https://en.bharatpedia.org/w/api.php?action=feedcontributions&feedformat=atom&user=Sarfaraz+Siyam 2026-08-09T01:57:38Z User contributions MediaWiki 1.43.6 https://en.bharatpedia.org/w/index.php?title=Jodhpur_Municipal_Corporation&diff=432603 2023-10-01T04:16:05Z

<p>Sarfaraz Siyam: Created page for Municipal Corporation Jodhpur</p> <hr /> <div>{{Short description|Local civic body in Jodhpur, Rajasthan, India}}<br /> {{Infobox legislature <br /> |name = Jodhpur Municipal Corporation<br /> |house_type = [[Municipal Corporation (India)|Municipal Corporation]]<br /> |body = Jodhpur<br /> |foundation = {{start date and age|17 December 1992}}<br /> |leader1_type = [[Mayor (India)|Mayor (MCJ North)]]<br /> |leader1 = Kunti Deora Parihar<br /> |party1 = [[Indian National Congress|INC]]<br /> |election1 = 2020<br /> |leader2_type = [[Mayor (India)|Mayor (MCJ South)]]<br /> |leader2 = Vanita Seth<br /> |party2 = [[Bharatiya Janata Party|BJP]]<br /> |election2 = 2020<br /> |term_length = 5 years<br /> |seats1_title = North<br /> |seats1 = 80<br /> |seats2_title = South<br /> |seats2 = 80<br /> |house1 = MCJ North<br /> |structure1 = File:India Jodhpur Municipal Corporation North 2020.svg<br /> |structure1_res = 250px<br /> |political_groups1 = '''Government (61)'''<br /> *{{Party legend|Indian National Congress|53}}<br /> * {{Party legend|Independent politician|8|shortname=IND}}<br /> '''Opposition (19)'''<br /> *{{Party legend|Bharatiya Janata Party|19}}<br /> |house2 = MCJ South<br /> |structure2 = File:India Jodhpur Municipal Corporation South 2020.svg<br /> |structure2_res = 250px<br /> |political_groups2 = '''Government (45)'''<br /> *{{Party legend|Bharatiya Janata Party|43}}<br /> * {{Party legend|Independent politician|2|shortname=IND}}<br /> '''Opposition (35)'''<br /> *{{Party legend|Indian National Congress|29}}<br /> * {{Party legend|Independent politician|6|shortname=IND}}<br /> |last_election1 = 2020<br /> |last_election2 = 2020<br /> |next_election1 = 2025<br /> |next_election2 = 2025<br /> |website = {{URL|https://jodhpurmc.org/}}<br /> |footnotes = &lt;ref name=&quot;Result&quot;&gt;{{cite web |title=Seats Won By Per Party |url=https://sec.rajasthan.gov.in/Pri-PartyWise-WinnerCount.aspx?code=CEM |publisher=State Election Commission, Rajasthan |access-date=29 September 2023}}&lt;/ref&gt;&lt;ref name=&quot;Mayor&quot;&gt;{{cite web |title=Chairperson Received Nominations |url=https://sec.rajasthan.gov.in/ChairpersonNomination.aspx?code=CEM |publisher=State Election Commission, Rajasthan |access-date=29 September 2023}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> }}<br /> <br /> '''Jodhpur Municipal Corporation (MCJ)''' is the [[Municipal corporation (India)|municipal corporation]] of [[Jodhpur]] city in the [[India]]n state of [[Rajasthan]]. It is responsible for civic infrastructure and administration of the city. MCJ is divided into 160 wards and each represented by an elected member. It consist of three [[Rajasthan Vidhan Sabha|Vidhan Sabha]] constituencies [[Jodhpur Assembly constituency|Jodhpur]], [[Soorsagar Assembly constituency|Soorsagar]] and [[Sardarpura Assembly constituency|Sardarpura]].&lt;ref&gt;{{cite web |title=Municipal Corporation Jodhpur |url=https://jodhpurmc.org/ |access-date=29 September 2023}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> == Jodhpur Municipal Corporation North ==<br /> MCJ North consists of 80 wards. In last election, the [[Indian National Congress]] won 53 seats and formed the government, while the [[Bharatiya Janata Party]] won 19 seats with the remaining 8 seats being won by independent candidates.&lt;ref name=&quot;Result&quot; /&gt;<br /> <br /> == Jodhpur Municipal Corporation South ==<br /> MCJ South consists of 80 wards. In last election, the [[Bharatiya Janata Party]] won 43 seats and formed the government with the support of 2 independent candidates, while the [[Indian National Congress]] won 19 seats with the remaining 8 seats being won by independent candidates.&lt;ref name=&quot;Result&quot; /&gt;&lt;ref name=&quot;Mayor&quot; /&gt;<br /> == References ==<br /> {{reflist}}<br /> <br /> == External Links ==<br /> *{{URL|https://jodhpurmc.org/|Official website}}<br /> <br /> [[Category:Jodhpur]]<br /> [[Category:Municipal corporations in Rajasthan]]<br /> [[Category:Local government in Rajasthan]]<br /> [[Category:1992 establishments in India]]<br /> [[Category:Government of Jodhpur]]</div>

Sarfaraz Siyam https://en.bharatpedia.org/w/index.php?title=Gold_Glam_and_Style_Awards&diff=394840 2023-07-18T05:32:00Z

<p>Sarfaraz Siyam: Contributed a new addition to the platform.</p> <hr /> <div>{{short description|Annual Indian television awards}}<br /> {{Cleanup|reason=excess [[WP:BOLDFACE]] in the table}}<br /> {{Infobox award<br /> | name = Gold Glam and Style Awards<br /> | current_awards = <br /> | subheader = <br /> | image =<br /> | image_size = <br /> | alt = <br /> | caption = <br /> | awarded_for = Excellence in Hindi Television<br /> | sponsor = <br /> | date = <br /> | location = [[Mumbai]], [[Maharashtra]]<br /> | country = India<br /> | presenter = Vikaas Kalantri<br /> | hosts = <br /> | former name = <br /> | year = 2020<br /> | year2 = <br /> | holder_label = <br /> | holder = <br /> | website = <br /> | network = [[Youtube]]<br /> | runtime = 1 hr 50 min (2020)<br /> | viewership = <br /> | producer = Vikaas Kalantri<br /> | director = <br /> | individual = <br /> | higher = <br /> | same = <br /> | lower = <br /> | previous = [2020]<br /> | main = <br /> | next = <br /> }}<br /> The '''Gold Glam and Style Awards''' is an annual awards show that honours the best performers in the [[Television in India|Hindi-language television industry]].&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite web |title=Gold Awards 2020: Sidharth Shukla, Hina Khan, Surbhi Chandna to Kanika Mann, list of TV celebs who won big |publisher=INDIA TV |url=https://www.indiatvnews.com/amp/entertainment/tv/gold-awards-2020-sidharth-shukla-hina-khan-to-surbhi-chandna-list-of-tv-celebs-who-won-big-667348 |access-date=27 November 2020}}&lt;/ref&gt; The awards are presented in various areas of excellence, such as popular shows, music programmes, news, entertainment programmes, style, and fashion. The event is managed by Vikaas Kalantari, founder of [[Gold Awards]].&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite web |title=Gold Glam and Style Awards 2020: Hina Khan, Sidharth Shukla win big |url=https://indianexpress.com/photos/entertainment-gallery/gold-glam-and-style-awards-2020-hina-khan-sidharth-shukla-win-big-7064808/ |access-date= |website=The Indian Express |language=en}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> == Winners ==<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot;<br /> |+Winners of the 1st edition<br /> !Category<br /> !Winner(s)<br /> !Ref(s)<br /> |-<br /> |''Fitness Icon(Female)''<br /> |'''[[Drashti Dhami]]'''<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |''Fitness Icon(Male)''<br /> |'''[[Harshad Chopda]]'''<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |''Fitness Icon(Female)OTT''<br /> |'''[[Pooja Banerjee]]'''<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |''Fitness Icon(Male)Social Media''<br /> |'''[[Gurmeet Choudhary]]'''<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |''Fitness Icon(Female)Social Media''<br /> |'''[[Debina Bonnerjee]]'''<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |''Stylish Actor(Male)Tv''<br /> |'''[[Pearl V Puri]]'''<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |rowspan=2|''Stylish Actor(Female)Tv''<br /> |'''[[Helly Shah]]'''<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |'''[[Kanika Mann]]'''<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |''Stylish Actor(Male)OTT''<br /> |'''[[Karan Tacker]]'''<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |''Stylish Actor(Female)OTT''<br /> |'''[[Nikita Dutta]]'''<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |rowspan=2|''Stylish Influencer(Male)''<br /> |'''[[Shakti Arora]]'''<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |'''[[Nakuul Mehta]]'''<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |''Stylish Influencer(Female)''<br /> |'''[[Avneet Kaur]]'''<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |''Professional Glamorous Star(Male)Tv''<br /> |'''[[Dheeraj Dhoopar]]'''<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |''Professional Glamorous Star(Female)Tv''<br /> |'''[[Shraddha Arya]]'''<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |''Best Dressed Actor(Male)Tv''<br /> |'''[[Sharad Malhotra]]'''<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |rowspan=2|''Best Dressed Actor(Female)Tv''<br /> |'''[[Nyra Banerjee]]'''<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |'''[[Surbhi Jyoti]]'''<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |''Most Photogenic Star(Male)Tv''<br /> |'''[[Mohsin Khan (actor)|Mohsin Khan]]'''<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |''Most Photogenic Star(Female)Tv''<br /> |'''[[Mugdha Chaphekar]]'''<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |''Most Photogenic Star(Female)OTT''<br /> |'''[[Raai Laxmi]]'''<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |''Alive Anchor OTT''<br /> |'''Gunjan Utreja'''<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |''Most Stylish Reality Star(Male)Tv''<br /> |'''[[Karan Kundra]]'''<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |''Most Stylish Reality Star(Female)Tv''<br /> |'''[[Gauhar Khan]]'''<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |''Man of Substance''<br /> |'''[[Arjun Bijlani]]'''<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |rowspan=2|''Woman of Substance''<br /> |'''[[Shweta Tiwari]]'''<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |'''[[Munmun Dutta]]'''<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |''Most Sought After Influencer(Male)''<br /> |'''[[Siddharth Nigam]]'''<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |rowspan=2|''Most Sought After Influencer(Female)''<br /> |'''[[Jannat Zubair Rahmani]]'''<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |'''[[Shivangi Joshi]]'''<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |''Style Icon of Television Industry(Male)''<br /> |'''[[Siddharth Shukla]]'''<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |''Diva of the Television Industry''<br /> |'''[[Hina Khan]]'''<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |''Hotstepper(Male)Tv''<br /> |'''[[Zain Imam]]'''<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |''Hotstepper(Female)Tv''<br /> |'''[[Surbhi Chandna]]'''<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |''Stylish Couple''<br /> |'''[[Prince Narula]] and [[Yuvika Chaudhary]]'''<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |''Diva(Female)Social Media''<br /> |'''[[Hina Khan]]'''<br /> |<br /> |}<br /> <br /> == References ==<br /> {{Reflist|30em}}<br /> <br /> {{Uncategorized}}</div>

Sarfaraz Siyam https://en.bharatpedia.org/w/index.php?title=Zaara_Yesmin&diff=395207 2023-07-14T19:06:19Z

<p>Sarfaraz Siyam: </p> <hr /> <div>{{Short description|British actress (born 1997)}}<br /> {{Use Indian English}}<br /> {{Use dmy dates}}<br /> {{Infobox person<br /> | name = Zaara Yesmin<br /> | image = <br /> | caption = <br /> | birth_name = <br /> | birth_date = {{birth date and age|1997|1|8}}<br /> | birth_place = [[Assam]], India &lt;ref&gt;https://www.rediff.com/getahead/report/think-backless-think-zaara-yesmin/20230627.htm&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> | nationality = Indian<br /> | citizenship = <br /> | occupation = {{plainlist|<br /> * [[Actress]]<br /> * [[Model (person)|Model]]<br /> }}<br /> | works = <br /> | awards = Femina Style Diva East<br /> | yearsactive = <br /> | spouse = <br /> | relatives = <br /> | website = {{Instagram|zaarayesmin}}<br /> }}<br /> '''Zaara Yesmin''' is an Indian actress and model, who works predominantly in [[Hindi cinema]].&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite web |title=Actress Zaara Yesmin body-hugging leopard print dress {{!}} Entertainment - Times of India Videos |url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/videos/entertainment/hindi/actress-zaara-yesmin-body-hugging-leopard-print-dress/videoshow/101197140.cms |access-date=2023-07-14 |website=The Times of India |language=en}}&lt;/ref&gt; She is known for her role in the Bollywood song “Sab ki Baaratein&quot; which has around 200 million views in a year.&lt;ref&gt;{{Citation |title=Sabki Baaratein Aayi {{!}} Zaara Yesmin {{!}} Parth Samthaan {{!}} Dev Negi, Seepi Jha {{!}} Raaj {{!}}Tips Official |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DsROfrRB-1k |access-date=2023-04-21 |language=en}}&lt;/ref&gt;&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite web |title=Watch New Hindi Trending Song Music Video - 'Sabki Baaratein Aayi' Sung By Dev Negi And Seepi Jha Featuring Zaara Yesmin And Parth Samthaan {{!}} Entertainment - Times of India Videos |url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/videos/entertainment/music/hindi/watch-new-hindi-trending-song-music-video-sabki-baaratein-aayi-sung-by-dev-negi-and-seepi-jha-featuring-zaara-yesmin-and-parth-samthaan/videoshow/89096265.cms |access-date=2023-07-14 |website=The Times of India |language=en}}&lt;/ref&gt; She has also appeared in music videos and television commercials.&lt;ref name=&quot;:0&quot;&gt;{{Cite web |title=Zaara Yesmin to make her film debut with Superstar |url=https://www.newindianexpress.com/entertainment/kannada/2020/dec/30/zaara-yesmin-to-make-herfilm-debut-with-superstar-2242859.html |access-date=2023-04-09 |website=The New Indian Express}}&lt;/ref&gt;&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite web |title=Zaara Yesmin Bikini Photos: బికినీలో జారా యాస్మిన్ అందాల విందు.. పిక్స్ చూస్తే అంతేసంగతులు!! |url=https://zeenews.india.com/telugu/photo-gallery/model-zaara-yesmin-latest-bikini-photo-shoot-shakes-internet-57079 |access-date=2023-07-14 |website=Zee News Telugu |language=te}}&lt;/ref&gt; She won the title of &quot;Femina Style Diva East&quot; back in 2016.&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite web |title=Zaara Yesmin |url=http://www.imdb.com/name/nm10311288/bio |access-date=2023-04-21 |website=IMDb}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> == Career ==<br /> The Punjabi song &quot;Ik Waar&quot;, in which Yesmin appeared alongside Punjabi singers Falak Shabir and [[Guru Randhawa]], served as the platform for her breakthrough in the entertainment industry.&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite web |last=Innfinity |title=Zaara Yesmin: everything about the Indian model, actress, entrepreneur and explorer{{!}}Instagram, bio and more |url=https://www.innfinity.in/entertainment/zaara-yesmin/ |access-date=2023-07-10 |website=INNFINITY |language=en-US}}&lt;/ref&gt;&lt;ref name=&quot;:0&quot; /&gt; Yesmin has acted in numerous music videos.&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite news |title=Parth Samthaan: Zaara Yesmin pitched my name for the music video; fans love our chemistry |work=The Times of India |url=https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/videos/tv/hindi/parth-samthaan-zaara-yesmin-pitched-my-name-for-the-music-video-fans-love-our-chemistry/videoshow/95322820.cms?from=mdr |access-date=2023-04-09 |issn=0971-8257}}&lt;/ref&gt; She started her career with Kannada film ''Superstar''.&lt;ref name=&quot;:0&quot; /&gt;&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite web |title=Queen of music videos, Zaara Yesmin gifts her a swanky car |url=https://www.mid-day.com/lifestyle/infotainment/article/queen-of-music-videos-zaara-yesmin-gifts-her-a-swanky-car-23160114 |access-date=2023-07-14 |website=Mid-day |language=en}}&lt;/ref&gt; Yesmin was awarded as best performance by Governor of [[Maharashtra]] Shri [[Bhagat Singh Koshyari]] in 2022.&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite web |title=Breathtaking beauty with brains: Zaara Yesmin taking over the glamour industry |url=https://www.mid-day.com/brand-media/article/breathtaking-beauty-with-brains-zaara-yesmin-taking-over-the-glamour-industry-23218678 |access-date=2023-07-10 |website=Mid-day |language=en}}&lt;/ref&gt; Zaara has recently starred in the music video &quot;Sadi Gali 2.0&quot; alongside [[Freddy Daruwala]] which was released by [[T-Series (company)|T-series]]. Within a span of two weeks, the video has amassed over 5 million views.&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite web |title=Zaara Yesmin talks about her new song 'Sadi Gali 2.0' &amp; shooting experience {{!}} Television News |url=https://www.zoomtventertainment.com/videos/tv-news/zaara-yesmin-talks-about-her-new-song-sadi-gali-2-0-shooting-experience-television-news-video-101215921 |access-date=2023-07-10 |website=Zoom TV |language=en}}&lt;/ref&gt;&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite web |title=Zaara Yesmin talks about her new song 'Sadi Gali 2.0' &amp; shooting experience {{!}} Television News |url=https://www.zoomtventertainment.com/videos/tv-news/zaara-yesmin-talks-about-her-new-song-sadi-gali-2-0-shooting-experience-television-news-video-101215921 |access-date=2023-07-10 |website=Zoom TV |language=en}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> == Filmography ==<br /> === Music videos ===<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot;<br /> |-<br /> ! Year !! Title !! Singer(s) !! Ref.<br /> |-<br /> |2016<br /> |&quot;Ik waar&quot;<br /> |Falak Shabir<br /> |&lt;ref&gt;{{Citation |title=Ik Waar (feat. DJ Shadow) |url=https://open.spotify.com/track/51qlTfLsHop4BEPZFqcE68 |access-date=2023-04-21 |language=en}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> |-<br /> | 2017 || &quot;Nayan Ne Bandh Rakhine&quot; || [[Darshan Raval]]|| &lt;ref&gt;{{Citation |title=Nayan ne bandh rakhi ne by darshan raval |url=https://soundcloud.com/deep-shah-73897516/nayan-ne-bandh-rakhi-ne-by |access-date=2023-04-21 |language=en}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> |-<br /> | 2018 || &quot;Tere Te&quot; || [[Guru Randhawa]], [[Ikka Singh|Ikka]]|| &lt;ref&gt;{{Citation |title=Tere Te (From &quot;Tere Te&quot;) (Full Song &amp; Lyrics) - Ikka, Guru Randhawa - Download or Listen Free - JioSaavn |url=https://www.jiosaavn.com/song/tere-te-from-tere-te/PikbXAN3WXg |access-date=2023-04-21 |language=en-US}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> |-<br /> | rowspan=&quot;2&quot; | 2020 || &quot;Jassi&quot; || [[Payal Dev]], Ikka||&lt;ref&gt;{{Citation |title=Jassi - Single by Payal Dev &amp; Ikka |url=https://music.apple.com/nz/album/jassi-single/1517029863 |access-date=2023-04-21 |language=en-AU}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> |-<br /> | &quot;Kandhe Ka Woh Til&quot; || [[Sachet–Parampara|Sachet Tandon]]||&lt;ref&gt;{{Citation |title=Kandhe Ka Woh Til (Full Song &amp; Lyrics) - Sachet Tandon, Manan Bhardwaj - Download or Listen Free - JioSaavn |url=https://www.jiosaavn.com/song/kandhe-ka-woh-til/Q1kDXT0BRAA |access-date=2023-04-21 |language=en-US}}&lt;/ref&gt;&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite web |title=Kandhe Ka Woh Til: Salman Yusuff Khan and Zaara Yesmin's song out now |url=https://www.mid-day.com/entertainment/bollywood-news/article/kandhe-ka-woh-til-salman-yusuff-khan-and-zaara-yesmins-song-out-now-22981220 |access-date=2023-07-14 |website=Mid-day |language=en}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> |-<br /> | 2021 || &quot;Is Tarah Aashiqui Ka&quot; || [[Dev Negi]]||&lt;ref&gt;{{Citation |title=Is Tarah Aashiqui Ka (Full Song &amp; Lyrics) - Is Tarah Aashiqui Ka - Download or Listen Free - JioSaavn |url=https://www.jiosaavn.com/song/is-tarah-aashiqui-ka/AyYoZENdYXw |access-date=2023-04-21 |language=en-US}}&lt;/ref&gt;&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite web |title=Actress Zaara Yesmin oozes oomph in her latest song ‘Is Tarah Aashiqui Ka’ |url=https://www.mid-day.com/lifestyle/infotainment/article/actress-zaara-yesmin-oozes-oomph-in-her-latest-song-is-tarah-aashiqui-ka-23182664 |access-date=2023-07-14 |website=Mid-day |language=en}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> |-<br /> | rowspan=&quot;3&quot; | 2022 || &quot;Sabki Baaratein Aayi&quot; || Dev Negi, Seepi Jha ||&lt;ref&gt;{{Citation |title=Sabki Baaratein Aayi - Single by Dev Negi &amp; Seepi Jha |url=https://music.apple.com/in/album/sabki-baaratein-aayi-single/1606228952 |access-date=2023-04-21 |language=en-GB}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> |-<br /> | &quot;Honthon Pe Bas&quot; <br /> |Seepi Jha, Sameer Khan|| &lt;ref&gt;{{Citation |title=Honthon Pe Bas by Seepi Jha &amp; Sameer Khan |url=https://music.apple.com/in/album/honthon-pe-bas-single/1652491150 |access-date=2023-04-21 |language=en-GB}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> |-<br /> | &quot;Behaal&quot; || Karan Sehmbi, Simar Kaur || &lt;ref&gt;{{Citation |title=Behaal (Full Song) - Behaal - Download or Listen Free - JioSaavn |url=https://www.jiosaavn.com/song/behaal/JB8cYRB8Q3E |access-date=2023-04-21 |language=en-US}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> |-<br /> | rowspan=&quot;2&quot; |2023<br /> |&quot;Soneya Sajna&quot;<br /> |[[Antara Mitra]], [[Shoaib Ibrahim]]<br /> |&lt;ref&gt;{{Citation |title=Soneya Sajna by Shekhar Khanijo &amp; Antara Mitra |url=https://music.apple.com/in/album/soneya-sajna-single/1669871277 |access-date=2023-04-21 |language=en-GB}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> |-<br /> |&quot;Sadi Gali 2.0&quot;<br /> |[[Lehmber Hussainpuri]], [[Shipra Goyal]]<br /> |&lt;ref&gt;{{Citation |title=Sadi Gali 2.0 {{!}} Freddy, Zaara Yesmin {{!}} Lehmber Hussainpuri, Shipra Goyal {{!}} Krsna, DJ Shadow Dubai |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZHjjXZYN7Yg |access-date=2023-07-10 |language=en}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> <br /> == References ==<br /> {{reflist}}<br /> <br /> {{DEFAULTSORT:Yesmin, Zaara}}<br /> [[Category:Living people]]<br /> [[Category:Actresses in Hindi cinema]]<br /> [[Category:Actresses from Mumbai]]<br /> [[Category:Indian film actresses]]<br /> [[Category:21st-century Indian actresses]]<br /> [[Category:People from Assam]]<br /> [[Category:Indian television actresses]]<br /> [[Category:Actresses in Hindi television]]<br /> <br /> == External links ==<br /> * {{IMDb name|nm10311288}}<br /> * {{Instagram|zaarayesmin}}</div>

Sarfaraz Siyam https://en.bharatpedia.org/w/index.php?title=LKU&diff=394926 2023-07-11T03:07:36Z

<p>Sarfaraz Siyam: Composed an original article.</p> <hr /> <div>'''LKU''' or '''lku''' may refer to:<br /> <br /> * LKU, the FAA LID code for [[Louisa County Airport]], Virginia, United States<br /> * LKU, the Indian Railways station code for [[Lalkuan Junction railway station]], Uttarakhand, India<br /> * lku, the ISO 639-3 code for [[Kungkari language]], an extinct Australian language<br /> <br /> {{Disambiguation}}</div>

Sarfaraz Siyam https://en.bharatpedia.org/w/index.php?title=Jodhpur_-_Sabarmati_Vande_Bharat_Express&diff=394876 2023-07-05T05:41:07Z

<p>Sarfaraz Siyam: Wrote an insightful write-up.</p> <hr /> <div>#REDIRECT [[Jodhpur - Sabarmati (Ahmedabad) Vande Bharat Express]]<br /> <br /> {{Redirect category shell|<br /> {{R from move}}<br /> }}</div>

Sarfaraz Siyam https://en.bharatpedia.org/w/index.php?title=Proportional_representation&diff=388367 2022-11-10T21:52:43Z

<p>Sarfaraz Siyam: Just finished drafting a fresh page.</p> <hr /> <div>{{Short description|Voting system that makes outcomes proportional to vote totals}}<br /> {{redirect|Proportional rule|the division rule in financial law|Proportional rule (bankruptcy)}}<br /> [[File:Byron Weber Becker + Sharon Sommerville.jpg|thumb|right|Activists campaigning for proportional representation in Canada in September 2013]]<br /> {{Electoral systems}}<br /> '''Proportional representation''' ('''PR''') refers to a type of [[electoral system]] under which subgroups of an electorate are reflected proportionately in the elected body.&lt;ref name=JSM7&gt;{{cite book|last1=Mill|first1=John Stuart|author-link=John Stuart Mill|title=Considerations on Representative Government|chapter=Chapter VII, Of True and False Democracy; Representation of All, and Representation of the Majority only |chapter-url=http://www.gutenberg.org/files/5669/5669-h/5669-h.htm#link2HCH0007 |year=1861 |publisher=Parker, Son, &amp; Bourn |location=London|title-link=Considerations on Representative Government}}&lt;/ref&gt; The concept applies mainly to political divisions ([[Political party|political parties]]) among voters. The essence of such systems is that all votes cast{{Snd}}or almost all votes cast{{Snd}}contribute to the result and are effectively used to help elect someone{{Snd}}not just a bare [[Plurality (voting)|plurality]] or (exclusively) the [[majority]]{{Snd}}and that the system produces mixed, balanced representation reflecting how votes are cast.<br /> <br /> In the context of voting systems, PR means that each representative in an assembly is elected by a roughly equal number of voters. In the common case of electoral systems that only allow a choice of parties, the seats are allocated in proportion to the ''vote share'' each party receives.<br /> <br /> The term &quot;proportional representation&quot; may also be used to mean fair representation by population as applied to states, regions, etc. However, representation being proportional with respect solely to population size is not considered to make an electoral system &quot;proportional&quot; the way the term is usually used. For example, the [[United States House of Representatives|US House of Representatives]] has 435 members, who each represent a roughly equal number of people and each state is allocated a number of members in accordance with its population size, thus producing fair representation by population. But members of the House are elected in single-member districts generally through [[First-past-the-post voting|first-past-the-post elections]]: single-winner contests are not proportional by vote share as each has only one winner. Conversely, PR electoral systems are typically proportional to both population (seats per set amount of population) and vote share (typically party-wise). The [[European Parliament]] gives each member state a number of seats roughly based on its population size (see [[degressive proportionality]]) and in each member state, the election must also be held using a PR system (with proportional results based on vote share). <br /> <br /> The most widely used families of PR electoral systems are [[party-list proportional representation|party-list PR]], used in 85 countries,&lt;ref&gt;{{cite web |last1=ACE Project: The Electoral Knowledge Network |title=Electoral Systems Comparative Data, Table by Question |url=http://aceproject.org/epic-en/CDTable?view=country&amp;question=ES005 |access-date=20 November 2014}}&lt;/ref&gt; [[mixed-member proportional representation|mixed-member PR]] (MMP), used in 7 countries,&lt;ref name=&quot;DouglasHowPrElecWork&quot;&gt;{{cite web |last=Amy |first=Douglas J |title=How Proportional Representation Elections Work |url=https://fairvote.org/archives/proportional-representation-voting-systems/ |access-date=26 October 2017 |publisher=[[FairVote]]}}&lt;/ref&gt; and the [[single transferable vote]] (STV), used in [[Republic of Ireland|Ireland]],&lt;ref name=&quot;ideaGallagher&quot;&gt;{{cite web |last1=Gallagher |first1=Michael |title=Ireland: The Archetypal Single Transferable Vote System |url=http://www.community.netidea.com/ccbc/Gallagher.pdf |access-date=26 October 2014}}&lt;/ref&gt; [[Malta]] and [[Australian Senate]].&lt;ref name=&quot;maltaStv&quot;&gt;{{cite web |last1=Hirczy de Miño |first1=Wolfgang, University of Houston |last2=Lane |first2=John, State University of New York at Buffalo |year=1999 |title=Malta: STV in a two-party system |url=http://www.um.edu.mt/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/179912/2pty.pdf |access-date=24 July 2014}}&lt;/ref&gt; All PR systems require multi-member [[electoral district|voting districts]], meaning votes are pooled to elect multiple representatives at once. Pooling may be done in various multi-member districts (in STV and most list PR systems) or in single countrywide{{Snd}}so called ''at-large''{{Snd}}district (in other list-PR systems). A country-wide pooling of votes to elect more than a hundred members is used in Angola, for example. For large districts, [[Party-list proportional representation|party-list PR]] is more often used. A purely candidate-based PR system, [[Single transferable vote|STV]], has never been used to elect more than 21 in a single contest to this point in history. Some PR systems use at-large pooling or regional pooling in conjunction with [[Single-member district|single-member districts]] (such as the New Zealand [[Mixed-member proportional representation|MMP]] and the Scottish [[additional member system]]), others use at-large pooling in conjunction with multi-member districts (Denmark). In these cases pooling is used to allocated the so called [[leveling seat]]s (top-up) to compensate for the disproportional results produced in single-member districts using FPTP (MMP/AMS) or to polish the fairness produced in multi-member districts using list PR (Denmark's MMP). PR systems that achieve the highest levels of proportionality tend to use as general pooling as possible (typically country-wide) or districts with large numbers of seats. <br /> <br /> Due to various factors, perfect proportionality is rarely achieved under PR systems. The use of [[electoral threshold]]s (in list-PR or MMP), small districts with few seats in each (in STV or list-PR), absence or insufficient number of leveling seats (in list-PR, MMP or AMS) may produce disproportionality. Other sources are [[Strategic voting|electoral tactics]] that may be used in certain system, such as [[Mixed-member proportional representation#Splitting parties|party splitting]] in some MMP systems. Nonetheless, PR systems approximate proportionality much better than other systems&lt;ref name=&quot;Laakso 1980 pp. 249–264&quot;&gt;{{cite journal | last=Laakso | first=Markku | title=Electoral Justice as a Criterion for Different Systems of Proportional Representation | journal=Scandinavian Political Studies | publisher=Wiley | volume=3 | issue=3 | year=1980 | issn=0080-6757 | doi=10.1111/j.1467-9477.1980.tb00248.x | pages=249–264}}&lt;/ref&gt; and are more resistant to [[gerrymandering]] and other forms of manipulation.<br /> <br /> == Basics ==<br /> [[File:Proportional representation, 40% of the votes = 40% of the seats.jpg|thumb|right|An illustrated graphic regarding the basic concept of proportional representation]]<br /> To achieve their intended effect, Proportional electoral systems always have to allow for multiple winners. There needs to be more than one seat in each district or some form of pooling of votes. Elections for a single president cannot be based on proportional representation, but a legislative body (assembly, parliament) may be elected proportionally. <br /> <br /> In the [[European Parliament]] for instance, each member state has a number of seats that is (roughly) proportional to its population, enabling ''geographical proportional representation''. For these elections all EU countries also must use a proportional electoral system (enabling ''political proportional representation''): When ''n''% of the electorate support a particular [[political party]] or set of candidates as their favorite, then roughly ''n''% of seats are allotted to that party or those candidates.&lt;ref name=&quot;ACEpr&quot;&gt;{{cite web |title=Proportional Representation (PR) |url=http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/es/esd/esd02/default |access-date=9 April 2014 |publisher=[[ACE Electoral Knowledge Network]]}}&lt;/ref&gt; All PR aim to provide some form of equal representation for votes, but may differ in their approaches on how they achieve this.<br /> <br /> === How party-list PR works ===<br /> {{Main articles|Party-list proportional representation}}<br /> <br /> Party list PR is the most commonly used version of proportional representation. Voters cast votes for parties and each party is allocated seats based on its party share.<br /> <br /> Some party-list PR systems use overall country-wide vote counts; others count vote shares in separate parts of the country and allocate seats in each part according to that specific vote count. Some use both.<br /> <br /> List PR involves parties in the election process'''.''' Voters do not primarily vote for candidates (persons), but for [[Electoral list|''electoral lists'']] (or ''party lists''), which are lists of candidates that parties put forward. The mechanism that allocates seats to the parties/lists is how these systems achieve proportionality. Once this is done, the candidates who take the seats are based on the order in which they appear on the list. This is the basic, [[closed list]] version of list PR.<br /> <br /> An example election where the assembly has 200 seats to be filled is presented below. Every voter votes for the list created by their favourite party and the results of the election are as follows (popular vote). Under party-list PR, every party gets a number of seats proportional to their share of the popular vote.<br /> <br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot;<br /> ! colspan=&quot;2&quot; rowspan=&quot;2&quot; |Party<br /> ! rowspan=&quot;2&quot; |Popular vote<br /> ! colspan=&quot;3&quot; |Party-list PR — Sainte-Laguë method<br /> |-<br /> !Number of seats<br /> !Seats %<br /> | rowspan=&quot;6&quot; |[[File:Party list pr-example total seats.svg|frameless]]<br /> |-<br /> | style=&quot;background:#D10000&quot; |<br /> |Party A<br /> |43.91%<br /> |88<br /> |44%<br /> |-<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0008A5&quot; |<br /> |Party B<br /> |39.94%<br /> |80<br /> |40%<br /> |-<br /> | style=&quot;background:#03AA00&quot; |<br /> |Party C<br /> |9.98%<br /> |20<br /> |10%<br /> |-<br /> | style=&quot;background:#820084&quot; |<br /> |Party D<br /> |6.03%<br /> |12<br /> |6%<br /> |-<br /> | colspan=&quot;2&quot; |''TOTAL''<br /> |''100%''<br /> |''200''<br /> |''100%''<br /> |}<br /> This is done by a proportional formula/method, for example the [[Sainte-Laguë method]] — these are the same methods that may be used to allocate seats for geographic proportional representation (for example, how many seats each states gets in the US House of Representatives). Votes and seats often cannot be mathematically perfectly allocated, so some amount of rounding has to be done. The various methods deal with this in different ways, although the difference is reduced if there are many seats ― for example, if the whole country is one district. Party list PR is also more complicated in reality than in the example, as countries often use more than one district, multiple tiers (e.g. local, regional and national), [[open list]]s or an [[electoral threshold]].<br /> <br /> === How the single transferable vote (STV) works ===<br /> {{Main articles|Single transferable vote}}<br /> The single transferable vote is an older method than party-list PR, and it does not need to formally involve parties in the election process. Instead of parties putting forward ordered lists of candidates from which winners are drawn in order, candidates run by name and it is voters themselves who rank the candidates. This is done using a [[Ranked voting|preferential ballot]]. The ranking is used to instruct election officials of how the vote should be used in case it is placed on an un-electable candidate or on an elected candidate. Each voter casts one vote and the district used elects multiple members (more than one, usually 3 to 7). Because parties play no role in the vote count, STV may be used for nonpartisan elections, such as the city council of [[Cambridge, Massachusetts]].&lt;ref name=&quot;amyHist&quot;&gt;{{cite web |last=Amy |first=Douglas J |title=A Brief History of Proportional Representation in the United States |url=http://archive.fairvote.org/?page=647 |access-date=16 October 2015 |publisher=[[FairVote]]}}&lt;/ref&gt; A large proportion of the votes cast are used to actually elect someone so the result is mixed and balanced with no one voting block taking much more than its due share of the seats. Where party labels are indicated, proportionality party-wise is noticeable.<br /> <br /> [[Counting single transferable votes|Counting votes under STV]] is more complicated than [[first-past-the-post voting]], but the following example shows how the vote count is performed and how proportionality is achieved in a district with 3 seats. In reality, districts need to be larger than that to achieve strict proportionality. The risk though is that if the number of seats is larger than say 10 seats, the ballot will be so large as to be inconvenient and voters may find it difficult to rank the many candidates. (Note that in many STV systems voters are not required to mark more choices than is desired. Even if all voters marked only one preference, the resulting representation would be more balanced than under single-winner FPTP.) <br /> <br /> Under STV, an amount that guarantees election is set. This is called the ''quota''. Specifically the [[Droop quota]] is used. In this example, a candidate who earns more than 25% of the vote is declared elected. Note that it is only possible for 3 candidates to each get that quota. <br /> <br /> In the first count, the first preferences (favourite candidates) of all the voters are counted. Any candidates who pass the quota are declared elected. <br /> [[File:Preferential_ballot.svg|thumb|Simplified example of an STV ballot]]<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot;<br /> !Candidate<br /> ! colspan=&quot;2&quot; |Party<br /> !Popular vote<br /> (first preferences)<br /> !Quota<br /> !Elected?<br /> !If elected: surplus votes<br /> |-<br /> |Jane Doe<br /> | style=&quot;background:#D10000&quot; |<br /> |Party A<br /> |40%<br /> |25%(+1 vote)<br /> |'''Yes'''<br /> |15%<br /> |-<br /> |John Citizen<br /> | style=&quot;background:#D10000&quot; |<br /> |Party A<br /> |11%<br /> |25%(+1 vote)<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |Joe Smith<br /> | style=&quot;background:#D10000&quot; |<br /> |Party A<br /> |16%<br /> |25%(+1 vote)<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |Fred Rubble<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0008A5&quot; |<br /> |Party B<br /> |30%<br /> |25%(+1 vote)<br /> |'''Yes'''<br /> |5%<br /> |-<br /> |Mary Hill<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0008A5&quot; |<br /> |Party B<br /> |3%<br /> |25%(+1 vote)<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | colspan=&quot;3&quot; |''TOTAL''<br /> |''100%''<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |}<br /> Next, the votes the candidates received above the quota (surplus votes that they did not need to get elected) are transferred to the next preferences of the voters who voted for them. We start with Jane Doe's surplus. For the example we suppose that all voters of Jane Doe prefer John Citizen as their second choice (as he is also from Party A). Based on this we reallocate the votes and find that John Citizen has passed the quota and so is declared elected to the 3rd and last seat that we had to fill. (Even if we assume that Fred Rubble's surplus would have gone to Mary Hill, the vote transfer plus Hill's original votes would not add up to quota. Party B did not have two quotas of votes so was not due two seats, while Party A was.) (It is possible in realistic STV elections for a candidate to win without quota if they are still in the running when the field of candidates is thinned to the number of remaining open seats. But that was not necessary in this case.)<br /> <br /> The district result is balanced party-wise. No one party took all the seats as frequently happens under FPTP or other non-proportional voting systems. The result is fair{{Snd}}the most popular party took two seats; the less popular party took just one. The most popular candidate(s) in each party won the party's seat(s). 81 percent of the voters saw their first choice elected. Fifteen percent of them saw both their first and second choices elected. Every voter had satisfaction of seeing someone of the party they support elected in the district. <br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot;<br /> !Candidate<br /> ! colspan=&quot;2&quot; |Party<br /> !Current vote total<br /> !Quota<br /> !Elected?<br /> !Party<br /> !First preference votes<br /> for candidates of party<br /> !Number of seats<br /> !Party seats % under STV<br /> |-<br /> |Jane Doe<br /> | style=&quot;background:#D10000&quot; |<br /> |Party A<br /> |already elected (25%+1 vote)<br /> |25%(+1 vote)<br /> |'''Yes'''<br /> | rowspan=&quot;3&quot; |Party A<br /> | rowspan=&quot;3&quot; |67%<br /> | rowspan=&quot;3&quot; |2<br /> | rowspan=&quot;3&quot; |67%<br /> |-<br /> |John Citizen<br /> | style=&quot;background:#D10000&quot; |<br /> |Party A<br /> |11% + 15% = 26%<br /> |25%(+1 vote)<br /> |'''Yes''' <br /> |-<br /> |Joe Smith<br /> | style=&quot;background:#D10000&quot; |<br /> |Party A<br /> |16%<br /> |25%(+1 vote)<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> |Fred Rubble<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0008A5&quot; |<br /> |Party B<br /> |already elected (25%+1 vote)<br /> |25%(+1 vote)<br /> |'''Yes'''<br /> | rowspan=&quot;2&quot; |Party B<br /> | rowspan=&quot;2&quot; |33%<br /> | rowspan=&quot;2&quot; |1<br /> | rowspan=&quot;2&quot; |33%<br /> |-<br /> |Mary Hill<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0008A5&quot; |<br /> |Party B<br /> |3%<br /> |25%(+1 vote)<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | colspan=&quot;3&quot; |''TOTAL''<br /> |''100%''<br /> |<br /> |''3''<br /> |<br /> |''100%''<br /> |''3''<br /> |''100%''<br /> |}<br /> <br /> === How mixed-member proportional representation (MMP) works ===<br /> {{Main articles|Mixed-member proportional representation}}<br /> <br /> Mixed Member Proportional Representation combines election of district members with election of additional members as compensatory top-up.<br /> <br /> Often MMP systems use single-member districts to elect district members. (Denmark, Iceland and Sweden uses multi-member districts in their MMP systems). MMP with SMDs is described here.<br /> <br /> The mixed-member proportional system combines single member plurality voting (SMP), also known as [[First-past-the-post voting|first-past-the-post]] (FPTP), with party-list PR in a way that the overall result of the election is supposed to be proportional. The voter may vote for a district candidate as well as a party. The main idea behind MMP is ''compensation'', meaning that the list-PR seat allocation is not independent of the results of the district level voting. First-past-the-post is a single winner system and cannot be proportional (winner-takes-all), so these disproportionalities are compensated by the party-list component.<br /> <br /> A simple, yet common version of MMP has as many list-PR seats as there are single-member districts. In the example it can be seen, as is often the case in reality, that the results of the district elections are highly disproportional: large parties typically win more seats than they should proportionally, but there is also randomness — a party that receives more votes than another party might not win more seats than the other. Any such dis-proportionality produced by the district elections is addressed, where possible, by the allocation of the compensatory additional members.<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot;<br /> ! colspan=&quot;4&quot; |<br /> |[[File:Mixed compensatory example fptp.svg|frameless]]<br /> |[[File:Mixed-compensatory-example compensatory seats.svg|frameless]]<br /> |[[File:Mixed-compensatory-example total seats.svg|frameless]]<br /> |[[File:Party list pr-example total seats.svg|center|frameless]]<br /> !<br /> |-<br /> ! colspan=&quot;3&quot; |Party<br /> !Popular vote<br /> !FPTP seats<br /> (Number of districts won)<br /> !Compensatory seats under MMP<br /> (party-list PR seats)<br /> ! colspan=&quot;2&quot; |Total number of seats<br /> under MMP<br /> !Seats % under MMP<br /> |-<br /> | style=&quot;background:#D10000&quot; |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#ff2c2c&quot; |<br /> |Party A<br /> |43.91%<br /> |64<br /> |24<br /> | colspan=&quot;2&quot; |88<br /> |44%<br /> |-<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0008A5&quot; |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#000cff&quot; |<br /> |Party B<br /> |39.94%<br /> |33<br /> |47<br /> | colspan=&quot;2&quot; |80<br /> |40%<br /> |-<br /> | style=&quot;background:#03AA00&quot; |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#05ff00&quot; |<br /> |Party C<br /> |9.98%<br /> |0<br /> |20<br /> | colspan=&quot;2&quot; |20<br /> |10%<br /> |-<br /> | style=&quot;background:#820084&quot; |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#fb00ff&quot; |<br /> |Party D<br /> |6.03%<br /> |3<br /> |9<br /> | colspan=&quot;2&quot; |12<br /> |6%<br /> |-<br /> | colspan=&quot;3&quot; |''TOTAL''<br /> |''100%''<br /> |''100''<br /> |''100''<br /> | colspan=&quot;2&quot; |''200''<br /> |''100%''<br /> |}<br /> MMP gives only as many compensatory seats to a party as they need to have the number of seats of each party be proportional. Another way to say this is that MMP focuses on making the final outcome proportional.<br /> <br /> ==== Differences to parallel voting ====<br /> Compare the MMP example to [[parallel voting]]. [[Parallel voting]] is a [[Mixed-member majoritarian representation|mixed-member majoritarian]] system. Here the party-list PR seat allocation is independent of the district results, meaning that there is no compensation (no regard to how the district seats were filled). The popular vote, the number of districts won by each party, and the number of districts and party-list PR seats are all the same as in the MMP example above, yet the total number of seats is different.<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot;<br /> ! colspan=&quot;4&quot; |<br /> |[[File:Mixed compensatory example fptp.svg|frameless]]<br /> |[[File:Mixed compensatory example non compensatory parallel seats.svg|frameless]]<br /> |[[File:Mixed compensatory example non compensatory total seats.svg|frameless]]<br /> |[[File:Parallel voting mmm-example total seats.svg|center|frameless]]<br /> !<br /> |-<br /> ! colspan=&quot;3&quot; |Party<br /> !Popular vote<br /> !FPTP seats<br /> (Number of districts won)<br /> !Party-list PR seats<br /> under parallel voting<br /> ! colspan=&quot;2&quot; |Total number of seats<br /> under parallel voting<br /> !Seats %<br /> under parallel voting<br /> |-<br /> | style=&quot;background:#D10000&quot; |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#ff2c2c&quot; |<br /> |Party A<br /> |43.91%<br /> |64<br /> |44<br /> | colspan=&quot;2&quot; |108<br /> |54.0%<br /> |-<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0008A5&quot; |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#000cff&quot; |<br /> |Party B<br /> |39.94%<br /> |33<br /> |40<br /> | colspan=&quot;2&quot; |73<br /> |36.5%<br /> |-<br /> | style=&quot;background:#03AA00&quot; |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#05ff00&quot; |<br /> |Party C<br /> |9.98%<br /> |0<br /> |10<br /> | colspan=&quot;2&quot; |10<br /> |5.0%<br /> |-<br /> | style=&quot;background:#820084&quot; |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#fb00ff&quot; |<br /> |Party D<br /> |6.03%<br /> |3<br /> |6<br /> | colspan=&quot;2&quot; |9<br /> |4.5%<br /> |-<br /> | colspan=&quot;3&quot; |''TOTAL''<br /> |''100%''<br /> |''100''<br /> |''100''<br /> | colspan=&quot;2&quot; |''200''<br /> |''100%''<br /> |}<br /> The overall results are not proportional, although they are more balanced and fair than most single-winner First past the post elections. Parallel voting is mostly [[Semi-proportional representation|semi-proportional]]. [[Mixed electoral system|Mixed system]] is the most proportional if the additional members are allocated in compensatory form. <br /> <br /> There are many versions of MMP in use. Some use only a [[Mixed single vote|single vote]]; in some, voters cast two votes, one for a local candidate and one for a party. Some allocate compensatory seats to best losers; others allocate according to party lists. Some use levelling seats to compensate for potential [[overhang seat]]s; others don't. Most impose an electoral threshold in order for a party to be eligible for any additional seats; some allow parties that elect one or more district seats to be eligible for additional seats even if its party share is below the threshold. Any barrier to access to the additional seats may produce wasted votes and dis-proportionality in the final result.<br /> <br /> As well, there is [[single non-transferable vote]], which is also [[Semi-proportional representation|semi-proportional]]. It has the advantage that parties play no direct role in elections and voters do not need to mark ranked votes. Each voter casts one vote for a candidate and as many candidates win by plurality as the number of seats in the district. Due to each voter casting just one vote, as in STV, and each district electing multiple members, as in STV, mixed representation is produced in each district and overall rough proportionality more or less. Without transferable votes, more votes are wasted than under STV.<br /> <br /> ==Advantages and disadvantages==<br /> The case for a Single Transferrable Vote system, a form of proportional representation, was made by [[John Stuart Mill]] in his 1861 essay ''[[Considerations on Representative Government]]'':<br /> {{Blockquote|text=In a representative body actually deliberating, the minority must of course be overruled; and in an equal democracy, the majority of the people, through their representatives, will outvote and prevail over the minority and their representatives. But does it follow that the minority should have no representatives at all? ... Is it necessary that the minority should not even be heard? Nothing but habit and old association can reconcile any reasonable being to the needless injustice. In a really equal democracy, every or any section would be represented, not disproportionately, but proportionately. A majority of the electors would always have a majority of the representatives, but a minority of the electors would always have a minority of the representatives. Man for man, they would be as fully represented as the majority. Unless they are, there is not equal government ... there is a part whose fair and equal share of influence in the representation is withheld from them, contrary to all just government, but, above all, contrary to the principle of democracy, which professes equality as its very root and foundation.&lt;ref name=JSM7/&gt;}}<br /> <br /> Mill's essay does not support Party-based Proportional Representation and may indicate a distaste for the ills of Party-based systems in saying:&lt;blockquote&gt;Of all modes in which a national representation can possibly be constituted, this one affords the best security for the intellectual qualifications desirable in the representatives. At present, by universal admission, it is becoming more and more difficult for any one who has only talents and character to gain admission into the House of Commons. The only persons who can get elected are those who possess local influence, or make their way by lavish expenditure, or who, on the invitation of three or four tradesmen or attorneys, are sent down by one of the two great parties from their London clubs, as men whose votes the party can depend on under all circumstances.&lt;ref name=&quot;JSM7&quot; /&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;Many political theorists agree with Mill&lt;ref name=&quot;forder&quot;&gt;{{cite book |last=Forder|first=James |author-link=James Forder |title=The case against voting reform |publisher=[[Oneworld Publications]] |location=Oxford|isbn=978-1-85168-825-8}}&lt;/ref&gt; that in a [[representative democracy]] the representatives should represent all substantial segments of society but want reform rather than abolition of direct local community representation in the legislature.&lt;ref&gt;Abbott, Lewis F. ''British Democracy: Its Restoration and Extension''. ISR/Kindle Books, 2019. {{ISBN|9780906321522}}. Chapter 7, &quot;Electoral System Reform: Increasing Competition and Voter Choice and Influence&quot;.&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> STV and the Additional-Member system both produce local area representation and overall PR through mixed, balanced representation at the district level.&lt;ref&gt;2020 Irish general election]]&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> ===Fairness===<br /> [[File:Canada-election-2015.jpg|thumb|left|924x924px]]<br /> {{clear}}<br /> PR tries to resolve the unfairness of [[majoritarian]] and [[plurality voting]] systems where the largest parties receive an &quot;unfair&quot; seat bonus and smaller parties are disadvantaged, always under-represented, and on occasion win no representation at all ([[Duverger's law]]).&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite journal |title=Optimal apportionment | journal=Journal of Political Economy | volume=121 |issue=3 |pages=584–608 |first1=Y. |last1=Koriyama |first2=A. | last2=Macé | first3=J.-F. |last3=Laslier |first4=R. |last4=Treibich| doi=10.1086/670380 | s2cid=10158811 }}&lt;/ref&gt;&lt;ref name=&quot;AmyPR&quot;&gt;{{cite web|last1=Amy|first1=Douglas|title=Proportional Representation Voting Systems |url=http://www.fairvote.org/proportional_representation_voting_systems |website=Fairvote.org |access-date=25 August 2017|location=Takoma Park}}&lt;/ref&gt;&lt;ref name=&quot;Norris&quot; /&gt;{{rp|6–7}} Under FPTP, an established party in UK elections has been elected to majority government with as little as 35% of votes ([[2005 United Kingdom general election|2005 UK general election]]). In certain Canadian elections, majority governments have been formed by parties with the support of under 40% of votes cast ([[2011 Canadian federal election|2011 Canadian election]], [[2015 Canadian federal election|2015 Canadian election]]). If turnout levels in the electorate are less than 60%, such outcomes allow a party to form a majority government by convincing as few as one quarter of the electorate to vote for it. In the [[2005 United Kingdom general election|2005 UK election]], for example, the [[Labour Party (UK)|Labour Party]] under [[Tony Blair]] won a comfortable parliamentary majority with the votes of only 21.6% of the total electorate.&lt;ref&gt;{{cite web|author1=Colin Rallings|author2=Michael Thrasher|title=The 2005 general election: analysis of the results|url=http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/167891/UK-Parliament-elections-2005-Electoral-data-Report.pdf|website=Electoral Commission, Research, Electoral data|publisher=[[Electoral Commission (United Kingdom)|Electoral Commission]]|access-date=29 March 2015|location=London|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171020142823/http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/167891/UK-Parliament-elections-2005-Electoral-data-Report.pdf|archive-date=20 October 2017|url-status=dead}}&lt;/ref&gt;{{rp|3}} Such misrepresentation has been criticized as &quot;no longer a question of 'fairness' but of elementary rights of citizens&quot;.&lt;ref name=&quot;hansard1976&quot; /&gt;{{rp|22}} <br /> <br /> However, intermediate PR systems with a high [[electoral threshold]], or other features that reduce proportionality, are not necessarily much fairer: in the [[2002 Turkish general election]], using an open list system with a 10% threshold, 46% of votes were wasted.&lt;ref name=&quot;ideaEsd&quot;&gt;{{cite web |year=2005 |title=Electoral System Design: the New International IDEA Handbook |url=https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/electoral-system-design-new-international-idea-handbook |access-date=9 April 2014 |publisher=[[International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance]]}}&lt;/ref&gt;{{rp|83}} The other 54 percent of the votes did receive fair level of representation, though. Under First past the post, a third or so of members are elected with less than half the votes cast in their district, the majority in such districts not getting any local representation and with no levelling seats getting no representation at all.<br /> <br /> Plurality/majoritarian systems also benefit regional parties that win many seats in the region where they have a strong following but have little support nationally, while other parties with national support that is not concentrated in specific districts, like the [[Green politics|Greens]], win few or no seats. An example is the [[Bloc Québécois]] in Canada that won 52 seats in the [[1993 Canadian federal election|1993 federal election]], all in [[Quebec]], on 13.5% &lt;!-- Norris's figure of 18% is wrong, see following UBC ref --&gt; of the national vote, while the [[Progressive Conservative Party of Canada|Progressive Conservatives]] collapsed to two seats on 16% spread nationally. The Conservative party although strong nationally had had very strong regional support in the West but in this election its supporters in the West turned to the Reform party (another regional party), which won all its seats west of Ontario, winning most of its seats west of Saskatchewan.&lt;ref name=&quot;Norris&quot;&gt;{{Cite journal |last=Norris |first=Pippa |year=1997 |title=Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed Systems |url=http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/019251297018003005 |journal=International Political Science Review |language=en |publisher=[[Harvard University]] |volume=18 |issue=3 |pages=297–312 |doi=10.1177/019251297018003005 |s2cid=9523715 |issn=0192-5121 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150705000416/https://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Acrobat/Choosing%20Electoral%20Systems.pdf |archive-date=2015-04-01 |access-date=9 April 2014}}&lt;/ref&gt;&lt;ref&gt;{{cite web|title=1993 Canadian Federal Election Results|url=http://esm.ubc.ca/CA93/results.html|publisher=University of British Columbia|access-date=25 January 2016}}&lt;/ref&gt; Similarly, in the [[2015 United Kingdom general election|2015 UK General Election]], the [[Scottish National Party]] gained 56 seats, all in [[Scotland]], with a 4.7% share of the national vote while the [[UK Independence Party]], with 12.6%, gained only a single seat.&lt;ref&gt;{{cite web|title=Election 2015 — BBC News|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/election/2015/results|website=BBC|access-date=11 May 2015}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> ===Representation of minor parties===<br /> The use of multiple-member districts enables a greater variety of candidates to be elected. It has been argued that in emerging democracies, inclusion of minorities in the legislature can be essential for social stability and to consolidate the democratic process.&lt;ref name=&quot;ideaEsd&quot; /&gt;{{rp|58}}<br /> <br /> Critics, on the other hand, claim this can give extreme parties a foothold in parliament, sometimes cited as a cause for the [[Weimar Republic#Institutional problems|collapse of the Weimar]] government. With very low thresholds, very small parties can act as &quot;king-makers&quot;,&lt;ref&gt;{{cite news|author1=Ana Nicolaci da Costa|author2=Charlotte Greenfield|title=New Zealand's ruling party ahead after poll but kingmaker in no rush to decide|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-newzealand-election-tally/new-zealands-ruling-party-ahead-after-poll-but-kingmaker-in-no-rush-to-decide-idUSKCN1BY0LZ|work=[[Reuters]]}}&lt;/ref&gt; holding larger parties to ransom during [[Coalition government|coalition]] discussions. The example of [[Israel]] is often quoted,&lt;ref name=&quot;ideaEsd&quot; /&gt;{{rp|59}} but these problems can be limited, as in the modern German [[Bundestag]], by the introduction of higher threshold limits for a party to gain parliamentary representation (which in turn increases the number of wasted votes).<br /> <br /> Another criticism is that the dominant parties in plurality/majoritarian systems, often looked on as &quot;coalitions&quot; or as &quot;[[broad church]]es&quot;,&lt;ref&gt;{{cite web|last1=Roberts|first1=Iain|title=People in broad church parties should think twice before attacking coalitions|url=http://www.libdemvoice.org/people-in-broad-church-parties-should-think-twice-before-attacking-coalitions-20101.html|publisher=[[Liberal Democrat Voice]]|access-date=29 July 2014}}&lt;/ref&gt; can fragment under PR as the election of candidates from smaller groups becomes possible. Israel, Brazil, and Italy (until [[Italian electoral law of 1993|1993]]) are examples.&lt;ref name=&quot;ideaEsd&quot; /&gt;{{rp|59,89}} However, research shows, in general, there is only a small increase in the number of parties in parliament (although small parties have larger representation) under PR.&lt;ref name=&quot;FairvoteCanadaWPR&quot;&gt;{{cite web|url=https://www.fairvote.ca/a-look-at-the-evidence/|title=A look at the evidence|publisher=Fair Vote Canada|access-date=2 January 2019}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> Open list systems and STV, the only prominent PR system which does not require political parties,&lt;ref&gt;{{cite web|last=Amy|first=Douglas J|title=Single Transferable Vote Or Choice Voting|url=http://www.fairvote.org/proportional_representation_voting_systems|publisher=[[FairVote]]|access-date=9 April 2014}}&lt;/ref&gt; enable [[Independent politician|independent]] candidates to be elected. In Ireland, on average, about six independent candidates have been elected each parliament.&lt;ref&gt;{{cite web|title=Electoral Reform Society's evidence to the Joint Committee on the Draft Bill for House of Lords Reform |url=http://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/reforming-the-house-of-lords |publisher=[[Electoral Reform Society]] |access-date=10 May 2015}}&lt;/ref&gt; This can lead to a situation where forming a Parliamentary majority requires support of one or more of these independent representatives. In some cases these independents have positions that are closely aligned with the governing party and it hardly matters. The Irish Government formed after the [[2016 Irish general election|2016]] election even included independent representatives in the cabinet of a minority government. In others, the electoral platform is entirely local and addressing this is a price for support.<br /> <br /> ===Coalitions===<br /> The election of smaller parties gives rise to one of the principal objections to PR systems, that they almost always result in [[coalition government]]s.&lt;ref name=&quot;ideaEsd&quot; /&gt;{{rp|59}}&lt;ref name=&quot;forder&quot; /&gt;<br /> <br /> Supporters of PR see coalitions as an advantage, forcing compromise between parties to form a coalition at the centre of the [[political spectrum]], and so leading to continuity and stability. Opponents counter that with many policies compromise is not possible. Neither can many policies be easily positioned on the left-right spectrum (for example, the environment). So policies are [[Horse trading (political)|horse-traded]] during coalition formation, with the consequence that voters have no way of knowing which policies will be pursued by the government they elect; voters have less influence on governments. Also, coalitions do not necessarily form at the centre, and small parties can have excessive influence, supplying a coalition with a majority only on condition that a policy or policies favoured by few voters is/are adopted. Most importantly, the ability of voters to vote a party in disfavour out of power is curtailed.&lt;ref name=&quot;forder&quot; /&gt;<br /> [[File:Number of elections by country.jpg|thumb|upright=1.8|Countries with PR do not appear to have more elections.]]<br /> All these disadvantages, the PR opponents contend, are avoided by two-party plurality systems. Coalitions are rare; the two dominant parties necessarily compete at the centre for votes, so that governments are more reliably moderate; the strong opposition necessary for proper scrutiny of government is assured; and governments remain sensitive to public sentiment because they can be, and are, regularly voted out of power.&lt;ref name=&quot;forder&quot; /&gt; However, this is not necessarily so; a two-party system can result in a &quot;drift to extremes&quot;, hollowing out the centre,&lt;ref&gt;{{cite news |last1=Harris|first1=Paul |title='America is better than this': paralysis at the top leaves voters desperate for change |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/20/paralysis-in-us-politics-extremism |access-date=17 November 2014 |work=The Guardian}}&lt;/ref&gt; or, at least, in one party drifting to an extreme.&lt;ref&gt;{{cite web|last1=Krugman|first1=Paul |title=Going To Extreme |url=https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/19/going-to-extreme/ |website=The Conscience of a Liberal, Paul Krugman Blog |publisher=[[The New York Times Co.]]|access-date=24 Nov 2014}}&lt;/ref&gt; The opponents of PR also contend that coalition governments created under PR are less stable, and elections are more frequent. Italy is an often-cited example with many governments composed of many different coalition partners. However, Italy is unusual in that both its houses can make a government fall, whereas other PR nations have either just one house or have one of their two houses be the core body supporting a government. Italy's current [[Italian electoral law of 2017|parallel voting system]] is not PR, so Italy is not an appropriate candidate for measuring the stability of PR.<br /> <br /> ===Voter participation===<br /> Plurality systems usually result in single-party-majority government because generally fewer parties are elected in large numbers under FPTP compared to PR, and FPTP compresses politics to little more than two-party contests. Relatively few votes in a few of the most finely balanced districts, the &quot;[[marginal seat|swing seats]]&quot;, are able to swing majority control in the house. Incumbents in less evenly divided districts are invulnerable to slight swings of political mood. In the UK, for example, about half the constituencies have always elected the same party since 1945;&lt;ref name=&quot;DMstvPdf&quot;&gt;{{cite web|last1=Mollison|first1=Denis|title=Fair votes in practice STV for Westminster|url=http://www.macs.hw.ac.uk/~denis/signif.pdf|publisher=[[Heriot Watt University]]|access-date=3 June 2014}}&lt;/ref&gt; in the 2012 [[United States House of Representatives|US House]] elections 45 districts (10% of all districts) were uncontested by one of the two dominant parties.&lt;ref&gt;{{cite web|title=Democrats' Edge in House Popular Vote Would Have Increased if All Seats Had Been Contested|url=http://www.fairvote.org/research-and-analysis/blog/democrats-edge-in-house-popular-vote-would-have-increased-if-all-seats-had-been-contested/|publisher=[[FairVote]]|access-date=7 July 2014}}&lt;/ref&gt; Voters who know their preferred candidate will not win have little incentive to vote, and even if they do their votes have [[wasted vote|no effect]], although they are still counted in the popular vote calculation.&lt;ref name=&quot;ideaEsd&quot; /&gt;{{rp|10}}<br /> <br /> With PR, there are no &quot;[[marginal seat|swing seats]]&quot;. Most votes contribute to the election of a candidate, so parties need to campaign in all districts, not just those where their support is strongest or where they perceive most advantage. This fact in turn encourages parties to be more responsive to voters, producing a more &quot;balanced&quot; ticket by nominating more women and minority candidates.&lt;ref name=&quot;Norris&quot; /&gt; On average about 8% more women are elected.&lt;ref name=&quot;FairvoteCanadaWPR&quot; /&gt;<br /> <br /> Since most votes count, there are fewer &quot;[[wasted vote]]s&quot;, so voters, aware that their vote can make a difference, are more likely to make the effort to vote, and less likely to vote [[Tactical voting|tactically]]. Compared to countries with plurality electoral systems, [[voter turnout]] improves and the population is more involved in the political process.&lt;ref name=&quot;ideaEsd&quot; /&gt;&lt;ref name=&quot;Norris&quot; /&gt;&lt;ref name=&quot;FairvoteCanadaWPR&quot; /&gt; However, some experts argue that transitioning from plurality to PR only increases voter turnout in geographical areas associated with [[safe seat]]s under the plurality system; turnout may decrease in areas formerly associated with [[marginal seat|swing seats]].&lt;ref name=&quot;CoxContEffect&quot;&gt;{{cite journal|last1=Cox|first1=Gary W.|last2=Fiva|first2=Jon H.|last3=Smith|first3=Daniel M.|title=The Contraction Effect: How Proportional Representation Affects Mobilization and Turnout|url=http://www.jon.fiva.no/docs/Cox-Fiva-Smith-JoP-Final_Main.pdf|journal=[[The Journal of Politics]]|volume=78|number=4|pages=1249–1263|doi=10.1086/686804|hdl=11250/2429132|s2cid=55400647|hdl-access=free}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> Proportional systems show higher [[political efficacy]], citizens' trust in their ability to influence and understand the government, compared to plurality and majoritarian systems.&lt;ref&gt;[https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123408000161 Karp, Jeffrey A., and Susan A. Banducci. &quot;Political efficacy and participation in twenty-seven democracies: How electoral systems shape political behaviour.&quot; British journal of political science 38.2 (2008): 311-334.]&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> ===Gerrymandering===<br /> First past the post elections are dependent on the drawing of boundaries of their [[single-member district]]s, a process vulnerable to political interference ([[gerrymandering]]) even if districts are drawn in such a way as to ensure approximately equal representation. To compound the problem, boundaries have to be periodically re-drawn to accommodate population changes. Even apolitically drawn boundaries can unintentionally produce the effect of gerrymandering, reflecting naturally occurring concentrations.&lt;ref name=&quot;amyRCNV&quot;&gt;{{cite book|last=Amy |first=Douglas J |title=Real Choices / New Voices, How Proportional Representation Elections Could Revitalize American Democracy |publisher=[[Columbia University Press]]|isbn=9780231125499 }}&lt;/ref&gt;{{rp|65}}<br /> <br /> PR systems, due to having larger and fewer multiple-member districts, are less prone to gerrymandering {{snd}} research suggests five-seat districts or larger are immune to gerrymandering.&lt;ref name=&quot;amyRCNV&quot; /&gt;{{rp|66}}<br /> <br /> Equality of size of multiple-member districts is not important (the number of seats can vary) so districts can be aligned with historical territories of varying sizes such as cities, counties, states or provinces. Later population changes can be accommodated by simply adjusting the number of representatives elected, without having to re-draw boundary. For example, Professor Mollison in his 2010 plan for STV for the UK divided the country into 143 districts and then allocated varying number of seats to each district (to add up to the existing total of 650 MPs) depending on the number of voters in each but with wide ranges (his five-seat districts include one with 327,000 voters and another with 382,000 voters). His district boundaries follow historical [[county]] and [[local authority]] boundaries, yet he achieves more uniform representation than does the [[Boundary Commissions (United Kingdom)|Boundary Commission]], the body responsible for balancing the UK's [[First-past-the-post voting|first-past-the-post]] constituency sizes.&lt;ref name=&quot;DMstvPdf&quot; /&gt;&lt;ref name=&quot;DMstvSite&quot;&gt;{{cite web|last1=Mollison|first1=Denis|title=Fair votes in practice: STV for Westminster|url=http://www.macs.hw.ac.uk/~denis/stv4uk/|publisher=[[Heriot-Watt University]]|access-date=3 June 2014}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> Mixed member systems are susceptible to gerrymandering for the local seats that remain a part of such systems. Under [[parallel voting]], a [[semi-proportional representation|semi-proportional system]], there is no compensation for the effects that such gerrymandering might have. Under MMP, the use of compensatory list seats makes gerrymandering less of an issue. However, its effectiveness in this regard depends upon the features of the system, including the size of the regional districts, the relative share of list seats in the total, and opportunities for [[Mixed-member proportional representation#Collusion|collusion]] that might exist. A striking example of how the compensatory mechanism can be undermined can be seen in the [[2014 Hungarian parliamentary election]], where the leading party, [[Fidesz]], combined gerrymandering and decoy lists, which resulted in a two-thirds parliamentary majority from a 45% vote.&lt;ref&gt;{{cite web|last1=Scheppele|first1=Kim Lane|title=Legal But Not Fair (Hungary)|url=https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/04/13/legal-but-not-fair-hungary/|website=The Conscience of a Liberal, Paul Krugman Blog|publisher=[[The New York Times Co.]]|access-date=12 July 2014}}&lt;/ref&gt;&lt;ref&gt;{{cite web|author1=Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights|author-link1=Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights|title=Hungary, Parliamentary Elections, 6 April 2014: Final Report|url=http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/hungary/121098 |website=[[OSCE]] }}&lt;/ref&gt; This illustrates how certain implementations of [[Mixed electoral system|mixed systems]] (if non-compensatory or insufficiently compensatory) can produce moderately proportional outcomes, similar to parallel voting.<br /> <br /> ===Link between constituent and representative===<br /> It is generally accepted that a particular advantage of plurality electoral systems such as [[first-past-the-post voting|first past the post]], or majoritarian electoral systems such as the [[Instant-runoff voting|alternative vote]], is the geographic link between representatives and their constituents.&lt;ref name=&quot;ideaEsd&quot; /&gt;{{rp|36}}&lt;ref name=&quot;Law Commission of Canada&quot;&gt;{{cite web|title=Voting Counts: Electoral Reform for Canada |url=http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/J31-61-2004E.pdf |publisher=Law Commission of Canada|page=22|year=2004}}&lt;/ref&gt;{{rp|65}}&lt;ref name=&quot;hansard1976&quot;&gt;{{cite web|title=Report of the Hansard Society Commission on Electoral Reform |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ma0nvgAACAAJ|website=[[Hansard Society]]|location=London|last1=Commission On Electoral Reform|first1=Hansard Society for Parliamentary Government}}&lt;/ref&gt;{{rp|21}} A notable disadvantage of PR is that, as its multiple-member districts are made larger, this link is weakened.&lt;ref name=&quot;ideaEsd&quot; /&gt;{{rp|82}} In party list PR systems without delineated districts, such as the Netherlands and Israel, the geographic link between representatives and their constituents is considered weak, but has shown to play a role for some parties. Yet with relatively small multiple-member districts, in particular with STV, there are counter-arguments: about 90% of voters can consult a representative they voted for, someone whom they might think more sympathetic to their problem. In such cases it is sometimes argued that constituents and representatives have a closer link;&lt;ref name=&quot;DMstvPdf&quot; /&gt;&lt;ref name=&quot;amyRCNV&quot; /&gt;{{rp|212}} constituents have a choice of representative so they can consult one with particular expertise in the topic at issue.&lt;ref name=&quot;amyRCNV&quot; /&gt;{{rp|212}}&lt;ref name=&quot;ersSTV&quot;&gt;{{cite web|title=Single Transferable Vote|url=https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/voting-systems/types-of-voting-system/single-transferable-vote/|publisher=[[Electoral Reform Society]]|access-date=28 July 2014|location=London}}&lt;/ref&gt; With multiple-member districts, prominent candidates have more opportunity to be elected in their home constituencies, which they know and can represent authentically. There is less likely to be a strong incentive to [[Parachute candidate|parachute]] them into constituencies in which they are strangers and thus less than ideal representatives.&lt;ref name=&quot;humphreys&quot;&gt;{{cite book |last1=Humphreys |first1=John H |url=https://archive.org/details/proportionalrepr00humpuoft |title=Proportional Representation, A Study in Methods of Election |publisher=Methuen &amp; Co.Ltd |location=London}}&lt;/ref&gt;{{rp|248–250}} Mixed-member PR systems incorporate single-member districts to preserve the link between constituents and representatives.&lt;ref name=&quot;ideaEsd&quot; /&gt;{{rp|95}} However, because up to half the parliamentary seats are list rather than district seats, the districts are necessarily up to twice as large as with a plurality/majoritarian system where all representatives serve single-member districts.&lt;ref name=&quot;hansard1976&quot; /&gt;{{rp|32}}<br /> <br /> An interesting case occurred in the Netherlands, when &quot;out of the blue&quot; a party for the elderly, the [[General Elderly Alliance]] gained six seats in the [[1994 Dutch general election|1994 election]]. The other parties had not paid attention, but this made them aware. With the next election, the Party of the Elderly was gone, because the established parties had started to listen to the elderly. Today, a party for older folks, [[50PLUS]], has established itself in the Netherlands, albeit never with the same high number of seats. This can be seen as an example how geography in itself may not be a good enough reason to establish voting results around it and overturn all other particulars of the voting population. In a sense, voting in districts restricts the voters to a specific geography. Proportional voting follows the exact outcome of all the votes.&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite web|url=https://www.parlement.com/id/vh8lnhrp1x0a/evenredige_vertegenwoordiging (Dutch)|title=Evenredige vertegenwoordiging|website=www.parlement.com|language=nl|access-date=2020-01-28}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> ===Potential lack of balance in presidential systems===<br /> In a [[presidential system]], the president is chosen independently from the parliament. As a consequence, it is possible to have a [[divided government]] where a parliament and president have opposing views and may want to balance each other's influence. However, the proportional system favors government of coalitions of many smaller parties that require compromising and negotiating topics.{{citation needed}} As a consequence, these coalitions might have difficulties presenting a united front to counter presidential influence, leading to a lack of balance between these two powers. With a proportionally elected House, a President may strong-arm certain political issues{{Citation needed}}<br /> <br /> This issue does not happen in a [[parliamentary system]], where the prime-minister is elected indirectly by the parliament itself. As a consequence, a divided government is impossible. Even if the political views change with time and the prime minister loses their support from parliament, they can be replaced with a [[motion of no confidence]]. Effectively, both measures make it impossible to create a [[divided government]].<br /> <br /> ==Attributes of PR systems==<br /> ===District magnitude===<br /> Academics agree that the most important influence on proportionality is an electoral district's [[District magnitude|magnitude]], the number of representatives elected from the district. As magnitude increases, proportionality improves.&lt;ref name=&quot;ideaEsd&quot; /&gt; Some scholars recommend for STV voting districts of roughly four to eight seats,&lt;ref name=&quot;CareyElecSweetSpot&quot;&gt;{{cite journal|last1=Carey|first1=John M.|last2=Hix|first2=Simon|title=The Electoral Sweet Spot: Low-Magnitude Proportional Electoral Systems|journal=[[American Journal of Political Science]]|volume=55|issue=2|pages=383–397|doi=10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00495.x|url=http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/25125/1/PSPE_WP1_09_%28LSERO%29.pdf|doi-access=free}}&lt;/ref&gt; which are considered small relative to PR systems in general, which frequently have district magnitudes in the hundreds.<br /> <br /> At one extreme, the [[binomial voting|binomial electoral system]] used in [[Chile]] between 1989 and 2013,&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite news|url=https://www.economist.com/news/americas/21643216-new-voting-system-should-liven-up-politics-tie-breaker |title=Electoral reform in Chile: Tie breaker |newspaper=The Economist |access-date=11 April 2018}}&lt;/ref&gt; a nominally proportional open-list system, features two-member districts. As this system can be expected to result in the election of one candidate from each of the two dominant political blocks in most districts, it is not generally considered proportional.&lt;ref name=&quot;ideaEsd&quot; /&gt;{{rp|79}}<br /> <br /> At the other extreme, where the district encompasses the entire country (and with a low minimum threshold, highly proportionate representation of political parties can result), parties gain by broadening their appeal by nominating more minority and women candidates.&lt;ref name=&quot;ideaEsd&quot; /&gt;{{rp|83}}<br /> <br /> After the introduction of STV in [[Politics of the Republic of Ireland|Ireland]] in 1921, district magnitudes slowly diminished as more and more three-member constituencies were defined, benefiting the dominant [[Fianna Fáil]], until 1979 when an independent boundary commission was established reversing the trend.&lt;ref name=&quot;laver&quot;&gt;{{cite web|last1=Laver|first1=Michael|title=A new electoral system for Ireland?|url=http://www.tcd.ie/policy-institute/assets/pdf/BP2_Laver_Electoral_System.pdf|publisher=The Policy Institute, [[Trinity College Dublin]]|year=1998}}&lt;/ref&gt; In 2010, a parliamentary constitutional committee recommended a minimum magnitude of four.&lt;ref&gt;{{cite web|title=Joint Committee on the Constitution|url=http://www.oireachtas.ie/viewdoc.asp?fn=/documents/Committees30thDail/J-Constitution/Report_2008/20100722.pdf|publisher=Houses of the [[Oireachtas]]|location=Dublin}}&lt;/ref&gt; Despite relatively low magnitudes, Ireland has generally experienced highly proportional results.&lt;ref name=&quot;ideaEsd&quot; /&gt;{{rp|73}}<br /> <br /> In the [[FairVote]] plan for STV (which FairVote calls ''choice voting'') for the [[United States House of Representatives|US House of Representatives]], three- to five-member super-districts are proposed.&lt;ref&gt;{{cite web|title=National projections|url=http://www.fairvote.org/assets/UnitedStates2014.pdf|work=Monopoly Politics 2014 and the Fair Voting Solution|publisher=[[FairVote]]|access-date=9 July 2014}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> In Professor Mollison's plan for STV in the UK, four- and five-member districts are mostly used, with three and six seat districts used as necessary to fit existing boundaries, and even two and single member districts used where geography dictates.&lt;ref name=&quot;DMstvPdf&quot; /&gt;<br /> <br /> ===Electoral threshold===<br /> The [[electoral threshold]] is the minimum vote required to win one seat. The lower the threshold, the higher the proportion of votes contributing to the election of representatives and the lower the proportion of votes wasted.&lt;ref name=&quot;ideaEsd&quot; /&gt;<br /> <br /> All electoral systems have electoral thresholds, either formally defined or the [[Electoral threshold#Natural threshold|natural threshold]], which is the mathematical consequence of the district magnitude and election parameters.&lt;ref name=&quot;ideaEsd&quot; /&gt;{{rp|83}}<br /> <br /> A formal threshold usually requires parties to win a certain percentage of the vote in order to be awarded seats from the party lists. In Germany and New Zealand (both MMP), the threshold is 5% of the national vote but the threshold is not applied to parties that win a minimum number of constituency seats (three in Germany, one in New Zealand). Turkey defines a threshold of 7%,&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite web |title=Turkey reduces election threshold to 7 percent — Türkiye News |url=https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-parliament-approves-election-law-changes-172648 |access-date=2023-03-19 |website=Hürriyet Daily News |language=en}}&lt;/ref&gt; the Netherlands 0.67%.&lt;ref name=&quot;ideaEsd&quot; /&gt; Israel has raised its threshold from 1% (before 1992) to 1.5% (up to 2004), 2% (in [[2006 Israeli legislative election|2006]]) and 3.25% in 2014.&lt;ref&gt;{{cite news|last1=Lubell|first1=Maayan|title=Israel ups threshold for Knesset seats despite opposition boycott|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-knesset-idUSBREA2A0MX20140311|access-date=10 July 2014|publisher=[[Thomson Reuters]]}}&lt;/ref&gt; South Africa has no explicit electoral threshold, only a natural threshold ~0.2%. A [[Electoral threshold#List of electoral thresholds by country|list of electoral thresholds by country]] shows a typical electoral threshold for party-list PR is 3-5%.<br /> <br /> In STV elections, winning the [[Droop quota|quota]] (ballots/(seats+1)plus 1) of votes assures election.&lt;ref&gt;Benoit, Kenneth. &quot;Which Electoral Formula Is the Most Proportional?&quot; (PDF). doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.pan.a029822. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2010-06-24&lt;/ref&gt; Winning the [[Droop quota|quota]] in the first count when first preference votes are all that are counted, assures election at that point.&lt;ref name=&quot;auto1&quot;&gt;A Report on Alberta Elections, 1905-1982&lt;/ref&gt; E.g. for a district magnitude of 3, the STV electoral threshold would be 25% (of first-preference votes plus transferred later-preference votes), significantly higher than typical party-list PR. However, candidates who receive only about half the quota of first preference votes alone may attract good second (and third, etc.) preference support and win election.&lt;ref name=&quot;DMstvPdf&quot; /&gt;<br /> <br /> However success with less than quota cannot be relied on. Sometimes candidates in winning positions in the first count (but who do not have quota) are not elected, being pushed aside during the vote count in favor of other candidates who were initially less popular but have wide support and benefit from vote transfers. The need to attract second preferences tends to promote consensus and to disadvantage extremes. Those who do not have wide support may not benefit greatly from vote transfers so may not be elected if they do not receive quota on first count.&lt;ref name=&quot;auto1&quot;/&gt;<br /> <br /> The electoral threshold has different effects on STV than on Party-list PR. For STV the votes for candidates below natural threshold are not wasted, but transferred to the next-indicated choice. For party-list PR a vote for a party below electoral threshold is a [[wasted vote]] unless the [[spare vote]] system is applied.<br /> <br /> ===Party magnitude===<br /> Party magnitude is the number of candidates elected from one party in one district. As party magnitude increases a more balanced ticket will be more successful, encouraging parties to nominate women and minority candidates for election.&lt;ref&gt;{{cite web|title=Party Magnitude and Candidate Selection|url=http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/pc/pcc/pcc04/pcc04b|publisher=[[ACE Electoral Knowledge Network]]}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> But under STV, nominating too many candidates can be counter-productive, splitting the first-preference votes and allowing the candidates to be eliminated before receiving transferred votes from other parties. An example of this was identified in a ward in the [[2007 Scottish local elections]] where [[Labour Party (UK)|Labour]], putting up three candidates, won only one seat while they might have won two had one of their voters' preferred candidates not stood.&lt;ref name=&quot;DMstvPdf&quot; /&gt; The same effect may have contributed to the collapse of [[Fianna Fáil]] in the [[2011 Irish general election]].&lt;ref&gt;{{cite web|last1=O'Kelly|first1=Michael|title=The fall of Fianna Fáil in the 2011 Irish general election|url=http://www.significancemagazine.org/details/webexclusive/1048883/The-fall-of-Fianna-Fail-in-the-2011-Irish-general-election.html|website=[[Significance (magazine)|Significance]]|publisher=[[Royal Statistical Society]], [[American Statistical Association]]|url-status=bot: unknown|archive-url=https://archive.today/20140806103006/http://www.significancemagazine.org/details/webexclusive/1048883/The-fall-of-Fianna-Fail-in-the-2011-Irish-general-election.html|archive-date=2014-08-06}}&lt;/ref&gt; But generally in STV contests the transfers of votes allows each party to take roughly its due share of the seats based on vote tallies of the party's candidates and where all the candidates of a party preferred by a voter are eliminated, the vote may be transferred to a candidate of a different party also preferred by the voter.&lt;ref&gt;Hoag and Hallett, Proportional Representation, p. 74&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> ===Others===<br /> Other aspects of PR can influence proportionality such as the size of the elected body, the choice of open or closed lists, ballot design, and vote counting methods.<br /> <br /> ==Measuring disproportionality==<br /> Exact proportionality has a single unambiguous definition: the seat shares must exactly equal the vote shares, measured as [[seats-to-votes ratio]]. When this condition is violated, the allocation is disproportional, and it may be interesting to examine the ''degree'' of disproportionality – the degree to which the number of seats won by each party differs from that of a perfectly proportional outcome. This degree does not have a single unambiguous definition. Some common disproportionality indexes are:&lt;ref name=&quot;karpov2008&quot;&gt;{{cite journal|last1=Karpov|first1=Alexander|title=Measurement of disproportionality in proportional representation systems|journal=Mathematical and Computer Modelling|volume=48|issue=9–10|pages=1421–1438|doi=10.1016/j.mcm.2008.05.027|doi-access=free}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> * The [[Gallagher Index]] — involves squaring the difference between each party's vote share and seat share, and taking the square root of the sum.<br /> * [[Wasted vote]], which only measures the difference between votes cast and seats obtained for parties which did not obtain any seat.<br /> * The [[Sainte-Laguë Index]] — where the squared discrepancy from ideal [[seats-to-votes ratio]] is weighted equally for each voter.<br /> <br /> The disproportionality changes from one election to another depending on voter behavior and size of effective electoral threshold, here shown is the wasted vote for New Zealand.&lt;ref name=&quot;results&quot;&gt;{{cite web |url= https://electionresults.govt.nz/electionresults_2020/statistics/index.html |title= 2020 GENERAL ELECTION — OFFICIAL RESULTS AND STATISTICS |website= ElectionResults.govt.nz |publisher= [[Electoral Commission (New Zealand)|Electoral Commission]] }}&lt;/ref&gt; In [[2005 New Zealand general election]] every party above 1% got seats due to the electoral threshold in New Zealand of at least one seat in first-past-the-post voting, which caused a much lower wasted vote compared to the other years.<br /> {{Graph:Chart|width=400|height=160|type=rect|xAxisTitle=Year of New Zealand general election |yAxisTitle=wasted vote in %|yAxisMin=0|yAxisMax=10<br /> |x=1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2017, 2020<br /> |y1Title=wasted vote|y1=7.54,6.03,4.89, 1.5, 6.46, 3.31, 6.1, 4.62, 7.71<br /> |colors=#99ccff}}<br /> <br /> Different indexes measure different concepts of disproportionality. Some disproportionality concepts have been mapped to [[social welfare function]]s.&lt;ref name=&quot;wada2016&quot;&gt;<br /> {{cite journal |last1=Wada |first1=Junichiro |title=Apportionment behind the veil of uncertainty |journal=The Japanese Economic Review |volume=67 |issue=3 |pages=348–360 |doi=10.1111/jere.12093 |s2cid=156608434 }}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> Disproportionality indexes are sometimes used to evaluate existing and proposed electoral systems. For example, the [[Parliament of Canada|Canadian Parliament's]] [[Canadian House of Commons Special Committee on Electoral Reform|2016 Special Committee on Electoral Reform]] recommended that a system be designed to achieve &quot;a Gallagher score of 5 or less&quot;. This indicated a much lower degree of disproportionality than observed in the [[2015 Canadian federal election|2015 Canadian election]] under [[first-past-the-post voting]], where the Gallagher index was 12.&lt;ref name=&quot;CanadaErreFinalReport&quot;&gt;{{cite web|author=Canadian House of Commons Special Committee on Electoral Reform|title=Strengthening Democracy in Canada: Principles, Process and Public Engagement for Electoral Reform|url=http://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-1/ERRE/report-3|author-link=Canadian House of Commons Special Committee on Electoral Reform}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> There are various other measures of proportionality, some of them have software implementation.&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite web|title=polrep: Calculate Political Representation Scores version 0.32.7 from R-Forge|url=https://rdrr.io/rforge/polrep/|access-date=2021-04-18|website=rdrr.io|language=en}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> The common indexes (Loosemore–Hanby, Gallagher, Sainte-Laguë) do not support [[ranked voting]].&lt;ref name=&quot;KestelmanQuanRep&quot;&gt;{{cite journal|last1=Kestelman|first1=Philip|title=Quantifying Representativity|url=http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/ISSUE10/P6.HTM|journal=Voting Matters|issue=10|access-date=10 August 2013}}&lt;/ref&gt;&lt;ref name=&quot;HillMeasProp&quot;&gt;{{cite journal|last1=Hill|first1=I D|title=Measuring proportionality|url=http://www.mcdougall.org.uk/VM/ISSUE8/P5.HTM|journal=Voting Matters|issue=8}}&lt;/ref&gt; An alternative that does support it is the [[Droop proportionality criterion]] (DPC). It requires that if, for some set ''M'' of candidates, there exist more than ''k'' [[Droop quota]]s of voters who rank them at the top |''M''| positions, then at least ''k'' candidates from ''M'' are elected. In the special case in which voters vote solely by party, DPC implies proportionality.<br /> <br /> ==PR electoral systems==<br /> <br /> === Party-based systems ===<br /> <br /> ==== Party list PR ====<br /> {{Main|Party-list proportional representation}}<br /> <br /> Party list proportional representation is an electoral system in which seats are first allocated to parties based on vote share, and then assigned to party-affiliated candidates on the parties' [[electoral list]]s. This system is used in many countries, including [[Finland]] (open list), [[Latvia]] (open list), [[Sweden]] (open list), [[Israel]] (national closed list), [[Brazil]] (open list), [[Nepal]] (closed list) as adopted in 2008 in first CA election, the [[Netherlands]] (open list), [[Russia]] (closed list), [[South Africa]] (closed list), [[Democratic Republic of the Congo]] (open list), and [[Ukraine]] (open list). For elections to the [[European Parliament]], most [[Member states of the European Union|member states]] use open lists; but most large EU countries use closed lists, so that the majority of EP seats are distributed by those.&lt;ref&gt;As counted from the table in http://www.wahlrecht.de/ausland/europa.htm [in German]; &quot;Vorzugsstimme(n)&quot; means &quot;open list&quot;.&lt;/ref&gt; Local lists were used to elect the [[Italian Senate]] during the second half of the 20th century. Some common types of electoral lists are:<br /> <br /> * [[Closed list]] systems, where each party lists its candidates according to the party's [[candidate selection]] process. This sets the order of candidates on the list and thus, in effect, their probability of being elected. The first candidate on a list, for example, will get the first seat that party wins. Each voter casts a vote for a list of candidates. Voters, therefore, do not have the option to express their preferences at the ballot as to which of a party's candidates are elected into office.&lt;ref&gt;{{cite web |title=Party List PR |url = http://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/party-list|publisher=Electoral Reform Society |access-date=23 May 2016}}&lt;/ref&gt;&lt;ref&gt;{{cite book |title=Fixing Canadian Democracy |author= Gordon Gibson |url = https://books.google.com/books?id=y7hFz5GawkcC&amp;q=closed+list+PR&amp;pg=PA58 |publisher=The Fraser Institute |page=76 |isbn= 9780889752016 }}&lt;/ref&gt; A party is allocated seats in proportion to the number of votes it receives.&lt;ref&gt;{{cite book |last1=Gallagher |first1=Michael |last2=Mitchell |first2=Paul |title=The Politics of Electoral Systems |location=Oxford, New York |publisher=Oxford University Press |page=11 |isbn=978-0-19-925756-0}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> * [[Ley de Lemas]], an intermediate system used in Uruguay, where each party presents several closed lists, each representing a faction. Seats are distributed between parties according to the number of votes, and then between the factions within each party.{{citation needed}}<br /> * [[Open list]] systems, where voters may vote, depending on the model, for one person, or for two, or indicate their order of preference within the list. These votes sometimes rearrange the order of names on the party's list and thus which of its candidates are elected. Nevertheless, the number of candidates elected from the list is determined by the number of votes the list receives.{{citation needed}}<br /> * [[Localized list]] systems, where parties divide their candidates in single member-like constituencies, which are ranked inside each general party list depending by their percentages. This method allows electors to judge every single candidate as in a [[FPTP]] system.<br /> * Two-tier party list systems, as in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. In [[Folketing#Constitutional requirements|Denmark]], for example, the country is divided into ten multiple-member voting districts arranged in three regions, electing 135 representatives. In addition, 40 compensatory seats are elected. Voters have one vote which can be cast for an individual candidate or for a party list on the district ballot. To determine district winners, candidates are apportioned their share of their party's district list vote plus their individual votes. The compensatory seats are apportioned to the regions according to the party votes aggregated nationally, and then to the districts where the compensatory representatives are determined. In the 2007 general election, the district magnitudes, including compensatory representatives, varied between 14 and 28. The basic design of the system has remained unchanged since its introduction in 1920.&lt;ref name=&quot;denmark&quot;&gt;{{cite web|title=The Parliamentary Electoral System in Denmark |url=http://www.thedanishparliament.dk/Publications/The%20Parliamentary%20Electoral%20System%20in%20DK.aspx|publisher=Ministry of the Interior and Health|location=Copenhagen|access-date=1 Sep 2014}}&lt;/ref&gt;&lt;ref&gt;{{cite web|title=The main features of the Norwegian electoral system |url=http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/kmd/information-campaigns/election_portal/the-electoral-system/the-norwegian-electoral-system.html?id=456636|publisher=Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation|location=Oslo|access-date=1 Sep 2014}}&lt;/ref&gt;&lt;ref&gt;{{cite web|title=The Swedish electoral system|url=http://www.val.se/sprak/engelska/general_information/index.html|publisher=Election Authority|location=Stockholm|access-date=1 Sep 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140818233057/http://www.val.se/sprak/engelska/general_information/index.html|archive-date=18 August 2014|url-status=dead}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> ==== Mixed systems ====<br /> There are [[mixed electoral system]]s combining a plurality/majority formula with a proportional formula&lt;ref name=&quot;ACEMixSys&quot;&gt;{{cite web|last1=ACE Project Electoral Knowledge Network|title=Mixed Systems|url=https://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/es/esd/esd03/default|access-date=29 June 2016}}&lt;/ref&gt; or using the proportional component to compensate for disproportionality caused by the plurality/majority component.&lt;ref name=&quot;MassicotteSearch&quot;&gt;{{cite report|first1=Louis|last1=Massicotte|title=In Search of Compensatory Mixed Electoral System for Québec|url=https://www.institutions-democratiques.gouv.qc.ca/publications/mode_scrutin_rapport_en.pdf}}&lt;/ref&gt;&lt;ref name=&quot;BochslerTerritory&quot;&gt;{{cite book|first1=Daniel|last1=Bochsler|title=Territory and Electoral Rules in Post-Communist Democracies|chapter=Chapter 5, How Party Systems Develop in Mixed Electoral Systems|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=qkCBDAAAQBAJ|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|isbn=9780230281424}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> The most prominent mixed compensatory system is [[mixed member proportional representation]] (MMP). It combines a single-district vote, usually [[First-past-the-post voting|first-past-the-post]], with a compensatory regional or nationwide party list proportional vote. For example, suppose that a party wins 10 seats based on [[plurality voting|plurality]], but requires 15 seats in total to obtain its proportional share of an elected body. A fully proportional mixed compensatory system would award this party 5 compensatory (PR) seats, raising the party's seat count from 10 to 15. MMP has the potential to produce proportional or moderately proportional election outcomes, depending on a number of factors such as the ratio of FPTP seats to PR seats, the existence or nonexistence of extra compensatory seats to make up for [[overhang seat]]s, and electoral thresholds.&lt;ref name=&quot;IfesElecSys&quot;&gt;{{cite web |title=Electoral Systems and the Delimitation of Constituencies |url=http://www.ifes.org/publications/electoral-systems-and-delimitation-constituencies |publisher=[[International Foundation for Electoral Systems]]}}&lt;/ref&gt;&lt;ref name=&quot;MoserMixedElec&quot;&gt;{{cite journal |title=Mixed electoral systems and electoral system effects: controlled comparison and cross-national analysis|volume=23 |issue=4 |pages=575–599|last1=Moser|first1=Robert G. |doi=10.1016/S0261-3794(03)00056-8 |journal=Electoral Studies}}&lt;/ref&gt;&lt;ref name=&quot;MassicotteMixedElecSys&quot;&gt;{{cite journal |title=Mixed electoral systems: a conceptual and empirical survey |volume=18 |issue=3 |pages=341–366|last1=Massicotte|first1=Louis |doi=10.1016/S0261-3794(98)00063-8 |journal=Electoral Studies}}&lt;/ref&gt; It was invented for the German [[Bundestag]] after the Second World War, and has spread to [[Lesotho]], [[Bolivia]], [[New Zealand]] and [[Thailand]]. The system is also used for the [[Senedd|Welsh Parliament]] and [[Scottish Parliament]] where it is called the [[additional member system]].&lt;ref name=&quot;ersAMS&quot;&gt;{{cite web |title=Additional Member System |url=http://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/additional-member-system |access-date=16 October 2015 |publisher=[[Electoral Reform Society]] |location=London}}&lt;/ref&gt;&lt;ref name=&quot;DouglasHowPrElecWork&quot; /&gt;<br /> <br /> Voters typically have two votes, one for their district representative and one for the party list. The list vote usually determines how many seats are allocated to each party in parliament. After the district winners have been determined, sufficient candidates from each party list are elected to &quot;top-up&quot; each party to the overall number of parliamentary seats due to it according to the party's overall list vote. Before apportioning list seats, all list votes for parties which failed to reach the threshold are discarded. If eliminated parties lose seats in this manner, then the seat counts for parties that achieved the threshold improve. Any direct seats won by independent candidates are subtracted from the parliamentary total used to apportion list seats.&lt;ref&gt;{{cite web|title=MMP Voting System |url=http://www.elections.org.nz/voting-system/mmp-voting-system |publisher=[[Electoral Commission (New Zealand)|Electoral Commission New Zealand]]|location=Wellington|access-date=10 Aug 2014}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> Proportionality of MMP can be compromised if the ratio of list to district seats is too low, as it may then not be possible to completely compensate district seat disproportionality. Another factor can be how [[overhang seat]]s are handled, district seats that a party wins in excess of the number due to it under the list vote. To achieve proportionality, other parties require &quot;balance seats&quot;, increasing the size of parliament by twice the number of overhang seats, but this is not always done. Until recently, Germany increased the size of parliament by the number of overhang seats but did not use the increased size for apportioning list seats. This was changed for the 2013 national election after the constitutional court rejected the previous law, not compensating for overhang seats had resulted in a [[negative vote weight]] effect.&lt;ref&gt;{{cite news|title=Deutschland hat ein neues Wahlrecht |url=http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2013-02/bundestag-wahlrecht-beschluss |publisher=[[Zeit Online]]|language=de}}&lt;/ref&gt; Lesotho, Scotland and Wales do not increase the size of parliament at all, and, in 2012, a New Zealand parliamentary commission also proposed abandoning compensation for overhang seats, and so fixing the size of parliament. At the same time, it would abolish the single-seat threshold{{snd}} any such seats would then be overhang seats and would otherwise have increased the size of parliament further{{snd}} and reduce the electoral threshold from 5% to 4%. Proportionality would not suffer.&lt;ref name=&quot;ideaEsd&quot; /&gt;&lt;ref name=&quot;NZ2012EC&quot;&gt;{{cite web|title=Report of the Electoral Commission on the Review of the MMP Voting System|url=http://www.elections.org.nz/events/past-events-0/2012-mmp-review/results-mmp-review|publisher=[[Electoral Commission (New Zealand)|Electoral Commission New Zealand]]|location=Wellington|access-date=10 Aug 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140707151142/http://www.elections.org.nz/events/past-events-0/2012-mmp-review/results-mmp-review|archive-date=7 July 2014|url-status=dead}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> Similarly to MMP, [[Mixed single vote|mixed single vote systems]] (MSV) use a proportional formula for allocating seats on the compensatory tier, but voters only have one vote that functions on both levels. MSV may use a positive vote transfer system, where unused votes are transferred from the lower tier to the upper, compensatory tier, where only these are used in the proportional formula. Alternatively, the MMP (seat linkage) algorithm can be used with a mixed single vote to &quot;top-up&quot; to a proportional result. With MSV, the similar requirements as in MMP apply to guarantee an overall proportional result.<br /> <br /> [[Parallel voting]] (MMM) systems use proportional formulas to allocate seats on a proportional tier separately from other tiers. Certain systems, like [[scorporo]] use a proportional formula after combining results of a parallel list vote with transferred votes from lower tiers (using negative or positive vote transfer).<br /> <br /> Another mixed system is [[dual-member proportional representation]] (DMP). It is a single-vote system that elects two representatives in every district.&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite journal |last=Graham |first=Sean |title=Dual-Member Mixed Proportional: A New Electoral System for Canada |url=https://era.library.ualberta.ca/items/e3ab993a-d264-4d30-b819-290ab5fd6b62 |access-date=2022-08-10 |doi=10.7939/R3-QPPP-B676}}&lt;/ref&gt; The first seat in each district is awarded to the candidate who wins a plurality of the votes, similar to [[first-past-the-post voting|FPTP voting]]. The remaining seats are awarded in a compensatory manner to achieve proportionality across a larger region. DMP employs a formula similar to the &quot;best near-winner&quot; variant of [[mixed-member proportional representation|MMP]] used in the German state of [[Baden-Württemberg]].&lt;ref&gt;{{cite news|author=Antony Hodgson|title=Why a referendum on electoral reform would be undemocratic|url=https://thetyee.ca/Opinion/2016/01/21/Why-Referendum-on-Electoral-Reform-Undemocratic/|work=[[The Tyee]]}}&lt;/ref&gt; In Baden-Württemberg, compensatory seats are awarded to candidates who receive high levels of support at the district level compared with other candidates of the same party. DMP differs in that at most one candidate per district is permitted to obtain a compensatory seat. If multiple candidates contesting the same district are slated to receive one of their parties' compensatory seats, the candidate with the highest vote share is elected and the others are eliminated. DMP is similar to [[Single transferable vote|STV]] in that all elected representatives, including those who receive compensatory seats, serve their local districts. Invented in 2013 in the [[Provinces and Territories of Canada|Canadian province]] of [[Alberta]], DMP received attention on [[Prince Edward Island]] where it appeared on a [[2016 Prince Edward Island electoral reform referendum|2016 plebiscite]] as a potential replacement for [[first-past-the-post voting|FPTP]],&lt;ref&gt;{{cite news|author=Kerry Campbell|title=P.E.I. electoral reform committee proposes ranked ballot|url=http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/prince-edward-island/pei-electoral-reform-1.3537355|work=[[CBC News]]}}&lt;/ref&gt; but was eliminated on the third round.&lt;ref&gt;{{cite web|author=Elections PEI|title=Plebiscite Results|url=http://www.electionspei.ca/plebisciteresults|access-date=October 26, 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161108134958/http://www.electionspei.ca/plebisciteresults|archive-date=November 8, 2016|url-status=dead}}&lt;/ref&gt;&lt;ref&gt;{{cite news|author=Susan Bradley|title=P.E.I. plebiscite favours mixed member proportional representation|url=http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/prince-edward-island/mixed-member-proportional-representation-in-plebiscite-1.3840172|work=[[CBC News]]}}&lt;/ref&gt; It was also one of three proportional voting system options on a [[2018 British Columbia electoral reform referendum|2018 referendum]] in [[British Columbia]].&lt;ref&gt;{{cite web |first=David |last=Eby |title=How We Vote: 2018 Electoral Reform Referendum Report and Recommendations of the Attorney General |url=https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/271/2018/05/How-We-Vote-2018-Electoral-Reform-Referendum-Report-and-Recommendations-of-the-Attorney-General.pdf |access-date=June 9, 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180831060310/https://engage.gov.bc.ca/app/uploads/sites/271/2018/05/How-We-Vote-2018-Electoral-Reform-Referendum-Report-and-Recommendations-of-the-Attorney-General.pdf |archive-date=August 31, 2018 |url-status=dead }}&lt;/ref&gt;&lt;ref&gt;{{cite news |first=Justin |last=McElroy |title=Know your voting systems: three types of electoral reform on B.C.'s ballot |url=http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/pr-electoral-reform-questions-1.4688604?cmp=rss |work=[[CBC News]] }}&lt;/ref&gt;&lt;ref&gt;{{cite web |publisher=[[Elections BC]] |title=2018 Referendum on Electoral Reform: Voting Results Available |url=https://elections.bc.ca/news/2018-referendum-on-electoral-reform-voting-results-available/ |access-date=November 1, 2020}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> ==== Biproportional apportionment ====<br /> {{Main|Biproportional apportionment}}<br /> <br /> Biproportional [[apportionment (politics)|apportionment]] aims to achieve proportionality in two dimensions, for example: proportionality by region and proportionality by party. There are several mathematical methods to attain biproportionality.<br /> <br /> One method is called [[iterative proportional fitting]] (IPF). It was proposed for elections by the mathematician [[Michel Balinski]] in 1989, and first used by the city of [[Zurich]] for its council elections in February 2006, in a modified form called &quot;new Zurich apportionment&quot; (''Neue Zürcher Zuteilungsverfahren''). Zurich had had to modify its party list PR system after the [[Switzerland|Swiss Federal Court]] ruled that its smallest [[Ward (electoral subdivision)|wards]], as a result of population changes over many years, unconstitutionally disadvantaged smaller political parties. With biproportional apportionment, the use of open party lists has not changed, but the way winning candidates are determined has. The proportion of seats due to each party is calculated according to their overall citywide vote, and then the district winners are adjusted to conform to these proportions. This means that some candidates, who would otherwise have been successful, can be denied seats in favor of initially unsuccessful candidates, in order to improve the relative proportions of their respective parties overall. This peculiarity is accepted by the Zurich electorate because the resulting city council is proportional and all votes, regardless of district magnitude, now have equal weight. The system has since been adopted by other Swiss cities and [[Cantons of Switzerland|cantons]].&lt;ref name=&quot;pukZna&quot;&gt;{{Cite journal |last=Pukelsheim |first=Friedrich |title=Zurich's New Apportionment |url=http://www.uni-augsburg.de/pukelsheim/2008e-en.pdf |journal=German Research |volume=31 |issue=2 |pages=10–12 |doi=10.1002/germ.200990024 |access-date=10 August 2014 |ref=ZurichNA}}&lt;/ref&gt;&lt;ref name=&quot;balinskiFMV&quot;&gt;{{Cite journal |last=Balinski |first=Michel |author-link=Michel Balinski |title=Fair Majority Voting (or How to Eliminate Gerrymandering) |url=http://www.maa.org/programs/maa-awards/writing-awards/fair-majority-voting-or-how-to-eliminate-gerrymandering |journal=The American Mathematical Monthly |volume=115 |issue=2 |pages=97–113 |doi=10.1080/00029890.2008.11920503 |access-date=10 August 2014 |ref=FMV |s2cid=1139441}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> Balinski has proposed another variant called [[fair majority voting]] (FMV) to replace single-winner plurality/majoritarian electoral systems, in particular the system used for the [[US House of Representatives]]. FMV introduces proportionality without changing the method of voting, the number of seats, or the{{snd}}possibly gerrymandered{{snd}}district boundaries. Seats would be apportioned to parties in a proportional manner at the [[U.S. state|state]] level.&lt;ref name=&quot;balinskiFMV&quot; /&gt; In a related proposal for the [[UK parliament]], whose elections are contested by many more parties, the authors note that parameters can be tuned to adopt any degree of proportionality deemed acceptable to the electorate. In order to elect smaller parties, a number of constituencies would be awarded to candidates placed fourth or even fifth in the constituency{{snd}} unlikely to be acceptable to the electorate, the authors concede{{snd}} but this effect could be substantially reduced by incorporating a third, regional, apportionment tier, or by specifying minimum thresholds.&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite journal |last1=Akartunalı |first1=Kerem |last2=Knight |first2=Philip A. |title=Network models and biproportional rounding for fair seat allocations in the UK elections |url=http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10479-016-2323-0 |journal=Annals of Operations Research |language=en |publisher=[[University of Strathclyde]] |volume=253 |issue=1 |pages=1–19 |doi=10.1007/s10479-016-2323-0 |s2cid=30623821 |issn=0254-5330 |access-date=10 August 2014}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> === Candidate-based systems ===<br /> <br /> ==== Single transferable vote ====<br /> {{Main|Single transferable vote}}<br /> <br /> The single transferable vote (STV), also called [[Ranked voting|ranked choice voting]],&lt;ref name=&quot;fairVoteFairRep&quot;&gt;{{cite web |title=Fair Voting/Proportional Representation |url=http://www.fairvote.org/reforms/fair-representation-voting/ |access-date=9 April 2014 |publisher=[[FairVote]]}}&lt;/ref&gt;&lt;ref name=&quot;amyHist&quot; /&gt; is a [[ranked voting|ranked system]]: voters rank candidates in order of preference. Voting districts usually elect three to seven representatives; each voter casts just one vote. The count is cyclic, electing or eliminating candidates and transferring votes until all seats are filled. A candidate whose tally reaches a [[Droop quota|quota]], the minimum vote that guarantees election, is declared elected. The candidate's surplus votes (those in excess of the quota) are transferred to other candidates at a fraction of their value proportionate to the surplus, according to the voters' preferences. If there are no surplus votes to transfer and there are still seats to fill, the least popular candidate is eliminated, those votes being transferred to their next preference at full value. The votes are transferred according to the next marked preference. Any votes that cannot be transferred are moved to a pile labelled exhausted or non-transferable.<br /> <br /> The cont continues until all the seats are filled or until there is only one more candidate than the number of remaining open seats. At that point all of them except the least popular candidate are declared elected, even if they do not have quota.<br /> <br /> The transfer of votes of eliminated candidates is simple – the transfer of surplus votes is more involved. There are various methods for transferring surplus votes. <br /> <br /> Manual methods used in early times and still today in places where STV was adopted in early 20th century (Ireland and Malta) transfer surplus votes according to a randomly selected sample, or transfer only a segment of the surplus selected based on the next usable marked preference. <br /> <br /> Other more recent methods transfer all votes at a fraction of their value (the fraction derived by the surplus divided by the candidate's tally) and with reference to all the marked preferences on the ballots, not just the next usable preference. They may need the use of a computer. <br /> <br /> The different methods may not produce the same result in all respects. But the front runners in the first count before any transfers are conducted are all or mostly elected in the end, so the various methods of transfers all produce much the same result.<br /> <br /> Some variants of STV allow transfers to already elected or eliminated candidates, and these, too, can require a computer.&lt;ref name=&quot;tidemanSTV&quot;&gt;{{cite journal |last1=Tideman |first1=Nicolaus |author-link=Nicolaus Tideman |title=The Single Transferable Vote |url=http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.9.1.27 |journal=Journal of Economic Perspectives |volume=9 |issue=1 |pages=27–38 |doi=10.1257/jep.9.1.27}}&lt;/ref&gt;&lt;ref&gt;{{cite journal |last1=O’Neill |first1=Jeffrey C. |title=Comments on the STV Rules Proposed by British Columbia |url=http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/ISSUE22/INDEX.HTM |journal=Voting Matters |issue=22 |access-date=10 August 2013}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> In effect, the method produces groups of voters of much the same size so the overall effect is to reflect the diversity of the electorate, each substantial group having one or more representatives the group voted for. <br /> <br /> Statistics of effective votes vary.<br /> <br /> In Cambridge, under STV, 90 percent of voters see their vote help to elect a candidate, more than 65 percent of voters see their first choice candidate elected, and more than 95 percent of voters see one of their top three choices win.&lt;ref&gt;[http://www.nationalcivicleague.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Model-City-Charter%E2%80%949th-Edition.pdf Model City Charter] National Civic League. 9th edition. 2021&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> Other reports claim that 90% of voters have a representative to whom they gave their first preference. Voters can choose candidates using any criteria they wish, the proportionality is implicit.&lt;ref name=&quot;DMstvPdf&quot; /&gt; <br /> <br /> Political parties are not necessary; all other prominent PR electoral systems presume that parties reflect voters wishes, which many believe gives power to parties.&lt;ref name=&quot;tidemanSTV&quot; /&gt; STV satisfies the [[Comparison of electoral systems|electoral system criterion]] ''[[Proportionality for Solid Coalitions|proportionality for solid coalitions]]''{{snd}} a solid coalition for a set of candidates is the group of voters that rank all those candidates above all others{{snd}} and is therefore considered a system of proportional representation.&lt;ref name=&quot;tidemanSTV&quot; /&gt; <br /> <br /> However, the small district magnitude used in STV elections (usually 5 to 9 seats, but sometimes rising to 21) has been criticized as impairing proportionality, especially when more parties compete than there are seats available,&lt;ref name=&quot;forder&quot; /&gt;{{rp|50}} and STV has, for this reason, sometimes been labelled &quot;quasi proportional&quot;.&lt;ref name=&quot;AusOVC&quot;&gt;{{cite book |author=David M. Farrell |title=The Australian Electoral System: Origins, Variations, and Consequences |author2=Ian McAllister |publisher=[[UNSW Press]] |isbn=978-0868408583 |location=Sydney}}&lt;/ref&gt;{{rp|83}} <br /> <br /> While this may be true when considering districts in isolation, results {{em|overall}} are proportional. <br /> <br /> Even though Ireland has particularly small magnitudes (3 to 5 seats), results of STV elections are &quot;highly proportional&quot;.&lt;ref name=&quot;ideaEsd&quot; /&gt;{{rp|73}}&lt;ref name=&quot;ideaGallagher&quot; /&gt; In [[1997 Irish general election|1997]], the average magnitude was 4.0 but eight parties gained representation, four of them with less than 3% of first preference votes nationally. Six independent candidates also won election.&lt;ref name=&quot;laver&quot; /&gt; <br /> <br /> STV has also been described as the {{em|most}} proportional system as it elects candidates without the need for parties. The influence of parties can distort proportionality.&lt;ref name=&quot;AusOVC&quot; /&gt;{{rp|83}} <br /> <br /> The system tends to handicap extreme candidates because, to gain transfers based on back-up preferences and so improve their chance of election, candidates need to canvass voters beyond their own circle of supporters, and so need to moderate their views.&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite news |title=Referendum 2011: A look at the STV system |work=[[The New Zealand Herald]] |publisher=The New Zealand Herald |location=Auckland |url=http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&amp;objectid=10762976 |access-date=21 Nov 2014}}&lt;/ref&gt;&lt;ref&gt;{{cite magazine |title=Change the Way We Elect? Round Two of the Debate |url=https://thetyee.ca/Views/2009/04/30/STV2/ |magazine=The Tyee |location=Vancouver |access-date=21 Nov 2014}}&lt;/ref&gt; <br /> <br /> Conversely, widely respected candidates can win election even if they receive relatively few first preferences. They do this by benefiting from strong subordinate preference support. Of course, they must have enough initial support so that they are not in the bottom rung of popularity or they will be eliminated when the field of candidate is thinned.&lt;ref name=&quot;DMstvPdf&quot; /&gt;<br /> <br /> ==== Proportional approval voting ====<br /> {{Main|Proportional approval voting}}<br /> <br /> Systems can be devised that aim at proportional representation but are based on approval votes on individual candidates (not parties). Such is the idea of [[proportional approval voting]] (PAV).&lt;ref&gt;{{cite arXiv|eprint=1611.08691|last1=Brill|first1=Markus|title=Multiwinner Approval Rules as Apportionment Methods|last2=Laslier|first2=Jean-François|last3=Skowron|first3=Piotr|class=cs.GT|year=2016}}&lt;/ref&gt; When there are a lot of seats to be filled, as in a legislature, counting ballots under PAV may not be feasible, so sequential variants have been used, such as [[sequential proportional approval voting]] (SPAV). <br /> <br /> ==== Sequential proportional approval voting ====<br /> {{Main|Sequential proportional approval voting}}<br /> <br /> [[Sequential proportional approval voting]] (SPAV) is a multi-winner voting system similar to STV in that voters can express support for multiple candidates, but different in that candidates are [[Cardinal voting|graded]] instead of [[Ranked voting|ranked]].&lt;ref name=&quot;smithMultisurv&quot;&gt;{{cite web |last=Smith |first=Warren |title=Comparative survey of multiwinner election methods |url=http://rangevoting.org/WarrenSmithPages/homepage/multisurv.pdf}}&lt;/ref&gt; That is, a voter approves or disapproves of each candidate. SPAV was used briefly in Sweden during the early 1900s.&lt;ref name=&quot;AzizGaspers2014&quot;&gt;{{cite book |last1=Aziz |first1=Haris |title=Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems |author2=Serge Gaspers, Joachim Gudmundsson, Simon Mackenzie, Nicholas Mattei, Toby Walsh |year=2014 |isbn=978-1-4503-3413-6 |pages=107–115 |chapter=Computational Aspects of Multi-Winner Approval Voting |arxiv=1407.3247v1}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> The vote counting procedure occurs in rounds. The first round of SPAV is identical to [[approval voting]]. All ballots are added with equal weight, and the candidate with the highest overall score is elected. In all subsequent rounds, ballots that support candidates who have already been elected are added with a reduced weight. Thus voters who support none of the winners in the early rounds are increasingly likely to elect one of their preferred candidates in a later round. The procedure has been shown to yield proportional outcomes especially when voters are loyal to distinct groups of candidates (e.g. political parties).&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite journal |last1=Faliszewski |first1=Piotr |last2=Skowron |first2=Piotr |last3=Szufa |first3=Stanisław |last4=Talmon |first4=Nimrod |title=Proportional Representation in Elections: STV vs PAV |url=https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3306127.3331972 |journal=Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems |series=AAMAS '19 |location=Richland, SC |publisher=International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems |pages=1946–1948 |isbn=978-1-4503-6309-9}}&lt;/ref&gt;&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite book |last1=Lackner |first1=Martin |last2=Skowron |first2=Piotr |title=Multi-Winner Voting with Approval Preferences |chapter= |series=SpringerBriefs in Intelligent Systems |year=2023 |doi=10.1007/978-3-031-09016-5 |arxiv=2007.01795 |isbn=978-3-031-09015-8 |s2cid=244921148 }}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> ==== Reweighted range voting ====<br /> Reweighted range voting (RRV) uses the same method as [[sequential proportional approval voting]] but uses a [[Score voting|score ballot]].&lt;ref name=&quot;kokSmithRangeWeb&quot;&gt;{{cite web |last1=Kok |first1=Jan |last2=Smith |first2=Warren |title=Reweighted Range Voting – a Proportional Representation voting method that feels like range voting |url=http://rangevoting.org/RRV.html |access-date=4 April 2016}}&lt;/ref&gt;&lt;ref name=&quot;ryanAssetWeb&quot;&gt;{{cite web |last=Ryan |first=Ivan |title=Reweighted Range Voting – a Proportional Representation voting method that feels like range voting |url=http://rangevoting.org/RRVr.html |access-date=4 April 2016}}&lt;/ref&gt; Reweighted range voting was used for the nominations in the Visual Effects category for recent Academy Award Oscars from 2013 through 2017,&lt;ref name=&quot;oscars2017Rules&quot;&gt;{{cite web |title=89th Annual Academy Awards of Merit for Achievements during 2017 |url=https://www.oscars.org/sites/oscars/files/89aa_rules.pdf |access-date=4 April 2016}}&lt;/ref&gt;&lt;ref name=&quot;oscars2012RulesRule22&quot;&gt;{{cite web |title=Rule Twenty-Two: Special Rules for the Visual Effects Award |url=http://www.oscars.org/awards/academyawards/rules/rule22.html |url-status=bot: unknown |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120914153856/http://www.oscars.org/awards/academyawards/rules/rule22.html |archive-date=14 September 2012 |access-date=4 April 2016}}&lt;/ref&gt; and is used in the city of [[Berkeley, California]], for sorting the priorities of the city council.&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite web |last=Sargent |first=Felix |title=Opinion: Berkeley's City Council's switch to 're-weighted range voting' adds fairness to the system |url=https://www.berkeleyside.org/2019/06/19/opinion-berkeleys-city-councils-switch-to-re-weighted-range-voting-adds-fairness-to-the-system |access-date=2022-05-11 |website=Berkeleyside |language=en-US}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> ==== Asset voting ====<br /> In asset voting,&lt;ref name=&quot;smithMultisurv&quot; /&gt;&lt;ref name=&quot;smithAssetMultiwin&quot;&gt;{{cite web|last=Smith|first=Warren|title=&quot;Asset voting&quot; scheme for multiwinner elections|url=http://rangevoting.org/WarrenSmithPages/homepage/multiwin.pdf}}&lt;/ref&gt; the voters vote for candidates and then the candidates negotiate amongst each other and reallocate votes amongst themselves. Asset voting was proposed by [[Lewis Carroll]] in 1884&lt;ref&gt;{{cite web |url=https://archive.org/details/ThePrinciplesOfParliamentaryRepresentation |title=The Principles of Parliamentary Representation |last=Dodgson |first=Charles |publisher=London: Harrison and Sons |access-date=28 June 2019 |quote=The Elector must understand that, in giving his vote to ''A'', he gives it to him as his absolute property, to use for himself, or to transfer to other Candidates, or to leave unused.}}&lt;/ref&gt; and has been more recently independently rediscovered and extended by Warren D. Smith and Forest Simmons.&lt;ref name=&quot;smithAssetWeb&quot;&gt;{{cite web|last=Smith|first=Warren|title=Asset voting – an interesting and very simple multiwinner voting system|url=http://rangevoting.org/Asset.html|access-date=4 April 2016}}&lt;/ref&gt; As such, this method substitutes candidates' collective preferences for those of the voters.<br /> <br /> ==== Evaluative proportional representation (EPR) ====<br /> <br /> Similar to [[majority judgment]] voting that elects single winners, evaluative proportional representation (EPR) elects all the members of a legislative body.&lt;ref&gt;Balinski, M. &amp; Laraki R., 2011 ''Majority Judgment'', MIT; pp. 389 and 394.&lt;/ref&gt; In contrast to any other voting method, EPR explains how it does not &quot;waste&quot; any votes, quantitatively, or qualitatively.&lt;ref&gt;Bosworth, S. et al., 2020.Electing Legislatures by Evaluative Proportional Representation (EPR): An Algorithm. &lt;nowiki&gt;https://www.jpolrisk.com/legislatures-elected-by-evaluative-proportional-representation-epr-an-algorithm-v3/&lt;/nowiki&gt;. 14 February 2023.&lt;/ref&gt; &lt;ref&gt;{{cite book |author=M. Balinski &amp; R. Laraki |title=Majority Judgment. |publisher=MIT |year=2010 |isbn=978-0-262-01513-4}}&lt;/ref&gt; Each EPR voter is invited to grade one or more of the candidate's suitability for office as one of: Excellent (ideal), Very Good, Good, Acceptable, Poor, or Reject (entirely unsuitable). Multiple candidates may be given the same grade by a voter. Each citizen is assured that their one vote will equally increase the voting power of the elected member of the legislature who received either their highest grade, remaining highest grade, or proxy vote. Each elected member has a weighted vote in the legislative body exactly equal to the number of citizens' ballots exclusively counted for them. Using EPR, each citizen elects their representative at-large for a city council. For a large and diverse state legislature, each citizen chooses to vote through any of the districts or official non-geographically defined electoral associations in the country. Each voter grades any number of candidates in the whole country. Each member's weighted vote results from receiving one of the following from each voter: their highest grade, highest remaining grade, or proxy vote. Each citizen's vote equally adds to the voting power in the legislative body of the elected candidate they see as most likely to represent their hopes and concerns accurately. Also, each self-identifying minority or majority, is proportionally represented exactly. Like majority judgment, EPR reduces by almost half both the incentives and possibilities for voters to use Tactical Voting. {{See also|Tactical voting#Majority judgment}}<br /> <br /> == History ==<br /> One of the earliest proposals of proportionality in an assembly was by [[John Adams]] in his influential pamphlet ''[[Thoughts on Government]]'', written in 1776 during the [[American Revolution]]:<br /> {{Blockquote|text=It should be in miniature, an exact portrait of the people at large. It should think, feel, reason, and act like them. That it may be the interest of this Assembly to do strict justice at all times, it should be an equal representation, or in other words equal interest among the people should have equal interest in it.&lt;ref&gt;{{cite web|last1=Adams|first1=John|title=Thoughts on Government|url=http://www.masshist.org/publications/apde/portia.php?&amp;id=PJA04d040|website=The Adams Papers Digital Edition|publisher=Massachusetts Historical Society|access-date=26 July 2014|year=1776}}&lt;/ref&gt;}}<br /> <br /> [[Honoré Gabriel Riqueti, comte de Mirabeau|Mirabeau]], speaking to the [[Parlement|Assembly of Provence]] on January 30, 1789, was also an early proponent of a proportionally representative assembly:&lt;ref name=&quot;hoagHallett&quot;&gt;{{cite book |last1=Hoag |first1=Clarence |url=http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015008357249;view=1up;seq=5 |title=Proportional Representation |last2=Hallett |first2=George |publisher=The Macmillan Company |location=New York}}&lt;/ref&gt; <br /> <br /> {{Blockquote|text=A representative body is to the nation what a chart is for the physical configuration of its soil: in all its parts, and as a whole, the representative body should at all times present a reduced picture of the people, their opinions, aspirations, and wishes, and that presentation should bear the relative proportion to the original precisely.}}<br /> <br /> In February 1793, the [[Marquis de Condorcet]] led the drafting of the [[Girondin constitutional project|Girondist constitution]] which proposed a [[limited voting]] scheme with proportional aspects. Before that could be voted on, the [[The Mountain|Montagnards]] took over the [[National Convention]] and produced their own [[French Constitution of 1793|constitution]]. On June 24, [[Louis Antoine de Saint-Just|Saint-Just]] proposed the [[single non-transferable vote]], which can be proportional, for national elections but the constitution was passed on the same day specifying [[first-past-the-post voting]].&lt;ref name=&quot;hoagHallett&quot; /&gt;<br /> <br /> Already in 1787, [[James Wilson (Founding Father)|James Wilson]], like Adams a [[Founding Fathers of the United States|US Founding Father]], understood the importance of multiple-member districts: &quot;Bad elections proceed from the smallness of the districts which give an opportunity to bad men to intrigue themselves into office&quot;,&lt;ref&gt;{{cite web |last1=Madison |first1=James |title=Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, Wednesday, June 6 |url=http://teachingamericanhistory.org/convention/debates/0606-2/ |access-date=5 August 2014 |publisher=TeachingAmericanHistory.org}}&lt;/ref&gt; and again, in 1791, in his Lectures on Law: &quot;It may, I believe, be assumed as a general maxim, of no small importance in democratical governments, that the more extensive the district of election is, the choice will be the more wise and enlightened&quot;.&lt;ref&gt;{{cite book |last1=Wilson |first1=James |title=The Works of the Honourable James Wilson |publisher=[[Constitution Society]] |chapter=Vol 2, Part II, Ch.1 Of the constitutions of the United States and of Pennsylvania – Of the legislative department, I, of the election of its members |access-date=5 August 2014 |chapter-url=http://www.constitution.org/jwilson/jwilson2.htm}}&lt;/ref&gt; The 1790 [[Constitution of Pennsylvania]] specified multiple-member districts for the state Senate and required their boundaries to follow [[county line]]s.&lt;ref&gt;{{cite web |title=Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania – 1790, art.I,§ VII, Of districts for electing Senators |url=http://www.duq.edu/academics/gumberg-library/pa-constitution/texts-of-the-constitution/1790 |access-date=9 December 2014 |publisher=[[Duquesne University]]}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> STV or more precisely, an election method where voters have one transferable vote, was first invented in 1819 by an English schoolmaster, [[Thomas Wright Hill]], who devised a &quot;plan of election&quot; for the committee of the ''Society for Literary and Scientific Improvement'' in Birmingham that used not only transfers of surplus votes from winners but also from losers, a refinement that later both Andræ and Hare initially omitted. But the procedure was unsuitable for a public election and was not publicised. In 1839, Hill's son, [[Rowland Hill]], recommended the concept for public elections in Adelaide, and a simple process was used in which voters formed as many groups as there were representatives to be elected, each group electing one representative.&lt;ref name=&quot;hoagHallett&quot; /&gt;<br /> <br /> The first practical PR election method, the List Plan system, was conceived by Thomas Gilpin, a retired paper-mill owner, in a paper he read to the [[American Philosophical Society]] in Philadelphia in 1844: &quot;On the representation of minorities of electors to act with the majority in elected assemblies&quot;. It was never put into practical use, but even as late as 1914 it was put forward as a way to elect the U.S. electoral college delegates and for local elections.&lt;ref name=&quot;hoagHallett&quot; /&gt;&lt;ref&gt;Hoag, Effective Voting (1914), p. 31&lt;/ref&gt;&lt;ref&gt;Swain, Civics for Montana Students, 1912, p. 163&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> A practical election using the Single Transferable Vote system (a combination of preferential voting and multi-member districts) was devised in Denmark by [[Carl Andræ]], a mathematician, and first used there in 1855, making it the oldest PR system. That system was later adopted for national elections in Malta (1921), the Republic of Ireland (1921) and Australia (1948).<br /> <br /> STV was also invented (apparently independently) in the UK in 1857 by [[Thomas Hare (political scientist)|Thomas Hare]], a London [[barrister]], in his pamphlet ''The Machinery of Representation'' and expanded on in his 1859 ''Treatise on the Election of Representatives''. The scheme was enthusiastically taken up by [[John Stuart Mill]], ensuring international interest. The 1865 edition of the book included the transfer of preferences from dropped candidates and the STV method was essentially complete, although Hare pictured the entire British Isles as one single district. Mill proposed it to the House of Commons in 1867, but the British parliament rejected it. The name evolved from &quot;Mr.Hare's scheme&quot; to &quot;proportional representation&quot;, then &quot;proportional representation with the single transferable vote&quot;, and finally, by the end of the 19th century, to &quot;the single transferable vote&quot;.<br /> <br /> In Australia, the political activist [[Catherine Helen Spence]] became an enthusiast of STV and an author on the subject. Through her influence and the efforts of the Tasmanian politician [[Andrew Inglis Clark]], Tasmania became an early pioneer of the system, [[Hare–Clark electoral system|electing the world's first legislators through STV in 1896]], prior to its federation into Australia.&lt;ref&gt;Newman, Hare-Clark in Tasmania, p. 7-10&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> The [[Sainte-Laguë method]] method was first described in 1832 by the American statesman and senator [[Daniel Webster]]. The [[d'Hondt method]] was devised in 1878 and some Swiss cantons started using PR beginning with Ticino in 1890. [[Victor Considerant]], a utopian socialist, devised a similar system in an 1892 book. Many European countries adopted similar systems during or after World War I. List PR was favoured on [[the Continent]] because the use of lists in elections, the [[scrutin de liste]], was already widespread. STV was preferred in the English-speaking world because its tradition was the election of individuals.&lt;ref name=&quot;humphreys&quot; /&gt;<br /> <br /> In the UK, the 1917 [[Speaker of the House of Commons (United Kingdom)|Speaker]]'s Conference recommended STV for all multi-seat Westminster constituencies, but it was only applied to [[university constituencies]], lasting from 1918 until 1950 when those constituencies were abolished.<br /> <br /> In Ireland, STV was used in 1918 in the [[Dublin University (constituency)|Dublin University]] constituency, and was introduced for devolved [[1921 Irish elections|elections in 1921]].<br /> <br /> STV is currently used for two national lower houses of parliament, Ireland, since independence (as the [[Irish Free State]]) in 1922,&lt;ref name=&quot;ideaGallagher&quot; /&gt; and Malta, since 1921, long before independence in 1966.&lt;ref name=&quot;AceMalta&quot;&gt;{{cite web |last1=Hirczy de Miño |first1=Wolfgang |title=Malta: Single-Transferable Vote with Some Twists |url=http://aceproject.org/regions-en/countries-and-territories/MT/case-studies/malta-single-transferable-vote-with-some-twists-1997 |access-date=5 Dec 2014 |publisher=[[ACE Electoral Knowledge Network]]}}&lt;/ref&gt; In Ireland, two attempts were made by [[Fianna Fáil]] governments to abolish STV and replace it with the '[[First Past the Post]]' plurality system. Both attempts were rejected by voters in referendums held [[Third Amendment of the Constitution Bill 1958|in 1959]] and [[Third Amendment of the Constitution Bill 1968|again in 1968]]. STV is also prescribed for all other elections in Ireland including that of the presidency, although it is there effectively the [[alternative vote]], as it is an election with a single winner.<br /> <br /> It is also used for the Northern Ireland Assembly and European and local authorities, Scottish local authorities, some New Zealand and Australian local authorities,&lt;ref name=&quot;ersSTV&quot; /&gt; the [[Tasmanian House of Assembly|Tasmanian]] (since 1907) and [[Australian Capital Territory Legislative Assembly|Australian Capital Territory]] assemblies, where the method is known as ''Hare-Clark'',&lt;ref name=&quot;prsaHC&quot;&gt;{{cite web |title=The Hare-Clark System of Proportional Representation |url=http://www.prsa.org.au/hareclar.htm |access-date=21 Nov 2014 |publisher=Proportional Representation Society of Australia |location=Melbourne}}&lt;/ref&gt; and the city council in [[Cambridge, Massachusetts]], (since 1941).&lt;ref name=&quot;amyHist&quot; /&gt;&lt;ref name=&quot;cambridgePlanE&quot;&gt;{{cite web |title=Adoption of Plan E |url=http://www.cambridgema.gov/election/programsandservices/cambridgemunicipalelections/Cambridge-City-Charter/adoptionofplane.aspx |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141213015655/http://www.cambridgema.gov/election/programsandservices/cambridgemunicipalelections/Cambridge-City-Charter/adoptionofplane.aspx |archive-date=13 December 2014 |access-date=25 November 2014 |website=Welcome to the City of Cambridge |publisher=City of Cambridge, MA}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> PR is used by a majority of the world's 33 most robust democracies with populations of at least two million people; only six use [[Plurality voting|plurality]] or a majoritarian system ([[Two-round system|runoff]] or [[Instant-runoff voting|instant runoff]]) for elections to the legislative assembly, four use [[Parallel voting|parallel systems]], and 23 use PR.&lt;ref&gt;{{cite web |title=Proportional Representation in Most Robust Democracies |url=http://www.fairvote.org/proportional_representation_in_most_robust_democracies |access-date=9 October 2017 |website=Fair Vote: The Center for Voting And Democracy}}&lt;/ref&gt; PR dominates Europe, including Germany and most of northern and eastern Europe; it is also used for [[European Parliament]] elections. France adopted PR at the end of World War II, but discarded it in 1958; it was used for parliament elections in 1986. [[Switzerland]] has the most widespread use of proportional representation, which is the system used to elect not only national legislatures and local councils, but also all local executives. PR is less common in the English-speaking world; [[Malta]] and [[Ireland]] use STV for election of legislators. [[Australia]] uses it for Senate elections. [[New Zealand]] adopted MMP in 1993. But UK, Canada and India use plurality (First Past the Post) systems for legislative elections. In [[Canada]], STV was used to elect provincial legislators in [[Alberta]] from 1926 to 1955, and in [[Manitoba]] from 1920 to 1953. In both provinces the [[Instant-runoff voting|alternative vote]] (AV) was used in rural areas. [[First-past-the-post voting|First-past-the-post]] was re-adopted in Alberta by the dominant party for reasons of political advantage. In Manitoba a principal reason was the underrepresentation of Winnipeg in the provincial legislature.&lt;ref name=&quot;hoagHallett&quot; /&gt;{{rp|223–234}}&lt;ref&gt;{{cite web |last1=Jansen |first1=Harold John |title=The Single Transferable Vote in Alberta and Manitoba |url=http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/tape15/PQDD_0004/NQ29051.pdf |access-date=23 March 2015 |website=[[Library and Archives Canada]] |publisher=University of Alberta}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> STV has some history in the [[United States]]. Between 1915 and 1962, twenty-four cities used the system for at least one election. In many cities, minority parties and other groups used STV to break up single-party monopolies on elective office. One of the most famous cases is [[New York City]], where a coalition of Republicans and others pursued the adoption of STV in 1936 as part of an effort to free the city from control by the [[Tammany Hall]] [[Political machine|machine]].&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite journal |last=Santucci |first=Jack |title=Party Splits, Not Progressives |journal=American Politics Research |language=en |volume=45 |issue=3 |pages=494–526 |doi=10.1177/1532673x16674774 |issn=1532-673X |s2cid=157400899}}&lt;/ref&gt; Another famous case is [[Cincinnati]], Ohio, where, in 1924, Democrats and [[Progressive Era|Progressive]]-wing Republicans secured the adoption of a [[Council–manager government|council-manager]] charter with STV elections in order to dislodge the [[Republican Party (United States)|Republican]] machine of [[Rudolph K. Hynicka]]. Although Cincinnati's council-manager system survives, Republicans and other disaffected groups replaced STV with [[plurality-at-large voting]] in 1957.&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite book |last=Barber |first=Kathleen |title=Proportional Representation and Election Reform in Ohio |publisher=Ohio State University Press |year=1995 |isbn=978-0814206607 |location=Columbus, OH}}&lt;/ref&gt; From 1870 to 1980, [[Illinois]] used a semi-proportional [[cumulative voting]] system to elect [[Illinois House of Representatives|its House of Representatives]]. Each district across the state elected both Republicans and Democrats year-after-year.<br /> <br /> [[Cambridge, Massachusetts]] (STV), and [[Peoria, Illinois]] (cumulative voting), have used PR for many years now.<br /> <br /> [[San Francisco]] (before 1977 and 1980–1999) had citywide elections in which people cast votes for as many as nine candidates, but usually five or six candidates, simultaneously ([[Plurality block voting|block voting]]), delivering some of the benefits of proportional representation through the use of a multi-member district. San Francisco used preferential voting ([[Bucklin Voting]]) in its 1917 city election.<br /> <br /> == List of countries using proportional representation ==<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot;<br /> |+<br /> ! colspan=&quot;4&quot; |List of countries using proportional representation to elect the lower (or only) house of national legislature<br /> |-<br /> | colspan=&quot;4&quot; |[[File:Proportional voting systems.svg|center|frameless|500x500px]]<br /> |-<br /> |<br /> {{legend|#0066FF|Party-list PR}}<br /> |{{legend|#37C871|Single transferable vote}}<br /> |{{legend|#5A2CA0|Mixed-member proportional}}<br /> |}<br /> <br /> Eighty-five countries in the world use a proportional electoral system to fill a nationally elected legislative body. <br /> <br /> The table below lists those countries and gives information on the specific PR system that is in use.<br /> <br /> Detailed information on electoral systems applying to the first chamber of the legislature is maintained by the [[ACE Electoral Knowledge Network]].&lt;ref&gt;{{cite web |last1=ACE Project: The Electoral Knowledge Network |title=Electoral Systems Comparative Data, World Map |url=http://aceproject.org/epic-en/CDMap?question=ES005&amp;set_language=en |access-date=24 October 2017}}&lt;/ref&gt;&lt;ref&gt;{{cite web |last1=ACE Project: The Electoral Knowledge Network |title=Electoral Systems Comparative Data, Table by Country |url=http://aceproject.org/epic-en/CDTable?question=ES005&amp;view=country&amp;set_language=en |access-date=24 October 2017}}&lt;/ref&gt; Countries using PR as part of a [[Mixed-member majoritarian representation|mixed-member majoritarian]] (e.g. [[parallel voting]]) system are not included.<br /> <br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot;<br /> |-<br /> ! Country<br /> ! Body<br /> !Type of body<br /> ! colspan=&quot;2&quot; |Type of proportional system<br /> ! List type<br /> (if applicable)<br /> ! Variation of [[Open list#Variation|open lists]]<br /> (if applicable)<br /> ! Allocating formula<br /> ! [[Electoral threshold]]<br /> ! [[#District magnitude|Constituencies]]<br /> ! Governmental system<br /> ! Notes<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Albania|'''Albania''']]<br /> |[[Parliament of Albania|Parliament]] (Kuvendi)<br /> |Unicameral national legislature<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> | style=&quot;background:#dfd&quot; |[[Open list]]<br /> |?<br /> |[[D'Hondt method]]<br /> |4% nationally or 2.5% in a district<br /> |Counties<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Algeria|'''Algeria''']]<br /> |[[People's National Assembly]]<br /> |Lower house of national legislature<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> | style=&quot;background:#dfd&quot; |[[Open list]]<br /> |?<br /> |[[Hare quota]]<br /> |5% of votes in respective district.&lt;ref name=&quot;algeriaACE&quot;&gt;{{cite web |title=FINAL REPORT ON ALGERIA'S LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS |url=http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/africa/DZ/algeria-final-report-legislative-elections-ndi/at_download/file |access-date=10 January 2015 |website=ACE Project |publisher=National Democratic Institute |format=pdf}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Angola|'''Angola''']]<br /> |[[National Assembly of Angola|National Assembly]]<br /> |Lower house of national legislature<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> | style=&quot;background:#fdd&quot; | [[Closed list]]<br /> |&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: center;&quot;&gt;—&lt;/div&gt;<br /> |[[D'Hondt method]]<br /> |{{Citation needed}}<br /> |5 member districts and nationwide<br /> |<br /> |[[Double simultaneous vote]] use to elect the President and the National Assembly at the same election.<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Argentina|'''Argentina''']]<br /> |[[Chamber of Deputies (Argentina)|Chamber of Deputies]]<br /> |Lower house of national legislature<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> | style=&quot;background:#fdd&quot; | [[Closed list]]<br /> |&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: center;&quot;&gt;—&lt;/div&gt;<br /> |[[D'Hondt method]]<br /> |3% of registered voters<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | rowspan=&quot;2&quot; | [[Elections in Armenia|'''Armenia''']]<br /> | rowspan=&quot;2&quot; |[[National Assembly (Armenia)|National Assembly]]<br /> | rowspan=&quot;2&quot; |<br /> | rowspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> | rowspan=&quot;2&quot; |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]] with [[Majority bonus system|majority jackpot]] and minority jackpot &lt;ref&gt; Following electoral system amendments introduced in April 2021, members of parliament are elected only through closed party lists by party list proportional representation method but with more seats added if leading party takes more than 2/3 of seats or after two-round of voting no party takes more than 54 percent of the seats&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> | style=&quot;background:#dfd&quot; |[[Open list]]<br /> |?<br /> |[[Largest remainder method]] (? quota)<br /> | rowspan=&quot;2&quot; |5% (parties), 7% (blocs)<br /> |<br /> | rowspan=&quot;2&quot; |<br /> | rowspan=&quot;2&quot; |Party lists run-off, but only if necessary to ensure stable majority of 54% if it is not achieved either immediately (one party) or through building a coalition.&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite web |title=Armenia, Parliamentary Elections, 2 April 2017: Needs Assessment Mission Report |url=https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/armenia/293546 |access-date=2022-05-30 |website=www.osce.org |language=en}}&lt;/ref&gt;&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite web |title=DocumentView |url=https://www.arlis.am/DocumentView.aspx?DocID=109081 |website=www.arlis.am}}&lt;/ref&gt; If a party would win more than 2/3 seats, at least 1/3 seats are distributed to the other parties.<br /> |-<br /> | style=&quot;background:#fdd&quot; | [[Closed list]]<br /> |&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: center;&quot;&gt;—&lt;/div&gt;<br /> |[[Largest remainder method]] (? quota)<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Aruba|'''''Aruba''''']] ([[Kingdom of the Netherlands]])<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Australia|'''Australia''']]<br /> |[[Australian Senate|Senate]] <br /> |Upper house of national legislature<br /> | style=&quot;background:#37C871&quot; | <br /> | [[Single transferable vote]] (STV)<br /> |&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: center;&quot;&gt;—&lt;/div&gt;<br /> |&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: center;&quot;&gt;—&lt;/div&gt;<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | rowspan=&quot;3&quot; | [[Elections in Austria|'''Austria''']]<br /> | rowspan=&quot;3&quot; |[[National Council (Austria)|National Council]]<br /> | rowspan=&quot;3&quot; |Lower house of national legislature<br /> | rowspan=&quot;3&quot; style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> | rowspan=&quot;3&quot; |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> | style=&quot;background:#dfd&quot; |[[Open list]]<br /> |[[Open list#More open|More open]]:<br /> 14% on the district level<br /> |[[Hare quota]]<br /> | rowspan=&quot;3&quot; |4%<br /> |Single-member districts within federal states (''Länder'')<br /> | rowspan=&quot;3&quot; |[[Parliamentary republic]]<br /> | rowspan=&quot;3&quot; |<br /> |-<br /> | style=&quot;background:#dfd&quot; |[[Open list]]<br /> |[[Open list#More open|More open]]:<br /> 10% on the regional (state) level<br /> |[[Hare quota]]<br /> |Federal states (''Länder'')<br /> |-<br /> | style=&quot;background:#dfd&quot; |[[Open list]]<br /> |[[Open list#More open|More open]]: 7% of the on the federal level <br /> |[[D'Hondt method]]<br /> |Single federal (nationwide) constituency<br /> |-<br /> | [[Chamber of Representatives (Belgium)|'''Belgium''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |5%<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Benin|'''Bénin''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | rowspan=&quot;2&quot; | [[Elections in Bolivia|'''Bolivia''']]<br /> |[[Chamber of Deputies (Bolivia)|Chamber of Deputies]]<br /> |Lower house of national legislature<br /> | style=&quot;background:#5A2CA0&quot; | <br /> | [[Additional member system]] (AMS) – MMP (fixed number of seats – no leveling seats)<br /> | style=&quot;background:#fdd&quot; | [[Closed list]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |3%<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | rowspan=&quot;2&quot; |Ballots use the [[double simultaneous vote]]: voters cast a single vote for a presidential candidate and their party's list and local candidates at the same time (vote splitting is not possible/allowed)<br /> |-<br /> |[[Chamber of Senators (Bolivia)|Chamber of Senators]]<br /> |Upper house of national legislature<br /> |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> | style=&quot;background:#fdd&quot; | [[Closed list]]<br /> |<br /> |[[D'Hondt method]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina|'''Bosnia and Herzegovina''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | [[Sainte-Laguë method]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Brazil|'''Brazil''']]<br /> |[[Chamber of Deputies (Brazil)|Chamber of Deputies]]<br /> |Lower house of national legislature<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> | style=&quot;background:#dfd&quot; |[[Open list]]<br /> |?<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |States and Federal District<br /> |[[Presidential republic|Presidential Republic]]<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Bulgaria|'''Bulgaria''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |4%<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Burkina Faso|'''Burkina Faso''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Burundi|'''Burundi''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |2%<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Cape Verde|'''Cape Verde''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Chile|'''Chile''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Colombia|'''Colombia''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Costa Rica|'''Costa Rica''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Croatia|'''Croatia''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |5%<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Cyprus|'''Cyprus''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in the Czech Republic|'''Czech Republic''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |[[Imperiali quota]]<br /> |5%<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Denmark|'''Denmark''']]<br /> | [[Folketing]]<br /> | Unicameral national legislature<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> | [[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> | style=&quot;background:#dfd&quot; |[[Open list]]<br /> |<br /> | [[Sainte-Laguë method]] for leveling seats<br /> |2%<br /> |<br /> | [[Parliamentary system]]<br /> | 135 [[constituency]] seats, 40 [[leveling seats]]<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in the Dominican Republic|'''Dominican Republic''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in East Timor|'''East Timor''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> | [[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Ecuador|'''Ecuador''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> | [[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> | style=&quot;background:#fdd&quot; | [[Closed list]]<br /> |&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: center;&quot;&gt;—&lt;/div&gt;<br /> |[[Sainte-Laguë method]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in El Salvador|'''El Salvador''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Equatorial Guinea|'''Equatorial Guinea''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Riigikogu|'''Estonia''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |5%<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | rowspan=&quot;2&quot; | [[Elections to the European Parliament|'''''European Union''''']]<br /> | rowspan=&quot;2&quot; |[[European Parliament]]<br /> | rowspan=&quot;2&quot; |Lower house of supranational legislature<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> | rowspan=&quot;2&quot; | ''varies by state''<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]] in 25 member states<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | style=&quot;background:#37C871&quot; |<br /> |&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: center;&quot;&gt;—&lt;/div&gt;<br /> | &lt;div style=&quot;text-align: center;&quot;&gt;—&lt;/div&gt;<br /> |[[Single transferable vote]] (STV) in Ireland and Malta<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in the Faroe Islands|'''Faroe Islands''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Fiji|'''Fiji''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | [[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |5%<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Finland|'''Finland''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Germany|'''Germany''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#5A2CA0&quot; |<br /> | [[Mixed-member proportional representation]] (MMP)<br /> | style=&quot;background:#fdd&quot; | [[Closed list]]<br /> |&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: center;&quot;&gt;—&lt;/div&gt;<br /> |[[Sainte-Laguë method]]<br /> |5% regionally<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Greenland|'''Greenland''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Guatemala|'''Guatemala''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Guinea-Bissau|'''Guinea-Bissau''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Guyana|'''Guyana''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Honduras|'''Honduras''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Iceland|'''Iceland''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Indonesia|'''Indonesia''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | [[Sainte-Laguë method]]<br /> |4%<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in the Republic of Ireland|'''Ireland''']]<br /> |<br /> |Lower house of national legislature<br /> | style=&quot;background:#37C871&quot; |<br /> | [[Single transferable vote]] (STV)<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Israel|'''Israel''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |3.25%<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Kosovo|'''Kosovo''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | [[Sainte-Laguë method]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Latvia|'''Latvia''']]<br /> |[[Saeima]]<br /> |Unicameral national legislature<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> | [[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> | style=&quot;background:#dfd&quot; | [[Open list]]<br /> |[[Open list#Most open|Most open]]<br /> |[[Sainte-Laguë method]]<br /> |5%<br /> |5 multi-member constituencies consisting of [[Administrative divisions of Latvia|municipalities]]&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite web |title=Saeimas vēlēšanu likums |url=https://likumi.lv/doc.php?id=35261 |access-date=2022-06-10 |website=LIKUMI.LV |at=Section 7. |language=lv}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> |[[Parliamentary republic]]<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Lebanon|'''Lebanon''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Lesotho|'''Lesotho''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#5A2CA0&quot; |<br /> | [[Mixed-member proportional representation]] (MMP)<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |variant using a [[mixed single vote]]<br /> |-<br /> | [[Landtag of Liechtenstein|'''Liechtenstein''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | [[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |8%<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Luxembourg|'''Luxembourg''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | [[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in North Macedonia|'''Macedonia''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | [[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Malta|'''Malta''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#37C871&quot; |<br /> | [[Single transferable vote]] (STV)<br /> |&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: center;&quot;&gt;—&lt;/div&gt;<br /> |&lt;div style=&quot;text-align: center;&quot;&gt;—&lt;/div&gt;<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Moldova|'''Moldova''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | [[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |6%<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Montenegro|'''Montenegro''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | [[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |3%<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Mozambique|'''Mozambique''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Namibia|'''Namibia''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in the Netherlands|'''Netherlands''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in New Zealand|'''New Zealand''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#5A2CA0&quot; |<br /> | [[Mixed-member proportional representation]] (MMP)<br /> |[[Sainte-Laguë method]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |5%<br /> <br /> or 1 district won<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Nepal|'''Nepal''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | Mixed list<br /> |[[Sainte-Laguë method]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |3%<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Norway|'''Norway''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | [[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> | [[Sainte-Laguë method]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |4%<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Paraguay|'''Paraguay''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | [[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Peru|'''Peru''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | [[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |5%<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Poland|'''Poland''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | [[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |5% threshold or more for single parties, 8% or more for coalitions or 0% or more for minorities<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Portugal|'''Portugal''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Romania|'''Romania''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Rwanda|'''Rwanda''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in San Marino|'''San Marino''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | <br /> | 3.5%<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | If needed to ensure a stable majority, the two best-placed parties participate in a run-off vote to receive a [[Majority bonus system|majority bonus]]. <br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in São Tomé and Príncipe|'''São Tomé and Príncipe''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Serbia|'''Serbia''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |3%<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Sint Maarten|'''Sint Maarten''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Slovakia|'''Slovakia''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |5%<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Slovenia|'''Slovenia''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |4%<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in South Africa|'''South Africa''']]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> |[[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Spain|'''Spain''']]<br /> | [[Congress of Deputies]]<br /> |Lower house of national legislature<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> | [[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite web |title=IPU PARLINE database: SPAIN (Congreso de los Diputados), Electoral system |url=http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2293_B.htm |website=archive.ipu.org}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> | style=&quot;background:#fdd&quot; | [[Closed list]]<br /> | &lt;div style=&quot;text-align: center;&quot;&gt;—&lt;/div&gt;<br /> | [[D'Hondt method]]<br /> | 3%<br /> | [[Provinces of Spain]]<br /> | [[Parliamentary system]]<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | rowspan=&quot;2&quot; | [[Elections in Sri Lanka|'''Sri Lanka''']]<br /> | rowspan=&quot;2&quot; | [[Parliament of Sri Lanka|Parliament]]<br /> | <br /> | rowspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> | rowspan=&quot;2&quot; | [[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite web |title=IFES Election Guide &amp;#124; Elections: Sri Lanka Parliament 2020 |url=https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/3498/ |website=www.electionguide.org}}&lt;/ref&gt;&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite web |title=IPU PARLINE database: SRI LANKA (Parliament), Electoral system |url=http://archive.ipu.org/parline/reports/2295_B.htm |website=archive.ipu.org}}&lt;/ref&gt;&lt;ref&gt;{{cite web |title=Archived copy |url=https://www.ndi.org/files/1198_lk_postelect122000.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303232543/https://www.ndi.org/files/1198_lk_postelect122000.pdf |archive-date=3 March 2016 |access-date=12 January 2022 |website=www.ndi.org}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> | style=&quot;background:#dfd&quot; | [[Open list]]&lt;br /&gt;(District lists elect 196/225 seats)<br /> | [[Panachage]]&lt;br /&gt;(up to 3 preference votes)&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite web |title=Sri Lanka electors can vote for one party, three preferences in 2020 general elections: polls chief |url=https://economynext.com/sri-lanka-electors-can-vote-for-one-party-three-preferences-in-2020-general-elections-polls-chief-72625 |website=EconomyNext}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> |[[Hare quota]]<br /> | 5%&lt;br /&gt;(per constituency)<br /> | Constituencies (Electoral Districts)<br /> | rowspan=&quot;2&quot; | [[Semi-presidential system]]<br /> | rowspan=&quot;2&quot; |<br /> |-<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#fdd&quot; | [[Closed list]]&lt;br /&gt;(National list to elect 29/225 seats)<br /> | &lt;div style=&quot;text-align: center;&quot;&gt;—&lt;/div&gt;<br /> | [[Hare quota]]<br /> | ''No threshold''<br /> | ''None''&lt;br /&gt;(single nationwide constituency)<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Suriname|'''Suriname''']]<br /> | [[National Assembly (Suriname)|National Assembly]]<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> | [[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite web |title=IPU PARLINE database: SURINAME (Nationale Assemblee), Electoral system |url=http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2299_B.htm |website=archive.ipu.org}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> | style=&quot;background:#dfd&quot; | [[Open list]]<br /> | [[Open list#Most open|Most open]]<br /> | [[D'Hondt method]]<br /> | ''No threshold''<br /> | [[Districts of Suriname]]<br /> | [[List of countries by system of government#Assembly-independent republican systems|Assembly-independent republic]]<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Sweden|'''Sweden''']]<br /> | [[Riksdag]]<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> | [[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite web |title=IFES Election Guide &amp;#124; Elections: Sweden Parliament 2018 |url=https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/3066/ |website=www.electionguide.org}}&lt;/ref&gt;&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite web |title=IPU PARLINE database: SWEDEN (Riksdagen), Electoral system |url=http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2303_B.htm |website=archive.ipu.org}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> | style=&quot;background:#dfd&quot; , | [[Open list]]<br /> | [[Open list#More open|More open]]&lt;br /&gt;(5% of the party vote to override the default party-list)&lt;ref&gt;Swedish Election Authority: [http://www.val.se/pdf/electionsinsweden_webb.pdf Elections in Sweden: The way its done] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090225072954/http://www.val.se/pdf/electionsinsweden_webb.pdf}} (page 16)&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> | [[Sainte-Laguë method]]<br /> | 4% nationally or 12%&lt;br /&gt;in a given constituency<br /> | [[Counties of Sweden]]&lt;br /&gt;(some counties are further subdivided)<br /> | [[Parliamentary system]]<br /> | [[Leveling seat]]s<br /> |-<br /> | rowspan=&quot;2&quot; | [[Elections in Switzerland|'''Switzerland''']]<br /> | [[National Council (Switzerland)|National Council]]<br /> |Lower house of national legislature<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> | [[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite web |title=IPU PARLINE database: SWITZERLAND (Nationalrat – Conseil national – Consiglio nazionale), Electoral system |url=http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2305_B.htm |website=archive.ipu.org}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> | style=&quot;background:#dfd&quot; | [[Open list]]<br /> | [[Panachage]]<br /> | [[Hagenbach-Bischoff system]]<br /> | ''No threshold''<br /> | [[Cantons of Switzerland]]<br /> | rowspan=&quot;2&quot; | [[Semi-direct democracy]] under an [[assembly-independent]]&lt;ref&gt;{{cite journal |last1=Shugart |first1=Matthew Søberg |title=Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive And Mixed Authority Patterns |journal=French Politics |volume=3 |issue=3 |pages=323–351 |doi=10.1057/palgrave.fp.8200087 |s2cid=73642272}}&lt;/ref&gt;&lt;ref&gt;{{cite journal |last=Elgie |first=Robert |title=Government Systems, Party Politics, and Institutional Engineering in the Round |journal=Insight Turkey |volume=18 |issue=4 |pages=79–92 |issn=1302-177X |jstor=26300453}}&lt;/ref&gt; [[Directorial system|directorial]] [[republic]]<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Council of States (Switzerland)|Council of States]]&lt;br /&gt;(only to elect Councillors in:<br /> <br /> * [[Canton of Jura|Jura]]&lt;ref name=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;{{Cite web |title=IFES Election Guide &amp;#124; Elections: Switzerland Council of States 2019 |url=https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/3448/ |website=www.electionguide.org}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> * [[Canton of Neuchâtel|Neuchâtel]])&lt;ref name=&quot;auto&quot; /&gt;<br /> |<br /> |<br /> | [[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite web |title=IPU PARLINE database: SWITZERLAND (Ständerat – Conseil des Etats – Consiglio degli Stati), Electoral system |url=http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2306_B.htm |website=archive.ipu.org}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> | style=&quot;background:#dfd&quot; | [[Open list]]<br /> | [[Open list#Most open|Most open]]<br /> | ?<br /> | ''No threshold''&lt;ref&gt;Thresholds moot due to these cantons only electing 2 Councillors&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> | ''None''&lt;br /&gt;(single cantonwide constituency)&lt;ref&gt;As these cantons only send two members to the [[Council of States (Switzerland)|Council of States]], further subdividing these cantons into constituencies while retaining proportionality would be mathematically impossible)&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Thailand|'''Thailand''']]<br /> | [[House of Representatives (Thailand)|House of Representatives]]<br /> |Lower house of national legislature<br /> | style=&quot;background:#5A2CA0&quot; |<br /> | [[Mixed-member proportional representation]]&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite news |last=&lt;!--Check author names--&gt; |first= |title=Explainer: New rules for the House of Representatives |newspaper=Bangkok Post |url=https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/politics/1605898/explainer-new-rules-for-the-house-of-representatives }}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> | style=&quot;background:#fdd&quot; | [[Closed list]]<br /> | &lt;div style=&quot;text-align: center;&quot;&gt;—&lt;/div&gt;<br /> | [[Largest remainder method]] (? quota)<br /> | ''No threshold''<br /> | ''None''&lt;br /&gt;(single nationwide constituency)<br /> | [[Parliamentary system]]&lt;br /&gt;under a [[constitutional monarchy]]<br /> |Next elections are to be held under [[parallel voting]]<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Togo|'''Togo''']]<br /> | [[National Assembly (Togo)|National Assembly]]<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> | [[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite web |title=IPU PARLINE database: TOGO (Assemblée nationale), Electoral system |url=http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2315_B.htm |website=archive.ipu.org}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> | style=&quot;background:#fdd&quot; | [[Closed list]]<br /> | &lt;div style=&quot;text-align: center;&quot;&gt;—&lt;/div&gt;<br /> | [[Highest averages method]] (?)<br /> | ''No threshold''<br /> | Constituencies<br /> | [[Presidential system]]<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Tunisia|'''Tunisia''']]<br /> | [[Assembly of the Representatives of the People]]<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> | [[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite web |title=IFES Election Guide &amp;#124; Elections: Tunisia Parliament 2019 |url=https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/3175/ |website=www.electionguide.org}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> | style=&quot;background:#fdd&quot; | [[Closed list]]<br /> | &lt;div style=&quot;text-align: center;&quot;&gt;—&lt;/div&gt;<br /> | [[Largest remainder method]] (? quota)<br /> | ''No threshold''<br /> | Constituencies<br /> | [[Semi-presidential system]]<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | [[Elections in Turkey|'''Turkey''']]<br /> | [[Grand National Assembly of Turkey|Grand National Assembly]]<br /> |<br /> | style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> | [[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite web |title=IFES Election Guide &amp;#124; Elections: Turkey Grand National Assembly 2018 |url=https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/3078/ |website=www.electionguide.org}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> | style=&quot;background:#fdd&quot; | [[Closed list]]<br /> | &lt;div style=&quot;text-align: center;&quot;&gt;—&lt;/div&gt;<br /> | [[D'Hondt method]]<br /> | 7%<br /> | [[Provinces of Turkey]]&lt;br /&gt;(some provinces are further subdivided)<br /> | [[Presidential system]]<br /> |<br /> |-<br /> | rowspan=&quot;2&quot; | [[Elections in Uruguay|'''Uruguay''']]<br /> | [[Chamber of Representatives of Uruguay|Chamber of Representatives]]<br /> |Lower house of national legislature<br /> | rowspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background:#0066FF&quot; |<br /> | rowspan=&quot;2&quot; | [[Party-list proportional representation|Party-list PR]]&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite web |title=IPU PARLINE database: URUGUAY (Cámara de Representantes), Electoral system |url=http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2341_B.htm |website=archive.ipu.org}}&lt;/ref&gt;&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite web |title=IPU PARLINE database: URUGUAY (Cámara de Senadores), Electoral system |url=http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2342_B.htm |website=archive.ipu.org}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> | rowspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background:#fdd&quot; , | [[Closed list]]<br /> | rowspan=&quot;2&quot; | &lt;div style=&quot;text-align: center;&quot;&gt;—&lt;/div&gt;<br /> | rowspan=&quot;2&quot; | [[D'Hondt method]]<br /> | rowspan=&quot;2&quot; | ''No threshold''<br /> | [[Departments of Uruguay]]<br /> | rowspan=&quot;2&quot; | [[Presidential system]]<br /> | rowspan=&quot;2&quot; | Ballots use the [[double simultaneous vote]], the same ballot is used for electing the president (first round) and the two chambers<br /> |-<br /> | [[Senate of Uruguay|Chamber of Senators]]<br /> |Upper house of national legislature<br /> | ''None''&lt;br /&gt;(single nationwide constituency)<br /> |}<br /> <br /> ==Incentives for choosing an electoral system==<br /> Changing the electoral system requires the agreement of a majority of the currently selected legislators, who were chosen using the incumbent electoral system. Therefore, an interesting question is what incentives make current legislators support a new electoral system, particularly a PR system.<br /> <br /> Many political scientists argue that PR was adopted by parties on the right as a strategy to survive amid suffrage expansion, democratization and the rise of workers' parties. According to Stein Rokkan in a seminal 1970 study, parties on the right opted to adopt PR as a way to survive as competitive parties in situations when the parties on the right were not united enough to exist under majoritarian systems.&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite book|url=https://archive.org/details/citizenselection0000rokk|url-access=registration|title=Citizens, elections, parties: approaches to the comparative study of the processes of development|last=Rokkan|first=Stein|publisher=McKay|language=en}}&lt;/ref&gt; This argument was formalized and supported by Carles Boix in a 1999 study.&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite journal|last=Boix|first=Carles|title=Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies|journal=The American Political Science Review|volume=93|issue=3|pages=609–624|doi=10.2307/2585577|issn=0003-0554|jstor=2585577|hdl=10230/307|s2cid=16429584 |hdl-access=free}}&lt;/ref&gt; Amel Ahmed notes that prior to the adoption of PR, many electoral systems were based on majority or plurality rule, and that these systems risked eradicating parties on the right in areas where the working class was large in numbers. He therefore argues that parties on the right adopted PR as a way to ensure that they would survive as potent political forces amid suffrage expansion.&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite book|url=http://ebooks.cambridge.org/ref/id/CBO9781139382137|title=Democracy and the Politics of Electoral System Choice: Engineering Electoral Dominance|last=Ahmed|first=Amel|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=9781139382137|location=Cambridge|doi=10.1017/cbo9781139382137|s2cid=153171400 }}&lt;/ref&gt; A 2021 study linked the adoption of PR to incumbent fears of revolutionary threats.&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite journal|last1=Gjerløw|first1=Haakon|last2=Rasmussen|first2=Magnus B.|title=Revolution, Elite Fear, and Electoral Institutions|url=https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/cuny/cp/pre-prints/content-jcpo54403;jsessionid=7pajb124g6gjr.x-ic-live-02|url-status=live|journal=Comparative Politics|volume=54 |issue=4 |pages=595–620 |language=en|doi=10.5129/001041522x16316387001621|s2cid=244107337}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> In contrast, other scholars argue that the choice to adopt PR was also due to a demand by parties on the left to ensure a foothold in politics, as well as to encourage a consensual system that would help the left realize its preferred economic policies.&lt;ref&gt;{{Cite journal|last1=Cusack|first1=Thomas R.|last2=Iversen|first2=Torben|last3=Soskice|first3=David|title=Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems|journal=The American Political Science Review|volume=101|issue=3|pages=373–391|issn=0003-0554|jstor=27644455|doi=10.1017/S0003055407070384|hdl=10419/51231 |s2cid=2799521}}&lt;/ref&gt;<br /> <br /> ==See also==<br /> * [[Condorcet paradox]]<br /> * [[Direct representation]]<br /> * [[Electoral threshold]]<br /> * [[First-past-the-post voting]]<br /> *[[Hare quota]]<br /> * [[Interactive representation]]<br /> * [[Justified representation]], a generalization of the principle of proportionality to multiwinner approval voting.<br /> * [[One man, one vote|One person, one vote]]<br /> *[[Sainte-Laguë method]]<br /> *[[Spare vote]]<br /> *[[Two-round system]]<br /> <br /> ==References==<br /> {{Reflist}}<br /> <br /> ==Further reading==<br /> ===Books===<br /> {{refbegin|30em}}<br /> * Abbott, Lewis F. ''British Democracy: Its Restoration and Extension''. ISR/Kindle Books, 2019. {{ISBN|9780906321522}}. Chapter 7, &quot;Electoral System Reform: Increasing Competition and Voter Choice and Influence&quot;.<br /> * {{cite book|last1=Ashworth|first1=H.P.C.|last2=Ashworth|first2=T.R.|title=Proportional Representation Applied to Party Government|location=Melbourne|publisher=Robertson and Co|year=1900}}<br /> * {{cite book|last=Amy|first=Douglas J.|title=Real Choices/New Voices: The Case for Proportional Representation Elections in the United States|publisher=Columbia University Press|year=1993}}<br /> * Batto, Nathan F.; Huang, Chi; Tan, Alexander C.; Cox, Gary (2016). ''Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context: Taiwan, Japan, and Beyond.'' Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.<br /> * {{cite book|first=Dennis |last=Pilon|title=The Politics of Voting|publisher=Edmond Montgomery Publications|year=2007}}<br /> * {{cite book|first=Josep M.|last=Colomer|title=Political Institutions|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2003|author-link=Josep Colomer}}<br /> * {{cite book|editor-first=Josep M.|editor-last=Colomer|title=Handbook of Electoral System Choice|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|year=2004}}<br /> * {{cite book|first=Friedrich|last=Pukelsheim|title=Proportional Representation|publisher=Springer|year=2014}}<br /> * {{cite book|first1=Martin |last1=Linton|first2=Mary |last2=Southcott|title=Making Votes Count: The Case for Electoral Reform|publisher=Profile Books|location=London|year=1998}}<br /> * {{cite book|last=Forder|first=James|title=The case against voting reform|publisher=[[Oneworld Publications]]|location=Oxford|isbn=978-1-85168-825-8}}<br /> *Jenifer Hart, Proportional Representation: Critics of the British Electoral System,1820-1945 (Clarendon Press, 1992)<br /> *F.D. Parsons, Thomas Hare and Political Representation in Victorian Britain (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009)<br /> * {{cite book |author1=Sawer, Marian |author2=Miskin, Sarah |name-list-style=amp | title =Papers on Parliament No. 34 Representation and Institutional Change: 50 Years of Proportional Representation in the Senate | publisher = Department of the Senate | year = 1999 | url = https://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/senate/pubs/pops/pop34/pop34.pdf | isbn = 0-642-71061-9 }}<br /> {{refend}}<br /> <br /> ===Journals===<br /> {{refbegin|30em}}<br /> * {{cite journal | last1 = Hickman | first1 = John | last2 = Little | first2 = Chris | title = Seat/vote proportionality in Romanian and Spanish parliamentary elections | journal = Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans Online | volume = 2 | issue = 2 | pages = 197–212 | doi= 10.1080/713683348 | date = November 2000 | s2cid = 153800069 }}<br /> * {{cite journal | last1 = Galasso | first1 = Vincenzo | last2 = Nannicini | first2 = Tommaso | title = So closed: political selection in proportional systems | journal = [[European Journal of Political Economy]] | volume = 40 | issue = B | pages = 260–273 | doi= 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.04.008 | date = December 2015 | s2cid = 55902803 | url = https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:igi:igierp:526 }}<br /> * {{cite journal | last1 = Golder | first1 = Sona N. | last2 = Stephenson | first2 = Laura B. | last3 = Van der Straeten | first3 = Karine | last4 = Blais | first4 = André | last5 = Bol | first5 = Damien |last6 = Harfst | first6 = Philipp |last7 = Laslier | first7 = Jean-François | title = Votes for women: electoral systems and support for female candidates | journal = [[Politics &amp; Gender]] | volume = 13 | issue = 1 | pages = 107–131 | doi = 10.1017/S1743923X16000684 | date = March 2017 | url = https://zenodo.org/record/894500 | doi-access = free }}<br /> {{refend}}<br /> <br /> ==External links==<br /> * [http://www.deborda.org/ The De Borda Institute] A Northern Ireland-based organisation promoting inclusive voting procedures<br /> * [https://electiondistrictsvoting.com/ Election Districts Voting] improves PR with overlapping districts elections for first past the post, alternative vote and single transferable vote voters<br /> * [https://web.archive.org/web/20070824230201/http://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/index.php Electoral Reform Society] founded in England in 1884, the longest running PR organization. Contains good information about [[single transferable vote]]{{snd}} the Society's preferred form of PR<br /> * [http://electoralreformaustralia.org/ Electoral Reform Australia]<br /> * [http://www.prsa.org.au/ Proportional Representation Society of Australia]<br /> * [https://www.fairvote.ca/ Fair Vote Canada]<br /> * [http://www.fairvote.org/ FairVote, USA]<br /> * [http://www.proportional-representation.org/ Why Not Proportional Representation?]<br /> * [http://lawiscool.com/2007/07/29/vote-dilution-means-minorities-have-less-voice Vote Dilution means Voters have Less Voice] Law is Cool site<br /> * [http://theglottalstop.wordpress.com/debate/ Proportional Representation and British Democracy] Debate on British electoral system reform<br /> * [https://rangevoting.org/PropRep.html RangeVoting.org. page on PR]<br /> * [https://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/rearvision/australias-upper-houses/11038996 Australia's Upper Houses – ABC Rear Vision] A podcast about the development of Australia's upper houses into STV proportional representation elected chambers.<br /> <br /> [[Category:Proportional representation electoral systems| ]]</div>

Sarfaraz Siyam https://en.bharatpedia.org/w/index.php?title=Pakistan_Eastern_Command&diff=388307 2022-04-17T21:00:33Z

<p>Sarfaraz Siyam: Designed an original page.</p> <hr /> <div>#REDIRECT [[Evolution of Pakistan Eastern Command plan]]</div>

Sarfaraz Siyam