submarine]] (2)
*[[Lada-class submarine]] (1 on sea trials in the Baltic as of April 2023)
*[[Kilo-class submarine]] (4)
*[[Russian submarine BS-64|Delta IV-class special operations submarine ''BS-64 Podmoskovye'']] (1)
*[[Russian submarine Belgorod (K-329)|K-239 ''Belgorod'' special operations submarine]] (1, in an "experimental role" with the Northern Fleet as of July 2022;<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://seawaves.com/?p=8177|title=Sevmash General Director Updates Belgorod Trials – SeaWaves Magazine|access-date=13 January 2021|archive-date=15 January 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210115161411/https://seawaves.com/?p=8177|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Sutton |first=H. I. |title=Losharik Spy Submarine Accident Is Still A Problem For Russian Navy |url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2020/07/06/russian-navys-spy-submarine-losharik-1-year-after-fatal-accident/ |website=Forbes |access-date=13 January 2021 |archive-date=25 November 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211125172601/https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2020/07/06/russian-navys-spy-submarine-losharik-1-year-after-fatal-accident/ |url-status=live }}</ref> projected to transfer to the Pacific Fleet in due course)<ref>{{cite web | url=https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2022/07/worlds-longest-nuclear-submarine-handed-over-russian-navy | title=World's longest nuclear submarine handed over to the Russian Navy | access-date=9 July 2022 | archive-date=9 January 2023 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230109063115/https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2022/07/worlds-longest-nuclear-submarine-handed-over-russian-navy | url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Belgorod nuclear submarine carrier with Poseidon nuke drones to serve in Pacific — source |url=https://tass.com/defense/1274461 |website=TASS |access-date=6 April 2021 |archive-date=6 April 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210406130735/https://tass.com/defense/1274461 |url-status=live }}</ref>
* [[Russian submarine Sarov (B-90)|B-90 ''Sarov'' special operations submarine]] (1)
*[[Russian submarine Losharik|''Losharik'' (AS-12/or 28/or 31) special operations submarine]] (1 in refit/repair)
*[[Delta-class submarine|Delta III-class special operations submarine ''Orenburg'' (BS-136)]] (1)
*[[Paltus-class submarine|Paltus-class special operations mini-submarine]] (2)
*[[Kashalot-class submarine|Kashalot-class special operations submarine]] (2)

The Northern Fleet also includes patrol ships, mine countermeasures vessels, light amphibious ships and support and logistic ships.

===Western Military District – Western Joint Strategic Command===

====Baltic Fleet====
[[File:Kaliningrad 05-2017 img50 Oberpostdirektion building.jpg|thumb|Headquarters of the Baltic Fleet in Kaliningrad]]
{{Main|Baltic Fleet}}

The Baltic Fleet, established on 18 May 1703, is based in [[Baltiysk]] and [[Kronshtadt]], with its headquarters in the city of [[Kaliningrad]], [[Kaliningrad Oblast]]. The Fleet consists of the following units:<ref name="warfare.ru">[http://www.warfare.ru/?lang=&linkid=1720&catid=243&type=ssk State of the Russian Navy |ssk|Russian Arms, Military Technology, Analysis of Russia's Military Forces] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101204052152/http://warfare.ru/?lang=&linkid=1720&catid=243&type=ssk |date=4 December 2010 }}. Warfare.ru. Retrieved on 9 September 2010.</ref>
*[[Sovremenny-class destroyer|''Sovremenny''-class destroyer]] (1 in prolonged refit)
*[[Neustrashimy-class frigate|''Neustrashimy''-class frigate]] (2)
*[[Steregushchiy-class corvette|''Steregushchiy-''class multi-role corvette]] (4)
*[[Buyan-class corvette|Buyan-M-class corvette]] (3)
*[[Karakurt-class corvette]] (3)
*[[Tarantul-class corvette]] (6)
*[[Nanuchka-class corvette]] (4)
*[[Parchim-class corvette]] (6)
*[[Kilo-class submarine]] (1 assigned unit as of 2020)

The Baltic Fleet also includes patrol vessels, minehunters, amphibious ships and support vessels.

===Southern Military District – Southern Joint Strategic Command===
====Black Sea Fleet====
{{Main|Black Sea Fleet}}
[[File:Soviet and Russian Black Sea Fleet.jpg|thumb|right|400px|Some major ships of the Black Sea Fleet, including the ''[[Russian cruiser Moskva|Moskva]]'' (far left) and the ''Saratov'' (second right), in [[Sevastopol]], August 2007]]

The Black Sea Fleet, established on 2 May 1783, is based at the Sevastopol, Karantinnaya, and Streletskaya Bays in [[Sevastopol]] which is also the location of its headquarters, and at [[Novorossiysk]] in Krasnodar Kray. The fleet also has various other facilities on the [[Crimea|Crimean Peninsula]] and facilities in Krasnodar Kray. The Black Sea Fleet's flagship, the cruiser [[Russian cruiser Moskva|''Moskva'']], was [[Sinking of the Moskva|sunk]] on 14 April 2022 during the [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine]].<ref>{{Cite web |date=2022-04-15 |title=Russia says Moskva cruiser has sunk after reported Ukrainian missile strike |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/14/russia-moskva-cruiser-sunk-stormy-seas-defense-ministry |access-date=2022-04-15 |website=the Guardian |language=en |archive-date=14 April 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220414202148/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/14/russia-moskva-cruiser-sunk-stormy-seas-defense-ministry |url-status=live }}</ref> The [[Tapir-class landing ship|Tapir-class]] landing ship ''Saratov'' was also scuttled on 24 March 2022 after it was damaged in an attack.<ref>{{cite web |date=24 March 2022 |title=Russian Landing Ship Destroyed In Massive Explosion In Captured Ukrainian Port City |url=https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/44904/russian-landing-ship-destroyed-in-massive-explosion-in-captured-ukrainian-port-city |work=The Drive |access-date=6 February 2023 |archive-date=13 April 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220413141126/https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/44904/russian-landing-ship-destroyed-in-massive-explosion-in-captured-ukrainian-port-city |url-status=live }}</ref> The Fleet consists of the following units:<ref name="warfare.ru" />

*[[Admiral Grigorovich-class frigate|''Admiral Grigorovich''-class frigate]] (3)
*[[Krivak-class frigate|''Burevestnik'' (Krivak)-class frigate]] (2)
*[[Steregushchiy-class corvette|''Steregushchiy''-class multi-role corvette]] (1 on sea trials in the Baltic)
*[[Buyan-class corvette|Buyan-M-class corvette]] (4)
*[[Karakurt-class corvette]] (1 on sea trials)
*[[Project 22160 patrol ship|''Bykov''-class corvette/offshore patrol ship]] (4)
*[[Tarantul-class corvette]] (4)
*[[Bora-class hovercraft|''Bora''-class corvette]] (2)
*[[Grisha-class corvette]] (6)
*[[Kilo-class submarine]] (1)
*[[Kilo-class submarine#Project 636.3 units|Improved Kilo-class submarine]] (6)

The Black Sea Fleet also includes patrol and coastal protection vessels, amphibious ships, and support vessels.

====Operational Command South - Tartus====
{{main|Russian naval facility in Tartus}}
{{main|Permanent task force of the Russian Navy in the Mediterranean Sea}}

The Russian Navy maintains a base under the command of the Southern Military District in [[Syria]] at [[Tartus]]. The Mediterranean squadron was disestablished soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but a small naval logistics support facility remained there. In January 2017 Russia and Syria signed an agreement, to be valid for 49 years, to expand the Tartus facility with a view to improving the support at Tartus.<ref name="rabs">{{cite news |last1=kuimova |first1=alexandra |last2=wezeman |first2=siemon t. |title=RUSSIA AND BLACK SEA SECURITY |url=https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-12/bp_1812_black_sea_russia_0.pdf |publisher=SIPRI Background Paper |date=December 2018 |access-date=14 June 2022 |archive-date=28 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220728035711/https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-12/bp_1812_black_sea_russia_0.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref>

On 4 February 2022, naval detachments from the Northern Fleet and Baltic Fleet arrived at Tartus. Large amphibious assault ships ''Pyotr Morgunov'', ''Georgy Pobedonosets'', ''[[Olenegorsky Gornyak]]'', ''Korolyov'', ''Minsk'' and ''Kaliningrad'' were under the direction of Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral [[Nikolay Yevmenov]].<ref name="tass22">{{cite news |title=Russian naval ships arrive at Syria's Tartus in large-scale drills |url=https://tass.com/defense/1397811?utm_source=google.com&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=google.com&utm_referrer=google.com |publisher=TASS |date=4 February 2022 |access-date=14 June 2022 |archive-date=15 April 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220415001019/https://tass.com/defense/1397811?utm_source=google.com&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=google.com&utm_referrer=google.com |url-status=live }}</ref> In April 2022 there were around 20 Russian naval ships in the [[Mediterranean Sea]].<ref name="tarf24">{{cite news |title=NATO, Russia eye each other as both up forces in the Med |url=https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220422-nato-russia-eye-each-other-as-both-up-forces-in-the-med |publisher=France24 |date=22 April 2022 |access-date=14 June 2022 |archive-date=14 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220614191653/https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220422-nato-russia-eye-each-other-as-both-up-forces-in-the-med |url-status=live }}</ref> On 11 May it was reported that the flotilla had remained without change since early February. There were 13 ships and 5 support vessels of the four Russian fleets, including 9 attack missile ships. The formation of a "Mediterranean Squadron" of the Russian Navy in February 2022, using the Northern, Baltic, and Pacific Fleets' ships allowed the Russian Black Sea Fleet to return a large number of ships to the Black Sea some time prior to Russia’s attack on Ukraine. On 27 February three days after the commencement of the [[Russian invasion of Ukraine]] Turkey (who acts as guarantor of the [[Montreux Convention]]) decided to ban the passage through the straits of any warships whose homeport is not in the Black Sea.<ref name="bsn11.5">{{cite news |title=The Presence of Russian Warships in the Mediterranean Sea as of 10 May 2022 |url=https://www.blackseanews.net/en/read/189129 |publisher=Black Sea News |date=11 May 2022 |access-date=14 June 2022 |archive-date=7 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220707070359/https://www.blackseanews.net/en/read/189129 |url-status=live }}</ref>

====Caspian Flotilla====
{{Main|Caspian Flotilla}}

The Caspian Flotilla, established on 4 November 1722, is based in [[Astrakhan]] and [[Mahachkala|Makhachkala]] with its headquarters in Astrakhan. The Fleet consists of:<ref name="warfare.ru" />
*[[Gepard-class frigate|''Tatarstan''/Gepard-class frigate]] (2)
*[[Buyan-class corvette]] (3)
*[[Buyan-class corvette|Buyan-M-class corvette]] (3)
*[[Tarantul-class corvette]] (1)

The Caspian Flotilla also includes 4 small artillery ships, patrol and mine warfare ships as well as landing craft.

===Eastern Military District – Eastern Joint Strategic Command===

====Pacific Fleet====
{{Main|Pacific Fleet (Russia)}}

The Pacific Fleet, established on 10 May 1731, is headquartered in Vladivostok and based around [[Vladivostok]] and [[Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy]]. The Fleet consists of the following units:<ref name="warfare.ru" />
*[[Slava-class cruiser|''Slava''-class cruiser]] (1)
*[[Sovremenny-class destroyer|''Sovremennyy-''class destroyer]] (1 inactive since 2005; still reported in refit as of 2020)
*[[Udaloy-class destroyer|''Udaloy-''class destroyer]] (4)
*[[Steregushchiy-class corvette|''Steregushchiy''-class multi-role corvette]] (3, plus 1 in sea trials)
*[[Gremyashchiy-class corvette|''Gremyashchiy''-class multi-role corvette]] (1)
*[[Tarantul-class corvette]] (10)
*[[Grisha-class corvette]] (8)
*[[Nanuchka-class corvette]] (1-3)
*[[Borei-class submarine|''Dolgorukiy-''class submarine]] (4)
*[[Delta III-class submarine]] (1)
*[[Yasen-class submarine]] (1, plus 1 destined for the Pacific on sea trials in Northern Fleet operational area as of June 2022)
*[[Oscar-class submarine]] (5)
*[[Akula-class submarine|''Akula-''class submarine]] (4)
*[[Kilo-class submarine]] (6-7)
*[[Kilo-class submarine#Project 636.3 units|Improved Kilo-class submarine]] (4;<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://tass.com/defense/1519889|title=Latest diesel-electric sub built for Russian Pacific Fleet arrives in Vladivostok|website=TASS|access-date=11 October 2022|archive-date=11 October 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221011010944/https://tass.com/defense/1519889|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://seawaves.com/?p=17152|title=New Pacific Fleet Trio Visits Manila on Delivery Voyage – SeaWaves Magazine|access-date=17 November 2021|archive-date=17 November 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211117130513/https://seawaves.com/?p=17152|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://seawaves.com/2022/11/30/indonesian-navy-featured-at-sail-tidore-in-2022/|title=Indonesian Navy Featured at Sail Tidore in 2022|access-date=16 January 2023|archive-date=30 January 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230130163416/https://seawaves.com/2022/11/30/indonesian-navy-featured-at-sail-tidore-in-2022/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Project 636.3 diesel-electric submarine Volkhov entered service with Russian Navy |url=https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/2020/october/9193-project-636-3-diesel-electric-submarine-volkhov-entered-service-with-russian-navy.html |website=www.navyrecognition.com |access-date=27 October 2020 |archive-date=29 October 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201029100014/https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/2020/october/9193-project-636-3-diesel-electric-submarine-volkhov-entered-service-with-russian-navy.html |url-status=live }}</ref> the fourth boat was deployed in the Baltic as of November 2022)<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/naval-news/naval-news-archive/2022/november/12484-russian-navy-officially-commissions-kilo-class-submarine-ufa.html | title=Russian Navy officially commissions Kilo class submarine Ufa | access-date=16 November 2022 | archive-date=16 November 2022 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221116132732/https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/naval-news/naval-news-archive/2022/november/12484-russian-navy-officially-commissions-kilo-class-submarine-ufa.html | url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/naval-news/naval-news-archive/2022/july/11893-russian-improved-kilo-class-submarine-ufa-begins-sea-trials-in-baltic-sea.html | title=Russian Improved Kilo class submarine Ufa begins sea trials in Baltic Sea | access-date=18 August 2022 | archive-date=18 August 2022 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220818155757/https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/naval-news/naval-news-archive/2022/july/11893-russian-improved-kilo-class-submarine-ufa-begins-sea-trials-in-baltic-sea.html | url-status=live }}</ref>

The Pacific Fleet also includes patrol ships, mine warfare ships, amphibious ships, and support vessels. There are also naval aviation and coastal troops and naval infantry components.

==Future and modernization==
{{update|date=January 2023}}
{{Further|Future of the Russian Navy}}
[[File:International Maritime Defence Show 2011 (375-27).jpg|thumb|[[Lada-class submarine|Lada-class]] diesel-electric submarine [[Russian submarine Sankt Peterburg (B-585)|''Sankt Petersburg'']]]]

Russia's military budget expanded from 1998 until 2015, but economic problems including a sharp decline in oil prices led to budget cuts in 2016.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Hille |first=Kathrin |date=15 October 2014 |title=Russia's defence budget hit by slowdown |work=Financial Times |url=http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f6564f36-53a3-11e4-929b-00144feab7de.html |url-status=live |access-date=28 October 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141020181046/http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f6564f36-53a3-11e4-929b-00144feab7de.html |archive-date=20 October 2014}}</ref> Higher expenditure led to an increase in numbers of ships under construction, initially focusing on submarines, such as the conventional [[Lada-class submarine|''Petersburg'' (''Lada'')-class]] and nuclear [[Yasen-class submarine|''Severodvinsk'' (''Yasen'')-class]]. Some older vessels have been refitted as well. ''[[Jane's Fighting Ships]]'' commented in 2004 that the construction programme was too focused on Cold War scenarios, given the submarine emphasis.<ref>Foreword to ''[[Jane's Fighting Ships]] 2004–2005'', p.30</ref>

According to the Russian Defence Ministry, share of modern armament in the Navy has reached more than 50% in 2014.<ref>{{Cite news |title=Шойгу: оснащенность Российской армии современным оружием и техникой за год выросла на 7% |work=Тасс |url=http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/1660936 |url-status=live |access-date=10 October 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160305190713/http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/1660936 |archive-date=5 March 2016}}</ref> A report from December 2019 estimated the figure at 68%.<ref>{{Cite web |date=16 July 2015 |title=Восемь МБР приняты на вооружение в интересах РВСН во втором квартале |url=http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20150716/1132598887.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171009215251/https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20150716/1132598887.html |archive-date=9 October 2017 |access-date=10 October 2017}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=ЦАМТО / Новости / Выступление министра обороны РФ генерала армии Сергея Шойгу на расширенном заседании Коллегии Минобороны |url=http://www.armstrade.org/includes/periodics/news/2016/1222/161038788/detail.shtml |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171009210744/http://www.armstrade.org/includes/periodics/news/2016/1222/161038788/detail.shtml |archive-date=9 October 2017 |access-date=10 October 2017 |website=www.armstrade.org}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Remarks by Chief of General Staff of the Russian Federation General of the Army Valery Gerasimov at the Russian Defence Ministry's board session (November 7, 2017) : Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation |url=http://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12149743@egNews# |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171109191754/http://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12149743@egNews |archive-date=9 November 2017 |access-date=9 November 2017}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=ЦАМТО / Новости / ВМФ за год пополнился 19 боевыми кораблями и судами обеспечения |url=https://armstrade.org/includes/periodics/news/2019/1227/171056062/detail.shtml |website=armstrade.org |access-date=26 May 2021 |archive-date=26 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210526194120/https://armstrade.org/includes/periodics/news/2019/1227/171056062/detail.shtml |url-status=live }}</ref> However, in September 2020 it was reported that the defence budget was to be cut by 5% as part of a shift to social spending and in response the financial impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.<ref name="overtdefense.com">{{Cite web |date=22 September 2020 |title=Russian Defense Spending to Be Cut Due to Economic Woes and Upcoming Election |url=https://www.overtdefense.com/2020/09/22/russian-defense-spending-to-be-cut-due-to-economic-woes-and-upcoming-election/ |access-date=25 September 2020 |archive-date=6 October 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201006231448/https://www.overtdefense.com/2020/09/22/russian-defense-spending-to-be-cut-due-to-economic-woes-and-upcoming-election/ |url-status=live }}</ref> The resulting impact of such a cut on Russian Navy modernization plans was not immediately apparent. Likely more significant is the impact of sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation after 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. In 2021, Russian Security Council Secretary [[Nikolai Patrushev]] reportedly acknowledged that the Russian defence industry “is still dependent on foreign technologies.” The impact of western sanctions on naval procurement projects, given both reduced access to foreign technologies and significant pressure on the defence budget, had yet to be determined.<ref>{{Cite web | url=https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/05/sanctions-targeting-russias-defense-sector-will-they.html | title=Sanctions Targeting Russia's Defense Sector: Will They Influence Its Behavior? | date=20 May 2021 | access-date=2 April 2022 | archive-date=28 April 2022 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220428013807/https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/05/sanctions-targeting-russias-defense-sector-will-they.html | url-status=live }}</ref>

[[File:Admiral Gorshkov frigate 02.jpg|thumb|[[Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate|Admiral Gorshkov-class]] guided missile frigate [[Russian frigate Admiral Gorshkov|''Admiral Gorshkov'']], commissioned in 2018]]

[[File:Schiff «Burya» 03.jpg|thumb|A [[Karakurt-class corvette|Karakurt-class]] guided-missile corvette, capable of launching [[Kalibr (missile family)|Kalibr]] or [[P-800 Oniks|Oniks]] supersonic cruise missiles]]

The [[Steregushchiy-class corvette|''Steregushchiy''-class corvettes]], the lead ship of which was laid down on 21 December 2001, is the first new surface construction since the collapse of the Soviet Union,<ref>Foreword to ''[[Jane's Fighting Ships]], 2002–2003'', p. 79.</ref> while the new [[Admiral Sergei Gorshkov class frigate]]s marks the first attempt of the Navy to return to the construction of large blue water capable vessels.{{cn|date=February 2023}} The Russian Navy had been planning to procure a new class of destroyer, the general-purpose [[Project 21956]]. The Lider-class has been envisaged as a "green water" vessel and was anticipated to be nuclear-powered.<ref>{{Cite web |date=21 October 2014 |title=New-generation missile destroyer under development in Russia |url=http://en.itar-tass.com/russia/755539 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141024041212/http://en.itar-tass.com/russia/755539 |archive-date=24 October 2014 |access-date=28 October 2014 |publisher=TASS}}</ref>

The project was reportedly suspended in 2020, apparently in favour of the less expensive Project 22350 Admiral Gorshkov-class frigates.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Manaranche |first=Martin |date=27 April 2020 |title=Russia postpones Leader destroyer construction – Part 1 |url=https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/04/russia-postpones-leader-destroyer-construction-part-1/ |access-date=8 September 2020 |archive-date=15 August 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200815132756/https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/04/russia-postpones-leader-destroyer-construction-part-1/ |url-status=live }}</ref> The Gorshkov-class vessels have themselves experienced technical challenges and in 2020 it was initially suggested that the larger 22350M variant of that class would not be proceeding.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Leadership: The Cancel Culture |url=https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htlead/articles/20200523.aspx |website=www.strategypage.com |access-date=16 September 2020 |archive-date=4 December 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201204193740/https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htlead/articles/20200523.aspx |url-status=live }}</ref> However, it was later reported that design work on both the Lider and the 22350M variant of the Gorshkov-class was in fact moving forward.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Russian Shipbuilding Officials Outlined Future for Project 22350/22350M Frigates |url=http://mil.today/2020/Industry4/ |website=Mil.Today |access-date=26 May 2021 |archive-date=26 May 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210526194153/http://mil.today/2020/Industry4/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Military Watch Magazine |url=https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russia-s-ambitious-shkval-nuclear-powered-destroyer-program-isn-t-dead-yet |website=militarywatchmagazine.com |access-date=29 December 2020 |archive-date=11 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210211210924/https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/russia-s-ambitious-shkval-nuclear-powered-destroyer-program-isn-t-dead-yet |url-status=live }}</ref>

[[File:«Александр Невский» в Вилючинске.jpg|thumb|[[Borei-class submarine|Borei-class]] nuclear ballistic missile submarine [[Russian submarine Alexander Nevsky (K-550)|''Alexander Nevsky'']]]]

In keeping with the emphasis on strategic forces, the Navy's submarine fleet is being modernized by the acquisition of several classes of strategic and tactical submarines. Up to 12 [[Borei-class submarine|Borei/Dolgorukiy-class SSBNs]] are planned to replace older classes in both the Northern and Pacific fleets.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/naval-news/naval-news-archive/2021/december/11177-two-project-955a-borei-a-class-ballistic-missile-submarines-will-be-laid-down-in-2023.html|title=Two Project 955A Borei-A class ballistic missile submarines will be laid down in 2023|website=Navy Recognition|access-date=10 January 2022|archive-date=28 December 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211228204016/https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/naval-news/naval-news-archive/2021/december/11177-two-project-955a-borei-a-class-ballistic-missile-submarines-will-be-laid-down-in-2023.html|url-status=live}}</ref> These are being complemented by new [[Yasen-class|Yasen]] and [[Khabarovsk-class submarine|Khabarovsk-class SSGN]]s, as well as conventional submarines of the [[Kilo-class submarine|Improved Kilo]] and [[Lada-class submarine|Lada]] classes. However, in terms of the tactical nuclear submarine fleet, it is unclear whether the new Yasen-class, Khabarovsk-class, and potential follow-on models, can be produced in sufficient numbers, and on a timely basis, to replace aging older model nuclear submarines on a one-for-one basis. It has been reported that Russian third-generation nuclear submarines have not been modernized to a level to avoid block obsolescence before 2030.<ref>{{Cite news |title=Russian Navy postpones upgrade of third-generation nuclear submarines |url=https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/focus-analysis/9055-russian-navy-postpones-upgrade-of-third-generation-nuclear-submarines.html |website=Navy Recognition |access-date=2 October 2020 |archive-date=25 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210225135949/https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/focus-analysis/9055-russian-navy-postpones-upgrade-of-third-generation-nuclear-submarines.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

On 28 April 2010, the [[Verkhovna Rada|Ukrainian parliament]] ratified an agreement to extend Russia's lease of Crimean base facilities to 2042 with an option for five more years, through 2047.<ref>{{Cite web |title=YouTube |url=https://www.youtube.com/watchv=35vpFAE4n08 |website=[[YouTube]]}}</ref> Following the invasion and subsequent [[Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation|annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014]], this agreement has been officially invalidated by the [[State Duma|Russian State Duma]]. The Russian Navy has also revealed that the Russia's Black Sea Fleet will receive 30 new ships by 2020 and will become self-sufficient with its own infrastructure in the [[Crimea|Crimean peninsula]]. The fleet will be updated with new warships, submarines, and auxiliary vessels within the next six years. The new ships built for the Black Sea Fleet include three [[Admiral Grigorovich-class frigate|''Admiral Grigorovich''-class frigate]]s (originally six, but two of the remaining three were sold to India and in 2021 it was reported that a third ship would also be sold abroad)<ref>{{Cite web |date=24 September 2021 |title=Последний фрегат проекта 11356 продадут за рубеж |url=https://ria.ru/20210924/fregat-1751563463.html |access-date=3 October 2021 |archive-date=27 September 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210927100744/https://ria.ru/20210924/fregat-1751563463.html |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Gady |first=Franz-Stefan |title=Russia to Deliver 2 Guided-Missile Frigates to India by 2024 |url=https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/russia-to-deliver-2-guided-missile-frigates-to-india-by-2024/ |website=thediplomat.com |access-date=28 December 2020 |archive-date=19 January 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210119095347/https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/russia-to-deliver-2-guided-missile-frigates-to-india-by-2024/ |url-status=live }}</ref> and six Varshavyanka-class (Improved Kilo-class) diesel-electric submarines.<ref>{{Cite web |date=9 January 2019 |title=The Naval Power Shift in the Black Sea |url=https://warontherocks.com/2019/01/the-naval-power-shift-in-the-black-sea/ |website=War on the Rocks |access-date=28 December 2020 |archive-date=20 January 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210120234107/https://warontherocks.com/2019/01/the-naval-power-shift-in-the-black-sea/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

On 27 December 2015, state-owned [[United Shipbuilding Corporation]] declared that by 2019 the company would have the technical ability to build aircraft and helicopter carriers, which came as some surprise to analysts as previously the company had stated carrier-building would not take place until 2025 at the earliest. Russia's only existing carrier, the Soviet era ''Admiral Kuznetsov'' will remain in service at least until 2030.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Fedoseyev |first=Lev |date=27 December 2015 |title=''Russian state shipbuilder expected to be able to build aircraft carriers as of 2019'' |url=http://tass.ru/en/defense/847215 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151230072907/http://tass.ru/en/defense/847215 |archive-date=30 December 2015 |access-date=30 December 2015 |publisher=ITAR-TASS}}</ref>

In a May 2017, ten year defence review the development of a new aircraft carrier and nuclear powered destroyers was cancelled in favour of concentrating modernisation efforts on the nuclear triad. Development of a sixth generation SSBN was announced even though the fifth generation Borei class are still under construction as was a fleet of sub-frigate sized surface combatants.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Bodner |first=Matthew |date=8 August 2017 |title=Russia's Putin drafts new rearmament program |url=http://www.defensenews.com/articles/russias-putin-drafts-new-rearmament-program |access-date=10 October 2017}}</ref>

On 14 July 2021, shipyard Sevmash announced that for the first time in decades several nuclear submarines of different projects are undergoing sea trials.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/11898417|title=Несколько построенных на "Севмаше" атомных подлодок вышли на испытания в море - ТАСС|website=TACC|access-date=24 September 2021|archive-date=24 September 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210924105001/https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/11898417|url-status=live}}</ref> In the summer 2021, three nuclear submarines were undergoing sea trials simultaneously: ''Borei II'' class ''Knyaz Oleg'', ''Yasen-M'' class ''Novosibirsk'' and modernized ''Antey'' class ''Belgorod''. The last time in Russia or Soviet Union nuclear submarines of three different classes were undergoing sea trials was 1993, when ''Improved Akula'' class ''Tigr'', ''Antey'' class ''Omsk'' and ''Sierra II'' class ''Pskov'' were undergoing sea trials. The increased intensity of sea trials taking place indicates enhanced shipbuilding in Russian Navy.

On January 12, 2023, The Russian Northern Fleet announced in a press release that the [[3M22 Zircon]] hypersonic missile-equipped Admiral Gorshkov Frigate successfully sailed through the English Channel to carry out its assigned duties in the Atlantic Ocean.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://theigmp.org/teasing-uk-nato-russian-warship-armed-with-zircon-hypersonic-missiles-sails-through-the-english-channel/|title=Teasing UK & NATO, Russian warship armed with Zircon Hypersonic Missiles sails through The English Channel|website=IgMp|access-date=13 January 2023|archive-date=7 May 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230507085653/https://theigmp.org/teasing-uk-nato-russian-warship-armed-with-zircon-hypersonic-missiles-sails-through-the-english-channel/|url-status=live}}</ref>

==Main Naval Parade in St. Petersburg==
{{Main|Navy Day (Russia)|Culture of the Russian Armed Forces}}
[[File:NavalParade2017 01.jpg|thumb|Passage of warships to [[Kronstadt]]]]
Since 2017, by the decree of the President of Russia dated 27 July 2017,<ref>{{Cite web |title=Главный военно-морской парад в Санкт-Петербурге |url=http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55192 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180728191442/http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55192 |archive-date=28 July 2018 |access-date=28 July 2018}}</ref> the tradition of holding the "Main Naval Parade" in St. Petersburg on the Navy Day has been restored. Prior to 2017, in Soviet and Russian Federation times the previously held annual St. Petersburg Navy Day parade was not so specifically named. The parade is composed of ships and sailors representing the several fleets and the Caspian Flotilla with small ships and submarines in the Neva River and the larger ones arrayed off Kronshtadt in the Gulf of St. Petersburg. It is celebrated annually on the last Sunday of July during the [[Navy Day (Russia)|Navy Day]] holiday.

==Deployments from 2018==
[[File:Tactical exercises of the Russian Navy.jpg|thumb|The nuclear-powered missile cruiser ''Peter the Great'' during a naval exercise]]

===Ocean Shield===
In the years 2018–2021, the Russian Navy has been organizing central annual naval exercise called Ocean Shield.

Between 1–8 September 2018, Ocean Shield exercise was held for the first time. Unlike 2019 and 2020 exercises, conducted in the Baltic Sea, the first exercise took place in the Mediterranean Sea. 26 ships, 2 submarines and 34 aircraft were included.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2 November 2018 |title=Shoigu: "Ocean Shield" exercise in Mediterranean will become permanent/ |url=https://www.kp.ru/daily/26903.7/3948110/ |access-date=12 July 2021 |website=kp.ru |archive-date=12 July 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210712125856/https://www.kp.ru/daily/26903.7/3948110/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Among participants were cruiser ''Marshal Ustinov'', destroyers ''Smetlivy'' and ''Severomorsk'', frigates ''Admiral Grigorovich'', ''Admiral Essen'', ''Admiral Makarov'', ''Pytlivy'' and ''Yaroslav Mudry'', corvettes ''Vishny Volochyok'', ''Grad Sviyazhsk'' and ''Veliky Ustyug'' and conventional submarines ''Kolpino'' and ''Velikiy Novgorod''.<ref name="rg.ru">{{Cite news |date=3 December 2018 |title=Черноморский флот получит 18 новых кораблей |url=https://rg.ru/2018/12/03/reg-ufo/chernomorskij-flot-poluchit-18-novyh-korablej.html |access-date=12 July 2021 |newspaper=Российская Газета |archive-date=12 July 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210712131730/https://rg.ru/2018/12/03/reg-ufo/chernomorskij-flot-poluchit-18-novyh-korablej.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

The aircraft present included Tu-160 bombers, Tu-142 and Il-38 anti-submarine aircraft and Su-33 and MiG-29K maritime fighters. This was the largest Russian naval exercise in the Mediterranean Sea of the post-Cold War era and the largest Russian post-Cold War naval exercise in the far sea zone. In terms of distant location and number of capital ships participating it's comparable only to June 2021 exercises of the Pacific Fleet off the Hawaii islands.<ref name="rg.ru" />

Organized between 1–9 August 2019, the second Ocean Shield exercise was the exercise with the largest number of participating ships (69 ships, including 49 warships and 20 support ships) in the independent Russia and took place in the Baltic Sea. The 22 known ships of the exercise "Ocean Shield 2019" include cruiser ''Marshal Ustinov'', destroyer ''Severomorsk'' and frigate ''Admiral Gorshkov'' of the Northern Fleet, as well as Baltic Fleet's frigate ''Yaroslav Mudry'', corvettes ''Steregushchy'', ''Soobrazitelny'',<ref>{{Cite news |date=27 September 2019 |title=Гвардейский почерк |language=en |url=http://redstar.ru/gvardejskij-pocherk/ |access-date=13 June 2021 |archive-date=13 June 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210613081844/http://redstar.ru/gvardejskij-pocherk/ |url-status=dead }}</ref> ''Stoykiy'', ''Boikiy'', ''Passat'', ''Geyzer'', ''Serpukhov'', ''Mitishchi'', ''Chuvashiya'', ''Morshansk'', ''Liven'', ''Urengoy'', R-257 and LSTs ''Aleksandr Shabalin'', ''Kaliningrad'', ''Minsk'' and ''Korolyov'',<ref>Strazh Baltiki, 9 August 2019, p. 4 https://sc.mil.ru/files/morf/military/archive/SB_09_08_19.pdf {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210613075527/https://sc.mil.ru/files/morf/military/archive/SB_09_08_19.pdf |date=13 June 2021 }}</ref> as well as nuclear submarine ''Smolensk''.<ref>{{Cite news |date=3 August 2019 |title=Russian navy group, nuclear sub, sail north along coast of Norway |language=en |url=https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2019/08/russian-navy-group-nuclear-sub-sail-north-along-coast-norway |access-date=13 June 2021 |archive-date=6 August 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200806035333/https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2019/08/russian-navy-group-nuclear-sub-sail-north-along-coast-norway |url-status=live }}</ref> Other possible participants include ships, participating in the July Naval Parade in St. Petersburg, i.e. frigate ''Admiral Kasatonov'', corvettes ''Gremyashchy'' and ''Sovetsk'', submarine ''Kronshtadt'' and minesweepers ''Ivan Antonov'', ''Aleksandr Obukhov'' and ''Pavel Khenov''.<ref>http://bastion-karpenko.ru/VVT/GL_VMF_PARAD_190722_02.jpg {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211009192059/http://bastion-karpenko.ru/VVT/GL_VMF_PARAD_190722_02.jpg |date=9 October 2021 }} {{Bare URL image|date=March 2022}}</ref>

On 3 August 2020, third Ocean Shield exercise started in the Baltic Sea and included Northern Fleet's destroyer ''Vice-Admiral Kulakov'' and LST ''Pyotr Morgunov'' and Baltic Fleet's corvettes ''Steregushchy'', ''Boikiy'' and ''Stoikiy''.<ref>{{Cite news |date=24 August 2020 |title=Ocean Shield 2020 - After action report |language=en |url=https://russianfleetanalysis.blogspot.com/2020/08/ocean-shield-2020-after-action-report.html |access-date=13 July 2021 |archive-date=15 July 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210715141321/https://russianfleetanalysis.blogspot.com/2020/08/ocean-shield-2020-after-action-report.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

===Combined-fleet exercises===
====June 2021====
In 2021, no usual Ocean Shield exercise was conducted in August or September in the Baltic Sea. However, in June, the Pacific, Northern and Black Sea fleets conducted large-scale exercises. In mid June, four Russian cruisers and four destroyers were simultaneously at sea, or all operational large surface combatants except destroyer ''Severomorsk'', which was probably the first time in the post-Cold war era. A complex large-scale exercise took place in the central Pacific Ocean, where the Russian Navy conducted possibly the strongest exercise of the post-Soviet era.

It took place prior to the 2021 Putin-Biden summit, similarly to Aport and Atrina exercises that were held in 1985 and 1987 prior to the Geneva and Washington summits of Gorbachev and Reagan to improve Soviet negotiation position. Officially, however, it was stated that the exercise is an answer to the exercise Agile Dagger 2021 of the US Pacific Fleet, employing one third of the operational submarines of the US Pacific Fleet.

In the Barents Sea, cruisers ''Marshal Ustinov'' and ''Pyotr Veliky'', destroyer ''Vice-admiral Kulakov'' and submarines ''Kaluga'', ''Gepard'' and ''Dmitry Donskoy'' were active.<ref>{{Cite news |date=1 June 2021 |title=Russian Navy guided missile ships deploy to Barents Sea for drills |language=en |url=https://tass.com/defense/1296671 |access-date=12 June 2021 |archive-date=1 June 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210601145224/https://tass.com/defense/1296671 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=15 June 2021 |title=Russian Navy anti-submarine ship attacks enemy sub with torpedoes in Arctic drills |language=en |url=https://tass.com/defense/1302893 |access-date=15 June 2021 |archive-date=17 June 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210617042627/https://tass.com/defense/1302893 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=16 June 2021 |title=ДЭПЛ "Калуга" взяла на себя роль вражеской подлодки |language=ru |url=https://flot.com/2021/%D0%A1%D0%B5%D0%B2%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%BD%D1%8B%D0%B9%D0%A4%D0%BB%D0%BE%D1%8229/ |access-date=17 June 2021 |archive-date=25 June 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210625175922/https://flot.com/2021/%D0%A1%D0%B5%D0%B2%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%BD%D1%8B%D0%B9%D0%A4%D0%BB%D0%BE%D1%8229/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=17 June 2021 |title=Подлодка "Гепард" выполнила стрельбы противолодочной ракетой на учениях в Баренцевом море |language=ru |url=https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/11673441 |access-date=17 June 2021 |archive-date=19 June 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210619181121/https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/11673441 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=19 June 2021 |title=Военные закрывали район Белого моря для маневров с участием самой большой в мире атомной подлодки |language=en |url=https://www.militarynews.ru/story.asp?rid=1&nid=551926&lang=RU |access-date=19 June 2021 |archive-date=10 August 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230810101137/https://www.militarynews.ru/story.asp?rid=1&nid=551926&lang=RU |url-status=live }}</ref>
[[Image:North Pacific location map 2.svg|thumb|The location of the exercise in the Pacific Ocean in the vicinity of 23°, -170°]]

Between 7 and 24 June, a large-scale exercise was conducted by the Pacific Fleet in the central Pacific Ocean, being the first post-Cold war Russian naval exercise in that area (minor exceptions being destroyer ''Admiral Panteleev'' taking part in RIMPAC-2012 exercise and frigate ''Admiral Gorshkov'' sailing near Hawaii in 2019<ref name="TASS">{{Cite web |date=19 August 2019 |title=Russia's Northern Fleet warships return home after round-the-globe deployment |url=https://tass.com/defense/1074054 |access-date=17 February 2020 |website=[[TASS]] |archive-date=2 December 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191202053924/https://tass.com/defense/1074054 |url-status=live }}</ref>). It included cruiser ''Varyag'', destroyers ''Marshal Shaposhnikov'' and ''Admiral Panteleyev'', corvettes ''Sovershenny'', ''Gromky'' and ''Aldar Tsydenzhapov'',<ref>{{Cite news |date=10 June 2021 |title=RF Navy's Pacific Fleet conducts operational exercise in the central Pacific |language=en |url=https://en.portnews.ru/news/314103/ |access-date=12 June 2021 |archive-date=13 June 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210613072203/https://en.portnews.ru/news/314103/ |url-status=live }}</ref> (a) nuclear submarine(s) (likely ''Omsk''<ref>{{Cite web |title=На Камчатке торжественно встретили атомный подводный крейсер "Омск" после выполнения задач в море : Министерство обороны Российской Федерации |url=https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12375483@egNews |website=function.mil.ru}}</ref> and ''Kuzbass''<ref>{{Cite web |title=Подводная лодка К-419, "Морж", "Кузбасс". Проект 971 |url=http://www.deepstorm.ru/DeepStorm.files/45-92/nts/971/K-419/K-419.htm |publisher=Deepstorm.ru |accessdate=2022-02-09 |archive-date=30 April 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130430024613/http://www.deepstorm.ru/DeepStorm.files/45-92/nts/971/K-419/K-419.htm |url-status=live }}</ref>) and intelligence ship ''Kareliya''.<ref>{{Cite news |date=21 June 2021 |title=Корабли ТОФ на учениях отработали уничтожение авианосной группы условного противника |language=en |url=https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/11702139 |access-date=21 June 2021 |archive-date=10 August 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230810101610/https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/11702139 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=26 May 2021 |title=UPDATED: Russian Navy Surveillance Ship Quietly Operating Off Hawaii - USNI News |url=https://news.usni.org/2021/05/26/russian-navy-surveillance-ship-quietly-operating-off-hawaii |access-date=7 August 2021 |archive-date=10 August 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230810101704/https://news.usni.org/2021/05/26/russian-navy-surveillance-ship-quietly-operating-off-hawaii |url-status=live }}</ref>

The exercise started in the central Pacific Ocean on 10 June, and on 21 June the ships 2500 nautical miles southeast of the Kuril islands simulated an attack on the enemy carrier strike group. Prior to that, the ships operated in two groups, sailing at 300 nautical miles from each other, one of them playing the role of enemy. The largest auxiliary ship of the Russian Navy ''Marshal Krylov'' also took part in the exercise and acted as a command ship for the commander of the exercise, rear admiral Konstantin Kabantsev, commander of Primorskaya Flotilla, as well as hospital ship ''Irtysh''<ref>{{Cite news |date=10 June 2021 |title=Крейсер, фрегат, корветы: кадры больших Тихоокеанских учений российского флота |language=en |url=https://tvzvezda.ru/news/20216101134-5PRPN.html |access-date=14 June 2021 |archive-date=10 August 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230810101628/https://tvzvezda.ru/news/20216101134-5PRPN.html |url-status=live }}</ref> and MiG-31 interceptors and Il-38 and Tu-142 anti-submarine aircraft.

On 24 June, the final day of the exercise, three Tu-95 bombers, several Tu-22M bombers, escorted by interceptors MiG-31BM and two Il-78 tankers flied to the central Pacific Ocean as well. The Tu-95s delivered conditional strikes against enemy's critical infrastructure and Tu-22M delivered strikes against enemy's conditional carrier strike group together with ''Varyag'' and ''Marshal Shaposhnikov''.<ref>{{Cite news |date=24 June 2021 |title=Военные отработали нанесение удара по противнику в дальней зоне на учениях в Тихом океане |language=ru |url=https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/11736499 |access-date=24 June 2021 |archive-date=10 August 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230810101635/https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/11736499 |url-status=live }}</ref>

An additional destroyer ''Admiral Tributs'' was deployed to the South China Sea, accompanying nuclear submarine ''Nerpa''.

On 18 June 2021, the Black Sea Fleet deployed cruiser ''Moskva'' to the Mediterranean Sea,<ref>{{Cite news |date=18 June 2021 |title=Крейсер "Москва" и фрегат "Адмирал Эссен" направились в Средиземное море |language=ru |url=https://flot.com/2021/%D0%A7%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B9%D0%A4%D0%BB%D0%BE%D1%8236/ |access-date=19 June 2021 |archive-date=24 June 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210624203338/https://flot.com/2021/%D0%A7%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B9%D0%A4%D0%BB%D0%BE%D1%8236/ |url-status=live }}</ref> which, amid deployment of [[HMS Queen Elizabeth (R08)|''Queen Elizabeth'']] to the Eastern Mediterranean, took part in an unprecedented anti-ship exercise with bombers Tu-22M and interceptors MiG-31K both deployed to Syria for the first time in May and June. A MiG-31K reportedly fired a [[Kh-47M2 Kinzhal|Kinzhal]] missile against a ground target in Syria,<ref>{{Cite web |date=29 June 2021 |title=Истребитель МиГ-31К нанёс удар гиперзвуковой ракетой "Кинжал" по неизвестной цели в Сирии |url=https://avia.pro/news/istrebitel-mig-31k-nanyos-udar-giperzvukovoy-raketoy-kinzhal-po-neizvestnoy-celi-v-sirii |access-date=2 July 2021 |website=avia.pro |language=ru |archive-date=9 July 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210709182427/https://avia.pro/news/istrebitel-mig-31k-nanyos-udar-giperzvukovoy-raketoy-kinzhal-po-neizvestnoy-celi-v-sirii |url-status=live }}</ref> while a newest air defence system [[S-500 missile system|S-500]] was reportedly tested at Khmeymim airbase and obtained a lock on F-35 fighter from ''Queen Elizabeth''.<ref>{{Cite web |date=1 July 2021 |title=Неизвестная система ПВО, размещённая на авиабазе "Хмеймим", перепугала НАТО |url=https://avia.pro/news/neizvestnaya-sistema-pvo-razmeshchyonnaya-na-aviabaze-hmeymim-perepugala-nato |access-date=2 July 2021 |website=avia.pro |language=ru |archive-date=2 July 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210702051845/https://avia.pro/news/neizvestnaya-sistema-pvo-razmeshchyonnaya-na-aviabaze-hmeymim-perepugala-nato |url-status=live }}</ref> The exercise included rocket fire 30 km away from ''Queen Elizabeth''.<ref>{{Cite web |date=26 June 2021 |title=Russia to conduct rocket fire 30 km away from the British aircraft carrier |url=https://frontierindia.com/russia-to-conduct-rocket-fire-30-km-away-from-the-british-aircraft-carrier/ |access-date=2 July 2021 |website=frontierindia.com |language=en |archive-date=26 June 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210626031346/https://frontierindia.com/russia-to-conduct-rocket-fire-30-km-away-from-the-british-aircraft-carrier/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

====January–February 2022====
In January–February 2022 large-scale exercise of all Russian fleets took place with some 140 warships and support ships.

In the Northern Fleet it included two task groups. First, cruiser ''Marshal Ustinov'', destroyer ''Vice-Admiral Kulakov'' and frigate ''Admiral Kasatonov'', as well as tanker ''Vyazma'' and tug SB-406 were deployed to the southwest of Ireland, conducting first Russian post-Cold war naval exercise west of British isles.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Russian Northern Fleet's naval group deploys to Barents Sea for Arctic drills - Military & Defense |url=https://tass.com/defense/1393131 |publisher=TASS |accessdate=2022-02-09 |archive-date=26 January 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220126111149/https://tass.com/defense/1393131 |url-status=live }}</ref> Second, destroyer ''Severomorsk'', frigate ''Admiral Gorshkov'', LST ''Ivan Gren'', nuclear submarine ''Severodvinsk'', diesel-electric submarine ''Kaluga'', corvettes ''Snezhnogorsk'' and ''Brest'', as well as support ships operated in the Barents Sea.<ref>{{Cite web |last=п©я─п╣я│я│-я│п╩я┐п╤п╠п╟ п║п╓ |date=2022-01-26 |title=п▓ п░я─п╨я┌п╦п╨п╣ п╫п╟я┤п╟п╩п╦я│я▄ я┐я┤п╣п╫п╦я▐ п║п╣п╡п╣я─п╫п╬пЁп╬ я└п╩п╬я┌п╟ п╦ я█п╨я│п©п╣п╢п╦я├п╦п╬п╫п╫п╬п╧ пЁя─я┐п©п©п╦я─п╬п╡п╨п╦ - п≤п░ REGNUM |url=https://regnum.ru/news/polit/3487500.html |publisher=Regnum.ru |accessdate=2022-02-09 |archive-date=26 January 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220126111152/https://regnum.ru/news/polit/3487500.html |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2022-01-28 |title=Малые противолодочные корабли Северного флота отработали поиск и атаку подводной лодки в Баренцевом море : Министерство обороны Российской Федерации |url=https://structure.mil.ru/structure/forces/navy/news/more.htm?id=12405696@egNews |publisher=Structure.mil.ru |accessdate=2022-02-09 |archive-date=28 January 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220128130020/https://structure.mil.ru/structure/forces/navy/news/more.htm?id=12405696@egNews |url-status=live }}</ref> Additionally, three LSTs were deploying to the Black Sea (''Olenogorsky Gornyak'', ''Georgiy Pobedonosets'' and ''Pyotr Morgunov'').<ref>{{Cite web |last=Newdick |first=Thomas |date=2022-01-19 |title=Flotilla Of Russian Landing Ships Has Entered The English Channel |url=https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/43942/flotilla-of-russian-amphibious-warships-has-entered-the-english-channel |publisher=Thedrive.com |accessdate=2022-02-09 |archive-date=26 January 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220126114245/https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/43942/flotilla-of-russian-amphibious-warships-has-entered-the-english-channel |url-status=live }}</ref>

In the Pacific Fleet, cruiser ''Varyag'', destroyer ''Admiral Tributs'' and tanker ''Boris Butoma'' were deployed to the Indian Ocean, participating in the third Russo-Sino-Iranian naval exercise, first Russo-Chinese naval exercise away from Russian/Chinese coast that took place in the western Indian Ocean and will finally strengthen Mediterranean squadron. Additionally, submarine ''Volkhov'' fired a Kalibr missile in the Sea of Japan<ref>{{Cite web |title=Russian sub live-fires Kalibr cruise missile from submerged position in Sea of Japan - Military & Defense |url=https://tass.com/defense/1390859 |publisher=TASS |accessdate=2022-02-09 |archive-date=10 August 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230810101613/https://tass.com/defense/1390859 |url-status=live }}</ref> and two Tu-142 performed flight above the Okhotsk Sea.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2022-01-28 |title=Crews of anti-submarine aircraft of the Pacific Fleet performed training flights over the Sea of Okhotsk - ВПК.name |url=https://vpk.name/en/575181_crews-of-anti-submarine-aircraft-of-the-pacific-fleet-performed-training-flights-over-the-sea-of-okhotsk.html |publisher=Vpk.name |accessdate=2022-02-09 |archive-date=28 January 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220128165404/https://vpk.name/en/575181_crews-of-anti-submarine-aircraft-of-the-pacific-fleet-performed-training-flights-over-the-sea-of-okhotsk.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

In the Baltic Fleet, corvettes ''Soobrazitelny'' and ''Stoykiy'' were deployed to the Northern Sea,<ref>{{Cite web |last=13:18, 24 января 2022 |date=2022-01-24 |title=Корабли Балтфлота вышли в море на крупные учения |url=https://www.interfax.ru/russia/818021 |publisher=Interfax.ru |accessdate=2022-02-09 |archive-date=26 January 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220126111150/https://www.interfax.ru/russia/818021 |url-status=live }}</ref> while ''Zeleny Dol'', ''Mytishchi'', ''Odintsovo'', ''Aleksin'', ''Kabardino-Balkariya''<ref>{{Cite web |title=п²п·п▓п·п║п╒п≤ п▓п÷п , п≤п║п╒п·п═п≤п╞ п·п═пёп√п≤п╞, п▓п·п∙п²п²п░п╞ п╒п∙п╔п²п≤п п░, п▒п░п║п╒п≤п·п², п▓п·п∙п²п²п·-п╒п∙п╔п²п≤п╖п∙п║п п≤п≥ п║п▒п·п═п²п≤п . BASTION, MILITARY-TECHNICAL COLLECTION. MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX NEWS, HISTORY OF WEAPONS, MILITARY EQUIPMENT |url=http://bastion-karpenko.ru/ |publisher=Bastion-karpenko.ru |accessdate=2022-02-09 |archive-date=22 June 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210622223103/http://bastion-karpenko.ru/ |url-status=live }}</ref> were active in the Baltic Sea.<ref>{{Cite web |last=п©я─п╣я│я│-я│п╩я┐п╤п╠п╟ п≈п▓п· |date=2022-01-26 |title=п п╬я─п╟п╠п╩п╦ п▒п╟п╩я┌п╦п╧я│п╨п╬пЁп╬ я└п╩п╬я┌п╟ п©я─п╬п╡п╣п╩п╦ я┐я│п©п╣я┬п╫я▀п╣ п╟я─я┌п╦п╩п╩п╣я─п╦п╧я│п╨п╦п╣ я│я┌я─п╣п╩я▄п╠я▀ - п≤п░ REGNUM |url=https://regnum.ru/news/polit/3487551.html |publisher=Regnum.ru |accessdate=2022-02-09 |archive-date=26 January 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220126111150/https://regnum.ru/news/polit/3487551.html |url-status=live }}</ref> Additionally, three LSTs were deploying to the Black Sea: ''Korolyov'', ''Minsk'' and ''Kaliningrad'' and intelligence ship ''Vasily Tatishchev'' to the Mediterranean Sea, where it will monitor three-carrier exercise with CVN ''Harry Truman'', ''Cavour'' and ''Charles de Gaulle'' in February 2022.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Russian forces in the Mediterranean - Wk03/2022 |url=https://russianfleetanalysis.blogspot.com/2022/01/russian-forces-in-mediterranean-wk032022.html |publisher=Russianfleetanalysis.blogspot.com |accessdate=2022-02-09 |archive-date=28 January 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220128165359/https://russianfleetanalysis.blogspot.com/2022/01/russian-forces-in-mediterranean-wk032022.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

In the Black Sea Fleet, an exercise was conducted by frigates ''Admiral Essen'', ''Ladnyy'', corvettes ''Ingushetiya'', ''Grayvoron'', ''Naberezhnye Chelny'', R-60, ''Yeysk'', ''Suzdalets'' and other ships, totally around 20 ships.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Over 20 Russian Black Sea Fleet's warships deploy to sea for drills - Military & Defense |url=https://tass.com/defense/1393273 |publisher=TASS |accessdate=2022-02-09 |archive-date=26 January 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220126111151/https://tass.com/defense/1393273 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Black Sea Fleet deployments-Wk04/2022 |url=https://russianfleetanalysis.blogspot.com/2022/01/black-sea-fleet-deployments-wk042022.html |publisher=Russianfleetanalysis.blogspot.com |accessdate=2022-02-09 |archive-date=27 January 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220127090601/https://russianfleetanalysis.blogspot.com/2022/01/black-sea-fleet-deployments-wk042022.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

===Annual exercise===
Russia organises a central military exercise for September each year.

During Zapad 2021, in Northern Fleet two surface groups were active: ''Admiral Ushakov'' and ''Admiral Kasatonov'' in the Barents Sea (along with coastal systems Bal and Bastion-P) and ''Severomorsk'' in the Arctic (along with LST ''Georgiy Pobedonosets'', tug ''Pamir'' and tanker ''Sergey Osipov''<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/12585823|title=Арктическая группировка Северного флота проведет учения на островах Земли Франца-Иосифа - ТАСС|website=TACC|access-date=6 October 2021|archive-date=6 October 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211006081506/https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/12585823|url-status=live}}</ref>), as well as submarines ''Orel'' and ''Verkhoturye'' (along with minesweepers ''Yelnya'', ''Soloyevetskiy'', ''Yunga'', ''Yadrin'' and ''Kotelnich'' in two groups). In the Baltic Fleet, frigate ''Yaroslav Mudry'', corvettes ''Steregushchy'' and ''Stoykiy'' and submarine ''Dmitrov'' were active (along with coastal system Bal).

===Barents Sea===

On 22 February 2021, the Northern Fleet conducted an exercise in which cruiser ''Marshal Ustinov'' sailed in Varanger Fjord in the area of the Russia–Norway maritime border, becoming the first Russian warship to do so in the post-Cold War era.<ref>{{Cite web |date=22 February 2021 |title=Large Russian missile cruiser sails Varanger fjord close to Norway's border |url=https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2021/02/large-russian-missile-cruiser-sails-varanger-fjord |access-date=26 February 2021 |website=thebarentsobserver.com |archive-date=26 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210226085447/https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2021/02/large-russian-missile-cruiser-sails-varanger-fjord |url-status=live }}</ref> Sailing was speculated to be response to the US bombers (B-1B) landing in Norway on the same day for the first time.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2021-03-09 |title=U.S. B-1 bomber makes first landing inside Norway's Arctic Circle | The Independent Barents Observer |url=https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2021/03/us-b-1-bomber-makes-first-landing-inside-norways-arctic-circle |publisher=Thebarentsobserver.com |accessdate=2022-02-09 |archive-date=27 January 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220127090610/https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2021/03/us-b-1-bomber-makes-first-landing-inside-norways-arctic-circle |url-status=live }}</ref>

Other ships active in the area in January–February 2021 included destroyer ''Severomorsk'',<ref>{{Cite web |date=21 January 2021 |title=Большой противолодочный корабль Северного флота "Североморск" вышел в Баренцево море для выполнения учебно-боевых задач |url=https://structure.mil.ru/structure/forces/navy/news/more.htm?id=12339995@egNews |access-date=20 February 2021 |website=mil.ru |language=Russian |archive-date=6 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210206070250/https://structure.mil.ru/structure/forces/navy/news/more.htm?id=12339995@egNews |url-status=live }}</ref> frigate {{ship|Russian frigate|Admiral Gorshkov||2}} with the tug ''Altay'',<ref>{{Cite web |date=19 January 2021 |title=Фрегат "Адмирал Горшков" вышел в Баренцево море для выполнения учебно-боевых задач |url=https://structure.mil.ru/structure/forces/navy/news/more.htm?id=12345054@egNews |access-date=20 February 2021 |website=mil.ru |language=Russian |archive-date=27 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210227012427/https://structure.mil.ru/structure/forces/navy/news/more.htm?id=12345054@egNews |url-status=live }}</ref> nuclear submarine ''Severodvinsk (''that launched a [[3M-54 Klub|Kalibr missile)]],<ref>{{Cite web |date=5 February 2021 |title=Подлодка "Северодвинск" поразила "Калибром" учебную береговую цель в Архангельской области |url=https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/10635379 |access-date=20 February 2021 |website=tass.ru |language=Russian |archive-date=16 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210216101027/https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/10635379 |url-status=live }}</ref> corvettes ''Aysberg'',<ref>{{Cite web |date=11 January 2021 |title=Малый ракетный корабль Северного флота "Айсберг" вышел в Баренцево море для отработки учебно-боевых задач |url=https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12334199@egNews |access-date=20 February 2021 |website=mil.ru |language=Russian |archive-date=8 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210308121736/https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12334199@egNews |url-status=live }}</ref> ''Snezhnogorsk'',<ref>{{Cite web |date=15 January 2021 |title=Малый противолодочный корабль "Снежногорск" вышел в Баренцево море для выполнения артиллерийских стрельб |url=https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12334882@egNews |access-date=20 February 2021 |website=mil.ru |language=Russian |archive-date=20 October 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211020235521/https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12334882@egNews |url-status=live }}</ref> ''Yunga'' and ''Brest,''<ref>{{Cite web |date=14 February 2021 |title=Противолодочные корабли Северного флота отработают поиск подводных лодок в Баренцевом море |url=https://structure.mil.ru/structure/okruga/north/news/more.htm?id=12344088@egNews |access-date=20 February 2021 |website=mil.ru |language=Russian |archive-date=26 January 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220126082047/https://structure.mil.ru/structure/okruga/north/news/more.htm?id=12344088@egNews |url-status=live }}</ref> and salvage vessel ''Georgiy Titov'' with deep-submergence rescue vehicle ''[[Russian submarine AS-34|AS-34]]''.<ref>{{Cite web |date=20 February 2021 |title=Спасатели Северного флота провели тренировку с экипажем глубоководного аппарата АС-34 |url=https://portnews.ru/news/309194/ |access-date=26 February 2021 |website=portnews.ru |language=Russian |archive-date=2 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210302075030/https://portnews.ru/news/309194/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

===Atlantic===
South of Gibraltar, in September–October 2021 Russian Navy deployed destroyer ''Vice-Admiral Kulakov'' (along tanker ''Akademik Pashin'' and tug ''Altai'') that visited Praia, Capo Verde and performed anti-piracy exercise in the Gulf of Guinea.<ref>{{Cite web |title=БПК Северного флота Вице-адмирал Кулаков совершил деловой заход в Кабо-Верде |url=https://www.korabel.ru/news/comments/bpk_severnogo_flota_vice-admiral_kulakov_sovershil_delovoy_zahod_v_kabo-verde.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210929174335/https://www.korabel.ru/news/comments/bpk_severnogo_flota_vice-admiral_kulakov_sovershil_delovoy_zahod_v_kabo-verde.html |archive-date=29 September 2021 |access-date=29 September 2021}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://tass.com/defense/1348815|title=Russian Navy warships hold anti-piracy drills in Gulf of Guinea in eastern Atlantic|website=TASS|access-date=13 October 2021|archive-date=13 October 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211013100525/https://tass.com/defense/1348815|url-status=live}}</ref> It was the first deployment of a Russian warship south of Gibraltar since ''Admiral Gorshkov'''s 2019 world circumnavigation.

===Western Atlantic and US eastern seaboard===
In August 2012, the news media published an unconfirmed report that a ''Akula''-class submarine operated in the [[Gulf of Mexico]] purportedly undetected for over a month, sparking controversy within US military and political circles, with US Senator [[John Cornyn]] of the [[United States Senate Committee on Armed Services|Senate Armed Services Committee]] demanding details of this deployment from Admiral [[Jonathan Greenert|Jonathan W. Greenert]], the [[Chief of Naval Operations]].<ref>{{Cite news |last=Gertz |first=Bill |author-link=Bill Gertz |date=14 August 2012 |title=Silent Running |work=[[Washington Free Beacon]] |url=http://freebeacon.com/silent-running/ |url-status=live |access-date=4 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121003162300/http://freebeacon.com/silent-running/ |archive-date=3 October 2012 |quote=A Russian nuclear-powered attack submarine armed with long-range cruise missiles operated undetected in the Gulf of Mexico for several weeks and its travel in strategic U.S. waters was only confirmed after it left the region, the ''Washington Free Beacon'' has learned.}}; {{cite news |first=Bill |last=Gertz |author-link=Bill Gertz |title=Torpedo Run |url=http://freebeacon.com/torpedo-run/ |quote=A [[John Cornyn|member]] of the [[Senate Armed Services Committee]] has asked the [[Jonathan W. Greenert|Navy's top admiral]] to explain reports that a Russian submarine operated undetected in the Gulf of Mexico recently. |work=[[Washington Free Beacon]] |date=21 August 2012 |access-date=4 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120924040230/http://freebeacon.com/torpedo-run/ |archive-date=24 September 2012 |url-status=live }}; {{cite news |title=Reports of Russian sub in gulf downplayed |url=http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2012/08/19/Reports-of-Russian-sub-in-gulf-downplayed/UPI-35751345390615/ |quote=Russia declined to confirm or deny a media report that one of its submarines spent a month in the Gulf of Mexico without the knowledge of the United States. |work=[[UPI]] |date=19 August 2012 |access-date=4 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120922023039/http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2012/08/19/Reports-of-Russian-sub-in-gulf-downplayed/UPI-35751345390615 |archive-date=22 September 2012 |url-status=live }}; and {{cite news |title=Russian submarine sailed incognito along the coast of the U.S. |url=http://english.pravda.ru/russia/politics/21-08-2012/121931-russian_sub-0/ |quote=A Russian nuclear submarine of project 971 ("Jaws", in NATO classification), armed with long-range cruise missiles, sailed for a long time without being detected in the waters along the U.S. coastline, the Gulf of Mexico, informs the ''Washington Free Beacon'', citing an unnamed U.S. official. |work=[[Pravda]] |date=21 August 2012 |access-date=4 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121012053419/http://english.pravda.ru/russia/politics/21-08-2012/121931-russian_sub-0/ |archive-date=12 October 2012 |url-status=live }}</ref> Adm Greenert stated that no Russian submarine had operated in the Gulf of Mexico.<ref>{{Cite news |date=20 August 2012 |title=Pentagon Denies Russian Sub Patrolled in Gulf of Mexico |language=en-US |url=https://news.usni.org/2012/08/20/pentagon-denies-russian-sub-patrolled-gulf-mexico |access-date=12 December 2019 |archive-date=15 February 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200215160238/https://news.usni.org/2012/08/20/pentagon-denies-russian-sub-patrolled-gulf-mexico |url-status=live }}</ref>

===North Atlantic and Mediterranean Sea===
In February 2008 a Russian Northern Fleet naval task force completed a two-month deployment in the [[Mediterranean Sea]] and the North Atlantic which started on 4 December 2007. The operation was the first large-scale Russian Navy deployment to the Atlantic and the Mediterranean in 15 years. The task force included the ''Admiral Kuznetsov''-class aircraft carrier ''Admiral Kuznetsov'', the ''Udaloy''-class destroyers {{ship|Russian destroyer|Admiral Levchenko||2}} and {{ship|Russian destroyer|Admiral Chabanenko||2}}, and the ''Slava''-class guided missile cruiser ''Moskva'', as well as auxiliary vessels. During the operation the navy practiced rescue and counter-terror operations, reconnaissance, and missile and bomb strikes on the (theoretical) enemy's naval task force. Over 40 [[Russian Air Force]] aircraft took part in joint exercises with the navy as well.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Russian Mediterranean Naval Build-Up Challenges NATO Sixth Fleet Domination |url=http://www.defense-update.com/analysis/analysis_091207_navy.htm |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141104101337/http://www.defense-update.com/analysis/analysis_091207_navy.htm |archive-date=4 November 2014 |access-date=14 December 2014 |publisher=Defense Update}}</ref>

* In October 2008, a naval task group from the [[Northern Fleet]], comprising the nuclear-powered missile cruiser ''Pyotr Velikiy'', the large ASW ship ''Admiral Chabanenko'', and support ships, left their homeport of Severomorsk in northern Russia on 22 September and sailed into the northern Atlantic, having covered a distance of {{convert|1000|nmi|km}} in a week. Russian warships were scheduled to participate in joint naval exercises with the Venezuelan Navy in the Caribbean on 10–14 November, in line with the 2008 training program, and in order to expand military cooperation with foreign navies.{{cn|date=February 2023}} These exercises actually took place on 1 December.
* 11 October 2008, Russian warships bound for Venezuela, including the nuclear-powered cruiser ''Pyotr Velikiy'', put in at the Libyan port of Tripoli for resupply.<ref>https://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20081011/wl_mideast_afp/russialibyamilitaryvenezueladiplomacy_081011173147 {{Dead link|date=September 2010}}</ref>
* From Venezuela ''Petr Velikiy'' proceeded alone to a port call in Cape Town, South Africa, then participated in the INDRA-2009 exercise off western India, briefly engaged in counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, and returned to its homeport of Severomorsk in March 2009. The other ships in company returned to their home base in the Northern Fleet.
* A group of [[Pacific Fleet (Russia)|Pacific Fleet]] ships arrived in the Mediterranean Sea on 15 May 2013 having sailed from [[Vladivostok]] on 19 March 2013.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Russian Pacific Fleet Warships Enter Mediterranean Waters for the 1st Time in Decades |url=http://docs.newsbank.com/openurl?ctx_ver=z39.88-2004&rft_id=info:sid/iw.newsbank.com:AWNB:null&rft_val_format=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rft_dat=146578920250F0F8&svc_dat=InfoWeb:aggdocs&req_dat=787B728BE4FF4EEE919E134595DD9ADE |access-date=14 December 2014}}</ref> {{ship|Russian destroyer|Admiral Panteleyev||2}}, the ''Ropucha''-class landing ships ''Peresvet'' and ''Admiral Nevelskoy'', the [[tanker (ship)|tanker]] ''Pechenga'' and the rescue [[Tugboat|tug]] ''Fotiy Krylov'' augmented the Russian Navy's grouping there, and carried out tasks in the [[Black Sea]] and [[Mediterranean Sea]]. The Pacific Fleet ships practiced activities jointly with forces from other Russian navy fleets and made a number of business calls at ports in the region, including a call at [[Limassol]], Cyprus on 17 May 2013.<ref>Interfax, Moscow 1031 GMT 8 May 13</ref>
* The [[Baltic Fleet]] ''Ropucha''-class landing ships ''Kaliningrad'', ''Aleksandr Shabalin'' and ''Azov'' arrived at [[Novorossiysk]] naval base on 14 May 2013 having completed their duties in the Mediterranean. The Baltic Fleet ships spent several weeks at [[Novorossiysk]] undergoing checks and maintenance and replenishing supplies before resuming their duties in the Mediterranean.<ref>Interfax-AVN, Moscow 0905 GMT 14 May 13</ref>
* The Northern Fleet's ''Udaloy''-class destroyer {{ship|Russian destroyer|Vice-Admiral Kulakov||2}} was reported to be heading for the Atlantic on 20 May 2013 after completing a visit to Norway. The ship had been taking part in the Russian-Norwegian [[Pomor]]-2013 exercise and is expected to take on supplies from the tanker ''Vyazma'' while at anchor in the [[North Sea]] before undertaking a lengthy voyage in the north eastern regions of the Atlantic Ocean.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Russian warship heading for Atlantic after exercise with Norway |url=http://docs.newsbank.com/openurl?ctx_ver=z39.88-2004&rft_id=info:sid/iw.newsbank.com:AWNB:BBAB&rft_val_format=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rft_dat=146684337345CF08&svc_dat=InfoWeb:aggdocs&req_dat=787B728BE4FF4EEE919E134595DD9ADE |access-date=14 December 2014}}</ref>
* On 1 June 2013, Navy Commander Adm [[Viktor Chirkov]] said that the aircraft carrier ''Admiral Kuznetsov'' is "expected to put out and perform a number of missions in an offshore oceanic zone as part of a group. Northern Fleet naval pilots will perform a number of missions on board this cruiser during the long-range mission." He also stated that the ship's deployment might be as part of a permanent operational group in the Mediterranean. In preparing for the deployment the ships' airwing would not be using the NITKA pilot training facility located in Crimea, Ukraine.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Servicing of Russian aircraft-carrying warship expected to be completed in 2013 |url=http://docs.newsbank.com/openurl?ctx_ver=z39.88-2004&rft_id=info:sid/iw.newsbank.com:AWNB:BBAB&rft_val_format=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rft_dat=146B216AD9F9DB48&svc_dat=InfoWeb:aggdocs&req_dat=787B728BE4FF4EEE919E134595DD9ADE |access-date=14 December 2014}}</ref>
* On 20 October 2016, a Northern Fleet task group headed by ''Admiral Kuznetsov'' was monitored by a fleet of least eight ships in the English Channel en route to Syria reportedly to participate in the attack on Aleppo. The British [[Royal Navy]] sent multiple ships including HMS ''Dragon'' to shadow each warship as the fleet met up with an additional two Russian warships. NATO also tasked its standing naval group [[SNMG1]] to shadow the group and escort it through the Dover Straits towards the Mediterranean.{{citation needed|date=December 2019}}
* On 17 February 2017, the Russian Navy surveillance vessel SSV-175 ''Viktor Leonov'' was cruising international waters off the East Coast of the United States. ''Viktor Leonov'' is outfitted with a variety of high-tech spying equipment designed to intercept signals intelligence. It first appeared off Delaware and, then moved south of the US submarine base at Groton, Connecticut collecting electronic signals.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Russian spy ship patrols 30 miles off the coast of Connecticut |url=https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/02/15/russian-spy-ship-spotted-near-us/97939010/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171010114256/https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/02/15/russian-spy-ship-spotted-near-us/97939010/ |archive-date=10 October 2017 |access-date=10 October 2017 |website=[[USA Today]]}}</ref>

===Syria===
{{main|Russian naval base in Tartus}}
* Sequentially having lost naval support facility access in Albania, Yugoslavia, and Egypt, in 1971 the Soviet Navy began operating from a leased facility in Tartus, Syria.
* In September 2008, it was reported that Russia and Syria conducted talks about permitting Russia to develop and enlarge its [[Russian naval facility in Tartus|naval base in Syria]] in order to establish a stronger naval presence in the Mediterranean,<ref>David R. Sands, "Russia Expanding Navy into Mediterranean Sea", ''The Washington Times'', 7 August 2007.</ref> and amidst the deteriorating Russia relations with the west in conjunction with the [[Russo-Georgian War|2008 South Ossetia war]] and the plans to deploy [[Poland–Russia relations|US missile defence shield in Poland]], it has even been asserted that [[Bashar al-Assad|President Assad]] has agreed to [[Tartus]] port's conversion into a permanent Middle East base for Russia's nuclear-armed warships.<ref>{{Cite news |date=21 August 2008 |title=Big Russian flotilla led by Admiral Kuznetsov carrier heads for Syrian port |publisher=[[DEBKAfile]] |url=http://www.debka.com/headline.php?hid=5526 |url-status=live |access-date=22 August 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080823171949/http://www.debka.com/headline.php?hid=5526 |archive-date=23 August 2008}}</ref> [[Moscow]] and [[Damascus]] additionally announced that it would be renovating the port, although there was no mention in the Syrian press.<ref name="Haa">[http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1020643.html "Syria and Russia strengthen naval cooperation"] [[Information Telegraph Agency of Russia|Itar-Tass]] news agency via ''[[Haaretz]]''. Retrieved 12 September 2008. {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080915011328/http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1020643.html |date=15 September 2008 }}</ref>
* On 22 September 2008, Russian Navy spokesman Igor Dygalo said the nuclear-powered ''Pyotr Velikiy'' cruiser, accompanied by three other ships, sailed from the Northern Fleet's base of [[Severomorsk]]. The ships will cover about {{convert|15000|nmi|km}} to conduct joint maneuvers with the Venezuelan navy. Dygalo refused to comment on Monday's report in the daily ''Izvestia ''claiming that the ships were to make a stopover in the Syrian port of Tartus on their way to [[Venezuela]]. Russian officials said the Soviet-era base there was being renovated to serve as a foothold for a permanent Russian navy presence in the Mediterranean.<ref>{{Cite news |title=Russian navy ships head to Venezuela. |publisher=CNN |url=http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/09/22/russia.venezuela.ap/index.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081219031612/http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/09/22/russia.venezuela.ap/index.html |archive-date=19 December 2008}}</ref>
* In late November 2011, [[Pravda]] and [[Reuters]] wrote that a naval flotilla led by the aircraft carrier ''Admiral Kuznetsov'' would sail to its naval base in [[Tartus]] as a show of support for the [[Al-Assad family|al-Assad regime]].<ref>{{Cite web |date=30 November 2011 |title=Russia sent military ships to base in Syria |url=http://english.pravda.ru/hotspots/terror/30-11-2011/119791-Russia_sent_military_ships_to_Syria-0/ |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111201161857/http://english.pravda.ru/hotspots/terror/30-11-2011/119791-Russia_sent_military_ships_to_Syria-0/ |archive-date=1 December 2011 |access-date=1 December 2011 |website=[[Pravda]]}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Thomas Grove |date=28 November 2011 |title=Russia sending warships to its base in Syria |publisher=[[Reuters]] |url=https://af.reuters.com/article/egyptNews/idAFL5E7MS1XT20111128?sp=true |url-status=dead |access-date=1 December 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111129194721/http://af.reuters.com/article/egyptNews/idAFL5E7MS1XT20111128?sp=true |archive-date=29 November 2011}}</ref> Such a visit is not possible because the lengths of all of Russia's current modern warships exceed the size of the two 100 meter piers located at the Russian leasehold in Tartus. (see next paragraph)
* On 29 November 2011, Army General [[Nikolay Yegorovich Makarov|Nikolay Makarov]], Chief of the Russian General Staff, said that sending ships of the Russian Navy to the Mediterranean Sea is linked to exercises and not to the situation in Syria. "In the event of necessity, namely to carry out repairs, to take water and food on board and to allow rest for the crews, Russian ships may visit Tartus but in this case this has not been included in the plan of the trip," the Interfax source said. He also noted that the size of ''Admiral Kuznetsov'' does not allow it to moor in Tartus because the port does not have suitable infrastructure, i.e., large enough mooring.<ref>Interfax, Moscow 29 Nov 11</ref>

===Sudan===
* On 23 July 2019, Russia and [[Sudan]] signed an agreement on establishment of a Russian naval base in [[Port Sudan]] in [[Khartoum]] and, on 1 December 2020, in Moscow. On 25 June 2021, Russian prime minister [[Mikhail Mishustin|Mishustin]] submitted the agreement for ratification.<ref>{{Cite news |date=25 June 2021 |title=Мишустин подписал документ по ратификации соглашения о базе ВМФ в Судане |language=ru |url=https://ria.ru/20210625/soglashenie-1738585837.html |access-date=25 June 2021 |archive-date=25 June 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210625102618/https://ria.ru/20210625/soglashenie-1738585837.html |url-status=live }}</ref> On 12 July, Sudan was preparing for ratification too.<ref>{{Cite news |date=12 July 2021 |title=Лавров: Судан готовится к ратификации соглашения о пункте обеспечения ВМФ РФ |language=ru |url=https://tass.ru/politika/11882579 |access-date=12 July 2021 |archive-date=12 July 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210712105652/https://tass.ru/politika/11882579 |url-status=live }}</ref>
* Between 28 February and 2 May 2021, a number of Russian ships called at Port Sudan, beginning with frigate [[Russian frigate Admiral Grigorovich|''Admiral Grigorovich'']]<ref>{{Cite web |date=2 March 2021 |title=US, Russian warships simultaneously visit Port Sudan |url=https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/us-russian-warships-simultaneously-visit-port-sudan |access-date=8 March 2021 |website=janes.com |archive-date=25 June 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210625114711/https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/us-russian-warships-simultaneously-visit-port-sudan |url-status=live }}</ref> in what was the first visit of a Russian warship to Sudan in the modern history. This was followed by corvette [[Russian corvette Stoikiy|''Stoikiy'']] and tug ''Kola'' on 19 March,<ref>{{Cite web |date=19 March 2021 |title=Отряд кораблей Балтийского флота завершил программу делового захода в порт Судана |url=https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12349761@egNews |access-date=20 March 2021 |website=mil.ru |archive-date=19 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210319165830/https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12349761@egNews |url-status=live }}</ref> signals intelligence ship ''[[Ivan Khurs]]'' on 10 April,<ref>{{Cite web |date=11 April 2021 |title=В порт Судана зашел российский разведывательный корабль |url=https://www.interfax.ru/world/760621 |access-date=25 June 2021 |website=interfax.ru |archive-date=25 June 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210625114711/https://www.interfax.ru/world/760621 |url-status=live }}</ref> signals intelligence ship ''Vasily Tatishchev''<ref>{{Cite web |date=29 April 2021 |title=В порт Судана, где создается база ВМФ РФ, зашел российский разведкорабль |url=https://www.interfax.ru/world/763841 |access-date=25 June 2021 |website=interfax.ru |archive-date=25 June 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210625114714/https://www.interfax.ru/world/763841 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=8 May 2021 |title=Russian Warships Visit Port Sudan amidst Reports of Khartoum Suspending Naval Base Deal |url=https://www.defenseworld.net/news/29534/Russian_Warships_Visit_Port_Sudan_amidst_Reports_of_Khartoum_Suspending_Naval_Base_Deal#.YNW9U-gzYww |website=defenseworld.net |access-date=25 June 2021 |archive-date=25 June 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210625113425/https://www.defenseworld.net/news/29534/Russian_Warships_Visit_Port_Sudan_amidst_Reports_of_Khartoum_Suspending_Naval_Base_Deal#.YNW9U-gzYww |url-status=live }}</ref> and its accompanying repair ship PM-138 on 2 May.

===Algeria===
Russia and Algeria hold annual naval exercise at the end of the year.
* Between 16 and 17 November 2021, Russo-Algerian naval exercise was conducted. Russian Black Sea Fleet's frigate ''Admiral Grigorovich'', patrol ship ''[[Russian patrol boat Vasily Bykov|Vasily Bykov]]'' and seagoing tug SB-742 took part, as well as Algerian frigate ''Harrad'', training vessel ''La Sammam'' and rescue vessel ''El Munjid''.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://russianfleetanalysis.blogspot.com/2021/11/russian-forces-in-mediterranean-wk462021.html|title=Russian forces in the Mediterranean - Wk46/2021|access-date=20 November 2021|archive-date=20 November 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211120103805/https://russianfleetanalysis.blogspot.com/2021/11/russian-forces-in-mediterranean-wk462021.html|url-status=live}}</ref>

===Egypt===
Russia and Egypt have held an annual naval exercise at the end of the year since 2015. Usually, the exercise is conducted in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, an exception being 2020, when the exercise took place in the Black Sea. From 3–10 December 2021, another Russo-Egyptian naval exercise, Bridge of Friendship, took place in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. The Russian task force comprised frigate ''Admiral Grigorovich'', patrol ship ''Dmitry Rogachev'' and sea-going tug SB-742.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://tass.com/defense/1369611|title=Russian naval ships to arrive in Egypt on Dec. 3 for joint drills|website=TASS|access-date=2 December 2021|archive-date=2 December 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211202153523/https://tass.com/defense/1369611|url-status=live}}</ref>

===Caribbean Sea===
On 8 September 2008, it was announced that the ''Pyotr Velikiy'' would sail to the [[Caribbean Sea]] in order to participate in naval exercises with the [[Bolivarian Navy of Venezuela|Venezuelan Navy]]. This represented the first major Russian show of force in that sea since the end of the [[Cold War]].<ref>{{Cite web |title=Russia says to send battleship to Caribbean Sea - Yahoo! News |url=http://news.yahoo.com/s//nm/20080908/wl_nm/russia_venezuela_navy_dc |url-status=dead |archive-date=2008-09-11 |archiveurl=https://archive.today/20080911011350/http://news.yahoo.com/s//nm/20080908/wl_nm/russia_venezuela_navy_dc}}</ref> On 22 September the ''Kirov-''class nuclear missile cruiser ''Pyotr Velikiy'' and the Udaloy class large anti-submarine ship ''Admiral Chabanenko'', accompanied by support vessels, left their home port of Severomorsk for naval exercises with Venezuela scheduled for early November 2008.<ref>[ITAR-TASS 22 September 2008]</ref> On 25 November 2008, a group of warships from Russia's [[Northern Fleet]] arrived at the [[Venezuela]]n port of [[La Guaira]].{{cn|date=February 2023}}

=== East Africa: Somali Coast ===
* On 24 September 2008, the Russian frigate ''[[Russian frigate Neustrashimy|Neustrashimy]]'' left its home base at Baltiysk, Kaliningrad Oblast, Russia, for counter-piracy operations near the Somali coast.<ref>Moscow Interfax-Agenstvo Voyennykh Novostey 24 September 2008</ref>{{refn|group=Note|The Ukrainian merchant vessel ''[[MV Faina|Faina]]'' was seized by Somali pirates on 25 September. The deployment of the ''Neustrashimy'' was not in response to the seizure of the ''Faina''.}}
* From 11 January to 17 March 2009, the ''[[Russian destroyer Admiral Vinogradov|Admiral Vinogradov]]'' took up the counter-piracy mission from the ''Neustrashimy'' and upon completion took a course home to Vladivostok by way of a port visit to Jakarta, Indonesia 24–28 March 2009.<ref>Moscow ITAR-TASS 1754 GMT 11 January 2008, Moscow INTERFAX 11 January 2008</ref><ref>[http://www.morskayakollegiya.ru/news/obshchie_novosti/2009/03/30/394 Морская коллегия. – Новости. Отряд кораблей Тихоокеанского флота в составе большого противолодочного корабля «Адмирал Виноградов» и танкера «Борис Бутома» закончил патрулирование в районе Африканского рога] {{dead link|date=April 2018 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}. Morskayakollegiya.ru (30 August 2010). Retrieved on 9 September 2010.</ref>
* From 26 April to 7 June 2009, the Pacific Fleet destroyer ''Admiral Panteleyev'' took up counter-piracy duties in the Gulf of Aden, having left Vladivostok at the end of March 2009 to relieve the ''Admiral Vinogradov''. It returned to Vladivostok on 1 July.<ref>{{Cite web |title=БПК "Адмирал Виноградов" возвращается во Владивосток |url=http://www.news.infobot.ru/detail/124000161100000325815.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160305190946/http://news.infobot.ru/detail/124000161100000325815.html |archive-date=5 March 2016 |access-date=8 October 2010}}</ref><ref>[http://www.russkie.org/index.php?module=fullitem&id=15942 "Адмирал Пантелеев" вернулся во Владивосток после успешно выполненной миссии -Русское зарубежье, российские соотечественники, русские за границей, русские за рубежом, соотечественники, русскоязычное население, русские общины, диаспора, эмиграция] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110720010631/http://www.russkie.org/index.php?module=fullitem&id=15942 |date=20 July 2011 }}. Russkie.org. Retrieved on 9 September 2010.</ref>

===Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea===
Main article: [[Cam Ranh Air Base]]<ref>{{Cite web |title=Москва швартуется к Камрани |url=http://3mv.ru/publ/moskva_shvartuetsja_k_kamrani/3-1-0-34091 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141204203022/http://3mv.ru/publ/moskva_shvartuetsja_k_kamrani/3-1-0-34091 |archive-date=4 December 2014 |access-date=10 October 2017}}</ref>
* On 11 January 2009, Army General [[Nikolay Yegorovich Makarov|Nikolai Makarov]], Chief of the Russian General Staff, announced that the ''Kirov-''class nuclear-powered cruiser ''Pyotr Velikiy'' and five other ships would take part in exercises with the Indian Navy in late January 2009.<ref>Moscow ITAR-TASS 1125 GMT 11 Jan 9</ref>
* In 2021, Black Sea Fleet's intelligence ship ''Kildin'' entered port Oman on 1 November.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://russianfleetanalysis.blogspot.com/2021/11/russian-forces-in-mediterranean-wk472021.html|title=Russian forces in the Mediterranean - Wk47/2021|access-date=28 November 2021|archive-date=23 November 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211123200916/https://russianfleetanalysis.blogspot.com/2021/11/russian-forces-in-mediterranean-wk472021.html|url-status=live}}</ref> Besides, in summer, the newly built frigate ''Gremyashchy'' and Kilo (Varshavanka) class diesel-electric submarines ''Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky'' and ''Volkhov'' transited Indian Ocean on their way from the Baltic Sea to the Pacific Ocean.

===East Asia===
Since 2012, Russia and China have conducted an annual naval exercise.<ref>{{Cite journal|url=https://www.csis.org/analysis/assessing-chinese-russian-military-exercises-past-progress-and-future-trends|title=Assessing Chinese-Russian Military Exercises: Past Progress and Future Trends|website=www.csis.org|date=9 July 2021|last1=Weitz|first1=Richard|access-date=23 November 2021|archive-date=26 May 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220526043241/https://www.csis.org/analysis/assessing-chinese-russian-military-exercises-past-progress-and-future-trends|url-status=live}}</ref> In even years, they take place off Chinese coast (usually in the Yellow Sea), and in odd years off Russian coast (usually in the Sea of Japan). In 2015 and 2017, in addition to the exercises in the Sea of Japan, additional exercises in the Mediterranean and Baltic Sea, respectively, were held. In 2021, for the first time the exercise surpassed the defensive character as Russian and Chinese warships passed through the Tsugaru Strait between Japanese islands Hokkaido and Honshu.

* On 23 October 2021, Russian and Chinese Navies conducted first ever joint patrol.<ref>{{Cite news |date=23 October 2021 |title=Russian, Chinese warships conduct first ever joint patrol in western Pacific |url=https://tass.com/defense/1353271 |access-date=23 October 2021 |archive-date=23 October 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211023113223/https://tass.com/defense/1353271 |url-status=live }}</ref> Five warships of each navy participated, including two destroyers, two corvettes and a command ship. Russian Navy was represented by destroyers ''Admiral Panteleyev'' and ''Admiral Tributs'', corvettes ''Gromky'' and ''Geroy Rossiyskoy federatsii Aldar Tsydenzhapov'' and tracking ship ''Marshal Krylov''. The patrol group passed through the Tsugaru Strait. Joint Russo-Chinese operations imply readiness of both superpowers to cooperate to limit the power of the American-led order in the Asia-Pacific region.
* From 1–3 December 2021, the first naval exercise between Russia and ASEAN occurred in the Indonesian territorial waters.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://tass.com/defense/1364893|title=Russia, ASEAN to hold first ever joint naval drills in early December|website=TASS|access-date=23 November 2021|archive-date=23 November 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211123160729/https://tass.com/defense/1364893|url-status=live}}</ref> Russia was represented by destroyer ''Admiral Panteleyev'', Vietnam by frigate ''Ly Thai To'',<ref>{{Cite web |title=Vietnamese warship participates in ASEAN - Russia naval drills - VnExpress International |url=https://e.vnexpress.net/news/news/vietnamese-warship-participates-in-asean-russia-naval-drills-4393967.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211126162844/https://e.vnexpress.net/news/news/vietnamese-warship-participates-in-asean-russia-naval-drills-4393967.html |archive-date=26 November 2021 |access-date=26 November 2021}}</ref> Indonesia by frigate ''Raden Eddy Martadinata'', Malaysia by frigate ''Lekiu'', Singapore by corvette ''Vigour'', Brunei by off-shore patrol vessel ''Daruttaqwa'', Thailand by frigate ''Kraburi'' and Myanmar by frigate ''Kyansittha'',<ref>{{Cite web |title=Stage set for first-ever Russia-ASEAN navy exercise in Indonesian waters |url=https://www.indianarrative.com/world-news/stage-set-for-first-ever-russia-asean-navy-exercise-in-indonesian-waters-131758.html |website=indianarrative.com |date=30 November 2021 |access-date=1 December 2021 |archive-date=1 December 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211201183505/https://www.indianarrative.com/world-news/stage-set-for-first-ever-russia-asean-navy-exercise-in-indonesian-waters-131758.html |url-status=live }}</ref> while Philippines joined as an observer.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Calunsod |first1=Ronron |title=PH virtually joins first ever ASEAN-Russia naval drills being held in Indonesia |url=https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/12/01/21/ph-virtually-joins-asean-russia-naval-drills |website=ABS-CBN News |date=1 December 2021 |access-date=1 December 2021 |archive-date=1 December 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211201195016/https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/12/01/21/ph-virtually-joins-asean-russia-naval-drills |url-status=live }}</ref>

==See also==
*[[History of the Russian Navy]]
* [[Future of the Russian Navy]]
* [[Kuznetsov Naval Academy|Russian Naval Academy]]
* [[List of ships of the line of Russia]]
* [[List of aircraft carriers of Russia and the Soviet Union]]
* [[List of Russian Navy cruisers]]
* [[List of Russian Navy equipment]]
* [[List of ships of Russia by project number]]
* [[List of Soviet and Russian submarine classes]]
* [[List of active Russian Navy ships]] for current Order of Battle of the Russian Navy
* [[Russian Hydrographic Service]]
* [[Torpedo#Russian Navy|Russian torpedoes]]

== Notes ==
{{NoteFoot}}
{{reflist|group=Note}}

== References ==
{{reflist|colwidth=30em}}

== Further reading ==
* Lebedev A.A. ''To March and Battle Ready? The Combat Capabilities of Naval Squadrons Russian Sailing Fleet XVIII – mid XIX centuries. from the Point of View of the Status of Their Personnel''. SPb, 2015. {{ISBN|978-5-904180-94-2}}.
* Reuben Johnson, "Russian Navy 'faces irreversible collapse,'" ''[[Jane's Defence Weekly]]'', 15 July 2009, and link to original Russian article at [http://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2009-07-03/1_vmf.html ВМФ умрет в ближайшие годы]. Nvo.ng.ru (2009-07-03). Retrieved on 2010-09-09.
* "Russia Will Not Build Aircraft Carriers Till 2010." [[RIA Novosti]]. 16 May 2005. (Via Lexis-Nexis, 27 July 2005).
* "The Russian Navy – A Historic Transition." U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence. December 2015 [https://www.oni.navy.mil/Portals/12/Intel%20agencies/russia/Russia%202015print.pdf?ver=2015-12-14-082038-923]

== External links ==
{{Commons category|Russian Navy}}
* {{Official website}}

{{-}}
{{Russian fleet}}
{{Soviet and Russian ships after 1945}}
{{Armed Forces of the Russian Federation}}
{{Black Sea Naval Co-operation Task Group}}
{{Navies of the Commonwealth of Independent States}}
{{Navies in Europe}}

{{Authority control}}

[[Category:Russian Navy| ]]
[[Category:Military of Russia]]
[[Category:Military units and formations established in 1992]]
[[Category:1992 establishments in Russia]]

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Anti-aircraft artillery

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Multiple rocket launcher

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{{Short description|Rocket artillery system capable of launching multiple rockets in quick succession}}
{{Redirect|MLRS|the U.S. Army system known as "MLRS"|M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System}}
{{More citations needed|date=August 2014}}
[[File:HIMARS - missile launched.jpg|thumb|right|upright=1.2|[[M142 HIMARS]] launching a GMLRS rocket at the White Sands Missile Range in 2005]]
A '''multiple rocket launcher''' ('''MRL''') or '''multiple launch rocket system''' ('''MLRS''') is a type of [[rocket artillery]] system that contains multiple [[rocket launcher|launcher]]s which are fixed to a single [[weapons platform|platform]], and shoots its [[rocket (weapon)|rocket ordnance]] in a fashion similar to a [[volley gun]]. Rockets are self-propelled in flight and have different capabilities than conventional [[artillery]] [[shell (projectile)|shell]]s, such as longer [[effective range]], lower [[recoil]], typically considerably higher [[payload]] than a similarly sized gun artillery platform, or even carrying multiple [[warhead]]s.

Unguided rocket artillery is notoriously inaccurate and slow to reload compared to gun artillery. A multiple rocket launcher helps compensate for this with its ability to launch multiple rockets in rapid succession, which, coupled with the large [[blast radius|kill zone]] of each warhead, can easily deliver [[saturation fire]] over a target area. However, modern rockets can use [[GPS]] or [[inertial guidance]] to combine the advantages of rockets with the higher accuracy of [[precision-guided munition]]s.

==History==
[[File:11th century basketry fire arrow rocket launcher.jpg|thumb|left|An illustration of a handheld multiple rocket launcher constructed of basketry, as depicted in the 11th century book [[Wujing Zongyao]] of the [[Song dynasty]]]]
[[Image:Hwacha.jpg|thumb|Korean [[Joseon]] ''[[hwacha]]'' multiple rocket launcher (designed in 1409) in a museum]]
The first multiple rocket launchers were invented during the medieval Chinese [[Song dynasty]], in which the Chinese [[fire lance]] was fixed backward on a pike or arrow and shot at an enemy as early as 1180.<ref name=James>{{Cite book |title=Ancient Inventions |last1=James |first1=Peter J. |last2=Thorpe |first2=Nick |last3=Thorpe |first3=I. J. |publisher=Ballantine Books |year=1995 |isbn=978-0345401021 |page=[https://archive.org/details/ancientinvention00jame/page/238 238] |url=https://archive.org/details/ancientinvention00jame/page/238 }}</ref> This form of rocket was used during the [[Mongol siege of Kaifeng]].<ref name=Gruntman>{{Cite book |title=Blazing the Trail: The Early History of Spacecraft and Rocketry |last=Gruntman |first=Mike |author-link=Mike Gruntman |publisher=American Institute of Aeronautics |year=2005 |isbn=978-1563477058 |pages=5–6}}</ref>

Chinese militaries later created multiple rocket launchers that fired up to 100 small fire-arrow rockets simultaneously. The typical powder section of the arrow-rockets was 1/3 to 1/2 ft (10 to 15 cm) long. Bamboo arrow shafts varied from 1.5 ft (45 cm) to 2.5 ft (75 cm) long and the striking distance reached 300 to 400 paces. The Chinese also enhanced rocket tips with poison and made sure that the launchers were mobile. They designed a multiple rocket launcher to be carried and operated by a single soldier.<ref name=Gruntman /> Various forms of MRLs evolved, including a launcher mounted on a wheelbarrow.<ref name=James />

The [[Joseon dynasty]] of Korea used an expanded variant of such a launcher (called a ''[[hwacha]]'') made of 100 to 200 holes containing rocket arrows placed on a two-wheeled cart. The range of the fired arrows is estimated to have been 2,000 meters. The ''hwacha'' was used to great effect against invading armies during the [[Japanese invasions of Korea (1592–98)|Japanese invasions of 1592–1598]], most notably the [[Battle of Haengju]],<ref>{{Cite book |title=What Life was Like in the Land of the Dragon |publisher=Time-Life |edition=1st |date=1998 |isbn=978-0783554587}}</ref> in which 40 hwachas were deployed to repel 30,000 Japanese soldiers.<ref>{{Cite book |title=Tools of War: History of Weapons in Early Modern Times |last=Ramsey |first=Syed |publisher=Alpha Edition |year=2016 |isbn=978-9386101679 |page=|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jkk5DAAAQBAJ&dq=%22hwacha%22+%22choi%22&pg=PT72 }}</ref>

European armies preferred relatively large single-launch rockets prior to World War II. Napoleonic armies of both sides followed the British adoption of [[Mysorean rockets]] as the [[Congreve rocket]]. These were explosive steel-cased bombardment rockets with minimal launchers. European navies developed naval multiple launcher mounts with steadily improving explosive rockets for light and coastal vessels. These weapons were largely replaced by conventional light artillery during the late nineteenth century.

===World War II===
[[Image:Katjuscha 1938 Moscow.jpg|thumb|BM-13 [[Katyusha rocket launcher|Katyusha]] (in service from 1939)]]
[[Image:T-34-rocket-launcher-France.jpg|thumb|American [[T34 Calliope]] (designed in 1943) in action]]
[[File:The British Army in Normandy 1944 B9593.jpg|thumb|A German Panzerwerfer [[Sd.Kfz. 4]] captured by the British during the [[Invasion of Normandy]] in 1944]]
[[File:385th Guards Artillery Brigade's 9K57 Uragan firing at the Totsky training ground (23-08-2018).webm|300px|thumb|Video of firing [[BM-27 Uragan]] in Russian service, 23 August 2018]]

The first [[self-propelled artillery|self-propelled]] MRLs—and arguably the most famous—was the [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] [[Katyusha rocket launcher|BM-13 Katyusha]], first used during [[World War II]] and exported to Soviet allies afterwards. They were simple systems in which a rack of launch rails was mounted on the back of a truck. This set the template for modern MRLs. The Americans mounted tubular launchers atop [[M4 Sherman]] tanks to create the [[T34 Calliope]] rocket launching tank, only used in small numbers, as their closest equivalent to the Katyusha. The Germans began using a towed six-tube multiple rocket launcher during World War II, the [[15 cm Nebelwerfer 41|Nebelwerfer]], called the "Screaming Mimi" by the Allies. The system was developed before the war to skirt the limitations of the Treaty of Versailles. Later in the war, 15 cm Nebelwerfer 41s were mounted on modified Opel Maultier "Mule" halftracks, becoming [[Panzerwerfer]] 42 4/1s. Another version produced in limited numbers towards the end of the war was a conversion of the [[Schwerer Wehrmachtschlepper]] ("heavy military transport", sWS) halftrack to a configuration similar to the Panzerwerfer 42 4/1, mounting the 10-barreled 15 cm Nebelwerfer.

Another German halftrack MRL system was inspired by the Russian BM-13. Keeping the Soviet 82 mm rocket caliber as well as the launch and rocket stabilisation designs, it was developed into a system of two rows of 12 guide rails mounted to a [[Maultier]] chassis, each row providing the capacity for 24 rockets, underslung as well as on top of the rails, for 48 rockets total. This vehicle was designated [[8 cm Raketen-Vielfachwerfer]] (8 cm multiple rocket launcher). As the launch system was inspired by and looked similar to the BM-13, which the Germans had nicknamed "''Stalin-Orgel''" or "Stalin-Organ", the Vielfachwerfer soon became known as the "''Himmler-Orgel''", or "Himmler-Organ".

==Types==

There are two main types of MRLs:
* With tubes or pipes, usually made of steel, non-removable from launcher, with options to be reloaded in on the battlefield with rockets loaded manually or semi-automatically. This was the most usual type until the 21st century. It is more convenient for battlefield usage because it does not require special tools to reload modules and test them before using them on launchers as with other types.
* With containers, pods or modules that can be removed from the launcher and quickly replaced with same or different types of rockets and calibers. They are usually reloaded at a factory or within specially-equipped army workshops. These are more modern types of weapons as they are not necessarily related to just one type of rocket and give more options to commanders in the field to deal with different tactical situations using different types of rockets or to quickly reload. They are also easier to upgrade for different types of rockets.

==Current usage==
[[File:Bangladesh Army WS-22 MLRS (30871693973).jpg|thumb|122 mm guided MLRS [[Weishi Rockets#WS-22|WS-22]] of the [[Bangladesh Army]]]]

Like all artillery, MRLs have a reputation of devastating morale on ill-disciplined or already-shaken troops.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Prenatt |first1=Jamie |title=Katyusha Russian Multiple Rocket Launchers 1941-Present |date=2016 |publisher=Osprey Publishing |pages=4}}</ref> The material effect depends on circumstances, as well-covered field fortifications may provide reasonable protection.

MRLs are still unable to properly engage reverse slope positions in [[mountain warfare]] because it is more difficult to determine the trajectory compared to that of a [[howitzer]] by adding or removing propellant increments. Simple MRL rocket types have a rather long minimum firing range for the same reason. An approach to lessen this limit is the addition of drag rings to the rocket nose. The increased drag slows the rocket down relative to a clean configuration and creates a less flat trajectory. Pre-packaged MRL munitions do not offer this option but some MRL types with individually loaded rockets do.<ref>Jane's Armour and Artillery 2011-2012 data sheets</ref>

Improvised MRLs based on helicopter or aircraft-mounted rocket pods (typically of 57–80{{spaces}}mm caliber) especially on light trucks and pickups (so-called "[[Technical (vehicle)|technical]]s") are often seen in civil wars when rebels make use of captured launchers and munitions.<ref>{{cite web |url= http://www.armamentresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/ARES-Research-Report-No.-1-S-5-Rockets-in-Land-Warfare.pdf |title=Improvised Employment of S-5 Air-to-Surface Rockets in Land Warfare: A brief history and technical appraisal |date=2014 |publisher=Armament Research Services |access-date=2014-08-17 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140924204548/http://www.armamentresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/ARES-Research-Report-No.-1-S-5-Rockets-in-Land-Warfare.pdf |archive-date=2014-09-24 }}</ref>

Modern MRL systems can use modern land navigation (especially satellite navigation such as GPS) for quick and accurate positioning. The accurate determination of the battery position previously required such effort that making a dispersed operation of the battery was at times impractical. MRL systems with GPS can have their MRLs dispersed and fire from various positions at a single target, just as previously multiple batteries were often united on one target area.

Radar may be used to track [[weather balloon]]s to determine winds or to track special rockets that self-destruct in the air. The tracking allows determination of the influence of winds and propellant temperatures on the rockets' flight paths. These observations can then be factored into the firing solution for the rocket salvo for effect. Such tracking radars can also be used to predict the range error of individual rockets. Trajectory-correcting munitions may then benefit from this, as a directional radio may send a coded message to the rocket to deploy air brakes at just the right time to correct most of the range error. This requires that the rockets were originally aimed too far, as the range can only be shortened by the air brakes, not extended.

A more sophisticated system makes use of radar data and a one-way radio datalink to initiate a two dimensional (range and [[azimuth]]) correction of the rocket's flight path with steering by fins or nose thrusters. The latter is more common with systems which can be used to upgrade old rockets and the IMI [[ACCULAR]]<ref>{{cite web |last=Richardson |first=Doug |url=http://www.imi-israel.com/vault/documents/accular.pdf |title=Israel Military Industries exhibits reborn Accular guided rocket |access-date=2014-08-18 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150715052614/http://www.imi-israel.com/vault/documents/accular.pdf |archive-date=2015-07-15 }}</ref> is an example.

[[File:Tactical exercises of Radiological, Chemical and Biological Protection Troops units at Shikhani training ground (410-1).jpg|thumb|Heavy flamethrower system [[TOS-1|TOS-1A]] MRL capable of using thermobaric warheads, mounted on a T-72 tank chassis, in action]]

Fin-stabilised rockets also allow for easy course corrections using rudders or minute charges. [[Precision-guided munitions]] have been introduced to exploit this. Guidance principles such as GPS satellite navigation, inertial navigation systems and semi-active laser seekers are used for this. This improves dispersion from a [[Circular error probability|CEP]] of hundreds of meters at dozens of kilometers' range to just a few meters and largely independent of the range of the round (except for INS, as INS navigation creates a small dispersion that is about proportional to range). This in turn made great increases of rocket (or missile) ranges useful; previously dispersion had made rockets too inefficient and often too dangerous to friendly troops at long ranges.
Long-range MRL missiles often fly a higher quasi-ballistic trajectory than shorter-ranged rockets and thus pose a de-confliction challenge, as they might collide with friendly aircraft in the air.

The differences between an MRL missile and a large anti-tank guided missile, such as the [[Nimrod (missile)|Nimrod]], have blurred due to guided MRL missiles such as the [[M31 GMLRS]] (guided unitary multiple launch rocket system), which passed flight tests in 2014.<ref name=lm201408>{{cite press release|url=http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/GuidedUnitaryMLRSRocket.html |title=Guided MLRS Unitary Rocket |publisher=Lockheed Martin|date=11 August 2014 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140811224004/http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/GuidedUnitaryMLRSRocket.html |archive-date=2014-08-11 }}</ref>

==See also==
* {{annotated link|Cake (firework)}}
* [[List of rocket artillery]]
* [[List of U.S. Army rocket launchers]]
* [[Rouketopolemos]]
* [[Transporter erector launcher]]

==References==
{{Reflist}}{{commons category|Multiple rocket launchers}}

{{Authority control}}

[[Category:Chinese inventions]]
[[Category:Multiple rocket launchers| ]]
[[Category:Salvo weapons]]
[[Category:Self-propelled rocket launchers]]
[[Category:Military history of the Song dynasty]]

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India Optel Limited

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Peacekeeping

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{{short description|Activities intended to create conditions that favour lasting peace}}
{{Use mdy dates|date=March 2023}}
{{Use American English|date=March 2023}}
[[File:Italian Soldier UNIFIL 2 Lebanon 2007.jpg|thumb|A soldier from the [[Italian Army]] stands guard during the [[UNIFIL]] mission in Lebanon.]]

{{history of war}}

'''Peacekeeping''' comprises activities, especially military ones,<ref>"Peacekeeping". Oxford Languages. 2023.</ref> intended to create conditions that favor lasting peace.<ref name=":0" /><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/|title=United Nations Peacekeeping|access-date=23 October 2014}}</ref> Research generally finds that peacekeeping reduces civilian and battlefield deaths, as well as reduces the risk of renewed [[war]]fare.

Within the [[United Nations]] (UN) group of nation-state governments and organizations, there is a general understanding that at the international level, peacekeepers monitor and observe [[Peacebuilding|peace processes]] in post-conflict areas, and may assist ex-combatants in implementing [[peace agreement]] commitments that they have undertaken. Such assistance may come in many forms, including confidence-building measures, power-sharing arrangements, electoral support, strengthening the [[rule of law]], and economic and social development. Accordingly, the [[United Nations peacekeeping|UN peacekeepers]] (often referred to as '''Blue Berets '''or '''Blue Helmets''' because of their light blue [[beret]]s or helmets) can include soldiers, [[United Nations Police|police]] officers, and civilian personnel.<ref name=":0">{{cite web|author=United Nations Peacekeeping |url=https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/about/dpko/ |title=Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) |publisher=United Nations Peacekeeping |access-date=2012-10-03}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|author=United Nations Peacekeeping |url=https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/about/dfs/ |title=Department of Field Support (DFS) |publisher=United Nations Peacekeeping |access-date=2012-10-03}}</ref>

The United Nations is not the only organisation to implement peacekeeping missions. Non-UN peacekeeping forces include the [[Kosovo Force|NATO mission in Kosovo]] (with United Nations authorisation) and the [[Multinational Force and Observers]] on the [[Sinai Peninsula]] or the ones organised by the [[European Union]] (like [[EUFOR RCA]], with UN authorisation) and the [[African Union]] (like the [[African Union Mission in Sudan]]).{{Citation needed|date=August 2023}}

Under [[international law]], peacekeepers are [[non-combatant]]s due to their [[neutral country|neutral]] stance in the conflict between two or more [[belligerent]] parties (to the same extent as neutral personnel and properties outside of peacekeeping duties) and are to be protected from attacks at all times.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule33 |title=Rule 33. Personnel and Objects Involved in a Peacekeeping Mission|publisher=[[International Committee of the Red Cross]]|access-date=April 7, 2019}}</ref>

==Definitions and types of peacekeeping operations==

=== United Nations peacekeeping missions ===
{{See also|United Nations peacekeeping}}

====Chapter VI and Chapter VII mission types====
There is a range of various types of operations encompassed in peacekeeping. In Page Fortna's book ''Does Peacekeeping Work?'', for instance, she distinguishes four different types of peacekeeping operations.<ref name="Fortna 2008 6–7">{{Cite book|title=Does Peacekeeping Work?: Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War|last=Fortna|first=Page|publisher=Princeton University Press|year=2008|pages=Chapter 7}}</ref> Importantly, these types of missions and how they are conducted are heavily influenced by the mandate in which they are authorized. Three of Fortna's four types are consent-based missions, i.e., so-called "[[Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter|Chapter VI]]" missions, with the fourth being a "[[Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter|Chapter VII]]" Mission.
Chapter VI missions are consent-based; therefore they require the consent of the belligerent factions involved in order to operate. Should they lose that consent, Peacekeepers would be compelled to withdraw. Chapter VII missions, by contrast, do not require consent, though they may have it. If consent is lost at any point, Chapter VII missions would not be required to withdraw.
# ''Observation Missions'' which consist of small contingents of military or civilian observers tasked with monitoring cease-fires, troop withdrawals, or other conditions outlined in a ceasefire agreement. They are typically unarmed and are primarily tasked with observing and reporting on what is taking place. Thus, they do not possess the capability or mandate to intervene should either side renege on the agreement. Examples of observation missions include [[United Nations Angola Verification Mission II|UNAVEM II]] in [[Angola]] in 1991 and [[United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara|MINURSO]] in the [[Western Sahara]].
# ''Interpositional Missions'', also known as traditional peacekeeping, are larger contingents of lightly armed troops meant to serve as a buffer between belligerent factions in the aftermath of a conflict. Thus, they serve as a buffer zone between the two sides and can monitor and report on the compliance of either side with regard to parameters established in a given ceasefire agreement. Examples include [[United Nations Angola Verification Mission III|UNAVEM III]] in Angola in 1994, and [[MINUGUA]] in [[Guatemala]] in 1996.
# ''Multidimensional missions'' are carried out by military and [[United Nations Police|police]] personnel in which they attempt to implement robust and comprehensive settlements. Not only do they act as observers or in an interpositional role, but they also participate in more multidimensional tasks—such as electoral supervision, police and security forces reform, institution building, economic development, and more. Examples include [[United Nations Transition Assistance Group|UNTAG]] in [[Namibia]], [[ONUCA and ONUSAL|ONUSAL]] in [[El Salvador]], and [[United Nations Operation in Mozambique|ONUMOZ]] in [[Mozambique]].
# ''Peace enforcement Missions'' are Chapter VII missions and unlike the previous Chapter VI missions, they do not require the consent of the belligerent parties. These are multidimensional operations comprising both civilian and military personnel. The military force is substantial in size and fairly well-equipped by UN Peacekeeping standards. They are mandated to use force for purposes beyond just self-defence. Examples include [[Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group|ECOMOG]] and [[United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone|UNAMSIL]] in [[West Africa]] and [[Sierra Leone]] in 1999, as well as the [[NATO]] operations in [[Bosnia and Herzegovina|Bosnia]]—[[Implementation Force|IFOR]] and [[SFOR]].<ref name="Fortna 2008 6–7"/>

==== UN missions during and after the Cold War ====

During the [[Cold War]], peacekeeping was primarily interpositional in nature—thus being referred to as traditional peacekeeping. UN Peacekeepers were deployed in the aftermath of interstate conflict in order to serve as a buffer between belligerent factions and ensure compliance with the terms of an established peace agreement. Missions were consent-based, and more often than not observers were unarmed—such was the case with [[United Nations Truce Supervision Organization|UNTSO]] in the [[Middle East]] and [[UN mediation of Kashmir|UNCIP]] in [[India]] and [[Pakistan]]. Others were armed—such as [[United Nations Emergency Force|UNEF-I]], established during the [[Suez Crisis]]. They were largely successful in this role.

In the [[Post–Cold War era|post-Cold War]] era, the United Nations has taken on a more nuanced, multidimensional approach to Peacekeeping. In 1992, in the aftermath of the Cold War, then [[Secretary-General of the United Nations|Secretary-General]] [[Boutros Boutros-Ghali]] put together a report detailing his ambitious concepts for the United Nations and Peacekeeping at large. The report, titled ''[[An Agenda for Peace]]'', described a multi-faceted and interconnected set of measures he hoped would lead to effective use of the UN in its role in post-Cold War international politics. This included the use of preventative diplomacy, peace-enforcement, peace-making, peace-keeping and post-conflict reconstruction.

==== Broader aims of UN missions ====

In ''The UN Record on Peacekeeping Operations'', [[Michael W. Doyle|Michael Doyle]] and Nicolas Sambanis summarise Boutros Boutros' report as preventative diplomacy, confidence-building measures such as fact-finding missions, observer mandates, and the potential deployment of UN mandated forces as a preventative measure in order to diminish the potential for violence or the danger of violence occurring and thus increasing the prospect for lasting peace. Their definitions are as follows:
# ''Peace-enforcement'', meant to act with or without the consent of the belligerents in order to ensure any treaty or cease-fire mandated by the United Nations Security Council is maintained. This is done primarily under the auspices of Chapter VII of the UN Charter and the forces are generally heavily armed as opposed to the unarmed, or lightly-armed personnel frequently deployed as observers.
# ''Peace-making'', meant to compel belligerents to seek a peaceful settlement for their differences via mediation and other forms of negotiation provided by the UN under the auspices of Chapter VI of the [[United Nations Charter|UN Charter]].
# ''Peace-keeping'', deployment of a lightly-armed United Nations presence in the field with the consent of the belligerents involved in order to build confidence and monitor any agreements between concerned parties. Additionally, diplomats would continue to work toward comprehensive and lasting peace, or for the implementation of an agreed-upon peace.
# ''Post-Conflict Reconstruction,'' intended to develop economic and social cooperation meant to mend relations between the belligerents. Social, political, and economic infrastructure would ideally prevent potential violence and conflict in the future and help to contribute to lasting and robust peace.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Doyle|first1=Michael W.|last2=Sambanis|first2=Nicholas|date=2007|title=The UN Record On Peacekeeping Operations|journal=International Journal|volume=63|issue=3}}</ref>

Peacekeeping also means working together with NGOs with a view to protecting cultural property. The [[UN peacekeeping]] commitment to the protection of [[cultural heritage]] dates back to 2012 and is being expanded. An outstanding mission was the deployment of the UN peace mission [[UNIFIL]] together with [[Blue Shield International]] in 2019 to protect the [[UNESCO World Heritage]] in Lebanon. Basically, the protection of cultural property (carried out by military and civil experts in cooperation with local people) forms the stable basis for the future peaceful and economic development of a city, region or country in many conflict areas. Whereby there is also a connection between cultural user disruption and the cause of flight, as President of Blue Shield International [[Karl von Habsburg]] explained during the United Nations peacekeeping and [[UNESCO]] mission in Lebanon in April 2019: "Cultural assets are part of the identity of the people who live in a certain place. If you destroy their culture, you also destroy their identity. Many people are uprooted, often have no prospects anymore and subsequently flee from their homeland".<ref>{{cite web|title=Karl von Habsburg auf Mission im Libanon|date=28 April 2019 |url=https://www.krone.at/1911689|language=de}}</ref><ref>Jyot Hosagrahar: ''Culture: at the heart of SDGs.'' UNESCO-Kurier, April-Juni 2017.</ref><ref>Rick Szostak: ''The Causes of Economic Growth: Interdisciplinary Perspectives.'' Springer Science & Business Media, 2009, {{ISBN|9783540922827}}.</ref><ref>[https://www.bundesheer.at/cms/artikel.php?ID=10118 "Blue Helmet Forum 2019 - Protection of Cultural Heritage in Peace Operations", Austrian Armed Forces]</ref><ref>[https://en.unesco.org/courier/2017nian-di-3qi/historic-resolution-protect-cultural-heritage A historic resolution to protect cultural heritage, The UNESCO Courier]</ref><ref>[https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/action-plan-to-preserve-heritage-sites-during-conflict Action plan to preserve heritage sites during conflict - United Nations Peacekeeping, 12 April 2019.]</ref><ref>''UNESCO Director-General calls for stronger cooperation for heritage protection at the Blue Shield International General Assembly.'' UNESCO, 13 September 2017.</ref>

=== Non-United Nations peacekeeping ===
{{See also|NATO peacekeeping}}
[[File:En-MFO1.JPG|thumb|right|Canadian [[UH-1N Twin Huey|CH135 Twin Hueys]] assigned to the [[Multinational Force and Observers]] non-UN peacekeeping force, at [[El Gorah]], [[Sinai Peninsula|Sinai]], [[Egypt]], 1989.]]
[[File:75Parad 04.jpg|thumb|Members of the [[Azerbaijani peacekeeping forces]] in full combat uniform during the [[2020 Moscow Victory Day Parade]].]]
Not all international peacekeeping forces have been directly controlled by the United Nations. In 1981, an agreement between Israel and Egypt formed the [[Multinational Force and Observers]] which continues to monitor the [[Sinai Peninsula]].<ref name="10TAGpgA-1">10 Tactical Air Group: ''Canadian Contingent Multinational Force and Observers Handbook'' (unclassified), page A-1. DND, Ottawa, 1986.</ref>

The [[African Union]] (AU) is working on building an African Peace and Security Architecture that fulfils the mandate to enforce peace and security on the continent. In cases of [[genocide]] or other serious human rights violations, an AU-mission could be launched even against the wishes of the government of the country concerned, as long as it is approved by the AU General Assembly. The establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) which includes the African Standby Force (ASF) is planned earliest for 2015.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.dandc.eu/en/article/african-peace-and-security-architecture-already-proving-useful-even-though-it-still-work |title=The African Peace and Security Architecture is already proving useful even though it is still work in progress |publisher=dandc.eu |date=27 August 2013 |access-date=14 November 2013}}</ref> On the regional level, the [[Economic Community of West African States]] has initiated several peacekeeping missions in some of its member states, and it has been described as "Africa's most advanced regional peace and security mechanism".<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Oni|first1=Cyril I.|date=2009|journal=African Security|volume=2|pages=119–135|doi=10.1080/19362200903361945|title=Economic Community of West African States on the Ground: Comparing Peacekeeping in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Côte D'Ivoire|issue=2–3|doi-access=free}}</ref>

Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping (UCP) are civilian personnel that carry out non-violent, non-interventionist and impartial set of tactics in order to protect civilians in conflict zones from violence in addition to supporting additional efforts to build a lasting peace. While the term UCP is not entirely ubiquitous among non-governmental agencies (NGOs) in the field: many utilize similar techniques and desire shared outcomes for peace; such as accompaniment, presence, rumour control, community security meetings, the securing of safe passage, and monitoring.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Rachel|first1=Julian|last2=Schweitzer|first2=Christine|date=2015|title=The Origins And Development of Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping|url=http://eprints.leedsbeckett.ac.uk/1764/5/Origins%20and%20Development%20of%20UCP%20Submitted.pdf|journal=Peace Review|volume=27|issue=1|pages=1–8|doi=10.1080/10402659.2015.1000181|s2cid=144911738}}</ref>

==Brief history==
{{Main|History of United Nations peacekeeping}}

===Creation and early years===

United Nations Peacekeeping started in 1948 when the [[United Nations Security Council]] authorised the deployment of UN unarmed military observers to the Middle East in order to monitor the armistice agreement that was signed between Israel and its Arab neighbours in the wake of the [[1948 Arab–Israeli War|Arab-Israeli War]]. This operation was called the [[United Nations Truce Supervision Organization]] (UNTSO) and is still in operation today.<ref name=":02">{{Cite web|url=https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/history.shtml|title=History of Peacekeeping|publisher=United Nations|access-date=17 April 2016}}</ref> With the passage of resolution 73 (1949) by the Security Council in August 1949, UNTSO was given the task of fulfilling four Armistice Agreements between the state of Israel and the Arab states which had participated in the war. Thus, UNTSO's operations were spread through five states in the region—Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/untso/background.shtml|title=UNTSO Background|publisher=United Nations|access-date=17 April 2016}}</ref>

===Cold War peacekeeping===
In the wake of independence in India and Pakistan in August 1947 and the subsequent bloodshed that followed the Security Council adopted resolution 39 (1948) in January 1948 in order to create the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), with the purpose of mediating the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and the fighting related to it. This operation was non-interventionist in nature and was additionally tasked with supervision of a ceasefire signed by Pakistan and India in the state of [[Jammu and Kashmir (state)|Jammu and Kashmir]]. With the passage of the [[Karachi Agreement|Karachi agreement]] in July 1949, UNCIP would supervise a ceasefire line that would be mutually overseen by UN unarmed military observers and local commanders from each side in the dispute. UNCIP's mission in the region continues to this day, now under the operational title of the [[UN mediation of Kashmir|United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan]] (UNMOGIP).<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmogip/background.shtml|title=UNMOGIP Background|publisher=United Nations|access-date=17 April 2016}}</ref>

Since then, sixty-nine peacekeeping operations have been authorised and have deployed to various countries all over the world.<ref name=":02"/> The great majority of these operations have begun in the post-Cold War world. Between 1988 and 1998 thirty-five UN operations had been established and deployed. This signified a substantial increase when compared with the periods between 1948 and 1978; which saw the creation and deployment of only thirteen UN Peacekeeping operations and zero between 1978 and 1988.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Duffey|first=Tamara|date=2000|title=Cultural Issues in Contemporary Peacekeeping|journal=International Peacekeeping|volume=7|issue=1|pages=142–168|doi=10.1080/13533310008413823|s2cid=145210823}}</ref>

Armed intervention first came in the form of UN involvement in the wake of the Suez Crisis in 1956. [[United Nations Emergency Force]] (UNEF-1), which existed from November 1956 to June 1967 was essentially the first ever United Nations peacekeeping force. It was given the mandate of ensuring the cessation of hostilities between [[Egypt]], the [[United Kingdom]], [[France]], and [[Israel]] in addition to overseeing the withdrawal of French, Israeli and British troops from Egyptian territory. Upon completion of said withdrawal, UNEF would serve as a buffer force between Egyptian and Israeli forces in order to supervise conditions of the ceasefire and contribute to a lasting peace.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unef1mandate.html|title=UNEF Mandate|publisher=United Nations|access-date=17 April 2016}}</ref>

Shortly thereafter, the [[United Nations Operation in the Congo]] (ONUC), was deployed in 1960. This operation involved upwards of 20,000 military personnel at its peak, and resulted in the death of 250 UN personnel, including then Secretary-General [[Dag Hammarskjöld|Dag Hammarskjold]].<ref name=":1">{{Cite web|url=https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/early.shtml|title=The Early Years of UN Peacekeeping|publisher=United Nations|access-date=17 April 2016}}</ref> ONUC was meant to ensure the withdrawal of [[Belgium|Belgian]] forces in the [[Democratic Republic of the Congo|Congo]], who had reinserted themselves after Congolese independence in the wake of a revolt carried out by the [[Force Publique]] (FP), in order to protect Belgian citizens and economic interests. ONUC was also tasked with establishing and maintaining law and order (helping to end the FP revolt and ethnic violence) as well as provide technical assistance and training to Congolese security forces. An additional function was added to ONUC's mission, in which the force was tasked with maintaining the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onuc.htm|title=ONUC|publisher=United Nations|access-date=17 April 2016}}</ref>—resulting from the secession of the mineral-rich provinces of [[Katanga Province|Katanga]] and [[South Kasai]]. The UN forces there, somewhat controversially, more or less became an arm of the Congolese government at the time and helped to forcefully end the secession of both provinces.{{Citation needed|date=August 2023}}

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the UN created multiple short-term missions all over the world including the Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP), the UN Security Force in West New Guinea (UNSF), the [[United Nations Yemen Observation Mission|UN Yemen Observation Mission]] (UNYOM), in conjunction with more long-term operations such as the [[United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus|UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus]] (UNFICYP), the UN Emergency Force II (UNEF II), the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and the [[United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon|UN Interim Force]] in [[Lebanon]] (UNIFIL).<ref name=":1" />[[File:UNpeacekeeping.svg|thumb|right|[[United Nations]] peacekeeping missions as of 2012]]

===Since 1991===
[[File:Evstafiev-bosnia-sarajevo-un-holds-head.jpg|thumb|[[Norway|Norwegian]] Peacekeeper during the [[Siege of Sarajevo]], 1992 - 1993, photo by [[Mikhail Evstafiev]].]]Experiences of peacekeeping during the [[Yugoslav Wars]], especially failures such as the [[Srebrenica Massacre]], led, in part, to the [[United Nations Peacebuilding Commission]], which works to implement stable peace through some of the same civic functions that peacekeepers also work on, such as elections. The Commission currently works with six countries, all in Africa.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://pulitzercenter.org/projects/africa/beyond-peace-deals-united-nations-experiment-peacebuilding |title=Beyond Peace Deals: The United Nations Experiment in "Peacebuilding"|date=2010-06-22}}</ref> In 2013 the [[U.N. Security Council]] unanimously passed Resolution 2122, which among other things calls for stronger measures regarding women's participation in conflict and post-conflict processes such as peace talks, gender expertise in peacekeeping missions, improved information about the impact of armed conflict on women, and more direct briefing to the Council on progress in these areas.<ref name="AWID">{{cite web |url=http://www.awid.org/Library/UN-Security-Council-Takes-a-Historic-Stand-Supporting-Abortion-Access-for-Women-Raped-in-War |title=UN Security Council Takes a Historic Stand Supporting Abortion Access for Women Raped in War / Library / Homepage |publisher=AWID |access-date=2013-10-28 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131203101025/http://www.awid.org/Library/UN-Security-Council-Takes-a-Historic-Stand-Supporting-Abortion-Access-for-Women-Raped-in-War |archive-date=2013-12-03 }}</ref> Also in 2013, the [[Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women]] (CEDAW), a UN women's rights committee, said in a general recommendation that states that have ratified the UN Women's Rights Convention are obliged to uphold women's rights before, during, and after conflict when they are directly involved in fighting, and/or are providing peacekeeping troops or donor assistance for conflict prevention, humanitarian aid or post-conflict reconstruction.<ref name="ohchr.org">{{cite web|url=http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13885&LangID=E|title=OHCHR -|website=www.ohchr.org}}</ref>
The Committee also stated that ratifying states should exercise due diligence in ensuring that [[non-state actor]]s, such as armed groups and private security contractors, be held accountable for crimes against women.<ref name="ohchr.org"/>

One of the findings of Page Fortna about where peacekeepers go is that "peacekeeping is a matter of supply and demand" From the supply side, she observes that there is unlikely a Peacekeeping mission in civil wars on countries close to one of the members of the Security Council. From the demand side, there is diverse evidence that peacekeeping missions are deployed in the countries who need it the most, this is where the risk of a recurring war is high.<ref name="Fortna 2008 6–7" />

== Composition of peacekeeping forces ==

===Nations that participate in peacekeeping missions===
{{See also|List of countries by number of UN peacekeepers}}

[[File:Irish troops UNMIL.jpg|thumb|upright=0.9|Irish [[UNMIL]] troops on patrol in Liberia, July 2006]]
The [[United Nations Charter]] stipulates that to assist in maintaining peace and security around the world, all member states of the UN should make available to the Security Council necessary armed forces and facilities. Since 1948, about 130 nations have contributed military and civilian police personnel to peace operations. While detailed records of all personnel who have served in peacekeeping missions since 1948 are not available, it is estimated that up to one million soldiers, police officers and civilians have served under the UN flag on its 71 missions. As of September 2021, 122 countries were contributing a total of around 76,000 military observers, police, and troops.<ref name=":14">{{Cite web|title=Troop and police contributors|url=https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors|access-date=2021-10-31|website=United Nations Peacekeeping|language=en}}</ref>

Despite the large number of contributors, the greatest burden continues to be borne by a core group of [[Developing country|developing countries]]. The ten largest troop contributing countries (including police and military experts) to UN peacekeeping operations as of October 2021 were [[Bangladesh]] (6447), [[Nepal]] (5536), [[India]] (5481), [[Rwanda]] (5263), [[Ethiopia]] (4856), [[Pakistan]] (3949), [[Egypt]] (2818), [[Indonesia]] (2818), [[Ghana]] (2296), and [[China]] (2248).<ref name=":14" /> More than 14,000 civilian personnel serve in peacekeeping operations as legal or medical experts, educators, communication technology professionals, or administrators as of October 2021.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/civilians|title=Civilians|publisher=UN Peacekeeping|access-date=2021-10-30}}</ref>

As of 30 September 2021, 4147 people from over 100 countries have been killed while serving on peacekeeping missions.<ref name=":15">{{cite web|url=https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities|title=Fatalities|publisher=UN Peacekeeping|access-date=2021-10-30}}</ref> India has the highest number of peacekeeper casualties with 174, followed by Bangladesh (159), Pakistan (159), [[Nigeria]] (157), Ghana (145), Ethiopia (138), [[Canada]] (123), [[France]] (115) and the [[United Kingdom]] (106). Since 1948, 56 peacekeepers have been killed each year on average, but recent decades have seen this number almost double, with 110 deaths per year since 2001. 30% of the fatalities in the first 55 years of UN peacekeeping occurred between 1993 and 1995.<ref name=":15" />

There is a strong North-South divide in peacekeeping in that developing nations from the [[Global South]] provide the overwhelming majority of peacekeepers. [[Thomas G. Weiss]] and Giovanna Kuele argue that this is due to three factors: regional interests, prestige, and financial benefits.<ref name=":9">{{Cite web|date=2019-02-03|title=The Global South and UN Peace Operations|url=https://www.e-ir.info/2019/02/03/the-global-south-and-un-peace-operations/|access-date=2021-10-31|website=E-International Relations|language=en-US}}</ref> African countries are the largest contributors of peacekeepers, but the continent also has the highest number of peacekeeping missions, and most African peacekeepers serve on African missions. As an example, almost all 4800 Ethiopian peacekeepers are deployed in its neighboring countries of [[Sudan]] and [[South Sudan]].<ref name=":9" /> Being a contributor to peacekeeping missions also provides some international prestige for developing countries, and can bolster countries' claims to be a [[great power]] as in the case of Brazil and India. Lastly, providing peacekeepers can have financial benefits for poorer countries. The monthly rate of reimbursement per peacekeeper includes $1,028 for pay and allowances; $303 supplementary pay for specialists; $68 for personal clothing, gear and equipment; and $5 for personal weaponry.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/faq/q10.htm|title=United Nations Peacekeepers - How are peacekeepers compensated?|access-date=23 October 2014}}</ref> Both the direct payments and the training and equipment provided by UN peacekeeping missions can be financially attractive to individual soldiers and developing nations.<ref name=":9" /> About 4.5% of the troops and civilian police deployed in UN peacekeeping missions come from the [[European Union]] and less than one percent from the [[United States]].<ref name="factsheet">{{cite web |url=https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/overview.shtml |title=Peacekeeping Fact Sheet |publisher=United Nations|access-date=2010-12-20}}</ref>

With regard to mission leadership, Force Commanders often come from large troop contributors, while the Special Representatives of the Secretary General often come from developed countries.<ref>{{cite journal |last1= Oksamytna |first1= Kseniya|last2= Bove |first2= Vincenzo|last3= Lundgren |first3= Magnus|date= 2021 |title=Leadership selection in United Nations peacekeeping |journal= International Studies Quarterly|volume= 65|pages= 16–28|doi= 10.1093/isq/sqaa023 |doi-access= free }}</ref>

===Women's participation in peacekeeping===
[[United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325|Security Council Resolution 1325]] was the first major step taken by the UN to include women as active and equal actors in “the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and in post-conflict reconstruction and stresses the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security”.<ref>Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women (2013). "Landmark Resolution on Women Peace and Security", United Nations. http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps/#resolution</ref><ref>United Nations Security Council (October 31, 2000) "Resolution 1325", S/RES/1325, United Nations.</ref> A critique of this resolution is that UNSCR 1325 proposes the implementing gender mainstreaming, however the progress that has been accomplished in this area has focused on women, rather than on assessing the impacts of planned action on both men and women. In 2010, a comprehensive 10-year impact study was conducted to assess the success of this resolution and found that there was limited success with the implementation, particularly in the increasing women's participation in peace negotiations and peace agreements, and sexual and gender-based violence has continued to be prevalent, despite efforts to reduce it.<ref>United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support (2010). "Ten-year Impact Study on Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security in Peacekeeping", United Nations, p. 9-10. https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/10year_impact_study_1325.pdf</ref>
[[File:Ghana IntPeaceCorps 2016-05-29 B002a.jpg|thumb|Ghanaian women serve as UN Peacekeepers]]
In 2013 the [[U.N. Security Council]] unanimously passed Resolution 2122, which among other things calls for stronger measures regarding women's participation in conflict and post-conflict processes such as peace talks, gender expertise in peacekeeping missions, improved information about the impact of armed conflict on women, and more direct briefing to the Council on progress in these areas.<ref name="AWID"/> Also in 2013, the [[Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women]] (CEDAW), a UN women's rights committee, said in a general recommendation that states that have ratified the UN Women's Rights Convention are obliged to uphold women's rights before, during, and after conflict when they are directly involved in fighting, and/or are providing peacekeeping troops or donor assistance for conflict prevention, humanitarian aid or post-conflict reconstruction<ref name="ohchr.org"/> The Committee also stated that ratifying states should exercise due diligence in ensuring that non-state actors, such as armed groups and private security contractors, be held accountable for crimes against women.<ref name="ohchr.org"/>

As of July 2016, women serve in every UN peacekeeping mission either as troops, police, or civilian staff.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/gender.shtml|title=Gender statistics. United Nations Peacekeeping|website=www.un.org|access-date=2016-09-06}}</ref> In 1993, women made up 1% of deployed uniformed personnel. In 2020, out of approximately 95,000 peacekeepers, women constituted 4.8% of military personnel, 10.9% of police personnel, and 34% of justice and corrections personnel in UN peacekeeping missions.<ref name=":10">{{Cite web|title=Women in peacekeeping|url=https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/women-peacekeeping|access-date=2021-10-31|website=United Nations Peacekeeping|language=en}}</ref> As of September 2021, no state contributing more than 100 UN peacekeepers nominates more than 25% women; in absolute numbers, the largest female contingents are provided by Ethiopia (578 female peacekeepers, or 12% of its total forces), Rwanda (500/10%), and Ghana (389/17%).<ref>{{Cite web|title=Troop and police contributors|url=https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors|access-date=2021-10-31|website=United Nations Peacekeeping|language=en}}</ref> While there is no set target for the proportion of women among military personnel, the UN is requesting contributing states to nominate a minimum of 20% women for policer officer positions and 30% for justice and corrections personnel.<ref name=":10" />

== Theoretical basis for peacekeeping ==
While much has been written about peacekeeping and what peacekeepers do, very little empirical research has taken place in order to identify the manner in which peacekeepers can have an impact in a post-conflict environment. [[Columbia University]] Professor [[Virginia Page Fortna]] attempted to categorize four causal mechanisms through which peacekeepers have the opportunity to lay the groundwork for a lasting peace.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices After Civil War|last=Fortna|first=Virginia Page|publisher=Princeton University Press|year=2008|location=Princeton|pages=175}}</ref> Fortna's four mechanisms are as follows:
# Change the incentives of recent belligerents, making peace more desirable or war more costly.
# Reduce the uncertainty and fear that drives security dilemma spirals.
# Prevent or control accidents or the actions of rogue groups that might otherwise escalate back to war.
# Prevent political abuse by one side (generally the government) that might cause actors losing the peace to take up arms anew.
Fortna argues that peacekeepers have a positive impact on the peace process, despite often being sent to places where peace is most difficult to achieve. Peacekeeping is often looked at by detractors as ineffective, or unnecessary. Peace prevails when belligerents already have a vested interest in sustaining peace and therefore it could be argued that Peacekeepers play only a minor role in creating a strong foundation for enduring peace. Yet these causal reasons illustrate the important roles that Peacekeepers play in ensuring that peace lasts, especially when contrasted against situations in which belligerents are left to their own devices. These causal reasons thus illustrate the need for Peacekeeping and lay a foundation for the manner in which Peacekeeping operations can have a substantive impact on the post-conflict environment.

In order to change the incentives for war and make peace more appealing the UN can provide a military force by way of an enforcement mandate which provides deterrence to would-be spoilers. They can monitor the situation making the potential for surprise attack by one of the belligerents less likely to occur or by making it more difficult to carry out such an attack. A lightly-armed observer mission can also serve as an early-warning force or "tripwire" for the aforementioned enforcement mission. Aid and recognition provided to the belligerents by the international community should be made conditional and based on compliance with objectives laid out in the negotiating process. And lastly, peace dividends should be provided in the forms of jobs, public works and other benefits.

To reduce uncertainty and fear the UN Peacekeeping force can monitor the aforementioned compliance, facilitate communication between belligerents in order to ease security dilemma concerns thus reassuring belligerents that the other side will not renege, and allow for belligerents to signal their legitimate intentions for peace to the other side. That is to say, provide a meaningful pathway for communication between both sides to make their intentions known and credible.

Prevention and control of potential accidents that may derail the peace process can be achieved by the peacekeeping force by deterring rogue groups. Belligerent forces are often undisciplined without a strong central source of [[command and control]], therefore while a peace is being negotiated there is potential for a rogue group on one side to renege and spoil the peace process. UN forces can serve to prevent this. Additionally, the UN force can serve as a moderator and make communication easy between both parties and bring in political moderates from either side. By providing law and order UN peacekeeping forces can temporarily replace a state's security forces and prevent a bias overreaction to an alleged violation by one side which could in turn result in escalation and a renewal in the violence.

Prevention of political abuse can be achieved through the reformation of institutions associated with the government. Training and monitoring the security forces (e.g. army or police) help to make them an unbiased protector of the people rather than a weapon of suppression for the ruling government. Hopefully this training can bring trust by the people for the security establishment. UN forces can also run and monitor elections in order to ensure a fair process. In other cases, the UN may provide a neutral interim government to administer the country during a transitional period wherein the associated government institutions are being retrained, reformed or better developed. Lastly, military groups such as armed rebels can be encouraged to put down their weapons and transformed into political organisations using appropriate non-violent means to mete out their grievances and compete in the election cycle. This is especially important as many of these groups serve as the chief opposition to a given government, but lack the means or know-how to operate effectively as political organisations.

Different peacekeeping missions take place as a result of different causal mechanisms. More military deterrence and enforcement are meant for those missions operating under the auspices of Chapter VII, while Chapter VI missions are meant to serve more as monitoring forces and interpositional operations are meant to target and prevent potential political abuse—these are primarily multidimensional missions and are heavily involved in the post-conflict political situation.<ref name=":6">{{Cite book|title=Does Peacekeeping Work?: Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War|last=Fortna|first=Virginia Page|publisher=Princeton University Press|year=2008|chapter=4}}</ref>

== Effectiveness of peacekeeping missions ==

Reviews of the academic literature show considerable evidence that peacekeeping increases peace.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Walter|first1=Barbara F.|last2=Howard|first2=Lise Morje|last3=Fortna|first3=V. Page|date=2020|title=The Extraordinary Relationship between Peacekeeping and Peace|journal=British Journal of Political Science|volume=51|issue=4|language=en|pages=1705–1722|doi=10.1017/S000712342000023X|issn=0007-1234|doi-access=}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Hoeffler|first=Anke|date=2014-03-11|title=Can international interventions secure the peace?|journal=[[International Area Studies Review]]|language=en|volume=17|issue=1|pages=75–94|doi=10.1177/2233865914525380|s2cid=16303210|url=http://www.econrsa.org/node/700}}</ref> According to Fortna, there is strong evidence that the presence of peacekeepers significantly reduces the risk of renewed warfare; more peacekeeping troops contribute to fewer battlefield deaths; and more peacekeeping troops contribute to fewer civilian deaths.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2015/09/24/enough-with-the-pessimism-about-peacekeeping/|title=Enough with the Pessimism about Peacekeeping|date=2015-09-24|website=Political Violence at a Glance|access-date=2017-01-26}}</ref> A study by political scientists at [[Uppsala University]] and [[Peace Research Institute Oslo]] estimates that an ambitious UN peacekeeping policy with a doubled peacekeeping operation and strong mandates would "reduce the global incidence of armed conflict by two thirds relative to a no-PKO scenario."<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Hegre|first1=Håvard|last2=Hultman|first2=Lisa|last3=Nygård|first3=Håvard Mokleiv|date=2018-11-28|title=Evaluating the Conflict-Reducing Effect of UN Peacekeeping Operations|journal=The Journal of Politics|volume=81|language=en|pages=215–232|doi=10.1086/700203|s2cid=13894244|issn=0022-3816|doi-access=free}}</ref> According to Fordham University political scientist Anjali Dayal, "Scholars have found that peacekeeping keeps wars from bleeding across borders. Having more peacekeepers on the ground also seems to correspond with fewer civilians targeted with violence. And peace operations at times have successfully served as transitional authorities, handing power back to local authorities, although this is decreasingly true."<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/02/01/is-u-n-peacekeeping-under-fire-heres-what-you-need-to-know/|title=Is U.N. peacekeeping under fire? Here's what you need to know.|newspaper=Washington Post|access-date=2017-02-01}}</ref> A 2018 study found that peacekeeping reduces the severity of civil war on its own, but when it is coupled with mediation, the impact is greater.<ref>{{Cite journal|title=Mediation, Peacekeeping, and the Severity of Civil War|journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution|volume=63|issue=7|pages=1682–1709|language=en|doi=10.1177/0022002718817092|year = 2018|last1 = Beardsley|first1 = Kyle|last2=Cunningham|first2=David E.|last3=White|first3=Peter B.|s2cid=202164361}}</ref> There is also evidence that the promise to deploy peacekeepers can help international organizations bring combatants to the negotiation table and increase the likelihood that they will agree to a cease-fire.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Lundgren|first=Magnus|year=2016|title=Which international organizations can settle civil wars?|journal=Review of International Organizations|volume=DOI 10.1007/s11558-016-9253-0|issue=4|pages=613–641|doi=10.1007/s11558-016-9253-0|s2cid=152898046}}</ref>

By controlling for specific factors that affect where peacekeepers are deployed and what the potential chances for peace are, Page Fortna's statistical research shows that there is a statistically significant impact on lasting peace when peacekeepers are deployed. Despite the fact that peacekeepers are sent to locations where peace is least likely to succeed, Fortna finds that conservative estimates suggest that the presence of UN peacekeepers diminishes the risk for renewed violence by at least 55%-60%; with less conservative estimates upwards of 75%-85%.<ref name="Fortna 2008 116">{{Cite book|title=Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War|last=Fortna|first=Virginia|publisher=Princeton University Press|year=2008|pages=116}}</ref> Additionally, her analysis concludes that there is little difference in the effectiveness between Chapter VI consent-based missions and Chapter VII enforcement missions. Indeed, enforcement missions only remain effective if the UN peacekeeping force can prove and sustain their credibility in the use of force.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War|last=Fortna|first=Virginia|publisher=Princeton University Press|year=2008|pages=109, 116, 125}}</ref> This stresses the importance of a UN mission maintaining the consent of the peacekept. Ultimately, Fortna finds that peacekeeping is an effective tool for ensuring a lasting peace; especially compared to situations in which belligerents' are left to their own devices. Utilising the previously mentioned causal mechanisms for peacekeeping, a UN peacekeeping force can have a substantial and substantive impact on sustaining a lasting peace. Having a relative consensus of the positive impact of peacekeeping for ensuring a lasting peace, Fortna and Howard suggest that the literature is moving towards the study of i) the effectiveness of the types of peace-keepers, ii) the transitional administrations, iii) the links between peacekeeping and democratisation, and iv) the perspectives of the "peacekept".<ref>{{Cite journal|title=Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature*|journal = Annual Review of Political Science|volume = 11|pages = 283–301|last1=Fortna|first1=Virginia Page|last2=Howard|first2=Lise Morjé|date=2008-05-20|language=en|doi=10.1146/annurev.polisci.9.041205.103022|s2cid = 15740415|doi-access=free}}</ref>

Doyle and Sambanis' analysis finds that lasting peace is more likely after non-ethnic wars in countries with a relatively high level of development in addition to whether or not UN peacekeeping forces and financial assistance are available. They conclude that in the short run lasting peace is more dependent on a robust UN deployment coupled with low levels of hostility between belligerents. They note that increased economic capacity can provide an incentive not to renew hostilities. In the long run, however, economic capacity matters far more whereas the degree of hostility between belligerents is less important. As successful as UN deployments can be, they have inadequately spurred independent economic development within the countries where they have intervened. Thus, the UN plays a strong, but indirect role and success in lasting peace is predicated on the development of institutions that support peace, rather than serving as a deterrent for renewed war.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Making War and Building Peace : United Nations Peace Operations|last1=Doyle|first1=Michael W.|last2=Sambanis|first2=Nicholas|publisher=Princeton University Press|year=2010|pages=336–337}}</ref>

Other scholarly analyses show varying success rates for peacekeeping missions, with estimate ranging from 31 percent to 85 percent.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Autesserre|first1=Severine|title=Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention|date=2014|publisher=Cambridge University Press|page=22}}</ref>

According to a 2020 study, non-UN peacekeeping missions are as effective as UN peacekeeping missions.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Bara|first1=Corinne|last2=Hultman|first2=Lisa|date=2020-03-20|title=Just Different Hats? Comparing UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping|journal=International Peacekeeping|volume=27|issue=3|pages=341–368|doi=10.1080/13533312.2020.1737023|issn=1353-3312|doi-access=free}}</ref> Another 2020 study found that peacekeeping successfully protected civilians.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Carnegie|first1=Allison|last2=Mikulaschek|first2=Christoph|date=2020|title=The Promise of Peacekeeping: Protecting Civilians in Civil Wars|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/promise-of-peacekeeping-protecting-civilians-in-civil-wars/2BA3A91C26CF29480409B1FFB64F7E40|journal=International Organization|volume=74|issue=4|language=en|pages=810–832|doi=10.1017/S0020818320000442|s2cid=232253107|issn=0020-8183}}</ref>

A 2021 study in the ''American Journal of Political Science'' found that UN peacekeeping in South Sudan had a positive impact on the local economy.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Bove|first1=Vincenzo|last2=Salvatore|first2=Jessica Di|last3=Elia|first3=Leandro|date=2021|title=UN Peacekeeping and Households' Well-Being in Civil Wars|journal=American Journal of Political Science|volume=66 |issue=2 |pages=402–417 |language=en|doi=10.1111/ajps.12644|issn=1540-5907|doi-access=free}}</ref>

=== Factors that impact lasting peace ===
There are many factors that can have a negative impact on lasting peace such as hidden information about the relative strength possessed by the belligerents; a rebel group's involvement in illicit financing through means such as through the export of diamonds and other minerals; participation in the trafficking of drugs, weapons and human beings; whether or not military victory was achieved by one side; the length of the war as well as how costly it was; commitment problems and security dilemma spirals experienced by both sides; whether a cease-fire or treaty signed by the belligerents; lack of transparency in the motives and actions carried out by belligerents in the immediate aftermath of the conflict; extremist spoilers; participants in the conflict that may benefit from its continuation; indivisibility and more.

Perhaps one of the most statistically significant contributors to a lasting peace is whether or not military victory was achieved by one side. According to Fortna's research, civil wars in which one side wins, resulting in a cease-fire or truce, have an approximately 85–90% lower chance of renewed war. Moreover, peace treaties further reduce the risk by 60–70%.<ref name="Fortna 2008 116"/>

If a group is funded by drugs, diamonds or other illicit trade then there is a substantial increase in the chance of renewed violence—100–250%—which is to say that in such circumstances war is two to three-and-a-half times more likely to begin again.<ref name=":2">{{Cite book|title=Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choice after Civil War|last=Fortna|first=Virginia|publisher=Princeton University Press|year=2008|pages=117}}</ref> While Fortna finds that wars which involve many factions are less likely to resume,<ref name=":2" /> Doyle and Sambanis find the opposite.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Making War and Building Peace : United Nations Peace Operations|last1=Doyle|first1=Michael W.|last2=Sambanis|first2=Nicholas|publisher=Princeton University Press|year=2010|pages=336}}</ref>

Costly wars and wars fought along identity lines both provide varied chances of the renewal of violence. While longer wars and peace established by treaty (especially those attained by military victory) can reduce the chances of another war.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War|last=Fortna|first=Virginia|publisher=Princeton University Press|year=2008|pages=117–119}}</ref>

== Impacts of peacekeeping on participating forces ==

===Military normalisation===
Some commentators have highlighted the potential to leverage peacekeeping operations as a mechanism for advancing military normalisation. Michael Edward Walsh and Jeremy Taylor have argued that [[Japan]]'s peacekeeping operations in [[South Sudan]] provide those promoting Japan's military normalisation with "a unique opportunity to further erode the country's pacifist constitution."<ref name="nbr.org">Jeremy Taylor and Michael Edward Walsh (7 January 2014), ''[http://www.nbr.org/downloads/pdfs/psa/taylor-walsh_commentary_010714.pdf UN Operations in Africa Provide a Mechanism for Japan’s Military Normalization Agenda]'', retrieved 7 February 2014</ref> "Unable to accept the full weight of modern peacekeeping operations without fundamental political, legal, and social changes," they conclude that "Japan's peacekeepers remain ill-prepared to tackle many serious contingencies requiring use of deadly force."<ref>Michael Edward Walsh and Jeremy Taylor (23 December 2013), ''[http://africanarguments.org/2013/12/23/time-to-reconsider-the-japanese-peacekeeping-mission-in-south-sudan-by-michael-edward-walsh-jeremy-taylor/ Time to Reconsider the Japanese Peacekeeping Mission in South Sudan]'', retrieved 7 February 2014</ref> For this reason, they suggest that Japan's continued participation in UN peacekeeping operations might force policy changes that ultimately push the country toward "a tipping point from which the normalisation of Japan's military (will be) the only outcome."<ref name="nbr.org"/>

===Political impact on sending countries===
[[Diana Muir|Diana Muir Appelbaum]] has expressed concern that the creation of a military in [[Fiji]] for the purpose of serving in international peacekeeping missions, has produced a military powerful enough to stage four coups d'état (1987, 1999–2000, 2006, and 2009) and to rule Fiji as a military dictatorship for over two decades.<ref>Appelbaum, Diana Muir (27 August 2012), ''[http://www.jewishideasdaily.com/4867/features/how-the-sinai-peacekeeping-force-staged-a-military-coup-in-fiji/ How the Sinai Peacekeeping Force Staged a Military Coup in Fiji]'', retrieved 7 September 2012</ref> However, a 2018 study published in the ''Journal of Peace Research'' found that countries where militaries are highly dependent on the funds they receive from UN peacekeeping were less likely to experience coups d'états than comparable countries less dependent on such funds.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Lundgren|first=Magnus|date=2018|title=Backdoor peacekeeping: Does participation in UN peacekeeping reduce coups at home?|journal=Journal of Peace Research|volume=55|issue=4|pages=508–523|doi=10.1177/0022343317747668|s2cid=116168984}}</ref>

===Impacts on individual peacekeepers ===
[[File:UNAMIR Blue Berets memorial Kigali (4).jpg|thumb|Memorial in [[Kigali]], Rwanda, to ten Belgian peacekeepers of [[UNAMIR]] who were massacred by Hutu paramilitaries in 1994]]
Studies of peacekeeping soldiers show both positive and negative effects. A study of 951 US Army soldiers assigned to Bosnia revealed that 77% reported some positive consequences, 63% reported a negative consequence, and 47% reported both.<ref>Newby, John H., et al. "Positive and negative consequences of a military deployment." ''Military Medicine'' (2005) 170#10 pp: 815-819</ref> The peacekeepers are exposed to danger caused by the warring parties and often in an unfamiliar climate. This gives rise to different mental health problems, suicide, and substance abuse as shown by the percentage of former peacekeepers with those problems. Having a parent in a mission abroad for an extended period is also stressful to the peacekeepers' families.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Fernandes Souza | first1 = Wanderson |display-authors=etal | year = 2011 | title = Posttraumatic stress disorder in peacekeepers: a meta-analysis | journal = The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease | volume = 199 | issue = 5| pages = 309–312 | doi=10.1097/nmd.0b013e3182175180| pmid = 21543949 | s2cid = 28713512 }}</ref>

Another viewpoint raises the problem that the peacekeeping may soften the troops and erode their combat ability, as the mission profile of a peacekeeping contingent is totally different from the profile of a unit fighting an all-out war.<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20070926001502/http://www.usafa.af.mil/jscope/ISME2007/Papers/Prof%20Paulin%20Kaurin%20War%20Stories.doc Kaurin, P. M. (2007) War Stories: Narrative, Identity and (Recasting) Military Ethics Pedagogy. Pacific Lutheran University. ISME 2007. Retrieved 9-3-2007]</ref><ref>Liu, H. C. K., The war that could destroy both armies, ''Asia Times'', 23 October 2003. Retrieved 9-3-2007.</ref>

==Criticism==

===Peacekeeping, human trafficking, and forced prostitution===
{{Main|Peacekeeping child sexual abuse scandal}}
Since the 1990s, UN peacekeepers have been the subject of numerous accusations of abuse ranging from [[rape]] and [[sexual assault]], to [[pedophilia]] and [[human trafficking]]. Complaints have arisen from [[Cambodia]], [[East Timor]] and [[West Africa]]. In [[Bosnia and Herzegovina|Bosnia-Herzegovina]] prostitution associated with trafficked women skyrocketed and often operated just beyond the gates of U.N. compounds. David Lamb, a regional human rights officer in Bosnia from 2000 to 2001 claimed "The sex slave trade in Bosnia largely exists because of the U.N. peacekeeping operation. Without the peacekeeping presence, there would have been little or no forced prostitution in Bosnia." In addition, hearing held by the [[United States House of Representatives|U.S. House of Representatives]] in 2002 found that members of SFOR were frequenting Bosnian brothels and engaging in sex with trafficked women and underage girls.<ref name=":32">{{Cite journal|last=Allred|first=KJ|date=2006|title=Peacekeepers And Prostitutes: How Deployed Forces Fuel the Demand for Trafficked Women and New Hope for Stopping It|journal=Armed Forces & Society|volume=33|issue=1|page=7|doi=10.1177/0095327X06288803|s2cid=71430076}}</ref>

Reporters witnessed a rapid increase in prostitution in [[Cambodia]], [[Mozambique]], [[Bosnia and Herzegovina|Bosnia]], and [[Kosovo]] after UN and, in the case of the latter two, NATO peacekeeping forces moved in. In the 1996 UN study called "The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children", former first lady of Mozambique [[Graça Machel]] documented: "In 6 out of 12 country studies on sexual exploitation of children in situations of armed conflict prepared for the present report, the arrival of peacekeeping troops has been associated with a rapid rise in [[child prostitution]]".<ref name="unicef.org">{{cite web|url=http://www.unicef.org/graca/a51-306_en.pdf|title=The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children}}</ref>

[[Gita Sahgal]] spoke out in 2004 with regard to the fact that prostitution and [[sex abuse]] crops up wherever [[humanitarian intervention]] efforts are set up. She observed that the "issue with the UN is that [[peacekeeping operation]]s unfortunately seem to be doing the same thing that other militaries do. Even the guardians have to be guarded".<ref>[http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/1126/p06s02-wogi.html Sex charges haunt UN forces; In places like Congo and Kosovo, peacekeepers have been accused of abusing the people they're protecting,"] ''[[Christian Science Monitor]]'', 26 November 2004, accessed 16 February 2010</ref>

An investigation by [[Prince Zeid bin Ra'ad|Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein]], then Permanent Representative of [[Jordan]] to the United Nations, in 2006 resulted in a comprehensive report which detailed some of this abuse in detail— particularly that which occurred in the [[Democratic Republic of the Congo|Democratic Republic of Congo]]. Sexual exploitation frequently came in the form of prostitution, wherein some money (an average of $1-$3 per encounter) was exchanged for sex. In other instances food, or jobs were utilized to ply women for sex. Other young women reported of "rape disguised as prostitution", whereabouts peacekeepers would rape them and were then given some money or food in order to make the act seem consensual.<ref>al-Hussein, Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid. (2005) "A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations." Report to the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: 8.</ref> Between May and September 2004, there were seventy-two allegations of sexual exploitation—68 against military and 4 against civilian personnel. By the end of 2004 there would be a total of 105 allegations. The majority of these allegations were in regards to sex with person under the age of 18 years (45 percent) and sex with adult prostitutes (31 percent). Rape and sexual assault made up approximately 13 and 5 percent respectively, with the remaining 6 percent of allegations relating to other forms of sexual exploitation.<ref>al-Hussein, Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid. (2005) "A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations." Report to the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: 8-9.</ref> Most of the allegations were against peacekeepers from [[Pakistan]], [[Uruguay]], [[Morocco]], [[Tunisia]], [[South Africa]], and [[Nepal]].<ref name=":32"/>

[[Uruguay]]an President [[Jose Mujica]] apologized to Haitian President [[Michel Martelly]] over the alleged rape of an 18-year-old Haitian man by Uruguayan UN peacekeeping troops. Martelly said "a collective rape carried out against a young Haitian" would not go unpunished. Four soldiers suspected of being involved in the rape have been detained.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-haiti-uruguay-un-idUSTRE78603I20110907|title=Uruguay apologises over alleged rape by U.N. peacekeepers|newspaper=Reuters|access-date=23 October 2014|date=2011-09-07}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.jpost.com/Headlines/Article.aspx?id=236953|title=Uruguay to apologise over alleged rape by UN peacekeepers|access-date=23 October 2014}}</ref>

In July 2007 the United Nations [[Department of Peacekeeping Operations]] (DPKO) confined an entire contingent of 734 Moroccans in the [[Ivory Coast]] in the wake of allegations that some had sexually abused underage girls. In the following years, there were 80 investigations carried out by the UN [[United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services|Office of Internal Oversight Services]] (OIOS).<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Simic|first=Olivera|date=2012|title=UN Peacekeeping Operations: The Emerging Problem Of Sexual Exploitation|journal=Regulation of Sexual Conduct in UN Peacekeeping Operations|pages=13–38|doi=10.1007/978-3-642-28484-7_2|isbn=978-3-642-28483-0}}</ref> In 2013, allegations were levelled on personnel from [[France]], [[Gabon]], and [[Burundi]] operating in the [[Central African Republic]]. These include accusations of sexual abuse and exploitation of at least 108 from [[Kémo|Kemo Prefecture]] and that the vast majority of the cases involved minors.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/01/world/africa/un-peacekeeping-hit-by-new-allegations-of-sickening-sex-abuse.html?_r=0|title=U.N. Peacekeeping Hit By New Allegations of 'Sickening' Sex Abuse|last=Gladstone|first=Rick|date=2016|access-date=17 April 2016|newspaper=The New York Times}}</ref> In 2016, more allegations of abuse were levelled on Peacekeepers operating in the Democratic Republic of Congo's eastern province of [[North Kivu]]. [[Tanzania]] and the UN opened a joint inquiry into the alleged abuse, which involved Tanzanian troops. There have been 18 reports of sexual abuse, eight of which involved minors. Sixteen Tanzanian soldiers, a [[Malawi]]an and a South African are implicated in the accusations. The UN reported in March 2016 that there was a large increase in allegations; which involved troops from twenty one countries. Most of the allegations involved troops from African countries including: [[Cameroon]], [[Democratic Republic of the Congo|Congo]], [[Tanzania]], [[Benin]], [[Burkina Faso]], [[Burundi]], [[Ghana]], [[Madagascar]], [[Niger]], [[Nigeria]], [[Rwanda]], [[Senegal]] and [[Togo]].<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.yahoo.com/news/probe-opens-un-troops-alleged-sex-abuse-dr-155023758.html|title=Probe Opens into UN Troops' Alleged Sex Abuse in DR Congo|date=2016|access-date=17 April 2016|via=Yahoo News}}</ref>

===Peacekeepers and the Haiti cholera crisis===
Significant scientific evidence, first reported by the [[Associated Press]],<ref>{{cite web|last=Katz |first=Jonathan M. |url=http://seattletimes.com/html/health/2013276274_apcbhaitidiseaseoutbreak.html |title=Nation & World | UN probes base as source of Haiti cholera outbreak | Seattle Times Newspaper |publisher=Seattletimes.com |date=2010-10-27 |access-date=2013-07-28}}</ref> and later the ''[[New York Times]]'',<ref>[https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/01/world/americas/haitis-cholera-outraced-the-experts-and-tainted-the-un.html?pagewanted=all In Haiti, Global Failures on a Cholera Epidemic; In-depth New York Times piece investigating UN role in introducing cholera] ''[[New York Times]]'', 31 March 2012, accessed 30 July 2012</ref> ''[[Al Jazeera]]'',<ref>[http://www.aljazeera.com/video/americas/2012/03/201237194798262.html UN likely to blame for Haiti Cholera Outbreak] ''[[Al Jazeera]]'', 7 March 2012, accessed 30 July 2012</ref> and [[ABC News]]<ref>[https://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/scientists-soldiers-brought-deadly-superbug-americas/story?id=15341129 Scientists: UN Soldiers Brought Deadly Superbug to Americas] ''[[ABC News]]'', 12 January 2012, accessed 30 July 2012</ref> has shown that Nepalese Peacekeeping troops stationed at a remote base in [[Mirebalais]], [[Haiti]], triggered a deadly cholera epidemic that has ravaged the country since October 2010. [[Cholera]] is a waterborne disease that causes diarrhoea and vomiting, and it can kill in a matter of hours if patients do not receive rehydration intervention. As of July 2012, Haiti's cholera epidemic was the worst in the world:<ref>[https://www.cdc.gov/haiticholera/haiti_cholera.htm Haiti Cholera: One Year Later], [[Centers for Disease Control and Prevention]] 25 October 2011, accessed 30 July 2012</ref> about 7,500 had died and about 585,000 Haitians (about 1 in every 20 Haitians) had become ill with the disease.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.mspp.gouv.ht/site/downloads/Rapport%20journalier%20MSPP%20du%2022%20juillet%202012.pdf|title=Haitian Ministry of Public Health and Population Cholera Report of July 22, 2012, 22 July 2011, accessed 30 July 2012}}</ref>

According to the UN-appointed Independent Panel of Experts on the Cholera Outbreak in Haiti, the conditions at the Peacekeeping base were unsafe, and allowed contamination of Haiti's river systems in at least two ways: "The construction of the water pipes in the main toilet/showering area [was] haphazard, with significant potential for cross-contamination...especially from pipes that run over an open drainage ditch that runs throughout the camp and flows directly into the Meye Tributary System".<ref name="UNCholeraReport">{{cite web|url=https://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/haiti/UN-cholera-report-final.pdf|title=Final Report of the Independent Panel of Experts on the Cholera Outbreak in Haiti, pages 21-22, July 2011, accessed 30 July 2012}}</ref> Additionally, the Independent Panel reported that on a regular basis black water waste from the Mirebalais base and two other bases was deposited in an open, unfenced septic pit that was susceptible to flooding and would overflow into the Meye Tributary during rainfall.<ref name="UNCholeraReport" />

In November 2011, over 5,000 victims of the cholera epidemic filed a claim with the UN's internal claims mechanism seeking redress in the form of clean water and sanitation infrastructure necessary to control the epidemic, compensation for individual losses, and an apology.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-15648110|title=Haiti cholera demand against UN|date=9 November 2011|work=BBC News}}</ref> In July 2012, 104 Members of the [[U.S. Congress|United States Congress]] signed a letter affirming that the "actions of the UN" had brought cholera to Haiti and that the UN should "confront and ultimately eliminate cholera".<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18928405|title=Haiti cholera 'UN responsibility'|first=Mark|last=Doyle|date=20 July 2012|work=BBC News}}</ref> In 2013 the UN rejected the claim and the victims' lawyers have pledged to sue the UN in court.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ijdh.org/cholera-litigation/ |title=Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti: Cholera Litigation |publisher=Ijdh.org |date=2010-10-21 |access-date=2013-07-28}}</ref>

=== Cultural concerns related to contemporary peacekeeping ===
There is a notable intermingling of varied cultures when it comes to peacekeeping. From the vast number of troops, police and personnel that are brought together from various contributing countries to the oftentimes challenging ethnic regions which peacekeeping forces are often deployed. Because of these varied cultures, complicated cultural interactions take place which not only affect mission effectiveness, but can also lead to friction with the population the peacekeepers are meant to be assisting.

In most cases prior to 1988, specific countries often provided peacekeepers. At that point, only twenty six countries had sent personnel to participate in peacekeeping deployments. Today, that number has risen to more than eighty.<ref name=":03">{{Cite journal|last=Duffey|first=Tamara|date=2000|title=Cultural Issues in Contemporary Peacekeeping|journal=International Peacekeeping|volume=7|issue=1|pages=146–147|doi=10.1080/13533310008413823|s2cid=145210823}}</ref> This results in an extremely heterogeneous group. Thus, UN Peacekeeping deployments must not only contend with language complications, but also myriad cultural and social differences that can create operational difficulties that are hard to overcome. These differences can create problems with regard to interactions (whether personal or between institutions/units), misunderstandings, inadvertent offensive behaviour and prejudices that may be associated with a particular contingent from a given country.<ref name=":03" />

In terms of operations, effectiveness can be hindered by the varying tactics, techniques and procedures employed by the military or police personnel that are a part of a given deployment. Because UN forces are cobbled together from so many different sources, there is a discrepancy in capabilities, training, equipment, standards and procedures. Moreover, substantial differences exist in the form of command and control between contributing members personnel. In addition, some nations may not wish to be subordinated to another, complicating [[unity of command]]. This can lead to deep-seated divisions between contingents within the UN force that results in a lack of mutual support between units in the field. This can be demonstrated in the experiences of UN peacekeeping forces deployed to [[East Timor]], where the [[Australia]]ns engaged in a robust operation that maximised force protection in contrast to a pro-active heart and minds approach utilised by Great Britain's [[Gurkha|Ghurka]] personnel.<ref name=":03" />

Maintaining the consent of the peacekept is an important facet of modern peacekeeping. Notably in Bosnia, [[Somalia]] and Rwanda, fundamental principles of retaining that consent was ignored on the grounds of a humanitarian intervention—reflecting the nature of an Article VII intervention. Yet in order to stress and maintain the legitimacy of an intervention it is important that the UN's forces continue to enjoy the consent of the population and government of the country to which they were deployed. This means making the peacekept feel a part of the process in addition to important cultural knowledge of the area in which peacekeepers are operating, in order to reduce friction and provide for a successful operation.

There has been little study on the interaction of cultures that exist within a peacekeeping force and the population within which they operate. However, in 1976 Galtun and Hveem studied [[Norway|Norwegian]] personnel who participated in UNEF-1 (in Gaza) and ONUC (Congo). They posited that knowledge of the culture and an understanding of the inhabitants in a given country were not only necessary, but crucial for the success of the mission. They found that personnel from the Norwegian contingent wanted greater insight into the conflict and the culture in which they operated. They also wanted more robust training with regard to working with people from other countries. Yet the study revealed the troops received very little from briefings and that the majority of the information regarding the conflict was gained through the news, reading books or speaking with other UN personnel—rather than any established UN training program.<ref name=":12">{{Cite journal|last=Duffey|first=Tamara|date=2000|title=Cultural Issues in Contemporary Peacekeeping|journal=International Peacekeeping|volume=7|issue=1|pages=150–151|doi=10.1080/13533310008413823|s2cid=145210823}}</ref>

Similarly, a study conducted on the relations between members of UNIFIL and local population in Lebanon, carried out by Heiberg and Holst, all but confirmed the findings. In their example, they found that the countries that were able to integrate more fully with the population and show a depth of knowledge about the local culture were more successful, while those that were ambitious, but less integrated into the local scene found themselves far removed from the individuals with which they were supposed to be engaged with, and their success, or lack thereof, illustrated this.<blockquote>Only the Italian contingent of some 2,200 people operated as part of the local environment and became an active element in restoring normal living conditions. Its soldiers were provided with the training required to acquaint them with the cultural, political and social situation of the people among whom they worked. Operating in a sector that contained approximately 600,000 inhabitants, mostly Shi'ites, the Italians carefully nurtured contact with the ordinary citizens and the political leaders in their area... While the Americans thought they were becoming involved in Lebanese politics, they entered into Lebanese culture and history with little or no understanding of the way things worked—or didn't work... Most Americans did not understand the subtleties of short-term alliances, the length of memories and blood feuds, the strength of ''aln'' [kin] in Arab culture nor the nuances of religious differences.<ref name=":12" /></blockquote>This illustrates the importance of understanding the significance that culture plays in the conduct of successful peacekeeping operations. However, despite the existence of a UN training manual that attempts to advise peacekeepers on necessary techniques, there is no unifying doctrine, or standardised procedure among peacekeeping contingents, which will ultimately hinder the potential for success.

=== Limitations on contemporary intervention and conflict resolution ===
Throughout the duration of the Cold War external intervention and mediation in civil conflicts took on a state-centric mechanism in which sovereignty was inviolable. Rarely did the international community intervene in internal conflicts involving a state's government and domestic belligerents that opposed it. Since the end of the Cold War, however, that has changed. Today, mediation by international actors in civil conflict rest on a standardised resolution mechanism that accords broadly equal standing to all factions within a conflict, and attempts to reach a settlement accepted by all.<ref name=":3">{{Cite journal|last=Clapham|first=Christopher|date=1998|title=Rwanda: The Perils of Peace|journal=Journal of Peace Research|volume=35|issue=2|pages=193–210|doi=10.1177/0022343398035002003|s2cid=110533606}}</ref>

The end of the Cold War presented an opportunity to reshape the international system. This opportunity was afforded to the Cold War's victors—that is to say, the [[United States]] and other western capitalist states governed by liberal-democratic values that put a premium on [[Human rights|basic human rights]] and [[democratization]].<ref name=":3" /> In the preceding decades the state was the only entity to receive special status. While there were exceptions, such as groups struggling against colonial powers, the state possessed the ultimate degree of legitimacy. As a result, the international community rarely meddled with the internal machinations of a given country. Sovereignty was not to be violated and this was a system which benefited both superpowers, their allies, as well as [[Third World|third world]] governments.<ref name=":3" />

Now, however, with legitimacy being extended to non-state actors, as well as the opportunity for a minority to secede from a given state and form a new country there has been a dramatic shift in the international status quo. Moreover, the international community's model for conflict resolution is heavily influenced by academic thought developed in western countries. This model encourages intervening in civil wars in order to stop political violence and come to a negotiated settlement which often involves democratising efforts.<ref name=":3" /> Critics such as Christopher Clapham and [[David Shearer]], argue that this intervention can provide mechanisms for continued conflict to the detriment of the civilian population. Clapham's argument is principally in relation to the situation in [[Rwanda]] leading up to the [[Rwandan genocide|genocide]],<ref name=":3" /> whereas Shearer focuses on the negative aspects of intervention, primarily regarding [[Sierra Leone]], which prevents total victory by one side and results in the creation of asymmetries between belligerents which opens the door for continued bloodshed.<ref name=":4">{{Cite journal|last=Shearer|first=David|date=1997|title=Exploring the Limits of Consent: Conflict Resolution in Sierra Leone|journal=Millennium- Journal of International Studies|volume=26|issue=3|pages=845–860|doi=10.1177/03058298970260030601|s2cid=144940982}}</ref>

In Rwanda, third-party attempts at a negotiated settlement between the [[Hutu]] and [[Tutsi]] afforded an opportunity for Hutu extremists to prepare for the killing of Hutu moderates and the genocide of the Tutsi. The international community, led by regional states from the [[Organisation of African Unity]], sought to negotiate a settlement and find a solution for the ongoing ethnic violence between Hutu and Tutsi via the Arusha Peace Process. This process lasted just over a year, included substantial international involvement, and incorporated many regional actors such as [[Tanzania]] (host of the process), [[Burundi]], [[Uganda]] and [[Zaire]].<ref name=":3" />

While the [[Rwandan Patriotic Front]] (RPF) was a major beneficiary of the [[Arusha Accords (Rwanda)|Arusha accords]] and was able to redress many of its grievances, many of the gains that it made could have been achieved through military action. Arusha, according to Clapham, affected the relative power of the participants in the two following ways: a ceasefire which froze the distribution of territorial control at a particular point and secondly the importance it ascribed to the participants of the negotiations.<ref name=":3" /> Meaning that it froze the conflict and prevented continued territorial gains being made by the RPF, in addition to designating the degree of importance with regard to the factions within the negotiations. A faction's importance was weighted not on their relative popularity or military strength, but on artificial weight assigned by the mediators. Thus, the entire process served to undermine the RPF's position while stalling their hitherto successful military campaign, while allowing Hutu extremists to prepare for a genocide.

Shearer argues that modern strategies that rely solely on consent-based negotiations are severely limited and that victory by military means should not be ignored. He states that a shift in battlefield fortunes can often bring one belligerent to the negotiation table and will likewise moderate their demands.<ref name=":4" />

Consent is of great importance when it comes to negotiation and mediation. The current international system and the conflict resolution model which the international community has utilised most since the end of the Cold War puts a premium on consent. But Shearer asks that if a belligerent uses negotiations and cease-fires as a method of delay in order to allow them to reposition military forces and continue fighting, then should consent-based strategies still be pursued, regardless of the potential for lengthening a conflict and the associated human cost?<ref name=":4" />

According to the empirical analysis cited by Shearer, past civil wars with negotiated settlements have had little success. He cites a study from John Stedman that notes between 1900 and 1980 85% of civil wars were solved by one side winning outright (this excludes colonial wars). 15% percent ended as a result of negotiation.<ref name=":4" /> Additionally, Roy Licklider's study supports these conclusions by noting the following:<blockquote>From 1945 to 1989, 58 out of a total of 93 civil conflicts, as he categorised them, were settled in some form, while the remainder continued. However, only 14 (or 24 percent) of those settled were solved by negotiation. The others (76 percent) ended with military victories. Additionally, fighting resumed in seven of the 14 conflict which were initially ended by negotiation. The overall success rate of negotiated settlements, therefore, was around 12 percent out of the internal wars that ended.<ref name=":4" /></blockquote>In Sierra Leone the [[Revolutionary United Front]], led by [[Foday Sankoh]], fought an ongoing and bloody civil war with the government from 1991 to 1996. The conflict attracted little international attention, but managed to devastate the country and destroy its economy. Neither belligerent was willing to concede or compromise on their demands, despite multiple attempts at a negotiated settlement. Sankoh would come to the table after the intervention of the [[Private military company|private military corporation]] [[Executive Outcomes]] and a reversal in the RUF's battlefield fortunes.<ref name=":4" />

In the aftermath the RUF was a depleted threat, civilians were able to return from refugee camps and begin rebuilding their lives. But the peace was fragile and negotiations were ongoing. The RUF was reluctant to put down their arms, concerned over potential retribution at the hands of army units and civilian militias alike. There was a planned deployment of UN peacekeepers meant to ease these concerns and help with the transition to peace, but things began to unravel. International contributors began to shy away from further peacekeeping initiatives; such as an expensive and open-ended mission in a strategically unimportant country. As a result, the UN's intervention force was slow to come to fruition and then came to a halt completely when Sankoh argued the size of the contingent of 740 UN peacekeepers was too large.<ref name=":4" />

The UN refused to engage without total consent from both parties, thus preventing the deployment of a peacekeeping force. This consent-based approach, Shearer argues, illustrates the limits the UN can play in the volatile and fragile state of affairs that exist during and after civil wars. "In Sierra Leone, it meant that an important component needed to shore up the peace-building process was absent. It also meant that Sankoh was dictating terms."<ref name=":4" /> This consent-based approach effectively allowed the leadership of a brutal rebel group to hinder the potential for peace.

The situation was exacerbated by the fact that the newly elected [[Ahmad Tejan Kabbah|President]] of Sierra Leone terminated the Executive Outcomes contract undermining his [[hard power]] advantage. Things were further inflamed when disaffected officers of the [[Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces|army]] overthrew the government in 1997.<ref name=":4" /> The war quickly renewed. A small UN force of monitors was deployed to observe the security situation. [[United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone|UNOMSIL]], as it was called, was deployed between July 1998 and October 1999, but was forced to withdraw from the country when the RUF took the country's [[Freetown|capitol]].<ref name=":5">{{Cite book|title=Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' choices after Civil War|last=Fortna|first=Virginia|publisher=Princeton University Press|year=2008|pages=123–124}}</ref>

[[United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone|UNAMSIL]] was eventually formed and deployed in 1999, authorised under a Chapter VII mandate, it was meant to enforce the Lome agreements. However, violence would continue. From the outset the RUF was beyond uncooperative and once the [[Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group|ECOMOG]] contingent withdrew, the RUF attacked UN forces, eventually taking hundreds hostage.<ref name=":5" /> This led to an unexpected backlash from the international community that the RUF did not anticipate. Its leadership had expected the international community to cut and run, as it had done in Somalia and earlier when UNOMSIL fled Freetown. Instead, with British support, an aggressive [[British military intervention in the Sierra Leone Civil War|campaign]] was waged against the RUF. UNAMSIL's mandate was expanded and its manpower enlarged. By late 2000 and early 2001 the RUF's military strength had been severely depleted. Thus the [[Abuja Agreement (disambiguation)|Abuja agreements]] were signed and UNAMSIL fulfilled its mandate in December 2005.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamsil/|title=UNAMSIL: United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone|website=www.un.org|access-date=2016-05-05}}</ref> While Sierra Leone is at peace today and the UN's mission can be deemed a success, the way in which the situation developed illustrates Shearer's point: that a consent-based approach focused on negotiation that encompasses all belligerents' interest may not necessarily lead to success. As we see, fighting continued despite the presence of UNOMSIL. Indeed, even after UNOMSIL was replaced by a more robust force under a Chapter VII mandate in the form of UNAMSIL the violence continued. When the British intervened militarily and substantially degraded the RUF's capability to sustain the conflict, as Executive Outcomes had done years prior, the RUF finally come to the negotiating table and allowed for the establishment of peace.

Some authors question the idea of international interventions at all. In a 2005 working paper for the Center for Global Development, [[Jeremy Weinstein]] of [[Stanford University]] provides a theory of "autonomous recovery", in which states can achieve sustainable peace without international intervention. Using case studies of [[Uganda]], [[Eritrea]], and [[Somalia]], Weinstein demonstrates how states can develop effective institutions out of warfare. This method has cost and benefits that must be weighed against the potential outcome of international intervention. External intervention can stop mass atrocities, but also stop institutional change. Autonomous recovery elevates the strongest leader, but also rewards the strongest fighters who may be less inclined to share power. Furthermore, intervention depends on external influence while autonomous recovery is based on internal factors. The conclusions of his argument could suggest intervention is not ideal policy, but Weinstein argues the international community's "[[responsibility to protect]]" doctrine has moral importance for intervention and the conditions for "autonomous recovery" are very rare. Weinstein argues the fundamental challenge is how to incentivise good governance and assistance to rebel groups without disrupting the connection of citizens to rulers in terms of revenue collection that enables accountability.<ref>Weinstein, Jeremy M. 2005. "Autonomous Recovery and International Intervention in Comparative Perspective." Center for Global Development Working Paper 57.https://www.cgdev.org/files/2731_file_WP57.pdf</ref>

=== Mission creep ===
Although acknowledging a number of practical and moral reasons for peacekeeping operations, James Fearon and David Laitin assert that they have a tendency under some circumstances to become tangled with [[state-building]] efforts. In weak states facing successful guerrilla campaigns, peacekeepers face pressures to build state institutional and administrative capacity in order to achieve lasting peace. These pressures can lead to mission creep beyond the original purview of the peacekeeping operation; without engaging in state-building, the peacekeepers risk allowing the peacekept country to revert to violence following their exit. Thus, Fearon and Laitin advocate for the greater integration of state-building in peacekeeping efforts through a new framework of "neotrusteeship", which would see foreign powers exercising a great deal of control over a weak state's domestic affairs in order to ensure the prevention of future violence.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Fearon|first1=James D|last2=Laitin|first2=David D|date=2004|title=Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States|journal=International Security|volume=28|issue=4|pages=5–43|doi=10.1162/0162288041588296|s2cid=57559356}}</ref>

===Lack of engagement with the populace===
A growing critique of peacekeeping is the lack of engagement between the peacekeeping officials and the local populace. As [[Séverine Autesserre]] outlines in a 2015 Foreign Policy article,<ref name=":7">{{Cite web|url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/06/trouble-in-peaceland-united-nations-congo-development/|title=Trouble in Peaceland|last=Autesserre|first=Severine|website=Foreign Policy|date=October 6, 2015 }}</ref> this creates an environment where the peacekeeping officials develop plans to 'keep' the peace, but they are disconnected from reality, having the opposite effect on the ground. Additionally, it creates a reinforcement mechanism for the peacekeeping officials, because the officials on the ground report that their plan was successfully implemented, but, in reality, it had adverse effects. If the situation on the ground turns into another outbreak of violence, the local populace will be blamed.<ref name=":7" />

This criticism is similar to the critic levelled at development in developing countries by authors such as James C. Scott,<ref name=":8">{{Cite book|title=Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed|url=https://archive.org/details/seeinglikestateh00scot|url-access=limited|last=Scott|first=James C.|publisher=Yale University Press|year=1998|location=New Haven|pages=[https://archive.org/details/seeinglikestateh00scot/page/n17 1]–10|isbn=9780300078152}}</ref> James Ferguson, and L. Lohman.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Ferguson1 LLohmann2|first=James1 L2|date=1994|title=The anti-politics machine: 'development' and bureaucratic power in Lesotho.|journal=The Ecologist|volume=24}}</ref> Although peacekeeping and development are two different things, the logic behind the criticism is the same. The third-party officials-whether they are peacekeepers or agents of development-are isolated from the general populace, believing they know what is best, and refusing to gather information from a ground level. This is not out of maliciousness or imperialism, but out of a legitimate belief that they, as educated officials with access to other experts and who are well versed in development and peacekeeping literature, know what is best.<ref name=":8" />

==Proposed reform==

===Brahimi analysis===
In response to criticism, particularly of the cases of sexual abuse by peacekeepers, the UN has taken steps toward reforming its operations. The [[Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping|Brahimi Report]] was the first of many steps to recap former peacekeeping missions, isolate flaws, and take steps to patch these mistakes to ensure the efficiency of future peacekeeping missions. The UN has vowed to continue to put these practices into effect when performing peacekeeping operations in the future. The technocratic aspects of the reform process have been continued and revitalised by the DPKO in its "Peace Operations 2010" reform agenda. This included an increase in personnel, the harmonisation of the conditions of service of field and headquarters staff, the development of guidelines and standard operating procedures, and improving the partnership arrangement between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the [[United Nations Development Programme]] (UNDP), [[African Union]], and [[European Union]]. A 2008 capstone doctrine entitled "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines"<ref name="autogenerated1">{{cite web|url=http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf|title=Peacekeeping Resource Hub|website=pbpu.unlb.org|access-date=2008-07-08|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080819214105/http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf|archive-date=2008-08-19|url-status=dead}}</ref> incorporates and builds on the Brahimi analysis.

One of the main issues that the Brahimi report identifies is the lack of coordination and planning of the Peacekeeping Operations. Also, the difference between the objectives of the Peacekeeping Operations and the resources destined to fund the missions. Therefore, the report asks the Security Council to make clear the goals and the resources to accomplish them. According to Fearon and Laitin, the Brahimi Report provides a political instrument for the secretary-general to negotiate with the Security Council the goals, the troops, and the resources need it to the operations. This instrument tries to avoid the cases of underfunding presented in Missions such as in Bosnia, Somalia, and Sierra Leone.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Fearon | first1 = James D | last2 = Laitin | first2 = David D | year = 2004 | title = Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States | journal = International Security | volume = 28 | issue = 4| pages = 5–43 | doi=10.1162/0162288041588296| s2cid = 57559356 }}</ref>

Christine Gray analyses the issues of implementing the recommendations of the Brahimi Report. She explains the difficulty in implementing these recommendations. In particular, in reducing the gap between the mandates of Security Council and the actual resources devoted to implementing them.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Gray | first1 = Christine | year = 2001 | title = Peacekeeping After the ''Brahimi Report'': Is There a Crisis of Credibility for the UN?. | journal = J Conflict Security Law | volume = 6 | issue = 2| pages = 267–288 | doi=10.1093/jcsl/6.2.267}}</ref>

==See also==
{{Portal|Politics}}
{{Commons category|Peacekeeping}}
* [[Bangladesh UN Peacekeeping Force]]
* [[List of United Nations peacekeeping missions]]
* [[List of countries by number of UN peacekeepers]]
* [[List of countries where UN peacekeepers are currently deployed]]
* [[List of non-UN peacekeeping missions]]
* [[Multinational Force and Observers]]
* [[Military operations other than war]]
* [[Temporary International Presence in Hebron]]
* [[Timeline of UN peacekeeping missions]]
* [[Three Block War]]
* [[Peacebuilding]]
* [[Police action]]

==References==
{{Reflist}}

==Further reading==
* Aoi, Chiyuki; Coning, Cedric de; Thakur, Ramesh (eds.) [https://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:2483/pdf9789280811421.pdf ''Unintended consequences of peacekeeping operations'']. United Nations University, 2007.
* [[Séverine Autesserre|Autesserre, Séverine]]. 2014. ''[http://www.severineautesserre.com/research/peaceland/ Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention]''. Cambridge University Press. {{ISBN|9781107632042}}
* Barnett, Michael. 2002. ''Eyewitness to a Genocide: the United Nations and Rwanda''. Cornell University Press.
* {{cite journal
| last = Bureš
| first = Oldřich
|date= June 2006
| title = Regional Peacekeeping Operations: Complementing or Undermining the United Nations Security Council?
| journal = [[Global Change, Peace & Security]]
| volume = 18
| issue = 2
| pages = 83–99
| doi = 10.1080/14781150600687775
| s2cid = 154982851
}}
* {{cite journal | last2 = Gow | first2 = James | year = 1997 | title = The Future of Peace Support Operations: Strategic Peacekeeping and Success | journal = [[Armed Forces & Society]] | volume = 23 | issue = 3| pages = 327–347 | doi = 10.1177/0095327X9702300302 | last1 = Dandeker | first1 = Christopher | s2cid = 145191919 }}
* Doyle, Michael W. and Sambanis, Nicholas. 2006. ''Making War and Building Peace''. Princeton University Press
* Evelegh, Robin (1978). Peace Keeping in a Democratic Society: The Lessons of Northern Ireland. Montréal, Québec: McGill-Queen's University Press. {{ISBN|0-7735-0502-4}}
* {{cite journal
| last = Fortna
| first = Virginia Page
| year = 2004
| title = Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War
| journal = [[International Studies Quarterly]]
| volume = 48
| issue =2
| pages = 269–292
| doi = 10.1111/j.0020-8833.2004.00301.x
| url = http://www.columbia.edu/~vpf4/ISQ%20offprint.PDF
|citeseerx = 10.1.1.489.1831}}
* {{cite journal | last1 = Fortna | first1 = Virginia Page | last2 = Lise Morjé | first2 = Howard | year = 2008 | title = Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Future | journal = Annual Review of Political Science | volume = 11 | pages = 283–301 | doi = 10.1146/annurev.polisci.9.041205.103022| s2cid = 15740415 | doi-access=free }}{{cite journal
| last = Goulding
| first = Marrack
| author-link = Marrack Goulding
|date=July 1993
| title = The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping
| journal = [[International Affairs (journal)|International Affairs]]
| volume = 69
| issue = 3
| pages = 451–64
| doi = 10.2307/2622309
| jstor=2622309| doi-access=
}}
*[https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0738894218821044 Anja Jetschke and Bernd Schlipphak. 2019. MILINDA: A new dataset on United Nations-led and non-united Nations-led peace operations. Conflict Management and Peace Science.]
*Howard, Lise Morjé. 2008. UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars. New York: Cambridge University Press. abstract
* [[Kimberly Marten|Marten, Kimberly]]. 2004. ''Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past''. New York: Columbia University Press
* Paris, Roland. 2010. ''At War's End''. New York: Cambridge University Press
* {{cite journal
| last = Pushkina
| first = Darya
|date= June 2006
| title = A Recipe for Success? Ingredients of a Successful Peacekeeping Mission
| journal = [[International Peacekeeping]]
| volume = 13
| issue = 2
| pages = 133–149
| doi = 10.1080/13533310500436508
| s2cid = 144299591
}}{{cite journal | last1 = Worboys | first1 = Katherine | year = 2007 | title = The Traumatic Journey from Dictatorship to Democracy: Peacekeeping Operations and Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, 1989-1999 | journal = Armed Forces & Society | volume = 33 | issue = 2| pages = 149–168 | doi = 10.1177/0095327X05283843 | s2cid = 144147291 }}

* {{cite journal | last2 = Segal | first2 = David | year = 2000 | title = The Impact of Multiple Deployments on Soldiers' Peacekeeping Attitudes, Morale and Retention | journal = [[Armed Forces & Society]] | volume = 27 | issue = 1| pages = 57–78 | doi = 10.1177/0095327X0002700105 | last1 = Reed | first1 = Brian | s2cid = 143556366 }}
*{{cite journal | year = 2006 | title = 'Too Sweet and Innocent for War'?: Dutch Peacekeepers and the Use of Violence | journal = [[Armed Forces & Society]] | volume = 32 | issue = 3| pages = 454–474 | doi = 10.1177/0095327X05281453 | last1 = Sion | first1 = Liora | s2cid = 145272144 | url = https://zenodo.org/record/896301 }}
* {{cite journal | last1 = Blocq | first1 = Daniel | year = 2010 | title = Western Soldiers and the Protection of Local Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations: Is a Nationalist Orientation in the Armed Forces Hindering Our Preparedness to Fight? | url = https://semanticscholar.org/paper/e2f7211b8ebc11ee64c3cdd0c44bec4eebb4f16e| journal = [[Armed Forces & Society]] | volume = 36 | issue = 2| pages = 290–309 | doi = 10.1177/0095327X08330816 | s2cid = 146797513 }}

== External links ==
* {{Commons category-inline}}

{{United Nations}}

{{Nobel Peace Prize Laureates 1976-2000}}
{{Authority control}}

[[Category:Peacekeeping| ]]
[[Category:Military operations other than war]]

Mahabaratha

2023-09-13T18:34:58Z

Soldier: Created Mahabaratha

#REDIRECT [[Mahabharata]]

Israel Aerospace Industries

2023-09-10T13:53:53Z

Soldier: Created Israel Aerospace Industries

{{short description|Aerospace and defense manufacturer}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=June 2020}}
{{Infobox company
| name = Israel Aerospace Industries Ltd.
| logo = [[File:Israel Aerospace Industries logo.svg|200px]]
| caption =
| type = [[Government-owned corporation]]
| traded_as = {{TASE|ARSP.B1}}
| fate =
| predecessor = Bedek Aviation Company
| successor =
| foundation = {{start date and age|1953}}
| founder = [[Al Schwimmer]] [[Shimon Peres]]
| defunct = 
| location_city = [[Lod]]
| location_country = [[Israel]]
| location =
| locations =
| area_served =
| key_people = [[Boaz Levy]] ([[CEO]])
| industry = [[Aviation industry|Aviation]], [[Defense industry|Defense]]
| products = Military weapons and equipment
| services = [[Aircraft maintenance]] Aircraft upgrade
| revenue = {{profit}} {{US$|4.5 billion |link=yes}}
| revenue_year = 2021
| operating_income = {{profit}} {{US$|1.5 billion}}
| income_year = 2021
| net_income = {{profit}} {{US$|417 million}}
| net_income_year = 2021
| assets =
| equity =
| owner =
| num_employees = 15,000
| parent =
| divisions = Bedek Aviation Group Commercial Aircraft Group Military Aircraft Group Systems, Missiles & Space Group
| subsid = [[Elta Systems|ELTA Systems]]
| homepage = {{URL|iai.co.il}}
| footnotes =
| intl =
}}

'''Israel Aerospace Industries''' ([[Hebrew language|Hebrew]]: התעשייה האווירית לישראל ''ha-ta'asiya ha-avirit le-yisra'el'') or '''IAI''' (תע"א) is [[Israel]]'s major [[aerospace]] and [[aviation]] manufacturer, producing aerial and astronautic systems for both [[military]] and civilian usage. It has 15,000 employees as of 2018. IAI is completely state-owned by the [[government of Israel]].

IAI designs, develops, produces and maintains civil aircraft, [[Unmanned Aerial Vehicles|drones]], [[fighter aircraft]], [[missile]], [[avionics]], and [[Astronautics|space-based]] systems.

Although IAI's main focus is engineering, [[aviation]] and [[high-tech]] electronics, it also manufactures military systems for ground and [[naval]] forces. Many of these products are specially suited for the [[Israel Defense Forces]] (IDF) needs, while others are also marketed to foreign militaries.

==History==
Israel Aerospace Industries was founded in 1953 as Bedek Aviation Company under the initiative of [[Shimon Peres]], then director general of the Ministry of Defense, in order to maintain Israel Defense Forces aircraft.<ref>[http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4387779 Shimon Peres – Profile]{{dead link|date=August 2021|bot=medic}}{{cbignore|bot=medic}}, Defense News</ref> The company originally had 70 employees and recruited American born aviation expert [[Al Schwimmer]] as the company's founder and first president.<ref>[http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/al-schwimmer-founder-of-israel-aircraft-industries-dies-at-94-1.367102 Al Schwimmer, founder of Israel Aircraft Industries, dies at 94] Haaretz, 11.06.11</ref>

===First aircraft manufacturing===
[[File:Zukit579.jpg|thumb|IAI Tzukit of the [[IAF Aerobatic Team]] (2007)]]

In 1959 Bedek began manufacturing its first aircraft, a [[V-tail]]ed twinjet trainer of French design, the [[Fouga CM.170 Magister]], locally called ''Tzukit'' (Monticola). The ''Tzukit'' became the [[Israeli Air Force]] principal trainer for 50 years. The IAI [[Tzukit]] was also used in the 1967 [[Six-Day War]] by [[147 Squadron (Israel)|147 Squadron]] as a close support aircraft, attacking targets on the Egyptian front during the first day of the war, when Israel's more capable combat aircraft were deployed against Arab air bases and aircraft.<ref name="AE p44">Aloni 2001, p.44.</ref> They were then deployed against [[Jordan]]ian forces, including armour, on the [[West Bank]]. The Magister proved effective at the close-support mission albeit with heavy casualties, with six being lost.<ref name="AE p49-1, 54-5">Aloni 2001, pp. 49–51, 54–55.</ref>

The first aircraft to be fully designed and built by IAI, the [[IAI Arava]] short take-off and landing transport aircraft, first flew in 1969 after three years of development.<ref name=FundingUniverse>{{Citation
| title = Israel Aircraft Industries Ltd. – Company History
| url = http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/Israel-Aircraft-Industries-Ltd-Company-History.html
| journal = FundingUniverse
}}</ref>

===The French embargo impact===
[[File:IAI-Kfir-hatzerim-1.jpg|thumb|IAI Kfir]]
In response to the [[France–Israel relations|French embargo]], IAI began developing its own fighter aircraft, a derivative of the [[Mirage 5]] called the [[IAI Nesher]] ("hawk"), in 1968. The Nesher entered service in 1971, in time for the [[Yom Kippur War]]. The Nesher was followed by the [[IAI Kfir]] ("lion cub"), which was developed as a result of Israel's need for adapting the [[Dassault Mirage III]] to the specific requirements of the Israeli Air Force. The '''Kfir''' entered service with the IAF in 1975, the first units being assigned to the [[101 Squadron (Israel)|101st "First Fighter" Squadron]]. Over the following years, several other squadrons were also equipped with the new aircraft. The Kfir's first recorded combat action took place on 9 November 1977, during an Israeli air strike on a training camp at Tel Azia, in [[Lebanon]]. The only air victory claimed by a Kfir during its service with the IAF occurred on 27 June 1979 when a Kfir C.2 shot down a Syrian [[Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21|MiG-21]].<ref name=FundingUniverse />

The IAI Kfir has been exported to [[Colombia]], [[Ecuador]], [[Sri Lanka]] and was leased to the [[US Navy]] and the [[US Marine Corps]] from 1985 to 1989, to act as adversary aircraft in [[dissimilar air combat training]].<ref>[http://www.globes.co.il/serveen/globes/docview.asp?did=697938 IAI will lease Kfir aircraft to US Air Force, Navy] – Globes; 18 June 2003</ref>

===Diversification===
[[File:HN-Gabriel-1.jpg|thumb|IAI Gabriel]]

In 1969 IAI acquired [[North American Rockwell]]'s [[Jet Commander]] series of business aircraft. This became the basis for the [[IAI Westwind]] line. Work on an improved Westwind – named the Astra – began in the late 1970s<ref name="AI DEC93p314">Relman 1993, p. 314.</ref> by stretching the fuselage and designing a new swept wing, with the first prototype flight occurring on 19 March 1984.<ref name="AI DEC93p316">Relman 1993, p. 316.</ref> The first production Astra flew on 20 March 1985, [[FAA]] certification came on 29 August 1985 and customer deliveries started in 1986.<ref name="AI DEC93p316"/>

In the 1960s, IAI developed the [[Gabriel (missile)|Gabriel anti-ship missile]] and the [[Elta Electronics Industries]] subsidiary developed an inexpensive aircraft radar which would become a successful export item. In the 1970s IAI developed the [[Dabur class patrol boat]].<ref name=FundingUniverse />

In the 1970s IAI also entered the [[Unmanned aerial vehicle]] (UAV) market with the development of the [[IAI Scout]]. In 1984, IAI formed a [[joint venture]] with rival Israeli company [[Tadiran]] to market both companies' UAV's, the [[Tadiran Mastiff]] and the [[IAI Scout]].<ref>[http://www.vectorsite.net/twuav.html "Unmanned Aerial Vehicles" by Greg Goebel] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110902194407/http://www.vectorsite.net/twuav.html |date=2 September 2011 }}</ref>

====Developing the maintenance, repair and overhaul business====
By 1980s the original Bedek maintenance business was conducting extensive overhauls on dozens of different aircraft types, working on engines as well as airframes and interiors, IAI could provide more comprehensive refurbishments than even the aircraft manufacturers themselves. The unit had 4,000 employees by the mid-1980s and overhauled a huge range of aircraft, from propeller-driven trainers to airliners; including big civil aviation programs, such as conversion of [[Boeing 747]]s to freighters.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.iai.co.il/sip_storage/FILES/4/35704.pdf|title=IAI-Bedek Aviation Group Presentation|publisher=IAI |access-date=16 May 2019}}</ref>

===The Lavi program===
[[File:IAI-Lavi-B-2-hatzerim-2.jpg|thumb|IAI Lavi]]

In 1980 the Government of Israel decided to use the experience IAI had accumulated to develop and manufacture a modern fighter plane to be the mainstay of the [[Israel Air Force]]. The aircraft, called the [[IAI Lavi]], was to be a superior attack aircraft with advanced weapons systems. It had its rollout in July 1986 and successful maiden flight in December 1986.<ref name= Arens>{{Cite news | title = Arrow, Ofeq, Lavi | url = http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/arrow-ofeq-lavi-1.130654 | date = 5 August 2004 | last = Arens | first = Moshe | work = [[Haaretz]]}}</ref>

In August 1987, after extensive government deliberations, the decision was made (by one vote) to cancel the Lavi program, due to the questioning of Israel's economic ability to support the cost of such an extensive program.<ref>{{cite web| title="התעשייה האווירית לישראל" לביא | url = http://www.iaf.org.il/186-18185-he/IAF.aspx?indx=1| publisher = Israeli Air Force |access-date=29 December 2012}}</ref> This led to a serious crisis at IAI which necessitated a major reorganization of the company's structure and business strategy; the company's work force of more than 22,000 people was cut by 5,500 in 1988. However, the Lavi program was credited with developing a number of advanced technologies that IAI was able to market.<ref name=Arens />

===1990s onwards{{mdash}}export led growth===
[[file:Shavit Ofek7a.jpg|thumb|An [[Ofeq]] surveillance satellite launch utilising the [[Shavit 2|Shavit]] space vehicle]]
[[File:AMOS-5 Satellite.jpg|thumb|Model of an AMOS-5 satellite during "Semana de Espacio", in IFEMA, Madrid]]
[[File:Arrow-3_Jan-03-2013_(c).jpg|thumb|[[Arrow 3]] missile]]
[[File:avocet2.jpg|thumb|The Avocet ProJet with IAI Logo]]
[[File:IAI Harop PAS 2013 01.jpg|thumb|The [[IAI Harop]] loitering anti-radiation drone]]
[[File:LAHAT.jpg|thumb|[[LAHAT]] laser-guided anti-tank missile system]]
[[File:Lora missile launcher.jpg|thumb|200px|LORA tactical ballistic missile system]]
[[File:Flickr_-_Israel_Defense_Forces_-_Israeli_Made_Guardium_UGV_(1).jpg|thumb|The Guardium unmanned ground vehicle]]
By 1989 IAI posted a profit of $11.8 million on sales of $1.28 billion. The company had four divisions—Aircraft, Aviation, Electronics, and Technologies—and 17 factories. IAI was established as a world leader in upgrading aircraft. Planes such as the Vietnam-era [[McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II]] were modernized with advanced avionics and weaponry.

In the 1990s IAI entered the space race with the [[Amos (satellite)|AMOS communications satellites]], [[Ofeq|Ofeq observation satellites]] and the [[Shavit 2|Shavit]] space launcher.<ref name=Arens />

In December 1997, the [[IAI Galaxy]], a business jet with an intercontinental range developed as a [[joint venture]] Galaxy Aerospace with the [[Hyatt Corporation]], made its first flight and entered service in 2000. In May 2001, General Dynamics' [[Gulfstream Aerospace]] bought IAI's Galaxy Aerospace Co. L.P. unit for $330 million, although IAI continues to perform the most of the assembly and development of the jets which are marketed by Gulfstream.<ref>[http://www.airliners.net/aircraft-data/stats.main?id=226 Israel IAI-1126 Galaxy/Gulfstream G200]. Airliners.net.</ref>

In 2003, Israel Aircraft Industries attempted to enter the VLJ ([[very light jet]]) Market by launching the [[Avocet ProJet]], a 6–8 seat high utilization air taxi with a list price almost half the cost of the least expensive business jet available at that time. In early 2006, ProJet development stalled after a major undisclosed US [[Original equipment manufacturer|OEM]] pulled out of the program due to unspecified reasons.<ref>[http://www.ainonline.com/issues/09_03/09_03_avocoetjetp1.html Aviation International News, September 2003] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050115045244/http://www.ainonline.com/issues/09_03/09_03_avocoetjetp1.html |date=15 January 2005 }}</ref>

The company was working with the [[Aviation Technology Group]] on a military trainer version of the [[ATG Javelin]], a fighter style personal jet. The version being developed would have competed against a large field of jet trainers at a much lower cost of acquisition and maintenance. ATG halted development of the Javelin in 2008 due to a lack of funds.

In March 2004 IAI signed a $1.1 billion contract with [[India]] to install three [[EL/W-2090]] [[Airborne early warning and control|AWACS]] systems on Russian-made [[Ilyushin Il-76]] transports, which are based in part on IAI's earlier [[EL/M-2075|EL/M-2075 Phalcon]] platform which was developed in the 1990s.<ref>[http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Indian-AWACS-Moving-Forward-on-2-Fronts-04855/ Indian AWACS Moving Forward on 2 Fronts] Defense Industry Daily, 8 June 2011</ref> In the late 2000s IAI developed the follow-on [[IAI EL/W-2085|EL/W-2085]] system which is installed on heavily modified Gulfstream G550 aircraft and which besides serving in the IAF were also sold to Singapore and Italy.

On 6 November 2006, IAI changed its corporate name from "Israel Aircraft Industries Ltd." to "Israel Aerospace Industries Ltd."; to more accurately reflect the current scope of the firm's business activities, which includes not just aircraft, but also systems, satellites and launchers, as well as maritime and ground systems.

On 13 April 2009, the ''[[Moscow Times]]'' reported that the Russian [[Ministry of Defence (Russia)|Defense Ministry]] had signed an agreement with Israel Aerospace to purchase $50 million in pilotless drone aircraft. The contract reportedly includes three types of UAVs manufactured by the company.<ref>Combined Dispatches, "Red-Faced Military Buys Israeli Drones", ''[[Moscow Times]]'', 13 April 2009.</ref>

In January 2012, IAI announced a sale of $1.1 billion of defense systems to an Asian country. The deal has been signed but the company did not name the buyer. It was reported that the sale will include IAI aircraft, missiles and intelligence technologies.<ref>{{cite web | url=http://www.jpost.com/Headlines/Article.aspx?id=252795 | title=Israel Aerospace sells $1.1 billion in arms to Asian nation | work=[[Jerusalem Post]] | date=9 January 2012 | access-date=16 May 2019 | agency=[[Reuters]]}}</ref>

On 4 September 2012, the [[Gulfstream G280]], a new twin-engine business jet built by IAI, received full certification from the [[Federal Aviation Administration]] (FAA).<ref name=FG_full_cert>Sarsfield, Kate [http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/israel-and-usa-grant-full-certification-for-gulfstream-g280-376053/ "Israel and USA grant full certification for Gulfstream G280"]. ''[[Flight International]]'', 4 September 2012.</ref>

IAI is a member of the prestigious Trace International and Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics (SCCE) organizations and recognized in the [[Transparency International]] April 2015 report to be in the top third of worldwide defense companies for its ethics and anti-corruption programs.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.iai.co.il/2013/36463-en/CompanyInfo.aspx|title=Israel Aerospace Industries Ltd. – Home page|website=www.iai.co.il}}</ref>

In April 2018, IAI systems were observed in a film made by the [[Azerbaijan Army]], specifically the [[IAI Harop]] loitering munition system, resulting in criticism from the [[Armenian government]] concerning the supply of Israeli arms to the Azeri army.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Kubovich |first1=Yaniv |title=Advanced Israeli Weapons Sold to Azerbaijan Exposed in Army-produced Pop Music Video|url=https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/advanced-israeli-weapons-sold-to-azerbaijan-exposed-in-pop-music-video-1.6015052|website= Haaretz.com|access-date=14 December 2019}}</ref> In 2019, IAI sells drone defense systems to governments to be placed in sensitive areas such as borders, army bases, or power plans, and provides equipment to shoot down military drones as well. It also sells to clients such as airports looking to protect against consumer drones.<ref name="Jammer"/> IAI in 2019 is Israel’s major aerospace and defense manufacturer. It released its Popstar system in September 2019, which "can detect and track drones up to 4 km away in day or night".<ref name="Jammer">{{cite web |last1=Holmes |first1=Oliver |title=Detectors, jammers and cyber-attackers: the rise of anti-drone tech|website=[[TheGuardian.com]] |url=https://www.theguardian.com/news/2019/dec/12/detectors-jammers-and-cyber-attackers-the-rise-of-anti-drone-tech|access-date=13 December 2019}}</ref> IAI advised customers in December 2019 not to fly some Boeing 737 freighters it had converted, after IAI said it detected an "apparent irregularity" in the production process. IAI's converted 737s had come into service in 2003.<ref>{{cite web |title=Israel Aerospace Detects 'Irregularity' in Some Converted Boeing 737 Freighters|url=https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israel-aerospace-detects-irregularity-in-some-converted-boeing-737-freighters-1.8257649|access-date=23 December 2019}}</ref>

In July 2021, IAI Aviation Group has agreed to establish a passenger to freighter conversion site to convert the B737-700/800 with Atitech (Italy) in [[Naples International Airport|Naples]].<ref>{{Cite web|date=2021-07-05|title=Israel Aerospace Industries Will Establish World's First Passenger to Freighter Conversion Site in Europe|url=https://newsroom.aviator.aero/israel-aerospace-industries-will-establish-worlds-first-passenger-to-freighter-conversion-site-in-europe/|access-date=2021-07-08|website=AVIATOR|language=en}}</ref>

== Products ==

[[File:Salon_du_Bourget_20090619_077.jpg|thumb|[[Barak 8]] surface to air missile]]

=== Civilian aircraft produced<ref>{{cite web |url= http://www.iai.co.il/sip_storage/files/2/39952.pdf |title= Commercial Aircraft Group |date= 2013 |publisher= IAI}}</ref> ===

* [[IAI Westwind]] (1965–1987) :
** 1121 '''Jet Commander''', Certification : November 1964, Line relocated in Israël in 1969
** 1123 '''Commodore Jet''', Certification : December 1971, stretched, GE‐[[CJ610]]‐9 turbojets, thrust reversers, wing-tip tanks, APU
** 1124 '''Westwind I''', Certification : March 1976, [[TFE731]]‐3 turbofans, updated systems and avionics
** 1124A '''Westwind II''', Certification : April 1980, winglets, wing refinements, additional tank, upgraded avionics
* [[Gulfstream G100]] (1985–2016)
** 1125 '''Astra''', Certification : August 1985, new wing, modified fuselage, updated systems and avionics
** 1125 '''Astra SP''', Certification : May 1990, digital avionics
** '''G100 (Astra SPX)''', Certification : January 1996, improved engines, upgraded avionics
** '''G150''', Certification : November 2005, fuselage stretched and widened, new nose, new avionics, uprated engines
* [[Gulfstream G200]] (Galaxy, 1997–2011), Certification : December 1998, new fuselage, improved engines, winglets, modified wing, upgraded avionics
* [[Gulfstream G280]], (in production) Certification and EIS: 2011 : All new fuselage, T-Tail, Wings, engines, systems and avionics
* [[IAI Arava|Arava]]: medium-sized [[STOL]] transport aircraft (no longer in production)
* [[IAI Avocet ProJet]]: very light jet<ref>{{Citation | url = http://www.avocetprojet.com/images/exterior1.jpg | title = Exterior | url-status = dead | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20051108134515/http://www.avocetprojet.com/images/exterior1.jpg | archive-date = 8 November 2005}}.</ref> (program cancelled in 2005)

=== Civilian air systems ===
* Conversion of passenger aircraft to cargo aircraft
** B737-300
** B737-400
** B737-700
** B737-800
** B767-200
** B767-300
** B747-200
** B747-400
** B777-300
* Flight Guard [[infrared countermeasures]] system against [[MANPAD]] [[Surface-to-air missile|anti-aircraft missile]]s<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.iai.co.il/Default.aspx?docID=25873&FolderID=28973&lang=en&PageNum=3|title=IAI/Elta's "Flight Guard" Commercial Aircraft Protection System Funded|date=8 September 2003|publisher=[[Israeli Aerospace Industries]]}}</ref>

=== Military aircraft ===
* [[Boeing 377 Stratocruiser|377M Anak]] – conversions done to several ex-[[Pan American World Airways]] Boeing 377 Stratocruiser airliners into heavy lift military cargo aircraft after the United States refused the sale of the [[Lockheed C-130 Hercules|C-130]] to the [[Israeli Air Force]].<ref>[http://www.israeli-weapons.com/weapons/aircraft/anak/Anak.htm Israeli-Weapons.com – Anak(Boeing 377)] ''Retrieved 8/28/11''</ref>
* [[IAI Lavi|Lavi]] – an Israeli fighter jet, abandoned when the United States refused to fund an [[F-16]] competitor.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/row/3fal90.htm|title=The United States and the LAVI, Airpower Journal Vol. IV, No. 3, (Fall 1990): 34–44, Lt Col James P. DeLoughry, USAF}}</ref>
* [[IAI Kfir|Kfir]] – fighter jet, developed from the Nesher.
* [[IAI Nammer|Nammer]] – fighter jet, updated version of the Kfir.
* [[IAI Nesher|Nesher]] – fighter jet, derivative of the French Mirage 5.
* ELTA-ELI-3001 – AISIS – Airborne Integrated SIGINT System.
* CAEW Conformal Airborne Early Warning Aircraft – based on the G550 and equipped with the phalcon radar.

=== Unmanned aerial vehicles ===
* [[Unmanned aerial vehicle|UAVs]] – unmanned aerial vehicles, manufactured by IAI's MALAT division:
** [[IAI Pioneer|Pioneer]] (with the USA)
** [[RQ-5 Hunter]] (with the USA)
** [[IAI Heron|Heron]] family of long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
** [[IAI Harpy|Harpy]]
** [[IAI Eitan|Eitan]]
** [[IAI I-View|I-View]]
** [[IAI Harop|Harop]]
** [[IAI Ranger|Ranger]]
** [[IAI Scout|Scout]]
** [[IAI Searcher|Searcher]]
** [[IAI Bird-Eye|Bird-Eye]] family of mini-UAV
** [[IAI Panther|Panther]]
** [[IAI Ghost|Ghost]]

=== Military air systems ===
* [[Rafael Python 5]] air-to-air missile (together with [[Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd.]])
* Upgrades to [[F-16]] and [[F-15 Eagle|F-15]], and [[Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21|MiG-21]] jet fighters
* Upgrades to [[Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation|Sikorsky]] [[CH-53 Sea Stallion|CH-53]] Yas'ur in project "Yas'ur 2000"
* Avionics upgrades for the [[Kamov Ka-50#Ka-50-2 "Erdogan"|Ka-50-2 Erdogan]] [[gunship]] in collaboration with [[Kamov]]
* [[EL/M-2075|Phalcon]] air surveillance system
* [[EL/W-2085|Eitam]] – adaptations of a [[Gulfstream G550]] for [[airborne early warning and control]]
* [[Griffin LGB]] – a system for converting unguided bombs into [[precision-guided munition]]s
* [[SkySniper]] air to surface missile

===Ground defense systems===
[[File:D9-IDF-2018-Zachi-Evenor-1.jpg|thumb|[[IDF Caterpillar D9]] [[armored bulldozer]].]]
* [[IDF Caterpillar D9]]R's [[armor]] kit
* [[IAI JUMPER]]<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.iai.co.il/31015-40145-en/Business_Areas_Military_Land_Precision_Munitions.aspx?btl=1|title=Israel Aerospace Industries Ltd. – Home page|website=www.iai.co.il}}</ref> (See also [[XM501 Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System]])
* Unmanned [[skid steer loader]] "Front Runner"
* Unmanned [[IDF Caterpillar D9]] remote-controlled [[bulldozer]]
* [[AMMAD]]
* [[TopGun (artillery)]]
* [[Scorpius Electronic Warfare System]]

===Ground transportation===
* Assembly of [[DSB Class MF|IC3]] [[diesel multiple unit]] [[train]]s and [[Bombardier Double-deck Coach|double-decker railway coaches]] under license from [[Bombardier Transportation]]
* [[Taxibot]], semi-robotic towbarless [[pushback (aviation)|pushback]] tractor.<ref name=Globes1>{{cite news|url=http://www.globes.co.il/serveen/globes/docview.asp?did=1000620538&fid=1725 |title=New IAI "taxibot" to save airlines billions |date=3 February 2011|access-date=9 July 2012 |work=[[Globes (newspaper)|Globes]]|publisher=[[Globes (newspaper)|Globes]]}}</ref><ref name=Taxibot>{{cite news|url=http://www.iai.co.il/35095-39730-en/Groups_Military_Aircraft_Lahav_Products_TaxiBot.aspx |title=TAXIBOT SYSTEM|access-date=9 July 2012}}</ref>
* [[RBY MK 1]]
* [[RAM MK3]]

===Unmanned ground vehicles===
* [[Guardium]]
* [[Sahar (robot)|Sahar]] – robotic [[Combat engineering|engineering]] [[Reconnaissance|scout]]
* [[Robattle]]
* [[D9T Panda]] – unmanned version of the [[IDF Caterpillar D9]]T [[armored bulldozer]]

=== Naval systems ===
* [[Super Dvora Mk III class patrol boat]]<ref>{{Citation | url = http://www.iai.co.il/site/en/iai.asp?pi=23048&doc_id=33550 | title = IAI}}.</ref>
* [[Super Dvora Mk II class patrol boat]]
* [[Dvora class fast patrol boat]]
* [[Dabur class patrol boat]]

===Missile systems===
* [[Arrow (Israeli missile)|Arrow]] – Anti-ballistic missile system
* [[Arrow 3]] – Anti-ballistic missile system
* [[Barak 1]] – Surface-to-air missile
*
* [[Barak 8]] – Surface-to-air missile (jointly developed with [[DRDO]] of [[India]])
* [[Gabriel missile|Gabriel]] – Air-to-surface, surface-to-surface anti-ship missile
* [[Iron Dome]] – mobile all-weather air-defence system
* [[Jericho_(missile)#Jericho_I|Jericho I]] - Short-range ballistic missile
* [[Jericho_(missile)#Jericho_II|Jericho II & III]] - Long-range ballistic missile
* [[LAHAT]] – Anti-tank missile
* [[LORA (missile)|LORA]] - Tactical ballistic missile
* [[Nimrod (missile)|Nimrod]] – Air-to-surface, surface-to-surface missile
* [[SkySonic|Skysonic]] - weapon system under development

===Space hardware===
* [[AMOS (satellite bus)]]
** [[Intelsat 24]]
** [[AMOS-2]]
** [[AMOS-3]]
** [[AMOS-4]]
** [[AMOS-6]]
* [[EROS (satellite)]]
** [[EROS A]]
** [[EROS B]]
* [[Ofeq]] [[Satellite]] series
** [[Ofek-7]]
** [[Ofek-9]]
** [[Ofek-10]]
* [[RISAT-2]] satellite
* [[SHALOM (satellite)]]
* [[Shavit 2|Shavit]] space launcher
* Middle East Newsline has reported that IAI will launch one or more [[CubeSat]]s by the end of 2008.<ref>
{{cite web | url = http://www.menewsline.com/stories/2007/may/05_17_4.html | title = ISRAEL PLANS NANO-SATELLITE LAUNCH | publisher = Middle East Newsline | url-status = dead | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20070906110557/http://www.menewsline.com/stories/2007/may/05_17_4.html | archive-date = 6 September 2007}}</ref>
* [[TecSAR]] reconnaissance satellite, launched on 21 January 2008<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/iran/story/0,,2244324,00.html |title=Israel launches new satellite to spy on Iran |access-date=22 January 2008 |date=21 January 2008 |work=Guardian Unlimited | location=London | first=Mark | last=Tran}}</ref>
* [[VENµS]] satellite

== Manufacturing plants ==
[[File:Bet-Shemesh-Jr-rail.jpg|thumb|Many [[Israel Railways]] [[DSB Class MF|IC3]] trains (one shown at Beit Shemesh, August 2006) were assembled by RAMTA from [[knock-down kit]]s imported from Denmark.]]
* Systems, Missiles & Space Group
** Malam – integration
** Mabat – missiles and satellites
** Tamam – [[inertial guidance]] and [[electro-optic]] systems
* Military Aircraft Group
** Lahav – aircraft upgrades
** Mata – helicopter upgrades
** Golan Industries – crash survival seats and other aircraft parts
** Malat – [[Unmanned Aerial Vehicle]]s
* [[Elta Systems|Elta]] – [[Radar]]s, [[electronic warfare]] and [[ELINT]]
* Bedek Aviation Group – [[Maintenance, repair, and operations|MRO]]
** Aircraft Division – Conversion of passenger aircraft to cargo aircraft, heavy aircraft maintenance, Fleet Maintenance
** Engines Division – Repair and overhaul of civil and military aircraft engines ([[Pratt & Whitney|P&W]], [[GE]])
** Components Division – Repair and overhaul of civil and military aircraft components ([[Auxiliary power unit|APU]], [[Landing gear|Landing Gear]], CSD etc.).
* Commercial Aircraft Group
** Ramta – [[railcar]]s, [[patrol boat]]s, [[armor]] kits for [[engineering vehicle]]s etc.
** Aerostructures
*** Shahal – [[landing gear]] and other aircraft parts
** Technologies
** Business Jets
* Engineering Division – aircraft manufacturing and integration
** Maman – IT Services. mainly implementing and maintaining ERP/SAP Package.

== See also ==
{{Portal|Spaceflight}}
* [[Aeronautics Defense Systems]]
* [[Elta Systems]]
* [[Military equipment of Israel]]

==References==
{{reflist}}

==Bibliography==
*{{cite magazine|last=Aloni|first=Shlomo|title=Golden Heritage: Israeli Aircraft Industries at 50|magazine=[[Air Enthusiast]] |date=September–October 2003|issue=107 |pages=15–30 |issn=0143-5450}}
* Aloni, Shlomo. "Trainers in Combat: Valour and Sacrifice in the Six Day War". ''[[Air Enthusiast]]'', No. 94, July/August 2001. pp. 42–55. ISSN 0143-5450
* {{cite magazine|last=Relman|first=Paul|title=IAI Astra: Israel's star-struck biz jet|magazine=[[Air International]]|date=December 1993|volume=45|issue=6|pages=313–319|issn=0306-5634}}

== External links ==
{{Commons category}}
*[http://www.iai.co.il/Templates/Homepage/Homepage.aspx?lang=EN Israel Aerospace Industries] – official site.
*[http://www.iai.co.il/Default.aspx?FolderID=14467&lang=en&res=0&pos=0 IAI Space Systems]
*[http://www.iai.co.il/18660-en/SystemMissileandSpace_SpaceDivision.aspx IAI Space Division]
*[http://www.iai.co.il/Default.aspx?FolderID=18657&lang=en Official org-chart (2 January 2007)]

{{Israel Aerospace Industries}}
{{IAI aircraft}}

{{authority control}}

[[Category:Israel Aerospace Industries| ]]
[[Category:1953 establishments in Israel]]
[[Category:Aircraft manufacturers of Israel]]
[[Category:Government-owned companies of Israel]]

Sukhoi Su-57

2023-09-10T13:51:18Z

Soldier: Created Sukhoi Su-57

{{Short description|Russian stealth multirole fighter aircraft}}
{{redirect|SU-57||SU-57 (disambiguation)}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=October 2019}}
{{EngvarB|date=January 2023}}

{|{{Infobox aircraft begin
| name = Su-57
| image = Sukhoi Design Bureau, 054, Sukhoi Su-57 (49581303977).jpg
| caption = A Su-57 with serial production pixel [[Camouflage#Digital tattiflage|camouflage]]
| alt =
}}{{Infobox aircraft type
| type = [[Stealth aircraft|Stealth]] [[Multirole combat aircraft|multirole fighter]]
| national origin = Russia
| manufacturer =
| builder = [[Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aircraft Plant]]
| designer = 
| design group = [[Sukhoi]]
| first flight = {{Start date and age|2010|01|29|df=yes}}
| introduction = 25 December 2020{{refn|Date of first operational aircraft in military service; first operational Su-57 regiment is to be equipped by 2025.|group=N}}
| retired =
| status = In production<ref name="tass.ru">{{Cite web|url=https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/10352497|title=Первый серийный истребитель Су-57 поступил в авиаполк Южного военного округа - ТАСС|website=TACC|accessdate=22 May 2023}}</ref>
| primary user = [[Russian Aerospace Forces]] 
| more users = 
| produced = 2019–present
| number built = 21 (10 test<ref>{{cite web |url=https://news.rambler.ru/troops/38764567-sovershil-pervyy-polet-posledniy-su-57-istochnik/ |title=Совершил первый полет последний Су-57, — источник |website=News.rambler.ru |access-date=3 January 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171226235421/https://news.rambler.ru/troops/38764567-sovershil-pervyy-polet-posledniy-su-57-istochnik/ |archive-date=26 December 2017 |url-status=live}}</ref> and 11 serial<ref name="10 serial"/>{{Better source needed|reason=Citation is the post in LiveJournal.|date=April 2023}})
| variants with their own articles = [[Sukhoi/HAL FGFA]]
}}
|}

The '''Sukhoi Su-57''' ({{lang-ru|Сухой Су-57}}; [[NATO reporting name]]: '''Felon''')<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.ruaviation.com/news/2019/11/1/14330/ |title=NATO assigns new reporting name for Su-57 5th generation jet fighter |website=ruaviation.com |date=1 November 2019 |access-date=2 November 2019}}</ref> is a [[Twinjet|twin-engine]] [[stealth aircraft|stealth]] [[Multirole combat aircraft|multirole fighter]] aircraft developed by [[Sukhoi]].<ref name="t50su57">{{cite web |url=http://tass.com/defense/960000 |title=Russia's 5th-generation fighter jet named as Su-57 |agency=TASS |language=en |access-date=11 August 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170812021235/http://tass.com/defense/960000 |archive-date=12 August 2017 |url-status=live}}</ref> It is the product of the '''PAK FA''' ({{lang-ru|ПАК ФА}}, {{lang-ru|label=short for|Перспективный авиационный комплекс фронтовой авиации|Perspektivnyy Aviatsionnyy Kompleks Frontovoy Aviatsii|'prospective aeronautical complex of front-line air forces'}}) programme, which was initiated in 1999 as a more modern and affordable alternative to the [[Post-PFI Soviet/Russian aircraft projects|MFI]] ([[Mikoyan Project 1.44|Mikoyan Project 1.44/1.42]]). Sukhoi's internal designation for the aircraft is '''T-50'''. The Su-57 is the first aircraft in Russian military service designed with [[stealth technology]] and is intended to be the basis for a family of stealth combat aircraft.

A multirole fighter capable of aerial combat as well as ground and maritime strike, the Su-57 incorporates stealth, [[supermaneuverability]], [[supercruise]], integrated avionics, and large internal payload capacity.<ref name="sukhoi.org first flight">{{cite press release |url=http://sukhoi.org/eng/news/company/?id=3143 |title=Sukhoi Company launches flight tests of PAK FA advanced tactical frontline fighter |website=Sukhoi.org |date=29 January 2010 |access-date=26 January 2011 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110501030735/http://sukhoi.org/eng/news/company/?id=3143 |archive-date=1 May 2011}}</ref> The aircraft is expected to succeed the [[Mikoyan MiG-29|MiG-29]] and [[Sukhoi Su-27|Su-27]] in the Russian military service and has also been marketed for export. The first prototype aircraft flew in 2010, but the program experienced a protracted development due to various structural and technical issues that emerged during trials, including the destruction of the first production aircraft in a crash before its delivery. After repeated delays, the first Su-57 entered service with the [[Russian Aerospace Forces]] (VKS)<ref name=VVStoVKS group=N>Russia established the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) as a new branch of its military on 1 August 2015 with the merging of the Russian Air Force (VVS) and the Russian Aerospace Defence Forces (VVKO).</ref> in December 2020.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2009/01/16/Russia-bets-on-new-Sukhoi-fighter-to-match-F-35/UPI-93841232131619/|title=Russia bets on new Sukhoi fighter to match F-35|work=United Press International|first=Ariel|last=Cohen|date=16 January 2009|access-date=11 January 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100205081345/http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2009/01/16/Russia-bets-on-new-Sukhoi-fighter-to-match-F-35/UPI-93841232131619|archive-date=5 February 2010|url-status=live}}</ref> Not counting prototype test aircraft, a total of 11 had been produced as of December 2022.<ref name="10 serial"/>

==Development==

===Origins===
{{main|Post-PFI Soviet/Russian aircraft projects}}

In 1979, the [[Soviet Union]] outlined a need for [[Jet fighter generations|next-generation fighter]] aircraft intended to enter service in the 1990s. The programme became the I-90 ({{lang-ru|link=no|И-90}}, {{lang-ru|label=short for|link=no|Истребитель 1990–х годов||Fighter of the 1990s}}) and required the fighter to be "multifunctional" (i.e. multirole) by having substantial ground attack capabilities, and would eventually replace the MiG-29 and Su-27 in frontline tactical aviation service. Two subsequent projects were designed to meet these requirements: the [[Post-PFI Soviet/Russian aircraft projects#MFI|MFI]] ({{lang-ru|link=no|МФИ}}, {{lang-ru|link=no|label=short for|Многофункциональный фронтовой истребитель||Multifunctional Frontline Fighter}}) and smaller [[Post-PFI Soviet/Russian aircraft projects#LFI|LFI]] ({{lang-ru|link=no|ЛФИ}}, {{lang|ru|link=no|Л}} {{lang-ru|link=no|label=short for|Лёгкий||Light}}), with conceptual work beginning in 1983.{{refn|At the time, there was a planned fleet of one-third MFI and two-thirds LFI.<ref>Butowski (2021), p. 5</ref><ref>Gordon 2021, p. 7</ref>|group=N}} [[Mikoyan]] was selected for the MFI and began developing its [[Mikoyan Project 1.44|MiG 1.44/1.42]].<ref name="Gordon MFI S-37">{{cite book |author=Gordon, Yefim |title=Sukhoi S-37 and Mikoyan MFI: Russian Fifth-Generation Fighter Technology Demonstrators|series=Warbird Tech|volume=1|location=Hinckley, UK |publisher=Midland Publishing|year=2002|isbn=1-85780-120-2}}</ref> Though not a participant in the MFI, Sukhoi started its own programme in 1983 to develop technologies for a next-generation fighter, eventually resulting in the forward-swept wing [[Sukhoi Su-47|S-32]] experimental aircraft, later redesignated S-37 and then Su-47. Due to a lack of funds after the [[dissolution of the Soviet Union]], the MFI was repeatedly delayed and the first flight of the MiG 1.44/1.42 prototype did not occur until 2000, nine years behind schedule.<ref name="Gordon MFI S-37"/> Owing to the high costs, the MFI and LFI were eventually cancelled while the [[Ministry of Defence (Russia)|Russian Ministry of Defence]] began work on a new next-generation fighter programme; in 1999, the ministry initiated the PAK FA or I-21 programme, with the competition announced in April 2001.{{refn|In the late 1990s, as the status of MFI declined, conceptual work for a next generation fighter was conducted under the LFS ({{lang-ru|link=no|ЛФС}}, {{lang-ru|link=no|label=short for|Лёгкий фронтовой самолёт|Lyogkiy Frontovoy Samolyot|Light Frontline Aircraft}}) until efforts shifted to the PAK FA.|group=N}} Because of Russia's financial difficulties, the programme aimed to rein in costs by producing a single multirole fifth-generation fighter that would replace both the Su-27 and the MiG-29. Further cost-saving measures include an intended size in between that of the Su-27 and the MiG-29 and normal takeoff weight considerably smaller than the MiG MFI's {{convert|28.6|tonnes|lb}} and the Su-47's {{convert|26.8|tonnes|lbs}}.<ref>Butowski (2021), pp. 21–22</ref><ref>Gordon 2021, pp. 95–96</ref>

Sukhoi's approach to the PAK FA competition differed fundamentally from Mikoyan's; whereas Mikoyan proposed for the three design bureaus (Mikoyan, Sukhoi, and [[Yakovlev]]) to cooperate as a consortium with the winning team leading the design effort, Sukhoi's proposal had itself as the lead designer from the beginning and included a joint work agreement that covered the entire development and production cycle, from propulsion and avionics suppliers to research facilities. Additionally, the two companies had differing design philosophies for the aircraft. Mikoyan's E-721 was smaller and more affordable, with normal takeoff weight of {{convert|16|-|17|tonnes|lb}} and powered by a pair of [[Klimov]] VK-10M engines with 10–11 tonnes (98.1–108 kN, 22,000–24,300 lbf) of thrust each. In contrast, Sukhoi's T-50 would be comparatively larger and more capable, with normal takeoff weight goal of {{convert|22|-|23|tonnes|lbs}} and powered by a pair of [[Lyulka|Lyulka-Saturn]] AL-41F1 engines each with maximum thrust in the 14.5-tonne (142 kN, 32,000 lbf) class.<ref name=Butowski2021pp22-24>Butowski (2021), pp. 22–24</ref><ref name=gordon2021pp96-97>Gordon 2021, pp. 96–97</ref>{{refn|While Sukhoi tested forward-swept wings with the Su-47, Soviet and Russian research indicated that such configuration was mainly beneficial at transonic speeds and loses out to conventionally swept wings at supersonic speeds. The forward-swept wing was not chosen for the T-50.<ref>Butowski, p. 13</ref>|group=N}}

In April 2002, the Ministry of Defence selected Sukhoi over Mikoyan as the winner of the PAK FA competition and the lead design bureau of the new aircraft.{{refn|Yakovlev would only participate as a subcontractor for the potential short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) module in the future.|group=N}} In addition to the merits of the proposal, Sukhoi's experience in the 1990s was taken into account, with the successful development of various Su-27 derivatives and numerous exports ensuring its financial stability.<ref>Butowski (2021), p. 25</ref> According to the Russian Air Force [[Air Force ranks and insignia of the Russian Federation|Commander-in-Chief]] [[Vladimir Mikhaylov (general)|Vladimir Mikhaylov]], flight tests were projected to begin in 2007.<ref name=gordon2021pp96-97/><ref>{{cite news |title=Russia to test PAK-FA in 2007 |agency=Information Telegraph Agency of Russia |date=8 June 2005}}</ref> Mikoyan continued to develop its E-721 as the [[LMFS]] ({{lang-ru|link=no|ЛМФС}}, {{lang-ru|link=no|label=short for|Лёгкий многофункциональный фронтовой самолёт||Light Multifunctional Frontline Aircraft}}) at its own expense.<ref>{{cite news |author=Butowski, Piotr |url=http://www.ato.ru/content/migs-fifth-generation-fighter-builds-new-momentum?sess_=84553c372fffdffd0c0a107a50c04d85 |title=MiG's Fifth Generation Fighter Builds up New Momentum |agency=Russia & CIS Observer |date=1 November 2006 |access-date=14 May 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180514141834/http://www.ato.ru/content/migs-fifth-generation-fighter-builds-new-momentum?sess_=84553c372fffdffd0c0a107a50c04d85 |archive-date=14 May 2018 |url-status=live}}</ref>

===Research and development===
The research and development programme of the PAK FA was called ''Stolitsa'' ({{lang-ru|link=no|Столица||Capital city}}). In 2002, Alexander Davidenko selected as the T-50's chief designer at Sukhoi.<ref name=butowski2021p26>Butowski (2021), p. 26</ref> The [[Novosibirsk Aircraft Production Association]] (NAPO) and [[Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aircraft Production Association]] (KnAAZ) would manufacture the new multi-role fighter, with KnAAZ performing final assembly at [[Komsomol'sk-on-Amur]].<ref>{{cite web |last=Perry |first=Dominic |url=http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/fire-damages-pak-fa-prototype-on-landing-400255/ |title=Fire damages PAK-FA prototype on landing |work=FlightGlobal |date=10 June 2014 |access-date=12 June 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140614205207/http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/fire-damages-pak-fa-prototype-on-landing-400255/ |archive-date=14 June 2014 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="KnAAPO PAK FA page">{{cite web |url=http://www.knaapo.ru/eng/products/t-50/index.wbp |title=KnAAPO PAK FA information page |access-date=23 June 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140308040716/http://www.knaapo.ru/eng/products/t-50/index.wbp |archive-date=8 March 2014 |url-status=live}}</ref> Following a competition held in 2003, the Tekhnokompleks Scientific and Production Center, Ramenskoye Instrument Building Design Bureau, the [[Tikhomirov Scientific Research Institute of Instrument Design]] (NIIP), the [[Ural Optical and Mechanical Plant]] (UOMZ) in [[Yekaterinburg]], the Polet firm in [[Nizhny Novgorod]] and the Central Scientific Research Radio Engineering Institute in Moscow were selected for the development of the PAK FA's avionics suite. In April 2004, NPO Lyulka-Saturn (now [[NPO Saturn]]) was signed as the contractor for the AL-41F1 engines with the development designation ''izdeliye'' 117.<ref name="izdeliye" group="N">The Russian term {{lang|ru|[[:wikt:изделие|изделие]]}}, [[Romanization of Russian|translit.]] ''izdeliye'' literally means "manufactured article" or "product".</ref>

Sukhoi used existing airframes as testbeds for various subsystems and concepts; the Su-47 tested internal weapon bays, and [[Sukhoi Su-35#Upgraded Su-27|Su-27M]] prototypes served as testbeds for the flight control system and engines.<ref>Butowski (2021), p. 16</ref> To reduce developmental risk and spread out associated costs, as well as to bridge the gap with extant [[Fourth generation jet fighter|fourth generation]] fighters, Sukhoi implemented some of the T-50's technology and features, such as propulsion and certain avionics, in an advanced derivative of the Su-27 called the T-10BM ({{lang-ru|link=no|БМ}}, {{lang-ru|link=no|label=short for|большая модернизация||Major Modernization}}), which was eventually procured by the Russian Ministry of Defence in 2009 and entered service as the [[Sukhoi Su-35|Su-35S]] in 2014.<ref name=interavia20040622>{{cite news |last=Butowski|first=Piotr |title=Halfway to PAK FA: the latest addition to the Su-27 family seeks to bridge the gap to the fifth generation combat aircraft |url=http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-126558892.html |date=22 June 2004 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150924122311/http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-126558892.html|url-status=dead|archive-date=24 September 2015|work=Interavia Business & Technology |publisher=Aerospace Media Publishing {{Subscription required |via=[[HighBeam Research]]}} |access-date=19 April 2013 |oclc=71365085}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |author=Butowski, Piotr |title=Wraps come off new Russian fighters: Russia's so-called "intermediate-generation" fighters made their debut at MAKS 2007 |url=http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-170506722.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131105233557/http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-170506722.html|url-status=dead|archive-date=5 November 2013|work=Interavia Business & Technology |publisher=Aerospace Media Publishing {{Subscription required |via=[[HighBeam Research]]}} |access-date=19 April 2013 |date=22 September 2007 |oclc=71365085}}</ref>

In December 2004, the T-50's conceptual design and shape was complete and approved by the Ministry of Defence; government funding of the programme began in 2005 and drastically increased in 2006 when detailed design was underway.<ref name="pak_fa_evolution">{{cite web|last1=Коц|first1=Андрей |url=https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20170808/1500000200.html |title=Эволюция ПАК ФА. Как менялся российский истребитель пятого поколения |agency=[[RIA Novosti]] |access-date=12 August 2017 |language=ru|date=8 August 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170811225754/https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20170808/1500000200.html|archive-date=11 August 2017|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=butowski2021p26/> On 8 August 2007, Russian Air Force Commander-in-Chief [[Alexander Zelin]] was quoted by Russian news agencies that the programme's development stage was complete and construction of the first aircraft for [[flight testing]] would begin, with three flyable T-50 prototypes planned to be built by 2009.{{cn|date=February 2023}} In 2009, the aircraft's design was officially approved.{{cn|date=February 2023}} The T-50 was named Su-57 in July 2017.<ref name="t50su57"/>

Since the early stages of the PAK FA programme, Russia sought after foreign partnerships on the project to increase funding for its development and also secure large export orders.<ref>Butowski (2021), p. 54</ref> On 18 October 2007, Russia and India signed a contract for Sukhoi and [[Hindustan Aeronautics Limited]] (HAL) to jointly develop a derivative of the PAK FA called the [[Sukhoi/HAL FGFA|Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA)]].<ref>{{cite press release |url=http://www.sukhoi.org/eng/news/company/?id=5125 |title=The contract to develop a sketch and technical project of the Russian-Indian 5th -generation fighter was completed |website=Sukhoi.org |access-date=16 November 2013 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131005190949/http://www.sukhoi.org/eng/news/company/?id=5125 |archive-date=5 October 2013}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2009-10-10/india/28069553_1_india-and-russia-anatoly-serdyukov-admiral-gorshkov |title=India, Russia to ink new military pact |date=10 October 2009 |access-date=11 May 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130705132840/http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2009-10-10/india/28069553_1_india-and-russia-anatoly-serdyukov-admiral-gorshkov |archive-date=5 July 2013 |work=[[The Times of India]] |url-status=dead}}</ref> In September 2010, India and Russia agreed on a preliminary design contract where each country was to invest $6 billion; a memorandum of understanding for the preliminary design was signed in December 2010, and the development of the FGFA was expected to take 8–10 years.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/india-russia-to-ink-gen-5-fighter-pact/407746/ |title=India, Russia to Ink gen-5 fighter pact |work=Business Standard |access-date=19 November 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121006223031/http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/india-russia-to-ink-gen-5-fighter-pact/407746/ |archive-date=6 October 2012 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url= http://www.orfonline.org/cms/sites/orfonline/modules/analysis/AnalysisDetail.html?cmaid=20815&mmacmaid=20816 |title= Medvedev Flair Firms Up Indo-Russian Relations |publisher= Observer Research Foundation |date= 2010-12-29 |access-date= 2012-05-18 |url-status= dead |archive-url= https://archive.today/20120909001145/http://www.orfonline.org/cms/sites/orfonline/modules/analysis/AnalysisDetail.html?cmaid=20815&mmacmaid=20816 |archive-date= 2012-09-09 }}</ref> By 2014, however, the Indian Air Force began voicing concerns over performance, cost, and workshare. India found that the aircraft does not meet its requirements and eventually left the partnership in 2018.<ref name=india_exit/>

===Prototyping===
[[File:Sukhoi T-50 in 2011 (4).jpg|thumb|left|Su-57 prototype at the [[MAKS (air show)|MAKS-2011 Air Show]]]]

The T-50's maiden flight was repeatedly postponed from early 2007 after encountering unspecified technical problems. In August 2009, Alexander Zelin acknowledged that problems with the engine and in technical research remained unsolved.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article7007913.ece|title=Russia unveils its first stealth fighter jet – the Sukhoi T-50|work=The Times|first=Tony|last=Halpin|date=30 January 2010|access-date=7 February 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110604163330/http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article7007913.ece|archive-date=4 June 2011|url-status=live}}</ref> On 28 February 2009, Sukhoi general director [[Mikhail Pogosyan]] announced that the airframe was almost finished and that the first prototype should be ready by August 2009.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.india-defence.com/reports-4254 |title=Sukhoi PAK FA Updates: First Prototype by August 2009, Special Software for Indian Versions |publisher=India Defence |date=28 February 2009 |access-date=13 March 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090304133449/http://www.india-defence.com/reports-4254 |archive-date=4 March 2009 |url-status=live}}</ref> On 20 August 2009, Pogosyan said that the first flight would be by year's end. Konstantin Makiyenko, deputy head of the Moscow-based [[Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies]] said that "even with delays", the aircraft would likely make its first flight by January or February, adding that it would take five to ten years for commercial production.<ref>{{cite news |last=Solovyov |first=Dmitry |url=http://in.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idINIndia-41866120090820?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews&pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=11584 |title=Interview: Russia's new fighter to fly by yr-end – Sukhoi |work=Reuters |date=20 August 2009 |access-date=20 August 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100116093405/http://in.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idINIndia-41866120090820?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews&pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=11584 |archive-date=16 January 2010 |url-status=live}}</ref> Flight testing was further delayed when Deputy Prime Minister [[Sergei Ivanov]] announced in December 2009 that the first trials would begin in 2010.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.lenta.ru/news/2009/12/24/pakfa/ |title=Начались испытания российского истребителя пятого поколения |trans-title=Russian fifth-generation fighter tests have begun |work=Lenta.ru |date=24 December 2009 |access-date=26 December 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091227060644/http://lenta.ru/news/2009/12/24/pakfa/ |archive-date=27 December 2009 |url-status=live}}</ref> The first taxi test was successfully completed on 24 December 2009, and the maiden flight of the first prototype aircraft, T-50-1, occurred on 29 January 2010.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/russia/2009/12/091224_sukhoi_new_runway.shtml |title=Sukhoi fifth-generation fighter taxiing |agency=BBC Russian Service |date=24 December 2009 |access-date=30 December 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100113175116/http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/russia/2009/12/091224_sukhoi_new_runway.shtml |archive-date=13 January 2010 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="first_flight">{{cite web |url=http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/pictures-amp-video-sukhoi39s-pak-fa-fighter-completes-first-337795/ |title=PICTURES & VIDEO: Sukhoi's PAK FA fighter completes first flight |author=Vladimir Karnozov |website=FlightGlobal |access-date=14 November 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140216062945/http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/pictures-amp-video-sukhoi39s-pak-fa-fighter-completes-first-337795/ |archive-date=16 February 2014 |url-status=live}}</ref> Piloted by Sukhoi [[test pilot]] [[Sergei Bogdan|Sergey Bogdan]], the aircraft's 47-minute maiden flight took place at [[KnAAPO]]'s [[Dzemgi Airport]] in the [[Russian Far East]].<ref name="sukhoi.org first flight"/><ref>{{cite news|url=http://epaper.timesofindia.com/Default/Scripting/ArticleWin.asp?From=Archive&Source=Page&Skin=TOINEW&BaseHref=TOIKM/2010/01/30&PageLabel=13&EntityId=Ar01301&ViewMode=HTML&GZ=T|title=1st test of 5-Gen fighter in Russia|work=The Times of India|first=Rajat|last=Pandit|access-date=26 January 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120329045028/http://epaper.timesofindia.com/Default/Scripting/ArticleWin.asp?From=Archive&Source=Page&Skin=TOINEW&BaseHref=TOIKM%2F2010%2F01%2F30&PageLabel=13&EntityId=Ar01301&ViewMode=HTML&GZ=T|archive-date=29 March 2012|url-status=live}}</ref> Construction of the prototypes would progress slower than initially planned; by the end of October 2013, the test programme had amassed more than 450 flights across five aircraft.<ref>{{cite press release |url=http://www.sukhoi.org/eng/news/company/?id=5292 |title=Fifth PAK FA fighter aircraft made its first flight in Komsomolsk-on-Amur |website=Sukhoi.org |date=28 October 2013 |access-date=16 November 2013 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131111122320/http://www.sukhoi.org/eng/news/company/?id=5292 |archive-date=11 November 2013}}</ref>

[[File:Sukhoi T-50 MAKS'11 Zherdin.jpg|thumb|right|Su-57 prototype climbing after takeoff, 2011]]
A total of ten flying and three non-flying T-50 prototypes would be built for preliminary flight tests and state trials.<ref name="proto_knaapo">{{cite web |title=Т-50 – Альбомы |url=http://www.knaapo.ru/press-centre/gallery/22/ |publisher=[[KnAAPO]] |access-date=12 August 2017 |language=ru|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170813005616/http://www.knaapo.ru/press-centre/gallery/22/|archive-date=13 August 2017|url-status=live}}</ref> Initially, the program was planned to have up to six prototypes before the start of serial production; however testing would reveal that the initial prototypes did not have adequate fatigue life, with early structural cracks forming in the airframe.<ref name=butowski2021p44>Butowski (2021), p. 44</ref> The aircraft subsequently underwent a structural redesign, with changes including increased composite material usage, reinforced airframe to meet full life cycle requirements, elongated tail "sting", and slightly greater wingspan; the sixth flyable prototype was the first of the redesigned "second stage" aircraft, with the five initial prototypes consequently considered "first stage" vehicles and requiring additional structural reinforcements in order to continue flight tests.<ref name=sixthprototype group=N>The originally planned sixth flying prototype, T-50-6-1, was to be the last "first stage" airframe. After the fifth prototype, T-50-5, was involved in a fire accident, T-50-6-1 was completed using parts salvaged from the written-off T-50-5 and was renamed T-50-5R, carrying the same "055" bort number. While it is essentially a new and distinct airframe, official accounting still considers the two airframes to be the “same”, with the R ({{lang-ru|Р}}) {{lang-ru|link=no|label=short for|ремонтый||repair}}. The sixth flying prototype T-50-6-2, the first "second stage" aircraft, was given the "056" bort number.</ref><ref name=":10">{{Cite web |url=https://bmpd.livejournal.com/2760067.html |title=Как сообщается, серийный вариант истребителя Т-50 получил официальное наименование Су-57 |last=bmpd |date=31 July 2017 |website=bmpd |access-date=6 December 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180225093927/http://bmpd.livejournal.com/2760067.html |archive-date=25 February 2018 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=gordon2021p193-197>Gordon (2021), pp. 193–197</ref><ref name="AISep2017">Butowski, Piotr. "Putin's Raptorski". ''[[Air International]]'', Vol. 93, No 3, September 2017, pp. 24–27. Stamford, UK: Key Publishing.</ref> The last two flying prototypes were test articles of production Su-57 aircraft with full mission systems on board.<ref name="naked-science.ru">{{cite web |last1=Ведмеденко|first1=Илья |title=Новый экземпляр Су-57 совершил свой первый полет, — источник |url=https://naked-science.ru/article/tech/novyy-su-57-sovershil-svoy-pervyy |website=Naked Science |access-date=12 August 2017 |language=ru|date=7 August 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170807195041/https://naked-science.ru/article/tech/novyy-su-57-sovershil-svoy-pervyy|archive-date=7 August 2017|url-status=live}}</ref> While the "second stage" structural redesign reduced the weight growth from the required strengthening of the "first stage" design, the normal takeoff weight still increased to approximately {{convert|25|tonnes|lb}}.<ref>Butowski (2021), p. 45</ref> Issues and accidents during the testing resulted in repeated delays to the programme, with the delivery of the first production aircraft pushed back from 2015 to 2020.<ref>{{cite news |last=Sysoev |first=Grigoriy |url=http://en.ria.ru/mlitary_news/20120213/171286237.html |title=Russia to Increase Number of 5G Fighters in Test Flights |agency=RIA Novosti |date=13 February 2012 |access-date=16 October 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120417203808/http://en.ria.ru/mlitary_news/20120213/171286237.html |archive-date=17 April 2012 |url-status=live}}</ref>

===Procurement===
[[File:Sukhoi T-50 Pichugin 2.jpg|thumb|Sukhoi Su-57 in flight with landing gear deployed, 2010]]

The procurement plans for the PAK FA have been considerably scaled back and delayed from original plans. In 2011, the Ministry of Defence had planned on buying the first 10 aircraft for evaluation after 2012 and 60 production standard aircraft after 2015.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.flightglobal.com/features/russia-special/pak-fa/ |title=PAK FA – Russia Special Report |work=FlightGlobal |date=2 August 2011 |access-date=10 May 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140528051324/http://www.flightglobal.com/features/russia-special/pak-fa/ |archive-date=28 May 2014 |url-status=live}}</ref> These plans were refined under the State Armament Programme from 2011 to 2020 (GPV-2020), with serial production hoped to begin in 2016; the Ministry of Defence was planning to acquire 52 aircraft by 2020, and another 150–160 by 2025. Additionally, export orders for 250–300 FGFA were expected to begin in 2017.<ref>[http://www.ruaviation.com/news/2011/7/28/446/ "Sukhoi: Development of PAK FA is going on without any failures"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141023113751/http://www.ruaviation.com/news/2011/7/28/446/|date=23 October 2014}} ''Russian Aviation'', 28 July 2011.</ref><ref>Butowski (2021), p. 58</ref>

Plans were greatly cut down in 2015 as a result of technical obstacles encountered during testing, India's unclear commitment to the partnership, and Russia's economic downturn due to Western sanctions after its [[Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation|annexation of Crimea]] and the drop in oil prices. Russian Deputy Minister of Defence [[Yury Borisov]] stated in 2015 that the Russian Air Force would slow production, reduce its initial order to 12 fighters, and operate large fleets of upgraded [[Fourth-generation jet fighter|fourth-generation]] fighters such as the Su-35S and the [[Sukhoi Su-30|Su-30SM]].<ref>{{cite news |url=http://in.rbth.com/economics/2015/03/25/russian_air_force_to_buy_fewer_pak_fa_fighter_aircraft_42179.html |title=Russian Air Force to buy fewer PAK FA fighter aircraft |last=Safronov |first=Ivan |date=25 March 2015 |work=Russia & India Report |url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150727143528/http://in.rbth.com/economics/2015/03/25/russian_air_force_to_buy_fewer_pak_fa_fighter_aircraft_42179.html|archive-date=27 July 2015}}</ref><ref>{{cite magazine |url=http://aviationweek.com/blog/t-50-update |title=T-50 Update |magazine=Aviation Week |first=Bill |last=Sweetman |date=21 December 2013 |access-date=24 May 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140528050432/http://aviationweek.com/blog/t-50-update |archive-date=28 May 2014 |url-status=live}}</ref> In 2017, Borisov stated that the PAK FA would most likely enter service in 2018 and be part of the new State Armament Programme from 2018 to 2027 (GPV-2027).<ref>{{cite web |url=http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/russias-fearsome-new-stealth-fighter-will-enter-service-2018-19467 |title=Russia's Fearsome PAK-FA Stealth Fighter Will Enter Service in 2018 |last=Majumdar |first=Dave |website=The National Interest |date=16 February 2017 |language=en |access-date=9 April 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170409200709/http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/russias-fearsome-new-stealth-fighter-will-enter-service-2018-19467 |archive-date=9 April 2017 |url-status=live}}</ref> On 30 June 2018, an order for 12 aircraft was agreed, while deliveries to the [[Russian Armed Forces]] was pushed back again to 2019 with the first aircraft planned to join fighter regiments at the [[Lipetsk (air base)|Lipetsk Air Center]].<ref name=":0">{{cite news |url=https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20180630/1523694698.html |title=Первый контракт на поставку истребителей Су-57 заключат в ближайшее время |language=ru |access-date=30 June 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180701172049/https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20180630/1523694698.html |archive-date=1 July 2018 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="AIN">{{cite news|url=https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2018-07-03/russia-places-initial-production-order-stealth-fighter#|title=Russia Places Initial Production Order for Stealth Fighter|last=Karnozov|first=Vladimir|work=Aviation International News Online|access-date=13 July 2018|language=en-US|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180713231107/https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2018-07-03/russia-places-initial-production-order-stealth-fighter|archive-date=13 July 2018|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Introduction of the Su-57">{{cite web |url=https://ria.ru/arms/20180714/1524591896.html |title=ЛИПЕЦКИЙ АВИАЦЕНТР СКОРО ПОЛУЧИТ ИСТРЕБИТЕЛИ ПЯТОГО ПОКОЛЕНИЯ СУ-57 |agency=[[RIA Novosti]] |date=14 July 2018 |access-date=21 July 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180721192055/https://ria.ru/arms/20180714/1524591896.html |archive-date=21 July 2018 |url-status=live}}</ref> At the same time, Borisov praised the Su-35S, stating that it was comparable to the Su-57 except for the stealth features while being more affordable.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=3033426&3033426 |title=Первые истребители Су-57 готовы к отправке в войска |website=[[Russia-24]] |date=30 June 2018 |access-date=21 July 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180721192224/https://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=3033426&3033426 |archive-date=21 July 2018 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Diplomat">{{cite news|url=https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/russia-will-not-mass-produce-5th-generation-stealth-fighter-jet/|title=Russia Will Not Mass-Produce 5th Generation Stealth Fighter Jet|last=Gady|first=Franz-Stefan|work=The Diplomat|access-date=21 July 2018|language=en-US|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180713204438/https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/russia-will-not-mass-produce-5th-generation-stealth-fighter-jet/|archive-date=13 July 2018|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://uk.businessinsider.com/russia-admits-defeat-su-57-not-going-into-mass-production-2018-7|title=Russia admits defeat on its 'stealth' F-35 killer by canceling mass production of the Su-57 fighter jet|last=Lockie|first=Alex|work=Business Insider|access-date=21 July 2018|language=en-US|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180717082449/http://uk.businessinsider.com/russia-admits-defeat-su-57-not-going-into-mass-production-2018-7|archive-date=17 July 2018|url-status=live}}</ref>

Due to the substantially higher cost of the Su-57 compared to the Su-35S and Su-30SM, the design was placed on hold for mass production until the need arises. On 22 August 2018, during the International Military-Technical Forum «ARMY-2018», the Defence Ministry and Sukhoi signed the first contract for delivery of two serial Su-57 fighters scheduled for 2019 and 2020 respectively.<ref name="Two aircraft on order">{{cite web |url=http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/5480249 |title=Минобороны и "Сухой" заключили контракт на поставку двух Су-57 |agency=[[TASS]] |date=22 August 2018 |access-date=23 August 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180823105723/http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/5480249 |archive-date=23 August 2018 |url-status=live}}</ref> In January 2019, the Ministry of Defence announced they hoped to conclude a second contract for 13 more aircraft in 2020.<ref name="Second contract">{{cite web |url=https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/6003231 |title=Источник: контракт на поставку 13 Су-57 для ВКС России планируется подписать в 2020 году |agency=[[TASS]] |date=15 January 2019 |access-date=17 January 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190116024034/https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/6003231 |archive-date=16 January 2019 |url-status=live}}</ref>

However, on 15 May 2019, the acquisition plan drastically changed when Russian President [[Vladimir Putin]] announced that 76 aircraft would be purchased and delivered to the Aerospace Forces by 2028. This came after the negotiations were able to lower the price of the Su-57 and equipment by 20%.<ref name="Second contract 2">{{cite web |url=http://tass.com/defense/1058494 |title=Putin says 76 Su-57 jets to be purchased before 2028 |agency=[[TASS]] |date=15 May 2019 |access-date=18 May 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190517080533/http://tass.com/defense/1058494 |archive-date=17 May 2019 |url-status=live}}</ref> The contract for the 76 aircraft was formally signed on 27 June 2019 at the International Military-Technical Forum «ARMY-2019».<ref name="76 aircraft on order">{{cite web|url=https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/6601712|title=Минобороны получит 76 истребителей Су-57|agency=[[TASS]]|date=27 June 2019|access-date=28 June 2019}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://tass.com/defense/1065905|title=Russian Defense Ministry to get 76 Su-57 fighter jets|agency=[[TASS]]|date=27 June 2019|access-date=28 June 2019}}</ref> The same month, General Director of [[Tactical Missiles Corporation]] (KRTV) Boris Obnosov reported, a contract for serial production of ammunition for Su-57 fighters was signed, and is being inducted.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://tass.ru/ekonomika/6803087|title=На "Армии-2019" подписаны контракты на боеприпасы для Су-57|agency=[[TASS]]|date=27 August 2019|access-date=17 November 2019}}</ref> Serial production of the aircraft began in July 2019, with the first production aircraft scheduled to be delivered by the end of the year; following the crash of the first production aircraft, the Russian Aerospace Forces<ref name=VVStoVKS group=N/> took delivery of its first Su-57 in December 2020.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://tass.com/defense/1070884|title=Russia launches serial production of Su-57 fifth-generation fighter jet|agency=[[TASS]]|date=29 July 2019|access-date=25 December 2020}}</ref> By May 2022, four more aircraft were delivered, and production has progressed slower than planned.<ref name="avia.pro">{{cite web |date=28 May 2022 |title=В Новосибирске замечены два новых истребителя Су-57 |url=https://avia.pro/news/v-novosibirske-zamecheny-dva-novyh-istrebitelya-su-57 |website=avia.pro}}</ref>

===Further developments===
In 2004, Sukhoi anticipated that the Su-57 could become the basis for a family of combat aircraft for the Russian Aerospace Forces, similar to the Su-27 family.<ref name=interavia20040622/> Under the program name ''Megalopolis'' ({{lang-ru|link=no|Мегаполис||Megalopolis}}), the company is developing a new variant, designated Su-57M, that augments the base Su-57 design with improved mission systems, reliability and maintenance enhancements, incorporation of electromechanical drives, and the new NPO Saturn [[Saturn izdeliye 30|''izdeliye 30'']] engines. The formal contract was signed in 2018, although preliminary work had begun earlier. In 2020, flight test of the improved variant was planned to begin in 2022, with serial production in the mid-2020s. The second flying T-50 prototype was used to test the new ''izdeliye'' 30 engine starting in 2017; the third prototype was configured for teaming tests with the [[Sukhoi S-70 Okhotnik|Okhotnik]] [[UCAV]] in 2018.<ref name="bastion_053">{{cite web |title=Тяжёлый Ударный Беспилотный Летательный Аппарат "Охотник" |url=http://bastion-opk.ru/ohotnik-dpla/ |publisher=bastion-opk.ru |access-date=9 January 2020 |language=ru}}</ref> Additionally, work is underway to make a variant of the aircraft that can operate on aircraft carriers.<ref name=PiBu2021p89>Butowski (2021), p. 89</ref><ref name="Izvestia_electric_engines">{{cite news|url=https://iz.ru/999344/anton-lavrov-aleksei-ramm/nebesnaia-elektromekhanika-su-57-poluchit-printcipialno-novye-dvigateli |title=Небесная электромеханика: Су-57 получит новейшие системы управления |work=[[Izvestia]] |date=27 April 2020 |access-date=2 May 2020 |language=ru }}</ref><ref name="BlgMilitary_electric_engines">{{cite web|url=https://bulgarianmilitary.com/2020/04/27/russia-tries-something-different-an-electric-su-57-fighter-jet/ |title=Russia tries something different – an 'electric' Su-57 fighter jet |website=bulgarianmilitary.com |date=27 April 2020 |access-date=2 May 2020 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/10312083|title=Шойгу заявил, что боевые возможности российской армии за 2020 год возросли на 13%|agency=[[TASS]]|date=21 December 2020|access-date=25 December 2020}}</ref>

Sukhoi has also used technology from the Su-57 to produce a mockup of a more affordable lightweight single-engine aircraft, designated as the [[Sukhoi LTS|LTS]] ({{lang-ru|link=no|ЛТС}}, {{lang-ru|link=no|label=short for|Лёгкий тактический самолёт||Light Tactical Aircraft}}). At the 2021 Moscow Air Show (MAKS-2021), Sukhoi revealed its LTS mockup, named Checkmate, which shares many systems with the Su-57, including radar, main weapons bay, vertical stabilizers, and wings.<ref>{{cite web |last=Donald |first=David |url=https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2021-07-20/new-sukhoi-fighter-design-unveiled-maks |title=New Sukhoi Fighter Design Unveiled at MAKS |work=Aviation International News |date=20 July 2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/aircraft-propulsion/sukhoi-unveils-export-oriented-light-fighter |title=Sukhoi Unveils Export-Oriented Light Fighter |work=Aviation Week |date=22 July 2021}}</ref>

{{asof|2022}}, [[International sanctions during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine|international sanctions]] on Russia's defence industries may hamper development of the Su-57,<ref>{{Cite web |title=U.S. Treasury Sanctions Russia's Defense-Industrial Base, the Russian Duma and Its Members, and Sberbank CEO |url=https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0677 |access-date=2022-04-29 |website=U.S. Department of the Treasury |language=en}}</ref> as Russia could not import semiconductors and high-tech machining equipment from the European Union.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Seoul |first=Yang Jie in Tokyo and Jiyoung Sohn in |date=2022-03-19 |title=Chip Sanctions Challenge Russia's Tech Ambitions |language=en-US |work=The Wall Street Journal |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/chip-sanctions-challenge-russias-tech-ambitions-11647682202 |access-date=2022-04-29 |issn=0099-9660}}</ref> Potential export sales of Russian products -including military aircraft- also stalled because Russia cannot trade using U.S. dollars.<ref>{{Cite magazine |title=Here's What the New, Tightened SWIFT Sanctions on Russian Banks Actually Do |url=https://time.com/6153951/swift-sanctions-russia/ |access-date=2022-04-29 |magazine=Time |language=en}}</ref>{{update after|2022|10|26}}

The [[United Aircraft Corporation|UAC]] reported that an upgraded Su-57 aircraft made its first flight on October 21 2022. It is yet unclear whether this airframe represents a Su-57M, as the "second-stage engine" (alluding to the ''Izdeliye'' 30) was reportedly not mounted. The flight was carried out by Russian test-pilot Sergey Bogdan.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Russia's upgraded Su-57 fifth-generation fighter performs debut flight |url=https://tass.com/defense/1527211 |access-date=2022-10-26 |website=TASS |language=en}}</ref>

==Design==
[[File:Sukhoi T-50 Beltyukov.jpg|thumb|Su-57 view from above, showing an early pre-production camouflage similar to the [[Sukhoi Su-35|Su-35]]]]
[[File:PAK FA Prandtl Glauert singularity.jpg|thumb|Pre-production Su-57 [[Vortex|aerodynamic condensation]] at the [[MAKS (air show)|MAKS-2015 Air Show]]|alt=]]

The Su-57 is a [[Fifth-generation jet fighter|fifth-generation]] multirole fighter aircraft and the first operational stealth aircraft for the Russian armed forces. In addition to stealth, the fighter emphasizes supermaneuverability in all aircraft axes, capacious internal payload bays for multirole versatility, and advanced sensor systems such as [[Active electronically scanned array|active phased-array]] radar as well as the [[sensor fusion|integration]] of these systems to achieve high levels of automation.<ref name="KnAAPO PAK FA page"/><ref>{{cite web |last=Karnozov |first=Vladimir |url=http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/pictures-amp-video-sukhoi39s-pak-fa-fighter-completes-first-337795/ |title=Sukhoi's PAK FA fighter completes first flight |work=FlightGlobal |date=29 January 2010 |access-date=1 February 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140216062945/http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/pictures-amp-video-sukhoi39s-pak-fa-fighter-completes-first-337795/ |archive-date=16 February 2014 |url-status=live}}</ref> In the Su-57's design, Sukhoi cited the [[Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor|Lockheed Martin F-22]] as the baseline for a supermaneuverable stealth fighter, but addressed what the bureau considered to be the limitations, such as the inability to use thrust vectoring to induce roll and yaw moments, a lack of space for weapons bays between the engines resulting in insufficient payload, and complications for stall recovery if thrust vectoring fails.<ref name=sukhoit50configpatent>{{cite patent |country=RU |number=2440916 C1 |title=Самолет интегральной аэродинамической компоновки, Airplane with integral aerodynamic configuration (Sukhoi patent on T-50 configuration) |pubdate=2012-01-27 |url=https://patents.google.com/patent/RU2440916C1/de}}</ref><ref>Sweetman, Bill. "New moves". ''Aviation Week and Space Technology'', 10 August 2013. p. 43.</ref>

The aircraft has a wide [[blended wing body]] fuselage with two widely spaced engines and has all-moving [[Elevator (aeronautics)|horizontal]] and [[Rudder (aircraft)|vertical stabilisers]], with the vertical stabilisers canted for stealth; the trapezoid wings have [[Flap (aeronautics)#Leading edge flap|leading edge flaps]], [[aileron]]s, and [[flaperon]]s. The aircraft incorporates [[Vectoring nozzle|thrust vectoring]] and large [[leading edge root extension]]s that shift the aerodynamic center forward, increasing static instability and maneuverability. These extensions have adjustable [[Leading–edge extension#Leading–edge vortex controller|leading–edge vortex controllers]] (LEVCONs) designed to control the generated vortices and can provide trim and improve high [[angle of attack]] behaviour, including a quick stall recovery if the thrust vectoring system fails.<ref>{{cite patent |country=RU |number=2503584 |title=Маневренный самолет (Maneuverable aircraft) |url=http://russianpatents.com/patent/250/2503584.html}} {{Webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150626122309/http://russianpatents.com/patent/250/2503584.html |date=26 June 2015}}</ref> To [[air brake (aeronautics)|air-brake]], the ailerons deflect up while the flaperons deflect down and the vertical stabilisers toe inward to increase drag.<ref name=AW_T-50_Innovations>{{cite web |url=http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/AW_08_19_2013_p43-605528.xml |last=Sweetman |first=Bill |title=Sukhoi T-50 Shows Flight-Control Innovations |work=Aviation Week |date=19 August 2013 |access-date=16 November 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131020092004/http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=%2Farticle-xml%2FAW_08_19_2013_p43-605528.xml |archive-date=20 October 2013 |url-status=live}}</ref> Although the majority of the structural materials are [[alloy]]s with 40.5–44.5% [[aluminum alloy]]s and 18.6% [[titanium alloy]]s, the aircraft makes extensive use of [[Composite material|composites]], with the material comprising 22–26% of the structural weight and approximately 70% of the outer surface.<ref>Gordon 2021, pp. 312</ref>

Designed from the outset as a multirole aircraft, the Su-57 has substantial internal payload capacity that allows the carriage of multiple large air-to-surface ordnance.<ref name=sukhoit50configpatent/> Weapons are housed in two tandem main [[Bomb bay|weapons bays]] in the large ventral volume between the widely spaced engine [[nacelle]]s and smaller side bays with bulged triangular-section fairings near the wing root. Internal weapons carriage eliminates drag from external stores and enables higher performance compared to external carriage, as well as preserving the stealth shaping.<ref>Lake 2010, pp. 26–33.</ref><ref>Butowski (2021), p. 67</ref>

The high degree of static instability (or [[relaxed stability]]) in both pitch and yaw, advanced KSU-50 [[Aircraft flight control system|flight control system]], and canted thrust [[vectoring nozzles]] make the Su-57 [[Departure resistance|departure-resistant]] and [[supermaneuverability|highly maneuverable]] in all axes and enables the aircraft to perform very high angles of attack maneuvers such as the [[Pugachev's Cobra]] and the [[Tailslide|bell maneuver]], along with doing flat rotations with little altitude loss.<ref name=AW_T-50_Innovations/><ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.businessinsider.sg/interesting-new-video-shows-2-russian-su-57s-landing-at/?r=US&IR=T |title=2 new videos show Russian Su-57s fighters landing at the same time and performing flat spins |website=[[Business Insider]]|date=27 November 2018 |access-date=30 November 2018 |language=en-US|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181130202135/https://www.businessinsider.sg/interesting-new-video-shows-2-russian-su-57s-landing-at/?r=US&IR=T|archive-date=30 November 2018|url-status=live}}</ref> The aerodynamics and engines enable it to achieve speeds of Mach 2 and fly supersonic without afterburners ([[supercruise]]) giving a significant kinematic advantage and extends the effective range of missiles and bombs over previous generations of aircraft.{{refn|The initial maximum speed requirement was Mach 2.35 at high altitude, but this was reduced to Mach 2.15 and then to Mach 2.0 in 2006 order to increase the amount of composites used in the airframe.<ref name=AW_T-50_Innovations/>|group=N}}<ref name="Butowski 2021, p. 27">Butowski (2021), p. 27</ref> Combined with a high fuel load, the fighter has a supersonic range of over {{cvt|1500|km}}, more than twice that of the Su-27.<ref name="AW_T-50_Innovations" /><ref name="AIOct2013">{{cite magazine |last=Butowski |first=Piotr |title=T-50 Turning and Burning over Moscow |pages=79–82 |magazine=Air International |volume=85 |issue=4 October 2013 |location=Stamford, UK |publisher=Key Publishing}}</ref><ref>[http://www.aviaport.ru/digest/2013/05/20/255241.html "Mikhail Pogosyan: T-50 will Provide Reliable Protection Boundaries"] {{Webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141024045431/http://www.aviaport.ru/digest/2013/05/20/255241.html |date=24 October 2014 |datee=24 October 2014}}. ''AviaPort.ru'', 20 May 2013. Retrieved 15 July 2014.</ref> An extendable refueling probe is available to further increase its range.

===Stealth===
The first aircraft in Russian military service to emphasize stealth, the Su-57 employs a variety of methods to reduce its radar signature. Similar to other stealth fighters such as the F-22, the aircraft aligns the planform edges to reduce its [[radar cross-section]] (RCS); the leading and trailing edges of the wings and control surfaces and the [[Serration|serrated]] edges of [[Skin (aeronautics)|skin]] panels are carefully angled to reduce the number of directions the radar waves can be reflected. Weapons are carried internally in weapons bays within the airframe and antennas are recessed from the surface of the skin to preserve the aircraft's stealthy shape, while [[radar absorbent material]] (RAM) coatings absorb radar emissions and reduce the reflection back to the source. The infrared search-and-track sensor housing is turned backwards when not in use and its rear is also treated with RAM.<ref name="stealth patent">{{cite patent |country=RU |number=RU2502643C2 |status=patent |title=Многофункциональный самолет с пониженной радиолокационной заметностью (Multifunctional aircraft with reduced radar signature) |pubdate=27 December 2013 |fdate=30 December 2011 |url=https://findpatent.ru/patent/250/2502643.html}}</ref><ref name="Su-57's stealth features">{{cite web |url=http://www.janes.com/article/32190/pak-fa-stealth-features-patent-published |title=PAK FA stealth features patent published |website=[[Jane's Information Group]] |date=10 January 2014 |access-date=21 July 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141023114435/http://www.janes.com/article/32190/pak-fa-stealth-features-patent-published |archive-date=23 October 2014}}</ref> To mask the significant RCS contribution of the engine face, the walls of the inlet ducts are coated with RAM and the partial [[S-duct|serpentine ducts]] obscure most of the engines’ compressor face and inlet guide-vanes (IGV); the remaining exposed engine face is masked by a slanted blocker grid placed in front of the IGV at a distance of 0.7—1.2 times the diameter of the duct, similar in principle to the method on the [[Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet|Boeing F/A-18E/F]].<ref name="blocker">{{cite patent |country=RU |number=RU2623031C1 |status=patent |title=Воздухозаборник самолета (Aircraft air intake) |pubdate=2017-06-21 |gdate=2017-06-21 |fdate=2016-06-30 |pridate=2016-06-30 |url=https://patents.google.com/patent/RU2623031C1/ru}}</ref> The aircraft canopy is coated with 70–90 nm thick metal oxide layers with enhanced radar wave absorbing to minimize the radar return of the cockpit by 30% and protect the pilot from the impact of ultraviolet and thermal radiation.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://tass.com/defense/1039482 |title=Russia's 5th-generation fighter jet gets advanced stealth coating |agency=[[TASS]] |date=11 January 2019 |access-date=14 January 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190115132452/http://tass.com/defense/1039482 |archive-date=15 January 2019 |url-status=live}}</ref> The production tolerances are significantly tighter than previous Russian fighters in order to improve stealth characteristics.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Hunter|first=Jamie|title=Check Out These Images Of Russia's Second Su-57 Felon Fighter Under Construction|url=https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/35667/check-out-these-images-of-russias-second-su-57-felon-fighter-under-construction|access-date=2020-10-18|website=[[The War Zone (publication)|The War Zone]]|date=12 August 2020 }}</ref>

The combined effect of airframe shape and RAM of the production aircraft is estimated to have reduced the aircraft's RCS to a value thirty times smaller than that of the Su-27.<ref name="Butowski, Piotr 2011, p. 34">Butowski, Piotr. "Russian Supercruiser". Air International, February 2011, p. 34. Stamford, UK: Key Publishing.</ref> Sukhoi's patent for the T-50 stealth features cites an intention to reduce average RCS to approximately 0.1 to 1 m2, compared to the Su-27's RCS of approximately 10 to 15 m2.<ref name="Su-57's stealth features" /><ref>{{Cite patent |country=RU |number=2502643 |title=Многофункциональный самолет с пониженной радиолокационной заметностью (Multifunctional aircraft with reduced radar signature) |url=https://findpatent.ru/patent/250/2502643.html}}</ref> The Su-57's design emphasizes frontal stealth, with RCS-reducing features most apparent in the forward hemisphere; the shaping of the aft fuselage is less optimized for radar stealth compared to American stealth designs such as the F-22 and F-35, likely as a result of cost reduction as well as the Russian doctrine of operating the aircraft within the umbrella of friendly integrated [[air defense system]]s.<ref name="AW_T-50_Innovations" /> As with other stealth fighters, the Su-57's low observability measures are chiefly effective against [[high-frequency]] (between 3 and 30 [[Gigahertz|GHz]]) radars, usually found on other aircraft. The effects of [[Rayleigh scattering]] and resonance mean that [[low-frequency radar]]s, employed by [[weather radar]]s and [[early-warning radar]]s are more likely to detect the Su-57 due to its size. Such radars are also large, susceptible to [[clutter (radar)|clutter]] and are less precise.<ref>Plopsky, Guy and Fabrizio Bozzato. [https://thediplomat.com/2014/08/the-f-35-vs-the-vhf-threat/ "The F-35 vs. The VHF Threat"] {{Webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141226203753/https://thediplomat.com/2014/08/the-f-35-vs-the-vhf-threat/ |date=26 December 2014}}. ''The Diplomat'', 21 August 2014.</ref><ref>Ralston, J; Heagy, J; et al. [http://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a359931.pdf "Environmental/Noise Effects on UHF/VHF UWB SAR"] {{Webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150102110548/http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a359931.pdf |date=2 January 2015}}. ''dtic.mil'', September 1998. Retrieved 2 January 2015.</ref>

===Engines===
{{main|Saturn AL-31|Saturn izdeliye 30}}

The Su-57 is powered by a pair of NPO Lyulka-Saturn [[Saturn AL-31#AL-41F1 (izdeliye 117)|''izdeliye'' 117]], or AL-41F1, augmented turbofans.<ref name="NPO Saturn">[http://www.npo-saturn.ru/?act=gm_look&id=1264762617 "NPO."] {{Webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100201002003/http://www.npo-saturn.ru/?act=gm_look&id=1264762617 |date=1 February 2010}} ''Saturn Press Release'', 29 January 2010. Retrieved 26 January 2011.</ref> The engine is a highly improved and uprated variant of the [[Saturn AL-31|AL-31]] and produces 9 tonnes (88.3 [[Newton (unit)#Kilonewtons|kN]], 19,840 [[Pound (force)|lbf]]) of dry thrust, 14.5 tonnes (142.2 kN, 31,970 lbf) of thrust in afterburner, and 15 tonnes (147.1 kN, 33,070 lbf) of thrust in "special" emergency power. The engines have full authority digital engine control ([[FADEC]]) and are integrated into the flight control system to facilitate maneuverability and handling.<ref>Butowski (2021), p. 73</ref><ref name=AW_T-50_Innovations/> The AL-41F1 is closely related to the Lyulka-Saturn ''izdeliye'' 117S engine, or AL-41F1S, used by the Su-35S, with the latter's separate engine control system being the key difference.<ref name="AI_Oct2019">{{cite magazine |last=Butowski |first=Piotr |date=October 2019 |title=The Final Flanker; Russian Fifth-Gen |url=https://airinternational.keypublishing.com/the-magazine/view-issue/?issueID=7800 |magazine=Air International |location=London |publisher=Key Publishing |access-date=12 April 2020 }}</ref>

The aircraft employs [[thrust vectoring|thrust vector control]] (TVC) where the vectoring nozzles' rotational axes are each canted at an angle, similar to the nozzle arrangement first employed on the [[Sukhoi Su-30MKI|Su-30MKI]] and also used on Su-35S. The nozzles themselves vector in only one plane; the canting allows roll and yaw moments by vectoring each nozzle differentially, thus enabling the aircraft to produce thrust vectoring moments about all three aircraft axes, [[Flight dynamics|pitch, yaw and roll]]. The engine inlet incorporates variable [[intake ramp]]s for supersonic efficiency and retractable mesh screens to prevent engine damage from [[foreign object damage|foreign object debris]] ingestion especially when operating in short, austere runways.<ref name=AW_T-50_Innovations/> In 2014, the Indian Air Force openly expressed concerns over the reliability and performance of the AL-41F1; during the 2011 [[MAKS (air show)|Moscow Air Show]] (MAKS-2011), a Su-57 suffered a [[compressor stall]] that forced the aircraft to abort takeoff.<ref>Shukla, Ajai. [http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/russia-can-t-deliver-on-fifth-generation-fighter-aircraft-iaf-114012100059_1.html "Russia can't deliver on Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft: IAF".] {{Webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141021141540/http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/russia-can-t-deliver-on-fifth-generation-fighter-aircraft-iaf-114012100059_1.html |date=21 October 2014}} ''business-standard.com'', 21 January 2014.</ref>

The planned Su-57M will be equipped with a new engine from NPO Saturn in the mid-2020s under the development designation ''izdeliye'' 30. The engine is designed with an estimated thrust of 11 tonnes (107.9 kN, 24,300 lbf) dry and 17.5 tonnes (171.7 kN, 38,600 lbf) in afterburner. In addition to improved performance, reliability, and costs compared to the AL-41F1, the new powerplant will also reduce the aircraft's radar and infrared signature with glass-fibre plastic IGVs and a new nozzle with serrated flaps.<ref>{{cite web |last=Butowski |first=Piotr |url=https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/future-su-57-next-generation-engine-uncertain |title=Future Of Su-57 Next-Generation Engine Uncertain |work=Aviation Week |date=6 January 2020}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://defense-update.com/20171217_su-57_production-2.html |title=Russian Air Force to Receive the First Production Su-57 in 2018 – Defense Update |date=17 December 2017 |website=Defense-update.com |access-date=18 December 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171221004346/http://defense-update.com/20171217_su-57_production-2.html |archive-date=21 December 2017 |url-status=live}}</ref>

In 2023, it was reported that [[UEC Saturn]] is planning a "sixth-generation" engine design for the Su-57.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2022-05-25 |title=ОКБ им. А. Люльки и РАН договорились о работах по полноразмерному детонационному двигателю |url=https://new.ras.ru/activities/news/okb-im-a-lyulki-i-ran-dogovorilis-o-rabotakh-po-polnorazmernomu-detonatsionnomu-dvigatelyu/ |access-date=2023-07-03 |website=Российская академия наук |language=ru}}</ref>

===Armament===
The Su-57 has two tandem main internal weapon bays each approximately {{convert|4.4|m|ft|sigfig=3|abbr=on}} long and {{convert|0.9|m|ft|abbr=on}} wide and two side weapon bays with triangular section fairings under the fuselage near the wing root.<ref>{{cite patent |country=RU |number=2614871 |title=Грузовой отсек самолета (Aircraft cargo hold) |pubdate=24 June 2015 |gdate=10 January 2017 |url=https://findpatent.ru/patent/261/2614871.html}}</ref> The main bays have two types of ejection launchers made by [[Vympel NPO|Vympel]], the UVKU-50L for missiles weighing up to {{convert|300|kg|lb|abbr=on}}, and the UVKU-50U for ordnance weighing up to {{convert|700|kg|lb|abbr=on}}; the side bays use the VPU-50 launch rails.<ref name="Butowski, Piotr 2007"/><ref name="JanesMissilesRockets"/>

For air-to-air combat, the Su-57 carries four [[beyond-visual-range missile]]s in its two main weapons bays and two short-range missiles in the side bays.<ref>[http://www.i-mash.ru/news/nov_otrasl/44702-pak-fa-ukomplektujut-cifrovymi-raketami.html "PAK FA will complement digital missiles"] {{Webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141022020506/http://www.i-mash.ru/news/nov_otrasl/44702-pak-fa-ukomplektujut-cifrovymi-raketami.html |date=22 October 2014}}. ''Machine Resource'' i-mash.ru (RU), 3 December 2013. Retrieved 4 April 2014.</ref> The primary medium-range missile is the active radar-homing [[R-77|R-77M]] (''izdeliye'' 180), an upgraded R-77 variant with AESA seeker, dual-pulse motor, and conventional rear fins.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/the-su-57-is-only-as-dangerous-as-its-best-missile-why-the-k-77-will-be-a-game-changer-for-the-russian-air-force|title=The Su-57 is Only as Dangerous as its Best Missile; Why the K-77 Will be a Game Changer for the Russian Air Force|last=Tahar|first=Abraham Ait|date=26 May 2018|website=Military Watch Magazine|access-date=27 August 2019}}</ref> The short-range missile is the infrared-homing ("heat seeking") [[R-73 (missile)|R-74M2]] (''izdeliye'' 760), an upgraded R-74 variant with reduced cross-section for internal carriage.<ref name="JanesMissilesRockets">"Vympel plans to develop air-to-air missiles for Russia's PAK FA fighter". ''Jane's Missiles and Rockets''. 19 May 2006</ref><ref>Barrie, Douglas and Pyadushkin, Maxim. "R-77, R-73 Missile Upgrades Emerge". ''[[Aviation Week]]''. 13 August 2009</ref> A clean-sheet design short-range missile designated K-MD (''izdeliye'' 300) is being developed to eventually replace the R-74M2.<ref name="Butowski, Piotr 2007">Butowski, Piotr. ''Russia and CIS Observer''. 17 June 2007.</ref> For longer ranged applications, the ''izdeliye'' 810 missile, a further development of the [[R-37 (missile)|R-37M]], can be carried with two in each main weapons bay.{{Failed verification|date=July 2023}}<ref name="R-37_thediplomat">{{cite news |url=https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/report-russia-has-developed-prototype-of-air-to-ground-hypersonic-missile-for-su-57/ |title=Report: Russia Has Developed Prototype of Air-to-Ground Hypersonic Missile for Su-57 |agency=[[The Diplomat]] |date=25 February 2020 |access-date=13 March 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200305093800/https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/report-russia-has-developed-prototype-of-air-to-ground-hypersonic-missile-for-su-57/ |archive-date=5 March 2020 |url-status=live}}</ref>

For striking surface targets, the aircraft can carry the {{convert|250|kg|lb|abbr=on}} KAB-250 or {{convert|500|kg|lb|abbr=on}} KAB-500 [[Precision-guided munition|precision guided bombs]] in its main bays. Internal weapons also include the [[Kh-38M]] air-to-ground missile, [[Kh-35]]U (AS-20 "Kayak") anti-ship missile, [[Kh-58]]UShK (AS-11 "Kilter") [[anti-radiation missile]], and [[Kh-59]]MK2 cruise missile.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://en.ria.ru/mlitary_news/20120131/171043005.html |title=Russia to Field Air-Launched Missiles for T-50 by 2014 |agency=RIA Novosti |date=31 January 2012 |access-date=13 February 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120204111519/http://en.ria.ru/mlitary_news/20120131/171043005.html |archive-date=4 February 2012 |url-status=live}}</ref> For missions that do not require stealth, the Su-57 can carry stores on its six external hardpoints which can use most Russian tactical fighter weapons. New hypersonic missile with characteristics similar to the [[Kh-47M2 Kinzhal]] ALBM is also being developed for the Su-57. The missile is to have intra-body accommodation and smaller dimensions to allow it to be carried inside the Su-57's main bays.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://bmpd.livejournal.com/3444142.html |title=Истребитель пятого поколения Су-57 получит на вооружение гиперзвуковую ракету |website=bmpd.livejournal.com|date=7 December 2018 |access-date=27 December 2018}}</ref>

The aircraft has a 9A1-4071K ([[Gryazev-Shipunov GSh-30-1|GSh-30-1]]) 30 mm [[autocannon]] with 150 cartridges mounted internally near the right LEVCON root. The weapon has an effective range of {{convert|800|m|yd|abbr=on}} against aerial targets and {{convert|1800|m|yd|abbr=on}} against surface targets.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://vpk.name/news/125024_rossiiskii_samolet_pyatogo_pokoleniya_t50_poluchit_uluchshennuyu_aviapushku.html |title=Российский самолет пятого поколения Т-50 получит улучшенную авиапушку |work=vpk.name |access-date=1 April 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150407032017/http://vpk.name/news/125024_rossiiskii_samolet_pyatogo_pokoleniya_t50_poluchit_uluchshennuyu_aviapushku.html |archive-date=7 April 2015 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=https://theaviationist.com/2016/09/18/video-of-live-fire-tests-of-the-russian-t-50-stealth-fighters-30-mm-gun-appears-online/ |title=Video of live fire tests of the Russian T-50 stealth fighter's 30 mm gun appears online |date=18 September 2016 |work=The Aviationist |access-date=30 November 2018 |language=en-US |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181130155143/https://theaviationist.com/2016/09/18/video-of-live-fire-tests-of-the-russian-t-50-stealth-fighters-30-mm-gun-appears-online/ |archive-date=30 November 2018 |url-status=live}}</ref>

===Cockpit===
The Su-57 has a [[glass cockpit]] with no analogue gauges; information is displayed on two {{convert|38|cm|in|abbr=on}} main multi-functional [[Liquid-crystal display|LCD]] displays similar to the arrangement of the Su-35S. Supplementing the primary display is a smaller multi-functional display and digital control panel. The cockpit has a wide-angle (30° by 22°) [[head-up display]] (HUD). Primary controls are the [[joystick]] and a pair of throttles, with all major functions controlled with hands on throttle and stick ([[HOTAS]]).<ref name=butowski2021p76>Butowski (2021), p. 76</ref><ref>{{cite web |last=Trimble |first=Stephen |url=http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/the-dewline/2010/03/sukhoi-reveals-t-50-cockpit-la/ |title=Sukhoi reveals T-50 cockpit layout and static airframe |work=FlightGlobal |date=2 March 2010 |access-date=28 March 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131215084254/http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/the-dewline/2010/03/sukhoi-reveals-t-50-cockpit-la/ |archive-date=15 December 2013 |url-status=live}}</ref> The aircraft uses a two-piece [[Aircraft canopy|canopy]], with the aft section sliding forward and locking into place. The canopy is treated with metallized coatings to reduce the aircraft's radar signature.{{cn|date=August 2023}} The Su-57 integrated computer system at Chip "1890VM8Ya" — FGU FSC NIISI (in Russian).{{clarify|Make this a complete and coherent sentence|date=August 2023}}<ref>[https://uacrussia.livejournal.com/61632.html {{lang|ru|Многоядерный Т-50: на новом российском истребителе ИМА БК заменила «Багет»}}] Russian Developers noted that "1890VM8Ya" microprocessor used in the CPU module on TSP16 Sukhoi Su-57 "fifth-generation jet fighter" and Su-35 "4++ generation jet fighter".</ref><ref>[http://niisi.tech/?page_id=127 Chip "1890VM8Ya" — FGU FSC NIISI] Russian Semiconductor Foundry Company Group provides contract manufacturing services according to technological standards from 250nm to 65 nm with a focus on the following technologies.</ref><ref>[https://www.niisi.ru/1890ВМ8Я.pdf {{lang|ru|1890ВМ8Я - фгу фнц нииси ран}}] Russian 2-core 64-bit superscalar microprocessor with architecture KOMDIV64 with built-in system and peripheral controllers, second-level cache memory and additional functions for digital signal processing. Manufacturing technology of 65 nm CMOS. Serial production since 2016.</ref>

The aircraft uses the [[NPP Zvezda]] [[NPP Zvezda K-36|K-36D-5]] ejection seat and the SOZhE-50 [[Life support (aviation)|life support system]], which comprises the [[g suit|anti-g]] and oxygen generating system. The pilot is equipped with a ZSh-10B helmet which mounts the NSTsI-50 digital display system, which enhances pilot situational awareness through pupil tracking and allows engagement of targets at high angles off-boresight. The {{convert|30|kg|lb|abbr=on}} oxygen generating system provides the pilot with unlimited oxygen supply.<ref>[http://www.ruaviation.com/news/2013/7/19/1822/ "PAK FA fighter was fitted with advanced oxygen supply system".] {{Webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141023113606/http://www.ruaviation.com/news/2013/7/19/1822/ |date=23 October 2014}}, ''RuAviation.com'', 19 July 2013</ref> The life support system enables pilots to perform 9-g maneuvers for up to 30 seconds at a time, while the ejection seat and the new PPK-7 [[flight suit]] allows safe ejection at altitudes from 0 to {{cvt|20000|m}} and instrument airspeeds from 0 to {{cvt|1300|km/h|mph}}; the system also includes a survival kit to assist the pilot after ejection.<ref name=butowski2021p76/><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.zvezda-npp.ru/ru/node/118 |title=Катапультное кресло К-36Д-5 |language=ru |work=NPP Zvezda}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.zvezda-npp.ru/ru/node/93 |title=Противоперегрузочный костюм "ППК-7" |language=ru |work=NPP Zvezda}}</ref>

===Avionics===
[[File:PAK FA AESA maks2009.jpg|thumb|left|N036-1-01 X-band AESA radar]]

One of the main technical goals of the PAK FA programme is to achieve total integration of avionics systems, or sensor fusion, increase the pilot's situational awareness and reduce workload. Integration of the Su-57's onboard systems is controlled by an IUS ({{lang-ru|link=no|ИУС}}, {{lang-ru|link=no|label=short for|Информационно-управляющая система||Information Management System}}), with its computer system developed by GRPZ from [[Ryazan]]. The main avionics systems are the ''Sh-121'' ({{lang-ru|link=no|Ш-121}}) multifunctional integrated radio electronic system (MIRES) and the ''101KS "Atoll"'' ({{lang-ru|link=no|101КС "Атолл"}}) electro-optical system.<ref name=butowski2021pp78-82>Butowski 2021, pp. 78–82</ref> In a departure from prior Sukhoi aircraft, the IUS systems integration was performed by Sukhoi itself rather than RPKB of Ramenskoye. The integrated avionics suite, called IMA BK ({{lang-ru|link=no|ИМА БК}}, {{lang-ru|link=no|label=short for|Интегрированной модульной авионики боевых комплексов||Integrated Modular Avionics Combat Systems}}), uses fibre optic channels and runs on over 4 million [[Source lines of code|lines of code]].<ref name=":5">{{cite news |url=https://www.aviationtoday.com/2018/11/23/russia-completes-testing-su-57-avionics-complex/ |title=Russia Completes Testing of Su-57 Avionics 'Complex' – Avionics |date=23 November 2018 |work=Avionics |access-date=30 November 2018 |language=en-US |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181130155120/https://www.aviationtoday.com/2018/11/23/russia-completes-testing-su-57-avionics-complex/ |archive-date=30 November 2018 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=":7">{{cite web |url=http://www.airrecognition.com/index.php/archive-world-worldwide-news-air-force-aviation-aerospace-air-military-defence-industry/global-defense-security-news/global-news-2017/april/3405-sukhoi-starts-testing-new-ima-bk-fms-on-russia-s-pak-fa-fighter.html |title=Sukhoi starts testing new IMA BK FMS on Russia's PAK FA fighter |website=airrecognition.com |language=en-gb |access-date=30 November 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181130113115/http://www.airrecognition.com/index.php/archive-world-worldwide-news-air-force-aviation-aerospace-air-military-defence-industry/global-defense-security-news/global-news-2017/april/3405-sukhoi-starts-testing-new-ima-bk-fms-on-russia-s-pak-fa-fighter.html |archive-date=30 November 2018 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="butowski2021p76"/>

[[File:MAKS Airshow 2013 (Ramenskoye Airport, Russia) (523-37).jpg|thumb|right|N036B-1-01 X-band AESA side-looking radar]]
[[File:AESA L NIIP maks2009.jpg|thumb|right|N036L-1-01 L-band array]]
The Sh-121 consists of the [[Byelka (radar)|N036 Byelka]] radar system and L402 Himalayas [[electronic countermeasures]] (ECM) system. Developed by Tikhomirov NIIP Institute, the N036 consists of the main nose-mounted N036-1-01 [[X band]] active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, or in Russian nomenclature, active [[Phased array|phased array radar]] ({{lang-ru |link=no|АФАР|AFAR}}, {{lang-ru|link=no|label=short for|Активная фазированная антенная решётка}}), with 1,514 [[transceiver|T/R modules]] and two [[Side looking airborne radar|side-looking]] N036B-1-01 X-band AESA radars with 404 T/R modules embedded in the cheeks of the forward fuselage for increased angular coverage.<ref>Butowski (2021), pp. 78–79</ref> The nose antenna is tilted backwards for stealth. Moreover, the side-looking radar could enable the Su-57 to employ beaming tactics while still able to guide its own missile.<ref name=":8" /> The suite also has two N036L-1-01 [[L band]] transceivers on the wing's leading edge flaps that are not only used to handle the N036Sh Pokosnik (Reaper) [[Identification friend or foe|friend-or-foe identification]] system but also for [[electronic warfare]] purposes. Processing of the X- and L-band signals by the N036YeVS and GRPZ Solo-21 computers enable the system's information to be significantly enhanced.<ref name=butowski2021pp78-82/> The L402 Himalayas ECM suite made by the [[Concern Radio-Electronic Technologies#Structure|Kaluga Research Radio Engineering Institute]] uses both its own arrays and the N036 radar system, with one of its arrays mounted in the dorsal sting between the two engines.<ref name="ria.ru">{{cite news |url=http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20140424/1005305871.html |trans-title=The newest Russian fighter got one of the key elements |title=Новейший российский истребитель получил один из ключевых элементов |agency=RIA Novosti |date=24 April 2013 |access-date=29 April 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140428131143/http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20140424/1005305871.html |archive-date=28 April 2014 |url-status=live}}</ref> Redundant radio telephone communication and encrypted data exchange among various aircraft and also command centers (ground and sea-based and airborne) are provided by the S-111 system, developed by [[Production Corporation Polyot|Polyot]].<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.ruaviation.com/news/2017/8/16/9491/?h |title=Certification tests of the communication system for Su-57 will be completed this year - News - Russian Aviation |website=ruaviation.com |access-date=30 January 2019}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://tass.com/defense/960570 |title=Communication equipment for Sukhoi-57 jet to be completed in 2017 |agency=TASS |access-date=18 December 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171230143550/http://tass.com/defense/960570 |archive-date=30 December 2017 |url-status=live}}</ref>

[[File:MAKS2015part8-49.jpg|thumb|left|101KS-O DIRCM turret]]
The [[Urals Optical-Mechanical Plant|UOMZ]] 101KS "Atoll" electro-optical system consisted of the 101KS-V [[infrared search and track]] (IRST), 101KS-O directional infrared counter measures ([[DIRCM]]), 101KS-U [[ultraviolet]] [[Missile Approach Warning|missile approach warning sensors]] (MAWS), 101KS-P thermal imager for low altitude flight and landing, and 101KS-N navigation and [[targeting pod]].<ref name=":9">{{Cite web |url=https://globaldefencewatch.com/sukhoi-57s-targetting-pod-101ks-n-spotted/ |title=Sukhoi-57's Targetting Pod 101KS-N Spotted |website=Global Defence Watch |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181203163824/https://globaldefencewatch.com/sukhoi-57s-targetting-pod-101ks-n-spotted/ |archive-date=3 December 2018 |url-status=dead}}</ref> The IRST turret is mounted on the starboard side in front of the cockpit and can track multiple targets simultaneously. When not in use, the receiver is turned backwards and its rear is treated with RAM to preserve stealth. Additionally, the Su-57 is the first fighter to mount a DIRCM system, with one turret mounted behind the canopy and another mounted under the cockpit.<ref name=":8">{{cite news |url=http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/20434/no-the-su-57-isnt-junk-six-features-we-like-on-russias-new-fighter |title=No, The Su-57 Isn't 'Junk:' Six Features We like on Russia's New Fighter |date= April 30, 2018 |last=Rogoway |first=Tyler |access-date=30 November 2018 |language=en-US |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181130202147/http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/20434/no-the-su-57-isnt-junk-six-features-we-like-on-russias-new-fighter |archive-date=30 November 2018 |url-status=live |website=[[The War Zone (publication)|The War Zone]]}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |url=http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/17136/su-30s-acted-as-infrared-heat-traps-for-putins-arrival-in-syria-aboard-a-tu-214pu |title=Su-30s Acted As Infrared "Heat Traps" For Putin's Arrival in Syria Aboard A Tu-214PU |last=Rogoway |first=Tyler |access-date=3 December 2018 |language=en-US |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181203104033/http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/17136/su-30s-acted-as-infrared-heat-traps-for-putins-arrival-in-syria-aboard-a-tu-214pu |archive-date=3 December 2018 |url-status=live |website=[[The War Zone (publication)|The War Zone]]}}</ref> The aircraft is capable of deploying countermeasures such as flares and radar decoys, as well as single-use programmable ECM transmitters. The dispensers for these countermeasures are mounted in the tail boom between the engines.<ref name=butowski2021p83>Butowski (2021), p. 83</ref>

For in-flight navigation, the Su-57 uses the BINS-SP2M [[inertial navigation]] system developed by [[Concern Radio-Electronic Technologies]] (KRET). The system can also integrate with [[GLONASS]], and is controlled by the IVS-50 computing system.<ref name=butowski2021p83/><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.defenseworld.net/news/11616/Sukhoi_T_50_Aircraft_To_Get_New_Navigation_System|title=Sukhoi T-50 Aircraft To Get New Navigation System|website= defenseworld.net|access-date=2019-12-01}}</ref> In 2016, KRET announced it is developing a multifunctional video processing system called "Okhotnik" (Hunter) to increase the Su-57's target detection range as well as to improve automatic detection and tracking of targets.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://ria.ru/20160729/1473173131.html |title=КРЭТ разрабатывает новейшую систему обнаружения целей для ПАК ФА |agency=RIA Novosti |date=29 July 2016 |access-date=21 February 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190221113508/https://ria.ru/20160729/1473173131.html |archive-date=21 February 2019 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://airrecognition.com/index.php/archive-world-worldwide-news-air-force-aviation-aerospace-air-military-defence-industry/global-defense-security-news/global-news-2016/august/2801-kret-develops-new-okhotnik-target-detection-system-for-russia-s-pak-fa-fighter-jet.html |title=KRET develops new Okhotnik target detection system for Russia's PAK FA fighter jet |website=airrecognition.com |date=1 August 2016 |access-date=21 February 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190221165629/http://airrecognition.com/index.php/archive-world-worldwide-news-air-force-aviation-aerospace-air-military-defence-industry/global-defense-security-news/global-news-2016/august/2801-kret-develops-new-okhotnik-target-detection-system-for-russia-s-pak-fa-fighter-jet.html |archive-date=21 February 2019 |url-status=live}}</ref> A monitoring system allows real-time assessment of the aircraft's condition and predict the remaining 'life' of the composite parts of the aircraft by transmitting information through optical fibers, with sensitivity to mechanical influences, woven into the structure. This allows a more efficient maintenance and repair process.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://ria.ru/arms/20170711/1498299964.html |title=В России разработали "нервную систему" для самолетов будущего |date=11 July 2017 |agency=RIA Novosti |access-date=8 December 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171208175022/https://ria.ru/arms/20170711/1498299964.html |archive-date=8 December 2017 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://weaponews.com/news/11492-fpi-presented-a-model-of-the-nervous-system-of-the-future-fighter.html |title=FPI presented a model of the 'nervous system' of the future fighter |website=Weaponews.com |access-date=8 December 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171208175254/http://weaponews.com/news/11492-fpi-presented-a-model-of-the-nervous-system-of-the-future-fighter.html |archive-date=8 December 2017 |url-status=live}}</ref> The Su-57 could also serve as a testbed for advanced AI and man-unmanned teaming technologies intended for use in a future [[Sixth-generation jet fighter#Russia|sixth-generation fighter]] program. The aircraft has also tested autonomous flight without pilot input.<ref name="RIA_unmanned_1">{{cite news |url=https://ria.ru/20200516/1571532127.html |title=Источник: Су-57 отрабатывает беспилотный режим в ходе испытаний |agency=[[RIA Novosti]] |date=16 May 2020 |access-date=16 May 2020 |language=ru }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Russia's Su-57 plane tests onboard systems for 6th-generation fighter jet — source|url=https://tass.com/defense/1013337/amp|access-date=2020-06-29|agency=TASS}}</ref>

==Operational history==

=== Testing and trials ===
[[File:Sukhoi Design Bureau, 054, Sukhoi Su-57 (49581306132).jpg|thumb|Su-57 flying upside down]]

Even before the first flight of the T-50 prototype, several subsystems were tested on other aircraft for validation and risk reduction; an Su-27M was used to test the AL-41F1 engine on 21 January 2010, while another tested the KSU-50 flight control system.<ref>Butowski (2021), p. 43</ref> The T-50 prototype conducted its first high speed taxi run on 21 January 2010 and had its maiden flight several days later on 29 January 2010.<ref name="first_flight"/> First supersonic flight occurred on 14 March 2011 at a test range near Komsomolsk-on-Amur.<ref name= "Butowski 2021, p. 27"/>

The Su-57 tests consisted of preliminary trials PI ({{lang-ru|link=no|ПИ}}, {{lang-ru|link=no|label=short for|Предварительные испытания}}) conducted by Sukhoi at the [[Gromov Flight Research Institute]] (LII, {{lang-ru|link=no|ЛИИ}}) at [[Zhukovsky, Moscow Oblast|Zhukovsky]], as well as two stages of joint state trials GSI ({{lang-ru|link=no|ГСИ}}, {{lang-ru|link=no|label= short for|Государственные совместные испытания}}) conducted by the Ministry of Defence at the [[929th State Flight Test Centre named for V. P. Chkalov|929th State Flight Test Centre]] (GLITs, {{lang-ru|ГЛИЦ}}) at [[Akhtubinsk]].<ref name= "RuAviation1">{{cite web |url= http://www.ruaviation.com/news/2014/5/28/2343/ |title= Russian air forces started the state testing of T-50 fighter | work = Russian Aviation |access-date=28 May 2014 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20140602201205/http://www.ruaviation.com/news/2014/5/28/2343/ |archive-date=2 June 2014 |url-status=live}}</ref> The completion of GSI-1 resulted in the acceptance of the aircraft's [[airworthiness]], and the completion of GSI-2, which tests the mission systems and armaments, clears the Su-57 for operational service. The preliminary trials and state trials occurred with some overlap with each other.<ref name= Butowski2021pp44-46>Butowski (2021), pp. 44–46</ref>

Early flight tests revealed that the initial T-50 design had problems with structural strength and fatigue; when the first two prototypes were showcased publicly in MAKS-2011, the airframes cracked despite flying with a restrictive 5–''g'' limit, which necessitated grounding and structural reinforcing for over a year as well as a “second stage” structural redesign.<ref name= butowski2021p44/> Of the ten flying and three non-flying T-50 prototypes, the three non-flying prototypes tested static flight loads, one each for "first stage" and "second stage" structures, and avionics integration. The first two flying prototypes tested flight characteristics and basic mechanical systems, and thus had no mission systems. Testing of mission systems such as the radar and electronic warfare suite began from the third prototype onwards, with each subsequent aircraft having slight variations in the arrangement of avionics and sensor systems.<ref name=":14">{{Cite web |url=http://aviationweek.com/awin/three-more-sukhoi-t-50-prototypes-fly-next-12-months |title=Three More Sukhoi T-50 Prototypes To Fly in Next 12 Months|last=Komarov|first=Alexey|date=8 March 2010 |website=Aviation Week |access-date=30 January 2019}}</ref><ref>[https://archive.today/20130121083052/http://www.defpro.com/news/details/38365/?SID=6359fad858f10a6e854567fa5c99fe96 "Sukhoi Begins Testing Onboard Radar System for T-50 Aircraft"]. ''Sukhoi Company'', 8 August 2012.</ref><ref>Karnozov, Vladimir. [http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/ain-defense-perspective/2012-08-31/sukhoi-t-50-moves-radar-flight-refueling-tests "Sukhoi T-50 Moves to Radar, In-flight Refueling Tests"] {{Webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140914115124/http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/ain-defense-perspective/2012-08-31/sukhoi-t-50-moves-radar-flight-refueling-tests |date=14 September 2014}}. ''Aviation International News'', 31 August 2012.</ref> The final pre-production aircraft were equipped with full mission systems and tested the overall integrated avionics.<ref name=":6">{{cite news |url=https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20170808/1500000200.html |title=Эволюция ПАК ФА. Как менялся российский истребитель пятого поколения |date=8 August 2017 |work=РИА Новости |access-date=30 November 2018 |language=ru |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170811225754/https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20170808/1500000200.html |archive-date=11 August 2017 |url-status=live}}</ref>

By February 2014, the first phase of preliminary trials, PI-1, had concluded;{{refn|Conclusion of PI-1 in February 2014 saw envelope expansion to Mach 1.7, instrument airspeed of {{convert|1000|km/h|mph|abbr=on}}, ceiling of {{cvt|14000|m|ft}}, and ''g''-load of 6.5.|group=N}} in the same month, the 929th GLITs received its first T-50 at Akhtubinsk for further testing and GSI state trials.<ref>Gordon 2021, pp. 245–47</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20140221/187752685/Russian-Air-Force-Receives-New-Stealth-Fighter-Prototype-.html |title=Russian Air Force Receives New Stealth Fighter Prototype |date=21 February 2014 |agency=RIA Novosti |access-date=21 February 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140222204751/http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20140221/187752685/Russian-Air-Force-Receives-New-Stealth-Fighter-Prototype-.html |archive-date=22 February 2014 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite press release |url=http://www.sukhoi.org/eng/news/company/?id=5386 |title=Т-50-2 fighter aircraft made the flight to Akhtubinsk |website=Sukhoi.org |date=21 February 2014 |access-date=5 March 2014 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140427020021/http://www.sukhoi.org/eng/news/company/?id=5386 |archive-date=27 April 2014}}</ref> However, severe issues were discovered during PI-1; in addition to the structural issues, the aircraft suffered from engine problems, including the AL-41F1 compressor stall during the MAKS-2011 airshow.<ref name=Butowski2021pp44-46/><ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14564311 |title=Russia shows off Sukhoi T-50 stealth fighter |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180405154127/http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14564311 |archive-date=5 April 2018 |work=BBC News |date=17 August 2011}}</ref> In June 2014, the fifth prototype was severely damaged by an in-flight fire and written off, and an incomplete "first stage" airframe was finished using parts salvaged from the fifth prototype.<ref name=sixthprototype group=N/> Both preliminary and state trials were delayed by the fire and the structural redesign; the second phase of preliminary trials, PI-2, ran from 2014 to 2019 and mainly used structurally reinforced "first stage" aircraft while GSI-1 was halted until 2016 in order to wait for the updated "second stage" airframes. Armament trials were also delayed, with external weapon trials starting in May 2014 and internal trials starting in March 2016.<ref name="thedrive_missile">{{cite web|url=https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/32742/this-is-a-video-clip-of-an-su-57-firing-a-missile-from-its-side-weapon-bay-or-is-it |title=This Is The First Video Of An Su-57 Firing A Missile From Its Side Weapon Bay, Or Is It? |website=[[The War Zone (publication)|The War Zone]] |date=25 March 2020 |access-date= 26 March 2020}}</ref><ref>Butowski (2021), p. 86</ref> GSI-1 was finished on 8 February 2018 with formal signing in May 2018.<ref name=":18">{{cite web |url=http://tass.com/defense/988976 |title=Russia's defense ministry to sign contract for 12 Su-57 fighter jets |agency=[[TASS]] |date=8 February 2018 |access-date=24 February 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180225064852/http://tass.com/defense/988976 |archive-date=25 February 2018 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Two aircraft on order" /> After more than 3,500 flights, GSI-2 was planned to be completed by 2019, but this was pushed to 2020, partly because of the crash of the first production aircraft in December 2019.<ref name=Butowski2021pp44-46/><ref>{{cite news|url=https://rg.ru/2020/03/30/stali-izvestny-podrobnosti-ispytanij-su-57.html|title=Стали известны подробности испытаний Су-57|publisher=[[Rossiyskaya Gazeta]]|date=30 March 2020|access-date=30 March 2020}}</ref>

[[File:Sukhoi Su-57 bn058 Kubinka 2020.jpg|thumb|left|Su-57 solo display at ARMY-2020 forum]]
As the Su-57 is gradually being inducted into Russian military service, Sukhoi is testing upgrades for the improved Su-57M variant. First flight of the ''izdeliye'' 30 engine occurred on 5 December 2017 with the second prototype (T-50-2, [[Bort number|bort no.]] 052).<ref>{{cite web |url=http://tass.com/defense/979265 |title=Russia's Su-57 fifth-generation fighter makes first flight with new engine |agency=TASS |access-date=6 December 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171206215954/http://tass.com/defense/979265 |archive-date=6 December 2017 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="first_su57_with_new_prod">{{cite web |url=https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/video-russia-flies-first-su-57-fitted-with-new-prod-443899/ |title=VIDEO: Russia flies first Su-57 fitted with new Product 30 engine |date=5 December 2017 |website=FlightGlobal |access-date=8 December 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171208174913/https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/video-russia-flies-first-su-57-fitted-with-new-prod-443899/ |archive-date=8 December 2017 |url-status=live}}</ref> Prototypes were also used for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) teaming tests with the [[Sukhoi S-70 Okhotnik-B|Okhotnik]] UCAV, with a video of flight tests released by the Ministry of Defence on 27 September 2019.<ref name=Janes_Okhotnik_1st_flt>{{cite web|url=https://www.janes.com/article/91559/russia-s-okhotnik-uav-makes-first-flight-with-su-57|title=Russia's Okhotnik UAV makes first flight with Su-57|website=janes.com|date=27 September 2019|access-date=27 September 2019}}</ref> On 28 June 2020, TASS, with reference to anonymous sources within the military-industrial complex, reported that a 'swarm' teaming experiment had been conducted with a group of Su-35s and an Su-57 acting as a [[command and control]] aircraft. The networked information exchange significantly increases the efficiency of combat missions. Reportedly, the experiment was conducted in "real combat conditions".<ref>{{Cite web|title=Russian Su-57 Jet Controls Su-35 Aircraft 'Swarm' in Teaming Experiment|url=https://www.defenseworld.net/news/27298/Russian_Su_57_Jet_Controls_Su_35_Aircraft____Swarm____in_Teaming_Experiment|access-date=2020-06-29|website= defenseworld.net}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Russian Su-35s and Su-57s tested 'the flock' tactic in real combat conditions|url=https://bulgarianmilitary.com/amp/2020/06/28/russian-su-35s-and-su-57s-tested-the-flock-tactic-in-real-combat-conditions/|access-date=2020-06-29|website=bulgarianmilitary.com}}</ref><ref name="TASS_swarm">{{cite news |url=https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/8833031 |title=Источники: Россия провела эксперимент по применению "роя" истребителей |date=28 June 2020 |access-date=29 June 2020 |agency=[[TASS]] |language=ru }}</ref>

=== Syrian combat evaluation ===
On 21 February 2018, two Su-57s performed their first international flight as they were spotted landing at the Russian [[Khmeimim air base]] in Syria. The aircraft were deployed along with four Sukhoi Su-35 fighters, four [[Sukhoi Su-25]]s, and one [[Beriev A-50]] [[AEW&C]] aircraft.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Seidel |first1=Jamie |title=Syria: Russian Su-57 stealth fighter spotter landing |url=http://www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/has-moscow-moved-its-su57-stealth-fighter-into-syria/news-story/56cae8a44961133bb58605c43e04038d |access-date=22 February 2018 |agency=News.com.au |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180222045415/http://www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/has-moscow-moved-its-su57-stealth-fighter-into-syria/news-story/56cae8a44961133bb58605c43e04038d |archive-date=22 February 2018 |url-status=live}}</ref> Three days later two more Su-57s were reported to have arrived in Syria.<ref name="riatwomore">[https://ria.ru/syria/20180224/1515213306.html?relap=1 СМИ сообщили о прибытии еще двух истребителей Су-57 в Сирию‍] {{Webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180225205532/https://ria.ru/syria/20180224/1515213306.html?relap=1 |date=25 February 2018}} RIA Novosti, 24 February 2018.</ref> The deployment was criticised by some experts as overly risky, especially after reports of drone attacks at Khmeimim air base, as well as having limited value due to the short duration of only several days. As the deployment overlapped with Russia's [[Defender of the Fatherland Day]], the purpose may have been to support the president's state-of-the-nation speech. Additionally, deployment of the aircraft in a combat theatre may serve to enhance the aircraft's marketing.<ref>Gordon 2021, pp. 280–81</ref><ref>Butowski (2021), p. 50</ref><ref>[https://vz.ru/politics/2018/2/22/890631.html Переброска Су-57 в Сирию несет в себе значительный риск] {{Webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180224053338/https://vz.ru/politics/2018/2/22/890631.html |date=24 February 2018}} [[Vzglyad (newspaper)|vz.ru]], 22 February 2018.</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/24997/russia-releases-first-official-video-of-its-su-57s-on-their-absurdly-short-trip-to-syria|title=Russia Releases First Official Video of Its Su-57s on Their Absurdly Short Trip To Syria|last=Trevithick|first=Joseph|access-date=30 November 2018|language=en-US|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181130202103/http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/24997/russia-releases-first-official-video-of-its-su-57s-on-their-absurdly-short-trip-to-syria|archive-date=30 November 2018|url-status=live |website=[[The War Zone (publication)|The War Zone]]}}</ref> On 1 March 2018, the Russian Defence Minister [[Sergey Shoygu]] stated that the two Su-57s had spent two days in Syria and successfully completed a trials program, including combat trials during which parameters of weapons work were monitored.<ref>[https://tvzvezda.ru/news/opk/content/201803011617-3tfk.htm Новейшие истребители Су-57 прошли боевые испытания в Сирии – Шойгу] {{Webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180304054910/https://tvzvezda.ru/news/opk/content/201803011617-3tfk.htm |date=4 March 2018}} [[Zvezda (TV channel)|Zvezda]], 1 March 2018.</ref><ref>[http://tass.com/defense/992335 Su-57 fifth-generation fighter jets successfully tested in Syria] {{Webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180302104100/http://tass.com/defense/992335 |date=2 March 2018}} TASS, 1 March 2018.</ref> On 25 May 2018, the Defence Ministry disclosed that during the February 2018 deployment to Syria, a Su-57 fired a cruise missile in combat, likely a [[Kh-59#Variants|Kh-59MK2]].<ref>{{cite web |url=http://alert5.com/2018/05/26/su-57-launched-cruise-missile-while-deployed-to-syria/ |title=Alert 5 » Su-57 launched cruise missile while deployed to Syria – Military Aviation News |website=alert5.com |access-date=26 May 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180527074044/http://alert5.com/2018/05/26/su-57-launched-cruise-missile-while-deployed-to-syria/ |archive-date= 27 May 2018 |url-status=live}}</ref> On 18 November 2018, the Defence Ministry posted an extended video of the fighters' flights, and announced that Su-57 performed 10 flights during its deployment to Syria.<ref>{{cite news |url= https://themoscowtimes.com/news/russian-military-unveils-video-footage-new-su-57-stealth-fights-syria-63532 |title=Russian Military Unveils Video Footage of New Su-57 Stealth Fighter in Syria |access-date=30 November 2018}}</ref><ref name= ":2">{{cite news |url= http://tass.com/defense/1031495 |title=Russia's 5th-generation fighter jets make 10 flights in Syria |agency=TASS |access-date=30 November 2018 |language=ru |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20181130112932/http://tass.com/defense/1031495 |archive-date=30 November 2018 |url-status=live}}</ref> However, the video did not specify when the test flights took place.<ref name=":3">{{cite web|url=http://www.defenseworld.net/news/23701/Russia__Tests__Su_57_Stealth_Fighter_Jet_s_Onboard_Systems__Weapons_in_Syria|title=Russia 'Tests' Su-57 Stealth Fighter Jet's Onboard Systems, Weapons in Syria|website= Defense world |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20181130113146/http://www.defenseworld.net/news/23701/Russia__Tests__Su_57_Stealth_Fighter_Jet_s_Onboard_Systems__Weapons_in_Syria|archive-date=30 November 2018|url-status=live}}</ref>

In December 2019, the Chief of the Russian General Staff, [[Valery Gerasimov]], announced that Russian Defence Ministry had once again tested the Su-57 in Syria, and all tasks had been successfully fulfilled.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://tass.com/defense/1100391|title=Su-57 fighter jet once again tested in Syria — Russian General Staff|agency=[[TASS]]|date=18 December 2019|access-date=20 December 2019}}</ref>

=== Entry into service ===
On 25 December 2020, the Russian Defence Ministry announced that the Su-57 had entered service upon the delivery of the first production aircraft to one of the aviation regiments of the [[Southern Military District]] in Lipetsk Air Base. This initial production batch would be used for military evaluation, tactics development, and crew conversion training. The first operational unit to be equipped with the Su-57 is the 23rd Fighter Aviation Regiment based in [[Dzyomgi Airport|Dzyomgi Air Base]] in the [[Eastern Military District]], with deliveries to begin in 2023; the colocation of the unit with the KnAAZ aircraft manufacturing plant enables easier support for newly introduced aircraft.<ref name="tass.ru"/> {{Update after|2025|1|text=The first fully operational Su-57 regiment of 24 aircraft is expected to be equipped by 2025.<ref>Butowski (2021), p. 65</ref>}}<ref name="23rdIAP_service">{{cite web |last1=Butowski |first1=Piotr |title=Su-57 Felon To Enter Service With Elite Russian Air Force Unit |url=https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/su-57-felon-to-enter-service-with-elite-russian-air-force-unit |website=The Drive |date=1 December 2022}}</ref>

==== 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine ====
In May 2022, Russian sources claimed that Su-57 fighters were used two or three weeks after the start of the [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine]], striking targets with missiles outside of the zone of activity of Ukrainian air defenses,<ref>{{cite web|url=https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/14679393|title=Источник в ОПК сообщил о применении Россией Су-57 в спецоперации на Украине|agency=TASS|date=20 May 2022}}</ref> just like other Russian aircraft that are also restricted mainly to Russian airspace.<ref>{{cite web |url= https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/europe/many-russian-warplanes-fire-missiles-from-inside-russian-airspace/articleshow/90175377.cms |title= Many Russian warplanes fire missiles from inside Russian airspace |website=The Times of India |date=12 March 2022}}</ref>

In June 2022, [[RIA Novosti]] reported four Su-57s working in a network were used in [[SEAD]] role over Ukraine to identify and destroy Ukrainian air defense systems. The source also noted that its low radar visibility was demonstrated in combat.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.aviacionline.com/2022/06/the-sukhoi-su-57-in-combat-operations-over-ukraine/|title=The Sukhoi Su-57 completed combat operations over Ukraine|website=aviacionline.com|date=9 June 2022}}</ref>

On 19 October 2022, Russian [[Army general (Russia)|army general]] [[Sergey Surovikin]], then commander of all Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine, claimed that the Su-57 has been used both in air-to-air and air-to-ground role during the war in Ukraine and that it has scored kills in both roles.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://eurasiantimes.com/in-ukraine-war-russian-su-57-fighters-destroy-targets-punch-holes/|title=Russia Confirms Using Su-57 Fighters In Ukraine War As They Destroy Targets, Punch Holes In Western Myths|website=eurasiantimes.com|date=19 October 2022}}</ref> Subsequently, some Russian sources claimed the Su-57 shot down a [[Ukrainian Air Force|Ukrainian]] [[Sukhoi Su-27|Su-27]] with a long-range R-37 missile.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://eurasiantimes.com/first-kill-russian-su-57-stealth-fighter-downs-ukrainian-su-27-jet/|title=First Kill? Russian Su-57 Stealth Fighter Downs Ukrainian Su-27 Jet With New Long-Range Missile – Media Claims|website=eurasiantimes.com|date=19 October 2022}}</ref> However, while some Su-57s are based in Lipetsk and Akhtubinsk air bases for development and trials, no hard evidence for claims of combat have surfaced.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/su-57-felon-fighters-are-flying-ukraine-combat-missions-uk-intel |title=Su-57 Felon Fighters Are Flying Ukraine Combat Missions: U.K. Intel |work=The War Zone |date=9 January 2023}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last=Suciu |first=Peter |url=https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-says-upgraded-su57-stealth-jet-finally-made-debut-flight-2022-10 |title=Russia says an upgraded version of its struggling Su-57 stealth jet finally made its debut flight |work=Business Insider |date=26 October 2022}}</ref> Commercial satellite imagery from late December 2022 shows five Su-57s deployed at [[Akhtubinsk (air base)|Akhtubinsk]] air base, some 500 km from Ukraine; British [[Defence Intelligence]] stated that these aircraft operate solely in Russian airspace to avoid reputational damage from combat losses and compromise of sensitive technology.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.airrecognition.com/index.php/news/defense-aviation-news/2023-news-aviation-aerospace/january/8858-british-intelligence-claims-russian-air-force-operates-su-57-felon-fighters-in-ukraine-war.html|title=British intelligence states Russian Air Force operates Su-57 Felon fighters in Ukraine war|website=airrecognition.com|date=9 January 2023}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Ankel |first1=Sophia |title=Russia is holding back on using its most advanced fighter jets over Ukraine because it's scared they'll get shot down, UK intel says |url=https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-limiting-its-advanced-combat-jets-to-russia-airspace-2023-1 |website=Business Insider |publisher=Business Insider |access-date=9 January 2023}}</ref>

===Potential operators===
{{Update|part=section|date=May 2023|reason=section requires information after the Russian invasion of Ukraine post-2022}}
In the early stages of the PAK FA programme, India had planned to be one of the largest foreign customers by procuring the FGFA derivative. It originally planned on buying 166 single-seat and 48 two-seat fighters,<ref>{{Cite news |url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/IAF-to-induct-214-variants-of-fighter-aircraft/articleshow/10222133.cms |title=IAF to induct 214 variants of fighter aircraft |website=The Times of India |date=3 October 2011 |access-date=31 January 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190131131103/https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/IAF-to-induct-214-variants-of-fighter-aircraft/articleshow/10222133.cms |archive-date=31 January 2019 |url-status=live}}</ref> but later changed it to 214 single-seat fighters,<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2012-09-21/indian-air-force-chief-outlines-fighter-jet-plans |title=Indian Air Force Chief Outlines Fighter Jet Plans |last=Mathews |first=Neelam |website=Aviation International News |language=en |access-date=31 January 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190131093318/https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2012-09-21/indian-air-force-chief-outlines-fighter-jet-plans |archive-date=31 January 2019 |url-status=live}}</ref> and later reduced its purchase to 144 fighters by 2012.<ref name=":15">{{Cite web |url=http://www.indiastrategic.in/topstories1766_IAF_decides_144_fifth_generation_fighters.htm |title=..:: India Strategic ::. Air Force: IAF decides on 144 Fifth Generation Fighters |website=indiastrategic.in |access-date=31 January 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130928230454/http://www.indiastrategic.in/topstories1766_IAF_decides_144_fifth_generation_fighters.htm |archive-date=28 September 2013 |url-status=live}}</ref> In April 2018, India pulled out of the FGFA project, which it believed did not meet its requirements for stealth, combat avionics, radars and sensors by that time.<ref name= india_exit>{{cite web |url= http://www.janes.com/article/79457/india-withdraws-from-fgfa-project-leaving-russia-to-go-it-alone |title= India withdraws from FGFA project, leaving Russia to go it alone |publisher= Jane's 360 |date= 20 April 2018 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20180523125959/http://www.janes.com/article/79457/india-withdraws-from-fgfa-project-leaving-russia-to-go-it-alone |archive-date= 23 May 2018 |url-status=dead |df= dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{cite magazine |last= Gady |first=Franz-Stefan |url= https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/india-pulls-out-of-joint-stealth-fighter-project-with-russia/ |title=India Pulls out of Joint Stealth Fighter Project With Russia |magazine=The Diplomat |date= 23 April 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180426075935/https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/india-pulls-out-of-joint-stealth-fighter-project-with-russia/ |archive-date= 26 April 2018 |url-status=live |df= dmy-all}}</ref> Indian Air Force [[Air chief marshal (India)|Air Chief Marshal]] [[Birender Singh Dhanoa]], during an interview with Russian Ministry of Defence's official newspaper ''[[Krasnaya Zvezda]]'' (''Red Star''), stated that the Su-57 is currently not being considered for the service, but the aircraft can be evaluated once it enters service with the Russian Aerospace Forces.<ref>{{Cite web|url= https://ria.ru/20190719/1556675153.html|title=В Индии назвали условия закупки Су-57|date=2019-07-19|website=РИА Новости|language=ru|access-date= 2019-12-11}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |url= https://zeenews.india.com/india/sukhoi-su-57-not-on-iaf-radar-air-chief-marshal-birender-singh-dhanoa-says-decision-after-fighter-joins-russian-air-force-2223846.html/amp|title=Sukhoi Su-57 not on IAF radar, Air Chief Marshal Birender Singh Dhanoa says decision after fighter joins Russian Air Force |website=zeenews.india.com|access-date=2019-12-11}}</ref> The General Director of the United Aircraft Corporation Yuri Slyusar however denied the previous reports saying "the topic is not closed" and that Russia and India are still discussing the creation of the fifth-generation fighter.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://ria.ru/20180819/1526819582.html|title=Россия и Индия обсуждают создание истребителя пятого поколения|agency=RIA Novosti|date=19 August 2018|access-date=6 September 2020}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=http://zeenews.india.com/world/india-still-with-fifth-generation-fighter-aircraft-project-russian-defence-aviation-major-2134541.html|title=India still with fifth-generation fighter aircraft project: Russian defence aviation major|website=zeenews.india.com|date=20 August 2018|access-date=6 September 2020}}</ref> However, in October 2019, the Indian Air Force Chief of Air Staff [[RKS Bhadauria]] stated that the country will not be importing stealth fighters like the Su-57, and will instead focus on indigenous efforts such as the [[HAL AMCA]].<ref name="FGFA cancelled">{{cite web |last= Siddiqui |first= Huma |url= https://www.financialexpress.com/defence/make-in-india-iaf-will-focus-on-the-indigenous-amca-for-its-fighter-fleet-says-air-chief-rks-bhadauria/1727310/ |title= Make in India: IAF will focus on the indigenous AMCA for its fighter fleet, says Air Chief RKS Bhadauria |work= The Financial Express |date= 2019-10-05 |access-date= 2020-03-22}}</ref>

Sukhoi states that the main export advantage of the PAK FA is its lower cost than current US fifth generation jet fighters.<ref>[http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20100720/159882742.html "Russia's fifth-generation fighter to be cheaper than foreign analogues"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140903083649/http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20100720/159882742.html|date=3 September 2014}}.</ref> Russia was reported to be offering the PAK FA for [[F-X fighter program|South Korea's next generation jet fighter]].<ref>Tae-hoon, Lee. [http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/07/116_91281.html "Russia seeks to sell stealth jets to Korea"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110929025543/http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/07/116_91281.html|date=29 September 2011}}. ''Korea Times'', 20 July 2011.</ref> South Korea's [[Defense Acquisition Program Administration]] (DAPA) stated that the Sukhoi PAK FA was a candidate for the [[Republic of Korea Air Force]]'s next-generation fighter (F-X Phase 3) aircraft;<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.janes.com/products/janes/defence-security-report.aspx?ID=1065930093|title=South Korea confirms Sukhoi T-50's surprise entry into FX fighter contest|publisher=janes.com|date=22 July 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120916123435/http://www.janes.com/products/janes/defence-security-report.aspx?ID=1065930093|archive-date=16 September 2012|access-date=13 May 2022}}</ref> however, Sukhoi did not submit a bid by the January 2012 deadline.<ref>Lee, Tae-Hoon. [http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2012/01/113_103661.html "Russia pulls out of Korea fighter project"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120131184757/http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2012/01/113_103661.html|date=31 January 2012}}. ''The Korean Times'', 29 January 2012. Retrieved 30 January 2012.</ref> In 2013, Russia offered Brazil participation and joint production in a next-generation fighter based on the Su-57.<ref>{{cite news|date=14 October 2013|title=Russia to Offer Brazil Stake in Future Advanced Fighter Project|agency=RIA Novosti|url=http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20131014/184141077/Russia-to-Offer-Brazil-Stake-in-Future-Advanced-Fighter-Project.html|url-status=live|access-date=14 October 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131014143637/http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20131014/184141077/Russia-to-Offer-Brazil-Stake-in-Future-Advanced-Fighter-Project.html|archive-date=14 October 2013}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|date=14 October 2013|title=Russia proposes to Brazil a joint agreement to produce Sukhoi T-50 PAK-FA.|url=http://www.airrecognition.com/index.php/archive-world-worldwide-news-air-force-aviation-aerospace-air-military-defence-industry/2013-global-news-worldwide-world-international-air-force-aviation-/october-2013-global-news-worldwide-world-international-air-force-aviation-aerospace-/825-russia-proposes-to-brazil-a-joint-agreement-to-produce-sukhoi-t-50-pak-fa.html|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131103204854/http://www.airrecognition.com/index.php/archive-world-worldwide-news-air-force-aviation-aerospace-air-military-defence-industry/2013-global-news-worldwide-world-international-air-force-aviation-/october-2013-global-news-worldwide-world-international-air-force-aviation-aerospace-/825-russia-proposes-to-brazil-a-joint-agreement-to-produce-sukhoi-t-50-pak-fa.html|archive-date=3 November 2013|access-date=3 November 2013}}</ref> Instead of Russian Su-57 and French [[Rafale]], Brazil signed an agreement with the Swedish [[Saab Group]] to locally produce 36 [[Saab Gripen|Gripen E]] fighters for the [[Brazilian Air Force]].<ref>{{Cite news|last=Shukla|first=Ajai|date=2014-10-30|title=Brazil chooses Gripen over Rafale|work=Business Standard India|url=https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/brazil-chooses-gripen-over-rafale-114103000027_1.html|access-date=2021-07-19}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=F-X2: Brazils Saab Contract for Gripens a Done Deal|url=http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/brazil-embarking-upon-f-x2-fighter-program-04179/|access-date=2021-07-19|website=Defense Industry Daily}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|last=Reim2021-06-03T22:05:00+01:00|first=Garrett|title=Brazilian air force to nearly double Saab Gripen order, cut KC-390 order in half: reports|url=https://www.flightglobal.com/fixed-wing/brazilian-air-force-to-nearly-double-saab-gripen-order-cut-kc-390-order-in-half-reports/144019.article|access-date=2021-07-19|website=FlightGlobal|language=en}}</ref>

In May 2019, as Turkish participation in the F-35 program was in doubt due to Turkey's procurement of the [[S-400 missile system]], CEO of [[Rostec]] [[Sergey Chemezov]] said that Russia was ready to cooperate with Turkey on the export and local production of the Su-57.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/russia-ready-to-cooperate-to-sell-turkey-su-57-fighter-jets-143123 |title=Russia 'ready to cooperate' to sell Turkey Su-57 fighter jets |date=3 May 2019 |work=Hürriyet Daily News |access-date=6 May 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190504135930/http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/russia-ready-to-cooperate-to-sell-turkey-su-57-fighter-jets-143123 |archive-date=4 May 2019 |url-status=live}}</ref> On 14 September 2019, an Su-57 took part in the 2019 [[Teknofest Istanbul|Technofest]] festival held in [[Istanbul]].<ref>{{cite web|url=https://tass.com/defense/1078151|title=Russia's Su-57 jet lands in Turkey for Technofest|agency=[[TASS]]|date=14 September 2019|access-date=15 September 2019}}</ref> However, on 7 February 2020, President Erdogan announced that the replacement of the F-35 will not be Russian Su-57, but instead will be the Turkish domestic fifth-generation aircraft [[TAI TF-X|TF-X fighter]].<ref>{{Cite web|last=GDC|date=2020-02-07|title=Turkey rejects Russian Su-57 fighter jet|url=https://www.globaldefensecorp.com/2020/02/07/turkey-rejects-russian-su-57-fighter-jet/|access-date=2021-07-14|website=Global Defense Corp|language=en-US}}</ref>

On 27 December 2019, Algeria signed a contract for 14 aircraft as part of large military deal that also includes the purchase of Su-34 and Su-35 fighters. This decision was reportedly taken in summer 2019, when Algerian delegation personally inspected the Su-57 at the MAKS-2019 air show.<ref name="Algeria">{{cite web|url=https://www.menadefense.net/algerie/lalgerie-serait-le-premier-client-export-pour-le-su-57-et-le-su-34/|title=L'Algérie serait le premier client export pour le Su-57 et le Su-34 |website= Mena defense |date=27 December 2019 |access-date=31 December 2019}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.africanaerospace.aero/algeria-to-get-14-su-57-fighters-from-russia.html| work = African Aerospace | title = Algeria to get 14 Su-57 fighters from Russia}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url= https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20201124-algeria-buys-14-stealth-fighters-from-russia-report-says/ |title= Algeria buys 14 stealth fighters from Russia, report says |date= 24 November 2020}}</ref> Once Sukhoi fulfill domestic delivery commitment, Algeria set to receive the first Su-57E in 2028.<ref name="auto1">{{Cite web |date=2021-06-25|title=Sukhoi Forecasted 600 Su-57 Sale During Design Phase of the Aircraft|url=https://www.globaldefensecorp.com/2021/06/26/sukhoi-forecasted-600-su-57-sale-during-design-phase-of-the-aircraft/ |access-date= 2021-07-20 |website=Global Defense Corp|language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date= 2020-12-08|title=Algeria to Receive Su-57 in 2028|url= https://www.globaldefensecorp.com/2020/12/09/algeria-to-receive-su-57-in-2028/|access-date=2021-07-20|website=Global Defense Corp|language=en-US}}</ref>

It has been reported that [[Vietnam People's Air Force|Vietnam]] may become a customer of the Su-57.<ref>{{Cite web|date= 2019-01-08|title=Vietnam To Become 1st Country To Get Russian SU-57 5th Generation Fighter Jets|url=https://eurasiantimes.com/vietnam-to-become-1st-country-to-get-russian-su-57-5th-fighter-jets/|access-date=2021-02-08|website= EurAsian times |language=en-US}}</ref> The country is expected to acquire the fighters to replace its aging fleet of 11 Su-27s. On 9 July 2021, Vietnam announced its intention to buy Su-57 aircraft, but it is critical of the aircraft's workmanship.<ref name="auto1"/><ref>{{Cite web | date= 2021-07-09 |title=Su-57 may not be built with quality workmanship, says Vietnam's MoD |url= https://www.globaldefensecorp.com/2021/07/09/su-57-may-not-be-built-with-quality-workmanship-says-vietnams-mod/|access-date=2021-07-14|website=Global Defense Corp |language=en-US}}</ref>{{Unreliable source?|date=January 2023}}

Russia has offered Su-57E fighters to the United Arab Emirates during [[International Defence Exhibition|IDEX 2021]].<ref name= "auto1"/> During the 2019 [[Dubai Airshow|Dubai Air Show]], Chemezov talked about the possibility of "localization" of portions of the Su-57 supply chain within other countries that decide to buy those jets, including "…United Arab Emirates, India or Turkey…", depends on the capabilities of the defense industrial base of the customer in question.<ref>{{Cite web |last= Trevithick|first=Joseph|title= Russia Says UAE Could Help Build Su-57s As Gulf Nation Puts F-35 Ambitions On Hold|url= https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/31083/russia-says-uae-could-help-build-su-57s-as-gulf-nation-puts-f-35-ambitions-on-hold |access-date=2019-12-02 |website=[[The War Zone (publication)|The War Zone]]|date=18 November 2019 }}</ref> However, the UAE has refrained from signing a contract with Russia to avoid [[Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act|CAATSA]] sanctions from the United States.<ref>{{Cite web |date= 2021-03-10|title=Russian Efforts to Sale Su-57E to India and UAE Failed Again|url= https://www.globaldefensecorp.com/2021/03/11/russian-effort-to-sale-su-57e-to-india-and-uae-failed-again/|access-date=2021-07-19 |website= Global Defense Co |language=en-US}}</ref>

In 2021, Iraqi military leadership including its inspector for the Iraqi Ministry of Defence Imad Al-Zuhairin stated the country's interest in the Su-57.<ref>{{Cite web|title= Iraqi military leadership interested in russian Su-57 next generation fighter |url= https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/iraqi-military-leadership-interested-in-russian-su-57-next-generation-fighter |access-date=2021-07-19|website= Military watch magazine}}</ref>

==Variants==

===Su-57===
Su-57 is the first production variant for the Russian Aerospace Forces. Flight testing began with the T-50 prototype in 2010, and serial production began in 2019. A total of three regiments, 76 aircraft, are planned with the first aircraft delivered in December 2020.

===Su-57E===
'''Su-57E''' is the export version of Su-57.<ref name="Su-57E Rosoboronexport">{{cite web |url= http://roe.ru/eng/catalog/aerospace-systems/fighters/su-57e/|title= Su-57E Perspective multirole fighter |publisher= Rosoboronexport |access-date= 22 March 2021}}</ref> On 28 March 2019, the aircraft was first promoted to international customers during the 2019 [[Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace Exhibition]].<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.janes.com/article/87519/lima-2019-russia-set-to-clear-sukhoi-su-57-for-export|title=LIMA 2019: Russia set to clear Sukhoi Su-57 for export|date=28 March 2019|url-status=live|archive-url=https://archive.today/20190329144231/https://www.janes.com/article/87519/lima-2019-russia-set-to-clear-sukhoi-su-57-for-export|archive-date=29 March 2019|access-date=14 April 2019}}</ref> The aircraft was officially unveiled at the MAKS-2019 air show on 28 March 2019.<ref name="Su-57E">{{cite web |url=https://www.janes.com/article/90772/maks-2019-russia-unveils-export-variant-of-su-57|title=MAKS 2019: Russia unveils export variant of Su-57|website=janes.com|date=30 August 2019|access-date=31 August 2019}}</ref> [[Rosoboronexport]] is marketing the aircraft as ''Perspective multirole fighter'' (PMF).<ref name="Su-57E Rosoboronexport"/>

===Su-57M===
'''Su-57M''' is an upgraded variant of the base Su-57 under the program name ''Megapolis'', and incorporates improved mission systems, reliability and maintenance enhancements, new flight control actuators, and the Saturn izdeliye 30 engines. Flight testing is planned to begin in 2022, and serial production is planned for the mid-2020s.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://tass.com/defense/1323823 |title= Production of upgraded version of Su-57 fighter is to start in 2025 — source |agency=TASS}}</ref><ref name=PiBu2021p89/>

===FGFA===
{{main|Sukhoi/HAL FGFA}}

Sukhoi/HAL FGFA was a planned version of Su-57 for Indian Air Force but India withdrew from the FGFA programme in 2018 before any prototype was built.<ref name="FGFA cancelled"/> The FGFA was intended to be the primary export version of the PAK FA and was to differ in 43 ways with improvements to stealth, supercruise, sensors, networking, and combat avionics.<ref name="thediplomat.com">{{Cite web |url=https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/india-and-russia-fail-to-resolve-dispute-over-fifth-generation-fighter-jet/ |title=India and Russia Fail to Resolve Dispute Over Fifth Generation Fighter Jet |last=Diplomat |first=Franz-Stefan Gady, The |website=The Diplomat |language=en-US |access-date=31 January 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190327090821/https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/india-and-russia-fail-to-resolve-dispute-over-fifth-generation-fighter-jet/ |archive-date=27 March 2019 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>Bogdanov, Konstantin. [http://en.ria.ru/analysis/20120709/174500575.html "Russia’s Changing Aircraft Export Strategy"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140723062525/http://en.ria.ru/analysis/20120709/174500575.html|date=23 July 2014}}. RIA Novosti, 9 July 2012.</ref><ref>Mathews, Neelam. [http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/ain-defense-perspective/2012-05-25/indias-version-sukhoi-t-50-delayed-two-years "India’s Version of Sukhoi T-50 Delayed by Two Years."] {{Webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140707122432/http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/ain-defense-perspective/2012-05-25/indias-version-sukhoi-t-50-delayed-two-years |date=7 July 2014}} ''AIN'', 25 May 2012.</ref> There were conflicting reports on the FGFA, with India detailing numerous improvements over the baseline PAK FA, while Mikhail Pogosyan, the head of United Aircraft Corporation, said in 2013 that the PAK FA and the FGFA will use "identical onboard systems and avionics".<ref>[http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/ain-defense-perspective/2013-03-01/russia-india-describe-next-gen-fighter-plans "Russia, India Describe Next-Gen Fighter Plans"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141012213836/http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/ain-defense-perspective/2013-03-01/russia-india-describe-next-gen-fighter-plans|date=12 October 2014}}.</ref> India has refrained from signing a deal with Russia citing concerns of aircraft's stealth, radar and supercruise capability in 2014 and ultimately withdrew from the programme in 2018.<ref>{{cite web |url= http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/20347/its-no-surprise-india-finally-ditched-its-stealth-fighter-program-with-russia |title= It's No Surprise India Finally Ditched Its Stealth Fighter Program With Russia |publisher= [[The War Zone (publication)|The War Zone]] |date= 23 April 2018 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20180426075735/http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/20347/its-no-surprise-india-finally-ditched-its-stealth-fighter-program-with-russia |archive-date= 26 April 2018 |url-status=live |df= dmy-all}}</ref>

===Other versions===
In 2008, UAC president Alexei Fedorov has said that any decision on applying fifth-generation technologies to produce a smaller fighter (comparable to the [[F-35]]) must wait until after the development of the PAK FA is completed.<ref>[http://arms-tass.su/?page=article&aid=53759&cid=25 "Легкий истребитель 5-го поколения будет создан на базе технологий тяжелого перспективного истребителя (in Russian)".] {{Webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110918100807/http://arms-tass.su/?page=article&aid=53759&cid=25 |date=18 September 2011}} ''arms-tass.su.'' Retrieved: 26 January 2011.</ref>

A naval version of the Su-57 was proposed for the [[Project 23000E]] or ''Storm'' [[supercarrier]]. Models of the aircraft carrier project are showing Su-57 on board, with folding wings and stabilators. The Su-57 should be able to use the takeoff ramp as well as the [[Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System]].<ref>{{cite web |url=https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20150520/1065515849.html |title=IHS Jane's: в России разработали новый ядерный суперавианосец |date=20 May 2015 |agency=RIA Novosti |access-date=21 September 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170922050632/https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20150520/1065515849.html |archive-date=22 September 2017 |url-status=live}}</ref> The draft of the future state armament program (GVP) for 2024–2033 includes the development of a new carrier-based fighter based on the Su-57, albeit with deep modifications.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://ria.ru/20210517/pospelov-1732338234.html|title=Владимир Поспелов: десятый "Борей" сдадут до 2030 года|date=17 May 2021}}</ref>

The aircraft is used as a testbed for integration with UAVs as well as various subsystems (including weapon, control and navigation systems) being developed for Russia's future [[sixth-generation jet fighter|sixth-generation]] combat system, both in manned and [[unmanned aerial vehicle|unmanned]] version.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://tass.com/defense/1013337 |title=Russia's Su-57 plane tests onboard systems for 6th-generation fighter jet – source |agency=[[TASS]]|date=16 July 2018 |access-date=21 February 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180717145720/http://tass.com/defense/1013337|archive-date=17 July 2018|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/5376047 |title=Источник: бортовые системы истребителя шестого поколения испытывают на Су-57|date=16 July 2018 |agency=[[TASS]] |access-date=23 July 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180728011529/http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/5376047|archive-date=28 July 2018|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://tass.com/defense/973625|title=Russia may upgrade advanced Su-57 aircraft to 6th-generation fighter jet|agency=TASS|access-date=27 August 2019}}</ref> In January 2019, it was reported the third flyable Su-57 prototype (bort. no 053) is being used for interaction with the Sukhoi S-70 Okhotnik UCAV, and testing of its [[avionics]] systems.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/6054472 |title=Источник: системы БПЛА "Охотник" испытывают на Су-57 |agency=[[TASS]]|date=29 January 2019 |access-date=21 February 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190131201331/https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/6054472|archive-date=31 January 2019|url-status=live}}</ref>

In July 2021, it was officially announced that a two-seater variant of the Su-57 was under development, to be used for training pilots and for ensuring the control of the Sukhoi S-70 Okhotnik UCAV.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/11992083|title=Источник: для управления беспилотниками "Охотник" разработают двухместный Су-57 - ТАСС|website=TACC|accessdate=22 May 2023}}</ref> This variant was also mentioned at the Army-2022 forum in August 2022.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/15478429|title=ОАК и Минобороны обсуждают возможность создания двухместного Су-57|date=15 August 2022|language=ru|website=TASS}}</ref>

==Operators==
;{{Flagu|Russia}}
* [[Russian Aerospace Forces]] – 76 in total on order.<ref name=":1">{{Cite web |last=Embraer |first=In association with |title=2023 World Air Forces directory |url=https://www.flightglobal.com/reports/2023-world-air-forces-directory/151088.article |access-date=2022-12-28 |website=Flight Global |language=en}}</ref> According to the manufacturer United Aircraft Corporation 10 were delivered as of December 2022.<ref name="10 serial">{{cite web|url=https://bmpd.livejournal.com/4635723.html|title=ВКС России получили четыре новых серийных истребителя Су-57|website=bmpd.livejournal.com|date=28 December 2022}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://uacrussia.ru/ru/press-center/news/oak-peredala-minoborony-ocherednuyu-partiyu-seriynykh-samolyetov-pyatogo-pokoleniya-su-57|title=ОАК передала Минобороны очередную партию серийных самолётов пятого поколения Су-57|website=uacrussia.ru|date=28 December 2022}}</ref>
** 23rd Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment, [[Dzyomgi Airport|Dzyomgi AB]] (deliveries planned to start in 2023)<ref name="23rdIAP_service"/>

==Accidents==
On 10 June 2014, the fifth flying prototype, aircraft T-50-5, was severely damaged by an engine fire after landing. The pilot managed to escape unharmed. The aircraft was subsequently written off, and its salvageable parts were cannibalized to finish the sixth "first stage" prototype, which was then given the fifth prototype's bort number and its designation changed from T-50-6-1 to T-50-5R. However, official accounting still considers the two aircraft to be the "same" one.<ref name=gordon2021p193-197/>

On 24 December 2019, the first serial Su-57 (bort number "01 blue") crashed 110–120 km away from the [[Dzyomgi Airport]], [[Khabarovsk Krai]], during the final stage of its factory trials due to a control system malfunction. The pilot ejected and was recovered by helicopter.<ref name="vedomosti">{{cite news|url=https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2019/12/24/819543-su-57|title=Истребитель Су-57 потерпел первую аварию|newspaper=[[Vedomosti]]|date=24 December 2019|access-date=24 December 2019|language=ru}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://iz.ru/957594/2019-12-24/istrebitel-su-57-razbilsia-v-khabarovskom-krae|title=Истребитель Су-57 разбился в Хабаровском крае|newspaper=[[Izvestia]]|date=24 December 2019|access-date=24 December 2019|language=ru}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://ren.tv/news/v-rossii/640540-v-mchs-podtverdili-informatsiiu-o-padenii-su-57-v-khabarovskom-krae|title=Власти Хабаровского края подтвердили информацию о падении Т-50|publisher=[[REN TV]]|date=24 December 2019|access-date=24 December 2019|language=ru}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://ria.ru/20191224/1562752307.html|title=В Хабаровском крае разбился истребитель Су-57|agency=[[RIA Novosti]]|date=24 December 2019|access-date=24 December 2019|language=ru}}</ref> According to [[TASS]], the test flight took place at an altitude of 8,000 meters when the malfunction occurred, causing the airplane to enter a rapid spiral descent. When all attempts to stabilize the airplane into a horizontal flight using the [[Aircraft flight control system#Mechanical|manual flight control system]] failed, the pilot ejected at an altitude of 2,000 meters.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://tass.ru/proisshestviya/7418655|title=Источник: упавший в Хабаровском крае Су-57 самопроизвольно вошел в спираль|agency=[[TASS]]|date=25 December 2019|access-date=25 December 2019|language=ru}}</ref>

==Specifications (Su-57)==
[[File:Sukhoi T-50 3-view.svg|right|thumb|Sukhoi T-50 3-view drawings]]

{{Aircraft specs
|ref=[[Aviation Week]],<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/AW_08_19_2013_p43-605528.xml |title=Sukhoi T-50 Shows Flight-Control Innovations |website=Aviation Week & Space Technology |access-date=14 November 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140327141324/http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=%2Farticle-xml%2FAW_08_19_2013_p43-605528.xml |archive-date=27 March 2014 |url-status=live}}</ref> Key Aero,<ref>Butowski (2021), p. 75</ref> Crecy Publishing<ref>Gordon & Komissarov 2021, Chapter 7</ref>
|prime units?=met

|genhide=
|crew=1
|length m=20.1
|length ft=
|length in=
|span m=14.1
|span ft=
|span in=
|height m=4.6
|height ft=
|height in=
|wing area sqm=78.8
|wing area sqft=
|aspect ratio=
|airfoil=
|empty weight kg=18000
|empty weight lb=
|empty weight note=
|gross weight kg=25000
|gross weight lb=
|gross weight note=normal takeoff weight, 29,270 kg (64,530 lb) at full load 
|max takeoff weight kg=35000
|max takeoff weight lb=
|max takeoff weight note=
|fuel capacity={{cvt|10300|kg|lb}}
|more general=

|eng1 number=2
|eng1 name=[[Saturn AL-31#AL-41F1 (izdeliye 117)|Saturn AL-41F1]]
|eng1 type=[[afterburner|afterburning]] [[turbofan]]
|eng1 kn=88.3
|eng1 kn-ab=142.2
|more power=, {{convert|147.1|kN|lbf|abbr=on}} in emergency power

|perfhide=
|max speed mach=2 (2,135 km/h; 1,327 mph) at altitude
**Mach 1.3 (1,400 km/h; 870 mph) [[supercruise]] at altitude
|range km=3500
|range miles=
|range nmi=
|range note=subsonic, 4,500 km from 2 outboard fuel tanks<ref name="auto">{{cite web |url=https://army-news.ru/2018/01/su-35s-ili-su-57-chto-vazhnee-dlya-vks-rossii/ |title=Су-35С или Су-57: что важнее для ВКС России? – Армейский вестник |website=Army-news.ru |access-date=12 December 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181119173624/https://army-news.ru/2018/01/su-35s-ili-su-57-chto-vazhnee-dlya-vks-rossii/ |archive-date=19 November 2018 |url-status=live}}</ref>
**'''Supersonic range:''' 1,500 km (930 mi, 810 nmi)
|ceiling m=20000
|ceiling ft=
|climb rate ms=
|climb rate ftmin=
|lift to drag=
|wing loading kg/m2=371
|wing loading lb/sqft=
|wing loading note=normal takeoff weight
|thrust/weight=1.16 at normal takeoff weight (0.99 at loaded weight with full fuel)
|g limits=+9.0
|more performance=

|armament=
*'''Guns:''' 1 × [[30 mm caliber|30 mm]] [[Gryazev-Shipunov GSh-30-1]] [[autocannon]]
*'''[[Hardpoint]]s:''' 12 hardpoints (6 × internal, 6 × external)
**[[Air-to-air missile]]s:
***[[R-77|R-77M]]
***[[R-73 (missile)|R-74M2]]
***[[R-37 (missile)]]<ref name="interfax.ru">{{cite web |url=https://www.interfax.ru/russia/630714 |title=Су-57 вооружат сверхдальней гиперзвуковой ракетой Р-37М |date=26 September 2018 |website=Interfax.ru |access-date=12 December 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181218225518/https://www.interfax.ru/russia/630714 |archive-date=18 December 2018 |url-status=live}}</ref>
**[[Air-to-surface missile]]s:
***4 × [[Kh-38|Kh-38M]]
***4 × [[Kh-59|Kh-59MK2]]<ref name="auto"/>
**[[Anti-ship missile]]s:
***2 × [[Kh-35|Kh-35U]]
***2 × [[Kh-31]]
**[[Anti-radiation missile]]s:
***4 × [[Kh-58|Kh-58UShK]]
** KAB-250 guided bomb
** KAB-500 guided bomb
** Anti-tank "Drill"<ref>{{cite web |url=https://rg.ru/2018/05/31/novye-boepripasy-znachitelno-rasshiriat-boevoj-potencial-su-57.html |title=Новые боеприпасы значительно расширят боевой потенциал Су-57 |website=Российская газета |access-date=12 December 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180630134659/https://rg.ru/2018/05/31/novye-boepripasy-znachitelno-rasshiriat-boevoj-potencial-su-57.html |archive-date=30 June 2018 |url-status=live}}</ref> 500 kg cluster-bomb + active homing<ref name="interfax.ru"/>
|avionics=
*Sh-121 multifunctional integrated radio electronic system (MIRES)
**[[Byelka (radar)|Byelka]] [[radar]] (400 km, 60 tracks with 16 targeted)<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=2979702 |title=Су-57 теперь летает с новейшим оружием |website=vesti.ru |access-date=12 December 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180630161633/https://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=2979702 |archive-date=30 June 2018 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://rg.ru/2018/10/16/istrebitel-su-57-na-ispytaniiah-prevzoshel-luchshie-amerikanskie-analogi.html |title=Истребитель Су-57 на испытаниях превзошел лучшие американские аналоги |website=Российская газета |access-date=12 December 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181229233933/https://rg.ru/2018/10/16/istrebitel-su-57-na-ispytaniiah-prevzoshel-luchshie-amerikanskie-analogi.html |archive-date=29 December 2018 |url-status=live}}</ref>
***N036-1-01: Frontal X-band [[active electronically scanned array]] (AESA) radar
***N036B-1-01: Cheek X-band AESA radars for increased angular coverage
***N036L-1-01: [[Leading-edge slats|Slat]] L-band arrays for [[identification friend or foe|IFF]]
**L402 Himalayas [[electronic countermeasure]] suite
*101KS Atoll [[Electro-Optical Targeting System|electro-optical targeting system]]
**101KS-O: Laser [[Directional Infrared Counter Measures]]
**101KS-V: [[Infrared search and track]]
**101KS-U: [[Ultraviolet]] [[missile approach warning system]]
**101KS-N: [[Targeting pod]]
**101KS-P: thermal imager for low altitude flying and night landing
}}

==Notable appearances in media==



{{main|Aircraft in fiction#Sukhoi Su-57}}
The Su-57 appears via CGI in the 2022 film ''[[Top Gun: Maverick]]'' as the aircraft used by the unnamed hostile nation.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/44972/new-top-gun-trailer-shows-dogfight-between-f-14-and-su-57 |title=New Top Gun Trailer Shows Dogfight Between F-14 and Su-57 |work=The War Zone |date=29 March 2022}}</ref> The Su-57 is a flyable aircraft in the aerial combat game [[Ace Combat 7]].<ref>{{cite news |title=Ace Combat 7: Skies Unknown 'Su-57' trailer |url=https://www.gematsu.com/2019/01/ace-combat-7-skies-unknown-su-57-trailer |work=Gematsu |date=11 January 2019}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=Su-57: Bandai Namco Europe Launches Aircraft Focus Trailers To Tease Ace Combat 7 |url=https://gametyrant.com/news/bandai-namco-europe-launches-aircraft-focus-trailers-to-tease-ace-combat-7 |work=GameTyrant}}</ref>

==See also==
{{Portal|Russia|Military|Aviation}}
{{aircontent
|see also=
* [[Fifth-generation fighter]]
|related=
* [[Sukhoi Su-35]]S{{#tag:ref|The new fighter's control systems, avionics and cockpit will be designed on the basis of the Su-35BM's systems.{{cn|date=February 2023}}|group=N}}
* [[Sukhoi Su-47]]
* [[Sukhoi/HAL FGFA]]
* [[Sukhoi S-70 Okhotnik-B]]
* [[Sukhoi Su-75 Checkmate]]
|similar aircraft=
* [[Chengdu J-20]]
* [[Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor]]
* [[Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II]]
|lists=
* [[List of military aircraft of the Soviet Union and the CIS]]
* [[List of fighter aircraft]]
}}

==References==

===Notes===
{{Reflist|group=N}}

===References===
{{reflist}}

===Bibliography===
{{Refbegin|35em}}
* {{Cite book |last=Butowski |first=Piotr |title=Su-57 Felon |location=Stamford, UK |publisher=Key Books |year=2021 |isbn=978-1-913870-44-7 |url=https://shop.keypublishing.com/product/View/productCode/KB0043/Su-57%20Felon}}
* {{cite book |last1=Gordon |first1=Yefim |last2=Komissarov |first2=Dmitry |title=Famous Russian Aircraft: Sukhoi Su-57 |location=Cheshire, United Kingdom |publisher=Crecy Publishing |year=2021 |isbn=9781910809938 |url=http://www.crecy.co.uk/sukhoi-su-57}}
* Lake, Jon. "Sukhoi T-50 - Russia's Raptor?" ''Combat Aircraft'', Vol. 11, No.4, April 2010.
* Sweetman, Bill. "Sukhoi T-50 Shows Flight-Control Innovations". ''[[Aviation Week|Aviation Week & Space Technology]]'', 19 August 2013. New York City, New York, US: Penton Media, Inc.
{{Refend}}

==External links==
{{Commons category}}
* Official Sukhoi Su-57 webpage at {{Official website|https://www.uacrussia.ru/en/aircraft/lineup/military/su-57/|UAC}}

{{Sukhoi aircraft}}
{{Stealth aircraft}}
{{DEFAULTSORT:Sukhoi Su-57}}
[[Category:Sukhoi aircraft|Su-57]]
[[Category:2010s Russian fighter aircraft]]
[[Category:Twinjets]]
[[Category:Stealth aircraft]]
[[Category:Three dimension thrust vectoring aircraft]]
[[Category:Aircraft first flown in 2010]]

List of countries by size of armed forces

2023-09-10T13:48:04Z

Soldier: Created List of countries by size of armed forces|world's largest military forces

#REDIRECT [[List of countries by number of military and paramilitary personnel]]

Akash SAM

2023-09-10T13:44:59Z

Soldier: Created Akash SAM

#REDIRECT [[Akash (missile)]]

Minimum deterrence

2023-09-10T13:42:17Z

Soldier: Created minimum deterrence

#REDIRECT [[Minimal deterrence]]

Kh-35

2023-09-10T13:39:13Z

Soldier: Created Kh-35

{{Short description|Soviet anti-ship missile}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=June 2021}}
{{Infobox weapon
| is_missile = yes
| name = Kh-35 ([[NATO reporting name]]: AS-20 'Kayak') 3M24 ''Uran'' (SS-N-25 'Switchblade') 3K60 ''Bal'' (SSC-6 'Sennight')
| image = Kh-35E fol maks2009.jpg
| image_size = 300
| caption = Kh-35E in MAKS-2009
| origin = [[Soviet Union]]
| type = [[Air-to-surface missile|Air-to-surface]] [[Surface-to-surface missile]] [[Cruise missile]] [[Anti-ship missile]]
| used_by = [[Russian Navy]] [[Indian Navy]] [[Vietnam People's Navy]]
| wars =
| designer = Zvezda
| design_date = 1983-2003
| manufacturer = [[Tactical Missiles Corporation]]
| unit_cost = $500,000 (2010)<ref>"Annual Report", Tactical Missiles Corporation (2010), p.92.</ref>
| propellant = kerosene
| production_date = 1996 for export, 2003 for Russia
| service = 2003
| engine = R95TP-300 Turbofan<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.amntksoyuz.ru/en/ |title=About |website=Aero-Engine Scientific and Technical Complex «Soyuz»}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |url=http://amntksoyuz.ru/engines/airengines/history/#r95-300 |title=ОАО "АМНТК "Союз" – Продукция – Авиационные двигатели |date=2 February 2012 |website= |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120202051703/http://amntksoyuz.ru/engines/airengines/history/#r95-300 |archive-date=2 February 2012 |url-status=dead}}</ref>
| engine_power = 360 kgf
| weight = {{convert|520|kg|lb|abbr=on|sigfig=3}}<ref name="Rosoboronexport" /> (air version) {{convert|610|kg|lb|abbr=on|sigfig=3}}<ref name="Rosoboronexport" /> (surface & heli version)
| length = {{convert|385|cm|in|abbr=on|0}}<ref name="Rosoboronexport" /> (air version) {{convert|440|cm|in|abbr=on|0}}<ref name="Rosoboronexport" /> (surface & heli version)
| diameter = {{convert|42.0|cm|in|abbr=on|1}}<ref name="Rosoboronexport" />
| wingspan = {{convert|133|cm|in|abbr=on|1}}<ref name="Rosoboronexport" />
| speed = {{convert|0.8-0.85|Mach|mph km/h|0}}
| vehicle_range = {{convert|130|km|nmi|abbr=on}} {{convert|300|km|nmi|abbr=on}} (upgrade version, 2015)<ref>{{cite magazine |url=http://expert.ru/2015/05/25/vezdesuschaya-raketa/?partner=988462 |title=Новая ракета X-35: гроза американских эсминцев |trans-title=New X-35 missile: the terror of American destroyers |language=ru |first=Vadim |last=Ponomarev |date=25 May 2015 |magazine=[[Expert (magazine)|Expert]] |access-date=8 October 2015}}</ref>
| altitude = 10-15 m en route and about 4 m at terminal area
| filling = HE fragmentation [[shaped charge]]
| filling_weight = {{convert |145|kg|lb|0|abbr=on}}<ref name="Rosoboronexport" />
| guidance = [[inertial guidance]] and ARGS-35E [[X-band]] terminal [[active radar homing]]<ref>{{cite web |url=http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Radar-and-Electronic-Warfare-Systems/ARGS-35E-Algeria.html |title=ARGS-35E (Algeria), Airborne fire-control radars |website=[[Jane's]] |access-date=August 28, 2011 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120402214415/http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Radar-and-Electronic-Warfare-Systems/ARGS-35E-Algeria.html |archive-date=April 2, 2012}}</ref>
| launch_platform = [[Tupolev Tu-142]], [[Su-24]], [[MiG-29]]M/K, [[Sukhoi Su-35]], [[Su-27]]SM, [[Sukhoi Su-30MKI|Su-30MKI]]//[[Sukhoi Su-30#Su-30SM|Su-30SM]], [[Su-34]], [[HAL Tejas]], [[Ka-27]], [[Ka-28]],<ref name="Rosoboronexport" /><ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.airrecognition.com/index.php/archive-world-worldwide-news-air-force-aviation-aerospace-air-military-defence-industry/global-defense-security-news/global-news-2017/october/3823-kh-35u-asm-enters-su-35s-fighter-jet-weapon-package.html |title=Kh-35U ASM enters Su-35S fighter jet weapon package |date=24 October 2017 |website=AirRecognition.com}}</ref> [[Ka-50|Ka-52]], [[Sukhoi Su-57|Su-57]],{{citation needed|date=December 2020}} also ships and boats, coastal, LACM, TEL variants.
| variants = [[Neptune (cruise missile)|Neptune]] [[VCM-01]]
}}

The Zvezda '''Kh-35''' ({{lang-ru|[[Kha (Cyrillic)|Х]]-35 [[(Cyrillic)| ]]}}, '''AS-20 'Kayak'''') is a Soviet [[turbojet]] [[subsonic flight|subsonic]] cruise<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.enemyforces.net/missiles/kh_35.htm |title=Kh-35 (AS-20 "Kayak") Anti-Ship Cruise Missile |website=EnemyForces.net}}</ref> [[anti-ship missile]]. The missile can be launched from helicopters, surface ships and coastal defence batteries with the help of a rocket booster, in which case it is known as '''''Uran''''' ('Uranus', '''SS-N-25 'Switchblade'''', [[GRAU]] '''3M24''') or '''''Bal''''' ('''SSC-6 'Sennight'''', GRAU 3K60). It is designed to attack vessels up to 5,000 tonnes.<ref name="Rosoboronexport" />

==Development==
The previous anti-ship missiles made in USSR were highly capable, but they also were large and expensive. Therefore, the Soviet Navy found that a similar, small and very low flying missile would be useful. This new system was planned as small, cheap, and easy to install missile for a variety of platforms. This new system, called 3M24 Uran (in western nomenclature, SS-N-25) was originally meant for small surface combatants such as frigates, like the [[Krivak-class frigate|Krivak]], Gepard and Neustrashimy. It was the answer to western missiles like the US [[Harpoon (missile)|Harpoon]]. Informally, it was also known as 'Harpoonski', as it was broadly comparable, especially in appearance, with the American missile.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/as-20.htm |title=Zvezda Kh-35 |website= military today |access-date=2022-04-14}}</ref>

The initial development started in Zvezda-Strela State Scientific-Industrial Center (GNPTs) group in 1972 or 1977, depending on the sources.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.military-today.com/missiles/kh_35.htm |title=Zvezda Kh-35 |website= globalsecurity.org |access-date=2022-04-14}}</ref> Zvezda received the official go ahead to begin work on the Kh-35 in 1983-1984 by a decree of the [[USSR Council of Ministers]] and the USSR [[CPSU Central Committee]] to arm ships of medium tonnage.{{Citation needed|date=January 2021}}

Test launches began in 1985, but there were several problems and failures with the miniaturized active radar system. It was first displayed in 1992 and listed as only being intended for export, when it was, in fact, not yet for production. In 1994 India ordered Uran missiles (the Kh-35E export variant). This led to the full development, and deliveries started to the Indian Navy in 1996. Russia adopted it only in 2003 (for ships), and 2004 (Bal, coastal system). The air-launched variant (originally made for Indian Il-38SD patrol aircraft) was completed in 2005 and later deployed on Russian Federation aircraft.

The KH-35 can be considered the successor to the [[P-15 Termit|SS-N-2 Styx]] missile, albeit much smaller and more modern. It boasts greater range than legacy missile systems, and is much cheaper than other contemporary anti-ship missiles like Kalibr or Oniks, costing an estimated $500,000 USD per missile.

==Design==
[[File:Seeker Kh-35E maks2005.jpg|thumb|left|Cross-section of the active radar homing head of a Kh-35E missile at [[MAKS (air show)|MAKS]] 2005]]
[[File:Kh-35E maq maks2009.jpg|thumb|Kh-35E model at MAKS 2009]]

The Kh-35 missile is a subsonic weapon featuring a normal aerodynamic configuration with cruciform wings and fins and a semisubmerged air duct intake. The propulsion unit is a [[turbofan]] engine. The missile is guided to its target at the final leg of the trajectory by commands fed from the [[active radar homing]] head and the [[radio altimeter]].<ref name="Rosoboronexport">{{cite web |url=http://www.rusarm.ru/cataloque/air_craft/aircraft.pdf |title=Aerospace Systems Export Catalogue |website=[[Rosoboronexport]] |page=123 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071030213111/http://www.rusarm.ru/cataloque/air_craft/aircraft.pdf |archive-date=2007-10-30}}</ref>

Target designation data can be introduced into the missile from the launch aircraft or ship or external sources. Flight mission data is inserted into the missile control system after input of target coordinates. An [[inertial]] system controls the missile in flight, stabilizes it at an assigned altitude and brings it to a target location area. At a certain target range, the homing head is switched on to search for, lock on and track the target. The inertial control system then turns the missile toward the target and changes its flight altitude to an extremely low one. At this altitude, the missile continues the process of homing by the data fed from the homing head and the inertial control system until a hit is obtained.{{Citation needed|date=January 2021}}

The Kh-35 can be employed in fair and adverse weather conditions at [[sea state]]s up to 5–6, by day and night, under enemy fire and electronic countermeasures. Its aerodynamic configuration is optimized for high subsonic-speed [[sea-skimming]] flight to ensure stealthy characteristics of the missile. The missile has low signatures thanks to its small dimensions, sea-skimming capability and a special guidance algorithm ensuring highly secure operational modes of the active radar seeker.{{Citation needed|date=January 2021}}

Its ARGS-35E active radar seeker operates in both single and multiple missile launch modes, acquiring and locking on targets at a maximum range of up to 20 km.<ref name="ktrvkh35">{{cite web |url=http://eng.ktrv.ru/production/military_production/anti-ship_missiles/kh-35e.html |title=Tactical Anti-Ship Missile Kh-35E |website=JSC [[Tactical Missiles Corporation]] |access-date=8 October 2015 |archive-date=24 May 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200524130954/http://eng.ktrv.ru/production/military_production/anti-ship_missiles/kh-35e.html |url-status=dead }}</ref> A new radar seeker, Gran-KE has been developed by SPE Radar MMS<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.radar-mms.com/catalog/args35/ |title=Радиолокационная Головка АРГС-35Э |trans-title=ARGS-35E Radar |language=ru |website=Radar-MMS |access-date=2011-09-09 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110716145147/http://www.radar-mms.com/catalog/args35/ |archive-date=2011-07-16}}</ref> and will be replacing the existing ARGS-35E X band seeker.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://navaltoday.com/2011/08/26/jsc-tactical-missile-arms-presents-new-target-seeker |title=Russia: JSC Tactical Missile Arms Presents New Target Seeker |date=26 August 2011 |work=Naval Today |access-date=23 December 2014}}</ref>

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! colspan="2" |<ref name="ktrvkh35"/><ref name="ktrvkh35u">{{cite web |url=http://eng.ktrv.ru/production/military_production/anti-ship_missiles/kh-35ue.html |title=Tactical Guided Missile Kh-35UE |website=JSC Tactical Missiles Corporation |access-date=23 December 2014 |archive-date=21 October 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201021181950/http://eng.ktrv.ru/production/military_production/anti-ship_missiles/kh-35ue.html |url-status=dead }}</ref>
! Kh-35
! Kh-35U
|-
| rowspan="2" | {{center|'''Length'''}}
|{{center| '''Ship/Land/Heliborne''' }}
| colspan="2" |{{center|{{convert|4.4|m|ft|abbr=on}}}}
|-
|{{center|'''Aircraft-launched'''}}
| colspan="2" |{{center|{{convert|3.85|m|ft|abbr=on}}}}
|-
| colspan="2" | {{center|'''Diameter'''}}
| colspan="2" |{{center|{{convert|0.42|m|in|abbr=on}}}}
|-
| colspan="2" | {{center|'''Wingspan'''}}
| colspan="2" |{{center|{{convert|1.33|m|ft|abbr=on}}}}
|-
| rowspan="3" | {{center|'''Weight'''}}
|{{center|'''Surface-launched'''}}
| {{center|{{convert|620|kg|lb|abbr=on}}}}
| {{center|{{convert|670|kg|lb|abbr=on}}}}
|-
|{{center|'''Aircraft-launched'''}}
| {{center|{{convert|520|kg|lb|abbr=on}}}}
| {{center|{{convert|550|kg|lb|abbr=on}}}}
|-
|{{center|'''Heliborne'''}}
| {{center|{{convert|610|kg|lb|abbr=on}}}}
| {{center|{{convert|650|kg|lb|abbr=on}}}}
|-
| colspan="2" | {{center|'''Range'''}}
| {{center|{{convert|130|km|mi nmi|abbr=on}}}}
| {{center|{{convert|7-260|km|mi nmi|abbr=on|0}}}}
|-
| colspan="2" | {{center|'''Guidance'''}}
| {{center|Inertial, active radar}}
| {{center|Inertial, [[satellite navigation]], active/passive radar}}
|-
| colspan="2" | {{center|'''Seeker range'''}}
| {{center|{{convert|20|km|mi nmi|abbr=on}}}}
| {{center|{{convert|50|km|mi nmi|abbr=on}}}}
|-
| colspan="2" | {{center|'''Speed'''}}
| {{center|{{convert|0.8|Mach|mph km/h|0}}}}
| {{center|{{convert|0.8-0.85|Mach|mph km/h|0}}}}
|-
| rowspan="2" | {{center|'''Flight altitude'''}}
|{{center|'''Cruising'''}}
| colspan="2" style="text-align:center;" |10–15 m
|-
|{{center|'''Terminal phase'''}}
| colspan="2" style="text-align:center;" |4 m
|-
| colspan="2" | {{center|'''Warhead'''}}
| {{center|{{convert|145|kg|lb|abbr=on}} HE penetrator}}
| {{center|{{convert|145|kg|lb|abbr=on}} penetrating HE frag}}
|}

==Operational history==
The Kh-35 missile entered service with Russian Navy only in 2003. In July 2003, the system created by the "[[Tactical Missiles Corporation]]" passed the state tests and began to come into service of ships of the Russian Navy. Today it is generally accepted{{By whom|date=October 2016}} that in the criterion of "cost-effectiveness", "Uran-E" is one of the best systems in the world.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://nvo.ng.ru/armament/2012-01-20/8_uran-e.html |title="Уран-Э": рождение конструкторского замысла |trans-title="Uran-E": the birth of a design concept |language=ru |date=20 January 2012 |website=Nezavisimaya Gazeta |access-date=23 December 2014}}</ref> It has also been acquired by India.<ref name="Janes">{{cite journal |url=http://www.janes.com/extracts/extract/jalw/jalw9048.html |title=Kh-37 |journal=Jane's Air-Launched Weapons |date=2008-08-01}}{{dead link|date=April 2010}}</ref> The Bal coastal missile system showed excellent results in state tests in the fall of 2004, and entered service in 2008.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://old.nationaldefense.ru/1437/1440/index.shtml?id=3456 |title=Бал-Э» принят на вооружение |trans-title="Bal-E" is put into service |language=ru |website=National Defence |access-date=23 December 2014 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131112185749/http://old.nationaldefense.ru/1437/1440/index.shtml?id=3456 |archive-date=12 November 2013}}</ref> The tests of the upgraded Kh-35UE missile were completed as of June 2021.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://tass.ru/interviews/11732617|title=Глава КТРВ Обносов: мы разрабатываем новое морское оружие России|website=tass.ru}}</ref>

A Bal system has four self-propelled launcher vehicles each carrying eight missiles for a total of 32 missiles in a salvo, plus reloads for another wave. The launchers can be up to 10 km from the coast and hit targets at ranges up to {{convert|120|km|mi nmi|abbr=on}}.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/year-2011-news/december-2011-navy-naval-air-force-maritime-industry-news/225-bal-e-coastal-missile-system-with-kh-35-antiship-missile-to-defend-russia-coast-of-caspian-sea.html |title=Bal-E coastal missile system with Kh-35 antiship missile to defend Russia coast of Caspian Sea |date=5 December 2011 |website=NavyRecognition.com}}</ref> Currently, the Bal system is equipped with an upgraded version of the Kh-35E increasing the range to {{convert|300|km|mi nmi|abbr=on}}.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/year-2015-news/october-2015-navy-naval-forces-defense-industry-technology-maritime-security-global-news/3195-russias-bal-e-coastal-defense-system-to-be-equipped-with-upgraded-kh-35-missile.html |title=Russia's Bal-E coastal defense system to be equipped with upgraded Kh-35 missile |date=28 October 2015 |website=NavyRecognition.com}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |url=https://armstrade.org/includes/periodics/news/2019/0715/104053419/detail.shtml |title=Для КТРВ 2018 год стал рекордным с точки зрения объемов экспорта |trans-title=For KTRV, 2018 became a record year in terms of export volumes |language=ru |date=15 July 2019 |website=Armstrade.org}}</ref> At IMDS 2019, a new version of the Russian Bal-E coastal defence system was presented for the first time. The four-tube Rubezh-ME, dedicated to the export market, is based on a Kamaz 63501 8x8 chassis which is more compact than the MZKT-7930 of the original Bal-E.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/naval-exhibitions/2019-naval-exhibitions/imds-2019-news-online-show-daily/7282-imds-2019-first-public-appearance-of-the-rubezh-me-coastal-defence-system.html |title=IMDS 2019: First public appearance of the Rubezh-ME coastal defence system |date=11 July 2019 |website=NavyRecognition.com}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.janes.com/article/89890/russia-unveils-export-oriented-rubezh-me-coastal-defence-missile-system |title=Russia unveils export-oriented Rubezh-ME coastal defence missile system |first=Nikolai |last=Novichkov |date=15 July 2019 |website=Jane's |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190716112910/https://www.janes.com/article/89890/russia-unveils-export-oriented-rubezh-me-coastal-defence-missile-system |archive-date=16 July 2019}}</ref> As reported on October 19, 2021 by the TASS news agency, a new missile of the Bal coastal missile complex developed and manufactured by Tactical Missile Armament Corporation (KTRV) will allow hitting targets at a distance of over 500 km. The new capabilities of the complex made it comparable in range and the possibility of firing on the ground with the Bastion missile system using the Onyx supersonic missile, a source in the defense industry said.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://tass.com/defense/1351175|title=Russia's Bal coastal defense system to strike targets at over 500 km with new missile|website=tass.ru}}</ref>

==Variants==
[[File:Yaroslav Mudry Uran missiles.jpg|thumb|The KT-184 quadruple launcher mounted on [[Russian frigate Yaroslav Mudry]]]]
* '''Kh-35 (3M-24)''' - Base naval version for Russia (2003).<ref name="ktrvkh35"/>
* '''Kh-35E (3M-24E)''' - Export version of Kh-35 (1996).{{Citation needed|date=January 2021}}
* '''Kh-35U''' - Base upgrade ''unified'' missile (can be used with any carrier), version for Russia in production (as of July 1, 2015).<ref name="ktrvkh35u"/><ref>{{cite web |url=http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/2084708 |title="Тактическое ракетное вооружение" за три года запустило в серию 14 видов ракет |trans-title="Tactical Missile Armament" has launched 14 types of missiles into series in three years |language=ru |date=1 July 2015 |work=ТАSS |access-date=8 October 2015}}</ref> Capable of striking land targets.{{citation needed|date=December 2020}}
* '''Kh-35UE'''<ref>{{cite web |url=http://roe.ru/eng/catalog/aerospace-systems/air-to-air-missile/kh-35ue/ |title=Kh-35UE |website=Rosoboronexport}}</ref> - Export version of Kh-35U, in production.<ref name="ktrv_go2010">{{Cite web |url=http://www.ktrv.ru/news/company/721.html |title=ОАО "Корпорация Тактическое Ракетное Вооружение" |accessdate=2011-10-03 |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20131004235111/http://www.ktrv.ru/news/company/721.html |archivedate=2013-10-04 |url-status=dead }}</ref>
* '''Kh-35UV''' - Helicopter-launched version, intended for the [[Kamov Ka-50#Ka-52K "Katran"|Kamov Ka-52K]].<ref>{{cite book |last1=Butowski |first1=Piotr |title=Ka-52 Hokum |date=2022 |publisher=Key Publishing |location=Stamford, UK |isbn=978-1-80282-269-4 |page=84}}</ref>
*'''3M-24EMV''' - Export version of Kh-35 missile-target without warhead for Vietnam.<ref name="ktrv_go2010" />
* '''Kh-35 ''Uran/Uran-E''''' (SS-N-25 'Switchblade', 3M-24) - Shipborne equipment of the control system with a missile Kh-35/Kh-35E.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.granit-electron.ru/products/mil/complex/uran/index.shtml |title=Корабельная аппаратура системы управления «Уран Э |trans-title=Ship control system "Uran E" |language=ru |website=JSC Concern Granit-Electron |access-date=2012-04-09 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120911014416/http://www.granit-electron.ru/products/mil/complex/uran/index.shtml |archive-date=2012-09-11}}</ref>
* '''Bal/Bal-E''' - Coastal ('''SSC-6 Sennight''') missile complex with Kh-35/Kh-35E missiles (2008).{{Citation needed|date=January 2021}}
* '''Rubez-ME''' - Coastal missile complex with 4 Kh-35/Kh-35U missiles. Compact version of the Bal-E, dedicated for the export .<ref>{{cite web | url=https://militaryleak.com/2020/10/08/rubez-me-coastal-tactical-missile-system/ | title=Rubez-ME Coastal Tactical Missile System | date=8 October 2020 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=https://roe.ru/eng/catalog/naval-systems/coastal-weapon-systems/rubez-me/ | title=Coastal tactical missile system Rubez-ME | Catalog Rosoboronexport }}</ref>
* [[File:BAL-E003.jpg|thumb|Bal - coastal mobile missile complex]]'''KN-09 Kumsong/GeumSeong-3''' (Venus 3 금성3호 金星3号) - KN0v 0x 01, '''[[KN-19]]''' Reported North Korean copy of the Kh-35U. Kumsong-3 is a North Korean domestic variant/clone of Kh-35 likely based on Kh-35U due to range.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kumsong-3-kh-35-variant/ |title=Kumsong-3 (Kh-35 Variant) |website=Missile Threat}}</ref> Demonstrated range in 2017, June 8 test is 240 km.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/north-koreas-new-kn19-coastal-defense-cruise-missile-more-than-meets-the-eye/ |title=North Korea's New KN19 Coastal Defense Cruise Missile: More Than Meets the Eye |first=Ankit |last=Panda |date=July 26, 2017 |website=The Diplomat}}</ref>
* '''[[VCM-01]]''' - Vietnamese derivative<ref name="vcm-01" />
* [[Neptune (cruise missile)|'''Neptune''']] - Ukrainian derivative<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/ukraine-building-anti-ship-missiles-part-thanks-russia-43532|title=Ukraine Is Building Anti-Ship Missiles (In Part Thanks to Russia)|last=Episkopos|first=Mark|date=2019-02-06|website=The National Interest|language=en|access-date=2019-04-10}}</ref>

==Operators==
[[File:Kh-35 operators.png|thumb|400px|Map with Kh-35 operators in blue]]

===Current operators===
*{{ALG}}<ref>{{Cite web|last=Akramov|date=2021-09-24|title=L'Algérie muscle sa défense côtière|url=https://www.menadefense.net/algerie/lalgerie-muscle-sa-defense-cotiere-2/|access-date=2021-09-28|website=MENADEFENSE|language=fr-FR}}</ref>
*{{IND}}
*{{MYA}}
*{{PRK}} – Kh-35U derivative Kumsong/GeumSeong-3 (Venus 3) 금성3호 金星3号.<ref name="armstrade.sipri.org">{{cite web |url=http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php |title=Trade Registers |website=[[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]] |access-date=19 December 2014}}</ref>
**Mobile coastal defence (anti-ship) system '''KN-19''' on a tracked chassis.
**Believed to be also able launched with [[Ilyushin Il-28]]/H-5 due to missiles being stored at [[Uiju Airfield]], home to these bombers.<ref>{{Cite web|title=ALCMs in Uiju|url=https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1210131/air-launched-cruise-missiles-in-uiju-dprk/|access-date=2021-08-10|website=www.armscontrolwonk.com}}</ref>
*{{RUS}} – 112 Kh-35 (3M-24) delivered in 2009–2010.<ref name=AnnualReport>''Annual Report'', Tactical Missiles Corporation (2010), p.92.</ref>
**Bal coastal missile brigades deployed by the [[Russian Navy]]:
***11th Black Sea Fleet Brigade, Utash, Krasnodar
***46th Separate Division of the Caspian Flotilla, Dagestan
***15th Black Sea Fleet Brigade, Sevastopol, Crimea
***72nd Pacific Fleet Regiment, Smolyaninovo, Primorsky Krai
***At least one more complex was delivered to the Western Military District in mid-2016.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://tass.com/defense/907916 |title=Russian Navy received more than 100 Kalibr, Onix missiles in 3rd quarter |date=21 October 2016 |website=TASS}}</ref>
***Two Bal missile systems delivered in 2017 and one more in November 2018 for the BSF.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12160216@egNews |title=National Centre for State Defence Control hosts Military Acceptance Day chaired by Russian Minister of Defence |date=31 January 2018 |website=Russian Ministry of Defence}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |url=https://armstrade.org/includes/periodics/news/2018/1206/102049970/detail.shtml |title=За последний месяц в войска ЮВО поставлено около 200 ед. новой и модернизированной техники |trans-title=Over the past month, about 200 new and modernized equipment units have been delivered to the troops of the Southern Military District |language=ru |date=6 December 2018 |website=Armstrade.org}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |url=https://tass.com/defense/1045956 |title=Advanced coastal defense missile systems to protect Russia's Caspian Flotilla base |date=22 February 2019 |website=TASS}}</ref> Three more systems in 2019 and 2020 for the PF, CFl and BF.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://armstrade.org/includes/periodics/news/2019/0226/101551198/detail.shtml |title=Новые береговые ракетные комплексы "Бал" прибыли на Тихоокеанский флот |trans-title=New coastal missile systems "Bal" arrived at the Pacific Fleet |language=ru |date=26 February 2019 |website=Armstrade.org}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |url=https://armstrade.org/includes/periodics/news/2021/0112/065061188/detail.shtml |title=В 2020 году Балтийский флот пополнился кораблями и новейшей военной техникой |trans-title=In 2020, the Baltic Fleet was replenished with ships and the latest military equipment |language=ru |date=12 January 2021 |website=Armstrade.org}}</ref>
***A deployment was moved{{clarify|reason=moved from where?|date=December 2020}} to the [[Sredny Peninsula]] in 2019.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Nilsen |first1=Thomas |title=Russia deploys missile system 70 km from Norway's Vardø radar |url=https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2019/08/russia-deploys-bastion-missile-system-70-km-norways-vardo-radar |newspaper=The Barents Observer |access-date=30 December 2020 |date=7 August 2019}}</ref>
**The [[Russian Air Force]] has acquired since 2014 an unknown number of Kh-35U missiles integrated with the [[Sukhoi Su-35|Sukhoi Su-35S]] fighter aircraft and the [[Sukhoi Su-34]] fighter-bombers.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.airrecognition.com/index.php/archive-world-worldwide-news-air-force-aviation-aerospace-air-military-defence-industry/global-defense-security-news/global-news-2017/october/3823-kh-35u-asm-enters-su-35s-fighter-jet-weapon-package.html |title=Kh-35U ASM enters Su-35S fighter jet weapon package |date=24 October 2017 |website=AirRecognition.com |access-date=10 January 2018}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |url=https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12196794@egNews |title=Пуски с самолетов Су-34 противокорабельных ракет Х-35У по морским целям |trans-title=Launches from Su-34 aircraft of Kh-35U anti-ship missiles at sea targets |language=ru |date=25 September 2018 |website=Russian Ministry of Defence}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://ria.ru/arms/20180925/1529333330.html |title=Минобороны показало удары новейших российских противокорабельных ракет |trans-title=The Ministry of Defense showed the strikes of the latest Russian anti-ship missiles |date=25 September 2018 |website=RIA Novosti |language=ru}}
</ref>
*{{VEN}} – Bal Coastal missile complex being delivered.{{Citation needed|date=January 2022}}
*{{VNM}} – 340 Kh-35E missiles delivered in 2001–2021. A local derivative designated as [[VCM-01]] is being developed by [[Viettel]].<ref name="vcm-01">{{Cite web |url=https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/naval-news/naval-news-archive/2020/may-2020/8491-vietnam-unveils-its-new-vcm-01-anti-ship-cruise-missile.html |title=Vietnam unveils its new VCM-01 anti-ship cruise missile |date=28 May 2020 |website=Navy Recognition |access-date=2021-06-03}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Trade Registers |url=https://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php |access-date=2022-04-25 |website=armstrade.sipri.org}}</ref>
* {{UKR}} – Kh-35 derivative [[Neptune (cruise missile)|Neptune]]

===Failed bid===
*{{AZE}} – Bal Coastal missile complex suspended<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.rbc.ru/politics/05/12/2018/5c0756f59a79476960a42098 |title=Коммерсантъ» узнал об отказе Москвы поставить ракетные комплексы Баку |trans-title="Kommersant" learned of Moscow's refusal to supply missile systems to Baku |language=ru |date=5 December 2018 |website=[[RBK Group|РБК]]}}</ref>

==See also==
*[[AGM-158C LRASM]]
*[[Naval anti ship missile -MR]]
*[[Exocet]]
*[[Harpoon (missile)|A/R/UGM-84 Harpoon]]
*[[Naval Strike Missile]]
*[[Otomat]]
*[[RBS-15]]
*[[Sea Eagle missile|Sea Eagle]]
*[[Type 80 Air-to-Ship Missile]]
*[[Type 88 Surface-to-Ship Missile]]
*[[Type 90 Ship-to-Ship Missile]]
*[[Type 93 Air-to-Ship Missile]]
*[[YJ-83]]

==References==
{{reflist}}

==External sources==
{{commons category-inline}}
* [http://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kh-55/ KH-35] at CSIS Missile Threat

{{Russian and Soviet missiles|state_ASM=uncollapsed|state_SSM=uncollapsed}}

[[Category:Anti-ship cruise missiles of Russia]]
[[Category:Cruise missiles of Russia]]
[[Category:Submarine-launched cruise missiles of Russia]]
[[Category:Tactical Missiles Corporation products]]
[[Category:Military equipment introduced in the 2000s]]

National Security Advisory Board

2023-09-10T13:36:16Z

Soldier: Created National Security Advisory Board

#REDIRECT [[National Security Council (India)#National Security Advisory Board]]

South Pole

2023-09-10T13:33:48Z

Soldier: Created South Pole

{{About|the Geographic South Pole}}
{{Short description|Southernmost point on Earth}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=November 2020}}

[[Image:Pole-south.gif|thumb|upright=1.4|{{ordered list |South Geographic Pole |[[South Magnetic Pole]] (2007) |[[South Geomagnetic Pole]] (2005) |[[Pole of Inaccessibility|South pole of inaccessibility]]}}]]
[[File:Geographic Southpole crop.jpg|thumb|upright=1.25|The Geographic South Pole is marked by the stake on the right]]
[[File:Antarctica 6400px from Blue Marble.jpg|thumb|upright=1.4|[[NASA]] image showing Antarctica and the South Pole in 2005]]

The '''South Pole''', also known as the '''Geographic South Pole''', '''Terrestrial South Pole''' or '''90th Parallel South''', is the southernmost point on Earth and lies [[antipode (geography)|antipodally]] on the opposite side of Earth from the [[North Pole]], at a distance of 12,430 miles (20,004 km) in all directions. It is one of the [[geographical pole|two points]] where [[Earth's rotation|Earth's axis of rotation]] intersects its surface.

Situated on the continent of [[Antarctica]], it is the site of the [[United States]] [[Amundsen–Scott South Pole Station]], which was established in 1956 and has been permanently staffed since that year. The Geographic South Pole is distinct from the [[South Magnetic Pole]], the position of which is defined based on [[Earth's magnetic field]]. The South Pole is the center of the [[Southern Hemisphere]].{{Coord|90|S|0|E|display=title}}

==Geography ==
[[File:Ceremonial South Pole.jpg|thumb|The Ceremonial South Pole in 1998.]]
[[File:Amundsen-scott-south pole station 2007.jpg|thumb|The Ceremonial South Pole as of February 2008.]]
For most purposes, the Geographic South Pole is defined as the southern point of the two points where Earth's [[axis of rotation]] intersects its surface (the other being the [[North Pole|Geographic North Pole]]). However, Earth's axis of rotation is actually subject to very small "wobbles" ([[polar motion]]), so this definition is not adequate for very precise work.

The [[geographic coordinate]]s of the South Pole are usually given simply as 90°S, since its longitude is geometrically undefined and irrelevant. When a longitude is desired, it may be given as {{nowrap|0°.}} At the South Pole, all directions face north. For this reason, directions at the Pole are given relative to "grid north", which points northward along the [[Prime meridian (Greenwich)|prime meridian]].<ref>[http://quest.nasa.gov/antarctica/background/cara/movpole.html "Moving the South Pole"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110716140440/http://quest.nasa.gov/antarctica/background/cara/movpole.html |date=16 July 2011 }}, NASA Quest</ref> Along tight latitude circles, clockwise is east, and counterclockwise is west, opposite to the [[North Pole]].

The Geographic South Pole is presently located on the continent of [[Antarctica]], although this has not been the case for all of [[History of Earth|Earth's history]] because of [[continental drift]]. It sits atop a featureless, barren, windswept and icy plateau at an altitude of {{convert|2835|m|abbr=on}} above sea level, and is located about {{convert|1300|km|abbr=on}} from the nearest open sea at the [[Bay of Whales]]. The ice is estimated to be about {{convert|2700|m|abbr=on}} thick at the Pole, so the land surface under the [[ice sheet]] is actually near sea level.<ref name="autogenerated1">[https://www.nsf.gov/od/opp/support/southp.jsp Amundsen–Scott South Pole Station], National Science Foundation, Office of Polar Programs</ref>

The polar ice sheet is moving at a rate of roughly {{convert|10|m|abbr=on}} per year in a direction between 37° and 40° west of grid north,<ref>{{cite web | url=http://www.southpolestation.com/pole/survey.html | title=Where is the real Pole really? | access-date=25 March 2008 }}</ref> down towards the [[Weddell Sea]]. Therefore, the position of the station and other artificial features relative to the geographic pole gradually shift over time.

[[File:Garmin at 90 Deg South - South Pole.jpg|thumb|[[Garmin]] [[GPS]] receiver showing 90 Deg South – the South Pole]]The Geographic South Pole is marked by a stake in the ice alongside a small sign; these are repositioned each year in a ceremony on [[New Year's Day]] to compensate for the movement of the ice.<ref name=antarcticsun2006>[http://antarcticsun.usap.gov/pastIssues/2005-2006/2006_01_08.pdf "Marker makes annual move"], page 6, Antarctic Sun. 8 January 2006; McMurdo Station, Antarctica.</ref> The sign records the respective dates that [[Roald Amundsen]] and [[Robert Falcon Scott|Robert F. Scott]] reached the Pole, followed by a short quotation from each man, and gives the elevation as "9,301 ''FT.''".<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.classicalarchives.com/prs/astro/Antarctica/0640-Sign_at_the__moving__actual_geographical_South_Pole.jpg |title=Sign at the (ever moving) actual geographical South Pole (a few feet away from the Ceremonial Pole) |publisher=Pierre R. Schwob Physics/Astronomy |access-date=25 May 2013}}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=http://www.trekearth.com/gallery/photo284509.htm | author=Kiefer, Alex | title=South Pole Marker |date=January 1994 | access-date=24 March 2008 }}</ref> A new marker stake is designed and fabricated each year by staff at the site.<ref name=antarcticsun2006/>

===Ceremonial South Pole===
The Ceremonial South Pole is an area set aside for photo opportunities at the [[Amundsen–Scott South Pole Station|South Pole Station]]. It is located some meters from the Geographic South Pole, and consists of a metallic sphere on a short barber pole, surrounded by the flags of the original [[Antarctic Treaty]] signatory [[Sovereign state|states]].<ref>{{cite web|title=Flags at the South Pole|author=George F. Mobley|date=18 September 2012|url=https://www.nationalgeographic.org/photo/southpole-flags-990-61181/|access-date=14 June 2020|publisher=National Geographic|archive-date=15 June 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200615021844/https://www.nationalgeographic.org/photo/southpole-flags-990-61181/|url-status=dead}}</ref>

===Historic monuments===
[[File:Saludo a la Bandera Argentina durante la Operación 90.jpg|thumb|right|Argentinian soldiers saluting the flag after erecting the pole in 1965]]

====Amundsen's Tent====
The tent was erected by the Norwegian expedition led by Roald Amundsen on its arrival on 14 December 1911. It is currently buried beneath the snow and ice in the vicinity of the Pole. It has been designated a [[Historic Sites and Monuments in Antarctica|Historic Site or Monument]] (HSM 80), following a proposal by Norway to the [[Antarctic Treaty System|Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting]].<ref name=atcm>{{cite web |url= http://www.ats.aq/documents/ATCM35/WW/atcm35_ww003_e.pdf|title= List of Historic Sites and Monuments approved by the ATCM (2012)|access-date=7 January 2014 |publisher=Antarctic Treaty Secretariat |year=2012}}</ref> The precise location of the tent is unknown, but based on calculations of the rate of movement of the ice and the accumulation of snow, it is believed, as of 2010, to lie between 1.8 and 2.5 km (1.1 and 1.5 miles) from the Pole at a depth of 17 m (56 ft) below the present surface.<ref>[http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract;jsessionid=413DE249464BAEBDBF64B335F6B5C576.journals?fromPage=online&aid=8295706] ''Polar Record'' / Volume 47 / Issue 03 / July 2011</ref>

====Argentine Flagpole====
A [[flag#Flagpoles|flagpole]] erected at the South Geographical Pole in December 1965 by the [[Operación 90|First Argentine Overland Polar Expedition]] has been designated a [[Historic Sites and Monuments in Antarctica|Historic Site or Monument]] (HSM 1) following a proposal by Argentina to the [[Antarctic Treaty System|Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting]].<ref name=ats>{{cite web |url= http://www.ats.aq/documents/ATCM35/WW/atcm35_ww003_e.pdf|title= List of Historic Sites and Monuments approved by the ATCM (2012)|access-date=4 October 2013 |publisher=Antarctic Treaty Secretariat |year=2012}}</ref>

==Exploration==
{{see also|History of Antarctica|List of Antarctic expeditions|Heroic Age of Antarctic Exploration|Farthest South}}

===Pre-1900===
In 1820, several expeditions claimed to have been the first to have sighted Antarctica, with the first{{clarify | reason = Very first what? Claim or sighting?|date=September 2016}} being the Russian expedition led by [[Fabian Gottlieb von Bellingshausen]] and [[Mikhail Lazarev]].<ref>{{cite journal |date=1971 |title=Bellingshausen and the discovery of Antarctica|journal=Polar Record |volume=15 |issue=99 |pages=887–889 |doi=10.1017/S0032247400062112 |last1=Armstrong|first1=Terence|s2cid=129664580 }}</ref> The first landing was probably just over a year later when American captain [[John Davis (sealer)|John Davis]], a sealer, set foot on the ice.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Hurtigruten|title=General Information|url=http://people.rit.edu/~msl7852/webdesign/midterm/antarctica.html|website=hurtigruten.com/us/|publisher=Hurtigruten|access-date=23 October 2014|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141023171055/http://people.rit.edu/~msl7852/webdesign/midterm/antarctica.html|archive-date=23 October 2014}}</ref>

The basic geography of the Antarctic coastline was not understood until the mid-to-late 19th century. American naval officer [[Charles Wilkes]] claimed (correctly) that Antarctica was a new continent, basing the claim on his exploration in 1839–40,<ref>{{cite book|author1=Van Doren, Charles Lincoln |author2=McHenry, Robert |title=Webster's Guide to American History: A Chronological, Geographical, and Biographical Survey and Compendium|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=MVU6DS6Re8gC&pg=PA1326+|year=1971|publisher=Merriam-Webster|isbn=978-0-87779-081-5|page=1326}}</ref> while [[James Clark Ross]], in his expedition of 1839–1843, hoped that he might be able to sail all the way to the South Pole. (He was unsuccessful.)<ref>{{cite book|author=Berkman, Paul Arthur |title=Science Into Policy: Global Lessons from Antarctica|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LDiGTYXZ9X4C&pg=PA35+|year=2002|publisher=Academic Press|isbn=978-0-12-091560-6|page=35}}</ref>

===1900–1950===
[[File:Aan de Zuidpool - p1913-160.jpg|thumb|Amundsen's party at the South Pole, December 1911. From left to right: [[Roald Amundsen|Amundsen]], [[Helmer Hanssen|Hanssen]], [[Sverre Hassel|Hassel]] and [[Oscar Wisting|Wisting]] (photo by fifth member [[Olav Bjaaland|Bjaaland]]).]]

British explorer [[Robert Falcon Scott]] on the [[Discovery Expedition|''Discovery'' Expedition]] of 1901–1904 was the first to attempt to find a route from the Antarctic coastline to the South Pole. Scott, accompanied by [[Ernest Shackleton]] and [[Edward Adrian Wilson|Edward Wilson]], set out with the aim of travelling as far south as possible, and on 31 December 1902, reached 82°16′ S.<ref>{{cite book|author=Berkman, Paul Arthur |title=Science Into Policy: Global Lessons from Antarctica|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=LDiGTYXZ9X4C&pg=PA37|year=2002|publisher=Academic Press|isbn=978-0-12-091560-6|page=37}}</ref> Shackleton later returned to Antarctica as leader of the British Antarctic Expedition ([[Nimrod Expedition|''Nimrod'' Expedition]]) in a bid to reach the Pole. On 9 January 1909, with three companions, he reached 88°23' S – {{Convert|112|mi|km}} from the Pole – before being forced to turn back.<ref>{{cite book|author=Simpson-Housley, Paul |title=Antarctica: Exploration, Perception and Metaphor|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=M1ql3mx8xYgC&pg=PA24|date= 2002|publisher=Taylor & Francis|isbn=978-0-203-03602-0|page=24}}</ref>

The first men to reach the Geographic South Pole were the Norwegian [[Amundsen's South Pole expedition|Roald Amundsen and his party]] on 14 December 1911. Amundsen named his camp [[Polheim]] and the entire plateau surrounding the Pole [[King Haakon VII Vidde]] in honour of King [[Haakon VII of Norway]]. Robert Falcon Scott returned to Antarctica with his second expedition, the [[Terra Nova Expedition|''Terra Nova'' Expedition]], initially unaware of Amundsen's secretive expedition. Scott and four other men reached the South Pole on 17 January 1912, thirty-four days after Amundsen. On the return trip, Scott and his four companions all died of starvation and extreme cold.

In 1914 Ernest Shackleton's [[Imperial Trans-Antarctic Expedition]] set out with the goal of crossing Antarctica via the South Pole, but his ship, the ''[[Endurance (1912 ship)|Endurance]]'', was frozen in [[Sea ice|pack ice]] and sank 11 months later. The overland journey was never made.

US Admiral [[Richard Evelyn Byrd]], with the assistance of his first pilot [[Bernt Balchen]], became the first person to fly over the South Pole on 29 November 1929.

===1950–present===
[[Image:SPSM.05.jpg|thumb|upright=1.25|[[Amundsen–Scott South Pole Station]].The ceremonial pole and flags can be seen in the background, slightly to the left of centre, below the tracks behind the buildings. The actual geographic pole is a few more metres to the left. The buildings are raised on stilts to prevent snow build-up.]]
It was not until 31 October 1956 that humans once again set foot at the South Pole, when a party led by Admiral [[George J. Dufek]] of the US Navy landed there in an R4D-5L Skytrain ([[C-47 Skytrain]]) aircraft. The US [[Amundsen–Scott South Pole Station]] was established by air over 1956–1957 for the [[International Geophysical Year]] and has been continuously staffed since then by research and support personnel.<ref name="autogenerated1"/>

After Amundsen and Scott, the next people to reach the South Pole ''overland'' (albeit with some air support) were [[Edmund Hillary]] (4 January 1958) and [[Vivian Fuchs]] (19 January 1958) and their respective parties, during the [[Commonwealth Trans-Antarctic Expedition]]. There have been many subsequent expeditions to arrive at the South Pole by surface transportation, including those by Havola, [[Albert P. Crary|Crary]] and [[Ranulph Twistleton-Wykeham Fiennes|Fiennes]]. The first group of women to reach the pole were Pam Young, Jean Pearson, [[Lois Jones (scientist)|Lois Jones]], [[Eileen R. McSaveney|Eileen McSaveney]], Kay Lindsay and Terry Tickhill in 1969.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.southpolestation.com/trivia/igy2/welch/jones.html|title=First Women at Pole|website=South Pole Station|access-date=24 August 2016}}</ref> In 1978–79 Michele Eileen Raney became the first woman to winter at the South Pole.<ref name=":3">{{Cite web|url=http://antarcticsun.usap.gov/features/contentHandler.cfm?id=1954|title=Famous Firsts|date=13 November 2009|website=The Antarctic Sun|publisher=United States Antarctic Program|access-date=25 August 2016}}</ref>

Subsequent to the establishment, in 1987, of the logistic support base at [[Patriot Hills Base Camp]], the South Pole became more accessible to non-government expeditions.

On 30 December 1989, [[Arved Fuchs]] and [[Reinhold Messner]] were the first to traverse Antarctica via the South Pole without animal or motorized help, using only skis and the help of wind.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.suedtirol.info/South_Tyrol/Detail_Famous_persons/D-1208-en-Reinhold_Messner.html |title=Südtirol – Diese Seite existiert nicht |publisher=Suedtirol.info |access-date=13 August 2012 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120310043609/http://www.suedtirol.info/South_Tyrol/Detail_Famous_persons/D-1208-en-Reinhold_Messner.html |archive-date=10 March 2012 }}</ref><ref>{{cite encyclopedia|url=http://www.britannica.com/facts/5/263444/Antarctica-as-discussed-in-Reinhold-Messner-Italian-explorer |title=Britannica Online Encyclopedia |encyclopedia=Encyclopædia Britannica |access-date=13 August 2012}}{{dead link|date=May 2013}}</ref> Two women, [[Tori Murden|Victoria E. Murden]] and Shirley Metz, reached the pole by land on 17 January 1989.<ref name=":2">{{Cite web|url=http://www.antarctic-circle.org/firsts.htm|title=Antarctic Firsts|date=4 October 2014|website=Antarctic Circle|access-date=24 August 2016}}</ref>

The fastest unsupported journey to the Geographic South Pole from the ocean is 24 days and one hour from [[Hercules Inlet]] and was set in 2011 by Norwegian adventurer Christian Eide,<ref>{{cite news|author=Explorersweb |url=http://www.explorersweb.com/polar/news.php?id=19887 |title=Breaking news: Christian Eide bags the South Pole solo speed ski world record |publisher=explorersweb.com |date=13 January 2011 |access-date=13 January 2011}}</ref> who beat the previous solo record set in 2009 by American [[Todd Carmichael]] of 39 days and seven hours, and the previous group record also set in 2009 of 33 days and 23 hours.<ref>{{cite news|agency=The Canadian Press |url=https://www.thestar.com/News/Canada/article/563312 |title=Canadians break speed record trekking to South Pole |work=Toronto Star |date=7 January 2009 |access-date=10 February 2010}}</ref>

The fastest solo, unsupported and unassisted trek to the south pole by a female was performed by [[Hannah McKeand]] from the UK in 2006. She made the journey in 39 days 9 hours 33 minutes. She started on 19 November 2006 and finished on 28 December 2006.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Guinness World Records 2014|last=Glenday|first=Craig|publisher=The Jim Patison Group|year=2013|isbn=978-1-908843-15-9|pages=[https://archive.org/details/guinnessworldrec0000unse_r3e7/page/76 76]|url=https://archive.org/details/guinnessworldrec0000unse_r3e7/page/76}}</ref>

In the 2011–12 summer, separate expeditions by Norwegian [[Aleksander Gamme]] and Australians [[Cas and Jonesy|James Castrission and Justin Jones]] jointly claimed the first unsupported trek without dogs or kites from the Antarctic coast to the South Pole and back. The two expeditions started from [[Hercules Inlet]] a day apart, with Gamme starting first, but completing according to plan the last few kilometres together. As Gamme traveled alone he thus simultaneously became the first to complete the task solo.<ref>{{cite web|title=Ice Trek Expeditions|url=http://www.icetrek.com/?id=432|access-date=25 May 2013}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=Crossing the Ice|url=http://casandjonesy.com.au/expeditions/crossing-the-ice/|access-date=25 May 2013|archive-url=https://archive.today/20130624120256/http://casandjonesy.com.au/expeditions/crossing-the-ice/|archive-date=24 June 2013|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=Wilson, nå er vi framme!|url=http://gamme.no/x-blogg/entry/antarktis-2011-2012/wilsonnaerviframme|access-date=25 May 2013|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://archive.today/20130624120302/http://gamme.no/x-blogg/entry/antarktis-2011-2012/wilsonnaerviframme|archive-date=24 June 2013}}</ref>

On 28 December 2018, Captain [[Lou Rudd]] became the first Briton to cross the Antarctic unassisted via the south pole, and the second person to make the journey in 56 days.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/science-environment-46708667/capt-lou-rudd-is-first-briton-to-cross-antarctic-unaided|title=Capt Lou Rudd is first Briton to cross Antarctic unaided|publisher=BBC News|date=29 December 2018}}</ref> On 10 January 2020, [[Mollie Hughes]] became the youngest person to ski to the pole, aged 29.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-edinburgh-east-fife-51064356|title=Woman is youngest to ski solo to South Pole|date=10 January 2020|access-date=20 January 2020|language=en-GB}}</ref>

==Climate and day and night==
{{see also|Climate of Antarctica|Midnight sun|Polar night}}

During winter (May through August), the South Pole receives no sunlight at all, and is completely dark apart from moonlight. In summer (November through February), the sun is continuously above the horizon and appears to move in a counter-clockwise circle. However, it is always low in the sky, reaching a maximum of 23.5° around the December solstice because of the 23.5° tilt of the earth's axis. Much of the sunlight that does reach the surface is reflected by the white snow. This lack of warmth from the sun, combined with the high altitude (about {{convert|2800|m|ft|sigfig=2}}), means that the South Pole has one of the coldest climates on Earth (though it is not quite the coldest; that record goes to the region in the vicinity of the [[Vostok Station]], also in Antarctica, which lies at a higher elevation).<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20090610045758/http://www.gsfc.nasa.gov/scienceques2001/20020118.htm Science question of the week], Goddard Space Flight Center.</ref>

The South Pole is at an altitude of {{convert|9200|ft|m|sigfig=2}} but feels like {{convert|11000|ft|m|sigfig=2}}.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.usap.gov/travelAndDeployment/contentHandler.cfm?id=1819|title=The USAP Portal: Science and Support in Antarctica - Course Material|website=www.usap.gov}}</ref> Centrifugal force from the spin of the planet pulls the atmosphere toward the equator. The South Pole is colder than the [[North Pole]] primarily because of the elevation difference and for being in the middle of a continent.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/why-is-the-south-pole-col/|title=Why is the South Pole colder than the North Pole?|website=[[Scientific American]]}}</ref> The North Pole is a few feet from sea level in the middle of an ocean.

In midsummer, as the sun reaches its maximum elevation of about 23.5 degrees, high temperatures at the South Pole in January average at {{convert|-25.9|C|F|0|abbr=on}}. As the six-month "day" wears on and the sun gets lower, temperatures drop as well: they reach {{convert|-55|C|F|0|abbr=on}} around sunset (late March) and sunrise (late September). In midwinter, the average temperature remains steady at around {{convert|-60|C|F|0|abbr=on}}. The highest temperature ever recorded at the Amundsen–Scott South Pole Station was {{convert|-12.3|C|F|1|abbr=on}} on Christmas Day, 2011,<ref>{{cite web | url=http://amrc.ssec.wisc.edu/blog/2011/12/28/preliminary-report-record-temperatures-at-south-pole-and-nearby-aws-sites/|title=Preliminary Report: Record Temperatures at South Pole (and nearby AWS sites…)|date=28 December 2011|author=Matthew A. Lazzara|access-date=28 December 2011}}</ref> and the lowest was {{convert|-82.8|C|F|1|abbr=on}} on 23 June 1982<ref>[http://quest.nasa.gov/antarctica/background/NSF/sp-stay.html Your stay at Amundsen–Scott South Pole Station] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060202103223/http://quest.nasa.gov/antarctica/background/NSF/sp-stay.html |date=2 February 2006 }}, National Science Foundation Office of Polar Programs</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.niwa.co.nz/education-and-training/schools/resources/climate/antarctic |title=How cold is the Antarctic? |publisher=NIWA |access-date=13 August 2012|date=27 February 2007 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://icecube.wisc.edu/pole/weather|title=Antarctic Weather|access-date=25 May 2013}}</ref> (for comparison, the lowest temperature directly recorded anywhere on earth was {{convert|-89.2|C|F|1|abbr=on}} at [[Vostok Station]] on 21 July 1983, though {{convert|-93.2|C|F|1|abbr=on}} was measured indirectly by satellite in [[East Antarctica]] between [[Dome A]] and [[Dome F]] in August 2010<ref>[http://www.nasa.gov/content/goddard/nasa-usgs-landsat-8-satellite-pinpoints-coldest-spots-on-earth/ "NASA-USGS Landsat 8 Satellite Pinpoints Coldest Spots on Earth"], ''NASA'', 9 December 2013</ref>). Mean annual temperature at the South Pole is –49.5 °C (–57.1 °F).<ref name=":0" />

The South Pole has an [[ice cap climate]] ([[Köppen climate classification]] ''[[Ice cap climate|EF]]''). It resembles a desert, receiving very little precipitation. Air humidity is near zero. However, high winds can cause the blowing of snowfall, and the accumulation of snow amounts to about 7 cm (2.8 in) per year.<ref name=":0">[https://www.nsf.gov/pubs/stis1993/opp93103/opp93103.txt Initial environmental evaluation – development of blue-ice and compacted-snow runways], National Science Foundation Office of Polar Programs, 9 April 1993</ref> The former dome seen in pictures of the Amundsen–Scott station is partially buried due to snow storms, and the entrance to the dome had to be regularly bulldozed to uncover it. More recent buildings are raised on stilts so that the snow does not build up against their sides.

{{Weather box
|location = [[Amundsen–Scott South Pole Station]]
|metric first = yes
|single line = yes
|Jan record high C = -12.7
|Feb record high C = -20.6
|Mar record high C = -26.7
|Apr record high C = -27.8
|May record high C = -25.1
|Jun record high C = -28.8
|Jul record high C = -33.9
|Aug record high C = -32.5
|Sep record high C = -29.3
|Oct record high C = -25.1
|Nov record high C = -18.9
|Dec record high C = -12.3
|year record high C = -12.3
|Jan high C = -26.0
|Feb high C = -37.9
|Mar high C = -49.6
|Apr high C = -53.0
|May high C = -53.6
|Jun high C = -54.5
|Jul high C = -55.2
|Aug high C = -54.9
|Sep high C = -54.4
|Oct high C = -48.4
|Nov high C = -36.2
|Dec high C = -26.3
|year high C = -45.8
|Jan mean C = -28.4
|Feb mean C = -40.9
|Mar mean C = -53.7
|Apr mean C = -57.8
|May mean C = -58.0
|Jun mean C = -58.9
|Jul mean C = -59.8
|Aug mean C = -59.7
|Sep mean C = -59.1
|Oct mean C = -51.6
|Nov mean C = -38.2
|Dec mean C = -28.0
|year mean C = -49.5
|Jan low C = -29.6
|Feb low C = -43.1
|Mar low C = -56.8
|Apr low C = -60.9
|May low C = -61.5
|Jun low C = -62.8
|Jul low C = -63.4
|Aug low C = -63.2
|Sep low C = -61.7
|Oct low C = -54.3
|Nov low C = -40.1
|Dec low C = -29.1
|year low C = -52.2
|Jan record low C = -41.1
|Feb record low C = -58.9
|Mar record low C = -71.1
|Apr record low C = -75.0
|May record low C = -78.3
|Jun record low C = -82.8
|Jul record low C = -80.6
|Aug record low C = -79.3
|Sep record low C = -79.4
|Oct record low C = -72.0
|Nov record low C = -55.0
|Dec record low C = -41.1
|year record low C = -82.8
|Jan precipitation mm = 0.3
|Feb precipitation mm = 0.6
|Mar precipitation mm = 0.2
|Apr precipitation mm = 0.1
|May precipitation mm = 0.2
|Jun precipitation mm = 0.1
|Jul precipitation mm = trace
|Aug precipitation mm = trace
|Sep precipitation mm = 0.1
|Oct precipitation mm = 0.1
|Nov precipitation mm = 0.1
|Dec precipitation mm = 0.3
|year precipitation mm = 2.3
|unit precipitation days = 0.1 mm
|Jan precipitation days = 0.2
|Feb precipitation days = 0.3
|Mar precipitation days = 0.2
|Apr precipitation days = 0.0
|May precipitation days = 0.2
|Jun precipitation days = 0.1
|Jul precipitation days = 0.0
|Aug precipitation days = 0.0
|Sep precipitation days = 0.1
|Oct precipitation days = 0.1
|Nov precipitation days = 0.1
|Dec precipitation days = 0.3
|year precipitation days = 1.6
|Jan snow days = 22.0
|Feb snow days = 19.6
|Mar snow days = 13.6
|Apr snow days = 11.4
|May snow days = 17.2
|Jun snow days = 17.3
|Jul snow days = 18.2
|Aug snow days = 17.5
|Sep snow days = 11.7
|Oct snow days = 16.7
|Nov snow days = 16.9
|Dec snow days = 20.6
|year snow days = 203.0
|Jan sun = 497.2
|Feb sun = 406.1
|Mar sun = 195.3
|Apr sun = 0.0
|May sun = 0.0
|Jun sun = 0.0
|Jul sun = 0.0
|Aug sun = 0.0
|Sep sun = 34.1
|Oct sun = 390.6
|Nov sun = 558.0
|Dec sun = 616.9
|year sun = 2698.2
|Jand sun = 17.6
|Febd sun = 13.1
|Mard sun = 6.3
|Aprd sun = 0.0
|Mayd sun = 0.0
|Jund sun = 0.0
|Juld sun = 0.0
|Augd sun = 0.0
|Sepd sun = 1.1
|Octd sun = 12.6
|Novd sun = 18.6
|Decd sun = 19.9
|yeard sun = 7.4
|source 1 = Pogoda.ru.net (temperatures, 1981–2010, extremes 1957–present)<ref name=pogoda>{{cite web
| url = http://www.pogodaiklimat.ru/climate2/89009.htm
| title = Weather and Climate-The Climate of Amundsen–Scott
| language = ru
| publisher = Weather and Climate (Погода и климат)
| access-date = 5 April 2017}}</ref>
|source 2 = [[Deutscher Wetterdienst]] (precipitation 1957–1988 and sun 1978–1993),<ref name = DWD>
{{cite web
| url = http://www.dwd.de/DWD/klima/beratung/ak/ak_890090_kt.pdf
| title = Klimatafel von Amundsen - Scott / Südpol-Station (USA) / Antarktis
| work = Baseline climate means (1961-1990) from stations all over the world
| publisher = Deutscher Wetterdienst
| language = de
| access-date = 5 April 2017}}</ref> NOAA (snowy days data, 1961–1988)<ref name= NOAA>{{cite web
| url = ftp://ftp.atdd.noaa.gov/pub/GCOS/WMO-Normals/ANTARCTICA/AM/89009.TXT
| title = Amundsen–Scott Climate Normals 1961−1990
| publisher = [[National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration]]
| access-date = 5 April 2017}}</ref>
|date=August 2010
}}

==Flora and fauna==
Due to its exceptionally harsh climate, there are no native resident plants or animals at the South Pole. Off-course [[south polar skua]]s and [[snow petrel]]s are occasionally seen there.<ref>Mark Sabbatini, [http://antarcticsun.usap.gov/pastIssues/2002-2003/2003_01_05.pdf "Non-human life form seen at Pole"], ''The Antarctic Sun'', 5 January 2003.</ref>

In 2000 it was reported that [[microbe]]s had been detected living in the South Pole ice.<ref>[http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/827063.stm "Snow microbes found at South Pole"], BBC News, 10 July 2000</ref> Scientists published in the journal ''[[Gondwana Research]]'' that evidence had been found of [[Feathered dinosaur|dinosaurs with feathers]] to protect the animals from the extreme cold. The [[fossil]]s had been found over 100 years ago in [[Koonwarra, Victoria|Koonwarra]], Australia, but in [[sediment]] which had accumulated under a lake which had been near to the South Pole millions of years ago.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://edition.cnn.com/2019/11/14/australia/feathered-dinosaur-australia-intl-hnk-scli-scn/index.html|title=There used to be fluffy dinosaurs at the South Pole|author=Jessie Yeung|website=CNN|date=14 November 2019 |access-date=14 November 2019}}</ref>

==See also==
{{Portal|Geography}}
* [[List of Antarctic expeditions]]
* [[South Pole Telescope]]

==References==
{{Reflist|30em}}

==External links==
{{Commons category|South Pole}}
{{wikivoyage|South Pole}}
* [http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/obop/spo/livecamera.html NOAA South Pole Webcam]
* [http://www.adventure-antarctica.de/tag/panorama/ 360° Panoramas of the South Pole] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150428185409/http://www.adventure-antarctica.de/tag/panorama/ |date=28 April 2015 }}
* [http://confluence.org/confluence.php?lat=-90&lon=0&visit=1 Images of this location] are available at the [[Degree Confluence Project]]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20050905040819/http://www.cmdl.noaa.gov/gallery/SPO South Pole Photo Gallery]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20100426023311/http://www.aad.gov.au/default.asp?casid=1843 Poles] by the Australian Antarctic Division
* [http://antarcticsun.usap.gov/ The Antarctic Sun] – Online news source for the U.S. Antarctic Program
* [http://www.bigdeadplace.com/ Big Dead Place] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160625002841/http://www.bigdeadplace.com/ |date=25 June 2016 }}
* [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/6281839.stm UK team makes polar trek history] – BBC News article on first expedition to Pole of Inaccessibility without mechanical assistance
* Listen to Ernest Shackleton describing his 1908 [http://aso.gov.au/titles/spoken-word/my-south-polar-expedition/ South Pole Expedition], and read more about the recording on [australianscreen online].
* The recording describing Shackleton's 1908 South Pole Expedition was added to the [[National Film and Sound Archive]]'s [[Sounds of Australia]] registry in 2007

{{Polar exploration|state=collapsed}}
{{Historic Sites and Monuments in Antarctica|state=collapsed}}
{{Antarctica}}
{{Authority control}}
[[Category:South Pole| ]]
[[Category:East Antarctica]]
[[Category:Extreme points of Earth]]
[[Category:Geography of Antarctica]]
[[Category:Polar regions of the Earth]]
[[Category:Historic Sites and Monuments of Antarctica]]

Wular

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BrahMos (missile)

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Yantra India Limited

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Gabriel (missile)

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Soldier: Created Gabriel (missile)|Gabriel

'''Gabriel''' is a family of [[sea skimming]] [[anti-ship missile]]s manufactured by [[Israel Aerospace Industries]] (IAI). The initial variant of the missile was developed in the 1960s in response to the needs of the [[Israeli Navy]] which first deployed it in 1970. Since then, variants have been exported to navies around the world. The latest variant, the Gabriel V, is in use by the Finnish and Israeli navies as of 2020.

== Origin ==
On October 21, 1967, four [[P-15 Termit|Styx]] missiles sank the destroyer [[HMS Zealous (R39)|INS ''Eilat'']], which was patrolling along the northern shores of the [[Sinai Peninsula|Sinai]]. Forty-seven Israeli sailors and officers were killed or went [[missing in action]] and 100 were injured.<ref>{{cite web |author=Cécile Pilverdier |url=http://www.un-echo-israel.net/Histoire-d-Israel-annee-1967 |title=Histoire d'Israël : année 1967 - Un écho d'Israël |publisher=Un-echo-israel.net |language=fr |access-date=2011-11-16 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111023092842/http://www.un-echo-israel.net/Histoire-d-Israel-annee-1967 |archive-date=2011-10-23 |url-status=dead }}</ref> The loss of the ship prompted the [[Israeli Navy]] to ask [[Israel Aerospace Industries]] to accelerate the development of an anti-ship missile, which had begun in 1958 with the [[Luz (missile)|Luz]] (or Lutz) program.

==Development==
[[File:INSHaifaShootGabriel1969.jpg|thumb|Testing of the Gabriel missile from [[Sa'ar 2-class missile boat|Sa'ar 2]] class ship, 1969]]

Faced with [[Rafael Advanced Defense Systems]]'s anxiety to develop a new guidance system, [[Shlomo Erell]] asked Israel Aerospace Industries to take over the program by recruiting [[Ori Even-Tov]], a former Rafael engineer. Even-Tov suggested dropping the guidance joystick approach used by the Luz, and instead proposed the development of an autonomous guidance system which would allow the missile to seek its objective, even in bad weather or bad visibility.<ref name="escape">{{cite web|url=http://www.jpost.com/Magazine/Article.aspx?id=164148|access-date=November 1, 2011|title=Escape from Cherbourg|first=Abraham|last=Rebinovich|publisher=Jerusalem Post|date=December 24, 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121018004618/http://www.jpost.com/Magazine/Article.aspx?id=164148|archive-date=October 18, 2012|url-status=live}}</ref>
He further proposed using an altimeter, allowing the missile to fly some meters over the surface of the sea, making it difficult to detect and allowing it to hit the target just above the waterline. A radar installed on the ship had to guide the missile, while the altimeter would keep the missile in sea-skimming mode.<ref name=escape/>

===Gabriel Mk 1===
The development of the Gabriel for the [[Israeli Navy]] began in 1962,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.iai.co.il/14465-14641-en/BusinessAreas_NavalSystems_SeatoSeaMissiles.aspx|title=Israel Aerospace Industries LTD|access-date=8 October 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150207051422/http://www.iai.co.il/14465-14641-en/BusinessAreas_NavalSystems_SeatoSeaMissiles.aspx |archive-date=7 February 2015|url-status=dead}}</ref> before being first shown to the public in 1970. It was touted to be the world's first operational [[sea-skimming]] missile, and saw extensive action during the [[Yom Kippur War]].<ref name="Gabriel Family">{{cite web |url=http://www.harpoondatabases.com/encyclopedia/Entry1365.aspx |title=Gabriel family |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120629070356/http://www.harpoondatabases.com/encyclopedia/Entry1365.aspx |archive-date=2012-06-29 |url-status=dead}}</ref> A batch of 50 was imported by the [[Republic of China Navy]] for evaluation and as the interim weapon for the three Allen M. Sumner class destroyers upgraded with Gabriel Mk 2 missile system, and it is also the basis for the Taiwanese [[Hsiung Feng I]] missile.

===Gabriel Mk 2===
The Gabriel Mk 2, an improved version of Gabriel, was created in 1972 and entered service in 1976. It was also built under license in South Africa under the name ''Skerpioen'' ([[Afrikaans]] for Scorpion).<ref name=janes_gabriel/> The Taiwanese Hsiung Feng I missile can be considered as a parallel development, being based on Gabriel Mk 1 but with similar improvements, and ordnances used by the two systems are interchangeable.

===Gabriel III===
Gabriel III and Gabriel III A/S were introduced in 1978<ref name=janes_gabriel>{{cite web |url=http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Air-Launched-Weapons/Gabriel-Israel.html |title=Gabriel (Israel) - Jane's Air-Launched Weapons |publisher=Articles.janes.com |date=2010-09-08 |access-date=2011-11-16 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110811211404/http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Air-Launched-Weapons/Gabriel-Israel.html |archive-date=2011-08-11 |url-status=dead }}</ref> with major improvements. The air-launched Gabriel III A/S has a range of over 60 km.{{citation needed|date=April 2023}} Both Gabriel III versions employ the widely used '[[fire and forget]]' mode.{{Citation needed|date=May 2011}}

===Gabriel IV===
Developed in the early 1990s is related to the Gabriel Mk III but larger and with a turbojet engine for sustained flight. It is distinguishable from the Mk III because of its swept wings with cropped tip. Like the Mk III, it has 3 guidance modes: Fire and Forget, Fire and Update with data link, and Fire and command using Radar update<ref name="Gabriel Family"/>

===Gabriel V===
Israel Aerospace Industries is reportedly working on a Gabriel V Advanced Naval Attack Missile, with an advanced active multi-spectral seeker designed for cluttered littoral environments.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.iai.co.il/34406-36714-en/BusinessAreas_NavalSystems_AdvancedNavalAttackMissile.aspx|title=Israel Aerospace Industries LTD|access-date=8 October 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150207041019/http://www.iai.co.il/34406-36714-en/BusinessAreas_NavalSystems_AdvancedNavalAttackMissile.aspx |archive-date=7 February 2015|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://defense-update.com/newscast/1007/news/021007_gabriel.htm|title=IAI Introduces Gabriel 5 Anti-Ship Missile System|access-date=8 October 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150724162835/http://defense-update.com/newscast/1007/news/021007_gabriel.htm|archive-date=24 July 2015|url-status=dead}}</ref> As of 2020, this variant is deployed by the [[Finnish Navy|Finnish]] and Israeli navies.<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001343831 |title=צה"ל הודיע על ניסוי מוצלח במערכת טילי ים-ים |newspaper=Globes |date=25 September 2020 |language=he |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200927023449/https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001343831 |archive-date=2020-09-27 |url-status=live|last1=שניידר |first1=טל }}</ref> Range is claimed to be more than 200 km to 400 km.<ref name="Finnish navy"/>

Successful test firing of the Gabriel V was conducted by the Israel Defense Forces on September 21, 2022.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/09/israeli-navy-test-fires-gabriel-v-anti-ship-missile-from-saar-6-corvette/ | title=Israeli Navy test-fires Gabriel V anti-ship missile from Sa'ar 6 corvette | date=22 September 2022 }}</ref>

===Blue Spear and Sea Serpent missile systems===

In 2020, Israel's IAI and Singapore's [[ST Engineering]] started a 50/50 joint venture company called Proteus Advanced Systems to develop, produce and market a derivative of the Gabriel V called the '''Blue Spear''' missile system. The missile has both sea and deep land attack capabilities with enhanced maneuverability for littoral environments. The warhead employs an active radar-homing seeker, accurate INS-based navigation capabilities, beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) capability and a robust system which is immune to GPS disruptions and maximal accuracy target acquisition. The system is equipped with a variety of deception means to achieve its mission and cope with the different battle-field challenges. ST Engineering's role in the Blue Spear's development includes the design, development and production of major subsystems like the booster motor and warhead.

In 2021, IAI and Thales jointly marketed a variant of the Gabriel V/Blue Spear called '''Sea Serpent''' to the [[Royal Navy]] to replace its ageing [[Harpoon (missile)|Harpoon]] missile system. At DSEI 2021, IAI revealed that Sea Serpent was developed in parallel with Blue Spear and based on the Gabriel V missile system and/or older variants. IAI also revealed that Sea Serpent has a low profile mode or sea skimming range of greater than 290 km.<ref name=290km>{{cite web |url=https://www.navalnews.com/event-news/dsei-2021/2021/09/dsei-2021-iai-unveils-new-sea-serpent-anti-ship-missile/ |title=DSEI 2021 |website=navalnews.com |date=September 2021}}</ref> This range corresponds with the overall Gabriel V's range of 200 km to 400 km, depending on flight profile.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Buckby |first=Jack |date=2022-05-14 |title=Blue Spear: The Missile Israel Won't Give to Ukraine |url=https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/05/blue-spear-the-missile-israel-wont-give-to-ukraine/ |access-date=2023-03-21 |website=19FortyFive |language=en-US}}</ref>

In October 2021, it was announced that the [[Estonian Defence Forces]] purchased the Blue Spear missile system with a maximum range of 290 km (flight profile not mentioned).<ref>{{cite web|title=Estonia buys Blue Spear missiles for coastal defense|url=https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2021/10/08/estonia-buys-blue-spear-missiles-for-coastal-defense/|date=8 October 2021|access-date=8 October 2021|website=[[Defense News]]}}</ref> The cost of each missile is about $5 million.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Axe |first=David |title=Estonia’s Getting A Powerful Cruise Missile. Now It Needs Some Way To Find Targets. |url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2021/10/12/estonias-getting-a-powerful-cruise-missile-now-it-needs-some-way-to-find-targets/ |access-date=2023-03-21 |website=Forbes |language=en}}</ref> On 13 May 2022, it was reported that Israel gave permission to Estonia to give Ukraine one Blue Spear 5G SSM rocket complex.<ref>[https://www.jpost.com/international/article-706661 Israel agrees to equip Ukraine with Blue Spear system through Estonia - report], Retrieved on May 14th, 2022</ref> However, the Estonian Minister of Defense dismissed the claims as false.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.delfi.ee/artikkel/120006183/leht-eesti-annab-ukrainale-alles-hiljuti-soetatud-ulimoodsad-laevatorjeraketid-laanet-ei-vasta-toele-see-on-infooperatsioon |title=Leht: Eesti annab Ukrainale alles hiljuti soetatud ülimoodsad laevatõrjeraketid. Laanet: Ei vasta tõele, see on infooperatsioon |website=www.delfi.ee |access-date=May 14, 2022}}</ref>

===Older models===
Older models of the Gabriel are still used by [[Chilean Navy|Chile]] (Sa'ar 4 with Gabriel II), [[Israeli Navy|Israel]] (Sa'ar 4.5 with Gabriel II), [[Mexican Navy|Mexico]] (Sa'ar 4.5 with Gabriel II), [[Sri Lanka Navy|Sri Lanka]] (Sa'ar 4 with Gabriel II) and [[Royal Thai Navy|Thailand]] (FPB-45 with Gabriel I).{{Infobox weapon
| is_missile = yes
| name = Gabriel
| image = Gabrielout.jpg
| image_size = 250
| caption = An IAI Gabriel Anti-ship missile
| origin = Israel
| type = [[Anti-ship missile]]
| used_by = [[#Operators|See ''operators'']]
| manufacturer = [[Israel Aerospace Industries]]
| unit_cost = US$5 million per missile (Gabriel V / Blue Spear)
| production_date =
| service = 1970
| engine =
| weight = Mark I: {{convert|430|kg|abbr=on|lk=on}} Mark II: {{convert|522|kg|abbr=on}} Mark III: {{convert|560|kg|abbr=on}} Mark III A/S: {{convert|590|kg|abbr=on}} Mark IV: {{convert|960|kg|abbr=on}} Mark V: {{convert|1250|kg|abbr=on}}
| length = Mark I: {{convert|3.35|m|abbr=on}} Mark II: {{convert|3.36|m|abbr=on}} Mark III: {{convert|3.75|m|abbr=on}} Mark III A/S: {{convert|3.78|m|abbr=on}} Mark IV: {{convert|4.7|m|abbr=on}} Mark V: {{convert|5.5|m|abbr=on}}
| diameter = Mark I/ II /III / IIIA/S: {{convert|330|mm|abbr=on}} Mark IV: {{convert|440|mm|abbr=on}}
| wingspan = Mark I / II:{{convert|1.35|m|abbr=on}} Mark III:{{convert|1.32|m|abbr=on}} Mark IIIA/S{{convert|1.08|m|abbr=on}} Mark IV:{{convert|1.60|m|abbr=on}}
| speed =
| vehicle_range = Mark I: {{convert|20|km|abbr=on}} Mark II:{{convert|6|-|36|km|abbr=on}} Mark III:{{convert|36|km|abbr=on}} Mark IIIA/S:{{convert|60|km|abbr=on}} Mark IV:{{convert|200|km|abbr=on}}{{citation needed|reason=This claim needs a reliable source|date=April 2021}} Mark V/Blue Spear/Sea Serpent:{{convert|400|km|abbr=on}}
| ceiling =
| altitude = {{convert|2.5|m|abbr=on}}
| filling = Mark II: {{convert|100|kg|abbr=on}} Mark III / IIIA/S: {{convert|150|kg|abbr=on}} Mark IV: {{convert|240|kg|abbr=on}}
| guidance = Mark I / II:Semi-Active Radar Mark III / IIIA/S / IV: Active Radar
| detonation =
| launch_platform =
| variants = developed from [[Luz (missile)]]
}}

==Operational history==
{{more citations needed section|date=May 2011}}
{{See also|Battle of Latakia|Battle of Baltim}}
[[File:Saar 4 Shooting (retouched).jpg|thumb|[[Sa'ar 4-class missile boat|Sa'ar 4]] ship launches the Gabriel missile]]

During the [[Yom Kippur War]] the Gabriel I was used for the first time during the [[Battle of Latakia]]. Israeli missile boats armed with Gabriel Mk 1 missiles were credited with defeating [[Syrian]] ships armed with the [[Soviet Union|Soviet]]-made [[P-15 Termit]] (SS-N-2 Styx) missile. Even though the Styx missile had a longer range, the Gabriel's reliability and flexibility of handling contributed to the Israeli victory.
It is known that the Syrians shot missile salvos at the charging Israeli vessels, but missed due to the Israeli [[Electronic countermeasure|ECM]] technology of the time. When they were in range, the Israeli boats launched their Gabriel missiles, and sank all but one Syrian [[Osa class missile boat|Osa class]] ship, which was later sunk by [[Naval artillery|cannon fire]].
After defeating the Syrian Navy (surviving Syrian ships stayed in port) the Israeli missile boats defeated the Egyptian navy as well, achieving naval supremacy for the remainder of the war.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Razoux|first=Pierre|title=La marine israélienne d'hier à aujourd'hui|language=fr|journal=Marines et Forces Navales|issue=105|date=October–November 2006}}</ref><ref name="escape"/>

===Details===
During the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the [[P-15 Termit|Styx]] was shown to be far less effective than previously believed. From October 6 to October 12, 54 missiles were fired to no effect, according to Western sources. The aforementioned Russian sources{{which|date=September 2020}} however, claim that a total of seven ships were sunk - all small vessels such as trawlers, patrol boats, and missile boats. But the Russian specialists agreed with their Western counterparts that the overall results were unsatisfying, especially considering that seven Egyptian and Syrian vessels were sunk after being hit by Israeli Gabriel Mk.1 anti-ship missiles. This last figure is commonly recognized by specialists in both the West and East.

The first such encounter took place during the night of October 6 to October 7, 1973, near Latakia on the Syrian coast. Israeli forces used helicopters flying slowly at very low altitude, effectively simulating naval targets. No Israeli ship was hit by the large salvo of P-15s subsequently fired by the Syrians, who themselves lost the T-43 class trawler Jarmuk and three torpedo boats to Israeli Gabriel missiles. The Syrian missile boats withdrew successfully, but all of their missiles missed the Israeli helicopters, which had climbed to break the missile radars' locks. On the same night, a similar trick with helicopters was repeated against Egyptian ships north of the [[Sinai Peninsula]]. Yet another encounter took place near Latakia on the night of October 10–11. This time, the missile exchange between Israeli and Syrian missile boats took place without the use of helicopters, and Israeli ships relied on [[Chaff (countermeasure)|chaff]]. The Syrian vessels maneuvered outside their harbor among the anchored [[merchant ship]]s. Two of the warships were sunk by Gabriel missiles, which also hit two neutral ships, the Greek [[Tsimentaros]] and the Japanese [[Yamashuro Maru]]. According to Israeli sources, the use of chaff saved all of its vessels. The following night, the helicopter maneuver was again successfully used during an encounter near [[Tartus]] off the Syrian coast. No Israeli ship was hit by a salvo of P-15s fired by Syrian missile boats. On the Syrian side, two Komar-class vessels were sunk by Gabriel missiles, and also the Soviet merchant ship [[List of shipwrecks in 1973#12 October|''Ilya Mechnikov'']] was hit. On the same night, a similar encounter took place off the coast of [[Port Said]].

==Operators==
[[File:Gabriel operators.png|thumb|400px|Map with Gabriel operators in blue with former operators in red]]
[[File:HN-Gabriel-launcher-x3-1.jpg|thumb|A triple launcher for the Gabriel anti-ship missile]]

===Current operators===

;{{flag|Azerbaijan}}
*[[Azerbaijan Navy]]
;{{flag|Ecuador}}
*[[Ecuadoran Navy]]
;{{flag|Eritrea}}
*[[Eritrean Navy]]
;{{flag|Estonia}}
*[[Estonian Navy]] (Blue Spear 5G SSM)<ref>{{cite web |title=Estonia Awards Contract to Proteus for Blue Spear |url=https://www.iai.co.il/estonia-awards-contract-to-proteus-for-blue-spear |publisher=Israel Aerospace Industries |access-date=9 October 2021 |date=6 October 2021}}</ref>
;{{flag|Finland}}
*[[Finnish Navy]] from 2019 onwards<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.defmin.fi/en/topical/press_releases?588_m=9399 |title=Finnish Navy to acquire new Surface-to-surface Missile system |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180706090647/https://defmin.fi/en/topical/press_releases?588_m=9399 |archive-date=2018-07-06 |url-status=dead }}</ref> (Gabriel V<ref name="Finnish navy">{{Cite web |url=https://merivoimat.fi/artikkeli/-/asset_publisher/merivoimien-uusi-pintatorjuntaohjus-gabriel-5 |title=Merivoimien uusi pintatorjuntaohjus – Gabriel 5 |date=13 December 2019 |language=fi |trans-title=New Navy Surface Missile - Gabriel 5 |access-date=2019-12-13 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20210415072609/https://merivoimat.fi/-/merivoimien-uusi-pintatorjuntaohjus-gabriel-5 |archive-date=2021-04-15 |url-status=live }}</ref>)
;{{ISR}}
*[[Israeli Navy]]
;{{flag|Kenya}}
*[[Kenyan Navy]]
;{{MEX}}
*[[Mexican Navy]]
;{{flag|Sri Lanka}}
*[[Sri Lankan Navy]]

===Former operators===

;{{SGP}}
*[[Republic of Singapore Navy]]
;{{RSA}}
*[[South African Navy]]<ref>{{cite web |url=http://navy.org.za/pages/skerpioen.html |title=Skerpioen (Scorpion/Gabriel II) Ship-to-Ship Missile |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110823013154/http://navy.org.za/pages/skerpioen.html |archive-date=2011-08-23 |url-status=dead}}</ref>
;{{flag|Taiwan}}
*[[Republic of China Navy]] (Mk 2, reduced to reserve status due to service entry of the similar Hsiung Feng I missile and decommissioned in early 1990s)
;{{flag|Thailand}}
*[[Royal Thai Navy]]

==See also==
*[[3M24]]
*[[Exocet]]
*[[Qader (missile)|Qader]]
*[[SOM (missile)|SOM]]
*[[Noor (missile)|Noor ASCM]]
*[[Zafar (anti-ship missile)|Zafar]]
*[[Persian Gulf (missile)|Khalij Fars]]
*[[YJ-83]]

==References==
{{Commons|Gabriel missile}}
{{Reflist}}

{{IAI aircraft}}
{{Authority control}}

[[Category:Anti-ship missiles]]
[[Category:Guided missiles of Israel]]
[[Category:IAI missiles]]
[[Category:Military equipment introduced in the 1970s]]

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{{short description|Shortened version of a standard firearm}}
{{hatgrp|
{{other uses}}
{{Distinguish|Carbyne|Carbene|Carabiner}}
}}
[[File:Coltm4a1.jpeg|thumb|An [[M4 carbine]], a common [[AR-15–style rifle|AR-15–style]] carbine. The M4 is the shorter, lighter carbine variant of the [[M16 rifle]].]]
A '''carbine''' ({{IPAc-en|ˈ|k|ɑr|b|iː|n}} {{Respell|KAR|been}} or {{IPAc-en|ˈ|k|ɑr|b|aɪ|n}} {{Respell|KAR|byn}})<ref>{{cite web |url=http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=carbine |title=Carbine |website=[[Dictionary.com]] |access-date=October 8, 2014}}</ref> is a [[long gun]] that has a [[gun barrel|barrel]] shortened from its original length.<ref>{{cite EB1911|wstitle=Carbine|noicon=1}}</ref> Most modern carbines are [[rifle]]s that are compact versions of a longer rifle or are rifles chambered for less powerful [[cartridge (firearms)|cartridges]].

The smaller size and lighter weight of carbines make them easier to handle. They are typically issued to high-mobility troops such as [[special operations|special operations soldiers]] and [[paratrooper]]s, as well as to mounted, [[artillery]], logistics, or other non-[[infantry]] personnel whose roles do not require full-sized rifles, although there is a growing tendency for carbines to be issued to front-line soldiers to offset the increasing weight of other issued equipment. An example of this is the [[M4 carbine]], the standard issue carbine of the [[United States Armed Forces]].

==Etymology==
The name comes from its first users — cavalry troopers called "[[carabinier]]s", from the French ''carabine'',<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/carbine |title=Carbine |website=Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary |access-date=September 26, 2018}}</ref> from Old French ''carabin'' (soldier armed with a musket), whose origin is unclear. One theory connects it to an "ancient engine of war" called a ''calabre'';<ref name="oed">{{cite web |url=http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/27682 |title=Carabin |website=[[Oxford English Dictionary]] |url-access=subscription }}</ref> another connects it to Medieval Latin ''Calabrinus'' 'Calabrian';<ref name="oed"/><ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.etymonline.com/word/carbine |title=Carbine |website=[[Online Etymology Dictionary]] |access-date=September 26, 2018}}</ref> yet another, less likely, to ''escarrabin'', gravedigger, from the [[Scarabaeidae|scarab beetle]].<ref>{{cite encyclopedia |url=http://www.thefreedictionary.com/carbine |title=Carbine |date=2016 |publisher=Houghton Mifflin Harcourt |encyclopedia=The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language |edition=Fifth |via=thefreedictionary.com |access-date=September 26, 2018}}</ref>

==History==
===Hand cannon===
In 1432, the [[Joseon]] dynasty under the reign of [[Sejong the Great]] introduced world's first [[handgun]], named {{Ill|Chongtong|ko|세총통}} (총통). The chongtong has a total length of 13.8 cm, inner diameter of 0.9 cm, and outer diameter of 1.4 cm. It is held by its cheolheumja (철흠자, iron tong-handle), which allows a quick change of barrel for the next shot, and fires chase-jeon (차세전, a contemporary type of standardized arrow) with a maximum fatal range of 200 footsteps (≈250 meters). Initially, Joseon considered the gun a failure due to its short effective range, but the chongtong quickly saw use after fielding to the frontier provinces starting in June 1437. chongtong was used by both soldiers of different units and by civilians, including women and children, as a personal defense weapon. The gun was notably used by chetamja (체탐자, special reconnaissance), whose mission was to infiltrate enemy territory, and by [[carabinier]]s carrying multiple guns, who benefited from its compact size.<ref>{{Cite web|title=세총통(細銃筒) - 한국민족문화대백과사전|url=http://encykorea.aks.ac.kr/Contents/Item/E0029880|access-date=2022-02-25|website=encykorea.aks.ac.kr}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=보물 세총통 (細銃筒) : 국가문화유산포털 - 문화재청|url=https://www.heritage.go.kr/heri/cul/culSelectDetail.do?pageNo=1_1_1_0&ccbaKdcd=12&ccbaAsno=08540000&ccbaCtcd=11&ccbaCpno=1121108540000|access-date=2022-02-25|website=Heritage Portal : CULTURAL HERITAGE ADMINISTRATION|language=ko}}</ref><ref>{{Citation|title=【ENG SUB】세계최초 권총형 총통 '세총통' feat. 화력대왕 '세종' Se-Chongtong, the Smallest of Korean Hand Cannons|url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3T8tsaAM7es|language=en|access-date=2022-02-25}}</ref>

===Carbine arquebus and musket===
[[File:Reitar XVII (left, cropped).jpg|thumb|upright|Harquebusier, carbine-armed cavalry, 17th century]]
[[File:Carbine mod 1793-IMG 4737-white.jpg|thumb|upright|Carbine model 1793, used by the French Army during the [[French Revolutionary Wars]]]]

The carbine was originally developed for [[cavalry]]. The start of [[early modern warfare]] about the 16th century had infantry armed with [[firearm]]s, prompting cavalry to do the same, even though reloading [[Muzzleloader|muzzle loading]] firearms while moving mounted was highly impractical.<ref>Black, Jeremy, ''Cambridge Illustrated Atlas, Warfare: Renaissance to Revolution, 1492–1792'', (Cambridge University Press|page=1996)</ref> Some cavalry, such as the German [[Reiter]]s, added one or more pistols, while other cavalry, such as [[harquebusier]]s, tried various shorter, lightened versions of the infantry [[arquebus]] weapons – the first carbines. But these weapons were still difficult to reload while mounted, and the [[Sabre|saber]] often remained main weapon of such cavalry. [[Dragoon]]s and other [[mounted infantry]] that dismounted for battles usually adopted standard infantry firearms, though some favored versions that were less encumbering when riding – something that could be arranged to hang clear of the rider's elbows and horse's legs.

While more portable, carbines had the general disadvantages of less accuracy and power than the longer guns of the infantry. During [[Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic warfare]], pistol and carbine-armed cavalry generally transitioned into traditional melee cavalry or dragoons. Carbines found increased use outside of standard cavalry and infantry, such as support and artillery troops, who might need to defend themselves from attack but would be hindered by keeping full-sized weapons with them continuously; a common title for many short rifles in the late 19th century was ''artillery carbine''.

===Carbine rifle===

As the [[rifled musket]] replaced the [[smoothbore]] firearms for infantry in the mid 19th century, carbine versions were also developed; this was often developed separately from the infantry rifles and, in many cases, did not even use the same ammunition, which made for supply difficulties.

A notable weapon developed towards the end of the [[American Civil War]] by the [[Union (American Civil War)|Union]] was the [[Spencer repeating rifle|Spencer carbine]], one of the first [[Breechloader|breechloading]], [[Repeating rifle|repeating]] weapons.<ref name="Pritchard2003">{{cite book|last=Pritchard|first=Russ A.|title=Civil War Weapons and Equipment|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=YOmZolJJktAC&pg=PA49|date=1 August 2003|publisher=Globe Pequot Press|isbn=978-1-58574-493-0|pages=49–41}}</ref> It had a spring-powered, removable [[Magazine (firearms)|tube magazine]] in the [[Stock (firearms)|buttstock]] which held seven rounds and could be reloaded by inserting spare tubes. It was intended to give the cavalry a replacement weapon which could be fired from horseback without the need for awkward reloading after each shot – although it saw service mostly with dismounted troopers, as was typical of cavalry weapons during that war.

In the late 19th century, it became common for a number of nations to make [[Bolt action|bolt-action]] rifles in both full-length and carbine versions. One of the most popular and recognizable carbines were the [[Lever action|lever-action]] [[Winchester rifle|Winchester carbines]], with several versions available firing [[revolver]] cartridges. This made it an ideal choice for [[cowboy]]s and explorers, as well as other inhabitants of the [[Western United States|American West]], who could carry a revolver and a carbine, both using the same ammunition.

The [[Lee–Enfield#Magazine Lee–Enfield|Lee Enfield Cavalry Carbine]], a shortened version of the standard [[British Army]] infantry rifle was introduced in 1896, although it did not become the standard British cavalry weapon until 1903.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Skennerton |first=Ian |year=2007 |title=The Lee–Enfield |publisher=Arms & Militaria Press |location=Gold Coast QLD (Australia) |isbn=978-0-949749-82-6 |page=90}}</ref>

===World Wars===

[[File:Chauchat-Ribeyrolles 1918 submachine gun.jpg|thumb|[[Chauchat-Ribeyrolles 1918 submachine gun|Chauchat-Ribeyrolles]]]]

In late 1918 France developed the [[Chauchat-Ribeyrolles 1918 submachine gun|Chauchat-Ribeyrolles]] for tank crews to defend themselves. Developed from the [[Fusil Automatique Modèle 1917]], the stock was replaced with a pistol grip, and the barrel is significantly shorter at {{convert|340|mm|in|abbr=on}} resulting in an overall length of {{convert|575|mm|in|abbr=on}}.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Ribeyrolles shortened Model 1917 rifle |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230823022212/http://www.securityarms.com/20010315/galleryfiles/3300/3354.htm |access-date=2023-08-23 |website=www.securityarms.com}}</ref>

[[File:Garandcar.jpg|thumb|M1 Garand and M1 Carbine]]

In the decades following World War I, the standard battle rifle used by armies around the world had been growing shorter, either by redesign or by the general issue of carbine versions instead of full-length rifles. This move was initiated by the U.S. [[M1903 Springfield|Model 1903 Springfield]], which was originally produced in 1907 with a short {{convert|610|mm|in|abbr=on}} barrel, providing a short rifle that was longer than a carbine but shorter than a typical rifle, so it could be issued to all troops without need for separate versions.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Sheehan|first1=John|title=Battlefield tack driver: the model 1903 Springfield in WWI|journal=Guns Magazine|date=1 October 2006|url=http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Battlefield+tack+driver%3a+the+model+1903+Springfield+in+WWI.-a0150451303|access-date=22 April 2015}}</ref> Other nations followed suit after World War I, when they learned that their traditional long-barreled rifles provided little benefit in the trenches and merely proved a hindrance to the soldiers. Examples include the Russian [[Mosin–Nagant|Model 1891 rifle]], originally with an {{convert|800|mm|in|abbr=on}} barrel, later shortened to {{convert|730|mm|in|abbr=on}} in 1930, and to {{convert|510|mm|in|abbr=on}} in 1938, the German [[Mauser]] [[Gewehr 98]] rifles went from {{convert|740|mm|in|abbr=on}} in 1898 to {{convert|600|mm|in|abbr=on}} in 1935 as the ''[[Karabiner 98k]]'' (K98k or Kar98k), or "short carbine".

The barrel lengths in rifles used by the United States did not change between the bolt-action M1903 rifle of World War I and the World War II [[M1 Garand]] rifle, because the {{convert|610|mm|in|abbr=on}} barrel on the M1903 was still shorter than even the shortened versions of the Model 1891 and Gewehr 98. The U.S. [[M1 carbine]] was more of a traditional carbine in that it was significantly shorter and lighter, with a {{convert|450.9|mm|in|abbr=on}} barrel, than the M1 Garand rifle, and that it was intended for rear-area troops who could not be hindered with full-sized rifles but needed something more powerful and accurate than a [[M1911 pistol|Model 1911 pistol]] (although this did not stop soldiers from using them on the front line). Contrary to popular belief, and even what some books claim, in spite of both being designated "M1", the M1 Carbine was ''not'' a shorter version of the [[.30-06 Springfield|.30-06]] M1 Garand, as is typical for most rifles and carbines, but it was a wholly different design, firing [[.30 Carbine|a smaller, less-powerful cartridge]]. The "M1" designates each as the first model in the new U.S. designation system, which no longer used the year of introduction but a sequential series of numbers starting at "1": the M1 ''Carbine'' and M1 ''Rifle''.

The United Kingdom developed a "[[Jungle Carbine]]" version of their Lee–Enfield service rifle, featuring a shorter barrel, flash suppressor, and manufacturing modifications designed to decrease the rifle's weight<ref>Wilson, Royce (May 2006). Jungle Fever- The Lee-Enfield .303 Rifle. Australian Shooter Magazine</ref> Officially titled ''Rifle, No. 5 Mk I'', it was introduced in the closing months of World War II, but it did not see widespread service until the [[Korean War]], the [[Mau Mau Uprising]], and the [[Malayan Emergency]] as well as the [[Vietnam War]].

===Post World War II===
[[File:FAL IMG 1528.jpg|thumb|upright|[[FN FAL]] rifle – (left) full size, (right) carbine/paratrooper variant with a folding stock and shortened barrel]]
A shorter weapon was more convenient when riding in a truck, [[armored personnel carrier]], [[helicopter]], or aircraft, and also when engaged in close-range combat. Based on the combat experience of World War II, the criteria used for selecting infantry weapons began to change. Unlike previous wars, which were often fought mainly from fixed lines and trenches, World War II was a highly mobile war, often fought in cities, forests, or other areas where mobility and visibility were restricted. In addition, improvements in artillery made moving infantry in open areas even less practical than it had been.

The majority of enemy contacts were at ranges of less than {{convert|300|m|yd|abbr=off}}, and the enemy was exposed to fire for only short periods of time as they moved from cover to cover. Most rounds fired were not aimed at an enemy combatant but instead fired in the enemy's direction [[suppressive fire|to keep them from moving and from firing back]]. These situations did not require a heavy rifle, firing full-power rifle bullets with long-range accuracy. A less-powerful weapon would still produce casualties at the shorter ranges encountered in actual combat, and the reduced [[recoil]] would allow more shots to be fired in the short amount of time an enemy was visible. The lower-powered round would also weigh less, allowing a soldier to carry more ammunition. With no need of a long barrel to fire full-power ammunition, a shorter barrel could be used. A shorter barrel made the weapon weigh less, was easier to handle in tight spaces, and was easier to shoulder quickly to fire a shot at an unexpected target. [[Automatic firearm|Full-automatic]] fire was also considered a desirable feature, allowing the soldier to fire short bursts of three to five rounds, increasing the probability of a hit on a moving target.

The Germans had experimented with [[selective-fire]] carbines firing rifle cartridges during the early years of World War II. These were determined to be less than ideal, as the recoil of full-power rifle cartridges caused the weapon to be uncontrollable in full-automatic fire. They then developed an intermediate-power cartridge round, which was accomplished by reducing the power and the length of the standard [[7.92×57mm Mauser]] rifle cartridge to create the [[7.92×33mm]] {{lang|de|kurz}} (short) cartridge. A selective-fire weapon was developed to fire this shorter cartridge, eventually resulting in the [[Sturmgewehr 44]], later translated as "[[assault rifle]]" (also frequently called "machine carbines" by Allied intelligence, a quite accurate assessment, in fact). Very shortly after World War II, the USSR adopted a similar weapon, the ubiquitous [[AK-47]], the first model in the famed [[Kalashnikov rifle|Kalashnikov-series]], which became the standard Soviet infantry weapon and which has been produced and exported in extremely large numbers up through the present day.

Although the United States had developed the M2 Carbine, a selective-fire version of the M1 Carbine during WW2, the .30 Carbine cartridge was closer to a pistol round in power, making it more of a [[submachine gun]] than an assault rifle. It was also adopted only in very small numbers and issued to few troops (the semi-automatic M1 carbine was produced in a 10-to-1 ratio to the M2), while the AK47 was produced by the millions and was standard-issue to all Soviet troops, as well as those of many other nations. The U.S. was slow to follow suit, insisting on retaining a full-power, [[7.62×51mm NATO]] rifle, the [[M14 rifle|M14]] (although this ''was'' selective fire).

In the 1950s, the British developed the [[.280 British]], an intermediate cartridge, and a select-fire [[bullpup]] assault rifle to fire it, the [[EM-2 rifle|EM-2]]. They pressed for the U.S. to adopt it so it could become a NATO-standard round, but the U.S. insisted on retaining a full-power, .30 caliber round. This forced NATO to adopt the [[7.62×51mm NATO]] round (which in reality is only slightly different ballistically from the .308 Winchester), to maintain commonality. The British eventually adopted the 7.62mm [[FN FAL]], and the U.S. adopted the 7.62mm [[M14 rifle]]. These rifles are both what is known as ''[[battle rifle]]s'' and were a few inches shorter than the standard-issue rifles they replaced ({{convert|22|in|adj=on}} barrel as opposed to {{convert|24|in}} for the M1 Garand), although they were still full-powered rifles, with selective fire capability. These can be compared to the even shorter, less-powerful assault rifle, which might be considered the "carbine branch of weapons development", although indeed, there are now carbine variants of many of the assault rifles which had themselves seemed quite small and light when adopted.

[[File:M855 drop during 25-meter zeroing trajectory M16A2 M4.jpg|thumb|left|Bullet drop of the M16A2 rifle (yellow) vs M4 carbine (red)]]
By the 1960s, after becoming involved in war in Vietnam, the U.S. did an abrupt about-face and decided to standardize on the intermediate [[5.56×45mm NATO|5.56×45mm]] round (based on the [[.223 Remington]] [[Varmint rifle|varmint cartridge]]) fired from the new, lightweight [[M16 rifle]], leaving NATO to hurry and catch up. Many of the NATO countries could not afford to re-equip so soon after the recent 7.62mm standardization, leaving them armed with full-power 7.62mm battle rifles for some decades afterwards, although by this point, the 5.56mm has been adopted by almost all NATO countries and many non-NATO nations as well. This 5.56mm NATO round was even lighter and smaller than the Soviet [[7.62×39mm]] AK-47 cartridge but possessed higher velocity. In U.S. service, the M16 assault rifle replaced the M14 as the standard infantry weapon, although the M14 continued to be used by [[designated marksmen]]. Although at {{convert|20|in}}, the barrel of the M16 was shorter than that of the M14, it was still designated a "rifle" rather than a "carbine", and it was still longer than the AK-47, which used a {{convert|16|in|adj=on}} barrel. (The [[SKS]] – an interim, semi-automatic, weapon adopted a few years before the AK-47 was put into service – was designated a carbine, even though its {{convert|20|in|adj=on}} barrel was significantly longer than the AK series' {{convert|16.3|in}}. This is because of the Kalashnikov's revolutionary nature, which altered the old paradigm. Compared to previous rifles, particularly the Soviets' initial attempts at semi-automatic rifles, such as the {{convert|24|in|adj=on}} [[SVT-40]], the SKS was significantly shorter. The Kalashnikov altered traditional notions and ushered in a change in what was considered a "rifle" in military circles.)

In 1974, shortly after the introduction of the 5.56mm NATO, the USSR began to issue a new Kalashnikov variant, the [[AK-74]], chambered in the small-bore [[5.45×39mm]] cartridge, which was a standard 7.62×39mm necked down to take a smaller, lighter, faster bullet. It soon became standard issue in Soviet nations, although many of the nations with export Kalashnikovs retained the larger 7.62×39mm round. In 1995, the [[China|People's Republic of China]] adopted a new [[5.8×42mm]] cartridge to match the modern trend in military ammunition, replacing the previous 7.62×39mm and 5.45×39mm round as standard.

Later, even lighter carbine variants of many of these short-barreled assault rifles came to be adopted as the standard infantry weapon. In much modern tactical thinking, only a certain number of soldiers need to retain longer-range weapons, serving as designated marksmen. The rest can carry lighter, shorter-ranged weapons for [[close quarters combat]] and suppressive fire. This is basically a more extreme extension of the idea that brought the original assault rifle. Another factor is that with the increasing weight of technology, sighting systems, [[Armour|ballistic armor]], etc., the only way to reduce the burden on the modern soldier was to equip them with a smaller, lighter weapon. Also, modern soldiers rely a great deal on vehicles and helicopters to transport them around the battle area, and a longer weapon can be a serious hindrance to entering and exiting these vehicles. Development of lighter assault rifles continued, matched by developments in even lighter carbines. In spite of the short barrels of the new assault rifles, carbine variants like the [[5.45×39mm]] [[AKS-74U]] and [[CAR-15|Colt Commando]] were being developed for use when mobility was essential and a submachine gun was not sufficiently powerful. The AKS-74U featured an extremely short {{convert|8.1|in|adj=on}} barrel which necessitated redesigning and shortening the [[Gas-operated reloading|gas-piston]] and integrating front sights onto the gas tube; the Colt Commando was a bit longer, at {{convert|11.5|in}}. Neither was adopted as standard issue, although the U.S. did later adopt the somewhat longer M4 carbine, with a {{convert|14.5|in|adj=on}} barrel.

==Modern history==

===Contemporary military forces===
{{multiple image
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| caption1 = [[Steyr AUG]] ''rifle'' ({{convert|508|mm|in|1|abbr=on}} barrel)
| image2 = AUG A1 407mm 03.jpg
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| caption2 = Steyr AUG ''carbine'' ({{convert|407|mm|in|1|abbr=on}} barrel). Carbine conversion is achieved by changing to a shorter barrel.
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[[File:OH-58D 2.jpg|thumb|right|Two M4 carbines stowed ahead of the [[flight instrument]] panel of a US Army OH-58D reconnaissance helicopter, over Iraq in 2004]]

In 1994, the U.S. had adopted the [[M4 carbine]], a derivative of the M16 family which fired the same 5.56mm cartridge but was lighter and shorter (in overall length and barrel length), resulting in marginally reduced range and power, although offering better mobility and lighter weight to offset the weight of equipment and armor that a modern soldier has to carry.

In spite of the benefits of the modern carbine, many armies are experiencing a certain backlash against the universal equipping of soldiers with carbines and lighter rifles in general, and are equipping selected soldiers, usually designated marksmen, with higher-powered rifles. Another problem comes from the loss of muzzle velocity caused by the shorter barrel, which when coupled with the typical small, lightweight bullets, causes effectiveness to be diminished; a 5.56mm gets its lethality from its high velocity, and when fired from the {{convert|14.5|in|adj=on}} M4 carbine, its power, penetration, and range are diminished. Thus, there has been a move towards adopting a slightly more powerful cartridge tailored for high performance from both long and short barrels. The U.S. has experimented with a new, slightly larger and heavier caliber such as the [[6.5mm Grendel]] or [[6.8mm Remington SPC]], which are heavier and thus retain more effectiveness at lower muzzle velocities.

While the U.S. Army adopted the M4 carbine in 1994, the [[U.S. Marine Corps]] retained their {{convert|20|in|adj=on}} barrel M16A4 rifles long afterwards, citing the increased range and effectiveness over the carbine version; officers were required to carry an M4 carbine rather than an M9 pistol, as Army officers do. Because the Marine Corps emphasizes "every Marine a rifleman", the lighter carbine was considered a suitable compromise between a rifle and a pistol. Marines with restricted mobility such as vehicle operators, or a greater need for mobility such as squad leaders, were issued M4 carbines. In 2015, the Marine Corps approved the M4 carbine for standard issue to front-line Marines, replacing the M16A4 rifle. The rifles are issued to support troops while the carbines go to the front-line Marines, in a reversal of the traditional roles of "rifles for the front line, carbines for the rear".

===Special forces===
[[Special forces]] need to perform fast, decisive operations, frequently airborne or boat-mounted. A pistol, though light and quick to operate, is viewed as not having enough power, firepower, or range. A submachine gun has selective fire, but firing a pistol cartridge and having a short barrel and sight radius, it is not accurate or powerful enough at longer ranges. Submachine guns also tend to have poorer armor and cover penetration than rifles and carbines firing rifle ammunition. Consequently, carbines have gained wide acceptance among [[United States Special Operations Command]], [[United Kingdom Special Forces]], and other communities, having relatively light weight, large magazine capacity, selective fire, and much better range and penetration than a submachine gun.

==Usage==
The smaller size and relative lighter weight of carbines makes them easier to handle in close-quarter situations such as [[urban warfare|urban]] engagements, when deploying from military vehicles, or in any situation where space is confined. The disadvantages of carbines relative to rifles include inferior long-range accuracy and a shorter effective range. These comparisons refer to carbines (short-barreled rifles) of the same power and class as the regular full-sized rifles.

Compared to submachine guns, carbines have a greater effective range and are capable of penetrating [[Combat helmet|helmet]]s and [[Personal armor|body armor]] when used with [[armor-piercing ammunition]].<ref name="defensereview.com">{{cite web |url=http://www.defensereview.com/submachine-guns-smgs-outpaced-by-today%E2%80%99s-modern-short-barreled-rifles-sbrssub-carbines-or-still-a-viable-tool-for-close-quarters-battleclose-quarters-combat-cqbcqc/ |title=Submachine Guns (SMG's): Outpaced by Today's Modern Short-Barreled Rifles (SBR's)/Sub-Carbines, or Still a Viable Tool for Close Quarters Battle/Close Quarters Combat (CQB/CQC)? |last=Gurwitch |first=Jeff |date=December 11, 2011 |website=Defense Review |access-date=September 26, 2018}}</ref> However, submachine guns are still used by [[special forces|military special forces]] and [[SWAT|police SWAT teams]] for close quarters battle because they are "a pistol caliber weapon that's easy to control, and less likely to over-penetrate the target."<ref name="defensereview.com"/> Also, carbines are harder to maneuver in tight encounters where superior range and [[stopping power]] at distance are not great considerations.

Firing the same ammunition as standard-issue rifles or pistols gives carbines the advantage of standardization over those [[personal defense weapon]]s that require proprietary [[Cartridge (firearms)|cartridges]].

The modern usage of the term carbine covers much the same scope as it always had, namely lighter weapons (generally rifles) with barrels up to {{convert|20|in}} in length. These weapons can be considered carbines, while rifles with barrels longer than {{convert|20|in}} are generally not considered carbines unless specifically named so. Conversely, many rifles have barrels ''shorter'' than 20 inches, yet are not considered carbines. The AK series rifles has an almost universal barrel length of {{convert|16.3|in}}, well within carbine territory, yet has always been considered a rifle, perhaps because it was designed as such and not shortened from a longer weapon. Modern carbines use ammunition ranging from that used in light pistols up to powerful rifle cartridges, with the usual exception of high-velocity magnum cartridges. In the more powerful cartridges, the short barrel of a carbine has significant disadvantages in velocity, and the high residual pressure, and frequently still-burning powder and gases, when the bullet exits the barrel results in substantially greater [[Muzzle flash|muzzle blast]]. [[Flash suppressor]]s are a common, partial solution to this problem, although even the best flash suppressors are hard put to deal with the excess flash from the still-burning powder leaving the short barrel (and they also add several inches to the length of the barrel, diminishing the purpose of having a short barrel in the first place).

==Pistol-caliber carbines==

[[File:Marlin Model 1894C .357 Magnum.jpg|thumb|upright=1.35|[[Marlin Model 1894|Marlin 1894C]] .357 Magnum carbine]]
The typical carbine is the pistol-caliber carbine. These first appeared soon after metallic cartridges became common. These were developed as "companions" to the popular [[revolver]]s of the day, firing the same cartridge but allowing more velocity and accuracy than the revolver. These were carried by [[cowboy]]s, lawmen, and others in the [[Old West]]. The classic combination would be a [[Winchester rifle|Winchester]] lever-action carbine and a [[Colt Single Action Army]] revolver in [[.44-40 Winchester|.44-40]] or [[.38-40 Winchester|.38-40]]. During the 20th century, this trend continued with more modern and powerful smokeless revolver cartridges, in the form of [[Winchester Model 1894|Winchester]] and [[Marlin Model 1894|Marlin]] lever action carbines [[chamber (firearms)|chambered]] in [[.38 Special]]/[[.357 Magnum]] and [[.44 Special]]/[[.44 Magnum]].

Modern equivalents include the [[Ruger Police Carbine]] and Ruger PC Carbine, which uses the same magazine as the Ruger [[pistol]]s of the same caliber, and the (discontinued) [[Marlin Camp Carbine]], which, in [[.45 ACP]], used M1911 magazines. The [[Ruger Model 44]] and [[Ruger Deerfield Carbine]] were both carbines chambered in [[.44 Magnum]]. The [[Beretta Cx4 Storm]] shares magazines with many [[Beretta]] pistols and is designed to be complementary to the [[Beretta Px4 Storm]] pistol. The [[Hi-Point Carbine|Hi-Point 995TS]] are popular, economical and reliable alternatives to other pistol caliber carbines in the United States, and their magazines can be used in the [[Hi-Point C-9 and C-9 Comp|Hi-Point C-9]] pistol. Another example is the [[Kel-Tec SUB-2000]] series chambered in either [[9mm Parabellum]] or [[.40 S&W]], which can be configured to accept Glock, Beretta, S&W, or SIG pistol magazines. The SUB-2000 also has the somewhat unusual (although not unique) ability to fold in half.

[[File:Ruger-PC-Carbine-9mm.jpg|thumb|upright=1.35|Ruger PC Carbine in [[9×19mm Parabellum]]]]
[[File:Kel-Tec-Sub-2000.jpg|thumb|upright=1.35|[[Kel-Tec SUB-2000]] carbine in [[9×19mm Parabellum]]]]
The primary advantage of a carbine over a pistol using the same ammunition is controllability. The combination of firing from the shoulder, longer sight-radius, 3 points of contact (firing hand, support hand & shoulder), and precision offer a significantly more user-friendly platform. Carbines like the [[Kel-Tec SUB-2000]], [[Hi-Point Carbine|Hi Point 995TS]], Just Right Carbines (JR Carbine) and [[Beretta Cx4 Storm]] have the ability to mount user friendly optics, lights and lasers thanks to them having accessory rails, which make target acquisition and engagement much easier.
[[File:JR-Carbine-9mm.jpg|thumb|upright=1.35|Just Right Carbines (JC Carbine) in [[9×19mm Parabellum]] with 3-9 X 42mm scope and red dot sight]]

The longer barrel can offer increased velocity and, with it, greater energy and effective range due to the propellant having more time to burn. However, loss in bullet velocity can happen where the propellant is utilised before the bullet reaches the muzzle, combined with the friction from the barrel on the bullet. As long guns, pistol-caliber carbines may be less legally restricted than handguns in some jurisdictions. Compared to carbines chambered in [[intermediate cartridge|intermediate]] or [[rifle cartridge|rifle]] calibers, such as [[.223 Remington]] and [[7.62×54mmR]], pistol-caliber carbines generally experience less of an increase in [[external ballistics|external ballistic]] properties as a result of the [[smokeless powder#Physical variations|propellant]]. The drawback is that one loses the primary benefits of a handgun, i.e. portability and concealability, resulting in a weapon almost the size of, but less accurate than, a long-gun, but not much more powerful than a pistol.

Also widely produced are semi-automatic and typically longer-barreled derivatives of select-fire [[submachine gun]]s, such as the [[FN P90#Semi-automatic models|FN PS90]], [[Heckler & Koch UMP#Variants|HK USC]], [[KRISS Vector]], [[Thompson submachine gun|Thompson carbine]], [[CZ Scorpion Evo 3|CZ Scorpion S1 Carbine]] and the [[Uzi#Civilian variants|Uzi carbine]]. In order to be sold legally in many countries, the barrel must meet a minimum length ({{convert|16|in}} in the US). So the original submachine gun is given a legal-length barrel and made into a semi-automatic, transforming it into a carbine. Though less common, pistol-caliber conversions of [[Centerfire ammunition|centerfire]] rifles like the [[AR-15]] are commercially available.

===Shoulder-stocked handgun===
[[File:Mauser C96 M1916 Red 9 7.JPG|thumb|upright=1.35|[[Mauser C96]] "Red 9" variant with attached [[Stock (firearms)|shoulder-stock]]]]
Some handguns used to come from the factory with mounting lugs for a shoulder stock, notably including the "Broomhandle" [[Mauser C96]], [[Luger pistol|Luger P.08]], and [[Browning Hi-Power]]. In the case of the first two, the pistol could come with a hollow wooden stock that doubled as a holster.

Carbine conversion kits are commercially available for many other pistols, including [[M1911 pistol|M1911]] and most [[Glock]]s. These can either be simple shoulder stocks fitted to a pistol or full carbine conversion kits, which are at least {{convert|26|in|mm|abbr=on}} long and replace the pistol's barrel with one at least {{convert|16|in|mm|abbr=on}} long for compliance with the United States law. In the US, fitting a shoulder stock to a handgun with a barrel less than {{convert|16|in}} long legally turns it into a [[short-barreled rifle]], which is in violation of the [[National Firearms Act]].

==Legal issues==

===United States===
Under the [[National Firearms Act of 1934]], firearms with shoulder stocks or originally manufactured as a rifle and barrels less than {{convert|16|in|mm|abbr=on}} in length are classified as [[short-barreled rifle]]s. Short-barreled rifles are restricted similarly to [[Sawed-off shotgun#United States|short-barreled shotguns]], requiring a $200 tax paid prior to manufacture or transfer – a process which can take several months. Because of this, firearms with barrels of less than {{convert|16|in|mm|abbr=on}} and a shoulder stock are uncommon. A list of firearms not covered by the NFA due to their antique status may be found here<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.atf.gov/file/84401/download |title=Curios or Relics List — Update March 2001 through May 2005 |website=Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives |access-date=November 13, 2015}}</ref> or due to their ''Curio and Relic'' status may be found here;<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.atf.gov/file/84376/download |title=Curios or Relics List — Update January 2009 through June 2010 |website=Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives |access-date=November 13, 2015}}</ref> these lists includes a number of carbines with barrels less than the minimum legal length and firearms that are "primarily collector's items and are not likely to be used as weapons and, therefore, are excluded from the provisions of the National Firearms Act." [[Machine gun]]s, as their own class of firearm, are not subject to requirements of other class firearms.

Distinct from simple shoulder stock kits, full carbine conversion kits are not classified as short-barreled rifles. By replacing the pistol barrel with one at least {{convert|16|in|mm|abbr=on}} in length and having an overall length of at least {{convert|26|in|mm|abbr=on}}, a carbine converted pistol may be treated as a standard rifle under Title I of the [[Gun Control Act of 1968]] (GCA).<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.atf.gov/file/55526/download |title=ATF Rule 2011-4 pertaining to Carbine Conversion Units |website=Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives |access-date=November 16, 2015}}</ref> However, certain "Broomhandle" [[Mauser C96]], [[Luger pistol|Luger]], and [[Browning Hi-Power]] Curio & Relic pistols with their originally issued stock attached only may retain their pistol classification.

Carbines without a stock and not originally manufactured as a rifle are not classified as rifles or short barreled rifles. A carbine manufactured under {{convert|26|in|mm|abbr=on}} in length [[Foregrip#Legality on pistols in the United States|without a forward vertical grip]] will be a pistol and, state law notwithstanding, can be carried concealed without creating an unregistered [[Title II weapons#Any other weapon|Any Other Weapon]]. A nearly identical carbine with an overall length of {{convert|26|in|mm|abbr=on}} or greater is simply an unclassified firearm under Title I of the Gun Control Act of 1968, as the Any Other Weapon catch-all only applies to firearms under {{convert|26|in|mm|abbr=on}} or that have been concealed. However, a modification intending to fire from the shoulder and bypass the regulation of short-barreled rifles is considered the unlawful possession and manufacture of an unregistered short-barreled rifle.

In some historical cases, the term ''machine carbine'' was the official title for submachine guns, such as the British [[Sten]] and Australian [[Owen gun]]s. The semiautomatic-only version of the [[Sterling submachine gun]] was also officially called a "carbine". The original Sterling semi-auto would be classed a "short barrel rifle" under the U.S. [[National Firearms Act]], but fully legal long-barrel versions of the Sterling have been made for the U.S. collector market.{{Citation needed|date=April 2013}}

==See also==
{{Wiktionary}}
* [[List of carbines]]
* [[Personal defense weapon]]
* [[Short-barreled rifle]]

==References==
{{Reflist}}

==Further reading==
* Beard, Ross E. ''Carbine : the story of David Marshall Williams''. Williamstown, New Jersey: Phillips, 1997. {{ISBN|0-932572-26-X}} {{OCLC|757855022}}
* ''Carbines : cal. .30 carbines M1, M1A1, M2 and M3''. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Departments of the Army and the Air Force, 1953.
* McAulay, John D. ''Carbines of the Civil War, 1861–1865''. Union City, Tennessee: Pioneer Press, 1981. {{ISBN|978-0-913159-45-3}} {{OCLC|8111324}}
* McAulay, John D. ''Carbines of the U.S. Cavalry, 1861–1905''. Lincoln, Rhode Island: Andrew Mowbray Publishers, 1996. {{ISBN|0-917218-70-1}} {{OCLC|36087526}}

[[Category:Carbines| ]]
[[Category:Rifles]]
[[Category:18th-century weapons]]

Polar orbit

2023-09-10T12:52:24Z

Soldier: Created polar orbit

{{short description|Satellite orbit with high inclination}}
[[File:Polar orbit.ogv|thumb|200px|Polar orbit]]
A '''polar orbit''' is one in which a [[satellite]] [[pass (spaceflight)|pass]]es above or nearly above both [[Poles of astronomical bodies|poles]] of the body being [[orbit]]ed (usually a planet such as the [[Earth]], but possibly another body such as the [[Moon]] or [[Sun]]) on each revolution. It has an [[inclination]] of about 60–90 [[Degree (angle)|degree]]s to the body's [[equator]].<ref name="esa">{{cite web |url = http://www.esa.int/Enabling_Support/Space_Transportation/Types_of_orbits |title=ESA - Types of Orbits |date=2020-03-30 |access-date=2021-01-10}}</ref>

Launching [[satellite]]s into polar orbit requires a larger [[launch vehicle]] to launch a given payload to a given altitude than for a [[near-equatorial orbit]] at the same altitude, because it cannot take advantage of the [[Earth's rotation]]al [[velocity]]. Depending on the location of the [[Spaceport|launch site]] and the [[Orbital_inclination|inclination]] of the polar orbit, the launch vehicle may lose up to 460 m/s of [[Delta-v]], approximately 5% of the Delta-v required to attain [[Low Earth orbit]].

==Usage==
Polar orbits are used for [[Earth observation satellite|Earth-mapping]], [[reconnaissance satellite]]s, as well as for some [[weather satellite]]s.<ref>Science Focus 2nd Edition 2, pg. 297</ref>
The [[Iridium satellite constellation]] uses a polar orbit to provide telecommunications services.

{{anchor|nearPolarOrbit}}Near-polar orbiting satellites commonly choose a [[Sun-synchronous orbit]], where each successive orbital [[pass (spaceflight)|pass]] occurs at the same local time of day. For some applications, such as remote sensing, it is important that ''changes'' over time are not aliased by changes in local time. Keeping the same local time on a given pass requires that the [[frequency|time period]] of the orbit be kept as short, which requires a low orbit. However, very low orbits rapidly [[orbital decay|decay]] due to [[drag (physics)|drag]] from the atmosphere. Commonly used [[altitude]]s are between 700 and 800 km, producing an [[orbital period]] of about 100 minutes.<ref name="phy6">{{cite web |url=http://www.phy6.org/Education/wlopolar.html |title=Polar Orbiting Satellites |first=David P. |last=Stern |date=2001-11-25 |access-date=2009-01-21}}</ref> The half-orbit on the Sun side then takes only 50 minutes, during which local time of day does not vary greatly.

{{anchor|precessingSV}}To retain a Sun-synchronous orbit as the [[Earth's orbit|Earth revolves]] around the Sun during the year, the orbit must [[Nodal precession|precess]] about the Earth at the same rate (which is not possible if the satellite passes directly over the pole).
Because of Earth's [[equatorial bulge]], an orbit [[orbital inclination|inclined]] at a slight angle is subject to a [[torque]], which causes [[precession]]. An angle of about 8° from the pole produces the desired precession in a 100-minute orbit.<ref name="phy6" />

==See also==
*[[List of orbits]]
*[[Molniya orbit]]
*[[Tundra orbit]]
*[[Vandenberg Air Force Base]], a major United States launch location for polar orbits

==References==
{{reflist}}

==External links==
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20120204054322/http://www.braeunig.us/space/orbmech.htm Orbital Mechanics] (Rocket and Space Technology)

{{orbits}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Polar Orbit}}
[[Category:Astrodynamics]]
[[Category:Earth orbits]]
[[Category:Articles containing video clips]]

Aircraft carriers

2023-09-10T12:49:29Z

Soldier: Created aircraft carriers

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}}

INSAS

2023-09-10T12:46:34Z

Soldier: Created INSAS

#REDIRECT [[INSAS rifle]]

Radars

2023-09-10T12:43:30Z

Soldier: Created radars

#REDIRECT [[Radar]]

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ShinMaywa US-2

2023-09-10T12:40:48Z

Soldier: Created ShinMaywa US-2|Seaplane Mark 2 (US-2)

{{short description|Search and rescue flying boat}}

{|{{Infobox Aircraft Begin
|name = US-2
|image = File:ShinMaywa US-2 at Atsugi.jpg
|caption = ShinMaywa US-2
}}{{Infobox Aircraft Type
|type = Air-sea rescue amphibian
|manufacturer = [[ShinMaywa]]
|designer = 
|first flight = 18 December 2003
|introduction = 30 March 2007
|retired =
|status = In production
|primary user = [[Japan Maritime Self Defense Force]]
|produced = 2003–present
|number built = 8 (1 expected)
|unit cost =
|developed from = [[Shin Meiwa US-1A]]
|variants with their own articles =
}}
|}

The '''ShinMaywa US-2''' is a large Japanese [[STOL|short takeoff and landing]] [[amphibious aircraft]] that employs [[boundary layer control]] technology for enhanced STOL and [[Stall (fluid dynamics)|stall]] suppression performance. Manufactured by seaplane specialist [[ShinMaywa]] (formerly ''Shin Meiwa''), it was developed from the earlier [[Shin Meiwa US-1A]] seaplane, which was introduced during the 1970s.

The ShinMaywa US-2 was developed on behalf of the [[Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force]] (JMSDF) as a 'like-for-like' replacement for its aging US-1A fleet. In Japanese service, it is operated in the [[air-sea rescue]] (ASR) role. The US-2 can also be used in other capacities, such as an aerial fire fighter, carrying 15 tonnes of water for this mission.<ref>{{cite web |url = http://www.shinmaywa.co.jp/aircraft/english/us2/us2_fire.html |title = Fire Fighting |publisher = ShinMaywa |accessdate = 18 August 2018 |archive-date = 29 January 2018 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20180129004456/http://www.shinmaywa.co.jp/aircraft/english/us2/us2_fire.html |url-status = dead }}</ref> Various overseas operators have held discussions on potential acquisitions of the type, including the [[Indian Navy]] and [[Indian Coast Guard]]. Other countries such as the [[United States]], [[Indonesia]], [[Thailand]], and [[Greece]] have also shown interest in the US-2 for various purposes.

==Design and development==
During 1969, the [[Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force]] (JMSDF) issued a production order to Japanese seaplane manufacturer [[ShinMaywa|Shin Meiwa]] for a group of 21 [[anti-submarine warfare|anti-submarine]] aircraft, which were given the designation [[Shin Meiwa US-1A|PS-1]].<ref name = "theweek"/> The service had also opted to procure a variant of the type, designated [[Shin Meiwa US-1A|US-1A]], specifically for [[search-and-rescue]] (SAR). The US-1A was Japan's first [[Amphibious aircraft|amphibian]] - capable of being used on land and sea.<ref name = "theweek"/>

During the 1990s when the US-1A fleet was beginning to show its age, the JMSDF attempted to obtain funding towards acquiring a replacement, but could not secure enough to develop an entirely new aircraft. Therefore, during 1995, ShinMaywa, as Shin Meiwa had been renamed (reportedly so that the name would be easier to pronounce for non-Japanese speakers<ref name = "theweek"/>) commenced work on a project to develop an upgraded and modernised version of the US-1A, initially referred to as the '''US-1A ''kai''''' (US-1A 改 - meaning "improved US-1A"). This modified aircraft features numerous aerodynamic refinements over its predecessor, along with a pressurised hull, and the adoption of more powerful [[Rolls-Royce AE 2100]] engines and electronic cockpit instrumentation.<ref name = "theweek"/><ref name = "maidenflight fi"/> The JMSDF also listed various refinements for the amphibian, including improved handling while landing on water, better onboard patient transfer facilities, and improved search-and-rescue capabilities at sea.<ref name = "theweek">Simpson, James. [https://theweek.com/articles/575407/japans-defense-industry-super-excited-about-amphibious-plane "Japan's defense industry is super excited about this amphibious plane."] ''The Week'', 10 September 2015.</ref>

On 18 December 2003, flight testing of the type, which was subsequently designated as the US-2, commenced.<ref name = "maidenflight fi">{{cite web |url = https://www.flightglobal.com/shinmaywa-flies-kai/52225.article |title = ShinMaywa flies Kai |publisher = Flight International |first = Nicholas |last = Ionides |date = 23 December 2003}}</ref> During early 2007, ShinMaywa formally launched commercial production of the amphibian.<ref>{{cite web |url = http://www.shinmaywa.co.jp/english/news/p_news2007_0419.htm |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20090126024044/http://www.shinmaywa.co.jp/english/news/p_news2007_0419.htm |url-status = dead |archive-date = 2009-01-26 |title = ShinMaywa launches commercial production of US-2 STOL Search and Rescue Amphibians |publisher = ShinMaywa |date = 2007}}</ref> Production is handled by several of Japan's aviation companies. [[Mitsubishi]] manufactures the outer wing sections and the rear part of the engine nacelles, while [[NIPPI Corporation]] builds the watertight landing gear housings, and [[Kawasaki Heavy Industries]] produces the cockpit. Final assembly is performed by ShinMaywa around the US-2's [[Fuselage|hull]]. The production line only has the capacity to produce two aircraft at a time.<ref name = "theweek"/> During 2009, the first production US-2, which was outfitted for the search and rescue mission, was delivered to the Japan's Ministry of Defense.<ref>{{cite web |url = http://www.shinmaywa.co.jp/english/news/p_news2009_0219.htm |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20110722095218/http://www.shinmaywa.co.jp/english/news/p_news2009_0219.htm |url-status = dead |archive-date = 2011-07-22 |title = ShinMaywa delivers first production type of "US-2" STOL Search and Rescue Amphibians to Japan's Ministry of Defense |publisher = ShinMaywa |date = 2009}}</ref>

In 2010, ShinMaywa unveiled specifications for a civil fire-fighting variant of its US-2 amphibian. It began marketing the new variant to potential overseas customers that same year. The fire-fighting model replaces one fuel tank with a 15 tonne water tank, reducing its maximum range to 2,300 km (1,245 nm) compared with the SAR's 4,700 km range. The tank is durable enough for salt water, foam and [[fire retardant]]. Other features include a pair of water scoops for collecting water, automatic foam mixing equipment and a computer-controlled water drop system.<ref>{{cite web |url = https://www.flightglobal.com/japans-shinmaywa-floats-fire-fighting-us-2-amphibian/93503.article |title = Japan's ShinMaywa floats fire-fighting US-2 amphibian |publisher = Flight International |first = Leithen |last = Francis |date = 13 May 2010}}</ref>

==Operational history==
===Japan===
[[File:US-2 9903.JPG|thumb|right|ShinMeiwa US-2 search and rescue amphibian]]
The JMSDF intends to purchase up to 14 US-2s for its search and rescue needs. The type is currently operated by the 31st Fleet Air Wing (71st Air Force, 71st Flight Squadron) of the JMSDF from both [[Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni|Iwakuni Air Base]] and [[Naval Air Facility Atsugi|Atsugi Air Base]].<ref>{{cite web |url = https://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/iwakuni/ht/unit/h24/71fs241114.html |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20130129064241/http://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/iwakuni/ht/unit/h24/71fs241114.html |url-status = dead |archive-date = 29 January 2013 |title = 71st Flight Squadron (in Japanese) JMSDF Iwakuni air base |publisher = mod.go.jp |accessdate = 27 March 2020}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url = https://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/atsugi/butai/71fs.html |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20100119034416/http://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/atsugi/butai/71fs.html |url-status = dead |archive-date = 19 January 2010 |title = 71st Flight Squadron (in Japanese) JMSDF Atsugi air base |publisher = mod.go.jp |accessdate = 27 March 2020}}</ref> The introduction of the US-2 has enabled the withdrawal of the US-1A, the last of which performed its final flight during December 2017.<ref>{{cite web |url = https://defpost.com/japanese-navy-retires-last-us-1a-sar-amphibious-aircraft/ |title = Japanese Navy retires last US-1A SAR amphibious aircraft |publisher = defpost.com |date = 16 December 2017 |first = Arun |last = Mathew}}</ref>

During April 2015, aircraft 9905 was involved in an accident.<ref>{{cite web |url = https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/shinmaywa-us-2-involved-in-major-accident-at-sea-411696/ |title = ShinMaywa US-2 involved in major accident at sea |date = 29 April 2015 |publisher = Flight International |accessdate = 9 December 2016}}</ref> The aircraft was on a training mission near [[Cape Ashizuri]] in [[Shikoku]] and four crew members were injured.<ref>{{cite web |url = https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20150428-1 |title= Aircraft accident ShinMaywa US-2 9905 |publisher = Aircraft Safety Network |accessdate = 9 December 2016}}</ref> By November 2018, a total of six US-2s had been delivered while a further two aircraft were under production.<ref>{{cite web |last=Waldron |first=Greg |title=JAPAN AEROSPACE: Shinmaywa stays after India US-2 deal |publisher=FlightGlobal.com |date=28 November 2018 |url=https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/japan-aerospace-shinmaywa-stays-after-india-us-2-d-453978/ |accessdate=9 December 2018}}</ref>

===Export opportunities===
Since the early 2010s, the [[Indian Navy]] has an established requirement for between 12 and 18 US-2 amphibians configured as search and rescue aircraft at an anticipated cost of US$1.65 billion. The [[Indian Coast Guard]] has also shown interest in procuring three aircraft for its own purposes.<ref name = "ain indonesia2016"/> It is expected that, if procured, several of these amphibians would be stationed in the [[Andaman and Nicobar Islands]].<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/for-first-time-since-world-war-2-japan-will-sell-military-equipment-to-india-585231 |title=For First Time Since World War 2, Japan Will Sell Military Equipment to India |work=NDTV |accessdate=26 December 2014}}</ref><ref name= Flightglobalchandra>{{cite web |last = Chandra |first =Atul |title= India looks to acquire 18 ShinMaywa US-2 amphibians |url= http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/india-looks-to-acquire-18-shinmaywa-us-2-amphibians-403341/ |website= Flightglobal |publisher= Reed Business Information |accessdate=21 March 2015 |location= Bangalore |date= 4 September 2014}}</ref> Indian authorities have reportedly been keen to have the US-2 assembled in India via a [[licensed production|licensing arrangement]]. Performing final assembly of the aircraft locally is expected to cost 25% less than in Japan.<ref name = "ain indonesia2016"/> Negotiations between the two nations commenced during 2011.<ref>{{cite web |url = https://thediplomat.com/2015/11/japan-india-maritime-surveillance-aircraft-deal-may-come-before-the-new-year/ |title = Japan-India Maritime Surveillance Aircraft Deal May Come Before the New Year |publisher = [[The Diplomat]] |first = Ankit |last = Panda |date = 30 November 2015}}</ref>

The process of finalising purchase arrangements for the aircraft, which would represent the first sale of military equipment by Japan to India since the [[World War II|Second World War]], have been protracted.<ref>{{cite web |url = https://thediplomat.com/2016/03/is-the-japan-india-military-aircraft-deal-dead/ |title = Is the Japan-India Military Aircraft Deal Dead? |publisher = The Diplomat |date = 5 March 2016 |first = Franz-Stefan |last = Gady}}</ref><ref name="fgus2">{{cite web |last=Waldron |first=Greg |title= JAPAN AEROSPACE: India US-2 deal sees no progress |website=Flightglobal |url=https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/japan-aerospace-india-us-2-deal-sees-no-progress-430292/ |date=12 October 2016 |accessdate=15 October 2016}}</ref> During October 2016, ShinMaywa announced that it had reduced the offered price to around US$113 million per aircraft.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.defensenews.com/articles/india-resolves-us-2-aircraft-price-issue-with-japan |title=India Resolves US-2 Aircraft Price Issue With Japan |last1=Raghuvanshi |first1=Vivek |date=20 October 2016 |website=www.defensenews.com |publisher=Sightline Media Group |accessdate=20 October 2016}}</ref> At one point, there were expectations that Japan and India would be signing a contract for the US-2 purchase during November 2016.<ref>{{cite web |url = http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/11/06/national/japan-india-likely-ink-pivotal-us-2-aircraft-deal/ |title = Japan, India likely to ink pivotal US-2 aircraft deal |date = 6 November 2016 |publisher = [[Japan Times]] |accessdate = 28 November 2016 |archive-date = 14 September 2017 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20170914125024/https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/11/06/national/japan-india-likely-ink-pivotal-us-2-aircraft-deal/ |url-status = dead }}</ref> The decision was deferred by Indian defence minister [[Manohar Parrikar]].<ref>{{cite web |url = http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/defence-minister-manohar-parrikar-defers-rs-10-000-crore-deal-12-japanese-aircraft/1/807024.html |title = Defence minister Manohar Parrikar defers Rs 10,000 crore deal for 12 Japanese aircraft |date = 10 November 2016 |publisher = [[India Today]] |accessdate = 28 November 2016}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url = http://www.dailypioneer.com/nation/govt-oks-new-blacklisting-policy-rs-80k-cr-def-deals.html |title = Govt OK'S New Blacklisting Policy, RS 80K-CR Def Deals |date = 8 November 2016 |publisher = The Pioneer |accessdate = 28 November 2016}}</ref> During March 2018, Japanese ambassador to India Kenji Hiramatsu informed ''[[The Hindu]] [[Business Line]]'' that talks between the two nations were still in progress.<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/india-must-provide-high-quality-products-to-meet-japan-consumers-expectations-envoy/article23313018.ece |title=India must provide high-quality products to meet Japan consumers' expectations: Envoy |last1=Basu |first1=Nayanima |date=21 March 2018 |website=www.thehindubusinessline.com |accessdate=28 March 2018}}</ref> During April 2018, ShinMaywa signed a memorandum of understanding with Indian conglomerate [[Mahindra Group]] in support of future Indian sales.<ref>{{cite web |url = https://www.flightglobal.com/fixed-wing/shinmaywa-joins-with-mahindra-for-us-2-support/127746.article |title = Shinmaywa joins with Mahindra for US-2 support |publisher = Flight International |date = 13 April 2018}}</ref> As of 2021, further negotiations were stopped due to disagreement on pricing.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14512775 | title=Despite defense buildup, Japan's arms industry struggles | the Asahi Shimbun: Breaking News, Japan News and Analysis }}</ref>

Another prospective customer is [[Indonesia]], which has been reportedly concerned by a growing Chinese military presence across the islands of the [[South China Sea]].<ref>{{cite web |url = http://www.janes.com/article/65215/indo-defence-2016-shinmaywa-inches-towards-us-2-sale-to-indonesia |title = Indo Defence 2016: ShinMaywa inches towards US-2 sale to Indonesia |date = 4 November 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161220075116/http://www.janes.com/article/65215/indo-defence-2016-shinmaywa-inches-towards-us-2-sale-to-indonesia |archive-date= 20 December 2016 |publisher = [[Jane's]]}}</ref> It has been speculated that Indonesia could be a key partner in the production of the US-2, potentially competing with India for workshare in the programme.<ref name = "ain indonesia2016">{{cite web |url = https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2016-01-06/indonesia-could-trump-india-japans-us-2-partner |title = Indonesia Could Trump India as Japan's US-2 Partner |publisher = Indonesia Could Trump India as Japan’s US-2 Partner |first = Neelam |last = Mathews |date = 6 January 2016}}</ref> Reportedly, without implementing outsourced production, ShinMaywa is unlikely to be unable to promptly fulfil the needs of a third customer due to its limited production capacity.<ref name = "theweek"/> ShinMaywa was in talks at the time with PT Dirgantara.<ref>{{cite web | url=http://www.janes.com/article/65215/indo-defence-2016-shinmaywa-inches-towards-us-2-sale-to-indonesia | title=Indo Defence 2016: ShinMaywa inches towards US-2 sale to Indonesia | IHS Jane's 360 | access-date=2023-08-07 | archive-date=2016-11-07 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161107071337/http://www.janes.com/article/65215/indo-defence-2016-shinmaywa-inches-towards-us-2-sale-to-indonesia | url-status=bot: unknown }}</ref>

There have also been reports that [[Thailand]] is interested in purchasing a number of US-2s as [[maritime patrol aircraft]]. The nation is reportedly seeking to bolster its surveillance and [[anti-submarine warfare]] capabilities while developing deeper defense ties between itself and Japan.<ref>{{cite web |url = https://thediplomat.com/2016/06/thailand-mulling-purchase-of-japanese-sub-hunting-aircraft/ |title = Thailand Mulling Purchase of Japanese Sub-Hunting Aircraft |date = 7 June 2016 |publisher = [[The Diplomat]] |first = Franz-Stefan |last = Gady |accessdate = 9 December 2016}}</ref>

Following a series of deadly fires in the [[Attica (region)|Attica region]] of [[Greece]] circa July 2018, the Greek government reportedly sought to order several US-2s to replace their aging firefighting fleet.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-Relations/Japan-looks-to-Greece-for-first-major-defense-export |title=Japan looks to Greece for first major defense export |website=Nikkei Asian Review |language=en-GB |access-date=29 July 2018}}</ref> If the sale is completed, it would be the first major defense procurement by Greece from a Japanese supplier.<ref>{{cite web |url = https://www.thenationalherald.com/209348/greece-wants-to-buy-amphibious-firefighting-planes-from-japan/ |title = Greece Wants to Buy Amphibious Firefighting Planes from Japan |publisher = The National Herald |date = 31 July 2019}}</ref>

==Operators==
;{{JPN}}
* [[Japan Maritime Self Defense Force]]

==Specifications (US-2)==
[[File:ShinMaywa US-2 20120929-06.JPG|thumb|Side view of the engines and wing of a US-2]]
[[File:Us-2 03l.jpg|thumb|A US-2 during takeoff]]
[[File:9904 Shin Meiwa US-2 JMSDF (7575441596).jpg|thumb|A JMSDF US-2 at [[Haneda Airport]]]]
{{Aircraft specs
|ref= ''ShinMaywa''<ref name=Shinmaywa>{{cite web| title=Performance of the State-of-the-Art US-2: US-2 Specifications | url=http://www.shinmaywa.co.jp/aircraft/english/us2/us2_capability.html| website= ShinMaywa | accessdate= 21 March 2015}}</ref><ref name=AI6926-30>{{cite journal |last =Lake |first =Jon |title=ShinMaywa's Innovative Amphibian |journal=Air International |date=November 2005 |volume=69 |issue=5 |pages=26–30 |issn=0306-5634}}</ref><ref name=shinbrochure>{{cite web |title=US-2: STOL Search and Rescue Amphibian |url=http://www.shinmaywa.co.jp/english/news/pdf/09-02-19.pdf |publisher= ShinMaywa |accessdate= 21 March 2015}}</ref>
|prime units?= met

|genhide=

|crew= 11 (2 pilots, 1 search-and-rescue coordinator, 2 on-board maintenance personnel, 3 divers, 2 paramedics, and 1 sensor operator) <ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.spf.org/oceans/analysis_en/c1404.html |title=US-2: The JMSDF Air-Sea Rescue Flying Boat |website=From the Oceans |language=en-GB |access-date=31 July 2020}}</ref>
|capacity= 20 passengers or 12 stretchers
|length m= 33.46
|length ft=
|length in=
|length note=
|span m= 33.15
|span ft=
|span in=
|span note=
|height m= 9.8
|height ft=
|height in=
|height note=
|wing area sqm= 135.8
|wing area sqft=
|wing area note=
|aspect ratio=
|airfoil=
|empty weight kg= 25630
|empty weight lb=
|empty weight note=
|gross weight kg= 55148
|gross weight lb=
|max takeoff weight kg= 47700
|max takeoff weight lb=
|max takeoff weight note= land take-off
|fuel capacity=
|more general=

|eng1 number= 4
|eng1 name= [[Rolls-Royce AE 2100]]J
|eng1 type= turboprop
|eng1 kw= 3424
|eng1 hp=
|eng1 shp=
|eng1 kn=
|eng1 lbf=
|eng1 note=
|power original=
|thrust original=
|eng1 kn-ab=
|eng1 lbf-ab=

|eng2 number= 1
|eng2 name= [[LHTEC T800]]
|eng2 type= turboshaft
|eng2 kw= 1017
|eng2 hp=
|eng2 shp=

|eng2 note= (compressor for [[boundary layer control]])

|prop blade number= 6
|prop name= [[Dowty Rotol|Dowty]] R414
|prop dia m=
|prop dia ft=
|prop dia in=
|prop dia note=

|perfhide=

|max speed kmh= 560
|max speed mph=
|max speed kts=
|max speed note=
|max speed mach=
|cruise speed kmh= 480
|cruise speed mph=
|cruise speed kts=
|cruise speed note= at {{convert|6000|m|abbr=on}}
|stall speed kmh= 90
|stall speed mph=
|stall speed kts=
|stall speed note=
|range km= 4700
|range miles=
|range nmi=2300
|range note=
|combat range km=
|combat range miles=
|combat range nmi=
|combat range note=
|ferry range km=
|ferry range miles=
|ferry range nmi=
|ferry range note=
|endurance=
|ceiling m= 7195
|ceiling ft=
|ceiling note=
|climb rate ms=
|climb rate ftmin=
|climb rate note=
|time to altitude=
|sink rate note=
|lift to drag=
|wing loading kg/m2=
|wing loading lb/sqft=
|wing loading note=
|disk loading kg/m2=
|disk loading lb/sqft=
|disk loading note=
|fuel consumption kg/km=
|fuel consumption lb/mi=
|power/mass=
|thrust/weight=
|more performance=* '''Takeoff distance on ground:''' {{convert|490|m|abbr=on}} at MTOW
* '''Landing distance on ground:''' {{convert|1500|m|abbr=on}} at MTOW
* '''Takeoff distance on water:''' {{convert|280|m|abbr=on}} at Loaded weight
* '''Landing distance on water:''' {{convert|330|m|abbr=on}} at Loaded weight

|armament=
|guns=
|bombs=
|rockets=
|missiles=
|hardpoints=
|hardpoint capacity=
|hardpoint rockets=
|hardpoint missiles=
|hardpoint bombs=
|hardpoint other=

|avionics=
}}

==See also==
{{aircontent|
|related=
* [[ShinMaywa US-1A]]
|similar aircraft=
* [[AVIC AG600]]
|sequence=
|lists=
* [[List of military aircraft of Japan]]
* [[List of flying boats]]
|see also=
}}

==References==

=== Citations ===
{{Reflist}}


==External links==
{{commons category|ShinMaywa US-2}}
* [http://www.shinmaywa.co.jp/aircraft/english/us2/index.html ShinMaywa US-2 site]
* [https://archive.today/20140929112726/http://www.mastconfex.com/enews.asp?issue=jun14/ MAST Asia 2015]
* [http://www.shinmaywa.co.jp/english/news/pdf/09-02-19.pdf US-2 Brochure]

{{Kawanishi aircraft}}
{{JSDF aircraft designations}}

[[Category:Shin Meiwa aircraft|US-2]]
[[Category:2000s Japanese military rescue aircraft]]
[[Category:Post–Cold War military equipment of Japan]]
[[Category:Flying boats]]
[[Category:Amphibious aircraft]]
[[Category:Aerial firefighting aircraft]]
[[Category:Four-engined tractor aircraft]]
[[Category:High-wing aircraft]]
[[Category:Four-engined turboprop aircraft]]
[[Category:STOL aircraft]]
[[Category:Aircraft first flown in 2003]]
[[Category:T-tail aircraft]]

Sulphur mustard

2023-09-10T12:38:25Z

Soldier: Created sulphur mustard

#REDIRECT [[Mustard gas]]

{{Redirect category shell|
{{R from technical name}}
}}

Blue-water navy

2023-09-10T12:35:20Z

Soldier: Created Blue-water navy|blue water navy

{{short description|Naval force capable of operating across the deep waters of the open oceans}}
[[Image:Rimpac battlegroup 2006.jpg|thumb|upright 1.6|[[USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72)|USS ''Abraham Lincoln'']] leads a formation of ships from eight countries during the [[Exercise RIMPAC]] in July 2006.]]
{{war}}

A '''blue-water navy''' is a [[Navy|maritime force]] capable of operating globally, essentially across the deep waters of open oceans.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/jscsc/courses/RND/bmd|title=British Maritime Doctrine, BR 1806, Third Edition|year=2004|quote=The operating areas of maritime forces range from the deep waters of the open oceans (known colloquially as blue water).|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140225005304/http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/jscsc/courses/RND/bmd|archive-date=2014-02-25}}</ref> While definitions of what actually constitutes such a force vary, there is a requirement for the ability to exercise sea control at long range.

The term "blue-water navy" is a [[Maritime geography|maritime geographical]] term in contrast with "[[brown-water navy]]" (river and near to shore) and "[[green-water navy]]" (near to shore).

The [[Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency]] of the United States has defined the blue-water navy as "a maritime force capable of sustained operation across the deep waters of open oceans. A blue-water navy allows a country to [[power projection|project power]] far from the home country and usually includes one or more aircraft carriers. Smaller blue-water navies are able to dispatch fewer vessels abroad for shorter periods of time."<ref name="DSS Trend Report">{{cite web | url=http://www.dss.mil/counterintel/DSS_UNCLASS_2010/specialFocusArea/special.html | title=Special Focus Area: Marine Sensors | publisher=Defense Security Service (United States Department of Defense) | work=Targeting U.S. Technologies: A Trend Analysis of Reporting from Defense Industry | year=2010 | access-date=July 15, 2012 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120915162319/http://www.dss.mil/counterintel/DSS_UNCLASS_2010/specialFocusArea/special.html | archive-date=September 15, 2012 | url-status=dead }}</ref>

==Attributes==
[[File:INTEL-COGNITIVE-Cole.jpg|thumb|A blue-water navy still remains susceptible to [[asymmetric warfare|asymmetric threats]], an example being the [[USS Cole bombing|USS ''Cole'' bombing]] in October 2000.]]
In public discourse, blue-water capability is identified with the operation of [[capital ship]]s such as [[battleship]]s/[[battlecruiser]]s, [[aircraft carrier]]s, and [[nuclear submarine]]s. For instance, during the debate in the 1970s whether Australia should replace {{HMAS|Melbourne|R21|6}}, a former [[Chief of Navy (Australia)|chief of navy]] claimed that if Australia did not replace her last aircraft carrier, she "would no longer have a blue-water navy".<ref name="Brown2004">{{citation | url=http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=2104 | title=Why buy Abrams Tanks? We need to look at more appropriate options | first=Gary | last= Brown | date=31 March 2004 | journal=On Line Opinion | publisher= The National Forum}}</ref> In the end Australia did not buy a new carrier, but former Parliamentary defence advisor Gary Brown could still claim in 2004 that her navy remained "an effective blue-water force".<ref name=Brown2004 /> The [[Soviet Navy]] towards the end of the [[Cold War]] is another example of a blue-water navy that had minimal carrier aviation, relying instead on submarines, missile-carrying surface ships, and long-range bombers based on land.<ref name="Cockburn1984">{{cite book|author=Andrew Cockburn|title=The threat: inside the Soviet military machine|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5vjyAAAAMAAJ | page=408 |access-date=30 April 2012|year=1984|publisher=Vintage Books|isbn= 978-0-394-72379-2 |quote=in the past 15 years the Soviet Navy has steadily grown from a coastal defense force into a blue water navy powerful enough to challenge the US Navy in most major ocean areas of the world}}</ref>

A blue-water navy implies force protection from [[Submarine|sub-surface]], [[Surface combatant|surface]] and airborne threats and a sustainable logistic reach, allowing a persistent presence at long range. A hallmark of a true blue-water navy is the ability to conduct [[Underway replenishment|replenishment at sea]] (RAS),<ref>{{citation | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=2pDfAAAAMAAJ&q=true+blue-water | title=Cold war at sea: high-seas confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union | first=David Frank | last=Winkler | publisher = Naval Institute Press | year=2000 | isbn= 978-1-55750-955-0 |page=32}}</ref> and the commissioning of underway replenishment ships is a strong sign of a navy's blue-water ambitions.<ref name="Cole2001">{{cite book|last=Cole|first=Bernard D.|title=The Great Wall at Sea: China's Navy Enters the Twenty-First Century|url=https://archive.org/details/greatwallatseach0000cole |url-access=registration| access-date=30 April 2012|year=2001|publisher=Naval Institute Press|isbn=978-1-55750-239-1|page=[https://archive.org/details/greatwallatseach0000cole/page/104 104]}}</ref> While a blue-water navy can project sea control power into another nation's littoral, it remains susceptible to threats from less capable forces ([[asymmetric warfare]]). Maintenance and logistics at range have high costs, and there might be a saturation advantage over a deployed force through the use of land-based air or [[surface-to-surface missile]] assets, [[Diesel-electric#Submarines|diesel-electric submarines]], or asymmetric tactics such as Fast Inshore Attack Craft. An example of this vulnerability was the October 2000 [[USS Cole bombing|USS ''Cole'' bombing]] in [[Aden]].<ref>{{cite web |url= http://proceedings.ndia.org/5560/Wednesday/Session_III-A/Heijster.pdf|title=Smart Range of Burst fuzes|access-date=2009-02-23 |publisher= TNO|date= April 6, 2005|author = Rob van Heijster}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url= http://www.defense-update.com/newscast/0107/news/110107_fiac.htm|title= Protecting Naval Surface Ships from Fast Attack Boat Swarm Threats|access-date= 2009-02-23|publisher= defense-update.com|date= January 10, 2007|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20070116024340/http://www.defense-update.com/newscast/0107/news/110107_fiac.htm|archive-date= 2007-01-16|url-status= dead}}</ref>

The term 'blue-water navy' should not be confused with the capability of an individual ship. For example, vessels of a green-water navy can often operate in blue water for short periods of time. A number of nations have extensive maritime assets but lack the capability to maintain the required sustainable logistic reach.<ref name="Routledge"/> Some of them join coalition task groups in blue-water deployments such as anti-piracy patrols off Somalia.

===Definitions===
According to a dictionary definition, blue-water capability refers to an oceangoing fleet able to operate on the [[high seas]] far from its nation's home ports. Some operate throughout the world.<ref>[http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/blue-water Dictionary: Blue-water], dictionary.com</ref>

In their 2012 publication, "''Sea Power and the Asia-Pacific''", professors Geoffrey Till and Patrick C. Bratton outlined what they termed as "concise criteria" with regard to the definitions of brown-, green- and blue-water navies. Quote; "''...a brown-water navy standing for a navy capable of defending its coastal zones, a green-water navy for a navy competent to operate in regional sea and finally [a] blue-water navy described as a navy with capability to operate across the deep waters.''"<ref name="Bratton"/> They go on to say that even with such a definition and understanding of naval hierarchy, it is still "ambiguous". For example, while France and the United States may be considered blue-water navies, he states that the "operational capability and geographic reach of both navies are definitely different."<ref name="Bratton">{{cite book|last1=Bratton|first1=Patrick C|last2=Till|first2=Geoffrey|title=Sea Power and the Asia-Pacific|publisher=Routledge|year=2012|location=London, United Kingdom|isbn=978-1136627248|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=RxOpAgAAQBAJ}}</ref>

Another definition states that 'brown-water' refers to the littoral areas within 100 [[nautical mile]]s of the coastline. 'Green-water' begins from 100 nautical miles out to the next major land formation, while 'blue-water' is the ability to project force out to at least 1,500 nautical miles beyond the coast.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Amardeep|first1=Amardeep|title=China-India Relations: Contemporary Dynamics|date=10 Oct 2007|publisher=Routledge|location=London|isbn=9781134074662|page=131, note 12}}</ref> Traditionally a distinction used to be made between a coastal [[brown-water navy]] operating in the [[littoral|littoral zone]] to 200 nautical miles (or 370 [[kilometre]]s) and an oceangoing blue-water navy. However, the [[United States Navy]] created a new term, [[green-water navy]], to replace the term 'brown-water navy' in US Navy parlance.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/mullen/speeches/mullen051013.txt |title=Q&A with Adm. Michael G. Mullen 2006 CNO's Guidance Release Media Roundtable Pentagon |location=Washington, DC |date=13 October 2005 |publisher=US Navy |access-date=17 March 2015 |archive-date=15 October 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191015040114/https://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/mullen/speeches/mullen051013.txt |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref>U.S. Navy [[Chief of Naval Operations]] [[Admiral]] [[Michael Mullen]] pointed out in an interview with KQV ([[Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania|Pittsburgh]]): "We are looking at, in addition to the blue-water ships which I would characterize and describe as our aircraft carriers and other ships that support that kind of capability, we're also looking to develop capability in what I call the green-water and the brown-water, and the brown-water is really the rivers . . . These are challenges we all have, and we need to work together to ensure that the sea lanes are secure." FC [http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/mullen/speeches/mullen060519-kqv.txt KQV RADIO (PITTSBURGH) INTERVIEW WITH JOE FENN MAY 19, 2006]</ref> Today, a brown-water navy has come to be known as a predominantly [[Maritime geography#Riverine|riverine]] force.

Despite the above, however, there is no agreed definition of the term.<ref name=Michiko/>

===Classification and naval hierarchy===
[[File:Indian Navy flotilla of Western Fleet escort INS Vikramaditya (R33) and INS Viraat (R22) in the Arabian Sea.jpg|thumb|[[Indian Navy]] flotilla of Western Fleet escort [[INS Vikramaditya|INS ''Vikramaditya'']] (R33) and [[INS Viraat|INS ''Viraat'']] (R22) in the Arabian Sea; according to the Todd & Lindberg classification system, six navies are considered to be rank 3 blue-water "multi-regional power projection" navies, capable of operating in multiple regions adjacent its own.<ref name=Kirchberger/>]]

There have been many attempts by naval scholars and other authorities to classify world navies, including; Michael Morris,<ref name="classification">{{cite book|title=Small Navies: Strategy and Policy for Small Navies in War and Peace (Dr Deborah Sanders, Dr Ian Speller, Professor Michael Mulqueen)|date=28 June 2014|publisher=Ashgate Publishing|location=United Kingdom|isbn=9781472417619|pages=34–43}}</ref> British naval historians Eric Grove<ref name=classification/> and Professor Geoffrey Till,<ref name=classification/><ref>{{cite book|last1=Till|first1=Geoffrey|title=Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century|date=2 Aug 2004|publisher=Routledge|location=London|isbn=9781135756789|pages=113–120|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=CNgIbiDghI4C&q=Seapower%3A%20A%20Guide%20for%20the%20Twenty-First%20Century%202004|access-date=15 December 2015}}</ref> French strategist Hervé Coutau-Bégarie<ref name=classification/><ref>Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, ''Traité de stratégie'', (Economica: Paris 2002). pp 617-621</ref> and professors Daniel Todd and Michael Lindberg.<ref name=classification/><ref name="Lindberg-classification"/><ref name=Kirchberger/> All identify basic common criteria for gauging the capability of navies, such as; total displacement and number of ships; modernity and power of weapons and systems; logistical and geographic reach with capacity for sustained operations; and the professional qualifications/disposition of sailors.<ref name=classification/>
[[File:Carriers Cavour (550) - Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) and Charles de Gaulle (R91) underway in 2013.JPG|thumb|left|{{ship|Italian aircraft carrier|Cavour|C 550|2}} (foreground) operating with {{USS|Harry S. Truman|CVN-75|2}} (middle) and {{ship|French aircraft carrier|Charles de Gaulle|R91|2}} (background) in the [[Gulf of Oman]], 2013 ]]
The table below shows the world naval hierarchy according to the classification system by professors Daniel Todd and Michael Lindberg.<ref name=Kirchberger/> Their system originates from 1996<ref name="Lindberg-classification"/> and outlines ten ranks, distinguished by capability. Since then it has been used by various other experts to illustrate the subject.<ref name=Kirchberger/><ref name=Howarth2006/> According to Todd and Lindberg, a "blue-water navy" is one that can project any sort of power beyond its own territorial waters.<ref name=Kirchberger/><ref name=Howarth2006/> However they used the principle of [[Loss of Strength Gradient|loss of strength gradient]] and other criteria to distinguish navies by capability under the four "blue-water" ranks.<ref name=Kirchberger/><ref name=Howarth2006/> The six ranks of "Non blue-water navies" can be further broken down into "green-water" and "brown-water navies", and according to Todd and Lindberg, these are navies only capable of operating as coastal defence forces, coast guards or riverine forces.<ref name=Kirchberger/><ref name=Howarth2006/>

{|class="wikitable"
|+ World Naval Hierarchy, according to the Todd & Lindberg classification system (c.2015)<ref name=Kirchberger/><ref>{{cite book |title=Sea Power and the Asia-Pacific|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=RxOpAgAAQBAJ|last1=Bratton|last2=Till|first2=Geoffrey| date=7 February 2012 |location=London, United Kingdom|agency=Routledge|isbn=978-1-136-62724-8}}</ref>
|-
!
! Rank
! Designation
! Capabilities
! Navies
|-
! rowspan="4"| Blue-water navies
| 1 || Global-reach power projection || Multiple and sustained power projection missions globally || [[United States Navy|United States]]
|-
| 2 || Limited global-reach power projection || At least one major power projection operation globally || [[French Navy|France]], {{nowrap|[[Royal Navy|United Kingdom]]}}
|-
| 3 || Multi-regional power projection || Power projection to regions adjacent to its own || [[Russian Navy|Russia]], [[Italian Navy|Italy]], [[Indian Navy|India]]
|-

| 4 || Regional power projection || Limited range power projection beyond [[exclusive economic zone]] (EEZ) || [[Spanish Navy|Spain]], [[Brazilian Navy|Brazil]], [[Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force|Japan]], [[Royal Australian Navy|Australia]], [[Republic of Korea Navy|South Korea]], [[German Navy|Germany]], [[Egyptian Navy|Egypt]], [[People's Liberation Army Navy|China]]
|-
! rowspan="2"| Non blue-water: green-water navies
| 5 || Regional offshore coastal defence || Coastal defence within and slightly beyond EEZ || Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Israel, Singapore, Pakistan, and others
|-

| 6 || Inshore coastal defence || Coastal defence confined to inner EEZ || North Korea, Myanmar, Brunei, Sri Lanka, and others
|-
! rowspan="4"| Non blue-water: brown-water navies
| 7 || Regional offshore constabulary || Maritime policing within and slightly beyond EEZ || Iceland, Ireland, Tunisia, Estonia, Iraq, and others
|-
| 8 || Inshore constabulary || Maritime policing confined well within EEZ || Cambodia, Cyprus, the Philippines, and others
|-
| 9 || Inland waterway riverine || Riverine defence of landlocked states || Bolivia, Paraguay, Burundi, and many others
|-
| 10 || Token navy riverine || Very basic constabulary if at all || Many examples worldwide
|}

===Overseas basing===
{{See also|Unsinkable aircraft carrier}}
Historically, and to present day, blue-water navies have tended to establish overseas bases to extend the reach of supply lines, provide repair facilities and enhance the "effective striking power" of a fleet beyond the capabilities provided by the nation's [[Home port#Navy|homeports]].<ref name="Milan N. Vego">{{cite book|last=Vego|first=Milan N.|title=Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas|date=5 Sep 2013|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1136317941|pages=61–71|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6ea3AAAAQBAJ}}</ref> Generally, these overseas bases are located within areas where potential conflicts or threats to the nation's interests may arise. For example, since [[World War II]] the [[Royal Navy]] and later the [[United States Navy]] have continued to base forces in [[Bahrain]] for operations in the [[Persian Gulf]].<ref name="Milan N. Vego"/> The military importance and value of overseas basing is primarily dependent on geographical location. A base located at [[choke point]]s in narrow or enclosed seas can be of high value, especially if positioned near, or within striking distance of an enemy's [[sea lines of communication]]s.<ref name="Milan N. Vego"/> However advanced operating bases (''or'' forward operating bases) can be equally as valuable. [[Naval Station Pearl Harbor]] acts as a "gateway" for the US Navy to "operate forward" in the [[Pacific Ocean]].<ref>[http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=64887 CNO Sees Hawaii as 'Gateway' to Operate Forward], navy.mil, 1/20/2012</ref>

==Examples==
These are examples of navies that have been described by various defense experts or academics as being blue-water navies. Some have successfully used their blue-water capabilities to exercise control on the high seas and from there have projected power into other nations' [[littoral zone|littoral waters]].<ref name="Trident">{{cite web|title=The Royal Navy: Britain's Trident for a Global Agenda|url=http://henryjacksonsociety.org/2006/11/04/the-royal-navy-britains-trident-for-a-global-agenda/|work=henryjacksonsociety.org|publisher=[[Henry Jackson Society]]|access-date=4 November 2006|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160911235404/http://henryjacksonsociety.org/2006/11/04/the-royal-navy-britains-trident-for-a-global-agenda/|archive-date=11 September 2016|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref name="Bennett">{{cite book|last1=Bennett|first1=James C|title=The Anglosphere Challenge: Why the English-speaking Nations Will Lead the Way in the Twenty-first Century|date=1 January 2007|publisher=Rowman & Littlefield|location=United States|isbn=978-0742533332|page=286|quote=...the United States and the United Kingdom have the world's two best world-spanning blue-water navies... with the French being the only other candidate... and China being the most likely competitor in the long term}}</ref> However, there is no agreed upon definition among authorities as to what constitutes a blue-water navy.<ref name="Michiko">{{cite book|last1=Phifer|first1=Michiko|title=A Handbook of Military Strategy and Tactics|date=13 Jul 2012|publisher=Vij Books India Pvt Ltd|isbn=9789382573289|page=55}}</ref>


===China===
{{Main|People's Liberation Army Navy}}
{{update|date=March 2023}}
[[File:Aircraft Carrier Liaoning CV-16.jpg|thumb|Chinese aircraft carrier ''Liaoning'']]
The [[People's Liberation Army Navy]] is subject to a variety of assessments regarding its capabilities. Writing for the [[United States Naval Institute|US Naval Institute]] in 2012, Dr James Mulvenon believed that "the Chinese navy is still primarily a brown and green-water navy", highlighting problems with replenishment and logistics as key shortcomings in PLAN ambitions of becoming a blue-water capable fleet.<ref>{{cite book|title=China's Energy Strategy: The Impact on Beijing's Maritime Policies|date=2012|publisher=Naval Institute Press|location=United States|isbn=9781612511511|edition=2012|pages=1–9 (Part 1) }}</ref> This line of thinking has also been held by a number of academics throughout the years, including Dr Peter Howarth,<ref name="Howarth2006">{{cite book|last1=Howarth|first1=Peter|title=China's Rising Sea Power: The PLA Navy's Submarine Challenge|date=18 April 2006|publisher=Routledge|location=London|isbn=9781134203956|pages=179}}</ref> Professor Timo Kivimäki,<ref>{{cite book|last1=Kivimäki|first1=Timo|title=War Or Peace in the South China Sea?|date=2002|publisher=NIAS Press|location=Denmark|isbn=9788791114014|pages=65–66|edition=Issue 45}}</ref> Dr Denny Roy,<ref>{{cite book|last1=Roy|first1=Denny|title=China's Foreign Relations|date=1 January 1998|publisher=Rowman & Littlefield|location=United States|isbn=9780847690138|pages=112–113}}</ref> and Professor Bart Dessein.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Dessein|first1=Bart|title=Interpreting China as a Regional and Global Power: Nationalism and Historical Consciousness in World Politics|date=26 Nov 2014|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|location=United Kingdom|isbn=9781137450302|page=175}}</ref>

China's ambition towards blue-water capability received much attention, particularly from the [[United States Congress]]<ref name="China">Ronald O'Rourke, "China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress", December 10, 2012, page 7</ref> and [[United States Department of Defense|Department of Defense]],<ref name="US DOD Report">{{cite journal|title=Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2013|journal=Dod: Annual Report to Congress|date=2013|pages=38–39|url=http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_China_Report_FINAL.pdf|access-date=2014-11-10|archive-date=2015-01-13|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150113120816/http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_china_report_final.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref> with both acknowledging that China's primary aim was to project power in the [[First island chain|First and Second island chains]].<ref name="US DOD Report"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=O'Rourke |first1= Ronald|title=China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress|journal=Congressional Research Service|date=22 January 2020|url=https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf}}</ref> In a 2013 report to Congress, defense experts also asserted that over the coming decades, China would gain the capability to project power across the globe – similar to Britain's 1982 [[Falklands War]].<ref name="US DOD Report"/> In addition, there were those who thought China already had a blue-water navy, such as British naval historian and professor Geoffrey Till,<ref name="Routledge">{{cite book|last1=Till|first1=Geoffrey|title=Naval Modernisation in South-East Asia: Nature, Causes and Consequences|date=15 August 2013|publisher=Routledge|location=London |isbn=978-1135953942|page=267}}</ref> and also, Professor David Shambaugh who believed that the PLAN had transitioned from a green-water navy to that of a "limited" blue-water navy.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Shambaugh|first1=David|title=China Goes Global: The Partial Power|date=18 January 2013|publisher=Oxford University Press|location= United Kingdom|isbn=9780199323692|pages=289–290}}</ref> According to Todd and Lindberg's classification system, the PLAN was a rank four "regional power projection navy".<ref name="Lindberg-classification"/><ref name=Kirchberger/>

Since 2008, the PLAN has conducted anti-piracy missions in the [[Gulf of Aden]] on a [[People's Liberation Army Navy#2008 anti-piracy operations|continuous basis]].<ref>{{cite book|last1=Peter A. Dutton & Ryan D. Martinson|title=NWC China Maritime Studies 13: Beyond the Wall Chinese far sea operations|date=13 May 2015|publisher=Naval War College|location=United States|page=33|url=https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/667e7ff9-b1e4-46cb-b709-555d151d5c3f/WEB_CMS13.pdf.aspx|access-date=3 December 2015|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160110023343/https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/667e7ff9-b1e4-46cb-b709-555d151d5c3f/WEB_CMS13.pdf.aspx|archive-date=10 January 2016}}</ref>
{{Clear}}

===France===
{{Main|French Navy}}
[[File:Charles De Gaulle (R91) underway 2009.jpg|thumb|French aircraft carrier {{ship|French aircraft carrier|Charles de Gaulle|R91|2}}]]
The [[French Navy]] is recognised as being a blue-water navy by various experts and academics.{{ref|A|[A]}}<ref name="Bratton"/><ref name="Trident"/><ref name="Bennett"/> According to professors Daniel Todd and Michael Lindberg, the French Navy is a rank two "limited global-reach power projection navy".<ref name="Lindberg-classification">{{cite book|first1=Daniel |last1=Todd |first2=Michael |last2=Lindberg|title=Navies and Shipbuilding Industries: The Strained Symbiosis|date=1996|publisher=Greenwood Publishing Group|isbn=9780275953102|pages=56–57|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=he5KL_tWQvMC|access-date=30 November 2015|ref=Todd-1996}}</ref><ref name="Kirchberger">{{cite book|last1=Kirchberger|first1=Sarah| oclc=911616881| title=Assessing China's Naval Power: Technological Innovation, Economic Constraints, and Strategic Implications|date=2015| location=Heidelberg|publisher=Springer|isbn=9783662471272|page=60}}</ref>

The navy operates a single nuclear-powered aircraft carrier ({{ship|French aircraft carrier|Charles de Gaulle|R91|2}}) which forms the centrepiece of the Navy's principal expeditionary task group (known as the Aeronaval Group). In addition to this, the navy maintains a secondary Amphibious Group (known as Le Groupe Amphibie) based around the {{Sclass|Mistral|amphibious assault ship|1}}s. Both these formations are part of the [[Force d'action navale]] (or Naval Action Force). The '[[Submarine forces (France)|''Forces sous-marines'']]' operates four nuclear-powered [[Triomphant-class submarine|ballistic missile submarines]] and six nuclear-powered [[fleet submarine]]s. France retains a network of overseas naval facilities around the world; from [[Fort-de-France|Fort de France]] in the Caribbean, to [[Le Port, Réunion]] in the Indian Ocean, [[Papeete]] in the Pacific and in several other parts of the world too, including the Gulf, South Atlantic and the Western Pacific.<ref>[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/sede300309studype407004_/SEDE300309StudyPE407004_en.pdf The overseas military installations of the Member States of the European Union], uroparl.europa.eu, Published 2009, Retrieved 26 June 2014</ref>

The navy's operational duties include the protection of French interests abroad and the security of the nation's many [[Overseas departments and territories of France|overseas departments and territories]], as such the Navy undertakes a number of [[Standing French Navy Deployments|standing commitments]] worldwide.<ref>[http://www.defense.gouv.fr/marine French Navy official website], defense.gouv.fr</ref>
{{Clear}}

===India===
{{Main|Indian Navy}}
[[File:INS Vikrant (R11) and INS Vikramaditya (R33) with the carrier battle group.jpg|thumb|Indian aircraft carriers [[INS Vikramaditya]] and [[INS Vikrant (2013)|INS ''Vikrant'']] with the carrier battle group sailing together]]
The [[Indian Navy]] is unique among Asian navies due to its long experience in carrier power projection since 1961.<ref name="George-Gilboy">{{cite book|first1=George J.|last1=Gilboy|first2=Eric|last2=Heginbotham|title=Chinese and Indian Strategic Behavior: Growing Power and Alarm|date=12 Mar 2012|publisher=Cambridge University Press|location=United Kingdom|pages=175–176|isbn=9781107661691}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Freeman|first1=Carla P|title=Handbook on China and Developing Countries|date=30 Apr 2015|publisher=Edward Elgar Publishing|isbn=9781782544210|page=455}}</ref> This, according to Dr. George J. Gilboy and political scientist Eric Heginbotham, gives the Indian Navy the "leading power projection capability in the region".<ref name="George-Gilboy"/> The Indian Navy is also the only Asian navy considered to be a rank three "multi-regional power projection navy" per Todd and Lindberg's classification system.<ref name="Lindberg-classification"/><ref name=Kirchberger/> In his discussion paper for Consultancy Africa Intelligence, Greg Ryan asserts that in recent years, the Indian Navy has emerged as a "global power in the blue water sense".<ref name="CAI">{{cite journal|last1=Ryan|first1=Greg|title=The expansion of India's blue water capabilities into African maritime territories|journal=Consultancy Africa Intelligence|date=8 September 2014|issue=Discussion paper|url=http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1709:the-expansion-of-indias-blue-water-capabilities-into-african-maritime-territories&catid=58:asia-dimension-discussion-papers&Itemid=264|access-date=15 March 2015|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150402121239/http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1709:the-expansion-of-indias-blue-water-capabilities-into-african-maritime-territories&catid=58:asia-dimension-discussion-papers&Itemid=264|archive-date=2 April 2015}}</ref>

India initially outlined its intentions of developing blue-water capabilities under the 2007 ''Maritime Capabilities Perspective Plan'',<ref name="India">{{cite journal | url=http://www.jmss.org/2008/winter/articles/scott.pdf | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080528002213/http://www.jmss.org/2008/winter/articles/scott.pdf | archive-date=2008-05-28 | title=India's drive for a 'blue water' navy | author=Scott, David | journal=[[Journal of Military and Strategic Studies]]| date=Winter 2007–2008 | volume=10 | issue=2 | page=42}}</ref><ref name="India1">{{cite book|first1=Atish|last1=Sinha|first2=Madhup|last2=Mohta|title=Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities|year=2007|publisher=Academic Foundation|isbn=978-81-7188-593-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9lKEJBadmAQC}}</ref> with the navy's priority being the projection of "power in India's area of strategic interest", the [[Indian Ocean]] Region.<ref name="wcmp">{{cite book|editor1-first=Antony|editor1-last=Preston|editor2-first=John|editor2-last=Jordan|editor3-first=Stephen|editor3-last=Dent|title=Warship|year=2007|publisher=Conway Maritime Press|location=London|isbn=978-1844860418|page=164|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=dytTKHJ0_mUC&q=kolkata+class+destroyer&pg=PA164}}</ref><ref>[http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=275 India's Military Modernization: Plans and Strategic Underpinnings], Gurmeet Kanwal, September 24, 2012</ref> Since 2007 the navy has increased its presence in the [[Persian Gulf]] and the [[Horn of Africa]] to the [[Strait of Malacca]], and routinely conducts [[Piracy in Somalia#Military presence|anti-piracy]] operations and partnership building with [[Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Co-operation|other navies]] in the region.<ref>{{cite web|title=Indian Ocean: Reviving IOR-ARC forum|url=http://www.strategic-affairs.com/details.php?task=other_story&&id=502|publisher=Strategic Affairs|access-date=11 December 2013}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=Indian Navy - Naval Operations|url=http://indiannavy.nic.in/naval-operations|publisher=Indian Navy|access-date=23 May 2014|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140625095547/http://indiannavy.nic.in/naval-operations|archive-date=25 June 2014}}</ref> It also conducts routine two to three month-long deployments in the [[South China Sea|South]] and [[East China Sea|East China sea]]s as well as the western [[Mediterranean]] simultaneously.<ref>{{cite news|title=The power of the sea|url=http://www.deccanchronicle.com/140523/commentary-op-ed/article/power-sea|access-date=23 May 2014|newspaper=Deccan Chronicle|date=23 May 2014}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last=Brewster|first=David|title=India as an Asia Pacific power|date=2012|publisher=Routledge|location=Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon|isbn=978-1136620089|pages=140–143|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=1RGpAgAAQBAJ&q=indian+navy+deployments+south+china+sea&pg=PA141}}</ref> The navy has a listening post in [[Madagascar]].<ref>{{cite news|last1=Pubby|first1=Manu|title=India activates first listening post on foreign soil: radars in Madagascar|url=http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/india-activates-first-listening-post-on-foreign-soil-radars-in-madagascar/205416/|access-date=15 March 2015|agency=The Indian Express|date=18 July 2007}}</ref>

India inducted its first aircraft carrier in 1961, and the navy has ever since operated two independent carrier task forces. After {{INS|Viraat}} and {{INS|Vikrant|1961|6}} were decommissioned, the country’s strike force currently centers on the two carrier battle groups: {{INS|Vikramaditya}}, and a new indigenous aircraft carrier, {{INS|Vikrant|2013|6}} commissioned in September 2022, restoring India's two-carrier capability. The Indian Navy also possesses an [[amphibious transport dock]], {{INS|Jalashwa}}, and currently operates 2 [[Arihant-class submarine|''Arihant''-class]] indigenously developed nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine with two more under construction, along with leasing one {{Sclass|Akula|submarine|0}} nuclear-powered attack submarine and has many more ships of different types planned or under construction.
{{Clear}}

===Italy===
{{Main|Italian Navy}}
[[File:Cavour Napoli 2010.jpg|thumb|Italian aircraft carrier [[Italian aircraft carrier Cavour|''Cavour'']]]]
The [[Italian Navy]] was categorised as a "regional blue-water navy" in [[Liu Huaqing]]'s Memoirs (1994),<ref>[https://books.google.com/books?id=SDDDP_a3yIQC&q=regional-blue+water+type&pg=PA100 The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles?], 2012 (Footnote no. 16, page 139)</ref> and as a rank three "multi regional power projection navy" by Professors Daniel Todd and Michael Lindberg in 1996.<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=he5KL_tWQvMC|title=Navies and Shipbuilding Industries: The Strained Symbiosis|last1=Todd|first1=Daniel|last2=Lindberg|first2= Michael |date= 1996|publisher=Greenwood Publishing Group|isbn=9780275953102|pages= 56–57|ref=Todd-1996|access-date=30 November 2015}}</ref> In the former 1989 publication "''The Atlantic Alliance and the Middle East''", Joseph I. Coffey asserted that Italy's blue-water capabilities didn't extend beyond the Mediterranean sea.<ref name="Coffey">{{cite book|last1=Coffey|first1=Joseph I.|title=The Atlantic Alliance and the Middle East|date=1989|publisher=University of Pittsburgh Press|location=United States|isbn= 9780822911548|page=89|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=RmttAAAAMAAJ&q=The+Atlantic+Alliance+and+the+Middle+East |access-date=30 November 2015}}</ref> Today the navy possesses two [[aircraft carrier]]s ({{ship|Italian aircraft carrier|Cavour|C 550|2}} and {{ship|Italian aircraft carrier|Giuseppe Garibaldi|C 551|2}}), a third one to be commissioned in 2023, as well as a modern fleet of surface combatants and submarines.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.marina.difesa.it/uominimezzi/sommergibili/PublishingImages/todaro_hp.jpg |title=Archived copy |access-date=2017-08-06 |archive-date=2016-03-06 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160306021846/http://www.marina.difesa.it/uominimezzi/sommergibili/PublishingImages/todaro_hp.jpg |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref>https://s-media-cache-ak0.pinimg.com/originals/5a/b6/aa/5ab6aa6b864f1d8ef1d5e5a52000711a.jpg {{Bare URL image|date=March 2022}}</ref> The Marina Militare routinely deploys to the [[Indian Ocean]] and [[Persian Gulf]] as part of multinational anti-piracy missions such as [[Operation Ocean Shield]] and [[Operation Atalanta]],<ref>[http://www.marina.difesa.it/EN/operations/Pagine/default.aspx Marina Militaire – Operations], marina.difesa.it, (In Italian)</ref> and is capable of deploying a carrier battle group in support of NATO or EU operations such as during [[Participants in Operation Enduring Freedom#.Italy|Operation Enduring Freedom]] (2001) and [[EU Navfor Med]] ([[European migrant crisis]]). Recently, in 2015, scholar Sarah Kirchberger has mentioned Italy as a blue-water navy capable of operate in the high seas far from its home.<ref>{{cite book|first = Sarah |last = Kirchberger|title = Assessing China's Naval Power: Technological Innovation, Economic Constraints, and Strategic Implications |publisher = Springer|date = 2015|page = 69|isbn = 9783662471272|url = https://books.google.com/books?id=tbr-CQAAQBAJ&q=blue%20water%20navy%20italy%20spain%20russia%20brazil%20india%20france%20uk%202015&pg=PA69}}</ref>
{{Clear}}

===Russia===
{{Main|Russian Navy|Soviet Navy}}
[[File:Russian aircraft carrier Kuznetsov.jpg|thumb|Russian aircraft carrier {{ship|Russian aircraft carrier|Admiral Kuznetsov||2}}]]
The [[Soviet Navy]] maintained naval forces able to rival those of the United States; however, following the end of the [[Cold War]] and dissolution of the [[Soviet Union]] in 1991, the [[Russian Navy]] experienced a severe decline due to lack of funding.<ref name="Austin">{{cite book|last1=Austin|first1=Greg|title=The Armed Forces of Russia in Asia|date=14 Jul 2000|publisher=I.B.Tauris|isbn=9781860644856}}</ref> By the late 1990s, there was little tangible evidence of Russian blue-water capability.<ref name=Austin/> It wasn't until 2007, under President [[Vladimir Putin]], that "naval ambition broadened in scope and aimed at re-creating a large blue-water navy".<ref>{{cite book|last1=Dutton|first1=Peter|title=Twenty-First Century Seapower: Cooperation and Conflict at Sea|date=2013|publisher=Routledge|location=London|isbn=978-1136316968|pages=119–120}}</ref> Today, the Russian Navy is considered to be a rank 3 "multi-regional power projection navy" by Todd and Lindberg's classification system.<ref name="Lindberg-classification"/><ref name=Kirchberger/> The Russian Navy has also been described as a blue-water navy by British naval historian Professor Geoffrey Till.<ref name="Routledge"/>

Analysts have mentioned that as opposed to the focus on submarine operations in the North Atlantic during the Cold War era, Russia's strategic emphasis has shifted towards the Pacific regions where a rising China and the United States "[[East Asian foreign policy of the Barack Obama administration#The 'Pivot'|Asia-Pacific Pivot]]" are potential threats.<ref>{{cite web |first = Dmitry |last =Gorenburg|url = http://russiamil.wordpress.com/2011/05/23/russian-navy-shifts-strategic-focus-with-china-in-mind/ |title = Russian navy shifts strategic focus with China in mind|date = 23 May 2011 |work = Russian Military Reform}}</ref>

Since 2008, there has been a notable increase in [[Russian Navy#Deployments and increase in activity|Russian naval activity]], primarily in the Atlantic, Mediterranean, Caribbean and Indian Ocean.

Since 2018 Russia's only aircraft carrier has been out of service for repairs and after several accidents while it was dry docked, it is not expected to begin sea trials until 2024.
{{Clear}}

=== United Kingdom ===
{{Main|Royal Navy|UK Carrier Strike Group}}
[[File:HMS Queen Elizabeth Carrier Strike Group during Westlant 19.jpg|thumb|Aircraft carrier {{HMS|Queen Elizabeth|R08|6}} and her [[Carrier Strike Group]] during Exercise Westlant 19.]]
The [[Royal Navy]] is considered to be a blue-water navy by naval experts and academics. This position is likely to be further cemented with the introduction of two new {{sclass|Queen Elizabeth|aircraft carrier|1}}s, eighteen new frigates (8 [[Type 26 frigate|Type 26]], 5 [[Type 31 frigate|Type 31]], and 5 [[Type 32 frigate|Type 32]]), and other warships currently being procured.<ref name="Trident"/><ref name="Bennett"/>{{ref|A|[A]}}{{ref|B|[B]}} A term used commonly in the [[United Kingdom]] is that the Royal Navy maintains a maritime [[Expeditionary warfare|expeditionary]] capability.<ref>{{cite web|first=Ian |last=Speller |date=2002 |url=http://eprints.nuim.ie/844/1/Speller.pdf |title=UK Maritime Expeditionary Capabilities and the Lessons of the Falklands Conflict}}</ref> According to Todd and Lindberg's classification system, the Royal Navy is a rank two "limited global-reach power projection navy".<ref name="Lindberg-classification"/><ref name=Kirchberger/>

The Royal Navy supports a number of [[Standing Royal Navy deployments|standing commitments]] worldwide on a continuous basis and maintains an expeditionary task force known as the [[Joint Expeditionary Force (Maritime)]] (JEF (M)).<ref>{{cite web|title=The Royal Navy Deployed Forward Operating Globally|url=http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/About-the-Royal-Navy/~/media/Files/Navy-PDFs/About-the-Royal-Navy/Current%20RN%20Operations.pdf|work=royalnavy.mod.uk/|publisher=Royal Navy|access-date=21 May 2014}}</ref> The [[Royal Navy Submarine Service]] operates four {{sclass|Vanguard|submarine|0}} nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines and seven nuclear-powered {{sclass|Astute|submarine|5}} and {{sclass|Trafalgar|submarine|4}} [[fleet submarine]]s which operate globally.<ref>{{cite web|title=Royal Navy - A Global Force 2012/13|url=http://www.newsdeskmedia.com/images/Upload/PDFs/Global-Force-2013.pdf|website=www.newsdeskmedia.com/|publisher=Royal Navy|access-date=26 June 2014|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140116192947/http://www.newsdeskmedia.com/Images/Upload/PDFs/Global-Force-2013.pdf|archive-date=16 January 2014}} p. 45 (The Submarine Service)</ref> The [[Royal Fleet Auxiliary]] (RFA) maintains a number of ships which support Royal Navy operations globally by resupplying personnel, food, water, armament and fuel to their ships. The RFA also augment the Royal Navy's amphibious landing capabilities by operating the {{sclass2|Bay|landing ship|4}}.<ref>[https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201110_RDS_Michell2.pdf The Royal Fleet Auxiliary – Delivering Maritime Operational Support] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120415225950/http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201110_RDS_Michell2.pdf |date=2012-04-15 }}, rusi.org, Published 2011, Retrieved 26 June 2014</ref><ref>[https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201110_RDS_Willett.pdf The Royal Fleet Auxiliary – Adding Value to UK Defence] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120416042623/http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201110_RDS_Willett.pdf |date=2012-04-16 }}, rusi.org, Published 2011, Retrieved 26 June 2014</ref> The United Kingdom maintains five overseas naval facilities, including a naval support facility, named the [[British Defence Singapore Support Unit]], in [[Sembawang]], [[Singapore]] in the [[Far East]].<ref name="europarl">{{cite journal|title=The Status and Location of the Military Installations of the Member States of the European Union |journal=Policy Department External Policies|date=February 2009|pages=13–14|url=http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/sede300309studype407004_/SEDE300309StudyPE407004_en.pdf|access-date=21 October 2014}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=UK opens naval support facility in Bahrain|url=http://www.janes.com/article/65481/uk-opens-naval-support-facility-in-bahrain|access-date=24 November 2016|agency=IHS Jane's Defence Weekly|date=15 November 2016|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161125110458/http://www.janes.com/article/65481/uk-opens-naval-support-facility-in-bahrain|archive-date=25 November 2016}}</ref><ref>[https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm130617/text/130617w0002.htm#13061746000236 House of Commons Hansard Written Answers] (publications.parliament.uk) 17 June 2013</ref>

The [[Naval War College|U.S. Naval War College]] identifies the Royal Navy's tasks as fighting wars, conducting distant expeditions, maintaining good order at sea and preventing and deterring conflict.<ref name="USNWC Geoffrey Till">{{cite web|last1=Till|first1=Geoffrey|title=Great Britain Gambles With The Royal Navy|url=https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/42a6d74d-a770-4f61-94f6-9386d0f37a2a/Great-Britain-Gambles-with-the-Royal-Navy|website=www.usnwc.edu|publisher=U.S. Naval War College|access-date=26 June 2014|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304051724/https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/42a6d74d-a770-4f61-94f6-9386d0f37a2a/Great-Britain-Gambles-with-the-Royal-Navy|archive-date=4 March 2016}}</ref> As such, the Navy views the retention of its "world-class" high-end disciplines in anti-air and anti-submarine warfare as strategically important.<ref name="USNWC Geoffrey Till"/> The Royal Navy has shown many examples of its expeditionary capabilities{{ref|C|[C]}} since [[World War II]], such as the [[Korean War]], the 1982 [[Falklands War]], the 1990–91 [[Gulf War]], [[British military intervention in the Sierra Leone Civil War|Sierra Leone]], the [[War in Afghanistan (2001–present)|War in Afghanistan]], the [[2003 invasion of Iraq]],<ref name="USNWC Geoffrey Till"/> and during the [[2011 military intervention in Libya]].
{{Clear}}

===United States===
{{Main|United States Navy}}
[[File:USS Nimitz in Victoria Canada 036.jpg|thumb|United States Navy [[supercarrier]] {{USS|Nimitz}}]]
[[File:USS_America_(LHA-6)_off_Rio_de_Janeiro_in_August_2014.JPG|thumb|United States Navy [[amphibious assault ship]], {{USS|America|LHA-6|6}}]]
The [[United States Navy]] is considered a blue-water navy by experts and academics.<ref name="Bratton"/><ref name="Trident"/><ref name="Bennett"/> It is distinguished from other power projection navies in that it is considered a global blue-water navy, able to operate in the deep waters of every ocean simultaneously.<ref name="Routledge"/> According to Todd and Lindberg's classification system, the United States Navy is a rank one "global-reach power projection navy", and the only navy to occupy this rank.<ref name="Lindberg-classification"/><ref name=Kirchberger/>

The USN maintains ten [[carrier strike group]]s (centered on the {{Sclass|Nimitz|aircraft carrier|1}} and {{Sclass|Gerald R. Ford|aircraft carrier|1}}s), of which six are deployed or ready for deployment within 30 days, and two ready for deployment within 90 days under the Fleet Response Plan (FRP). The USN also maintains a continuous deployment of nine [[expeditionary strike group]]s that embark a [[Marine Expeditionary Unit]] with an [[Aviation Combat Element]] on [[List of United States Navy amphibious warfare ships|amphibious warfare ships]].<ref>[http://www.navy.mil/navydata/navy_legacy_hr.asp?id=146 Status of the U.S Navy] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101221114823/http://www.navy.mil/navydata/navy_legacy_hr.asp?id=146 |date=December 21, 2010 }}</ref> The US [[Military Sealift Command]] is the largest of its kind in the world and is responsible for delivering military transport and ship replenishment around the globe.<ref>[http://www.msc.navy.mil/ Military Sealift Command] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070210032557/http://www.msc.navy.mil/ |date=2007-02-10 }}, msc.navy.mil, Retrieved 23 June 2014</ref>

The US Navy has shown countless examples of its blue-water combat capabilities and has the ability to [[power projection|project force]] onto the [[littoral zone|littoral regions]] of the world, engage in forward areas during peacetime, and rapidly respond to regional crises. Some examples of such are [[World War II]], the [[Korean War]], the [[Vietnam War]], the [[Persian Gulf War]], the [[War in Afghanistan (2001–present)|War in Afghanistan]] and the [[Iraq War]].

The [[United States Coast Guard]], while not technically a navy, is also a blue-water naval force capable of deploying to waters throughout the world.

==From green-water to blue-water==
{{See also|Green-water navy}}

Some green-water navies have ambitions towards the development of blue-water capabilities.<ref name=Michiko/><ref name="Skaridov">{{citation | url= http://community.middlebury.edu/~scs/docs/ScienceDirect%20-%20Marine%20Policy%20%20Naval%20activity%20in%20the%20foreign.htm | title= Naval activity in the foreign EEZ—the role of terminology in law regime | first= Alexander S. | last= Skaridov | publisher= St. Petersburg Association of the Law of the Sea, 7 Kazanskaya St., St. Petersburg 191186, Russia, Available online 11 November 2004 | url-status= dead | archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20061017183601/http://community.middlebury.edu/~scs/docs/ScienceDirect%20-%20Marine%20Policy%20%20Naval%20activity%20in%20the%20foreign.htm | archive-date= 17 October 2006 }}</ref>

[[File:USMC F-35B conducting a vertical landing aboard the JS Izumo.jpg|thumb|An [[Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II#F-35B|F-35B]] conducting a vertical landing aboard [[JS Izumo|JS ''Izumo'']].]]
[[File:Bayraktar Kızılelma on the deck of TCG Anadolu (L-400) - 1.jpg|thumb|[[TCG Anadolu|TCG ''Anadolu'' (L-400)]] and the [[TF2000-class destroyer]]s will provide blue-water operational capabilities for the [[Turkish Naval Forces|Turkish Navy]]. [[Baykar Bayraktar Kızılelma|Baykar MIUS Kızılelma]] is a jet-engined [[UCAV]] designed to operate on TCG ''Anadolu''.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/turkeys-drone-carrier-amphibious-assault-ship-enters-service|title=Turkey's 'Drone Carrier' Amphibious Assault Ship Enters Service|author=Emma Helfrich|website=thedrive.com|date=11 April 2023}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.trtworld.com/video/strait-talk/turkish-navy-officially-welcomes-its-new-flagship-tcg-anadolu/64356f5e9d32a80017b0933d|title=Turkish Navy Officially Welcomes Its New Flagship, TCG Anadolu|publisher=[[TRT World]]|date=11 April 2023}}</ref><ref name="Baykar MIUS Official">{{cite web|url=https://baykartech.com/en/press/baykars-unmanned-fighter-aircraft-completes-first-flight/|title=Baykar's unmanned fighter aircraft completes first flight|website=baykartech.com|date=15 December 2022}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/05/here-is-how-uavs-will-be-recovered-aboard-tcg-anadolu/|title=Here Is How UAVs Will Be Recovered Aboard TCG Anadolu|website=navalnews.com|publisher=Naval News|author=Tayfun Özberk|date=1 May 2022}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://imgs.stargazete.com/imgsdisk/2022/12/14/carpici-tcg-anadolu-acikl-819_2-41.jpg|title=Image of Baykar MIUS Kızılelma UCAVs deployed on TCG Anadolu (L-400)|website=stargazete.com|date=14 December 2022}}</ref> Its maiden flight took place on December 14, 2022.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rwJ7fyvexGc|title=Bayraktar Kızılelma: Maiden Flight|publisher=Baykar Technologies|date=14 December 2022}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q8gkHRMewMg|title=Maiden flight of Baykar MIUS Kızılelma UCAV (14 December 2022)|publisher=SavunmaSanayiST|date=14 December 2022}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Herk |first=Hans van |title=Kızılelma takes to the sky! |url=https://www.scramble.nl/military-news/k-z-lelma-takes-to-the-sky |date=14 December 2022 |website=www.scramble.nl |language=en-GB}}</ref>]]

While considered to be a green-water navy,<ref name="Routledge"/> the [[Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force]] is undergoing transition to develop blue-water capabilities.<ref name="Hatou">{{Cite journal|author=Tomohisa Takei|date=November 2008|url=https://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/navcol/SSG/topics-column/images/c-030/c-030_eng.pdf|title=Japan Maritime Self Defense Force in the New Maritime Era|journal=Hatou|access-date=2012-12-03}}</ref><ref name="SLOC">{{cite journal|last=Katsumata|first=Hidemichi|date=February 2009|title =Japanese sealane defense today|journal=Ships of the World|volume=702|pages=76–81|location =Japan|publisher=Kaijin-sha}}</ref> It began in 1981 when [[Prime Minister of Japan|Prime Minister]] [[Zenkō Suzuki]] put forward a new doctrine requiring the JMSDF to expand its operations by 1,000 miles for defense of the nation's [[sea lines of communication]].<ref name="Hatou"/><ref name="SLOC"/> To respond to the growing blue-water requirements, the JMSDF has been developing impressive capabilities, most notably the creation of destroyer flotillas centered on large helicopter destroyers (such as the [[Hyūga-class helicopter destroyer|''Hyūga''-class helicopter carrier]]) and large [[Aegis Combat System|AEGIS]]-equipped destroyers.<ref name="Koda2011">{{cite journal|last=Koda|first=Yoji|author-link=:ja:香田洋二|date=November 2011|title =History of Fleet Escort Force since 1961|journal=Ships of the World|volume=750|pages=76–85|location =Japan|publisher=Kaijin-sha}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|author=Euan Graham|date=January 2006|title =Japan's Sea Lane Security, 1940-2004: A Matter Of Life And Death?|publisher=Routledge|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=EaiT_nSgsMcC|isbn=9780415356404}}</ref> The first Japanese post-WWII overseas naval air facility was established next to [[Djibouti-Ambouli International Airport]]; it supports a number of [[Lockheed P-3 Orion]] maritime patrol aircraft.<ref>{{cite web|author=Japan Ministry of Defense|url=https://www.mod.go.jp/e/about/answers/anti/index.html|title=MOD/JSDF ANSWERS - Anti-Piracy Efforts|access-date=November 16, 2012|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130108094155/http://www.mod.go.jp/e/about/answers/anti/index.html|archive-date=January 8, 2013}}</ref> It was then decided to operate F-35B fighters on board the [[Izumo-class multi-purpose destroyer|''Izumo''-class]], a development of the ''Hyūga''-class, and by July 2021 [[JS Izumo|JS ''Izumo'']] had completed modifications for this purpose,<ref>{{Citation|url=https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/07/japans-izumo-helicopter-destroyer-modified-to-operate-f-35b-fighters/|title=Japan's Izumo Helicopter Destroyer Modified To Operate F-35B Fighters|newspaper=Naval News|date=July 20, 2021}}</ref> followed by an operational test using the U.S. Marine Corps F-35B in October.<ref>{{Citation|url=https://news.usni.org/2021/09/30/u-s-marine-f-35bs-to-embark-on-japans-largest-warship-in-october|title=U.S. Marine F-35Bs to Embark on Japan's Largest Warship in October|author= Dzirhan Mahadzir|newspaper=USNI News|publisher=[[United States Naval Institute]]|date=September 30, 2021}}</ref>

The [[Republic of Korea Navy]] also has ambitions to develop blue-water capabilities.<ref name="autogenerated2001">[http://www3.yonsei.ac.kr:8888/kdjlibrary/historyData/researchData/viewNew.asp?pkid=30009&searchValue=&sYear=2001&sMonth=03&sDay=01&eYear=2001&eMonth=04&eDay=17&searchFlag=Y&historyYear=&itemGubun=1&page=1 "김대통령, 해군사관학교 졸업 및 임관식 참석말씀"] {{webarchive|url=https://archive.today/20121219201811/http://www3.yonsei.ac.kr:8888/kdjlibrary/historyData/researchData/viewNew.asp?pkid=30009&searchValue=&sYear=2001&sMonth=03&sDay=01&eYear=2001&eMonth=04&eDay=17&searchFlag=Y&historyYear=&itemGubun=1&page=1 |date=2012-12-19 }}. Kim Dae-jung Presidential Library Official Website. Retrieved March 12, 2007.</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/publication/22419/republic_of_korea_navy_and_chinas_rise.html | title=Republic of Korea Navy and China's Rise: Balancing Competing Priorities | publisher=Belfer Centre | work=Maritime Asia Report | access-date=2013-04-24 | author=Roehrig, Terence}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | title=The Emergence of a Korean Navy — A Japanese Perspective| journal= [[Naval War College Review]] | date=Spring 2010 |volume=32 |number= 2| url=https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1595&context=nwc-review| author=Koda, Yoji | pages=23| issn= 0028-1484}}</ref> In 2001, the South Korean President, [[Kim Dae-jung]], announced plans to build a "Strategic Mobile Fleet".<ref name="autogenerated2001"/> The plan includes the construction of up to three {{Sclass|Dokdo|amphibious assault ship|1}}s, with a [[Flight deck#Ski-jump ramp|ski-jump]] for the operation of [[V/STOL]] jet fighters being considered for the second vessel currently under construction.<ref>[http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131026/DEFREG03/310260005/S-Korea-Envisions-Light-Aircraft-Carrier S. Korea Envisions Light Aircraft Carrier] {{webarchive|url=https://archive.today/20131026174917/http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131026/DEFREG03/310260005/S-Korea-Envisions-Light-Aircraft-Carrier |date=2013-10-26 }}, defensenews.com, 26 October 2013</ref> On 3 December 2021 the National Assembly passed the budget to fund a fixed-wing aircraft carrier tentatively named [[CVX-class aircraft carrier]] capable of operating F35B, expected to enter operations possibly as early as 2033.<ref>Dominguez, Gabriel & Dae Young Kim (24 February 2021). [https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/south-korea-to-begin-work-on-light-aircraft-carrier-in-2022 "South Korea to begin work on light aircraft carrier in 2022"]. www.janes.com. Retrieved 2 December 2021.</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.hankyung.com/politics/article/202112033171i |title=결국 되살아난 '경항모 예산' 72억…해군, 내년 기본설계 추진|publisher=hankyung.com|date=3 December 2021|access-date=3 December 2021}}</ref><ref name="yna1">{{cite web|url=https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20211202169100001?section=politics/all&site=major_news01_related|title=국방 분야 핵심공약 좌초 우려에 정무라인 물밑작업 끝 원안 통과문대통령, 경항모 중요성 거듭 강조…예산부활 보고받고는 '반색|publisher=yna.co.kr|date=3 December 2021|access-date=3 December 2021}}</ref>

The [[Brazilian Navy]] is experiencing a "shift in maritime priorities" with ambitions of developing a blue-water navy.<ref name="Brazil1">{{cite journal|last1=Pryce|first1=Paul|title=The Brazilian Navy: Green Water or Blue?|journal=Offiziere.ch|date=19 January 2015|url=http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=187085|access-date=17 March 2015}}</ref> While the navy maintains a mix of capabilities enabling it to operate in the wider South Atlantic Ocean, the Brazilian government wishes to be recognized as "the leading maritime power in the Southern Hemisphere" and is seeking to develop a modern naval shipbuilding industry.<ref name="Brazil1"/>

==See also==
*[[Maritime geography]]
*[[Expeditionary warfare]]
*[[Power projection]]

==Footnotes==
:A. {{note|A}} Professor of International Politics, Adrian Hyde-Price, highlights that in the post-[[Cold War]] era both Britain and France have re-focused their attention "towards [[expeditionary warfare]] and [[power projection]]. Power projection has always been an element of British and French military thinking given their residual overseas interests, but it has now moved centre stage."<ref name="France&UK">Adrian Hyde-Price - "European Security in the Twenty-First Century: The Challenge of Multipolarity", published 9 Jan 2007 by [[Taylor & Francis|Taylor & Francis Group]]. Chapter - Britain, France and the multipolar challenge.</ref>

:B. {{note|B}} [[Royal United Services Institute]] (Occasional Paper, September 2013): "As a [[Permanent members of the United Nations Security Council|permanent member of the UN Security Council]], the independent ability to deploy a credible and powerful conventional force that enables access to most of the globe by sea is compelling. This force offers Britain the opportunity to commit political support in emerging crises to deter, prevent, coerce or – if necessary – destroy an aggressor, as envisaged in the [[National Security Strategy (United Kingdom)|UK's National Security Strategy (NSS)]]."<ref name="RUSI2014">{{cite web|last=Ellwood|first=Tobias|title=A Study into the Preparation for and Use of the Queen Elizabeth-Class Carriers (September 2013)|url=https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201309_OP_Leveraging_UK_Carrier_Capability.pdf|work=rusi.org/|publisher=[[Royal United Services Institute]]|access-date=25 May 2014|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141001144311/https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201309_OP_Leveraging_UK_Carrier_Capability.pdf|archive-date=1 October 2014}}</ref>

:C. {{note|C}} The Royal Navy does not typically use the term ''blue-water navy'', but rather the term ''expeditionary''. "The Navy is always expeditionary and is able to deal with threats to our nation's interest at range."<ref name="Royal Navy 2014">{{Citation |url = http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/About-the-Royal-Navy/The-Navy-and-the-Environment/At-Sea | title = Royal Navy At Sea (Archive) |date=2013 | publisher = The [[Royal Navy]]|archive-url=http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140514123414/http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/About-the-Royal-Navy/The-Navy-and-the-Environment/At-Sea |archive-date=2014-05-14}}</ref>

==References==
{{reflist|30em}}

==External links==
{{wiktionary|expeditionary}}
*[http://www.naval-history.net/F15invasion.htm Description of the Falklands War] (naval-history.net)
*[http://pwencycl.kgbudge.com/Table_Of_Contents.htm The Pacific War] (pwencycl.kgbudge.com)

{{Warship types of the 19th & 20th centuries}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Blue-Water Navy}}
[[Category:Navies by type|Blue-water]]
[[Category:Military doctrines]]
[[Category:Military logistics]]
[[Category:Military geography]]

Mangrol, Kathiawar

2023-09-10T12:32:39Z

Soldier: Created Mangrol, Kathiawar|Mangrol

#REDIRECT [[Mangrol, Gujarat]]

{{R from move}}

Union Cabinet of India

2023-09-10T12:30:23Z

Soldier: Created Union Cabinet of India|Union Cabinet

#REDIRECT [[Union Council of Ministers]]

Cochin Shipyard Limited

2023-09-10T12:27:39Z

Soldier: Created Cochin Shipyard Limited

#REDIRECT [[Cochin Shipyard]]

Air Force Academy, Dundigul

2023-09-10T12:24:42Z

Soldier: Created Air Force Academy, Dundigul|Air Force Academy

#REDIRECT [[Air Force Academy (India)]]

{{R from move}}