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List of National Democratic Alliance candidates in the next Indian general election

2023-09-22T20:46:32Z

Aravindhvnp: List of National Democratic Alliance candidates in the 2024 Indian general election: date of election

#REDIRECT [[List of National Democratic Alliance candidates in the 2024 Indian general election]]

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MZU

2023-09-08T23:45:47Z

Aravindhvnp: Article designed.

'''MZU''' or '''mzu''' may refer to:

* [[Inapang language]] (ISO 639-3: mzu), a Ramu language of Papua New Guinea
* [[Mizoram University]], a central university under the University Grants Commission, Government of India
* [[Muzaffarpur Airport]] (IATA: MZU), an airport located in Muzaffarpur, Bihar, India

{{Disambiguation}}

Bloomberg L.P.

2023-03-31T08:28:24Z

Aravindhvnp: Formulated fresh article content.

{{short description|American financial, software, data, and media company}}
{{other uses|Bloomberg (disambiguation)}}
{{Use mdy dates}}
{{Infobox company
| name = Bloomberg L.P.
| logo = Bloomberg logo.svg
| image = Bloomberg_tower.jpg
| image_caption = [[Bloomberg Tower]] on [[Lexington Avenue]] in [[Midtown Manhattan]]
| type = [[Privately held company|Private]], [[limited partnership]]
| industry = [[Technology]], [[Financial technology]], [[mass media]]
| foundation = {{Start date and age|1981|10|1}}<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/71466-1|title=Washington Friday Journal |access-date=January 20, 2010|publisher=[[C-SPAN]]|quote=Started the company the day after I left Salomon Brothers, October 1, 1981, so we're coming on our fifteenth year – anniversary.}}</ref><ref name="Fast Company"/>
| founders = [[Michael Bloomberg]] [[Thomas Secunda]] [[Duncan MacMillan (businessman)|Duncan MacMillan]] [[Charles Zegar]]<ref>{{cite news |title=The Bloomberg Bunch |access-date=December 13, 2011 |url=https://money.cnn.com/galleries/2011/fortune/1106/quotes.A_gallery_of_givers.fortune/6.html |publisher=[[CNNMoney]]}}</ref>
| location = [[731 Lexington Avenue|Bloomberg Tower]] 731 Lexington Avenue
| location_city = [[New York City]]
| locations = 176 offices (2021)
| key_people = {{ubl|[[Peter Grauer]] ([[chairman]])|Michael Bloomberg ([[Entrepreneurship|co-founder]] & [[Chief executive officer|CEO]])}}
| revenue = {{Increase}} [[United States dollar|US$]]10 billion (2019)<ref name=bloom/>
| owner = Michael Bloomberg (88%)<ref>{{cite news |url= https://www.forbes.com/profile/michael-bloomberg/ |title= #10 Michael Bloomberg |access-date= October 17, 2018 |work=[[Forbes]]}}</ref> Others (12%)<ref>{{cite news |url= https://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/jul/18/merrilllynch.jpmorgan/ |title= Merrill Lynch sells its 20% Bloomberg stake for $4.5bn |access-date= April 24, 2023 |work=[[The Guardian]]}}</ref>
| num_employees = 20,000<ref name="AboutBloombergCompany">{{cite web |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/company/ |title=About Bloomberg |publisher=Bloomberg |access-date=2019-05-29 }}</ref>
| homepage = [https://www.bloomberg.com/company bloomberg.com]
}}

{{Michael Bloomberg series}}

'''Bloomberg L.P.''' is a privately held financial, software, data, and media company headquartered in [[Midtown Manhattan]], [[New York City]]. It was co-founded by [[Michael Bloomberg]] in 1981, with [[Thomas Secunda]], [[Duncan MacMillan (Bloomberg)|Duncan MacMillan]], [[Charles Zegar]],<ref>{{cite news |title=Facebook's Zuckerberg Joins Gates, Buffett in Pledge |access-date=January 3, 2012 |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-09/seventeen-of-wealthiest-u-s-families-take-buffett-gates-giving-pledge-.html |publisher=Bloomberg }}</ref> and a 12% ownership investment by [[Bank of America]] through their [[Stockbroker|brokerage]] subsidiary [[Merrill Lynch]].<ref>{{cite web |title=Bloomberg LP History |access-date=July 17, 2010 |url=http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/bloomberg-l-p-history/ |publisher=FundingUniverse}}</ref>

Bloomberg L.P. provides financial software tools and enterprise applications such as analytics and equity trading platform, data services, and news to financial companies and organizations through the [[Bloomberg Terminal]] (via its Bloomberg Professional Service), its core [[revenue]]-generating product.<ref>{{cite web |title=What is a Bloomberg Terminal or Bloomberg Machine? |access-date=July 17, 2010 |url=http://beginnersinvest.about.com/od/research/qt/bloomberg.htm |publisher=About.com}}</ref> Bloomberg L.P. also includes a [[news agency]] ([[Bloomberg News]]), a global television network ([[Bloomberg Television]]), websites, radio stations ([[Bloomberg Radio]]), subscription-only newsletters, and two magazines: ''[[Bloomberg Businessweek]]'' and ''[[Bloomberg Markets]]''.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=5023|title=The Bloomberg Juggernaut|work=[[American Journalism Review]]|access-date=October 26, 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121012203239/http://www.ajr.org/article.asp?id=5023|archive-date=October 12, 2012|url-status=dead}}</ref>

The company has 176 locations and nearly 20,000 employees.<ref name=bloom>{{Cite web|url=https://www.businessinsider.com/bloomberg-hit-10-billion-in-annual-revenue-2019-1|title=A leaked memo shows Bloomberg reached $10 billion in annual revenue last year, and some insiders will receive a special bonus|first1=Dakin|last1=Campbell|last2=Kelley|first2=Trista|website=Business Insider|access-date=2019-05-29}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Global Roles {{!}} Careers|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/company/careers/global-roles/|access-date=2021-12-22|website=Bloomberg L.P.}}</ref>

==History==
[[File:Bloomberg Terminal.jpg|thumb|[[Bloomberg Terminal]] at [[London City Airport]]]]
In 1981, [[Salomon Brothers]] was acquired, and [[Michael Bloomberg]], a general partner, was given a $10{{nbsp}}million partnership settlement.<ref name="auto">{{cite news|url=https://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1997/05/12/226240/index.htm|title=Fire in His Belly, Ambition in His Eyes, Michael Bloomberg Could Have Sat on the Millions He Made at Salomon. Instead He Built a Media Empire That Gives Wall Streeters Crucial Information in a Flash|last=Whitford|first=David|website=CNN Money|access-date=April 11, 2013}}</ref> Bloomberg, having designed in-house computerized financial systems for Salomon,<ref name="Make It New">{{cite book|last=Bodine|first=Paul|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9G-FWJIAOSEC&pg=PA182 |title=Make It New: Essays in the History of American Business|publisher=iUniverse|year=2004|isbn=9780595309214|pages=182|access-date=February 27, 2020}}{{self-published source}}</ref> used his $10{{nbsp}}million partnership buyout to start Innovative Market Systems (IMS).<ref>{{cite encyclopedia|title=Michael Bloomberg|url=https://www.britannica.com/biography/Michael-Bloomberg|access-date=February 27, 2020|encyclopedia=Encyclopaedia Britannica}}</ref><ref name="Make It New" /> Bloomberg developed and built his own computerized system to provide real-time market data, financial calculations and other financial analytics to [[Wall Street]] firms. The Market Master terminal, later called the Bloomberg Terminal, was released to market in December 1982.<ref name="Fast Company">{{cite news|url=https://www.fastcompany.com/3051883/the-bloomberg-terminal|title=How the Bloomberg Terminal Made History—And Stays Ever Relevant|website=Fast Company|first=Harry|last=McCracken|access-date=February 27, 2020}}</ref> [[Merrill Lynch]] became the first customer, purchasing 20 terminals and a 30% equity stake in the company for $30{{nbsp}}million in exchange for a five-year restriction on marketing the terminal to Merrill Lynch's competitors.<ref name="Make It New" /> Merrill Lynch released IMS from this restriction in 1984.<ref name="Make It New" />

In 1986, the company renamed itself Bloomberg L.P. ([[limited partnership]]).<ref>{{cite web|work=Investopedia|first=Mara|last=Lesemann|title=Here's Why Bloomberg Stock Doesn't Exist|access-date=February 27, 2020|url=https://www.investopedia.com/articles/markets/121715/bloomberg-stock-doesnt-exist-here-why.asp}}</ref> Bloomberg launched Bloomberg Business News, later Bloomberg News, in 1990, with [[Matthew Winkler (journalist)|Matthew Winkler]] as editor-in-chief.<ref>{{cite encyclopedia|url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/Bloomberg-News|title=Bloomberg News|encyclopedia=Encyclopaedia Britannica|first=Chris|last=Roush|access-date=February 27, 2020}}</ref> Bloomberg.com was first established on September 29, 1993, as a financial portal with information on markets, [[currency conversion]], news and events, and Bloomberg Terminal subscriptions.<ref name="National Arbitration Forum">{{cite web|url=http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/96600.htm|archive-url=https://archive.today/20130801135547/http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/96600.htm|url-status=dead|archive-date=August 1, 2013|title=Decision: Bloomberg L.P. v. David Cohen|publisher=National Arbitration Forum|access-date=April 11, 2013}}</ref>

In late 1996, Bloomberg bought back one-third of Merrill Lynch's 30 percent stake in the company for $200{{nbsp}}million, valuing the company at $2{{nbsp}}billion.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB850771632890084000|title=Bloomberg Buys Back Stake From Merrill for $200 Million|newspaper=Wall Street Journal}}</ref> In 2008, facing losses during the financial crisis, Merrill Lynch agreed to sell its remaining 20 percent stake in the company back to Bloomberg Inc.,<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/65100/000095012308008850/y64172e10vq.htm|title=Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q |publisher=Securities and Exchange Commission }}</ref> majority-owned by Michael Bloomberg,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.recode.net/2016/1/26/11589068/mike-bloomberg-is-worth-49-billion-much-more-than-most-people-thought|title=Mike Bloomberg Is Worth $49 Billion, Much More Than Most People Thought|first=Edmund|last=Lee|publisher=recode.net }}</ref> for a reported $4.43{{nbsp}}billion, valuing Bloomberg L.P. at approximately $22.5{{nbsp}}billion.<ref name="The New York Times">{{cite news |first1=Michael J. |last1=de la Merced |last2=Story |first2=Louise |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/17/business/17broker.html|title=Bloomberg Expected to Buy Merrill's Stake in His Firm|work=[[The New York Times]] |access-date=October 26, 2011}}</ref><ref name="reuters.com">{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-merrill-results/merrill-posts-4-9-billion-loss-sells-bloomberg-stake-idUSWNAB118720080718|title=Merrill posts $4.9 billion loss, sells Bloomberg stake|publisher=Reuters|access-date=October 26, 2011}}</ref>

Bloomberg L.P. has remained a private company since its founding; the majority of which is owned by billionaire Michael Bloomberg.<ref name="The New York Times" /> To run for the position of [[Mayor of New York]] against [[Democratic Party (United States)|Democrat]] [[Mark J. Green|Mark Green]] in 2001, Bloomberg gave up his position of CEO and appointed Lex Fenwick as CEO in his stead.<ref name="Leadership – Lex Fenwick">{{cite web|url=http://www.dowjones.com/djcom/leadership/LFenwick.asp |title=Leadership – Lex Fenwick |publisher=Dow Jones |access-date=April 11, 2013 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131202221539/http://www.dowjones.com/djcom/leadership/LFenwick.asp |archive-date=December 2, 2013 |df=mdy }}</ref> in 2012, [[Peter Grauer]] became the chairman of the company, a role he still holds.<ref name="Bloomberg">{{cite news|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/pressroom/chairman/|title=Chairman – Chairman of Bloomberg L.P.|publisher=Bloomberg L.P.|access-date=April 11, 2013}}</ref> In 2008, Fenwick became the CEO of Bloomberg Ventures, a new venture capital division and [[Daniel ThejasKDasoff]], former deputy mayor in the Bloomberg administration, was named president and CEO, serving until September 2014.<ref name="mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com">{{cite news|url=http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/12/doctoroff-named-chief-executive-of-bloomberg-lp/|title=Doctoroff Named Chief Executive of Bloomberg L.P.|last=Stelter|first=Brian|work=The New York Times|access-date=December 20, 2011}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/04/business/media/michael-bloomberg-to-return-as-chief-of-company-he-founded.html|title=Michael Bloomberg to Return to Lead Bloomberg L.P.|last=Sorkin|first=Andrew Ross|work=The New York Times|access-date=2019-11-07|language=en-US|issn=0362-4331}}</ref> At that point, it was announced that Michael Bloomberg would be taking the reins of his eponymous market data company from Doctoroff, who was chief executive of Bloomberg for the past six years after his term as deputy mayor.<ref name="Financial Times">{{cite news|url=http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/08ae1f42-33ce-11e4-ba62-00144feabdc0.html/ |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221210/http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/08ae1f42-33ce-11e4-ba62-00144feabdc0.html/ |archive-date=December 10, 2022|title=Bloomberg to take helm at data group|work=Financial Times|access-date=September 4, 2014 |url-access=subscription}}</ref>

In May 2022, Bloomberg announced it would launch a new venture in the UK, Bloomberg UK, as part of a wider international strategy. Bloomberg UK plans to hire in the region and has launched a standalone website, a weekly video series, a podcast and new event series.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Silvera |first=Ian |title=Why people really pay for news |url=https://www.news-future.com/p/why-people-really-pay-for-news |access-date=2022-05-13 |website=www.news-future.com}}</ref>

== Senior leadership ==
* ''Chairman:'' [[Peter Grauer]] (since March 2001)
* ''Chief Executive:'' [[Michael Bloomberg]] (since December 2014)

=== List of former chairmen ===
# [[Michael Bloomberg]] (1981–2001)

=== List of former chief executives ===
# [[Michael Bloomberg]] (1981–2001)
# Alexius "Lex" Fenwick (2001–2008)
# [[Daniel Doctoroff]] (2011–2014)

==Acquisitions==
Since its founding, Bloomberg L.P. has made several acquisitions including the radio station [[WBBR|WNEW]], ''[[BusinessWeek]]'' magazine, research company New Energy Finance, the [[Bureau of National Affairs]] and the financial software company Bloomberg PolarLake. On July 9, 2014, Bloomberg L.P. acquired RTS Realtime Systems, a global provider of low-latency connectivity and trading support services.<ref>{{cite news |title=Bloomberg Acquires RTS Realtime Systems |access-date=July 9, 2014 |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/now/press-releases/bloomberg-acquires-rts-realtime-systems/ |publisher=Bloomberg Now}}</ref> On August 13, 2019, Bloomberg acquired RegTek.Solutions in a move to expand its suite of regulatory reporting and data management services.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.thetradenews.com/bloomberg-acquires-regtek-solutions-expand-reporting-hub/|title=Bloomberg acquires RegTek.Solutions to expand reporting hub - The TRADE|website=thetradeиышnews.com|access-date=2019-11-07}}</ref>

On March 13, 2023, Bloomberg entered into agreement to acquire Broadway Technology, a provider of high-performance trading systems and fixed income trading solutions.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/company/press/bloomberg-enters-agreement-to-acquire-broadway/|title=Bloomberg Enters Agreement to Acquire Broadway}}</ref>

===Bloomberg Radio (formerly WNEW)===
In 1992, Bloomberg L.P. purchased New York Radio station [[WNEW-FM|WNEW]] for $13.5{{nbsp}}million. The station was converted into an all-news format, known as [[Bloomberg Radio]], and the call letters were changed to [[WBBR]].<ref>{{cite news |title=Bloomberg to Pay $13 Million for WNEW-AM |access-date=October 27, 2011 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1992/08/15/business/company-news-bloomberg-to-pay-13-million-for-wnew-am.html |work=The New York Times |first=Geraldine |last=Fabrikant }}</ref>

===Bloomberg Businessweek (formerly BusinessWeek)===
Bloomberg L.P. bought a weekly business magazine, ''[[Bloomberg Businessweek|BusinessWeek]]'', from [[McGraw-Hill]] in 2009. The company acquired the magazine—which was suffering from declining advertising revenue and limited circulation numbers—to attract general business to its media audience composed primarily of terminal subscribers.<ref>{{cite web |title=Bloomberg to take over BusinessWeek |access-date=July 22, 2011 |url=http://www.nbcnews.com/id/33299108 |work=NBC News}}</ref> Following the acquisition, ''BusinessWeek'' was renamed ''[[Bloomberg Businessweek]]''. In 2018, Joel Weber was named editor of the magazine.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.axios.com/exclusive-joel-weber-named-editor-of-bloomberg-businessweek-1515111048-be82910c-bfd1-4eea-aa24-283f000118b5.html|title=Exclusive: Joel Weber named editor of Bloomberg Businessweek|website=Axios|language=en|access-date=2019-11-07}}</ref>

===New Energy Finance===
In 2009, Bloomberg L.P. purchased New Energy Finance, a data company focused on energy investment and carbon markets research based in the United Kingdom.<ref>{{cite web |title=Bloomberg Acquires New Energy Finance |access-date=July 26, 2011 |url=http://www.sustainablebusiness.com/index.cfm/go/news.display/id/19383 |publisher=Sustainable Business}}</ref> New Energy Finance was created by [[Michael Liebreich]] in 2004, to provide news, data and analysis on carbon and clean energy markets. Bloomberg L.P. acquired the company to become an industry resource for information to support low-carbon energy development. It was renamed to Bloomberg New Energy Finance or BNEF for short. Liebreich continued to lead the company, serving as the chief executive officer<ref>{{cite web|title=Bloomberg Bets on Carbon Markets |access-date=July 26, 2011 |url=http://www.thegreeneconomy.com/bloomberg-bets-on-carbon-markets/ |publisher=The Green Economy |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120322081832/http://www.thegreeneconomy.com/bloomberg-bets-on-carbon-markets/ |archive-date=March 22, 2012 |df=mdy }}</ref> until 2014, when he stepped down as CEO but remained involved as chairman of the advisory board.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://about.bnef.com/press-releases/bloomberg-new-energy-finance-founder-to-chair-advisory-board-joined-by-tanaka-rogers/|title=Bloomberg New Energy Finance founder to chair advisory board, joined by Tanaka, Rogers|publisher=Bloomberg New Energy Finance|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150424054115/http://about.bnef.com/press-releases/bloomberg-new-energy-finance-founder-to-chair-advisory-board-joined-by-tanaka-rogers/|archive-date=April 24, 2015|df=mdy-all}}</ref>

The company has been renamed BloombergNEF—or BNEF for short. BloombergNEF has expanded its research areas to cover renewable energy, advanced transport, digital industry, innovative materials, sustainability and commodities.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://cleantechnica.com/2019/10/30/latest-bnef-report-finds-levelized-cost-of-renewables-continues-to-fall/|title=Latest BNEF Report Finds Levelized Cost Of Renewables Continues To Fall|website=CleanTechnica|language=en-US|access-date=2019-11-07}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://sdg.iisd.org:443/news/gig-bnef-launch-tool-to-assess-climate-benefits-of-wind-and-solar-assets/|title=GIG, BNEF Launch Tool to Assess Climate Benefits of Wind and Solar Assets {{!}} News {{!}} SDG Knowledge Hub {{!}} IISD|work=IISD's SDG Knowledge Hub|language=en-US|access-date=2019-11-07}}</ref> BNEF provides research, long-term forecasts, analytical tools and global in-depth analysis covering a wide range of energy and related industries. Analysts covering 6 continents publish more than 700 research reports a year.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://about.bnef.com/|title=BloombergNEF {{!}} Bloomberg Finance L.P.|website=BloombergNEF|language=en-US|access-date=2019-11-07}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/oct/14/rise-renewables-oil-firms-decades-earlier-think|title=Rise of renewables may see off oil firms decades earlier than they think|last=Ambrose|first=Jillian|work=The Guardian|access-date=2019-11-07|language=en-GB|issn=0261-3077}}</ref>

===Bureau of National Affairs (BNA)===
Bloomberg L.P. purchased Arlington, Virginia-based [[Bloomberg BNA|Bureau of National Affairs]] in August 2011, for $990{{nbsp}}million to bolster its existing [[Bloomberg Government]] and [[Bloomberg Law]] services.<ref>{{cite news |title=Bloomberg L.P. To Buy BNA for $990 Million |access-date=December 12, 2011 |url=https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/25/bloomberg-l-p-to-buy-b-n-a-for-990-million/ |work=The New York Times |first=Kevin |last=Roose }}</ref> BNA publishes specialized online and print news and information for professionals in business and government. The company produces more than 350 news publications in topic areas that include corporate law and business, employee benefits, employment and labor law, environment, health and safety, health care, human resources, intellectual property, litigation, and tax and accounting.<ref name="Newsweek">{{cite web |title=Bloomberg's Plan for World Domination |access-date=July 10, 2017 |url=http://www.newsweek.com/bloombergs-plan-world-domination-66265 |work=Newsweek| first=Nick |last=Summers }}</ref>

===Bloomberg PolarLake===
In May 2012, Bloomberg L.P. acquired Dublin-based software provider PolarLake and launched a new [[enterprise data management]] service to help companies acquire, manage and distribute data across their organizations.<ref>{{cite news|title=Bloomberg Acquires PolarLake and Launches EDM Services |newspaper=Bloomberg Professional Services |access-date=January 7, 2018 |url=https://www.bloombergpolarlake.com/2012/05/22/news-item-02/ |publisher=Bloomberg PolarLake |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171222031647/https://www.bloombergpolarlake.com/2012/05/22/news-item-02/ |archive-date=December 22, 2017 |df=mdy }}</ref>

===Barclays indices business===
On December 16, 2015, it was announced that [[Barclays]] had agreed to sell its [[Index (economics)|index]] business, Barclays Risk Analytics and Index Solutions Ltd (BRAIS), to Bloomberg L.P. for £520{{nbsp}}million, or about $787{{nbsp}}million.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/company/announcements/bloomberg-to-acquire-barclays-risk-analytics-and-index-solutions-business/|title=Bloomberg to Acquire Barclays Risk Analytics and Index Solutions Business|publisher=Bloomberg L.P. }}</ref> The company will be renamed Bloomberg Index Services Limited.

=== Bloomberg sports analysis ===
In September 2014, Bloomberg sold its Bloomberg Sports analysis division to the data analysis firm STATS LLC (now [[Stats Perform]]) for a fee rumored to be between $15{{nbsp}}million and $20{{nbsp}}million.<ref name="Reuters">{{cite press release|publisher=Reuters|title=Bloomberg sells sports analysis division to STATS|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bloomberg-stats-idUSKBN0GZ2MU20140904|access-date=June 30, 2017|archive-date=October 19, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151019034956/http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/04/us-bloomberg-stats-idUSKBN0GZ2MU20140904|url-status=live}}</ref>

=== CityLab ===
On December 10, 2019, Bloomberg Media announced that it has reached an agreement to acquire [[CityLab]], [[The Atlantic]]'s news site covering transportation, environment, equity, life, and design. This was Bloomberg's first acquisition of an editorial property by the news and financial data company in over a decade.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.theatlantic.com/press-releases/archive/2019/12/bloomberg-media-acquire-citylab-atlantic/603388/|title=Bloomberg Media to Acquire CityLab From The Atlantic|website=The Atlantic}}</ref>

==Products and services==
===Bloomberg Professional Services===
In 2011, sales from the Bloomberg Professional Services, also known as the [[Bloomberg Terminal]], accounted for more than 85 percent of Bloomberg L.P.'s annual revenue.<ref name="Inside the Bloomberg Machine">{{cite web |title=Inside the Bloomberg Machine |access-date=October 21, 2018 |url=http://www.wallstreetandtech.com/trading-technology/inside-the-bloomberg-machine/d/d-id/1264634.html |publisher=Wall Street and Technology}}</ref> The [[financial data vendor]]'s proprietary computer system, starting at $24,000 per user per year,<ref>{{cite web |title=This is how much a Bloomberg terminal costs |access-date=December 10, 2015 |url=http://qz.com/84961/this-is-how-much-a-bloomberg-terminal-costs |publisher=Quartz}}</ref> allows subscribers to access the Bloomberg Professional service to monitor and analyze real-time financial data, search financial news, obtain price quotes and send electronic messages through the Bloomberg Messaging Service. The Terminal covers both public and private markets globally.<ref>{{cite web |title=How Bloomberg Will Fare in the Financial Crisis |access-date=October 28, 2011 |url=http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_41/b4103102263210.htm |work=[[BusinessWeek]] |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111031030317/http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_41/b4103102263210.htm |archive-date=October 31, 2011 |df=mdy }}</ref>

===Bloomberg News===
[[Bloomberg News]] was co-founded by Michael Bloomberg and [[Matthew Winkler (journalist)|Matthew Winkler]] in 1990, to deliver financial news reporting to Bloomberg terminal subscribers. In 2000, Bloomberg News included more than 2,300 editors and reporters in 100 countries.<ref name="Bloomberg Editor Casts a Wider Net">{{cite web |title=Bloomberg Editor Casts a Wider Net |access-date=October 27, 2011 |url=https://www.ft.com/content/10b70754-f98e-11df-9e29-00144feab49a |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221210/https://www.ft.com/content/10b70754-f98e-11df-9e29-00144feab49a |archive-date=December 10, 2022 |url-status=live |work=Financial Times |url-access=subscription}}</ref> Content produced by Bloomberg News is disseminated through the Bloomberg terminal, Bloomberg Television, Bloomberg Radio, ''Bloomberg Businessweek'', Bloomberg Markets and Bloomberg.com. Since 2015, [[John Micklethwait]] has served as [[editor-in-chief]].<ref name=":0">{{Cite magazine|url = https://www.wired.com/2015/09/bloombergs-future-future-news-everyone/|title = Bloomberg's Future is the Future of News For Everyone|last = Greenberg|first = Julia|date = 2 September 2015|magazine = Wired|access-date = 2015-09-03}}</ref>

===Bloomberg Radio===
{{main|Bloomberg Radio}}

===Bloomberg Television===
[[Bloomberg Television]], a service of Bloomberg News, is a 24-hour financial news television network. It was introduced in 1994, as a subscription service transmitted on satellite television provider [[DirecTV]], 13 hours a day, 7 days a week.<ref>{{cite news |title=At Bloomberg, Modest Strategy to Rule the World |access-date=October 27, 2011 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/15/business/media/15bloom.html |work=The New York Times |first1=Stephanie |last1=Clifford |first2=Julie |last2=Creswell }}</ref> The network has taken over the channel space of the-defunct [[Financial News Network]] and hired most of the former FNN employees. Soon after, the network entered the cable television market and by 2000, Bloomberg's 24-hour news programming was available to 200{{nbsp}}million households.<ref>{{cite news |title=Bloomberg Unit To Announce A Cable Deal |access-date=October 28, 2011 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/18/business/bloomberg-unit-to-announce-a-cable-deal.html |work=The New York Times |first=Danny |last=Hakim }}</ref> [[Justin B. Smith]] serves as CEO of Bloomberg Multimedia Group which includes Bloomberg Radio, Bloomberg Television and online components of Bloomberg's multimedia offerings.<ref>{{cite news |title=BLOOMBERG LP NAMES JUSTIN B. SMITH CEO OF BLOOMBERG MEDIA GROUP |access-date=November 20, 2013 |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/now/press-releases/bloomberg-lp-names-justin-b-smith-ceo-of-bloomberg-media-group-4 |publisher=Bloomberg LP}}</ref>

===Bloomberg Markets===
''[[Bloomberg Markets]]'' is a monthly magazine launched in 1992, that provides in-depth coverage of global financial markets for finance professionals.<ref>{{cite web |title=Bloomberg Markets |access-date=April 17, 2013 |url=http://www.businessfinancemagazines.com/magazines/bloomberg-markets/ |publisher=Business & Finance Magazines}}</ref> In 2010, the magazine was redesigned in an effort to update its readership beyond Bloomberg terminal users.<ref>{{cite web |last=Moses|first=Lucia|title=Bloomberg Strikes Again |access-date=September 15, 2011 |url=http://www.adweek.com/news/press/bloomberg-strikes-again-132453 |work=AdWeek}}</ref> Michael Dukmejian has served as the magazine's publisher since 2009.<ref>{{cite news |title=Michael Dukmejian Joins BLOOMBERG MARKETS Magazine As Publisher |access-date=December 20, 2011 |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/2009/06/24/idUS188318+24-Jun-2009+PRN20090624 |publisher=Reuters |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121114155702/https://www.reuters.com/article/2009/06/24/idUS188318%2B24-Jun-2009%2BPRN20090624 |archive-date=November 14, 2012 |df=mdy-all }}</ref>

=== Bloomberg Pursuits ===
''Bloomberg Pursuits'' was a bimonthly [[luxury magazine]] distributed to Bloomberg terminal users and to newsstands. It ceased publication in 2016. A digital edition and show on Bloomberg Television continue under the same name.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.foliomag.com/bloomberg-pursuits-ends-print-magazine/|title=Bloomberg Pursuits Ends Print Magazine - Folio|work=Folio|access-date=2018-05-09|language=en-US}}</ref>

===Bloomberg Entity Exchange===
Bloomberg Entity Exchange is a [[web-based]], centralised and secure platform for [[buy side]] firms, [[sell side]] firms, [[corporation]]s and insurance firms, [[bank]]s or brokers to fulfill [[Know your customer|Know Your Customer (KYC)]] compliance requirements. It was launched on May 25, 2016.<ref>{{cite news |last=Barnes |first=Rosemary |url=http://www.financemagnates.com/institutional-forex/execution/bloomberg-unveils-entity-exchange-ease-counterparty-onboarding-process/ |title=Bloomberg Unveils Entity Exchange to Ease Counterparty Onboarding Process |publisher=Finance Magnates |access-date=2017-04-06 }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/enterprise/financial-data-management/beyond-kyc/ |title=Beyond KYC |newspaper=Bloomberg Professional Services |publisher=Bloomberg L.P. |access-date=2017-04-06 }}</ref>

===Bloomberg Government===
Launched in 2011, [[Bloomberg Government]] is an online service that provides news and information about politics, along with legislative and regulatory coverage.<ref>{{cite news |title=Bloomberg Plans a Data Service on the Business of Government |access-date=July 26, 2011 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/11/business/media/11bloombergnews.html |work=The New York Times |first=Jeremy W. |last=Peters }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=Bloomberg's news venture is good news for those willing to pay |access-date=December 20, 2011 |url=http://articles.latimes.com/2011/may/28/entertainment/la-et-onthemedia-20110528 |work=Los Angeles Times |first=James |last=Rainey }}</ref>

===Bloomberg Law===
In 2009, Bloomberg L.P. introduced [[Bloomberg Law]], a subscription service for real-time legal research.<ref>{{cite news |title=Bloomberg Hangs New Shingle |access-date=October 28, 2011 |url=http://www.marketwatch.com/story/bloomberg-llp-hangs-new-shingle-2010-07-07-194600 |publisher=MarketWatch|newspaper=Wall Street Journal |last1=Adams |first1=Russell }}</ref> A subscription to the service provides access to law dockets, legal filings, and reports from Bloomberg legal analysts as well as business news and information.<ref>{{cite web |title=About Bloomberg Law |access-date=October 28, 2011 |url=https://www.bloomberglaw.com/info/about/index.html |publisher=Bloomberg L.P.}}</ref>

===Bloomberg Opinion===
''Bloomberg Opinion'', formerly Bloomberg View, is an editorial division of Bloomberg News which launched in May 2011.<ref>{{cite web|title=Bloomberg View reveals columnists, editorial board|access-date=October 28, 2011|url=http://www.politico.com/blogs/onmedia/0411/Bloomberg_View_reveals_columnists_ed_board.html|publisher=Politico}}</ref> The site provides editorial content from columnists, authors and editors about news issues and is available for free on the company's website.<ref>{{cite web|title=Bloomberg View Launches New opinion site is part of Bloomberg.com redesign|access-date=October 28, 2011|url=http://www.adweek.com/news/press/bloomberg-view-launches-131933|work=AdWeek}}</ref> [[David Shipley]], former Op-Ed page editor at ''[[The New York Times]]'', serves as Bloomberg Opinion's executive editor.<ref>{{cite news|title=Bloomberg View: Opinions, Yes, But Only Factual Ones|access-date=October 28, 2011|url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffbercovici/2010/12/15/bloomberg-voice-opinions-yes-but-only-factual-ones|work=Forbes|first=Jeff|last=Bercovici}}</ref>

===Bloomberg Tradebook===
[[Bloomberg Tradebook]] is an electronic agency [[Broker|brokerage]] for equity, futures, options and foreign exchange trades.<ref name="Bloomberg Tradebook Overview">{{cite news |title=Bloomberg Tradebook Overview |access-date=August 23, 2011 |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/solutions/bloomberg_tradebook/ |publisher=Bloomberg Tradebook}}</ref> Its "buyside" services include access to trading algorithms, analytics and marketing insights, while its "sellside" services include connection to electronic trading networks and global trading capabilities.<ref>{{cite web |title=Bloomberg Expands Tradebook Offering to Brokers |access-date=August 23, 2011 |url=http://www.tradersmagazine.com/news/bloomberg-tradebook-tierney-algorithms-broker-to-broker-business-107220-1.html?pg=1 |publisher=Traders Magazine Online}}</ref> Bloomberg Tradebook was founded in 1996, as an affiliate of Bloomberg L.P.<ref name="Bloomberg Tradebook Overview" />

===Bloomberg Beta===
[[Bloomberg Beta]] is a [[venture capital firm]] capitalized by Bloomberg L.P.<ref>{{cite news |title=Bloomberg Beta Launches With $75 Million Technology Venture Fund |access-date=June 2, 2014 |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/now/press-releases/bloomberg-beta-launches-with-75-million-technology-venture-fund/ |publisher=Bloomberg NOW (press release)}}</ref> Founded in 2013, the $75{{nbsp}}million fund is focused on investments in areas broadly of interest to Bloomberg L.P., and invests purely for financial return. It is headquartered in [[San Francisco]].<ref>{{cite news|last=Perloth|first=Nicole|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/technology/bloomberg-begins-fund-to-invest-in-start-ups.html|title=Bloomberg Begins Fund to Invest in Start-Ups|work=The New York Times|access-date=September 25, 2015}}</ref>

===Bloomberg Innovation Index===
The Bloomberg Innovation Index is an annual [[ranking]] of how [[innovative]] countries are. It is based on six criteria: [[research and development]], [[manufacturing]], [[high-tech]] companies, [[post-secondary education]], research personnel, and [[patents]].<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2015-innovative-countries/|title=The Bloomberg Innovation Index|publisher=Bloomberg}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.geektime.com/2015/02/01/bloombergs-global-innovation-index-ranks-s-korea-1st-snubs-u-s-at-6th-place/|title=Bloomberg's Global Innovation Index ranks S. Korea 1st, snubs U.S. at 6th place|publisher=Geektime}}</ref> Bloomberg uses data from the [[World Bank]], the [[International Monetary Fund]], the [[World Intellectual Property Organization]], the [[United States Patent and Trademark Office]], the [[OECD]] and [[UNESCO]] to compile the ranking.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/slideshow/2014-01-22/30-most-innovative-countries.html#slide32|title=30 Most Innovative Countries: Who Took Home the Gold?|publisher=Bloomberg}}</ref>

===Open Bloomberg===
Bloomberg has openly licensed its symbology system (Bloomberg Open Symbology, BSYM), and financial data [[Application programming interface|API]] (Bloomberg Programming API, BLPAPI).<ref>{{cite web
|url=http://www.openbloomberg.com/files/2012/03/bloomberg_open_market_data_whitepaper.pdf
|title=Open Market Data Initiative
|publisher=Bloomberg
|access-date=January 12, 2014
|url-status=dead
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130313133328/http://www.openbloomberg.com/files/2012/03/bloomberg_open_market_data_whitepaper.pdf
|archive-date=March 13, 2013
|df=mdy
}}</ref>

=== Bloomberg Live ===
Bloomberg Live is a series of conferences targeted towards business people.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.bloomberglive.com/|title=Bloomberg Live|website=Bloomberg Live|language=en-US|access-date=2018-05-05}}</ref>

=== Bloomberg Quicktake ===
Quicktake (formerly TicToc) is Bloomberg's social media brand. Originally launched on [[Twitter]], it was expanded to other platforms including [[Facebook]], [[Instagram]], [[YouTube]] and is also available on [[Amazon (company)|Amazon]]'s [[Amazon Alexa|Alexa]]. It will also play at several screens across multiple airports in the [[United States]] and [[Canada]]. The platform is managed by a team of 70 people, consisting of editors, producers and social media specialists located across three bureaus in New York, London and Hong Kong.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Spangler |first1=Todd |title=Bloomberg Is Expanding TicToc Social News Network Beyond Twitter, After Hitting Year-One Goals |url=https://variety.com/2018/digital/news/bloomberg-tictoc-twitter-news-expansion-1203093371/ |access-date=1 June 2019 |work=Variety |language=en}}</ref> In December 2019, TicToc was renamed "QuickTake by Bloomberg" in order to avoid confusion with the social media platform [[TikTok]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://variety.com/2019/digital/news/bloomberg-rebrands-tictoc-china-tiktok-app-1203418180/|title=Bloomberg Renames TicToc News Service QuickTake, Partly to Avoid Confusion With Chinese TikTok App (EXCLUSIVE)|last=Spangler|first=Todd|website=Variety|language=en|access-date=2019-12-04}}</ref> The [[camel case]] and the word "by" were later eliminated, and "Bloomberg" was moved in front of "Quicktake", although the two words do not always appear together.<ref>[https://www.mixdexhq.com/tv-news/a-look-at-the-bloomberg-quicktake-logo-design/ A look at the Bloomberg Quicktake logo design]</ref>

=== Bloomberg New Economy Forum ===
Bloomberg New Economy Forum is an invitation-only event for business executives, government officials, and academics.{{citation needed}} The inaugural event was held in 2018 in Singapore. In 2019, the annual forum will take place in Beijing, China.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.scmp.com/business/china-business/article/3010944/michael-bloomberg-host-second-edition-new-economy-forum|title=Michael Bloomberg to host high-profile business forum in Beijing|website=South China Morning Post|language=en|access-date=2019-06-18}}</ref>

The Bloomberg New Economy Forum Community includes leaders from the public and private sectors from around the world. 2018 participants represented more than $5.36 trillion in market cap and boasted a roster of over 400 delegates from around the world. Forum advisory board members include former U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Hank Paulson, Vice Premier of China Zeng Peiyan, Bill Gates, Mukesh Ambani, [[Janet Yellen]], Ursula Burns, Gary Cohn, Orit Gadiesh, Walter Isaacson, Yoriko Kawaguchi, Martin Lau, Jorge Paulo Lemann, Jean Liu, Strive Masiyiwa, and more.{{citation needed}} Founding partners of the forum included 3M, ADNOC, Dangote, ExxonMobil, FedEx, HSBC, Hyundai, Mastercard, Microsoft, & Softbank.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/company/announcements/400-worlds-influential-business-government-leaders-attend-bloombergs-first-ever-new-economy-forum-singapore-november-6-7-2018/|title=400 of the World's Most Influential Business and Government Leaders to Attend Bloomberg's First-Ever New Economy Forum in Singapore on November 6-7, 2018 {{!}} Bloomberg L.P.|last1=Paulson|first1=Hank|date=2018-10-03|access-date=2019-06-18|last2=Peiyan|first2=Zeng|language=en-US}}</ref>

=== Bloomberg Línea ===
Bloomberg Línea is a partnership launched in 2021 to serve Spanish, Portuguese and English speaking latino audiences.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Línea |first=Bloomberg |title=Bloomberg Línea Officially Launches with 9 Websites in Latin America |url=https://www.bloomberglinea.com/english/bloomberg-linea-officially-launches-with-9-websites-in-latin-america/ |access-date=2023-04-12 |website=Bloomberg Línea |language=en-US}}</ref>

==Offices==
===Locations===
[[File:Bloomberg European Headquarters, London.jpg|thumb|[[Bloomberg London]] building]]
Bloomberg L.P.'s headquarters is located in [[731 Lexington Avenue]] (informally known as Bloomberg Tower) in Midtown Manhattan, New York City.<ref>{{cite news |title=SQUARE FEET: INTERVIEW -- WITH BARRY M. GOSIN; Trained in Manhattan, Graduating to the World |access-date=July 28, 2011 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/23/business/yourmoney/trained-in-manhattan-graduating-to-the-world.html |work=The New York Times |first=Alison |last=Gregor }}</ref> {{as of|2011}}, Bloomberg L.P. occupied {{convert|900000|sqft|m2}} of office space at the base of the tower. The company's New York offices also include {{convert|400000|sqft|m2}} located at 120 Park Avenue.<ref>{{cite news |title=Growing Bloomberg L.P. To Rent Half of a Tower |access-date=August 3, 2011 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/10/nyregion/10bloomberg.html |work=The New York Times |first=Charles V. |last=Bagli }}</ref> It maintains offices in 167 locations around the world,<ref name="AboutBloombergCompany" /> including [[Bloomberg London]], its European headquarters.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/company/london/|title=Bloomberg London Building|work=Bloomberg L.P.|access-date=2018-05-09|language=en}}</ref>

===Corporate culture===
The Bloomberg L.P. offices are non-hierarchical – even executives do not have private offices.<ref name="Newsweek" /> All employees sit at identical white desks each topped with a custom-built Bloomberg computer terminal. The office space also includes rows of flat-panel monitors overhead that display news, market data, the weather and Bloomberg customer service statistics.<ref>{{cite magazine |title=Towers of Babble |access-date=October 28, 2011 |url=http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/skyline/2007/08/06/070806crsk_skyline_goldberger?currentPage=all |magazine=[[The New Yorker]]}}</ref>

===Leadership===
Bloomberg L.P.'s Management Committee includes [[Michael Bloomberg]], [[Peter Grauer]], and [[Thomas Secunda]].<ref>{{cite web |title=Company Overview of Bloomberg L.P. |access-date=April 18, 2013 |url=http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/people.asp?privcapId-160210 |work=Businessweek}}{{dead link|bot=medic}}{{cbignore|bot=medic}}</ref>

==Controversies==
=== Turner Construction and Bloomberg LP construction scandal ===
Between 2010 and 2017, a "pay-to-play" scheme went along between two [[Turner Construction]] executives, two Bloomberg executives; and vendors and subcontractors involving interior construction at the Bloomberg offices including its headquarters at 731 Lexington Ave.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Bagli|first=Charles V.|title=Former Bloomberg Executives to Be Charged in Construction Fraud Scheme|language=en-US|work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/10/nyregion/bloomberg-construction-fraud-kickback.html|access-date=2020-09-16|issn=0362-4331}}</ref> In July 2020, Bloomberg's construction manager Michael Campana was sentenced to two years in prison for tax evasion on $420,000 in connection with accepting bribery.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Former construction executive pleads guilty to tax evasion in connection with bribery scheme {{!}} Internal Revenue Service|url=https://www.irs.gov/compliance/criminal-investigation/former-construction-executive-pleads-guilty-to-tax-evasion-in-connection-with-bribery-scheme|access-date=2020-09-24|website=www.irs.gov|language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Westchester Man Among Former Executives To Admit To Multi-Million Dollar Kickback Scheme|url=https://dailyvoice.com/new-york/mountpleasant/news/westchester-man-among-former-executives-to-admit-to-multi-million-dollar-kickback-scheme/791648/|access-date=2020-09-24|website=Mount Pleasant Daily Voice|language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|last=Propper|first=David|title=Ex-Bloomberg construction manager from Tuckahoe gets prison for role in bribery scheme|url=https://www.lohud.com/story/news/crime/2020/07/29/tuckahoe-bribery-scheme-prison-sentence/5538692002/|access-date=2020-09-24|website=The Journal News|language=en-US}}</ref> The bribery was in the form of cash, work on personal property, Super Bowl tickets and payment for Campana's wedding.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Rebong|first=Kevin|title=Ex-Turner Construction Exec Pleads Guilty in Bribery Scheme|url=https://therealdeal.com/2020/07/30/former-turner-construction-exec-pleads-guilty-in-bribery-scheme/|access-date=2020-09-24|website=The Real Deal New York|language=en-US}}</ref> On September 29, 2020, Anthony Guzzone, the Director of Global Construction at Bloomberg from 2010 and 2017, pleaded guilty to evading taxes on over $1.45 million he received in bribes from construction subcontractors in exchange for being awarded work performed for Bloomberg. Guzzone accepted more than $5.1 million in bribes. He was sentenced to prison for three years and two months in January 2021<ref>{{Cite web|last=Rebong|first=Kevin|title=Ex-Bloomberg Construction Director Pleads Guilty to Tax Fraud|url=https://therealdeal.com/2020/09/30/bloomberg-construction-director-pleads-guilty-to-tax-fraud/|access-date=2020-10-01|website=The Real Deal New York|language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|last=NJ.com|first=Chris Sheldon {{!}} NJ Advance Media for|date=2021-01-20|title=Ex-Bloomberg exec sentenced after authorities say he led massive kickback scheme|url=https://www.nj.com/monmouth/2021/01/ex-bloomberg-exec-sentenced-after-authorities-say-he-led-massive-kickback-scheme.html|access-date=2021-02-04|website=nj|language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Ex-Bloomberg construction exec pleads guilty to tax evasion charges on bribes|url=https://www.crainsnewyork.com/commercial-real-estate/ex-bloomberg-construction-exec-pleads-guilty-tax-evasion-charges-bribes|url-access=subscription|access-date=2020-09-30|website=Crain's New York Business|language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Former Construction Executive Pleads Guilty To Tax Evasion In Connection With Bribery Scheme|url=https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/former-construction-executive-pleads-guilty-tax-evasion-connection-bribery-scheme-0|access-date=2020-09-30|website=www.justice.gov|language=en}}</ref>

=== Lawsuits ===
====''Olszewski v. Bloomberg L.P.''====
In 1996, former Bloomberg L.P. sales representative Mary Ann Olszewski sued the company, alleging that she was drugged and raped by her supervisor, Bryan Lewis, and claimed she was terminated shortly after reporting the incident in a May 25, 1995, meeting.<ref name="Kranish">{{cite news |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/politics/michael-bloomberg-women/ |title=Mike Bloomberg for years has battled women's allegations of profane, sexist comments |author=Kranish, Michael |newspaper=The Washington Post |access-date=February 18, 2020}}</ref><ref name="Barrett">{{cite web |url=https://www.villagevoice.com/2001/10/30/bloombergs-sexual-blind-spot/ |title=Bloomberg's Sexual Blind Spot |author=Barrett, Wayne |work=The Village Voice |access-date=February 18, 2020}}</ref> The lawsuit also alleged the company internally investigated Olszewski, attempting to get coworkers to portray her as "flirtatious" or a "sex hound."<ref name="Barrett"/> Olszewski also claimed that male employees at the company engaged in the "sexual degradation of women" and that the company "took no steps to prevent or curtail the ongoing sexual harassment of female employees by Michael Bloomberg."<ref name="Kranish"/> Bloomberg, on behalf of Bloomberg L.P., testified that he was made aware of the rape allegation and offered to move Olszewski into another sales unit.<ref name="Barrett"/> Bloomberg also testified that he did not find Olszewski's allegation genuine because there was not "an unimpeachable third-party witness" present during the alleged event, elaborating that "there are times when three people are together."<ref name="Garber">{{cite web |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2018/09/mike-bloomberg-comments-women-metoo/570448/ |title='I'd Do Her': Mike Bloomberg and the Underbelly of #MeToo |author=Garber, Megan |work=The Atlantic |access-date=February 18, 2020}}</ref>

The case was dismissed by a federal judge in 1999 after Olszewski's lawyer had ignored repeated deadlines to submit a response to a [[motion (legal)|motion]] to end the case. The case was re-opened by another lawyer in 2000, but disappeared from the [[Docket (court)|court docket]] in 2001.<ref name="Barrett"/>

====''Sekiko Sakai Garrison v. Michael Bloomberg and Bloomberg L.P.''====
In 1997, former Bloomberg L.P. sales executive Sekiko Sakai Garrison filed a lawsuit against the company and Michael Bloomberg, alleging [[sexual harassment]] and [[wrongful dismissal|wrongful termination]].<ref name="garrison">{{cite news |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/context/sekiko-sakai-garrison-v-michael-bloomberg-and-bloomberg-l-p/6d9bea84-4783-4b88-8866-26bddfb14b6d/ |title=Sekiko Sakai Garrison v. Michael Bloomberg and Bloomberg, L.P. |author=United States District Court Southern District of New York |newspaper=The Washington Post |access-date=February 17, 2020}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.nbcnews.com/id/21014984/ns/business-us_business/t/bloomberg-sued-pregnancy-discrimination/ |title=Bloomberg sued for pregnancy discrimination |agency=Associated Press |work=NBC |access-date=February 17, 2020}}</ref> Garrison alleged that when she told Bloomberg that she was pregnant, he told her to "Kill it!" and said "Great! Number 16," referring to the number of women in the company who were pregnant or on [[maternity leave]] at the time.<ref name="Garber"/> According to the lawsuit, Garrison told a manager about the incident but was told to "forget it ever happened" before being fired.<ref name="Kranish"/>

Garrison also claimed that Bloomberg told female salespeople to "line up to give him [oral sex] as a wedding present," referring to a male employee who was getting married.<ref name="Kranish"/> The lawsuit also alleged that Bloomberg berated a female employee who had trouble finding a nanny, saying, "It's a f------ baby! All it does is eat and s---! It doesn't know the difference between you and anyone else! All you need is some black who doesn't even have to speak English to rescue it from a burning building!"<ref name="Kranish"/><ref name="garrison"/>

The company did not admit any wrongdoing, but [[settlement (litigation)|settled]] the lawsuit out of court in 2000.<ref name="Barrett"/>

====''EEOC v. Bloomberg L.P.''====
In September 2007, the [[Equal Employment Opportunity Commission|Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)]] filed a [[class-action lawsuit]] against Bloomberg L.P. on behalf of more than 80 female employees who argued that Bloomberg L.P. engaged in discrimination against women who took [[maternity leave]].<ref>{{cite news |title=Bloomberg Is Deposed in Bias Suit Against Firm |access-date=October 28, 2011 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/15/nyregion/15bloomberg.html |work=The New York Times |first=David W. |last=Chen }}</ref> In August 2011, Judge [[Loretta A. Preska]] of the federal [[United States District Court for the Southern District of New York]] in Manhattan dismissed the charges, writing that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission did not present sufficient evidence to support their claim.<ref>{{cite news |title=Discrimination Suit Against Bloomberg L.P. Is Rejected |access-date=December 13, 2011 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/18/nyregion/discrimination-suit-against-bloomberg-lp-is-dismissed.html |work=The New York Times |first=David W. |last=Chen }}</ref>

In September 2013, Preska dismissed an EEOC lawsuit on behalf of 29 pregnant employees of Bloomberg L.P.<ref>{{cite news|last=Stempel|first=Jonathan|title=U.S. judge tosses pregnancy bias lawsuit against Bloomberg LP|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bloomberg-bias-lawsuit-idUSBRE9880ZD20130909|access-date=September 11, 2013|publisher=Reuters|author2=Jennifer Saba|archive-date=September 12, 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130912000027/http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/09/us-bloomberg-bias-lawsuit-idUSBRE9880ZD20130909|url-status=live}}</ref> In addition, she dismissed pregnancy bias claims from five individual plaintiffs, and allowed part of the case from a sixth plaintiff to proceed.<ref>{{cite news|last=Beekman|first=Daniel|title=Judge tosses most plaintiffs in discrimination suit against Bloomberg L.P.|url=http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/judge-tosses-plaintiffs-discrimination-suit-bloomberg-p-article-1.1450211|access-date=September 11, 2013|work=[[New York Daily News]]}}</ref>

====''Bloomberg L.P. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve''====
Bloomberg L.P. brought a [[lawsuit]] against the [[Federal Reserve Board of Governors|Board of Governors]] of the [[Federal Reserve|Federal Reserve System]] ([[Bloomberg L.P. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System]]) to force the Fed to share details about its lending programs during the [[Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008|U.S. Government bailout]] in 2008.<ref>{{cite news |title=The Fed's Secret Liquidity Lifelines |access-date=March 17, 2012 |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/data-visualization/federal-reserve-emergency-lending/#/overview/?sort=nomPeakValue&group=none&view=peak&position=0&comparelist=&search= |publisher=Bloomberg}}</ref> The records documented Federal Reserve loans issued to financial firms and revealed the identities of the firms, the amounts borrowed and the collateral posted in return.<ref>{{cite web |title=Bloomberg Wins Its Lawsuit Against the Federal Reserve |access-date=August 25, 2009 |url=https://www.cjr.org/the_audit/bloomberg_wins_its_lawsuit_aga.php |work=[[Columbia Journalism Review]]}}</ref> Bloomberg L.P. won at the trial court level.<ref>Docket entry 31, ''Bloomberg, L.P. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System'', case no. 1:08-cv-09595-LAP, U.S. District Court for the District of New York.</ref> The [[United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit|Second Circuit Court]] ruled in favor of Bloomberg L.P. in March 2010, but the case was appealed to the [[Supreme Court of the United States|Supreme Court]] by a group of large U.S. commercial banks in October. In March 2011, the Supreme Court let stand the Second Circuit Court ruling mandating the release of Fed bailout details.<ref>{{cite news |title=Fed's Court-Ordered Disclosure Shows Americans' 'Right to Know' |access-date=October 28, 2011 |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-22/fed-s-court-ordered-transparency-shows-americans-have-a-right-to-know-.html |work=Bloomberg Businessweek }}</ref>

====''Bloomberg L.P. v. Bloomberg Ltd''====
On October 22, 2008, Bloomberg L.P. applied for a change of name of Bloomberg Ltd, under s. 69(1)(b) of the [[Companies Act 2006]]. Bloomberg L.P. then amended its name to Bloomberg Finance Three L.P. Bloomberg Ltd was ordered at the [[Company Names Tribunal]] on May 11, 2009, to change its name so as to not have a name that would likely interfere, by similarity, with the goodwill of Bloomberg Finance Three L.P. as well as to pay costs.<ref>[http://www.ipo.gov.uk/o12309.pdf Bloomberg LP v Bloomberg Ltd] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121103025028/http://www.ipo.gov.uk/o12309.pdf }} Retrieved September 18, 2014</ref>

====''Nafeesa Syeed v. Bloomberg L.P.''====
According to a recent case in August 2020, Bloomberg L.P. is again being charged with discrimination against black and non-white workers. Nafeesa Syeed, who served at Bloomberg for around four years as a national security reporter and Middle East reporter, sued the corporation in New York city court for sexism based on her gender and her ethnicity as a South Asian-American. Bloomberg faces a related complaint by a former saleswoman, who filed under a pseudonym in June and the corporation is now seeking to compel a public release of her name. Throughout both cases the same law firm defends the victims.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Bloomberg LP Hit With More Discrimination Claims by Former Reporter|url=https://wwd.com/business-news/media/bloomberg-lp-sued-for-gender-race-discrimination-1203697697/|access-date=13 August 2020|website=WWD}}</ref>

==See also==
{{Portal|New York City|Companies}}
* [[Bloomberg Markets]]
* [[Bloomberg Terminal]]
* [[Financial data vendor]]

==References==
{{Reflist|30em}}

==External links==
* {{Official website}}
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20160124023831/http://ketupa.net/bloomberg.htm Bloomberg: Overview]
* [http://fdncenter.org/pnd/news/story.jhtml?id=36500027 PND News – New York City Mayor Gave $130{{nbsp}}Million to Charity in 2002]
* [https://archive.today/20121228103336/http://www.worldlii.org/int/cases/GENDND/2002/1665.html Bloomberg LP v. Triple E Holdings Limited (2002) GENDND 1665 (December 13, 2002)]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20030526165356/http://thevault.com/companies/company_main.jsp?product_id=657&ch_id=306&co_page=1 The Vault, containing a company overview]
* [https://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2007/04/16/8404302/index.htm?postversion=2007040506 Fortune Magazine: Bloomberg LP is a prodigious success]
* [http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/12/bloomberg200812?printable=true&currentPage=all Vanity Fair: Bloomberg Without Bloomberg]
* [https://livenewsof.com/bloomberg-tv/ Bloomberg Live]

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Cultural Revolution

2022-05-24T18:57:09Z

Aravindhvnp: Just published an influential work.

{{Short description|1966–1976 Maoist sociopolitical movement in China}}
{{about|the Chinese sociopolitical movement|the event in Libya|Cultural Revolution in Libya|the event in the Soviet Union|Cultural Revolution in the Soviet Union|the event in Iran|Cultural Revolution in Iran||List of cultural, intellectual, philosophical and technological revolutions}}

{{Use mdy dates}}
{{Infobox event
| Location = [[China|People's Republic of China]]
| duration = {{start and end dates|1966|5|16|1976|10|6}} ({{Age in years and days|16 May 1966|6 October 1976|sep=and}})
| Deaths = Hundreds of thousands to millions of civilians, Red Guard and military deaths (exact number not known)
| organizers = [[Mao Zedong]] ([[Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party]])
| injuries =
| image = Cultural Revolution poster.jpg
| caption = Propaganda poster depicting Mao Zedong, above a group of soldiers from the [[People's Liberation Army]]. The caption reads, "The Chinese People's Liberation Army is the great school of [[Mao Zedong Thought]]".
| title = Cultural Revolution
| image_size = 250px
| cause =
| result = Economic activity halted, historical and cultural material destroyed.
| motive = Preservation of communism by purging capitalist and traditional elements, and power struggle between Maoists and pragmatists.
| property damage = [[Cemetery of Confucius]], [[Temple of Heaven]], [[Ming Tombs]]
| arrests = [[Jiang Qing]], [[Zhang Chunqiao]], [[Yao Wenyuan]], and [[Wang Hongwen]]
| reported injuries =
}}{{Infobox Chinese
| picsize = 250px
| c = {{linktext|lang=zh|文化大革命}}
| l = "Great Cultural Revolution"
| p = Wénhuà dàgémìng
| bpmf = ㄨㄣˊㄏㄨㄚˋ ㄉㄚˋㄍㄜˊㄇㄧㄥˋ
| w = Wen2-hua4 ta4-ko2-ming4
| mi = {{IPAc-cmn|wen|2|h|ua|4|-|d|a|4|g|e|2|m|ing|4}}
| gr = Wenhuah dahgerminq
| wuu = Ven平ho去 du去 keh入min去
| j = Man4-faa3 daai6-gaak3-ming6
| y = Màhn-faa daaih-gaak-mihng
| poj = Bûn-hoà tāi-kek-bēng
| buc = Ùng-huá dâi gáik-mêng
| phfs = Vùn-fa thai-kiet-min
| altname = Formal name
| s2 = {{nowrap|无产阶级文化大革命}}
| t2 = 無產階級文化大革命
| l2 = "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution"
| p2 = Wúchǎnjiējí wénhuà dàgémìng
| bpmf2 = ㄨˊㄔㄢˇㄐㄧㄝˉㄐㄧˊ ㄨㄣˊㄏㄨㄚˋ ㄉㄚˋㄍㄜˊㄇㄧㄥˋ
| mi2 = {{IPAc-cmn|wu|2|ch|an|3|j|ie|1|j|i|2|-|wen|2|h|ua|4|-|d|a|4|g|e|2|m|ing|4}}
| j2 = Mou4-caan2 gaai1-kap1 man4-faa3 daai6 gaak3-ming6
| wuu2 = Vu平tshae上cia平cih入 ven平ho去 du去 keh入min去
| poj2 = Bû-sán-kai-kip bûn-hòa tōa kek-bēng
| buc2 = Ù-sāng-găi-ngék ùng-huá dâi gáik-mêng
| phfs2 = Vû-sán-kiê-kip vùn-fa thai-kiet-min
| order = st
| t =
| s =
| ci =
}}
{{History of the People's Republic of China}}
{{Revolution sidebar}}
The '''Cultural Revolution''', formally known as the '''Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution''', was a [[sociopolitical movement]] in the [[People's Republic of China]] (PRC) launched by [[Mao Zedong]] in 1966, and lasting until [[Death and state funeral of Mao Zedong|his death]] in 1976. Its stated goal was to preserve [[Ideology of the Chinese Communist Party|Chinese communism]] by [[Purge|purging]] remnants of [[Capitalism|capitalist]] and [[Chinese culture|traditional]] elements from [[Culture of the People's Republic of China|Chinese society]]. The Revolution marked the effective commanding return of Mao—who was still the [[chairman of the Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP)—to the centre of power, after a period of self-abstention and ceding to [[Seven Thousand Cadres Conference|less radical leadership]] in the aftermath of the Mao-led [[Great Leap Forward]] debacle and the [[Great Chinese Famine]] (1959–1961). The Revolution failed to achieve its main goals.

Launching the movement in May 1966 with the help of the [[Cultural Revolution Group]], Mao charged that [[Bourgeoisie|bourgeois]] elements had infiltrated the government and society with the aim of restoring capitalism. Mao called on young people to "[[Bombard the Headquarters|bombard the headquarters]]", and proclaimed that "to rebel is justified". The youth responded by forming various [[Red Guard (China)|Red Guards]] around the country. A selection of Mao's sayings were compiled into the [[Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung|''Little Red Book'']], which became a [[sacred text]] for [[Mao Zedong's cult of personality|Mao's personality cult]]. They held "[[Denunciation rally|denunciation rallies]]" against [[Revisionism (Marxism)|revisionists]] regularly, and [[Seizure of power (Cultural Revolution)|grabbed power]] from local governments and CCP branches, eventually establishing the [[Revolutionary committee (China)|revolutionary committees]] in 1967. The committees often split into rival factions and became involved in armed fights known as "[[violent struggle]]s", to which the [[People's Liberation Army|army]] had to be sent to restore order. [[Lin Biao]], an official of the PLA, was promoted as Vice Chairman and Mao's successor after military intervention, but was accused of engaging a [[Project 571|botched coup against Mao]], fled and [[Lin Biao incident|died in a plane crash]] later. In 1972, the [[Gang of Four]] rose to power and the Cultural Revolution continued until Mao's death and the arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976.

The Cultural Revolution was characterized by violence and chaos. Death toll claims vary widely, with [[#Humanitarian crisis|estimates of those perishing during the Revolution]] ranging from hundreds of thousands to millions. Beginning with the [[Red August]] of Beijing, [[massacre]]s took place nationwide, including the [[Guangxi Massacre]], in which massive [[Human cannibalism|cannibalism]] also occurred;<ref>{{cite news |last1=Kristof |first1=Nicholas D. |title=A Tale of Red Guards and Cannibals |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1993/01/06/world/a-tale-of-red-guards-and-cannibals.html |access-date=January 22, 2020 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|last1=Yan|first1=Lebin|title=我参与处理广西文革遗留问题|url=http://www.yhcqw.com/34/8938.html|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201124094818/http://www.yhcqw.com/34/8938.html|archive-date=November 24, 2020|access-date=January 22, 2020|website=[[Yanhuang Chunqiu]]|language=zh}}</ref> the [[Inner Mongolia incident]]; the [[Guangdong Cultural Revolution Massacre|Guangdong Massacre]]; the [[Yunnan Cultural Revolution Massacre (disambiguation)|Yunnan Massacres]]; and the [[Hunan Cultural Revolution Massacre (disambiguation)|Hunan Massacres]]. Red Guards destroyed [[Four Olds|historical relics and artifacts]], as well as [[ransack]]ing cultural and religious sites. The [[1975 Banqiao Dam failure]], one of the world's greatest technological catastrophes, also occurred during the Cultural Revolution. Meanwhile, tens of millions of people were persecuted: senior officials, most notably Chinese president [[Liu Shaoqi]], along with [[Deng Xiaoping]], [[Peng Dehuai]], and [[He Long]], were purged or exiled; millions were accused of being members of the [[Five Black Categories]], suffering [[public humiliation]], imprisonment, torture, hard labor, seizure of property, and sometimes execution or harassment into suicide; intellectuals were considered the "[[Stinking Old Ninth]]" and were widely persecuted—notable scholars and scientists such as [[Lao She]], [[Fu Lei]], [[Yao Tongbin]], and [[Zhao Jiuzhang]] were killed or committed suicide. [[Education in China|Schools and universities]] were closed with the [[National College Entrance Examination|college entrance exams]] cancelled. Over 10 million [[Sent-down youth|urban intellectual youths]] were sent to the [[Rural society in China|countryside]] in the [[Down to the Countryside Movement]].

In December 1978, Deng Xiaoping became the new [[Paramount leader|paramount leader of China]], replacing [[Hua Guofeng]], and started the "[[Boluan Fanzheng]]" program which gradually dismantled the Maoist policies associated with the Cultural Revolution, and brought the country back to order.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Bradsher |first1=Keith |last2=Wellman |first2=William J. |title=Hua Guofeng, Transitional Leader of China After Mao, Is Dead at 87 |language=en-US |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/21/world/asia/21hua.html |access-date=2022-03-16 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Barmé |first=Geremie R. |title=History for the Masses |url=http://www.morningsun.org/stages/history_for_the_masses.html |access-date=2022-03-16 |website=Morning Sun}}</ref> Deng, together with his allies, then began a new phase in China, by initiating the historic [[Chinese economic reform|Reforms and Opening-Up]] program. In 1981, the CCP declared and acknowledged that the Cultural Revolution was wrong and was "responsible for the most severe setback and the heaviest losses suffered by the people, the country, and the party since the founding of the People's Republic."<ref name="PRC-2020">{{Cite web|title=关于建国以来党的若干历史问题的决议|url=http://www.gov.cn/test/2008-06/23/content_1024934_2.htm|access-date=April 23, 2020|website=The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China|language=zh}}</ref><ref name="Wilson Center-1981">{{Cite web|title=Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China|url=https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121344.pdf?v=d461ad5001da989b8f96cc1dfb3c8ce7|website=Wilson Center}}</ref><ref name="CCCCP-11">Sixth [[Plenary session|Plenary Session]] of the [[11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party]]. June 27, 1981. "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China." ''Resolution on CPC History (1949–81)''. Beijing: [[Foreign Languages Press]]. p. 32.</ref> In contemporary China, differing views exist about the Cultural Revolution. Among some, it is referred to as the "ten years of chaos" (Chinese: ''shí nián dòngluàn'', 十年动乱; or ''shí nián hàojié'', 十年浩劫).<ref>{{cite book |last=Lu |first=Xing |title=Rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Impact on Chinese Thought |page=2 |quote=Known to the Chinese as the ten years of chaos [...]}}</ref>

==Background==
===Great Leap Forward===
{{Main|Great Leap Forward}}
{{see also|Great Chinese Famine|Seven Thousand Cadres Conference}}
[[File:Iron smelting in 1958 China, from- Backyardfurnace5 (cropped).jpg|alt=|thumb|People in the countryside working at night to produce steel during the [[Great Leap Forward]], 1958]]

In 1958, after China's first [[Five-year plans of China|Five-Year Plan]], Mao called for "[[grassroots]] [[socialism]]" in order to accelerate his plans for turning China into a modern [[Developed country|industrialized state]]. In this spirit, Mao launched the Great Leap Forward, established [[People's Commune]]s in the countryside, and began the [[mass mobilization]] of the people into [[collectives]]. Many communities were assigned production of a single commodity—[[Steel production by country|steel]]. Mao vowed to increase agricultural production to twice that of 1957 levels.<ref name="Tang"/>

The Great Leap was an economic failure. Many uneducated farmers were pulled from farming and harvesting and instead instructed to produce steel on a massive scale, partially relying on [[backyard furnace]]s to achieve the production targets set by local cadres. The steel produced was of low quality and mostly useless. The Great Leap reduced harvest sizes and led to a decline in the production of most goods except substandard [[pig iron]] and steel. Furthermore, local authorities frequently exaggerated production numbers, hiding and intensifying the problem for several years.<ref name="umd">{{cite web|last1=Worden|first1=Robert|title=A Country Study: China|url=http://www-chaos.umd.edu/history/prc2.html|publisher=Library of Congress|year=1987|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120716180625/http://www-chaos.umd.edu/history/prc2.html|archive-date=July 16, 2012|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=Jin>{{cite book|last=Jin|first=Qiu|title=The Culture of Power: Lin Biao and the Cultural Revolution|year=1999|publisher=Stanford University Press|isbn=978-0804735292}}</ref>{{rp|25–30}}

In the meantime, chaos in the collectives, bad weather, and exports of food necessary to secure hard currency resulted in the [[Great Chinese Famine]]. Food was in desperate shortage, and production fell dramatically. The famine caused the deaths of more than 30 million people, particularly in the more impoverished inland regions.<ref name="White">{{cite web|url=http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat1.htm#Mao|title=Historical Atlas of the 20th century|access-date=October 23, 2004|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110301071401/http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat1.htm#Mao|archive-date=March 1, 2011|url-status=live}}</ref>

The Great Leap's failure reduced Mao's prestige within the CCP. Forced to take responsibility, in 1959, Mao resigned as the [[President of the People's Republic of China|President of China]], China's ''de jure'' head of state, and was succeeded by [[Liu Shaoqi]], while Mao remained as [[Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party]] and [[Supreme Military Command of the People's Republic of China|Commander-in-chief]]. In July, [[Lushan Conference|senior Party leaders convened]] at the scenic [[Mount Lu]] to discuss policy. At the conference, Marshal [[Peng Dehuai]], the Minister of Defence, criticized Great Leap policies in a private letter to Mao, writing that it was plagued by mismanagement and cautioning against elevating political dogma over the laws of economics.<ref name=umd/>

Despite the moderate tone of Peng's letter, Mao took it as a personal attack against his leadership.<ref name=Jin/>{{rp|55}} Following the Conference, Mao had Peng removed from his posts, and accused him of being a "right-opportunist". Peng was replaced by [[Lin Biao]], another revolutionary army general who became a more staunch Mao supporter later in his career. While the Lushan Conference served as a death knell for Peng, Mao's most vocal critic, it led to a shift of power to moderates led by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, who took effective control of the [[Economy of China|economy]] following 1959.<ref name=umd/>

By the early 1960s, many of the Great Leap's economic policies were reversed by initiatives spearheaded by Liu, Deng, and Premier [[Zhou Enlai]]. This moderate group of pragmatists were unenthusiastic about Mao's utopian visions. By 1962, while Zhou, Liu and Deng managed affairs of state and the economy, Mao had effectively withdrawn from economic decision-making, and focused much of his time on further contemplating his contributions to Marxist–Leninist social theory, including the idea of "[[Continuous revolution theory|continuous revolution]]".<ref name=Jin/>{{rp|55}}

===Impact of international tensions and anti-revisionism===
{{main|Sino-Soviet split}}
In the early 1950s, the People's Republic of China and the [[Soviet Union]] (USSR) were the two largest [[communist states]] in the world. Although initially they had been mutually supportive, disagreements arose after the [[Death and state funeral of Joseph Stalin|death of Joseph Stalin]] and the rise of [[Nikita Khrushchev]] to power in the Soviet Union. In 1956, Khrushchev [[On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences|denounced Stalin and his policies]], and began implementing post-Stalinist [[Khrushchev Thaw|economic reforms]]. Mao and many other members of the [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP) opposed these changes, believing that they would have negative repercussions for the worldwide [[communist]] movement, among many of whom [[Stalin]] was still viewed as a hero.<ref name=Mac>{{cite book|last1=MacFarquhar|first1=Roderick|last2=Schoenhals|first2=Michael|title=[[Mao's Last Revolution]]|publisher=Harvard University Press|year=2006|isbn=978-0-674-02332-1}}</ref>{{rp|4–7}}

Mao believed that Khrushchev did not adhere to [[Marxism–Leninism]], but was instead a [[Revisionism (Marxism)|revisionist]], altering his policies from basic Marxist–Leninist concepts, something Mao feared would allow [[capitalists]] to regain control of the USSR. Relations between the two governments soured. The USSR refused to support China's case for joining the [[United Nations]] and reneged on its pledge to supply China with a [[nuclear weapon]].<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|4–7}}

Mao went on to publicly denounce revisionism in April 1960. Without pointing fingers at the Soviet Union, Mao criticized its ideological ally in the [[Balkans]], the [[League of Communists of Yugoslavia]]. In turn, the USSR criticized China's ally in the Balkans, the [[Party of Labour of Albania]].<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|7}} In 1963, the CCP began to denounce the Soviet Union openly, publishing nine polemics against its perceived revisionism, with one of them being titled ''On Khrushchev's Phoney Communism and Historical Lessons for the World'', in which Mao charged that Khrushchev was not only a revisionist but also increased the danger of capitalist restoration.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|7}} Khrushchev's downfall from an internal ''coup d'état'' in 1964 also contributed to Mao's fears of his own political vulnerability, mainly because of his declining prestige among his colleagues after the Great Leap Forward.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|7}}

Other Soviet actions increased concerns about potential [[fifth columnists]] in China.<ref name=":02">{{Cite book |last=Meyskens |first=Covell F. |url= |title=Mao's Third Front: The Militarization of Cold War China |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |isbn=978-1-108-78478-8 |location=Cambridge, United Kingdom |doi=10.1017/9781108784788 |oclc=1145096137 |s2cid=218936313}}</ref>{{Rp|page=141}} As a result of the tensions following the Sino-Soviet split, Soviet leaders had authorized radio broadcasts into China stating that the Soviet Union would assist "genuine communists" who overthrew Mao and his "erroneous course."<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=141}} Chinese leadership also feared the increasing military conflict between the United States and the North Vietnamese troops that China supported would lead to the United States seeking out potential Chinese traitors.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=141}} Academic Covell F. Meyskens writes that these international tensions shaped the inception and course of the Cultural Revolution.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=14}}

=== Precursor ===
{{See also|Socialist Education Movement|Hai Rui Dismissed from Office}}

[[File:Luo Ruiqing.jpg|thumb|upright|The purge of General [[Luo Ruiqing]] solidified the Army's loyalty to Mao.]]

In 1963, Mao launched the [[Socialist Education Movement]], which is regarded as the precursor of the Cultural Revolution.<ref name="Baum-1969">{{cite journal |last = Baum |first=Richard |year = 1969 |title = Revolution and Reaction in the Chinese Countryside: The Socialist Education Movement in Cultural Revolutionary Perspective |journal = [[The China Quarterly]] |volume=38 |issue=38 |pages=92–119 |doi=10.1017/S0305741000049158 |issn=0305-7410 |jstor=652308 |s2cid=154449798 }}</ref> Mao had set the scene for the Cultural Revolution by "[[Purge|cleansing]]" powerful officials of questionable loyalty who were based in [[Beijing]]. His approach was less than transparent, achieving this purge through newspaper articles, internal meetings, and by skillfully employing his network of [[Political alliance|political allies]].<ref name="Baum-1969" />

In late 1959, historian and [[Deputy mayor of Beijing|Beijing Deputy Mayor]] [[Wu Han (historian)|Wu Han]] published a [[historical drama]] entitled ''[[Hai Rui Dismissed from Office]]''. In the play, an honest [[civil servant]], [[Hai Rui]], is dismissed by a corrupt emperor. While Mao initially praised the play, in February 1965, he secretly commissioned his wife [[Jiang Qing]] and [[Shanghai]] [[Propaganda|propagandist]] [[Yao Wenyuan]] to publish an article criticizing it.<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|15–18}} Yao boldly alleged that ''Hai Rui'' was really an [[allegory]] attacking Mao; that is, Mao was the corrupt emperor, and Peng Dehuai was the honest civil servant.<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|16}}

Yao's article put [[Mayor of Beijing]] [[Peng Zhen]]{{NoteTag|No relation to [[Peng Dehuai]].}} on the defensive. Peng, a powerful official and Wu Han's direct superior, was the head of the "[[Five Man Group]]", a committee commissioned by Mao to study the potential for a cultural revolution. Peng Zhen, aware that he would be implicated if Wu indeed wrote an "anti-Mao" play, wished to contain Yao's influence. Yao's article was initially only published in select local newspapers. Peng forbade its publication in the nationally distributed ''[[People's Daily]]'' and other major newspapers under his control, instructing them to write exclusively about "academic discussion," and not pay heed to Yao's petty politics.<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|14–19}} While the "literary battle" against Peng raged, Mao fired [[Yang Shangkun]]—director of the [[General Office of the Chinese Communist Party|CCP General Office]], an organ that controlled [[internal communications]]—on a series of unsubstantiated charges, installing in his stead staunch [[Loyalism|loyalist]] [[Wang Dongxing]], head of Mao's security detail. Yang's dismissal likely emboldened Mao's allies to move against their factional rivals.<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|14–19}}

In December, [[Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China|Defence Minister]] and Mao loyalist Lin Biao accused General Luo Ruiqing, the chief of staff of the [[People's Liberation Army|PLA]], of being anti-Mao, alleging that Luo put too much emphasis on military training rather than Maoist "political discussion." Despite initial skepticism in the [[Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party]] of Luo's guilt, Mao pushed for an 'investigation', after which Luo was denounced, dismissed, and forced to deliver a [[self-criticism (Marxism)|self-criticism]]. Stress from the events led Luo to attempt suicide.<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|20–27}} Luo's removal secured the military command's loyalty to Mao.<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|24}}

Having ousted Luo and Yang, Mao returned his attention to Peng Zhen. On February 12, 1966, the "Five Man Group" issued a report known as the ''February Outline'' ({{lang|zh|二月提纲}}). The ''Outline'', sanctioned by the Party centre, defined ''Hai Rui'' as a constructive ''academic'' discussion and aimed to distance Peng Zhen formally from any ''political'' implications. However, Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuan continued their denunciation of Wu Han and Peng Zhen. Meanwhile, Mao also sacked [[Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party|Propaganda Department]] director [[Lu Dingyi]], a Peng Zhen ally.<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|20–27}}

Lu's removal gave Maoists unrestricted access to the press. Mao would deliver his final blow to Peng Zhen at a high-profile Politburo meeting through loyalists [[Kang Sheng]] and [[Chen Boda]]. They accused Peng Zhen of opposing Mao, labeled the ''February Outline'' "evidence of Peng Zhen's revisionism," and grouped him with three other disgraced officials as part of the "Peng-Luo-Lu-Yang Anti-Party Clique."<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|20–27}} On May 16, the Politburo formalized the decisions by releasing an official document condemning Peng Zhen and his "anti-party allies" in the strongest terms, disbanding his "Five Man Group", and replacing it with the Maoist [[Cultural Revolution Group]] (CRG).<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|27–35}}

== History ==
The history of the Cultural Revolution can generally be categorized into two main periods: (1) spring 1966 to summer 1968 (when most of the key events took place), and (2) a tailing period that lasted until fall 1976.<ref name="Russo-2020a">{{Cite book |last=Russo |first=Alessandro |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1156439609 |title=Cultural Revolution and revolutionary culture |publisher=[[Duke University Press]] |isbn=978-1-4780-1218-4 |location=Durham |pages=148 |oclc=1156439609}}</ref>

=== Early stage: mass movement (1966–68) ===
{{anchor|Beginning}}

The early phase of the Cultural Revolution was characterized by mass movement and political pluralization.<ref name="Russo-2020a" /> Virtually anyone could create a political organization, with or without party approval.<ref name="Russo-2020a" /> Known as Red Guards, these organizations originally arose in schools and universities and later arose in factories and other institutions.<ref name="Russo-2020a" /> After 1968, most of these organizations ceased to exist and their legacies were a topic of intense controversy in the latter part of the Cultural Revolution.<ref name="Russo-2020a" />

==== May 16 Notification ====
{{Main|May 16 Notification}}
[[File:人民日报516.jpg|thumb|right|250px|May 16 Notification, a secret inner-party published document that only people above rank 17 were allowed to read, was declassified and published in ''[[People's Daily]]'' on 17 May 1967, after 1 year of its inner-party publication.<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|41}}]]
In May 1966, an "expanded session" of the [[Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party]] was called in Beijing. The conference, rather than being a joint discussion on policy (as per the usual norms of party operations), was mainly a campaign to mobilize the Politburo into endorsing Mao's [[political agenda]]. The conference was heavily laden with Maoist political rhetoric on class struggle and filled with meticulously prepared 'indictments' on the recently ousted leaders such as Peng Zhen and Luo Ruiqing. One of these documents, released on May 16, was prepared with Mao's personal supervision and was particularly damning:<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|39–40}}

<blockquote>Those representatives of the [[bourgeoisie]] who have sneaked into the Party, the government, the army, and various spheres of culture are a bunch of counter-revolutionary revisionists. Once conditions are ripe, they will seize political power and turn the [[dictatorship of the proletariat]] into a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Some of them we have already seen through; others we have not. Some are still trusted by us and are being trained as our successors, persons like Khrushchev for example, who are still nestling beside us.<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|47}}</blockquote>

This text, which became known as the "May 16 Notification" ({{zh|s = 五一六通知 |p = Wǔyīliù Tōngzhī }}), summarized Mao's ideological justification for the Cultural Revolution.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|40}} Effectively it implied that there were enemies of the Communist cause within the Party itself: class enemies who "wave the red flag to oppose the red flag."<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|46}} The only way to identify these people was through "the telescope and microscope of Mao Zedong Thought."<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|46}} While the party leadership was relatively united in approving the general direction of Mao's agenda, many Politburo members were not especially enthusiastic, or simply confused about the direction of the movement.<ref name="Nianyi">{{cite book |last=Wang |first=Nianyi |script-title= zh:大动乱的年代：1949–1989 年的中国 |trans-title = Great age of turmoil, a history of China 1949–89 |language = zh-hans |year=1989 |publisher = Henan People's Publishing House }}</ref>{{rp|13}} The charges against esteemed party leaders like Peng Zhen rang alarm bells in China's intellectual community and among the [[United Front (China)|eight non-Communist parties]].<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|41}}

==== Early mass rallies (May–June 1966) ====
[[File:1966-08_1966年横扫一切牛鬼蛇神.jpg|thumb|right|On June 1, 1966, ''[[People's Daily]]'' published an editorial "[[Sweep Away All Cow Demons and Snake Spirits]]" on its front page, calling on the proletariat to "completely eradicate all the [[Four Olds|old ideas, old culture, old customs and old habits]] that have poisoned the people of China for thousands of years, fostered by the exploiting classes."<ref name="Gao1987">{{cite book|last1=Gao |first1=Yuan |title=Born Red: A Chronicle of the Cultural Revolution|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=OrN_UGo9S0UC&pg=PA50|publisher=[[Stanford University Press]]|isbn=978-0-8047-6589-3}}</ref>{{rp|50-}}]]
After the purge of Peng Zhen, the Beijing Party Committee had effectively ceased to function, paving the way for disorder in the capital. On May 25, under the guidance of {{Interlanguage link|Cao Yi'ou|lt=|zh|曹轶欧|WD=}}—wife of Maoist henchman Kang Sheng—[[Nie Yuanzi]], a philosophy lecturer at [[Peking University]], authored a [[big-character poster]] ({{zh|s=大字报|p=dàzìbào|c=|t=|labels=no}}) along with other [[Left-wing politics|leftists]] and posted it to a public bulletin. Nie attacked the university's party administration and its leader [[Lu Ping]].<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|56–58}} Nie insinuated that the university leadership, much like Peng Zhen, were trying to contain revolutionary fervour in a "sinister" attempt to oppose the party and advance revisionism.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|56–58}}

Mao promptly endorsed Nie's ''dazibao'' as "the first [[Marxism|Marxist]] big-character poster in China." Nie's call-to-arms, now sealed with Mao's personal stamp of approval, had a lasting [[ripple effect]] across all educational institutions in China. Students everywhere began to revolt against their respective schools' party establishment. Classes were promptly cancelled in Beijing primary and secondary schools, followed by a decision on June 13 to expand the class suspension nationwide.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|59–61}} By early June, throngs of young demonstrators lined the capital's major [[thoroughfare]]s holding giant portraits of Mao, beating drums, and shouting slogans against his perceived enemies.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|59–61}}

When the dismissal of Peng Zhen and the municipal party leadership became public in early June, widespread confusion ensued. The public and foreign missions were kept in the dark on the reason for Peng Zhen's ousting.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|62–64}} Even the top Party leadership was caught off guard by the sudden [[anti-establishment]] wave of protest and struggled with what to do next.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|62–64}} After seeking Mao's guidance in [[Hangzhou]], Liu Shaoqi and [[Deng Xiaoping]] decided to send in 'work teams' ({{zh|s=工作组|p=Gōngzuò zǔ|c=|t=|labels=no}})—effectively 'ideological-guidance' squads of [[Cadre (military)|cadres]]—to the city's schools and ''People's Daily'' to restore some semblance of order and re-establish party control.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|62–64}}

The work teams were hastily dispatched and had a poor understanding of student sentiment. Unlike the political movement of the 1950s that squarely targeted intellectuals, the new movement was focused on established party cadres, many of whom were part of the work teams. As a result, the work teams came under increasing suspicion for being yet another group aimed at thwarting revolutionary fervour.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|71}} The party leadership subsequently became divided over whether or not work teams should remain in place. Liu Shaoqi insisted on continuing work-team involvement and suppressing the movement's most radical elements, fearing that the movement would spin out of control.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|75}}

===="Bombard the headquarters" (July 1966)====
{{multiple image
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| footer = In 1966, Mao broke with [[Liu Shaoqi]] (right), then serving as [[President of the People's Republic of China|President of China]], over the work-teams issue. Mao's polemic ''[[Bombard the Headquarters]]'' was widely recognized as targeting Liu, the purported "bourgeois headquarters" of the party.
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[[File:1966-10 1966年毛泽东游长江2.jpg|thumb|right|230px|Mao waved to the "revolutionary masses" on the riverside before his "swim across the [[Yangtze]]", July 1966]]
On July 16, the 72-year-old Chairman Mao took to the [[Yangtze River]] in [[Wuhan]], with the press in tow, in what became an iconic "swim across the Yangtze" to demonstrate his battle-readiness. He subsequently returned to Beijing on a mission to criticize the party leadership for its handling of the work-teams issue. Mao accused the work teams of undermining the student movement, calling for their full withdrawal on July 24. Several days later a rally was held at the [[Great Hall of the People]] to announce the decision and set the new tone of the movement to university and high school teachers and students. At the rally, Party leaders told the masses assembled to 'not be afraid' and bravely take charge of the movement themselves, free of Party interference.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|84}}

The work-teams issue marked a decisive defeat for President Liu Shaoqi politically; it also signaled that disagreement over how to handle the unfolding events of the Cultural Revolution would break Mao from the established party leadership irreversibly. On August 1, the Eleventh [[Plenum (meeting)|Plenum]] of the [[8th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party]] was hastily convened to advance Mao's now decidedly radical agenda. At the plenum, Mao showed outright disdain for Liu, repeatedly interrupting Liu as he delivered his opening day speech.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|94}}

For several days, Mao repeatedly insinuated that the CCP's leadership had contravened his revolutionary vision. Mao's line of thinking received a lukewarm reception from the conference attendees. Sensing that the largely obstructive party elite was unwilling to embrace his revolutionary ideology on a full scale, Mao went on the offensive.{{citation needed}}
{{multiple image
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|footer = ''From left:'' (1) Students at [[Beijing Normal University]] writing [[big-character posters]] denouncing [[Liu Shaoqi]]; (2) Big-characters posted on the campus of [[Peking University]]; (3) Students at Beijing No. 23 Middle School reading ''[[People's Daily]]'' in a classroom during the "resume classes while carrying out the revolution" campaign. All photos from ''[[China Pictorial]]''}}

On July 28, [[Red Guards|Red Guard]] representatives wrote to Mao, calling for rebellion and upheaval to safeguard the revolution. Mao then responded to the letters by writing his own big-character poster entitled ''[[Bombard the Headquarters]]'', rallying people to target the "command centre (i.e., Headquarters) of counterrevolution." Mao wrote that despite having undergone a communist revolution, a "bourgeois" elite was still thriving in "positions of authority" in the government and Communist Party.<ref name="Tang">[[Tsou Tang|Tang, Tsou]]. [1986] 1986. ''The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms: A Historical Perspective''. Chicago: [[University of Chicago Press]]. {{ISBN|0-226-81514-5}}.</ref>

Although no names were mentioned, this provocative statement by Mao has been interpreted as a direct indictment of the party establishment under Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping—the purported "bourgeois headquarters" of China. The personnel changes at the Plenum reflected a radical re-design of the party's hierarchy to suit this new ideological landscape. Liu and Deng kept their seats on the Politburo Standing Committee but were in fact sidelined from day-to-day party affairs. Lin Biao was elevated to become the CCP's number-two figure; Liu Shaoqi's rank went from second to eighth and was no longer Mao's heir apparent.<ref name="Tang"/>

[[File:Guangmei cultural revolution.jpg|thumb|A [[struggle session]] of [[Wang Guangmei]], the wife of Liu Shaoqi.]]
Coinciding with the top leadership being thrown out of positions of power was the thorough undoing of the entire national bureaucracy of the Communist Party. The extensive [[Organization Department of the Chinese Communist Party|Organization Department]], in charge of party personnel, virtually ceased to exist. The Cultural Revolution Group (CRG), Mao's ideological '[[Praetorian Guard]]', was catapulted to prominence to propagate his ideology and rally popular support. The top officials in the Propaganda Department were sacked, with many of its functions folding into the CRG.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|96}}

==== Red August and the Sixteen Points (August 1966) ====
{{Main|Red August}}
[[File:1966-11 1966年毛泽东林彪与红卫兵.jpg|thumb|160px|[[Mao Zedong]] and [[Lin Biao]] surrounded by rallying Red Guards in Beijing, December 1966. Source: ''[[China Pictorial]]'']]

The [[Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung|''Little Red Book'']] (''Mao's Quotations'') was the mechanism that led the Red Guards to commit to their objective as the future for China. These quotes directly from Mao led to other actions by the Red Guards in the views of other Maoist leaders,<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|107}} and by December 1967, 350-million copies of the book had been printed.<ref name=Lu>{{cite book|last=Lu|first=Xing|title=Rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Impact on Chinese Thought, Culture, and Communication|publisher=University of South Carolina Press|year=2004|isbn=978-1570035432}}</ref>{{rp|61–64}} Quotations in the ''Little Red Book'' that the Red Guards would later follow as a guide, provided by Mao, included:

<blockquote>Every Communist must grasp the truth, "[[Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun]]."

Revolutionary war is an antitoxin which not only eliminates the enemy's poison but also purges us of our filth. Every just, revolutionary war is endowed with tremendous power and can transform many things or clear the way for their transformation. The Sino-Japanese war will transform both China and Japan; Provided China perseveres in the War of Resistance and in the united front, the old Japan will surely be transformed into a new Japan and the old China into a new China, and people and everything else in both China and Japan will be transformed during and after the war.

The world is yours, as well as ours, but in the last analysis, it is yours. You young people, full of vigor and vitality, are in the bloom of life, like the sun at eight or nine in the morning. Our hope is placed on you ... The world belongs to you. China's future belongs to you.</blockquote>During the Red August of Beijing, on August 8, 1966, the [[Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party]] passed its "Decision Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," later to be known as the "Sixteen Points."<ref>[http://www.rrojasdatabank.info/16points.htm Decision Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110520195051/http://www.rrojasdatabank.info/16points.htm }}, adopted on August 8, 1966, by the CC of the CCP (official English version)</ref> This decision defined the Cultural Revolution as "a great revolution that touches people to their very souls and constitutes a deeper and more extensive stage in the development of the [[socialist revolution]] in our country:"<ref>{{Cite web|title=1966.8.9 中共中央关于无产阶级文化大革命的决定（附图）|url=http://news.sina.com.cn/c/144490.html|access-date=June 10, 2020|website=[[Sina Corp|Sina]]|language=zh}}</ref><blockquote>

Although the bourgeoisie has been overthrown, it is still trying to use the old ideas, culture, customs, and habits of the exploiting classes to corrupt the masses, capture their minds, and stage a comeback. The proletariat must do just the opposite: It must meet head-on every challenge of the bourgeoisie ... to change the outlook of society. Currently, our objective is to struggle against and crush those people in authority who are taking the capitalist road, to criticize and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois academic "authorities" and the ideology of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes and to transform education, literature and art, and all other parts of the superstructure that do not correspond to the socialist economic base, so as to facilitate the consolidation and development of the socialist system.</blockquote>
The implications of the Sixteen Points were far-reaching. It elevated what was previously a student movement to a nationwide mass campaign that would galvanize workers, farmers, soldiers and lower-level party functionaries to rise, challenge authority, and re-shape the "superstructure" of society.

[[File:1966-11 1966年9月15日天安门游行-八届十一中.jpg|thumb|[[Tiananmen Square]] on September 15, 1966, the occasion of Chairman Mao's third of eight mass rallies with Red Guards in 1966.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://news.cri.cn/gb/9223/2006/04/19/1266@1007752_1.htm |script-title=zh:"毛泽东八次接见红卫兵始末(上) " |script-newspaper=zh:新闻午报 |language=zh |access-date=March 2, 2019 |archive-date=March 6, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190306043233/http://news.cri.cn/gb/9223/2006/04/19/1266@1007752_1.htm |url-status=dead }}</ref> Source: ''[[China Pictorial]]'']]
During the [[Red August]] of Beijing, on August 18, 1966, over a million Red Guards from all over the country gathered in and around [[Tiananmen Square]] in Beijing for a personal audience with the chairman.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|106–07}} Mao personally mingled with Red Guards and encouraged their motivation, donning a Red Guard armband himself.<ref name=Nianyi/>{{rp|66}} Lin Biao also took centre stage at the August 18 rally, vociferously denouncing all manner of perceived enemies in Chinese society that were impeding the "progress of the revolution."<ref name=Nianyi/>{{rp|66}} Subsequently, violence significantly escalated in Beijing and quickly spread to other areas of China.<ref name="Wang-2001-1">{{Cite web |last=Wang |first=Youqin |title=Student Attacks Against Teachers: The Revolution of 1966 |url=http://ywang.uchicago.edu/history/docs/2001_03_05.pdf |website=University of Chicago |page=5}}</ref><ref name="Jian-2006">{{Cite book |last1=Jian |first1=Guo |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=T5-4zOdHKOIC&q=Historical+Dictionary+of+the+Chinese+Cultural+Revolution+red+august&pg=PA237 |title=Historical Dictionary of the Chinese Cultural Revolution |last2=Song |first2=Yongyi |last3=Zhou |first3=Yuan |publisher=Scarecrow Press |isbn=978-0-8108-6491-7 |location= |pages=xxi |language=en |author-link2=Song Yongyi}}</ref>

On August 22, 1966, a central directive was issued to stop police intervention in Red Guard activities, and those in the police force who defied this notice were labeled [[Counter-revolutionary|counter-revolutionaries]].<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|124}} Mao's praise for rebellion encouraged actions of the Red Guards.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|515}} Central officials lifted restraints on violent behavior in support of the revolution.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|126}} [[Xie Fuzhi]], the national police chief, often pardoned Red Guards for their "crimes."<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|125}} In about two weeks, the violence left some 100 officials of the ruling and middle class dead in Beijing's western district alone. The number injured exceeded that.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|126}}

The most violent aspects of the campaign included incidents of torture, murder, and [[public humiliation]]. Many people who were indicted as counter-revolutionaries died by suicide. During the Red August 1966, in Beijing alone 1,772 people were murdered, many of the victims were teachers who were attacked and even killed by their own students.<ref name="Wang-2001" /> In Shanghai, there were 704 suicides and 534 deaths related to the Cultural Revolution in September. In Wuhan, there were 62 suicides and 32 murders during the same period.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|124}} Peng Dehuai was brought to Beijing to be publicly ridiculed.

==== Destruction of the Four Olds ====
{{main|Four Olds}}
[[File:Wanlitod.jpg|thumb|upright=0.8|The remains of [[Ming Dynasty]] [[Wanli Emperor]] at the [[Ming tombs]]. Red Guards dragged the remains of the Wanli Emperor and Empresses to the front of the tomb, where they were posthumously "denounced" and burned.<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/08/arts/08iht-wanli08.html?_r=0 |title=China's reluctant Emperor|newspaper=[[The New York Times]] |access-date=February 15, 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161006175341/http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/08/arts/08iht-wanli08.html?_r=0 |archive-date=October 6, 2016 |url-status=live |last1=Melvin |first1=Shelia}}</ref>]]

Between August and November 1966, eight mass rallies were held in which over 12 million people from all over the country, most of whom were Red Guards, participated.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|106}} The government bore the expenses of Red Guards travelling around the country exchanging "revolutionary experiences".<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|110}}

At the Red Guard rallies, Lin Biao also called for the destruction of the "Four Olds"; namely, old customs, culture, habits, and ideas.<ref name=Nianyi/>{{rp|66}} A revolutionary fever swept the country by storm, with Red Guards acting as its most prominent warriors. Some changes associated with the "Four Olds" campaign were mainly benign, such as assigning new names to city streets, places, and even people; millions of babies were born with "revolutionary"-sounding names during this period.<ref>{{cite web|last=Shi|first=Gang|title=红卫兵"破四旧"的文化与政治|url=http://ww2.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/PaperCollection/Details.aspx?id=5436|access-date=June 10, 2020|website=Chinese University of Hong Kong|language=zh}}</ref>

Other aspects of Red Guard activities were more destructive, particularly in the realms of culture and religion. Various historical sites throughout the country were destroyed. The damage was particularly pronounced in the capital, Beijing. Red Guards also laid siege to the [[Temple of Confucius, Qufu|Temple of Confucius]] in [[Shandong]] province,<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|119}} and numerous other historically significant tombs and artifacts.<ref name="Asiaweek, Volume 10" />

Libraries full of historical and foreign texts were destroyed; [[Book burning|books were burned]]. Temples, churches, mosques, monasteries, and cemeteries were closed down and sometimes converted to other uses, looted, and destroyed.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://wwwistp.murdoch.edu.au/publications/e_public/Case%20Studies_Asia/tourchin/tourchin.htm|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20051225041328/http://wwwistp.murdoch.edu.au/publications/e_public/Case%20Studies_Asia/tourchin/tourchin.htm|url-status=dead|title=murdoch edu|archive-date=December 25, 2005}}</ref> Marxist propaganda depicted [[Buddhism]] as [[superstition]], and religion was looked upon as a means of hostile foreign infiltration, as well as an instrument of the ruling class.<ref name="Dan Smyer 2007">Yu, Dan Smyer. "Delayed contention with the Chinese Marxist scapegoat complex: re-membering Tibetan Buddhism in the PRC." ''The Tibet Journal'', 32.1 (2007)</ref> [[Clergy]] were arrested and sent to camps; many [[Tibetan Buddhism|Tibetan Buddhists]] were forced to participate in the destruction of their [[Monastery|monasteries]] at gunpoint.<ref name="Dan Smyer 2007" />

<gallery>
File:Kong Yanjin - looking north - P1060200.JPG|The [[Cemetery of Confucius]] was attacked by Red Guards in November 1966.<ref name="Asiaweek, Volume 10">{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=dIMMAQAAMAAJ&q=cemetery+Tan+Houlan |title=Asiaweek, Volume 10 |year= 1984 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160427051328/https://books.google.com/books?id=dIMMAQAAMAAJ&q=cemetery+Tan+Houlan |archive-date=April 27, 2016 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Jeni Hung">{{cite magazine |url=http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3724/is_200304/ai_n9228762 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060321075615/http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3724/is_200304/ai_n9228762 |url-status=dead |archive-date=March 21, 2006 |title=Children of Confucius |author=Jeni Hung |magazine=The Spectator |access-date=March 4, 2007 }}</ref>
File:Statue of Emperor - Ming Tombs.jpg|This statue of the [[Yongle Emperor]] was originally carved in stone, and was destroyed in the Cultural Revolution. A metal replica is in its place.
File:Huineng.jpg|The remains of the 8th century Buddhist monk [[Huineng]] were attacked during the Cultural Revolution.
File:SuzhouGardenFrieze.jpg|A frieze damaged during the Cultural Revolution, originally from a garden house of a rich imperial official in Suzhou.
</gallery>

==== Central Work Conference (October 1966) ====
In October 1966, Mao convened a "Central Work Conference", mostly to convince those in the party leadership who had not yet adopted revolutionary ideology. Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were prosecuted as part of a bourgeois [[reactionary]] line (资产阶级反动路线; ''zichanjieji fandong luxian'') and begrudgingly gave self-criticisms.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|137}} After the conference, Liu, once a powerful moderate pundit of the ruling class, was placed under house arrest in Beijing, then sent to a detention camp, where he was denied medical treatment and died in 1969. Deng Xiaoping was sent away for a period of re-education three times and was eventually sent to work in an engine factory in [[Jiangxi]] province. Rebellion by [[Cadre system of the Chinese Communist Party|party cadres]] accelerated after the conference.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Walder |first=Andrew G. |title=Rebellion of the Cadres: The 1967 Implosion of the Chinese Party-State |url=https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/683125 |journal=The China Journal |volume=75 |pages=119 |doi=10.1086/683125 |s2cid=146977237 |issn=1324-9347}}</ref>

====Radicals seize power (1967)====
{{See also|Seizure of power (Cultural Revolution)|Violent Struggle}}

[[File:1968-01 1968年三支两军工作.jpg|thumb|PLA officers and soldiers reading books for the "Three Supports and Two Militaries", 1968]]
Mass organisations in China roughly coalesced into two hostile factions, the [[Rebel faction (Cultural Revolution)|radicals]] who backed Mao's purge of the Communist party, and the conservatives who backed the moderate party establishment. The "support the left" policy was established in late January 1967.<ref name="Tanigawa-2018">{{Cite journal |last=Tanigawa |first=Shinichi |title=The Policy of the Military "Supporting the Left" and the Spread of Factional Warfare in China's Countryside: Shaanxi, 1967–1968 |url=http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0097700417714159 |journal=Modern China |language=en |volume=44 |issue=1 |pages=35–67 |doi=10.1177/0097700417714159 |s2cid=148920995 |issn=0097-7004}}</ref> As conceived by Mao, the policy was intended to support the rebels in seizing power; it required the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to support "the broad mases of the revolutionary leftists in their struggle to seize power."<ref name="Tanigawa-2018" />

In March 1967, the policy was adapted into the "Three Supports and Two Militaries" initiative in which PLA troops were sent to schools and work units across the country in an effort to stabilize political tumult and end factional warfare.<ref name=":22">{{Cite book |last=Xu |first=Youwei |title=Everyday Lives in China's Cold War Military Industrial Complex: Voices from the Shanghai Small Third Front, 1964-1988 |last2=Wang |first2=Y. Yvon |publisher=[[Palgrave MacMillan]] |year=2022 |isbn=9783030996871}}</ref>{{Rp|page=345}} The three "Supports" were: (1) "Support the Left," (2) "Support the Interior," and (3) "Support Industry." The "Two Militaries" referred to "Military Management" and "Military Training."<ref name=":22" />{{Rp|page=345}} The policy of supporting the left was flawed from inception by its failure to define "leftists" at a time when almost all mass organizations claimed to be "leftist" or "revolutionary."<ref name="Tanigawa-2018" /> The PLA commanders had developed close working relations with the party establishment, many military units worked to repress radicals.<ref name=war/>

Spurred by the events in Beijing, '[[Seizure of power (Cultural Revolution)|power seizure]]' (''duoquan'') groups formed all over the country and began expanding into factories and the countryside. In Shanghai, a young factory worker named [[Wang Hongwen]] organized a far-reaching revolutionary coalition, one that galvanized and displaced existing Red Guard groups. On January 3, 1967, with support from CRG heavyweights Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, the group of firebrand activists overthrew the Shanghai municipal government under [[Chen Pixian]] in what became known as the "[[January Storm]]," and formed in its place the [[Shanghai People's Commune]].<ref name=Jiaqi>{{cite book|last1=Jiaqi|first1=Yan|last2=Gao|first2=Gao|title=Turbulent Decade: A History of the Cultural Revolution|publisher=University of Hawai'i Press|year=1996|isbn=978-0824816957}}</ref>{{rp}}<ref name=Lu/>{{rp|115}}

[[File:1967-04 1967年上海造反派庆祝游行.jpg|thumb|[[Rebel faction (Cultural Revolution)|Rebel groups]] of Red Guards marching in Shanghai, 1967]]
Shanghai's was the first provincial level government overthrown.<ref name="Walder-2016">{{Cite journal |last=Walder |first=Andrew G. |title=Rebellion of the Cadres: The 1967 Implosion of the Chinese Party-State |url=https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/683125 |journal=The China Journal |volume=75 |pages=103 |doi=10.1086/683125 |s2cid=146977237 |issn=1324-9347}}</ref> Within days, Mao expressed his approval.<ref name="Walder-2016" /> Provincial governments and many parts of the state and party bureaucracy were affected, with power seizures taking place in a remarkably different fashion. In the next three weeks, 24 more province-level governments were overthrown.<ref name="Walder-2016" /> [[Revolutionary committee (China)|''Revolutionary committees'']] were subsequently established, in place of local governments and branches of the Communist Party.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Bridgham|first=Philip|title=Mao's Cultural Revolution in 1967: The Struggle to Seize Power|journal=The China Quarterly|volume=34|issue=34|pages=6–37|doi=10.1017/S0305741000014417|jstor=651368|s2cid=145582720 |issn=0305-7410}}</ref> For example, in Beijing, three separate revolutionary groups declared power seizures on the same day, while in Heilongjiang, the local party secretary [[Pan Fusheng]] managed to "seize power" from the party organization under his own leadership. Some leaders even wrote the CRG asking to be overthrown.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|170–72}}

In Beijing, Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao made a target out of Vice-Premier [[Tao Zhu]]. The power-seizure movement was rearing its head in the military as well. In February, prominent generals [[Ye Jianying]] and [[Chen Yi (general)|Chen Yi]], as well as Vice-Premier [[Tan Zhenlin]], vocally asserted their opposition to the more extreme aspects of the movement, with some party elders insinuating that the CRG's real motives were to remove the revolutionary old guard. Mao, initially ambivalent, took to the Politburo floor on February 18 to denounce the opposition directly, giving a full-throated endorsement to the radicals' activities. This short-lived resistance was branded the "[[February Countercurrent]]"<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|195–96}}—effectively silencing critics of the movement within the party in the years to come.<ref name=Nianyi/>{{rp|207–09}}

[[File:1967-04 贵州革命派造反.jpg|thumb|right|Rebel groups of Red Guards marching in [[Guizhou]], 1967. The banner in the center reads: "The People's Liberation Army firmly supports the proletarian revolutionary faction."]]
Although in early 1967 popular insurgencies were still limited outside of the biggest cities, local governments nonetheless began collapsing all across China.<ref name="Walder-2019-1">{{Cite book |last=Walder |first=Andrew G. |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1120781893 |title=Agents of disorder : inside China's Cultural Revolution |isbn=978-0-674-24363-7 |location=Cambridge, Massachusetts |pages=172 |oclc=1120781893 |author-link=Andrew G. Walder}}</ref>{{Rp|page=21}} While revolutionaries dismantled ruling government and party organizations all over the country, because power seizures lacked centralized leadership, it was no longer clear who truly believed in Mao's revolutionary vision and who was opportunistically exploiting the chaos for their own gain. The formation of rival revolutionary groups, some manifestations of long-established local feuds, led to factional [[Violent Struggle|violent struggles]] across the country. Tension grew between mass organizations and the military as well. In response, Lin Biao issued a directive for the army to aid the radicals. At the same time, the army took control of some provinces and locales that were deemed incapable of sorting out their own power transitions.<ref name=Nianyi/>{{rp|219–21}}

In the central city of Wuhan, like in many other cities, two major revolutionary organizations emerged, one supporting the conservative establishment and the other opposed to it. The groups fought over the control of the city. [[Chen Zaidao]], the Army general in charge of the area, forcibly repressed the anti-establishment demonstrators who were backed by Mao. However, during the commotion, Mao himself flew to Wuhan with a large entourage of central officials in an attempt to secure military loyalty in the area. On July 20, 1967, local agitators in response kidnapped Mao's emissary [[Wang Li (politician)|Wang Li]] in what became known as the [[Wuhan Incident]]. Subsequently, Gen. Chen Zaidao was sent to Beijing and tried by Jiang Qing and the rest of the Cultural Revolution Group. Chen's resistance was the last major open display of opposition to the movement within the PLA.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|214}}

The Gang of Four's [[Zhang Chunqiao]], admitted that the most crucial factor in the Cultural Revolution was not the Red Guards or the Cultural Revolution Group or the "rebel worker" organisations, but the side on which the PLA stood. When the PLA local garrison supported Mao's radicals, they were able to take over the local government successfully, but if they were not cooperative, the seizures of power were unsuccessful.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|175}} Violent clashes occurred in virtually all cities, according to one historian{{Citation needed}}.

In response to the Wuhan Incident, Mao and Jiang Qing began establishing a "workers' armed self-defence force", a "revolutionary armed force of mass character" to counter what he estimated as rightism in "75% of the PLA officer corps." Chongqing city, a center of arms manufacturing, was the site of ferocious armed clashes between the two factions, with one construction site in the city estimated to involve 10,000 combatants with tanks, mobile artillery, anti-aircraft guns and "virtually every kind of conventional weapon." Ten thousand artillery shells were fired in Chongqing during August 1967.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|214–15}}

Nationwide, a total of 18.77 million firearms, 14,828 artillery pieces, 2,719,545 grenades ended up in civilian hands. They were used in the course of ''violent struggles'' ,which mostly took place from 1967 to 1968. In the cities of [[Chongqing]], [[Xiamen]], and [[Changchun]], tanks, armoured vehicles and even warships were deployed in combat.<ref name="war">{{cite journal|last1=Song|first1=Yongyi|author-link=Song Yongyi|title=Chronology of Mass Killings during the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966–1976)|url=https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/chronology-mass-killings-during-chinese-cultural-revolution-1966-1976|url-status=live|journal=Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence|volume=|pages=|issn=1961-9898|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190425062821/https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/chronology-mass-killings-during-chinese-cultural-revolution-1966-1976|archive-date=April 25, 2019|access-date=April 25, 2019}}</ref>

==== Cleansing the Class Ranks (May–Sept. 1968) ====
{{Main|Cleansing the Class Ranks}}
[[File:SZ 深圳博物館 Shenzhen Museum 深圳改革開放前歷史展廳 Before Reform and Opening-up History IX1 Anti-Liu Shaoqi.jpg|thumb|upright=1.35|An anti-[[Liu Shaoqi]] rally]]

In May 1968, Mao launched the massive "Cleansing the Class Ranks" [[Political purges during and after the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests|political purge]] in [[mainland China]]. Many were sent to the [[Rural society in China|countryside]] to work in reeducation camps. Generally, the campaign targeted rebels from the earlier, more populist, phase of the Cultural Revolution.<ref name=":22" />{{Rp|page=239}}

On July 27, 1968, the Red Guards' power over the PLA was officially ended, and the establishment government sent in units to [[besiege]] areas that remained untouched by the Guards. A year later, the Red Guard factions were dismantled entirely; Mao predicted that the chaos might begin running its own agenda and be tempted to turn against revolutionary ideology. Their purpose had been largely fulfilled; Mao and his radical colleagues had largely overturned establishment power.{{citation needed}}

Liu was expelled from the CCP at the 12th Plenum of the [[8th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|Eighth Central Committee]] in September 1968, and labelled the "headquarters of the bourgeoisie".<ref>{{Cite web|title=Liu Shaoqi rehabilitated|url=https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/ncm-5/lrs-liu.htm|access-date=June 10, 2020|website=www.marxists.org}}</ref>

==== Mao's meeting with student Red Guard leaders (July 1968) ====
As the Red Guard movement had waned over the course of the preceding year, violence by the remaining militant Red Guards increased on some Beijing campuses.<ref name="Russo-2020b">{{Cite book |last=Russo |first=Alessandro |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1156439609 |title=Cultural Revolution and revolutionary culture |publisher=[[Duke University Press]] |isbn=978-1-4780-1218-4 |location=Durham |pages=205–206 |oclc=1156439609}}</ref> Violence was particularly pronounced at [[Qinghua University]], where a few thousand hardliners of two different factions continued to fight.<ref name="Russo-2020c">{{Cite book |last=Russo |first=Alessandro |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1156439609 |title=Cultural Revolution and revolutionary culture |publisher=[[Duke University Press]] |isbn=978-1-4780-1218-4 |location=Durham |pages=206 |oclc=1156439609}}</ref> At Mao's initiative, on July 27, 1968, tens of thousands of workers entered the Qinghua campus shouting slogans in opposition to the violence.<ref name="Russo-2020c" /> Red Guards attacked the workers, who continued to remain peaceful.<ref name="Russo-2020c" /> Ultimately, the workers disarmed the students and occupied the campus.<ref name="Russo-2020c" />

On July 28, 1968, Mao and the Central Group for the Cultural Revolution met with the five most important remaining Beijing Red Guard leaders to address the movement's excessive violence and political exhaustion.<ref name="Russo-2020b" /> It was the only time during the Cultural Revolution that Mao met and addressed the student leaders directly. In response to a Red Guard leader's telegram sent prior to the meeting, which claimed that some "Black Hand" had maneuvered the workers against the Red Guards to suppress the Cultural Revolution, Mao told the student leaders, "The Black Hand is nobody else but me! ... I asked [the workers] how to solve the armed fighting in the universities, and told them to go there to have a look."<ref>{{Cite book |last=Russo |first=Alessandro |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1156439609 |title=Cultural Revolution and revolutionary culture |publisher=[[Duke University Press]] |isbn=978-1-4780-1218-4 |location=Durham |pages=210 |oclc=1156439609}}</ref>

During the meeting, Mao and the Central Group for the Cultural Revolution stated, "[W]e want cultural struggle, we do not want armed struggle" and "The masses do not want civil war."<ref>{{Cite book |last=Russo |first=Alessandro |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1156439609 |title=Cultural Revolution and revolutionary culture |publisher=[[Duke University Press]] |isbn=978-1-4780-1218-4 |location=Durham |pages=217 |oclc=1156439609}}</ref> Mao told the student leaders:<ref>{{Cite book |last=Russo |first=Alessandro |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1156439609 |title=Cultural Revolution and revolutionary culture |publisher=[[Duke University Press]] |isbn=978-1-4780-1218-4 |location=Durham |pages=211 |oclc=1156439609}}</ref>
{{Blockquote|text=You have been involved in the Cultural Revolution for two years: struggle-criticism-transformation. Now, first, you're not struggling; second, you're not criticizing; and third, you're not transforming. Or rather, you are struggling, but it's an armed struggle. The people are not happy, the workers are not happy, city residents are not happy, most people in schools are not happy, most of the students even in your schools are not happy. Even within the faction that supports you, there are unhappy people. Is this the way to unify the world?}}

===="Mango fever" and Mao's cult of personality (August 1968)====
{{Main|Mango cult}}{{See also|Mao Zedong's cult of personality}}
[[File:1967-11 1967年毛泽东接见红卫兵油画.jpg|thumb|A propaganda oil painting of Mao during the Cultural Revolution (1967)]]

In the spring of 1968, a massive campaign that aimed at [[Mao Zedong's cult of personality|enhancing Mao's reputation]] began. A notable example was the "mango fever." On August 4, 1968, Mao was presented with about 40 [[mango]]es by the [[Minister of Foreign Affairs (Pakistan)|Pakistani foreign minister]], [[Sharifuddin Pirzada|Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada]], in an apparent diplomatic gesture.<ref name="Murck2013">{{cite book|author=Alfreda Murck|title=Mao's Golden Mangoes and the Cultural Revolution|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=mymWMQEACAAJ|year=2013|publisher=University of Chicago Press|isbn=978-3-85881-732-7|access-date=September 29, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190228032644/https://books.google.com/books?id=mymWMQEACAAJ|archive-date=February 28, 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> Mao had his aide send the box of mangoes to his Mao Zedong Propaganda Team at [[Tsinghua University]] on August 5, the team stationed there to quiet strife among Red Guard factions.<ref name="Walder2015">{{cite book|author=Andrew G. Walder|title=China Under Mao|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=n_qpBwAAQBAJ&pg=PA280|year=2015|publisher=Harvard University Press|isbn=978-0-674-05815-6|pages=280–81|access-date=September 29, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190228032643/https://books.google.com/books?id=n_qpBwAAQBAJ&pg=PA280|archive-date=February 28, 2019|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Mango UofC P.R.">{{cite book |title=Mao's Golden Mangoes and the Cultural Revolution (Press Release) |url=https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/distributed/M/bo15616713.html |website=University of Chicago Press, Books |publisher=Scheidegger & Spiess |access-date=August 17, 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190929170716/https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/distributed/M/bo15616713.html |archive-date=September 29, 2019 |url-status=live }}</ref> On August 7, an article was published in the ''People's Daily'' saying:

<blockquote>In the afternoon of the fifth, when the great happy news of Chairman Mao giving mangoes to the Capital Worker and Peasant Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Team reached the Tsinghua University campus, people immediately gathered around the gift given by the Great Leader Chairman Mao. They cried out enthusiastically and sang with wild abandonment. Tears swelled up in their eyes, and they again and again sincerely wished that our most beloved Great Leader lived ten thousand years without bounds ... They all made phone calls to their own work units to spread this happy news; and they also organised all kinds of celebratory activities all night long, and arrived at [the national leadership compound] Zhongnanhai despite the rain to report the good news, and to express their loyalty to the Great Leader Chairman Mao.<ref name="Walder2015" /></blockquote>

[[File:Mangoes, The Precious Gift that Great Leader, Chairman Mao Personally Gave to the Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Team of Capital Workers %26 Peasants, China, 1968 - Jordan Schnitzer Museum of Art - DSC09533.jpg|thumb|"Mangoes, The Precious Gift" (Cultural Revolution poster, 1968)]]
Subsequent articles were also written by government officials propagandizing the reception of the mangoes,<ref name="Schrift2001">{{citation|author=Melissa Schrift|title=Biography of a Chairman Mao Badge: The Creation and Mass Consumption of a Personality Cult|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=MQFBcWSPRdYC&pg=PA98|year=2001|publisher=Rutgers University Press|isbn=978-0-8135-2937-0|pages=96–98|access-date=September 29, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190228032643/https://books.google.com/books?id=MQFBcWSPRdYC&pg=PA98|archive-date=February 28, 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> and another poem in the ''People's Daily'' said: "Seeing that golden mango/Was as if seeing the great leader Chairman Mao ... Again and again touching that golden mango/the golden mango was so warm."<ref name="Moore2013">{{cite news|last1=Moore|first1=Malcolm|title=How China came to worship the mango during the Cultural Revolution|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/9914895/How-China-came-to-worship-the-mango-during-the-Cultural-Revolution.html|access-date=January 28, 2016|work=[[The Daily Telegraph]]|location=Beijing|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151120055831/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/9914895/How-China-came-to-worship-the-mango-during-the-Cultural-Revolution.html|archive-date=November 20, 2015|url-status=live}}</ref> Few people at this time in China had ever seen a mango before, and a mango was seen as "a fruit of extreme rarity, like Mushrooms of Immortality."<ref name="Moore2013" />

One of the mangoes was sent to the Beijing Textile Factory,<ref name="Walder2015" /> whose revolutionary committee organised a rally in the mangoes' honour.<ref name="Schrift2001" /> Workers read out quotations from Mao and celebrated the gift. Altars were erected to display the fruit prominently. When the mango peel began to rot after a few days, the fruit was peeled and boiled in a pot of water. Workers then filed by and each was given a spoonful of mango water. The revolutionary committee also made a wax replica of the mango and displayed this as a centrepiece in the factory.<ref name="Walder2015" />

There followed several months of "mango fever," as the fruit became a focus of a "boundless loyalty" campaign for Chairman Mao. More replica mangoes were created, and the replicas were sent on tour around Beijing and elsewhere in China. Many revolutionary committees visited the mangoes in Beijing from outlying provinces. Approximately half a million people greeted the replicas when they arrived in [[Chengdu]]. Badges and wall posters featuring the mangoes and Mao were produced in the millions.<ref name="Walder2015" />

The fruit was shared among all institutions that had been a part of the propaganda team, and large processions were organised in support of the ''zhengui lipin or 珍贵礼品'' ("precious gift"), as the mangoes were known.<ref name="Leese2011">{{citation|author=Daniel Leese|title=Mao Cult: Rhetoric and Ritual in China's Cultural Revolution|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=iqjviY6aFloC&pg=PA221|year=2011|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-139-49811-1|pages=221–22|access-date=September 29, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190228032642/https://books.google.com/books?id=iqjviY6aFloC&pg=PA221|archive-date=February 28, 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> One dentist in a small town, Dr. Han, saw the mango and said it was nothing special and looked just like [[sweet potato]]. He was put on trial for malicious [[Defamation|slander]], found guilty, paraded publicly throughout the town, and then executed with one shot to the head.<ref name="Moore2013" /><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.collectorsweekly.com/articles/the-mao-mango-cult-of-1968/|title=The Mao Mango Cult of 1968 and the Rise of China's Working Class|last1=Marks|first1=Ben|website=Collectors Weekly|language=en|access-date=February 28, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191105161815/https://www.collectorsweekly.com/articles/the-mao-mango-cult-of-1968/|archive-date=November 5, 2019|url-status=live}}</ref>

It has been claimed that Mao used the mangoes to express support for the workers who would go to whatever lengths necessary to end the factional fighting among students, and a "prime example of Mao's strategy of symbolic support."<ref name="Schrift2001" /> Even up until early 1969, participants of [[Mao-Zedong-Thought]] study classes in Beijing would return with mass-produced mango [[facsimiles]] and still gain media attention in the provinces.<ref name="Leese2011" />

==== Down to the Countryside Movement (December 1968) ====
{{Main|Down to the Countryside Movement}}
In December 1968, Mao began the "Down to the Countryside Movement." During this movement, which lasted for the next decade, young bourgeoisie living in cities were ordered to go to the countryside to experience working life. The term "young intellectuals" was used to refer to recently graduated college students. In the late 1970s, these students returned to their home cities. Many students who were previously Red Guard members supported the movement and Mao's vision. This movement was thus in part a means of moving Red Guards from the cities to the countryside, where they would cause less social disruption. It also served to spread revolutionary ideology across China geographically.<ref>{{cite book |author=Donald N. Sull |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-2PVYI4kAtQC&pg=PA18 |title=Made In China: What Western Managers Can Learn from Trailblazing Chinese Entrepreneurs |author2=Yong Wang |publisher=Harvard Business School Press |year=2005 |isbn=978-1591397151 |pages=17–18}}</ref>

=== Lin Biao phase (1969–71) ===

====Transition of power (April 1969)====
The [[9th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party]] was held in April 1969 and served as a means to "revitalize" the party with fresh thinking and new cadres after much of the old guard had been destroyed in the struggles of preceding years.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|285}} The institutional framework of the Party established two decades earlier had broken down almost entirely: delegates for this Congress were effectively selected by Revolutionary Committees rather than through election by party members.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|288}} Representation of the military increased by a large margin from the previous Congress (28% of the delegates were PLA members), and the election of more PLA members to the new Central Committee reflected this increase.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|292}} Many military officers elevated to senior positions were loyal to PLA Marshal Lin Biao, opening a new factional divide between the military and civilian leadership.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|292}}
{{Quote box
|quote = We do not only feel boundless joy because we have as our great leader the greatest Marxist–Leninist of our era, Chairman Mao, but also great joy because we have Vice Chairman Lin as Chairman Mao's universally recognized successor.
|source = — Premier Zhou Enlai at the Ninth Party Congress<ref>As quoted in [[Roderick MacFarquhar|MacFarquhar]] and [[Michael Schoenhals]], p. 291.{{clarify|Which work? Mao's Last Revolution?|date=March 2021}}</ref>
|width = 30%
|align = right
}}

Lin Biao was officially elevated to become the Party's number-two figure, with his name written into the [[Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party|CCP's Constitution]] as Mao's "closest comrade-in-arms" and "universally recognized successor."<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|291}} At the time, no other Communist parties or governments anywhere in the world had adopted the practice of enshrining a successor to the current leader into their constitutions; this practice was unique to China. Lin delivered the [[keynote]] address at the Congress: a document drafted by hardliner leftists Yao Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao under Mao's guidance.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|289}}

The report was heavily critical of Liu Shaoqi and other "counter-revolutionaries" and drew extensively from quotations in the [[Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong|Little Red Book]]. The Congress solidified the central role of [[Maoism]] within the party psyche, re-introducing Maoism as an official guiding ideology of the party in the party constitution. Lastly, the Congress elected a new Politburo with Mao Zedong, Lin Biao, Chen Boda, Zhou Enlai and Kang Sheng as the members of the new Politburo Standing Committee.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|290}}

Lin, Chen and Kang were all beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution. Zhou, who was demoted in rank, voiced his unequivocal support for Lin at the Congress.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|290}} Mao also restored the function of some formal party institutions, such as the operations of the party's Politburo, which ceased functioning between 1966 and 1968 because the Central Cultural Revolution Group held ''[[de facto]]'' control of the country.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|296}}

====PLA gains pre-eminent role====
[[File:Lin Biao.jpg|thumb|upright=0.9|Marshal [[Lin Biao]] was constitutionally confirmed as Mao's successor in 1969.]]

Mao's efforts at re-organizing party and state institutions generated mixed results. Many far-flung provinces remained volatile as the political situation in Beijing stabilized. Factional struggles, many of which were violent, continued at the local level despite the declaration that the 9th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party marked a temporary "victory" for the Cultural Revolution.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|316}} Furthermore, despite Mao's efforts to put on a show of unity at the Congress, the factional divide between Lin Biao's PLA camp and the Jiang Qing-led radical camp was intensifying. Indeed, a personal dislike of Jiang Qing drew many civilian leaders, including prominent theoretician Chen Boda, closer to Lin Biao.<ref name=Jin/>{{rp|115}}

Between 1966 and 1968, China was isolated internationally, having declared its enmity towards both the Soviet Union and the United States. The friction with the Soviet Union intensified after [[Sino-Soviet border conflict|border clashes]] on the [[Ussuri River]] in March 1969 as the Chinese leadership prepared for all-out war.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|317}} In June 1969, the PLA's enforcement of political discipline and suppression of the factions that had emerged during the Cultural Revolution became intertwined with the central Party's efforts to accelerate [[Third Front (China)|Third Front]] work.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=150}} Those who did not return to work would be viewed as engaging in "splittist activities" (''fenlie huodong'') which risked undermining preparations to defend China from potential invasion.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|pages=150-151}}

In October 1969, the Party attempted to focus more on war preparedness and less on suppression of the factions that had emerged during the mass movement phase of the Cultural Revolution.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=151}} That month, senior leaders were evacuated from Beijing.<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|317}} Amidst the tension, Lin Biao issued what appeared to be an executive order to prepare for war to the PLA's eleven [[Military regions of the People's Liberation Army|Military Regions]] on October 18 without passing through Mao. This drew the ire of the chairman, who saw it as evidence that his authority was prematurely usurped by his declared successor.<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|317}}

The prospect of war elevated the PLA to greater prominence in domestic politics, increasing the stature of Lin Biao at the expense of Mao.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|321}} There is some evidence to suggest that Mao was pushed to seek closer relations with the United States as a means to avoid PLA dominance in domestic affairs that would result from a military confrontation with the Soviet Union.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|321}} During his [[1972 Nixon visit to China|meeting]] with U.S. President [[Richard Nixon]] in 1972, Mao hinted that Lin had opposed seeking better relations with the U.S.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|322}}

==== Restoration of Presidency (State Chairman) ====
[[File:前中共國家主席劉少奇在文革中被鬥爭，並遭軟禁折磨，終於病逝河南，其遺體被秘密火化.jpg|thumb|[[Liu Shaoqi]], former President of China, was persecuted to death in November 1969.]]
After Lin was confirmed as Mao's successor, his supporters focused on the restoration of the position of State Chairman (President),<ref>This position, effectively China's de jure [[head of state]], has been called "President" since 1982.</ref> which had been abolished by Mao after the purge of Liu Shaoqi. They hoped that by allowing Lin to ease into a constitutionally sanctioned role, whether Chairman or vice-chairman, Lin's succession would be institutionalized. The consensus within the [[Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party|CCP Politburo]] was that Mao should assume the office with Lin becoming vice-chairman; but perhaps wary of Lin's ambitions or for other unknown reasons, Mao had voiced his explicit opposition to the recreation of the position and his assuming it.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|327}}

Factional rivalries intensified at the Second Plenum of the Ninth Congress in Lushan held in late August 1970. Chen Boda, now aligned with the PLA faction loyal to Lin, galvanized support for the restoration of the office of President of China, despite Mao's wishes to the contrary.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|331}} Moreover, Chen launched an assault on Zhang Chunqiao, a staunch Maoist who embodied the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, over the evaluation of Mao's legacy.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|328}}

The attacks on Zhang found favour with many attendees at the Plenum and may have been construed by Mao as an indirect attack on the Cultural Revolution itself. Mao confronted Chen openly, denouncing him as a "false Marxist,"<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|332}} and removed him from the Politburo Standing Committee. In addition to the purge of Chen, Mao asked Lin's principal generals to write self-criticisms on their political positions as a warning to Lin. Mao also inducted several of his supporters to the Central Military Commission and placed his loyalists in leadership roles of the [[Beijing Military Region]].<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|332}}

====Flight of Lin Biao (September 1971)====
{{Main|Lin Biao incident}}
[[File:Huayangpalace layers 2007 09.jpg|thumb|upright=1.35|Graffiti with Lin Biao's foreword to Mao's Little Red Book, Lin's name (lower right) was later scratched out, presumably after his death.]]

By 1971, diverging interests between the civilian and military wings of the leadership were apparent. Mao was troubled by the PLA's newfound prominence, and the purge of Chen Boda marked the beginning of a gradual scaling-down of the PLA's political involvement.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|353}} According to official sources, sensing the reduction of Lin's power base and his declining health, Lin's supporters plotted to use the military power still at their disposal to oust Mao in a coup.<ref name=Jin/>{{rp}}

Lin's son, [[Lin Liguo]], and other high-ranking military conspirators formed a coup apparatus in Shanghai and dubbed the plan to oust Mao by force ''[[Project 571 Outline|Outline for Project 571]]'', which sounds similar to "Military Uprising" in [[Mandarin Chinese|Mandarin]]. It is disputed whether Lin Biao was involved in this process. While official sources maintain that Lin planned and executed the alleged coup attempt, scholars such as Jin Qiu portray Lin as a passive character manipulated by members of his family and his supporters.<ref name=Jin/>{{rp}} Qiu contests that Lin Biao was never personally involved in drafting the ''Outline'' and evidence suggests that Lin Liguo drafted the coup.<ref name=Jin/>{{rp}}

The ''Outline'' allegedly consisted mainly of plans for aerial bombardments through use of the Air Force. It initially targeted Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, but would later involve Mao himself. If the plan succeeded, Lin would arrest his political rivals and assume power. Assassination attempts were alleged to have been made against Mao in Shanghai, from September 8 to 10, 1971. Perceived risks to Mao's safety were allegedly relayed to the chairman. One internal report alleged that Lin had planned to bomb a bridge that Mao was to cross to reach Beijing; Mao reportedly avoided this bridge after receiving intelligence reports.{{Citation needed}}

==== Death of Lin Biao ====
In the official narrative, on September 13, 1971, Lin Biao, his wife [[Ye Qun]], Lin Liguo, and members of his staff attempted to flee to the Soviet Union ostensibly to [[Asylum seeker|seek asylum]]. En route, Lin's plane crashed in [[Mongolian People's Republic|Mongolia]], killing all on board. The plane apparently ran out of fuel en route to the Soviet Union. A Soviet team investigating the incident was not able to determine the cause of the crash but hypothesized that the pilot was flying low to evade radar and misjudged the plane's altitude.

The official account has been put to question by foreign scholars, who have raised doubts over Lin's choice of the Soviet Union as a destination, the plane's route, the identity of the passengers, and whether or not a coup was actually taking place.<ref name=Jin/>{{rp}}<ref>Hannam and Lawrence 3–4</ref>

On September 13, the Politburo met in an emergency session to discuss Lin Biao. Only on September 30 was Lin's death confirmed in Beijing, which led to the cancellation of the [[National Day of the People's Republic of China|National Day]] celebration events the following day. The Central Committee kept information under wraps, and news of Lin's death was not released to the public until two months following the incident.<ref name=Jin/>{{rp}} Many of Lin's supporters sought refuge in Hong Kong. Those who remained on the mainland were purged.<ref name=Jin/>{{rp}}

The event caught the party leadership off guard: the concept that Lin could betray Mao de-legitimized a vast body of Cultural Revolution political rhetoric and by extension, Mao's absolute authority, as Lin was already enshrined into the Party Constitution as Mao's "closest comrade-in-arms" and "successor." For several months following the incident, the party information apparatus struggled to find a "correct way" to frame the incident for public consumption, but as the details came to light, the majority of the Chinese public felt disillusioned and realised they had been manipulated for political purposes.<ref name=Jin/>{{rp}}

=== "Gang of Four" phase (1972–76) ===
{{Main|Gang of Four}}

====Antagonism towards Zhou and Deng (1972–73)====
{{multiple image|perrow = 2/3|total_width=280
|align =right
| image3 = 1967-07 1967年4月20日北京市革命委员会成立江青.jpg|width3=2466|height3=2952
| image2 = 1967-07_1967年4月20日北京市革命委员会成立_张春桥-上海革委会主任.jpg|width2=633|height2=829
| image4 = Yaowenyuan.jpg |width4=2072|height4=2745
| image1 = Wanghongwen.jpg|width1=3005|height1=4031
| footer = Members of the "[[Gang of Four]]", Clockwise from top-left: [[Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party|Vice Chairman of the CCP]] [[Wang Hongwen]], [[Vice Premier of the People's Republic of China|Vice Premier of China]] [[Zhang Chunqiao]], politician [[Yao Wenyuan]], Mao's wife [[Jiang Qing]]}}
Mao became depressed and reclusive after the Lin Biao incident. With Lin gone, Mao had no ready answers for who would succeed him. Sensing a sudden loss of direction, Mao attempted reaching out to old comrades whom he had denounced in the past. Meanwhile, in September 1972, Mao transferred a 38-year-old cadre from Shanghai, Wang Hongwen, to Beijing and made him vice-chairman of the Party.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|357}} Wang, a former factory worker from a peasant background,<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|357}} was seemingly being groomed for succession.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|364}}

Jiang Qing's position also strengthened after Lin's flight. She held tremendous influence with the radical camp. With Mao's health on the decline, it was clear that Jiang Qing had political ambitions of her own. She allied herself with Wang Hongwen and propaganda specialists Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, forming a political clique later pejoratively dubbed as the "[[Gang of Four]]".<ref name="Yao Wenyuan">{{Cite news|url=http://www.economist.com/node/5381892|title=Yao Wenyuan|newspaper=The Economist|issn=0013-0613|access-date=2016-05-22|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160623212046/http://www.economist.com/node/5381892|archive-date=2016-06-23|url-status=live}}</ref>

[[File:1967-03 1966年12月26日江青周恩来康生接见红卫兵.jpg|thumb|[[Jiang Qing]] (left), who was the wife of Mao Zedong and a member of the [[Gang of Four]], received the [[Red Guards]] in Beijing with Premier [[Zhou Enlai]] (center) and [[Kang Sheng]]. They were all holding the [[Little red book|''Little Red Book'']] (''Quotations from Mao'') in their hands.|alt=]]
By 1973, round after round of political struggles had left many lower-level institutions, including local government, factories, and railways, short of competent staff needed to carry out basic functions.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|340}} China's economy had fallen into disarray, which necessitated the rehabilitation of purged lower-level officials. The party's core became heavily dominated by Cultural Revolution beneficiaries and leftist radicals, whose focus remained to uphold ideological purity over economic productivity. The economy remained the domain of Zhou Enlai mostly, one of the few moderates 'left standing'. Zhou attempted to restore a viable economy but was resented by the Gang of Four, who identified him as their primary political threat in post-Mao era succession.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Forster|first=Keith|title=China's Coup of October 1976|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/189334|journal=Modern China|volume=18|issue=3|pages=263–303|doi=10.1177/009770049201800302 |jstor=189334 |s2cid=143387271 |issn=0097-7004}}</ref>

In late 1973, to weaken Zhou's political position and to distance themselves from Lin's apparent betrayal, the "[[Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius]]" campaign began under Jiang Qing's leadership.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|366}} Its stated goals were to purge China of [[New Confucianism|new Confucianist]] thinking and denounce Lin Biao's actions as traitorous and regressive.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|372}} Reminiscent of the first years of the Cultural Revolution, the battle was carried out through historical allegory, and although Zhou Enlai's name was never mentioned during this campaign, the Premier's historical namesake, the [[Duke of Zhou]], was a frequent target.{{citation needed}}

==== Deng's rehabilitation and economic reconstruction (1975) ====
With a fragile economy and Zhou falling ill to cancer, Deng Xiaoping returned to the political scene, taking up the post of Vice-Premier in March 1973, in the first of a series of promotions approved by Mao. After Zhou withdrew from active politics in January 1975, Deng was effectively put in charge of the government, party, and military, earning the additional titles of [[People's Liberation Army General Staff Department|PLA General Chief of Staff]], Vice-chairman of the Communist Party, and vice-chairman of the [[Central Military Commission (China)|Central Military Commission]] in a short time span.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|381}}

The speed of Deng's rehabilitation took the radical camp, who saw themselves as Mao's 'rightful' political and ideological heirs, by surprise. Mao wanted to use Deng as a counterweight to the military faction in government to suppress any remaining influence of those formerly loyal to Lin Biao. In addition, Mao had also lost confidence in the ability of the Gang of Four to manage the economy and saw Deng as a competent and effective leader. Leaving the country in grinding poverty would do no favours to the positive legacy of the Cultural Revolution, which Mao worked hard to protect. Deng's return set the scene for a protracted factional struggle between the radical Gang of Four and moderates led by Zhou and Deng.{{citation needed}}

At the time, Jiang Qing and associates held effective control of [[mass media]] and the party's [[Propaganda in China|propaganda]] network, while Zhou and Deng held control of most government organs. On some decisions, Mao sought to mitigate the Gang's influence, but on others, he acquiesced to their demands. The Gang of Four's heavy hand in political and media control did not prevent Deng from reinstating his economic policies. Deng emphatically opposed Party factionalism, and his policies aimed to promote unity as the first step to restoring economic productivity.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|381}}

Much like the post-Great Leap restructuring led by Liu Shaoqi, Deng streamlined the [[Rail transport in China|railway system]], [[Steel industry in China|steel production]], and other vital areas of the economy. By late 1975, however, Mao saw that Deng's economic restructuring might negate the legacy of the Cultural Revolution, and launched a campaign to oppose "rehabilitating the case for the rightists," alluding to Deng as the country's foremost "rightist." Mao directed Deng to write self-criticisms in November 1975, a move lauded by the Gang of Four.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|381}}

====Death of Zhou Enlai (early 1976)====
On January 8, 1976, Zhou Enlai died of [[bladder cancer]]. On January 15 Deng Xiaoping delivered Zhou's official [[eulogy]] in a funeral attended by all of China's most senior leaders with the notable absence of Mao himself, who had grown increasingly critical of Zhou.<ref name=Teiwes>{{cite journal|author1=Frederick Teiwes|author2=Warren Sun|title=The First Tiananmen Incident Revisited: Elite Politics and Crisis Management at the End of the Maoist Era|journal=[[Pacific Affairs]]|year=2004|volume=77|issue=2|pages=211–35|jstor=40022499}}</ref>{{rp|217–18}}<ref name=Spence>{{cite book|last=Spence|first=Jonathan|author-link=Jonathan Spence|title=[[The Search for Modern China]]|publisher=[[W.W. Norton and Company]]|year=1999|isbn=0-393-97351-4}}</ref>{{rp|610}} After Zhou's death, Mao selected neither a member of the Gang of Four nor Deng to become Premier, instead choosing the relatively unknown [[Hua Guofeng]].<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=tprrCQAAQBAJ&q=after+Zhou's+death,+Mao+selected+neither+a+member+of+the+Gang+of+Four+nor+Deng+Xiaoping+to+become+Premier,+instead+choosing+the+relatively+unknown+Hua+Guofeng.&pg=PT490|title=The Life/Death Rhythms of Capitalist Regimes – Debt Before Dishonour: Timetable of World Dominance 1400–2100|last1=Slatyer|first1=Will|year=2015|publisher=Partridge Publishing Singapore|isbn=978-1482829617|language=en}}</ref>

The Gang of Four grew apprehensive that spontaneous, large-scale popular support for Zhou could turn the political tide against them. They acted through the media to impose a set of restrictions on overt public displays of mourning for Zhou. Years of resentment over the Cultural Revolution, the public persecution of Deng Xiaoping (seen as Zhou's ally), and the prohibition against public mourning led to a rise in popular discontent against Mao and the Gang of Four.<ref name=Teiwes/>{{rp|213}}

Official attempts to enforce the mourning restrictions included removing public memorials and tearing down posters commemorating Zhou's achievements. On March 25, 1976, Shanghai's ''[[Wen Hui Bao]]'' published an article calling Zhou "the [[capitalist roader]] inside the Party [who] wanted to help the unrepentant capitalist roader [Deng] regain his power." These propaganda efforts at smearing Zhou's image, however, only strengthened public attachment to Zhou's memory.<ref name=Teiwes/>{{rp|214}}

====Tiananmen Incident (Apr. 1976)====
{{Main|1976 Tiananmen Incident}}

On April 4, 1976, on the eve of China's annual [[Qingming Festival]], a traditional day of mourning, thousands of people gathered around the [[Monument to the People's Heroes]] in Tiananmen Square to commemorate Zhou Enlai. The people of Beijing honored Zhou by laying wreaths, banners, poems, placards, and flowers at the foot of the Monument.<ref name=Spence/>{{rp|612}} The most apparent purpose of this memorial was to eulogize Zhou, but the Gang of Four were also attacked for their actions against the Premier. A small number of slogans left at Tiananmen even attacked Mao himself, and his Cultural Revolution.<ref name=Teiwes/>{{rp|218}}

Up to two million people may have visited Tiananmen Square on April 4.<ref name=Teiwes/>{{rp|218}} All levels of society, from the most impoverished peasants to high-ranking PLA officers and the children of high-ranking cadres, were represented in the activities. Those who participated were motivated by a mixture of anger over the treatment of Zhou, revolt against the Cultural Revolution and apprehension for China's future. The event did not appear to have coordinated leadership but rather seemed to be a reflection of public sentiment.<ref name=Teiwes/>{{rp|219–20}}

The Central Committee, under the leadership of Jiang Qing, labelled the event 'counter-revolutionary' and cleared the square of memorial items shortly after midnight on April 6. Attempts to suppress the mourners led to a violent riot. Police cars were set on fire, and a crowd of over 100,000 people forced its way into several government buildings surrounding the square.<ref name=Spence/>{{rp|612}} Many of those arrested were later sentenced to prison. Similar incidents occurred in other major cities. Jiang Qing and her allies pinned Deng Xiaoping as the incident's 'mastermind', and issued reports on official media to that effect. Deng was formally stripped of all positions "inside and outside the Party" on April 7. This marked Deng's second purge in ten years.<ref name=Spence/>{{rp|612}}

====Death of Mao and Arrest of the Gang of Four (Sept. 1976)====
{{See also|Death and state funeral of Mao Zedong}}
On September 9, 1976, Mao Zedong died. To Mao's supporters, his death symbolized the loss of the revolutionary foundation of Communist China. When his death was announced on the afternoon of September 9, in a press release entitled "A Notice from the Central Committee, the NPC, State Council, and the CMC to the whole Party, the whole Army and to the people of all nationalities throughout the country,"<ref>{{cite web|url=http://news.sina.com.cn/c/144508.html |script-title=zh:1976.9.10 毛主席逝世--中共中央等告全国人民书（附图）|publisher=[[Sina Corp|Sina]] |work=[[People's Daily]] |access-date=March 21, 2007|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20041214123917/http://news.sina.com.cn/c/144508.html|archive-date=December 14, 2004|url-status=live}}</ref> the nation descended into grief and mourning, with people weeping in the streets and public institutions closing for over a week. Hua Guofeng chaired the Funeral Committee and delivered the memorial speech.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Memorial speech by Hua Kuo-Feng|url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hua-guofeng/1976/09/18.htm|website=www.marxists.org|access-date=May 7, 2020}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=毛泽东葬礼上的江青：头戴黑纱面无表情_历史频道_凤凰网|url=http://news.ifeng.com/history/zhiqing/detail_2011_12/06/11135418_0.shtml?_from_ralated|website=news.ifeng.com|language=zh|access-date=May 7, 2020}}</ref>

Shortly before dying, Mao had allegedly written the message "With you in charge, I'm at ease," to Hua. Hua used this message to substantiate his position as successor. Hua had been widely considered to be lacking in political skill and ambitions, and seemingly posed no serious threat to the Gang of Four in the race for succession. However, the Gang's radical ideas also clashed with influential elders and a large segment of party reformers. With army backing and the support of Marshal Ye Jianying, on October 6, the [[Central Security Bureau|Special Unit 8341]] had all members of the Gang of Four arrested in a bloodless coup.<ref>{{Cite journal |jstor = 189334|title = China's Coup of October 1976|journal = Modern China|volume = 18|issue = 3|pages = 263–303|last1 = Forster|first1 = Keith|year = 1992|doi = 10.1177/009770049201800302|s2cid = 143387271}}</ref>

After Mao's death, people characterized as "Beating-smashing-looting elements," who were seen as having disturbed the social order during the earlier phases of the Cultural Revolution, were purged or punished.<ref name=":22" />{{Rp|page=359}} "Beating-smashing-looting elements" had typically been aligned with rebel factions.<ref name=":22" />{{Rp|page=359}}

==Aftermath==

=== Transition period ===
Although Hua Guofeng publicly denounced the Gang of Four in 1976, he continued to invoke Mao's name to justify Mao-era policies. Hua spearheaded what became known as the [[Two Whatevers]],<ref name = "Harding"/> namely, "Whatever policy originated from Chairman Mao, we must continue to support," and "Whatever directions were given to us from Chairman Mao, we must continue to follow." Like Deng, Hua wanted to reverse the damage of the Cultural Revolution; but unlike Deng, who wanted to propose new economic models for China, Hua intended to move the Chinese economic and political system towards Soviet-style planning of the early 1950s.<ref>[[Gilbert Rozman|Rozman, Gilbert]]. 2014. ''The Chinese Debate about Soviet Socialism, 1978–1985''. Princeton: [[Princeton University Press]]. pp. 63–68. {{ISBN|978-1400858590}}.
</ref><ref>Ferdinand, Peter. 1986. "China." pp. 194–204 in ''Leadership and Succession in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China'', edited by [[Martin McCauley (historian)|M. McCauley]] and S. Carter. Armonk, NY: [[M. E. Sharpe]].</ref>

It became increasingly clear to Hua that, without Deng Xiaoping, it was difficult to continue daily affairs of state. On October 10, Deng Xiaoping personally wrote a letter to Hua asking to be transferred back to state and party affairs; party elders also called for Deng's return. With increasing pressure from all sides, Premier Hua named Deng Vice-Premier in July 1977, and later promoted him to various other positions, effectively catapulting Deng to China's second-most powerful figure. In August, the [[11th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party]] was held in Beijing, officially naming (in ranking order) Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, [[Li Xiannian]] and Wang Dongxing as new members of the Politburo Standing Committee.<ref>[http://www.nihaotw.com/zhuanti/16da/pages/ghls_11.htm Basic Knowledge about the Communist Party of China: The Eleventh Congress] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070624082411/http://www.nihaotw.com/zhuanti/16da/pages/ghls_11.htm }}</ref>

===Repudiation of the Cultural Revolution by Deng===
{{See also|Boluan Fanzheng|1978 Truth Criterion Controversy|Reforms and Opening Up}}
[[File:Deng Xiaoping.jpg|thumb|[[Deng Xiaoping]] became the [[Paramount Leader of China|paramount leader of China]] in 1978. He started "[[Boluan Fanzheng]]" that brought the country back to order, and initiated China's historic [[Reforms and Opening Up|Reforms and Opening up]].|alt=]]

Deng Xiaoping first proposed the idea of "[[Boluan Fanzheng]]" in September 1977 in order to correct the mistakes of the Cultural Revolution. In May 1978, Deng seized the opportunity to elevate his protégé [[Hu Yaobang]] to power. Hu published an article in the ''[[Guangming Daily (China)|Guangming Daily]]'', making clever use of Mao's quotations while lauding Deng's ideas. Following this article, Hua began to shift his tone in support of Deng. On July 1, Deng publicized Mao's self-criticism report of 1962 regarding the failure of the Great Leap Forward. With an expanding power base, in September 1978, Deng began openly attacking Hua Guofeng's "Two Whatevers".<ref name="Harding">Harding, Harry. [1987] (1987). China's Second Revolution: Reform after Mao. Brookings Institution Press. {{ISBN|0-8157-3462-X}}</ref>

On December 18, 1978, the pivotal [[3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee]] was held. At the congress, Deng called for "a liberation of thoughts" and urged the party to "[[seek truth from facts]]" and abandon ideological dogma. The Plenum officially marked the beginning of the [[economic reform in the People's Republic of China|economic reform era]], with Deng becoming the second paramount leader of China. Hua Guofeng engaged in self-criticism and called his "Two Whatevers" a mistake. Wang Dongxing, a trusted ally of Mao, was also criticized. At the Plenum, the Party reversed its verdict on the Tiananmen Incident. Disgraced former Chinese president Liu Shaoqi was allowed a belated state funeral.<ref>Andrew, Christopher. Mitrokhin, Vasili. [2005] (2005). The World was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World. Basic Books Publishing. {{ISBN|0-465-00311-7}}</ref> Peng Dehuai, one of China's [[Ten Marshals|ten marshals]] and the first Minister of National Defense, was persecuted to death during the Cultural Revolution; he was politically rehabilitated in 1978.

At the Fifth Plenum held in 1980, Peng Zhen, [[He Long]] and other leaders who had been purged during the Cultural Revolution were politically rehabilitated. Hu Yaobang became head of the [[Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party]] as its [[Secretary-general of the Chinese Communist Party|Secretary-general]]. In September, Hua Guofeng resigned and [[Zhao Ziyang]], another Deng ally, was named [[Premier of the People's Republic of China|Premier of China]]. Deng remained the [[Chairman of the Central Military Commission (China)|Chairman of the Central Military Commission]], but formal power was transferred to a new generation of pragmatic reformers, who reversed Cultural Revolution policies to a large extent during the Boluan Fanzheng period. Within a few years from 1978, Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang helped rehabilitate over 3 million "unjust, false, erroneous" cases in Cultural Revolution.<ref>{{cite web|title=胡耀邦同志领导平反"六十一人案"追记|url=http://www.hybsl.cn/zonghe/xinwen/2008-01-23/7141.html|access-date=February 17, 2020|website=www.hybsl.cn|publisher=[[People's Daily]]|language=zh}}</ref> In particular, the trial of the Gang of Four took place in Beijing from 1980 to 1981, and the court stated that 729,511 people had been persecuted by the Gang, of whom 34,800 were said to have died.<ref>James P. Sterba, ''The New York Times'', January 25, 1981</ref>

In 1981, the Chinese Communist Party passed a resolution and declared that the Cultural Revolution was "responsible for the most severe setback and the heaviest losses suffered by the Party, the country, and the people since the founding of the People's Republic."<ref name="PRC-2020" /><ref name="Wilson Center-1981" /><ref name="CCCCP-11" />

== Humanitarian crisis ==
===Death toll===
{{see also|List of disasters in China by death toll}}
[[File:Xi Zhongxun on struggle session in September 1967.jpg|thumb|A [[struggle session]] of [[Xi Zhongxun]], the father of [[Xi Jinping]] (September 1967). Xi Zhongxun was labelled as an "anti-Party element". There were attempts to play down the effect of the Cultural Revolution under Xi, and his consolidation of power have sparked worries about return to one-man rule seen under Mao.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Beijing Revises 'Correct' Version of Party History Ahead of Centenary|url=https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/history-04152021091451.html|access-date=May 20, 2021|website=Radio Free Asia|language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|last=Cole|first=J. Michael|title=The Chinese Communist Party is playing dangerous games with history|url=https://ipolitics.ca/2021/04/22/the-chinese-communist-party-is-playing-dangerous-games-with-history/|url-status=live|access-date=May 20, 2021|website=iPolitics|language=en-US|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210422235008/https://ipolitics.ca/2021/04/22/the-chinese-communist-party-is-playing-dangerous-games-with-history/ |archive-date=April 22, 2021 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=With whiffs of Cultural Revolution, Xi calls for struggle 50 times|url=https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/With-whiffs-of-Cultural-Revolution-Xi-calls-for-struggle-50-times|access-date=May 20, 2021|website=Nikkei Asia|language=en-GB}}</ref>]]

Death toll estimates from different sources vary greatly, ranging from hundreds of thousands to 20 million.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Chirot |first=Daniel |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=e-kVgozyE8gC&dq=At+least+one+million+died,+though+some+estimates+of+deaths+go+as+high+as+20+million&pg=PA198 |title=Modern Tyrants: The Power and Prevalence of Evil in Our Age |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-0-691-02777-7 |pages=198 |language=en |quote=At least one million died, though some estimates of deaths go as high as 20 million |author-link=Daniel Chirot}}</ref><ref name="Song-2011c">{{Cite web |last=Song |first=Yongyi |author-link=Song Yongyi |title=文革中到底"非正常死亡"了多少人？——读苏扬的《文革中中国农村的集体屠杀》 |trans-title=How many really died in the Cultural Revolution?——After reading Su Yang's ''Collective Killings in Rural China during the Cultural Revolution'' |url=http://www.cnd.org/cr/ZK11/cr651.gb.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220624112011/http://www.cnd.org/cr/ZK11/cr651.gb.html |archive-date=2022-06-24 |access-date= |website=China News Digest |language=zh}}</ref><ref name="Ling-2011">{{Cite web |last1=Ling |first1=Zhijun |last2=Ma |first2=Licheng |title="四人帮"被粉碎后的怪事："文革"之风仍在继续吹 |trans-title=The strange thing after the collapse of the Gang of Four: the wind of Cultural Revolution continued to blow |url=http://history.people.com.cn/GB/205396/13852546.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200622104204/http://history.people.com.cn/GB/205396/13852546.html |archive-date=2020-06-22 |website=[[People's Daily]] |language=zh |quote=粉碎“四人帮”之后，叶剑英在一次讲话中沉痛地说：“文化大革命”死了2000万人，整了1亿人，浪费了8000亿人民币。}}</ref><ref name="Pye-1986">{{cite journal |last1=Pye |first1=Lucian W. |title=Reassessing the Cultural Revolution |journal=The China Quarterly |volume=108 |issue=108 |pages=597–612 |doi=10.1017/S0305741000037085 |issn=0305-7410 |jstor=653530 |s2cid=153730706}}</ref><ref name="WangS-2012">{{cite web |title=Remembering the dark days of China's Cultural Revolution |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1017272/remembering-dark-days-chinas-cultural-revolution |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180609084717/http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1017272/remembering-dark-days-chinas-cultural-revolution |archive-date=June 9, 2018 |access-date=November 29, 2019 |website=[[South China Morning Post]]}}</ref><ref name="Strauss-1994">{{cite news |last1=Strauss |first1=Valerie |last2=Southerl |first2=Daniel |title=How Many Died? New Evidence Suggests Far Higher Numbers For the Victims of Mao Zedong's Era |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]] |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/07/17/how-many-died-new-evidence-suggests-far-higher-numbers-for-the-victims-of-mao-zedongs-era/01044df5-03dd-49f4-a453-a033c5287bce/ |url-status=live |access-date=May 9, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190509114452/https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/07/17/how-many-died-new-evidence-suggests-far-higher-numbers-for-the-victims-of-mao-zedongs-era/01044df5-03dd-49f4-a453-a033c5287bce/ |archive-date=May 9, 2019 |issn=0190-8286}}</ref><ref name="WPF-2016">{{cite web |last1= |first1= |title=China: the Cultural Revolution {{!}} Mass Atrocity Endings |url=https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2016/12/14/china-the-cultural-revolution/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191128203527/https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2016/12/14/china-the-cultural-revolution/ |archive-date=November 28, 2019 |access-date=November 29, 2019 |publisher=[[World Peace Foundation]]}}</ref><ref name="EB-2019">{{cite encyclopedia |title=A Brief Overview of China's Cultural Revolution |encyclopedia=[[Encyclopedia Britannica]] |url=https://www.britannica.com/story/chinas-cultural-revolution |access-date=June 12, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190706210051/https://www.britannica.com/story/chinas-cultural-revolution |archive-date=July 6, 2019 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="White-2011">{{cite web |title=Source List and Detailed Death Tolls for the Primary Megadeaths of the Twentieth Century |url=http://necrometrics.com/20c5m.htm#Mao |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120722010621/http://necrometrics.com/20c5m.htm#Mao |archive-date=July 22, 2012 |access-date=November 9, 2014 |work=Necrometrics}}</ref> In addition, the [[1975 Banqiao Dam failure]], considered by some as the world's greatest technological catastrophe of the 20th century, resulted in an estimated death toll between 26,600 and 240,000; the disaster, which took place during the Cultural Revolution, was covered up until at least 1989.<ref>{{Cite web |title=230,000 Died in a Dam Collapse That China Kept Secret for Years |url=https://www.ozy.com/flashback/230000-died-in-a-dam-collapse-that-china-kept-secret-for-years/91699/ |access-date=March 26, 2020 |website=OZY}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=75·8板桥水库溃坝 20世纪最大人类技术灾难 |url=http://phtv.ifeng.com/program/shnjd/detail_2012_09/03/17307554_2.shtml |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200323211626/http://phtv.ifeng.com/program/shnjd/detail_2012_09/03/17307554_2.shtml |archive-date=2020-03-23 |website=[[Phoenix Television]] |language=zh}}</ref>

Most deaths arose after the end of the mass movement phase of the Cultural Revolution<ref name=":0">{{Cite book |last=Walder |first=Andrew G. |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1120781893 |title=Agents of disorder : inside China's Cultural Revolution |isbn=978-0-674-24363-7 |location=Cambridge, Massachusetts |pages=23 |oclc=1120781893}}</ref> when there were organized campaigns to consolidate order in workplaces and communities.<ref name="Walder-20192">{{Cite book |last=Walder |first=Andrew G. |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1120781893 |title=Agents of disorder : inside China's Cultural Revolution |isbn=978-0-674-24363-7 |location=Cambridge, Massachusetts |pages=143 |oclc=1120781893 |author-link=Andrew G. Walder}}</ref>{{rp||page=172}} As Walder summarizes, "[T]he cure for factional warfare was far worse than the disease."<ref name=":0" />

[[Literature review]]s of the overall death toll due to the Cultural Revolution usually include the following.<ref name="Song-2011c" /><ref name="Yan2016">{{cite journal |last=Yan |first=Fei |title=政治運動中的集體暴力：「非正常死亡」再回顧（1966-1976） |trans-title=Collective violence in political movements: a review of the "unnatural deaths" (1966-1976) |url=https://www.cuhk.edu.hk/ics/21c/media/articles/c155-201603016.pdf |journal=二十一世紀 (Twenty-first Century Online, by Chinese University of Hong Kong) |volume=155 |pages=64–65, 74}}</ref><ref name="open2012">{{cite journal |last=Jin |first=Zhong |title=最新版文革死亡人數 |script-title= |trans-title=The latest version of the Cultural Revolution death toll |url=http://www.open.com.hk/content.php?id=1008 |url-status=live |journal=Open Magazine |location=Hong Kong |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220629225002/http://www.open.com.hk/content.php?id=1008%23.YrzXDnbMJw8 |archive-date=2022-06-29}}</ref>
{| class="wikitable sortable"
|+
!Time
!Source
!Death Toll (in million)
!Remarks
|-
|2014
|[[Andrew G. Walder]]
|1.1–1.6<ref name="Walder-2014">{{cite journal |last=Walder |first=Andrew G. |title=Rebellion and Repression in China, 1966–1971 |journal=Social Science History |volume=38 |issue=3–4 |pages=513–539 |doi=10.1017/ssh.2015.23 |s2cid=143087356}}</ref>
|Death toll between 1966 and 1971 was examined.<ref name="Walder-2014" /> Walder reviewed the reported deaths in 2,213 county annals from every [[county (China)|Chinese county]] and interpreted the annals' vague language in the most conservative manner. For instance, "some died" and "a couple died" were interpreted as zero death, while "death in the scale of tens/hundreds/thousands" were interpreted as "ten/a hundred/a thousand died". While critics praised this approach as "much more empirical than other approaches",<ref name="Yan2016" /> the reported deaths certainly underestimate the actual deaths, especially because some annals actively cover up deaths.<ref name="Song-2011c" /><ref name="open2012" /><ref name="Song-2017">{{Cite web |last=Song |first=Yongyi |author-link=Song Yongyi |title=广西文革绝密档案中的大屠杀和性暴力 |trans-title=Massacres and sexual violence recorded in the classified documents of the Cultural Revolution in Guangxi |url=http://www.cnd.org/cr/ZK17/cr905.gb.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220622192624/http://www.cnd.org/cr/ZK17/cr905.gb.html |archive-date=2022-06-22 |access-date= |website=China News Digest}}</ref> It should also be noted that the editors of the annals were supervised by the [[Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party|propaganda department of the CCP]].<ref name="Song-2011c" /><ref name="Song-2017" /> In 2003, Walder and Yang Su coauthored a paper along this approach, but with fewer county annals available at the time.<ref name="Yan2016" /><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Walder |first1=Andrew G. |last2=Su |first2=Yang |title=The Cultural Revolution in the Countryside: Scope, Timing and Human Impact |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/20058959 |journal=The China Quarterly |volume=173 |issue=173 |pages=74–99 |doi=10.1017/S0009443903000068 |jstor=20058959 |s2cid=43671719 |issn=0305-7410}}</ref>
|-
|1999
|Shu Ding
|2<ref name="Open Magazine-1999">{{cite news |title=兩百萬人含恨而終─文革死亡人數統計 |journal=Open Magazine |location=Hong Kong}} A different version appears in: {{Cite news |last=Ding |first=Shu |title=文革死亡人数的一家之言 |language=zh |work=China News Digest |url=http://www.cnd.org/CR/ZK04/cr209.hz8.html}}</ref>
|Ding claimed that 100,000 were killed in the Red Terror in 1966, 200,000 committed suicide, 300,000–500,000 killed in [[violent struggle]]s, 500,000 killed during [[Cleansing the Class Ranks]], 200,000 killed in the [[One Strike-Three Anti Campaign]] and the [[May Sixteenth elements|Anti-May Sixteenth Elements Campaign]].<ref name="Open Magazine-1999" /><ref name="Song-2011c" /><ref name="Yan2016" /><ref name="open2012" />
|-
|1996
|CCP Party History Research Center
|1.728<ref name="ConsensusNet-2016">{{Cite web |title=文革五十周年：必须再来一次反文革 |trans-title=Fiftieth anniversary of the Cultural Revolution: Cultural Revolution must be opposed once again |url=http://www.hybsl.cn/beijingcankao/beijingfenxi/2016-01-08/56368.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200625142850/http://www.hybsl.cn/beijingcankao/beijingfenxi/2016-01-08/56368.html |archive-date=2020-06-25 |website=胡耀邦史料信息网 |publisher=[[Consensus (website)|Consensus Net]]}}</ref>
|The 1.728 million were counted as "[[unnatural death]]s", among which 9.4% (162,000) were CCP party members and 252,000 were intellectuals. The figures were extracted from a book (《建国以来历次政治运动事实》 ''Facts on the Successive Political Movements since the Founding of the PRC'') by the CCP Party History Research Center, which states that "according to CCP internal investigations in 1978 and 1984 ... 21.44 million were investigated, 125 million got implicated in these investigations; [...] 4.2 million were detained (by Red Guards and other non-police), 1.3 million were arrested by police, 1.728 million of [[unnatural death]]s; [...] 135,000 were executed for crimes of counter-revolution; [...] during [[violent struggle]]s 237,000 were killed and 7.03 million became disabled".<ref name="ConsensusNet-2016" /><ref>{{cite news |title=Title unknown |journal=Zhengming Magazine |location=Hong Kong |quote=中共一九七八年和一九八四年的内部调查 ...「两千一百四十四万余人受到审查、冲击；一亿两千五百余万人受到牵连、影响」...「四百二十余万人曾被关押、隔离审查；一百三十余万人曾被公安机关拘留、逮捕；一百七十二万八千余人非正常死亡 ...「十三万五千余人被以现行反革命罪判为死刑；在武斗中有二十三万七千余人死亡，七十三万余人伤残」}}</ref> While these internal investigations were never mentioned or published in any other official documents, the scholarly consensus found these figures very reasonable.<ref name="open2012" /> [[Chen Yung-fa]] endorsed the figures, yet he noted that peasants suffered far more in the [[Great Leap Forward]] than in the Cultural Revolution.<ref name="Chen 1998">{{cite book |last=Chen |first=Yung-fa |title=中國共產革命七十年 (下) |publisher=Linking Publishing Company |year=1998 |location=[[Taipei]] |page=817 |language=zh |quote=文化大革命的非正常死亡人數只有大躍進的十分之一不到, 從農民觀點來看, 其錯誤之嚴重, 遠遠不如大躍進 ... 二千六百萬人慘死 |author-link=Chen Yung-fa}}</ref>
|-
|1991
|[[Rudolph J. Rummel]]
|7.731<ref name="Rummel-1991">{{Cite book |last1=Rummel |first1=R. J. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=iIEPoEL4lG0C&q=7,731,000+cultural+revolution&pg=PA263 |title=China's Bloody Century: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900 |publisher=Transaction Publishers |isbn=9781412814003 |page=263}}</ref>
|Rummel included his estimate of ''[[Laogai]]'' camp deaths in this figure.<ref name="Yan2016" /> He estimated that 5% of the 10 million people in the Laogai camps died each year of the 12-year period, and that this amounts to roughly 6 million. He estimated that another 1.613 million were killed outright, a middle-ground figure he picked between 285,000 and 10,385,000, a range he deemed plausible.<ref name="Rummel-1991" />
|-
|1982
|[[Ye Jianying]]
|3.42
|Several sources have recorded a statement made by Marshall [[Ye Jianying]], "''683,000 deaths in the cities, 2.5 million deaths in the countryside, among which 1.2 million belong to the 'rich peasants' class, much more than the deaths of 0.2 million rich peasants in the [[Chinese Land Reform|Communist land redistribution]] campaign.''"<ref name="open2012" /><ref name="ConsensusNet-2016" /><ref name="Dai-2016" /> This quote is attributed to Ye Jianying, then [[Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party|Vice Chairman of the CCP]], in a 1982 CCP meeting, according to an unnamed bureaucrat in Beijing interviewed by an editor of the ''Open Magazine (Hong Kong)'' in 2012.<ref name="open2012" /><ref name="Dai-2016">{{cite news |last=Dai |first=Kaiyuan |title=文革的本质：一场大清洗 |language=zh |trans-title=The nature of the Cultural Revolution: a great purge |work=China News Digest |url=http://www.cnd.org/cr/ZK16/cr859.gb.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220408122445/http://www.cnd.org/cr/ZK16/cr859.gb.html |archive-date=2022-04-08 |quote=Note 12}}</ref> Meanwhile, several sources have also mentioned that Marshall Ye Jianying claimed the death toll to be 20 million during a CCP working conference in December, 1978.<ref name="Song-2011c" /><ref name="Ling-2011" /><ref name="Pye-1986" /><ref name="WangS-2012" /><ref name="open2012" />
|-
|1979
|''[[Agence France Presse]]''
|0.4<ref name="AGP-1979">''Agence France Presse'', Beijing, February 3, 1979; compiled into [[Foreign Broadcast Information Service|FBIS]]-Chi 79.25 (February 5, 1979), p. E2.{{Title missing}}</ref>
|This figure was obtained by an ''AFP'' correspondent in Beijing, citing an unnamed but "usually reliable" source.<ref name="AGP-1979" /> In 1986, [[Maurice Meisner]] referred to this number as a "widely accepted nationwide figure", but also said "The toll may well have been higher. It is unlikely that it was less."<ref>{{cite book |last=Meisner |first=Maurice |url=https://archive.org/details/maoschinaaftera00meis/page/371/ |title=Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic |publisher=Free Press |year=1986 |edition=2nd |pages=371–372, 394 |quote=Li's estimate for Guangdong is roughly consistent with a widely accepted nationwide figure of 400,000 Cultural Revolution deaths, a number first reported in 1979 by the Agence France Presse correspondent in Peking based on estimates of unofficial but “usually reliable” Chinese sources. The toll may well have been higher. It is unlikely that it was less.}}</ref> Jonathan Leightner asserted that the number is "perhaps one of the best estimates".<ref>{{Cite book |last=Leightner |first=Jonathan |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=RzUlDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA27 |title=Ethics, Efficiency and Macroeconomics in China: From Mao to Xi |publisher=[[Taylor & Francis]] |isbn=978-1-351-80583-4 |pages=27 |language=en |quote=There is no agreement on how many people died during the Cultural Revolution. Perhaps one of the best estimates is 400,000, made by a Beijing correspondent for Agence France-Presse (Meisner 1999: 354).}}</ref>
|}

=== Massacres and cannibalism ===
{{See also|List of massacres in China|Human_cannibalism#China|label 2=Human Cannibalism In China}}
[[File:Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong in Wuxuan 2.jpg|thumb|Quotations of Mao Zedong on a street wall of [[Wuxuan County]], one of the centers of Guangxi massacre and cannibalism during the Cultural Revolution]]

During the Cultural Revolution, [[massacre]]s took place across mainland China, including:<ref name="Song-2011a">{{Cite web |last=Song |first=Yongyi |author-link=Song Yongyi |title=Chronology of Mass Killings during the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) |url=https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/chronology-mass-killings-during-chinese-cultural-revolution-1966-1976.html |access-date=December 27, 2019 |website=[[Sciences Po]] |language=en}}</ref>
* the [[Guangxi Massacre]], in which massive [[Human cannibalism|cannibalism]] occurred;
* the [[Inner Mongolia incident]];
* the [[Guangdong Cultural Revolution Massacre|Guangdong Massacre]];
* the [[Yunnan Cultural Revolution Massacre (disambiguation)|Yunnan Massacres]];
* the [[Hunan Cultural Revolution Massacre (disambiguation)|Hunan Massacres]];
* the [[Red August|Beijing Massacre]] (i.e. [[Red August]]); and
* the [[Ruijin Massacre]].

These massacres were mainly led and organized by local revolutionary committees, Communist Party branches, [[militia]], and even the military.<ref name="Song-2011a" /><ref name="Song-2002">{{Cite book |last=Song |first=Yongyi |title=文革大屠杀 (Cultural Revolution Massacres) |publisher=开放杂志出版社 |year=2002 |isbn=978-9627934097 |location=Hong Kong |pages= |author-link=Song Yongyi}}</ref><ref name="Yang-2006" /> Most of the victims in the massacres were members of the [[Five Black Categories]] as well as their children, or members of the "rebel groups ({{Lang-zh|c=|s=|t=造反派|p=|labels=no}})". Chinese scholars have estimated that at least 300,000 people died in these massacres.<ref name="Song-2002" /><ref name="Yang-2017">{{Cite book |last=Yang |first=Jisheng |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=4d4qDwAAQBAJ&dq=%E5%A4%A9%E5%9C%B0%E7%BF%BB%E8%A6%86+%E4%B8%8D%E4%BD%8E%E4%BA%8E30%E4%B8%87%E4%BA%BA&pg=PT524 |title=天地翻覆—中国文化大革命史 |publisher=Cosmos Books Ltd (天地图书有限公司) |isbn= |location=Hong Kong |pages= |language=zh |author-link=Yang Jisheng (journalist)}}</ref> Collective killings in [[Guangxi province|Guangxi Province]] and [[Guangdong Province]] were among the most serious. In Guangxi, the official annals of at least 43 counties have records of massacres, with 15 of them reporting a death toll of over 1,000, while in Guangdong at least 28 county annals record massacres, with 6 of them reporting a death toll of over 1,000.<ref name="Yang-2006">{{Cite journal |last1=Yang |first1=Su |title="文革"中的集体屠杀：三省研究 |trans-title=Collective killings in the Cultural Revolution: a study of three provinces |url=https://www.modernchinastudies.org/cn/issues/past-issues/93-mcs-2006-issue-3/974-2012-01-05-15-35-10.html |journal=Modern China Studies |language=zh |volume=3}}</ref>
* In the [[Guangxi Massacre]], the official record shows an estimated death toll from 100,000 to 150,000.<ref name="RFA-2016">{{Cite web|url=https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/china-cultrev-04292016134149.html|title=Interview: 'People Were Eaten by The Revolutionary Masses'|website=Radio Free Asia|language=en|access-date=November 30, 2019}}</ref><ref name="Yan">{{Cite web|last1=Yan|first1=Lebin|title=我参与处理广西文革遗留问题|url=http://www.yhcqw.com/34/8938.html|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201124094818/http://www.yhcqw.com/34/8938.html|archive-date=November 24, 2020|access-date=November 29, 2019|website=[[Yanhuang Chunqiu]]|language=zh}}</ref> According to ''[[Mao: The Unknown Story]]'', an estimated 100,000 people died in one of the worst [[Violent Struggle|violent struggles]] in [[Guangxi]] between January and April 1968, before Premier [[Zhou Enlai]] sent the [[People's Liberation Army|PLA]] to intervene.<ref name="Chang">{{cite book|last1=Chang|first1=Jung|title=[[Mao: The Unknown Story]]|last2=Halliday|first2=Jon|publisher=Knopf|year=2005|isbn=0679422714|pages=}}</ref>{{rp|545}} Zheng Yi's ''[[Scarlet Memorial: Tales of Cannibalism in Modern China]]'' alleged that "systematic killing and [[Human cannibalism|cannibalization]] of individuals in the name of political revolution and '[[class struggle]]'{{-"}} among the [[Zhuang people]] in [[Wuxuan County]] during that period.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Zheng|first1=Yi|title=Scarlet Memorial: Tales of Cannibalism in Modern China|publisher=Westview Press|year=1996|isbn=081332615X|location=Boulder, Colo.}}, p. 198</ref> Zheng was criticized in China for reliance on unpublished interviews and for the negative portrayal of a Chinese ethnic minority,<ref name="Chen">{{Cite book|last1=Chen|first1=Xiaomei|title=Acting the Right Part: Political Theatre and Popular Drama in Contemporary China|publisher=University of Hawaii Press|year=2002|pages=30–31}}</ref> although senior party historians corroborated allegations of cannibalism.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|259}}
* In [[Shadian incident]] of [[Yunnan]], massacre targeting [[Hui people]] led by the PLA in 1975 resulted in the deaths of more than 1,600 civilians, including 300 children, and destroyed 4,400 homes.<ref name="Song-2011a" /><ref name="Zhou-1999">{{Cite book|last1=Zhou|first1=Yongming|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8Rv-MsA4UGIC&q=shadian+incident&pg=PA162|title=Anti-drug Crusades in Twentieth-century China: Nationalism, History, and State Building|publisher=Rowman & Littlefield|isbn=978-0-8476-9598-0|language=en}}</ref><ref name="Liang-2018">{{Cite web|url=https://stanfordpolitics.org/2018/11/26/chinas-puzzling-islam-policy/|title=China's Puzzling Islam Policy|website=Stanford Politics|language=en-US|access-date=December 27, 2019}}</ref>
* In [[Daoxian massacre|Daoxian Massacre]] of [[Hunan]], from August 13 to October 17, 1967, a total of 7,696 people were killed, 1,397 people were forced to commit suicide, and 2,146 people were permanently disabled.<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Tan|first1=Hecheng|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0QCDDQAAQBAJ&q=daoxian+massacre+7696&pg=PA20|title=The Killing Wind: A Chinese County's Descent Into Madness During the Cultural Revolution|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-062252-7|language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|author=Jiang|first=Fangzhou|title=发生在湖南道县的那场大屠杀|url=https://cn.nytimes.com/culture/20121108/cc08jiangfangzhou/|access-date=December 5, 2019|website=The New York Times|language=zh}}</ref>
* In [[Red August|Beijing massacre (Red August)]], official sources in 1980 have revealed that at least 1,772 people were killed by Red Guards from August to September 1966, including teachers and principals of many schools; in addition, 33,695 homes were ransacked and 85,196 families were forced to leave the city.<ref name="Wang-2001">{{Cite web|last1=Wang|first1=Youqin|author-link=Wang Youqin|title=Student Attacks Against Teachers: The Revolution of 1966|url=http://ywang.uchicago.edu/history/docs/2001_03_05.pdf|url-status=live|website=University of Chicago|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181223052419/http://ywang.uchicago.edu:80/history/docs/2001_03_05.pdf |archive-date=December 23, 2018 }}</ref><ref name="Jian-2015">{{Cite book|last1=Jian|first1=Guo|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=k9NQCgAAQBAJ&q=Daxing+Massacre&pg=PA86|title=Historical Dictionary of the Chinese Cultural Revolution|last2=Song|first2=Yongyi|last3=Zhou|first3=Yuan|publisher=Rowman & Littlefield|isbn=978-1-4422-5172-4|pages=|language=en|author-link2=Song Yongyi}}</ref><ref name="NPR-2014">{{Cite news|url=https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/01/23/265228870/chinese-red-guards-apologize-reopening-a-dark-chapter|title=Chinese Red Guards Apologize, Reopening A Dark Chapter|website=NPR|language=en|access-date=February 14, 2020}}</ref> In particular, the [[Daxing Massacre]] caused the deaths of 325 people from August 27 to September 1, 1966; the oldest killed was 80 years old and the youngest was only 38 days old, while 22 families were wiped out.<ref name="Song-2011a" /><ref name="Jian-2015"/><ref name="Yu-2020">{{Cite web|last1=Yu|first1=Luowen|title=文革时期北京大兴县大屠杀调查|url=http://mjlsh.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/Book.aspx?cid=4&tid=2464|access-date=February 15, 2020|website=Chinese University of Hong Kong|language=zh}}</ref>

=== Violent Struggles, Struggle sessions, and purges ===
{{main|Violent Struggle|Struggle session|Cleansing the Class Ranks}}
[[File:文革墓群.jpg|thumb|The Cultural Revolution Cemetery in [[Chongqing, China]]. At least 1,700 people were killed during the violent faction clash, with 400 to 500 of them buried in this cemetery.<ref name="Buckley">{{cite news |last1=Buckley |first1=Chris |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/05/world/asia/china-cultural-revolution-chongqing.html |title=Chaos of Cultural Revolution Echoes at a Lonely Cemetery, 50 Years Later |work=[[The New York Times]] |access-date=February 16, 2020 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref>]]

Violent Struggles, or ''Wudou'' ({{lang-zh|s=武斗|labels=no}}), were factional conflicts (mostly among Red Guards and "[[Rebel faction (Cultural Revolution)|rebel groups]]") which began in Shanghai and then spread to other areas of China in 1967. It brought the country to the state of [[civil war]].<ref name="Song-2011a" /><ref>{{cite news |last1=Phillips |first1=Tom |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/11/the-cultural-revolution-50-years-on-all-you-need-to-know-about-chinas-political-convulsion |title=The Cultural Revolution: all you need to know about China's political convulsion |work=[[The Guardian]] |access-date=February 16, 2020 |issn=0261-3077}}</ref> Weapons used in armed conflicts included some 18.77 million [[gun]]s (some claim 1.877 million), 2.72 million [[grenade]]s, 14,828 [[cannon]]s, millions of other ammunitions and even [[Armored car (military)|armored cars]] as well as [[tank]]s.<ref name="Song-2011a" /> Notable violent struggles include the battles in Chongqing, in [[Sichuan]], and in [[Xuzhou]].<ref name="Song-2011a" /><ref name="Buckley" /><ref>{{Cite news|last1=Ramzy|first1=Austin|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/15/world/asia/china-cultural-revolution-explainer.html|title=China's Cultural Revolution, Explained|work=The New York Times|access-date=February 16, 2020|language=en-US|issn=0362-4331}}</ref> Researchers have pointed out that the nationwide death toll in violent struggles ranges from 300,000 to 500,000.<ref name="Song-2011b">{{Cite web |last1=Song |first1=Yongyi |author-link=Song Yongyi |title=文革中"非正常死亡"了多少人？ |url=http://www.chinainperspective.com/ArtShow.aspx?AID=12445 |website=China in Perspective |language=zh |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120513113444/http://www.chinainperspective.com/ArtShow.aspx?AID=12445 |archive-date=2012-05-13}}</ref><ref name="Open Magazine-1999" /><ref name="Song-2011a" />

The incidence of violence rose in 1967, reaching a peak in summer of 1967 before dropping suddenly.<ref name="Walder-2019">{{Cite book |last=Walder |first=Andrew G. |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1120781893 |title=Agents of disorder : inside China's Cultural Revolution |isbn=978-0-674-24363-7 |location=Cambridge, Massachusetts |pages=143 |oclc=1120781893 |author-link=Andrew G. Walder}}</ref> During 1967, casualties were relatively low as weapons used during violent struggles were primarily clubs, spears, and rocks until late July.<ref name="Walder-2019" /> Although firearms and heavier weapons began to spread among the combatants during summer, most combatants at that time were neither trained nor committed fighters and therefore casualties remained relatively low.<ref name="Walder-2019" /> The peak of collective violence in summer 1967 dropped sharply after August, when Mao became concerned about rebel attacks on local army units and thereafter made clear that his prior calls to "drag out" army commanders was a mistake and he would instead support besieged army commands.<ref name="Walder-2019" />{{rp|150}}

The greatest number of casualties occurred with the process of restoring order in 1968, although the overall number of violent conflicts was lower.<ref name="Walder-2019" />{{rp|152-155}} Academic Andrew G. Walder states that while "rising casualties from a smaller number of insurgent conflicts surely reflected the increasing scale and organizational coherence of rebel factions, and their growing access to military weaponry[,]" another important factor was that "[t]he longer that local factional warfare continued without the prospect of an equitable political settlement, the greater the stakes for the participants and the more intense the collective violence as factions fought to avoid the consequence of losing.".<ref name="Walder-2019" />{{rp|154-155}}

In addition to violent struggles, millions of people in China were violently persecuted, especially in the [[struggle sessions]]. Those identified as spies, "[[running dog]]s," "revisionists," or coming from a suspect class (including those related to former landlords or rich peasants) were subject to beating, imprisonment, rape, torture, sustained and systematic harassment and abuse, seizure of property, denial of medical attention, and erasure of social identity. Intellectuals were also targeted. Many survivors and observers suggest that almost anyone with skills over that of the average person was made the target of political "struggle" in some way.<ref name="Harding" />

Some people were not able to stand the torture and, losing hope for the future, committed suicide. Researchers have pointed out that at least 100,000 to 200,000 people committed suicides during the early Cultural Revolution.<ref name="Song-2011b" /> One of the most famous cases of attempted suicide due to political persecution involved Deng Xiaoping's son, [[Deng Pufang]], who jumped (or was thrown) from a four-story building after being "interrogated" by Red Guards. Instead of dying, he developed [[paraplegia]].

At the same time, a large number of "unjust, false, mistaken cases ({{Lang-zh|c=|s=|t=冤假错案|p=|labels=no}})" appeared due to political purges. In addition to those who died in massacres, a large number of people died or permanently disabled due to [[lynching]] or other forms of persecution. From 1968 to 1969, the "[[Cleansing the Class Ranks]]", a massive political purge launched by Mao, caused the deaths of at least 500,000 people.<ref name="Song-2011a" /><ref>{{Cite web|last1=Ding|first1=Shu|title=文革中的"清理阶级队伍"运动 – 三千万人被斗，五十万人死亡|url=http://archives.cnd.org/HXWK/author/DING-Shu/zk0412b-0.gb.html|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170816021356/http://archives.cnd.org/HXWK/author/DING-Shu/zk0412b-0.gb.html|archive-date=August 16, 2017|access-date=January 13, 2020|website=China News Digest (华夏文摘)|language=zh}}</ref> Purges of similar nature such as the "[[One Strike-Three Anti Campaign]]" and the "[[May Sixteenth elements|Campaign towards the May Sixteenth elements]]" were launched subsequently in the 1970s.<ref name="Song-2011b" /><ref name="Open Magazine-1999" />

In [[Inner Mongolia incident]], official sources in 1980 stated that 346,000 people were wrongly arrested, over 16,000 were persecuted to death or executed, and over 81,000 were permanently [[disabled]].<ref name="Song-2011a" /><ref name="Bai">{{Cite web|url=http://mjlsh.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/Book.aspx?cid=4&tid=4510|last1=Bai|first1=Yintai|website=Chinese University of Hong Kong|language=zh|script-title=zh:"内人党"冤案前后|access-date=December 5, 2019}}</ref><ref name="Ba">{{Cite web|url=https://www.smhric.org/IMPRP.pdf|last1=Ba|first1=Yantai|publisher=Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center|language=zh|script-title=zh:挖肃灾难实录}}</ref> However, academics have estimated a death toll between 20,000 and 100,000.<ref name="Song-2011a" /><ref name="Bai" /><ref name="Ba" /><ref name="Brown-2007">{{Cite journal|last1=Brown|first1=Kerry|title=The Cultural Revolution in Inner Mongolia 1967–1969: The Purge of the "Heirs of Genghis Khan"|journal=Asian Affairs|volume=38|issue=2|pages=173–87|doi=10.1080/03068370701349128|issn=0306-8374|s2cid=153348414}}</ref>

In the [[Zhao Jianmin Spy Case]] of Yunnan, more than 1.387 million people were implicated and persecuted, which accounted for 6% of the total population of Yunnan at the time.<ref name="Song-2011a" /><ref name="WangH-2008">{{Cite web|url=http://www.hybsl.cn/xuezhewenji/wanghaiguang/2008-12-01/10962.html|last1=Wang|first1=Haiguang|work=Hu Yaobang Historical Information Net|language=zh|script-title=zh: – 个人的冤案和 – 个时代的冤案|access-date=December 30, 2019}}</ref> From 1968 to 1969, more than 17,000 people died in massacres and 61,000 people were crippled for life; in [[Kunming]] (the capital city of Yunnan) alone, 1,473 people were killed and 9,661 people were permanently disabled.<ref name="Song-2011a" /><ref name="WangH-2008" />

In the Li Chuli case of [[Hebei]], Li, the former deputy director of Organization Department of the Chinese Communist Party, was purged in 1968 and implicated around 80,000 people, 2,955 of whom were persecuted to death.<ref name="Ding-2016">{{Cite web|last1=Ding|first1=Shu|title=文革死亡人数统计为两百万人|url=https://www.chinesepen.org/blog/archives/47251|access-date=February 16, 2020|website=Independent Chinese PEN Center|language=zh}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last1=Schoenhals|first1=Michael|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uNeVJgUZseoC&q=Li+Chuli+cultural+revolution&pg=PA377|title=China's Cultural Revolution, 1966–1969: Not a Dinner Party|publisher=M.E. Sharpe|location =Armonk, NY|isbn=978-0-7656-3303-3|language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Schoenhals|first1=Michael|title=The Central Case Examination Group, 1966–79|journal=The China Quarterly|volume=145|issue=145|pages=87–111 |jstor=655646|doi=10.1017/S0305741000044143|s2cid=154681969 }}</ref>

=== Ethnic minorities ===
{{See also|Inner Mongolia incident|Shadian incident}}
[[File:Panchen Lama during the struggle (thamzing) session 1964.jpg|thumb|upright=1.35|The [[Tibetan people|Tibetan]] [[Panchen Lama]] during a [[struggle session]]]]
[[File:Sampho and his wife during the Cultural Revolution.jpg|thumb|[[Struggle session]] of [[Sampho Tsewang Rigzin]] and his wife during the Cultural Revolution]]

The Cultural Revolution wreaked much havoc on minority cultures and ethnicities in China. In [[Inner Mongolia]], some 790,000 people were persecuted during the Inner Mongolia incident. Of these, 22,900 were beaten to death, and 120,000 were maimed,<ref name="Mac" />{{rp|258}} during a witch hunt to find members of the alleged separatist New Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. In [[Xinjiang]], copies of the [[Qur'an]] and other books of the [[Uyghur people]] were apparently burned. Muslim imams reportedly were paraded around with paint splashed on their bodies.<ref name="Yongming Zhou 1999, p. 162">Yongming Zhou, ''Anti-drug crusades in twentieth-century China : nationalism, history, and state building'', Lanham [u.a.] Rowman & Littlefield 1999, p. 162</ref>

In the [[Koreans in China|ethnic Korean]] areas of northeast China, language schools were destroyed. In [[Yunnan]] Province, the palace of the [[Dai people]]'s king was torched, and a massacre of Muslim [[Hui people]] at the hands of the PLA in Yunnan, known as the [[Shadian incident]], reportedly claimed over 1,600 lives in 1975.<ref name="Yongming Zhou 1999, p. 162"/> After the Cultural Revolution was over, the government gave reparations for the Shadian Incident, including the erection of a Martyr's Memorial in Shadian.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Khalid|first1=Zainab|title=Rise of the Veil: Islamic Modernity and the Hui Woman|url=http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2068&context=isp_collection|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140809045544/http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2068&context=isp_collection|archive-date=August 9, 2014|access-date=July 25, 2014|website=SIT Digital Collections|series=Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection|publisher=SIT Graduate Institute|pages=8, 11|format=PDF|id=Paper 1074}}</ref>

Concessions given to minorities were abolished during the Cultural Revolution as part of the Red Guards' attack on the "Four Olds". [[People's commune]]s, previously only established in parts of Tibet, were established throughout [[Tibetan Autonomous Region]] in 1966,<ref>{{cite book|author=John Powers|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=wksCKIivSNUC&pg=PR35|title=Historical Dictionary of Tibet|author2=David Templeman|publisher=Grove Press|year=2007|isbn=978-0810868052|page=35|access-date=September 30, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160522032800/https://books.google.com/books?id=wksCKIivSNUC&pg=PR35&lpg=PR35|archive-date=May 22, 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> removing Tibet's exemption from China's period of land reform, and reimposed in other minority areas. The effect on Tibet had been particularly severe as it came following the repression after the [[1959 Tibetan uprising]].<ref>{{cite book|author=Adam Jones|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=TkPqxCBbF7UC&pg=PA97|title=Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction|publisher=Routledge|year=2006|isbn=978-0415353854|pages=96–97|access-date=September 30, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160522105753/https://books.google.com/books?id=TkPqxCBbF7UC&pg=PA97|archive-date=May 22, 2016|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="cycle">{{cite book|author=Ronald D. Schwartz|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=s_7WkbZAaWEC&pg=PA12|title=Circle Of Protest|year=1996|isbn=978-8120813700|pages=12–13|access-date=September 30, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160617101146/https://books.google.com/books?id=s_7WkbZAaWEC&pg=PA12&lpg=PA12|archive-date=June 17, 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> The destruction of nearly all of its over 6,000 monasteries, which began before the Cultural Revolution, were often conducted with the complicity of local ethnic Tibetan Red Guards.<ref name=Ardley>{{cite book|last=Ardley|first=Jane|title=Tibetan Independence Movement: Political, Religious and Gandhian Perspectives|publisher=Routledge|year=2002|isbn=978-0700715725}}</ref>{{rp|9}} Only eight were left intact by the end of the 1970s.<ref>{{cite book|author=Thomas Laird|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=As_4aQjGaUEC&pg=PA345|title=The Story of Tibet: Conversations with the Dalai Lama|year=2007|isbn=978-1555846725|page=345|access-date=September 30, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160617113548/https://books.google.com/books?id=As_4aQjGaUEC&pg=PA345&lpg=PA345|archive-date=June 17, 2016|url-status=live}}</ref>

Many monks and nuns were killed, and the general population were subjected to physical and psychological torture.<ref name=Ardley/>{{rp|9}} There were an estimated 600,000 monks and nuns in Tibet in 1950, and by 1979, most of them were dead, imprisoned or had disappeared.<ref name=Ardley/>{{rp|22}} The Tibetan government in exile claimed that many Tibetans also died from famines in 1961–1964 and 1968–1973 as a result of forced collectivization,<ref name="cycle" /><ref>{{cite book|author=Kimberley Ens Manning|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=aHPTn2Rq9IUC&pg=PA23|title=Eating Bitterness: New Perspectives on China's Great Leap Forward and Famine|author2=Felix Wemheuer|publisher=UBC Press|year=2011|isbn=978-0774859554|page=23|access-date=October 1, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160518114602/https://books.google.com/books?id=aHPTn2Rq9IUC&pg=PA23&lpg=PA23|archive-date=May 18, 2016|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|author=John Powers|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=wksCKIivSNUC&pg=PA170|title=Historical Dictionary of Tibet|author2=David Templeman|publisher=Grove Press|year=2007|isbn=978-0810868052|page=170|access-date=September 30, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160506205959/https://books.google.com/books?id=wksCKIivSNUC&pg=PA170|archive-date=May 6, 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> however the number of Tibetan deaths or whether famines, in fact, took place in these periods is disputed.<ref>{{cite book|author=Warren W. Smith|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=WYiVlfLzlRUC&pg=PA6|title=Tibet's Last Stand?: The Tibetan Uprising of 2008 and China's Response|publisher=Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.|year=2009|isbn=978-0742566859|page=6|access-date=September 30, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160506103025/https://books.google.com/books?id=WYiVlfLzlRUC&pg=PA6|archive-date=May 6, 2016|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|author=John Powers|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=D96ifo76RZEC&pg=PA142|title=History As Propaganda: Tibetan Exiles versus the People's Republic of China|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2004|isbn=978-0198038849|page=142|access-date=September 30, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160424080257/https://books.google.com/books?id=D96ifo76RZEC&pg=PA142|archive-date=April 24, 2016|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|author=Barry Sautman|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Z4hsGZ-idEwC&pg=PA240|title=Contemporary Tibet: Politics, Development, and Society in a Disputed Region|author2=June Teufel Dreyer|publisher=ME Sharp|year=2006|isbn=978-0765631497|pages=238–47|access-date=October 1, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160616205143/https://books.google.com/books?id=Z4hsGZ-idEwC&pg=PA240|archive-date=June 16, 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> Despite official persecution, some local leaders and minority ethnic practices survived in remote regions.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Schwartz|first1=Ronald|title=Religious Persecution in Tibet|url=http://www.tibet.ca/_media/PDF/Religious-Persecution-in-Tibet.pdf|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130923042104/http://www.tibet.ca/_media/PDF/Religious-Persecution-in-Tibet.pdf|archive-date=September 23, 2013|access-date=December 5, 2018|website=www.tibet.ca|publisher=Memorial University of Newfoundland}}</ref>

The overall failure of the Red Guards' and radical assimilationists' goals was mostly due to two factors. It was felt that pushing minority groups too hard would compromise China's border defences. This was especially important as minorities make up a large percentage of the population that live along China's borders. In the late 1960s, China experienced a period of strained relations with some of its neighbours, notably with the Soviet Union and India.<ref>See [[Sino-Soviet split]] and [[Sino-Indian relations]]</ref> Many of the Cultural Revolution's goals in minority areas were simply too unreasonable to be implemented. The return to pluralism, and therefore the end of the worst of the effects of the Cultural Revolution on ethnic minorities in China, coincides closely with Lin Biao's removal from power.<ref name="Dreyer">{{cite book|last1=Dreyer|first1=June Teufel|title=China's Political System: Modernization and Tradition|publisher=Macmillan|year=2000|isbn=0-333-91287-X|edition=3rd|location=London|pages=289–91}}</ref>

=== Rape and sexual abuse ===
Academic [[Pan Suiming]] writes that rape and sexual abuse of women were common during the height of the Cultural Revolution.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Larson |first=Wendy |title=Never This Wild: Sexing the Cultural Revolution |journal=[[Modern China]] |language=en |volume=25 |issue=4 |pages=423–450 |doi=10.1177/009770049902500402 |s2cid=144491731 |issn=0097-7004}}</ref> Tania Branigan also writes in ''Red Memory: Living, Remembering and Forgetting China's Cultural Revolution'' that women raped tend to be from educated urban backgrounds while their rapists were poor peasants or local officials.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Branigan |first=Tania |title=A tragedy pushed to the shadows: the truth about China's Cultural Revolution |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/19/tragedy-pushed-to-the-shadows-truth-about-china-cultural-revolution |access-date=2023-01-20 |website=[[The Guardian]] |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Branigan |first=Tania |title=Red Memory: Living, Remembering and Forgetting China's Cultural Revolution |publisher=Guardian Faber Publishing |isbn=978-1-78335-264-7 |location= |oclc=1337142742}}</ref>

== Cultural impact and influence ==

=== Red Guards riot ===
[[File:Beijing 1968 I.jpg|thumb|A 1968 map of Beijing showing streets and landmarks renamed during the Cultural Revolution. Andingmen Inner Street became "Great Leap Forward Road", Taijichang Street became the "Road for Eternal Revolution", Dongjiaominxiang was renamed "Anti-Imperialist Road", Beihai Park was renamed "Worker-Peasant-Soldier Park" and Jingshan Park became "Red Guard Park." Most of the Cultural Revolution-era name changes were later reversed.|alt=]]

The effects of the Cultural Revolution directly or indirectly touched essentially all of China's population. During the Cultural Revolution, much economic activity was halted, with "revolution", regardless of interpretation, being the primary objective of the country. Mao Zedong Thought became the central operative guide to all things in China. The authority of the Red Guards surpassed that of the PLA, local police authorities, and the law in general. Chinese traditional arts and ideas were ignored and publicly attacked, with praise for Mao being practiced in their place. People were encouraged to criticize cultural institutions and to question their parents and teachers, which had been strictly forbidden in traditional [[Chinese culture]].{{Citation needed}}

The start of the Cultural Revolution brought huge numbers of Red Guards to Beijing, with all expenses paid by the government, and the railway system was in turmoil. The revolution aimed to destroy the "[[Four Olds]]" (i.e., old customs, old culture, old habits, and old ideas) and establish the corresponding "Four News", which could range from changing of names and cutting of hair to the ransacking of homes, vandalizing cultural treasures, and desecrating temples.<ref name=Lu/>{{rp|61–64}} In a few years, countless ancient buildings, artifacts, antiques, books, and paintings were destroyed by Red Guards. The status of traditional Chinese culture and institutions within China was also severely damaged as a result of the Cultural Revolution, and the practice of many traditional customs weakened.

The revolution also aimed to "sweep away" all "[[cow demons and snake spirits]]", that is, all the class enemies who promoted bourgeois ideas within the party, the government, the army, among the intellectuals, as well as those from an exploitative family background or who belonged to one of the Five Black Categories. Large numbers of people perceived to be "monsters and demons" regardless of guilt or innocence were publicly denounced, humiliated, and beaten. In their revolutionary fervor, students especially the Red Guards denounced their teachers, and children denounced their parents.<ref name=Lu/>{{rp|59–61}} Many died through their ill-treatment or committed suicide. In 1968, youths were mobilized to go to the countryside in the [[Down to the Countryside Movement]] so they may learn from the peasantry, and the departure of millions from the cities helped end the most violent phase of the Cultural Revolution.<ref name=King>{{cite book|last=King|first=Richard|title=Art in Turmoil: The Chinese Cultural Revolution, 1966–76|publisher=University of British Columbia Press|year=2010|isbn=978-0774815437}}</ref>{{rp|176}}

=== Academics and education ===
[[File:Yao Tongbin.jpg|thumb|upright=.8|[[Yao Tongbin]], one of China's foremost [[missile]] scientists, was beaten to death by a mob in Beijing during the Cultural Revolution (1968). This caused [[Zhou Enlai]] to order special protection for key technical experts.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Stokes |first=Mark A. |chapter=The People's Liberation Army and China's Space and Missile Development |editor1=Laurie Burkitt |editor2=Andrew Scobell |editor3=Larry Wortzel |editor3-link=Larry Wortzel |title=The Lessons of History: The Chinese people's Liberation Army at 75 |publisher=[[Strategic Studies Institute]] |url=https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB52.pdf |page=198 |isbn=978-1-58487-126-2 |access-date=January 11, 2022 |archive-date=February 5, 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120205072610/http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB52.pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref>]]

[[File:1968-02 1967年北京二十三中复课闹革命2.jpg|thumb|A classroom at Beijing No. 23 Middle School in 1967. At the time, students were commanded to return to schools and "resume classes while carrying out the revolution".<ref>{{Cite book |last=Wu |first=Yiching |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/881183403 |title=The cultural revolution at the margins : Chinese socialism in crisis |publisher=[[Harvard University Press]] |isbn=978-0-674-41985-8 |location=Cambridge, Mass. |pages=145 |oclc=881183403}}</ref> On the blackboard at the back is the text "Conference to Complaint and Criticize the Revisionist Education Line".]]

Academics and [[intellectual]]s were regarded as the "[[Stinking Old Ninth]]" and were widely persecuted.<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Jihui|first1=Yu|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=WvIFxwEACAAJ&q=stinking+old+ninth+cultural+revolution|title=The Stinking Old Ninth: A Tale of The Coal Capital|year=2019|publisher=Independently Published|isbn=978-1-0721-7605-3|language=en}}</ref> Many were sent to rural labor camps such as the [[May Seventh Cadre School]]. According to the official documents in the prosecution of the Gang of Four, 142,000 cadres and teachers in the education circles were persecuted. Noted academics, scientists, and educators who died included [[Xiong Qinglai]], [[Jian Bozan]], Wu Han, [[Rao Yutai]], [[Wu Dingliang]], [[Yao Tongbin]] and [[Zhao Jiuzhang]].<ref name="documents"/> As of 1968, among the 171 senior members who worked at the headquarters of [[Chinese Academy of Sciences]] in Beijing, 131 were persecuted. Among all the members of the academy in China, 229 were persecuted to death.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://mjlsh.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/Book.aspx?cid=4&tid=3847|title=文革中的中科院：131位科学家被打倒，229人遭迫害致死|last1=Cao|first1=Pu|website=Chinese University of Hong Kong|language=zh|access-date=February 23, 2020}}</ref>

As of September 1971, more than 4,000 staff members of China's nuclear center in [[Qinghai]] were persecuted. More than 310 of them were permanently disabled, over 40 people committed suicide, and 5 were [[Capital punishment|executed]].<ref>{{Cite web|last=Wang|first=Jingheng|title=青海核武基地的劫难|url=http://www.yhcqw.com/36/9207.html|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200714221024/http://www.yhcqw.com/36/9207.html|archive-date=July 14, 2020|access-date=July 14, 2020|website=[[Yanhuang Chunqiu]]|language=zh}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=文革对中国核基地的损害：4000人被审查 40人自尽|url=http://news.ifeng.com/history/zhongguoxiandaishi/detail_2012_05/02/14277600_0.shtml|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200608171436/http://news.ifeng.com/history/zhongguoxiandaishi/detail_2012_05/02/14277600_0.shtml|archive-date=June 8, 2020|access-date=February 23, 2020|website=[[Phoenix Television|Phoenix New Media]]|language=zh}}</ref> During the Cultural Revolution, Chinese scientists still managed to successfully test the first missile, create the first [[hydrogen bomb]] and launch the first satellite in the [[Two Bombs, One Satellite]] program.<ref>{{Cite web|title=中国"文革"科研仅两弹一星核潜艇|url=http://phtv.ifeng.com/program/tfzg/detail_2013_11/21/31452743_0.shtml|access-date=February 23, 2020|website=[[Phoenix Television]]|language=zh}}</ref> There were also very significant achievements in both science and technology. These achievements laid the ground for further development in the [[Chinese economic reform|post-Mao years]].<ref>{{Cite web|last=Ching|first=Pao-yu|author-link=Pao-yu Ching|title=From Victory to Defeat – China's Socialist Road and Capitalist Reversal|url=https://foreignlanguages.press/new-roads/from-victory-to-defeat-pao-yu-ching/|url-status=live|website=[[Foreign Languages Press]]|page=45|language=en|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200810043322/https://foreignlanguages.press/new-roads/from-victory-to-defeat-pao-yu-ching/ |archive-date=August 10, 2020 }}</ref>

In the early months of the Cultural Revolution, schools and universities were closed. The secondary school classes of 1966, 1967, and 1968 which were unable to graduate on time later became known as the Old three cohort.<ref name=":22" />{{Rp|page=362}} Primary and middle schools later gradually reopened, but all colleges and universities were closed until 1970, and most universities did not reopen until 1972.<ref name=Joel>{{cite book|last=Joel|first=Andreas|title=Rise of the Red Engineers: The Cultural Revolution and the Origins of China's New Class|publisher=Stanford University Press|year=2009|isbn=978-0804760782}}</ref>{{rp|164}} The [[National College Entrance Examination|university entrance exams]] were cancelled after 1966, to be replaced later by a system whereby students were recommended by factories, villages and military units, and entrance exams were not restored until 1977 under Deng Xiaoping. Values taught in traditional education were abandoned.<ref name=Lu/>{{rp|195}}

During the Cultural Revolution, basic education was emphasized and rapidly expanded. While the years of schooling were reduced and education standard fell, the proportion of Chinese children who had completed primary education increased from less than half before the Cultural Revolution to almost all after the Cultural Revolution, and those who completed junior middle school rose from 15% to over two-third. The educational opportunities for rural children expanded considerably, while those of the children of the urban elite became restricted by the anti-elitist policies.<ref name=Joel/>{{rp|166–67}} July 21st Industrial Universities were established in factories to prove part-time technical and engineering programs for industrial workers.<ref name=":22" />{{Rp|page=362}} These study programs were inspired by Mao's July 1968 remarks that there should be increased vocational education.<ref name=":22" />{{Rp|page=362}}

In 1968, the Communist Party instituted the Down to the Countryside Movement, in which [[sent-down youth|"Educated Youths"]] (''zhishi qingnian'' or simply ''zhiqing'') in urban areas were sent to live and work in agrarian areas to be re-educated by the peasantry and to better understand the role of manual agrarian labor in Chinese society. In the initial stages, most of the youth who took part volunteered. Later on, the government resorted to forcing many of them to move. Between 1968 and 1979, 17 millions of China's urban youth left for the countryside. Being in the rural areas also deprived them the opportunity of higher education.<ref name=King/>{{rp|10}} The entire generation of tormented and inadequately educated individuals is often referred to as the 'lost generation' in both China and the West.<ref name=Lu/>{{rp}}<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=YFkx41kszGUC&pg=PA55 |title=A River Forever Flowing: Cross-cultural Lives and Identities in the Multicultural Landscape |author=Ming Fang He |page=55 |publisher=Information Age Publishing |isbn=978-1593110765 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160505174046/https://books.google.com/books?id=YFkx41kszGUC&pg=PA55 |archive-date=May 5, 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=http://edition.cnn.com/2012/10/24/world/asia/china-lost-generation/ |title=China's 'lost generation' recall hardships of Cultural Revolution |author=Tracy You |work=CNN |access-date=November 15, 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141129030828/http://edition.cnn.com/2012/10/24/world/asia/china-lost-generation/ |archive-date=November 29, 2014 |url-status=live }}</ref> In the post-Mao period, many of those forcibly moved attacked the policy as a violation of their human rights."<ref name=Gao>{{cite book|last=Gao|first=Mobo|title=The Battle for China's Past: Mao and the Cultural Revolution|publisher=Pluto Press|year=2008|url=http://www.strongwindpress.com/pdfs/EBook/The_Battle_for_Chinas_Past.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121103094507/http://www.strongwindpress.com/pdfs/EBook/The_Battle_for_Chinas_Past.pdf|url-status=dead|archive-date=November 3, 2012|isbn=978-0-7453-2780-8|author-link=Gao Mobo}}</ref>{{rp|36}}

The impact of the Cultural Revolution on accessible education varied among regions, and formal measurements of literacy did not resume until the 1980s.<ref name="Peterson">Peterson, Glen. [1997] (1997). The Power of Words: literacy and revolution in South China, 1949–95. UBC Press. {{ISBN|0-7748-0612-5}}</ref> Some counties in [[Zhanjiang]] had illiteracy rates as high as 41% some 20 years after the revolution. The leaders of China at the time denied that there were any illiteracy problems from the start. This effect was amplified by the elimination of qualified teachers—many districts were forced to rely on selected students to educate the next generation.<ref name="Peterson" />

Though the effect of the Cultural Revolution was disastrous for millions in China, there were positive outcomes for some sections of the population, such as those in rural areas. For example, the upheavals of the Cultural Revolution and the hostility to the intellectual elite is widely accepted to have damaged the quality of education in China, especially at the upper end of the education system. The radical policies provided many in rural communities with middle school education for the first time, which is thought to have facilitated the rural economic development in the 70s and 80s.<ref name=Joel/>{{rp|163}} Rural infrastructure greatly developed during the Cultural Revolution, facilitated by the political changes that empowered ordinary rural people.<ref name=":2" />{{Rp|page=177}}

Similarly, many health personnel were deployed to the countryside as [[barefoot doctors]] during the Cultural Revolution. Some farmers were given informal medical training, and health-care centers were established in rural communities. This process led to a marked improvement in the health and the life expectancy of the general population.<ref name="Huang Foreign Affairs 2011">{{cite journal|last1=Huang|first1=Yanzhong|year=2011|title=The Sick Man of Asia. China's Health Crisis|url=http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136507/yanzhong-huang/the-sick-man-of-asia|url-status=live|journal=Foreign Affairs|volume=90|pages=119–36|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141113012140/http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136507/yanzhong-huang/the-sick-man-of-asia|archive-date=November 13, 2014|access-date=November 12, 2014|number=6}}</ref>

===Slogans and rhetoric===
[[File:1967-04 1967年革命无罪造反有理.jpg|thumb|right|A Red Guard holding up the ''[[Selected Works of Mao Zedong]]'', with "revolution is no crime, to rebel is justified" written on a flag next to him, 1967.]]
According to Shaorong Huang, the fact that the Cultural Revolution had such massive effects on Chinese society is the result of extensive use of political slogans.<ref name="huang">Huang, Shaorong. 2001. "The power of Words: Political Slogans as Leverage in Conflict and Conflict Management during China's Cultural Revolution Movement." In ''Chinese Conflict Management and Resolution'', edited by G. Chen and R. Ma. [[Greenwood Publishing Group]].</ref> In Huang's view, rhetoric played a central role in rallying both the Party leadership and people at large during the Cultural Revolution. For example, the slogan "to rebel is justified" ({{Lang-zh|c=|s=|t=造反有理|p=zàofǎn yǒulǐ|labels=no}}) became a unitary theme.<ref name=huang/>

[[File:Cultural revolution anhui.jpg|thumb|The remnants of a banner containing slogans from the Cultural Revolution in [[Anhui]]]]
Huang asserts that political slogans were ubiquitous in every aspect of people's lives, being printed onto everyday items such as bus tickets, cigarette packets, and mirror tables.<ref name=Gao/>{{rp|14}} Workers were supposed to "grasp revolution and promote productions", while peasants were supposed to raise more pigs because "more pigs means more manure, and more manure means more grain." Even a casual remark by Mao, "Sweet potato tastes good; I like it" became a slogan everywhere in the countryside.<ref name=huang/>

Political slogans of the time had three sources: Mao, official Party media such as ''People's Daily'', and the Red Guards.<ref name=huang/> Mao often offered vague, yet powerful directives that led to the factionalization of the Red Guards.<ref>Chan</ref> These directives could be interpreted to suit personal interests, in turn aiding factions' goals in being most loyal to Mao Zedong. Red Guard slogans were of the most violent nature, such as "Strike the enemy down on the floor and step on him with a foot", "Long live the red terror!" and "Those who are against Chairman Mao will have their dog skulls smashed into pieces."<ref name=huang/>

Sinologists Lowell Dittmer and Chen Ruoxi point out that the Chinese language had historically been defined by subtlety, delicacy, moderation, and honesty, as well as the "cultivation of a refined and elegant literary style."<ref name=Dittmer>Dittmer, Lowel, and [[Chen Ruoxi]]. 1981 "Ethics and rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution." ''Studies in Chinese Terminology'' 19. p. 108</ref> This changed during the Cultural Revolution. Since Mao wanted an army of bellicose people in his crusade, rhetoric at the time was reduced to militant and violent vocabulary.<ref name=huang/> These slogans were a powerful and effective method of "thought reform," mobilizing millions in a concerted attack upon the subjective world, "while at the same time reforming their objective world."<ref name=huang/><ref name=Dittmer/>{{rp|12}}

Dittmer and Chen argue that the emphasis on politics made language a very effective form of propaganda, but "also transformed it into a jargon of stereotypes—pompous, repetitive, and boring."<ref name=Dittmer/>{{rp|12}} To distance itself from the era, Deng Xiaoping's government cut back heavily on the use of political slogans. During a eulogy for Deng's death, [[Jiang Zemin]] called the cultural revolution a "grave mistake."<ref>{{cite book |last1=Paulson |first1=Henry M. |title=Dealing with China : an insider unmasks the new economic superpower |location=New York |isbn=9781455504213 |page=4 |edition=First}}</ref>

===Arts and literature===
[[File:Revolutionary opera.jpg|thumb|upright=1.35|The ballet ''[[Red Detachment of Women (ballet)|The Red Detachment of Women]]'', one of the Model Dramas promoted during the Cultural Revolution]]

Drastic changes in art and culture took place during the Cultural Revolution.<ref name="Ching-2021">{{Cite book |last=Ching |first=Pao-Yu |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1325647379 |title=Revolution and counterrevolution : China's continuing class struggle since liberation |publisher=Foreign languages press |isbn=978-2-491182-89-2 |edition=2nd |location=Paris |pages=137 |oclc=1325647379}}</ref> Before this period, few Chinese cultural productions reflected the lives of peasants and workers.<ref name="Ching-2021" /> As part of the Cultural Revolution, the struggles of workers, peasants, and revolutionary soldiers became frequent artistic subjects, often created by peasants and workers themselves.<ref name="Ching-2021" /> The spread of peasant paintings in rural China, for example, became one of the "[[Newborn socialist things|newborn things]]" said to arise in a socialist society.<ref name="Ching-2021" /> In poor and remote areas of China, movies and operas were shown for free.<ref name="Lin 2006">{{Cite book |last=Lin |first=Chun |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/63178961 |title=The transformation of Chinese socialism |publisher=[[Duke University Press]] |isbn=978-0-8223-3785-0 |location=Durham [N.C.] |oclc=63178961}}</ref> Mobile film units brought the cinema to the countryside and were crucial to the standardization and popularization of cultural during this period, particularly including [[Revolutionary opera|revolutionary model operas]].<ref name=":1">{{Cite book |last=Coderre |first=Laurence |title=Newborn Socialist Things: Materiality in Maoist China |publisher=[[Duke University Press]] |isbn=978-1-4780-2161-2 |location=Durham |pages= |doi=10.2307/j.ctv1r4xd0g |jstor=j.ctv1r4xd0g |oclc=1250021710}}</ref>{{Rp|page=30}}

During the Cultural Revolution, Jiang Qing took control of the stage and introduced the revolutionary model operas under her direct supervision. Traditional operas were banned as they were considered feudalistic and bourgeois, but revolutionary opera, which is based on [[Peking opera]] but modified in both content and form, was promoted.<ref name=Lu/>{{rp|115}} Starting in 1967, eight model dramas (six operas and two ballets) were produced in the first three years, and the most notable of the operas was ''[[The Legend of the Red Lantern]]''. These operas were the only approved opera form. Other opera troupes were required to adopt or change their repertoire.<ref name=King/>{{rp|176}}

The model operas were broadcast on the radio, made into films, blared from public loudspeakers, taught to students in schools and workers in factories, and became ubiquitous as a form of popular entertainment and the only theatrical entertainment for millions in China.<ref name=Jiaqi/>{{rp|352–53}}<ref name=Lu/>{{rp|115}} Most of the model dramas featured women as their title characters and promoted China's policies of state feminism.<ref name="Karl-2010">{{Cite book |last=Karl |first=Rebecca E. |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/503828045 |title=Mao Zedong and China in the twentieth-century world : a concise history |publisher=[[Duke University Press]] |isbn=978-0-8223-4780-4 |location=Durham [NC] |pages=148 |oclc=503828045}}</ref> The narratives of these women protagonists begin with them oppressed by [[misogyny]], class position, and imperialism before liberating themselves through the discovery of internal strength and the Communist Party.<ref name="Karl-2010" />

In 1966, Jiang Qing put forward the Theory of the Dictatorship of the Black Line in Literature and Arts where those perceived to be bourgeois, anti-socialist or anti-Mao "black line" should be cast aside, and called for the creation of new literature and arts.<ref name=Jiaqi/>{{rp|352–53}} Writers, artists and intellectuals who were the recipients and disseminators of the "old culture" would be comprehensively eradicated. The majority of writers and artists were seen as "black line figures" and "reactionary literati", and therefore persecuted, many were subjected to "criticism and denunciation" where they may be publicly humiliated and ravaged, and may also be imprisoned or sent to be reformed through hard labour.<ref name=Hong>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=S7C9xtFKGWEC&pg=PA213 |title=A History of Contemporary Chinese Literature |author=Zicheng Hong |translator=Michael M. Day |publisher=Brill|year=2009 |isbn=978-9004173668 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160527131624/https://books.google.com/books?id=S7C9xtFKGWEC&pg=PA213 |archive-date=May 27, 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref>{{rp|213–14}} For instance, [[Mei Zhi]] and her husband were sent to a tea farm in [[Lushan County, Sichuan]], and she did not resume writing until the 1980s.<ref name=sina>{{cite web | url=http://news.sina.com.cn/s/2008-03-12/113615131996.shtml |script-title=zh:张晓风：我的父亲母亲 | trans-title=Zhang Xiaofeng: My father and mother | language=zh | last1=Zhang 张 | first1=Xiaofeng 晓风 | website=Sina | date=March 12, 2008 | access-date=May 3, 2017 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171019152135/http://news.sina.com.cn/s/2008-03-12/113615131996.shtml | archive-date=October 19, 2017 | url-status=live }}</ref>

Documents released in 1980 regarding the prosecution of the Gang of Four show more than 2,600 people in the field of arts and literature were revealed to have been persecuted by the Ministry of Culture and units under it alone.<ref name="documents">{{cite book |url= https://books.google.com/books?id=ipHX7n55ISIC&pg=PA132 |title= Chinese Politics: Fall of Hua Kuo-Feng (1980) to the Twelfth Party Congress (1982) |editor= James T. Myers |editor2= Jürgen Domes |editor3= Erik von Groeling |publisher= University of South Carolina Press |year= 1995 |isbn= 978-1570030635 |access-date= June 27, 2015 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20160428141628/https://books.google.com/books?id=ipHX7n55ISIC&pg=PA132 |archive-date= April 28, 2016 |url-status= live }}</ref> Many died as a result of their ordeal and humiliation—the names of 200 well-known writers and artists who were persecuted to death during the Cultural Revolution were commemorated in 1979, these include writers such as [[Lao She]], [[Fu Lei]], [[Deng Tuo]], [[Baren (author)|Baren]], [[Li Guangtian]], [[Yang Shuo (writer)|Yang Shuo]] and [[Zhao Shuli]].<ref name=Hong/>{{rp|213–14}}

During the Cultural Revolution, only a few writers who gained permission or requalification under the new system, such as [[Hao Ran]] and some writers of worker or farmer background, can have had their work published or reprinted.{{Citation needed}} The principles for cultural production laid out by Mao in the 1942 "[[Talks at the Yan'an Forum on Art and Literature]]" became dogmatized during the Cultural Revolution.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Cai |first1=Xiang |url= |title=Revolution and its narratives : China's socialist literary and cultural imaginaries (1949-1966) |last2=蔡翔 |publisher=[[Duke University Press]] |others=Rebecca E. Karl, Xueping Zhong, 钟雪萍 |isbn=978-0-8223-7461-9 |location=Durham |pages=xix |oclc=932368688}}</ref> The literary situation eased after 1972, more writers were allowed to write, and many provincial literary periodicals resumed publication, but the majority of writers still could not work.<ref name=Hong/>{{rp|219–20}}

The effect is similar in the film industry. A booklet titled "Four Hundred Films to be Criticized" was distributed, and film directors and actors/actresses were criticized with some tortured and imprisoned.<ref name=Jiaqi/>{{rp|401–02}} These included many of Jiang Qing's rivals and former friends in the film industry, and those who died in the period included [[Cai Chusheng]], [[Zheng Junli]], [[Shangguan Yunzhu]], [[Wang Ying (actress)|Wang Ying]], and [[Xu Lai (actress)|Xu Lai]].<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3XNyF4a7xHsC&pg=PA128 |title=China on Film: A Century of Exploration, Confrontation, and Controversy |author=Paul G. Pickowicz  |pages=128–29 |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield Publisher |year=2013 |isbn=978-1442211797 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160514012031/https://books.google.com/books?id=3XNyF4a7xHsC&pg=PA128&lpg=PA128 |archive-date=May 14, 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref> No feature films were produced in mainland China for seven years apart from the few approved "Model dramas" and highly ideological films,<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=V0R-3zFSJbkC&pg=PA207 |title=Handbook of Chinese Popular Culture |editor=Dingbo Wu |editor2=Patrick D. Murphy |page=207 |publisher=Greenwood Press |year=1994 |isbn=978-0313278082 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160429072451/https://books.google.com/books?id=V0R-3zFSJbkC&pg=PA207 |archive-date=April 29, 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref> a notable example of the handful of films made and permitted to be shown in this period is ''[[Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy (film)|Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy]]''.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6WzJq0hForAC&pg=PA219 |title=Chinese National Cinema |author=Yingjin Zhang |pages=219–20 |publisher=Routledge |year=2004 |isbn=978-0415172905 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160603153252/https://books.google.com/books?id=6WzJq0hForAC&pg=PA219 |archive-date=June 3, 2016 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Wh0QMOLRCeIC&pg=PA41 |title=Historical Dictionary of Chinese Cinema |author1=Tan Ye |author2=Yun Zhu |page=41 |publisher=Scarecrow Press |year=2012 |isbn=978-0810867796 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160430173644/https://books.google.com/books?id=Wh0QMOLRCeIC&pg=PA41 |archive-date=April 30, 2016 |url-status=live}}</ref>

Loyalty dances became a choreographic feature of the Cultural Revolution and were performed throughout the country by both professional cultural workers and ordinary people.<ref name=":22" />{{Rp|page=362}}

Revolution-themed songs instead were promoted during the Cultural Revolution, and songs such as "[[Ode to the Motherland]]", "[[Sailing the Seas Depends on the Helmsman]]", "[[The East Is Red (song)|The East Is Red]]" and "[[Without the Communist Party, There Would Be No New China]]" were either written or became extremely popular during this period. "The East Is Red", especially, became popular; it ''de facto'' supplanted "[[March of the Volunteers]]" as the national anthem of China, though the latter was restored to its previous place after the Cultural Revolution ended.{{citation needed}}

Quotation songs, in which Mao's quotations were set to music, were particularly popular during the early years of the Cultural Revolution.<ref name=":1" />{{Rp|page=34}} Records of quotation songs were well-suited to being played over loudspeakers, which were their intended primary means of broadcast<ref name=":1" />{{Rp|page=35}} as the use of transistor radios lagged in China until 1976.<ref name=":1" />{{Rp|pages=32-33}} "[[Rusticated youths]]" with an interest in broadcast technology frequently operated the rural radio stations after 1968.<ref name=":1" />{{Rp|page=42}}

====Visual arts====
[[File:SZ 深圳博物館 Shenzhen Museum 深圳改革開放前歷史展廳 Before Reform and Opening-up History Exhibition Hall 文革時代紅色思想宣傳海布 political posters IX1 03.jpg|thumb|Posters from the Cultural Revolution period|alt=]]

Some of the most enduring images of the Cultural Revolution come from poster arts. Propaganda art in posters was used as a campaigning tool and mass communication device and often served as the leading source of information for the people. They were produced in large number and widely disseminated, and were used by the government and Red Guards to educate the public the ideological value as defined by the party state.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=I3S6mlTj1K4C&pg=PA4 |title=Picturing Power in the People's Republic of China: Posters of the Cultural Revolution |editor1=Harriet Evans |editor2=Stephanie Donald |pages=1–5 |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |year=1999 |isbn=978-0847695119 |access-date=June 27, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160603095230/https://books.google.com/books?id=I3S6mlTj1K4C&pg=PA4 |archive-date=June 3, 2016 |url-status=live}}</ref> There were many types of posters, the two main genres being the big-character poster ({{Lang-zh|c=|s=|t=大字报|p=dazibao|labels=no|l=}}) and "commercial" propaganda poster ({{lang-zh|c=|s=|t=宣传画|p=xuanchuanhua|labels=no}}).<ref name=Cushing>{{cite book|last1=Cushing|first1=Lincoln|last2=Tompkins|first2=Ann|title=Chinese Posters: Art from the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution|publisher=Chronicle Books|year=2007|isbn=978-0811859462}}</ref>{{rp|7–12}}

The ''dazibao'' may be slogans, poems, commentary and graphics often freely created and posted on walls in public spaces, factories and communes. They were vital to Mao's struggle in the Cultural Revolution, and Mao himself wrote his own ''dazibao'' at Beijing University on August 5, 1966, calling on the people to "Bombard the Headquarters."<ref name=Cushing/>{{rp|5}}

The ''[[xuanchuan]]hua'' were artworks produced by the government and sold cheaply in stores to be displayed in homes or workplaces. The artists for these posters might be amateurs or uncredited professionals, and the posters were largely in a [[Socialist Realist]] visual style with certain conventions—for example, images of Mao were to be depicted as "red, smooth, and luminescent".<ref name=Cushing/>{{rp|7–12}}<ref name=Andrews>{{cite book|last=Andrews|first=Julia Frances|title=Painters and Politics in the People's Republic of China, 1949–1979|publisher=University of California Press|year=1995 |isbn=978-0520079816}}</ref>{{rp|360}}

Traditional themes in art were sidelined the Cultural Revolution, and artists such as [[Feng Zikai]], [[Shi Lu]], and [[Pan Tianshou]] were persecuted.<ref name=King/>{{rp|97}} Many of the artists have been assigned to manual labour, and artists were expected to depict subjects that glorified the Cultural Revolution related to their labour.<ref name=Andrews/>{{rp|351–52}} In 1971, in part to alleviate their suffering, several leading artists were recalled from manual labour or free from captivity under the initiative of Zhou Enlai to decorate hotels and railway stations defaced by Red Guards slogans. Zhou said that the artworks were for meant for foreigners, therefore were "outer" art not be under the obligations and restrictions placed on "inner" art meant for Chinese citizens. To him, landscape paintings should also not be considered one of the "Four Olds". However, Zhou was weakened by cancer, and in 1974, the Jiang Qing faction seized these and other paintings and mounted exhibitions in Beijing, Shanghai and other cities denouncing the artworks as "Black Paintings".<ref name=Andrews/>{{rp|368–76}}

===Historical relics===
[[File:Trip to Ningxia and Gansu.jpg|thumb|upright=1.35|Buddhist statues defaced during the Cultural Revolution|alt=]]

China's historical sites, artifacts and archives suffered devastating damage, as they were thought to be at the root of "old ways of thinking." Artifacts were seized, museums and private homes ransacked, and any item found that was thought to represent bourgeois or [[feudal]] ideas was destroyed. There are few records of exactly how much was destroyed—Western observers suggest that much of China's thousands of years of history was in effect destroyed, or, later, smuggled abroad for sale, during the short ten years of the Cultural Revolution. Chinese historians compare the cultural suppression during the Cultural Revolution to [[Qin Shihuang]]'s [[great Confucian purge]]. [[Religious persecution]] intensified during this period, as a result of religion being viewed in opposition to Marxist–Leninist and Maoist thinking.<ref name=Jiaqi/>{{rp|73}}

Although being undertaken by some of the Revolution's enthusiastic followers, the destruction of historical relics was never formally sanctioned by the Communist Party, whose official policy was instead to protect such items. On May 14, 1967, the CCP central committee issued a document entitled ''Several suggestions for the protection of cultural relics and books during the Cultural Revolution''.<ref name=Gao/>{{rp|21}} Nevertheless, enormous damage was inflicted on China's cultural heritage. For example, a survey in 1972 in Beijing of 18 key spots of cultural heritage, including the [[Temple of Heaven]] and [[Ming Dynasty Tombs|Ming Tombs]], showed extensive damage. Of the 80 cultural heritage sites in Beijing under municipal protection, 30 were destroyed, and of the 6,843 cultural sites under protection by Beijing government decision in 1958, 4,922 were damaged or destroyed.<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=zDhquEq5kTYC&pg=PA446 |title=Beijing Record: A Physical and Political History of Planning Modern Beijing |author= Jun Wang |pages=446–47 |publisher=World Scientific Publishing Co Pte Ltd. |year=2011 |isbn=978-9814295727}}</ref> Numerous valuable old books, paintings, and other cultural relics were also burnt to ashes.<ref name=Barnouin>{{cite book|last1=Barnouin|first1=Barbara|last2=Yu|first2=Changgen|title=Ten Years of Turbulence: The Chinese Cultural Revolution|publisher=Kegan Paul International, Routledge|year=2010|isbn=978-0-7103-0458-2}}</ref>{{rp|98}}

Later [[Archaeology|archaeological]] excavation and preservation after the destructive period in the 1960s, however, were protected, and several significant discoveries, such as the [[Terracotta Army]] and the [[Mawangdui]], occurred after the peak of the Revolution.<ref name=Gao/>{{rp|21}} Nevertheless, the most prominent symbol of academic research in archaeology, the journal ''[[Kaogu (journal)|Kaogu]]'', did not publish during the Cultural Revolution.<ref>''Journal of Asian history'', Volume 21, 1987, p. 87</ref> After the most violent phase of the 1960s ended, the attack on traditional culture continued in 1973 with the ''Anti-Lin Biao, Anti-Confucius Campaign'' as part of the struggle against the moderate elements in the party.

== Foreign relations ==
[[File:1967-09_1967年_中国驻印使馆被烧毁后.jpg|thumb|right|The [[Embassy of Indonesia, Beijing]] after being burned]]
During the Cultural Revolution, China [[exporting the revolution|exported communist revolutions]] as well as communist ideologies to multiple countries in [[Southeast Asia]], supporting the communist parties in [[Communist Party of Indonesia|Indonesia]], [[Malaysian Communist Party|Malaysia]], [[Communist Party of Vietnam|Vietnam]], [[Lao People's Revolutionary Party|Laos]], [[Communist Party of Burma|Myanmar]] and in particular, the [[Khmer Rouge|Khmer Rouge in Cambodia]] which was responsible for the [[Cambodian genocide]].<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.scmp.com/magazines/post-magazine/books/article/2188861/maoism-global-history-how-china-exported-revolution |title=When Pol Pot lounged by Mao's pool: how China exported Maoism |website=South China Morning Post |access-date=April 1, 2020}}</ref> It is estimated that at least 90% of the foreign aid to the Khmer Rouge came from China, with 1975 alone seeing at least US$1 billion in interest-free economic and military aid and US$20 million gift from China.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Laura |first1=Southgate |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=54iUDwAAQBAJ&q=By+mid-september+China+was+prepared+to+extend+to+Cambodia+a+total+of+US$1+billion&pg=PA84 |title=ASEAN Resistance to Sovereignty Violation: Interests, Balancing and the Role of the Vanguard State |publisher=Policy Press |isbn=978-1-5292-0221-2}}</ref> The economic malaise that resulted from the Cultural Revolution impacted China's ability to assist [[North Vietnam]] in its [[Vietnam War|war]] against [[South Vietnam]] by the 1970s, which resulted in a cooling of relations between the once allied nations.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Path |first1=Kosal |title=The economic factor in the Sino-Vietnamese split, 1972–75: An analysis of Vietnamese archival sources |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01446193.2010.512497 |journal=[[Cold War History (journal)|Cold War History]] |volume=11 |issue=4 |pages=519–555 |doi=10.1080/01446193.2010.512497 |s2cid=155036059 |access-date=19 March 2023}}</ref>

Among the over 40 countries which had established diplomatic or half-diplomatic relations with China at the time, around 30 countries went into diplomatic disputes with China—some countries even terminated their diplomatic relations with China, including [[Central African Republic|Central Africa]], [[Ghana]] and [[Indonesia]].<ref name="Huang-2014">{{cite web|last=Huang|first=Hua|author-link=Huang Hua|title=文革时期的荒诞外交|url=http://www.aisixiang.com/data/80986.html|access-date=April 1, 2020|website=Ai Si Xiang (爱思想)|language=zh}}</ref>{{better source needed}}
* [[Red Guards (China)|Red Guard]]s break into the British [[Legation]] in Beijing and assault three diplomats and a secretary, before setting it ablaze. The PRC authorities refuse to condemn the action. British officials in Shanghai were attacked in a separate incident, as the PRC authorities attempted to close the office there.<ref>{{cite news | author = Harold Munthe-Kaas |author2=Pat Healy | title = Britain's Tough Diplomatist in Peking | work = [[The Times]] | location = London | page = 6 | date = 23 August 1967 | issn = 0140-0460}}</ref>
* Red Guards also laid siege to the Soviet, French and Indonesian embassies and torched the Mongolian ambassador's car.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/11/the-cultural-revolution-50-years-on-all-you-need-to-know-about-chinas-political-convulsion | title=The Cultural Revolution: All you need to know about China's political convulsion | website=[[TheGuardian.com]] | date=May 11, 2016 }}</ref>
* With the help of Chinese [[embassies]] and [[consulates]] overseas, the CCP launched various propaganda campaigns for Mao, such as sending the [[Little red book|''Little Red Book'']] and the [[Chairman Mao badge]] to local citizens.<ref name="Huang-2014" />
* Many of Chinese ambassadors and consuls were called back to China to engage in the Cultural Revolution. Senior officials such as [[Chen Yi (marshal)|Chen Yi]], the 2nd [[Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China]], were persecuted.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Curran|first1=Thomas D.|title=Chinese Foreign Policy during the Cultural Revolution (Book Review)|url=https://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1046&context=his_fac|journal=History Faculty Publications}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Gurtov|first1=Melvin|title=The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs during the Cultural Revolution|journal=The China Quarterly|issue=40|pages=65–102|jstor=651980}}</ref>
* Several foreign guests were "mandated" to stand in front of the statue of Mao Zedong, holding the Little Red Book and "reporting" to Mao as other Chinese citizens did.<ref>{{Cite web|title=沉重的外交笑话：外国大使需挥舞《毛主席语录》|url=http://news.ifeng.com/history/zhongguoxiandaishi/detail_2010_08/26/2328352_1.shtml|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200608171706/http://news.ifeng.com/history/zhongguoxiandaishi/detail_2010_08/26/2328352_1.shtml|archive-date=June 8, 2020|access-date=April 1, 2020|website=[[Phoenix Television|Phoenix New Media]]}}</ref>

==Public views==
{{see also|Boluan Fanzheng}}

===Communist Party opinions===
{{main|Ideology of the Chinese Communist Party}}
[[File:Propaganda slogan removed - Wuhan University.JPG|thumb|upright=0.9|The central section of this wall shows the faint remnant marks of a propaganda slogan that was added during the Cultural Revolution, but has since been removed. The slogan read "Boundless faith that in Chairman Mao."]]

To make sense of the mass chaos caused by Mao's leadership in the Cultural Revolution while preserving the CCP's authority and legitimacy, Mao's successors needed to lend the event a "proper" historical judgment. On June 27, 1981, the Central Committee adopted the "''Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China''," an official assessment of major historical events since 1949.<ref name="marxists.org">{{cite web|url=http://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/cpc/history/01.htm|title=Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China (Chinese Communism Subject Archive)|access-date=December 27, 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121213182749/http://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/cpc/history/01.htm|archive-date=December 13, 2012|url-status=live}}</ref> This document became the key event in the official interpretation of the Cultural Revolution period.<ref name="Wu-2014">{{Cite book |last=Wu |first=Yiching |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/881183403 |title=The cultural revolution at the margins : Chinese socialism in crisis |publisher=[[Harvard University Press]] |isbn=978-0-674-41985-8 |location=Cambridge, Mass. |pages=7 |oclc=881183403}}</ref>

The Resolution frankly noted Mao's leadership role in the movement, stating that "chief responsibility for the grave 'Left' error of the 'Cultural Revolution,' an error comprehensive in magnitude and protracted in duration, does indeed lie with Comrade Mao Zedong." It diluted blame on Mao himself by asserting that the movement was "manipulated by the counterrevolutionary groups of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing," who caused its worst excesses. The Resolution affirmed that the Cultural Revolution "brought serious disaster and turmoil to the Communist Party and the Chinese people."<ref name="marxists.org"/> These themes of "turmoil" and "disaster" have become "master trope[s]" in both historical and popular understanding of the Cultural Revolution.<ref name="Wu-2014" />

The official view aimed to separate Mao's actions during the Cultural Revolution from his "heroic" revolutionary activities during the [[Chinese Civil War]] and the [[Second Sino-Japanese War]]. It also separated Mao's personal mistakes from the correctness of the theory that he created, going as far as to rationalize that the Cultural Revolution contravened the spirit of Mao Zedong Thought, which remains an official guiding ideology of the CCP. Deng Xiaoping famously summed this up with the phrase "Mao was 70% good, 30% bad."<ref name=ms>{{cite web|last1=Schiavenza|first1=Matt|title=Does a New Biography Tell the Whole Story on Deng Xiaoping?|url=http://asiasociety.org/blog/asia/does-new-biography-tell-whole-story-deng-xiaoping|publisher=Asia Society|access-date=October 30, 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111022060805/http://asiasociety.org/blog/asia/does-new-biography-tell-whole-story-deng-xiaoping|archive-date=October 22, 2011|url-status=live}}</ref> After the Cultural Revolution, Deng affirmed that Maoist ideology was responsible for the revolutionary success of the Communist Party, but abandoned it in practice to favour "[[Socialism with Chinese characteristics]]", a very different model of state-directed [[market economics]].{{Citation needed}}

CCP [[Chinese historiography|historiography]] characterizes the Cultural Revolution as an aberration and a period of chaos across all sectors of Chinese society.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Volland |first=Nicolai |title="Liberating the Small Devils": Red Guard Newspapers and Radical Publics, 1966–1968 |journal=The China Quarterly |language=en |volume=246 |pages=355 |doi=10.1017/S0305741021000424 |s2cid=235452119 |issn=0305-7410|doi-access=free }}</ref> In China, the official view of the party now serves as the dominant framework for historiography of the period; alternative views (see below) are discouraged. Following the Cultural Revolution, a new genre of literature known as "[[Scar literature]]" (''Shanghen Wenxue'') emerged, being encouraged by the post-Mao government. Written mainly by educated youth such as Liu Xinhua, [[Zhang Xianliang]], and [[Liu Xinwu]], scar literature depicted the Revolution from a negative viewpoint, using their own perspectives and experiences as a basis.<ref name=Gao/>{{rp|32}} Movies criticizing Cultural Revolution hardliners were prevalent from the late 1970s to the early 1980s, although they have since been banned under China's focus on opposing [[historical nihilism]].<ref name=":9">{{Cite book |last1=Marquis |first1=Christopher |url= |title=Mao and Markets: The Communist Roots of Chinese Enterprise |last2=Qiao |first2=Kunyuan |publisher=[[Yale University Press]] |isbn=978-0-300-26883-6 |location=New Haven |doi=10.2307/j.ctv3006z6k |jstor=j.ctv3006z6k |oclc=1348572572 |author-link=Christopher Marquis |s2cid=253067190}}</ref>{{Rp|page=248}}

After the [[1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre]], both liberals and conservatives within the CCP accused each other of excesses that they claimed were reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution. [[Li Peng]], who promoted the use of military force, cited that the student movement had taken inspiration from the grassroots populism of the Cultural Revolution and that if it is left unchecked, would eventually lead to a similar degree of mass chaos.<ref>''AsiaNews.it''</ref> Zhao Ziyang, who was sympathetic to the protestors, later accused his political opponents of illegally removing him from office by using "Cultural Revolution-style" tactics, including "reversing black and white, exaggerating personal offenses, taking quotes out of context, issuing slander and lies ... inundating the newspapers with critical articles making me out to be an enemy, and casual disregard for my personal freedoms."<ref>Zhao 43–44</ref>

===Alternative opinions in China===
Although the Chinese Communist Party officially condemns the Cultural Revolution, there are many Chinese people who hold more positive views of it, particularly amongst the working class, who benefited most from its policies.<ref name=Gao/>{{rp}} People in rural areas of China also tend to view the Cultural Revolution in a more positive light given the expansion of rural infrastructure and agricultural development that occurred during the period.<ref name=":2">{{Cite book |last=Han |first=Dongping |url= |title=The Unknown Cultural Revolution: Life and Change in a Chinese Village |isbn=978-1-58367-180-1 |location=New York |oclc=227930948}}</ref>{{Rp|page=ix}} Since Deng's ascendancy to power, the government has arrested and imprisoned figures who have taken a strongly pro-Cultural Revolution stance. For instance, in 1985, a young shoe-factory worker put up a poster on a factory wall in [[Xianyang]], Shaanxi, which declared that "The Cultural Revolution was Good" and led to achievements such as "the building of the [[Nanjing Yangtze River Bridge]], the creation of hybrid rice crops and the rise of people's consciousness." The factory worker was eventually sentenced to ten years in prison, where he died soon after "without any apparent cause."<ref name=Gao/>{{rp|46–47}} Since the late 1980s, China has experienced "at first a fitful and then a nationwide revival in Mao Zedong," including aspects of the Cultural Revolution.<ref name="Wu-2014" />{{Rp|pages=6-7}}

One of the student leaders of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, [[Shen Tong]], author of ''[[Almost a Revolution]]'', has a positive view of some aspects of the Cultural Revolution. According to Shen, the trigger for the famous Tiananmen hunger-strikes of 1989 was a big-character poster, a form of public political discussion that gained prominence during the Cultural Revolution. Shen remarked that the congregation of students from across the country to Beijing on trains and the hospitality they received from residents was reminiscent of the experiences of Red Guards in the Cultural Revolution.<ref name="Tang"/>

Since the advent of the Internet, people inside and outside China have argued online that the Cultural Revolution had many beneficial qualities for China that have been denied by both the post-Mao Chinese Communist Party and Western media. Some hold that the Cultural Revolution 'cleansed' China from superstitions, religious dogma, and outdated traditions in a 'modernist transformation' that later made Deng's economic reforms possible. The popular revival of Mao in the late 1990s coincided with the government's increasing privatization and its dismantling of the [[iron rice bowl]] employment and welfare policies.<ref name="Wu-2014" />{{Rp|page=5}} These sentiments also increased following the [[U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade]] in 1999 when a segment of the population began to associate anti-Maoist viewpoints with the United States.<ref name=Gao/>{{rp|117}}

[[Chinese New Left|Contemporary Maoists]] have also become more organized in the internet era, partially as a response to criticisms of Mao from academics and scholars. One Maoist website managed to collect thousands of signatures demanding punishment for those who publicly criticize Mao.{{Citation needed}} Along with the call for legal action, this movement demands the establishment of agencies similar to Cultural Revolution-era "neighborhood committees", in which "citizens" would report anti-Maoists to local public security bureaus. Maoist rhetoric and mass mobilization methods were resurgent in the interior city of Chongqing during the political career of [[Bo Xilai]].<ref>Ewing</ref>

In 2012, Chinese web portal and social media platform Tencent conducted an online survey focused on "how to combat the unhealthy trend of Cultural Revolution nostalgia."<ref name="Wu-2014" /> Seventy-eight percent of survey participants expressed nostalgia for the Cultural Revolution.<ref name="Wu-2014" />

[[Chinese New Left]] internet forum [[Utopia (internet forum)|Utopia]] promoted the idea of a new Cultural Revolution and was suspended for a month as a result.<ref name=":9" />{{Rp|page=47}}

===Contemporary China===
{{see also|Shantou Cultural Revolution Museum}}
Public discussion of the Cultural Revolution is still limited in China. The Chinese government continues to prohibit news organizations from mentioning details of the Cultural Revolution, and online discussions and books about the topic are subject to official scrutiny. Textbooks on the subject continue to abide by the "official view" (see above) of the events. Many government documents from the 1960s onward remain classified and are not open to formal inspection by private academics.<ref name="Fong">Fong</ref> At the [[National Museum of China]] in Beijing, the Cultural Revolution is barely mentioned in its historical exhibits.<ref name=johnson>{{cite news|last1=Johnson|first1=Ian|title=At China's New Museum, History Toes Party Line|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/04/world/asia/04museum.html?pagewanted=all|access-date=October 31, 2011|newspaper=The New York Times|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111014205212/http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/04/world/asia/04museum.html?pagewanted=all|archive-date=October 14, 2011|url-status=live}}</ref> Despite inroads made by numerous prominent sinologists, independent scholarly research of the Cultural Revolution is discouraged by the Chinese government.<ref name="Fong" /> There are concerns that as witnesses age and die, the opportunity to research the event thoroughly within China may be lost.<ref>[https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/23/world/asia/23iht-letter.html "A Grim Chapter in History Kept Closed"] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170216210326/http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/23/world/asia/23iht-letter.html }} article by Didi Kirsten Tatlow in ''The New York Times'', July 22, 2010, accessed July 22, 2010.</ref>

=== Contemporary discussions of Mao Zedong's legacy ===
Mao Zedong's public image is one that is widely disputed among the nation of China. Despite his gruesome actions, during the anniversary of his birth, many people within China are left viewing Mao as a godlike figure and refer to him as "the people's great savior." Supporters of Mao Zedong hold him to the highest regard, that of a deity. Additionally, contemporary discussions in modern newspapers like the Global Times continue to make attempts to preserve Mao's public image. Rather than focus on the horrific consequences of his leadership, newspapers make excuses by describing that revolutions typically have a brutal side and are unable to be viewed from the "humanitarian perspective." Supporters of Mao would agree on the opinion that the ends justify the means.<ref>{{Cite news|title=China media: Mao Zedong's legacy|language=en-GB|work=BBC News|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-25490140|access-date=May 18, 2021}}</ref>

Adversaries of Mao Zedong look at the actions that occurred under his leadership from a different point of view. An interesting way to look at Mao's public image is that "he was better at conquering power than at ruling the country and developing a socialist economy." It is clearly evident that Mao went to extreme measures to conquer power. However, despite successes in gaining power, it is obvious that Mao's actions had disastrous effects. Adversaries of Mao recognize that his actions were ill-conceived. In terms of his public image, they are also content with depicting him as innately evil. The benefits of Mao Zedong's rule do not exceed the countless lives lost within the nation. Millions of mothers, fathers, brothers, sisters, etc. of individuals were lost due to Mao's arrogance. It is clear that depending on who is asked, Mao Zedong's public image varies greatly.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Schram|first=Stuart R.|title=Mao Zedong a Hundred Years On: The Legacy of a Ruler|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/655689|journal=The China Quarterly|volume=137|issue=137|pages=125–43|doi=10.1017/S0305741000034068|jstor=655689|s2cid=154770001 |issn=0305-7410}}</ref>

===Outside mainland China===
In Hong Kong, a [[Hong Kong 1967 riots|pro-Communist anti-colonial strike]] inspired by the Cultural Revolution was launched in 1967. Its excesses damaged the credibility of these activists for more than a generation in the eyes of Hong Kong residents.<ref>Wiltshire, Trea. [First published 1987] (republished & reduced 2003). Old Hong Kong – Volume Three. Central, Hong Kong: Text Form Asia books Ltd. {{ISBN|962-7283-61-4}}</ref> In Taiwan, [[Chiang Kai-shek]] initiated the [[Chinese Cultural Renaissance]] to counter what he regarded as the destruction of traditional Chinese values by the Communists on the mainland. In [[People's Socialist Republic of Albania|Albania]], Communist leader and Chinese ally [[Enver Hoxha]] began a "[[Cultural and Ideological Revolution]]" organized along the same lines as the Cultural Revolution.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Blumi|first1=Isa|title=Hoxha's Class War: The Cultural Revolution and State Reformation, 1961–1971|journal=East European Quarterly|volume=33|issue=3|pages=303–26|via=ProQuest}}</ref>

In the world at large, Mao Zedong emerged as a symbol of the anti-establishment, grassroots populism, and self-determination. His revolutionary philosophies found adherents in the [[Shining Path]] of Peru, the [[Naxalite]] insurgency in India, various [[Communism in Nepal|political movements in Nepal]], the U.S.-based [[Black Panther Party]],<ref>''Up Against the Wall,'' Curtis Austin, University of Arkansas Press, Fayetteville, 2006, p. 170</ref> and the 1960s [[counterculture]] movement in general.{{According to whom}}

In October 1966, Enver Hoxha delivered a speech to a plenum of the CC of the Party of Labour titled "Some Preliminary Ideas about the Cultural Revolution" and analyzed it in an overall negative fashion. He said that "the cult of Mao was raised to the skies in a sickening and artificial manner" and added that, in reading of its purported objectives, "you have the impression that everything old in Chinese and world culture should be rejected without discrimination and a new culture, the culture they call proletarian, should be created." He further stated that, "It is difficult for us to call this revolution, as the 'Red Guards' are carrying it out, a Proletarian Cultural Revolution... the enemies could and should be captured by the organs of the dictatorship on the basis of the law, and if the enemies have wormed their way into the party committees, let them be purged through party channels. Or in the final analysis, arm the working class and attack the committees, but not with children."<ref>{{cite book |url=http://www.enverhoxha.ru/Archive_of_books/English/enver_hoxha_selected_works_volume_IV_eng.pdf |last=Hoxha |first=Enver |title=Selected Works|volume = 4 | location=Tirana |publisher=8 Nëntori Publishing House |year=1982}}</ref>

In 2007 [[Hong Kong Chief Executive]] [[Donald Tsang]] remarked that the Cultural Revolution represented the 'dangers of democracy', remarking "People can go to the extreme like what we saw during the Cultural Revolution [...], when people take everything into their own hands, then you cannot govern the place."<ref name=hk>{{cite news|last=BBC|title=HK's Tsang apologises for gaffe|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7042941.stm|work=BBC News|access-date=April 1, 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110728181344/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7042941.stm|archive-date=July 28, 2011|url-status=live}}</ref> The remarks caused controversy in Hong Kong and were later retracted with an accompanying apology.<ref name=hk/>

===Academic debate===
Scholars and academics continue to debate why events unfolded the way they did, Mao's role, how the Cultural Revolution began, and what it was. These debates have changed over the decades as researchers explored new sources. The Cultural Revolution does not lend itself to a single narrative storyline as it was a series of overlapping and internally complex movements.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Karl |first=Rebecca E. |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/503828045 |title=Mao Zedong and China in the twentieth-century world : a concise history |publisher=[[Duke University Press]] |isbn=978-0-8223-4780-4 |location=Durham [NC] |pages=119 |oclc=503828045}}</ref>

In the 1960s, while many scholars dismissed Mao's initiatives as ideological and destructive, others sympathized with his concern for equality, opposition to bureaucratism and corruption, and individual selfishness. They saw Maoism as a populist insistence on mass participation, mass criticism and the right to rebel, and a determination to wipe out a new ruling class. By the 1980s, however, Harvard University sociologist [[Andrew Walder]] wrote that the "public opinion in the field had changed markedly". Most in the field now "seem convinced that the Cultural Revolution was a human disaster, even a historical crime, something on the order of Hitler's holocaust and Stalin's great terror."<ref name=Walder/>

Walder argued that the failures of the Cultural Revolution did not come from poor implementation, bureaucratic sabotage, disloyalty, or lingering class antagonisms. If things turned out differently from what Mao expected, Walder concluded, this was "probably due to the fact that Mao did not know what he wanted, or that he did know what he was doing, or both ... the outcomes are what one should have expected, given the Maoist doctrine and aims."<ref name=Walder>{{cite journal|last=Walder|first=Andrew|title=Actually Existing Maoism|journal=Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs|volume=18|issue=18|pages=155–66|jstor=2158588|doi = 10.2307/2158588|s2cid =156609951|url=https://www.google.com/search?q=%22seem+convinced+that++the+Cultural+Revolution+was+a+human+disaster%22&tbm=bks}}</ref>

The debate continues because the movement contains many contradictions: led by an all-powerful omnipresent leader, it was mainly driven by a series of grassroots popular uprisings against the Communist establishment. Many English-language books published since the 1980s paint a negative picture of the movement. Historian Anne F. Thurston wrote that it "led to loss of culture, and of spiritual values; loss of hope and ideals; loss of time, truth and of life".<ref>[[#Thu84-85|Thurston 1984–85]]. pp. 605–06.</ref> Barnouin and Yu summarized the Cultural Revolution as "a political movement that produced unprecedented social divisions, mass mobilization, hysteria, upheavals, arbitrary cruelty, torture, killings, and even civil war", calling Mao "one of the most tyrannical despots of the twentieth century".<ref name=Barnouin/>{{rp|217}} According to historian Chun Lin, despite these human tragedies, there was also rapid expansion of individual freedoms and political self-organization during the Cultural Revolution.<ref name="Lin 2006"/>

Some scholars challenge the mainstream portrayals of the Cultural Revolution and offer to understand it in a more positive light. [[Gao Mobo|Mobo Gao]], writing in ''The Battle for China's Past: Mao and the Cultural Revolution'', argues that the movement benefited millions of Chinese citizens, particularly agricultural and industrial workers,<ref name="Gao" />{{rp|1}} and sees it as egalitarian and genuinely populist, citing continued Maoist nostalgia in China today as remnants of its positive legacy.<ref name="Gao" />{{rp|3}} Some draw a distinction between intention and performance.<ref name="Walder" />{{rp|159}} While Mao's leadership was pivotal at the beginning of the movement, Jin Qiu contends that as events progressed, it deviated significantly from Mao's utopian vision.<ref name="Jin" />{{rp|2–3}} In this sense, the Cultural Revolution was actually a much more decentralized and varied movement that gradually lost cohesion, spawning many 'local revolutions' which differed in their nature and goals.<ref name="Jin" />{{rp|2–3}}

Academic interest has also focused on the movement's relationship with Mao's personality. Mao envisioned himself as a wartime guerrilla leader, which made him wary of the bureaucratic nature of peacetime governance. With the Cultural Revolution Mao was simply "returning to form", once again taking on the role of a guerrilla leader fighting against an institutionalized party bureaucracy. [[Roderick MacFarquhar]] and [[Michael Schoenhals]], paint the movement as neither a ''bona fide'' war over ideological purity ''nor'' a mere power struggle to remove Mao's political rivals.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|2–3}}

While Mao's personal motivations were undoubtedly pivotal to the Cultural Revolution, they reasoned that other complex factors contributed to the way events unfolded. These include China's relationship with the global Communist movement, geopolitical concerns, the [[Sino-Soviet Split|ideological rift between China and the Soviet Union]], Khrushchev's ouster, and the failures of the Great Leap Forward.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|2–3}} They conclude that the movement was, at least in part, a legacy project to cement Mao's place in history, aimed to boost his prestige while he was alive ''and'' preserve the invulnerability of his ideas after his death.<ref name=Mac/>{{rp|2–3}}

Varying academic focuses on power conflicts or clashes of personalities as underlying Mao's motivations, or alternatively on ideological reasons for launching the Cultural Revolution, are not necessarily conflicting..<ref name="Wu-2014" />{{Rp|page=20}} Mao's suspicions of those around him in power also reflected his longstanding concerns with the decline of revolutionary spirit and the potential rise of a new class-stratified society arising as the popular revolutionary movement of the party transformed into a socialist bureaucracy to govern.<ref name="Wu-2014" />{{Rp|page=20}} Historian Rebecca Karl writes that for Mao, the pursuit of power was never an end in itself, but rather the seizure of state power was to be used in making the revolution.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Karl |first=Rebecca E. |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/503828045 |title=Mao Zedong and China in the twentieth-century world : a concise history |publisher=Duke University Press |isbn=978-0-8223-4780-4 |location=Durham [NC] |pages=117 |oclc=503828045}}</ref>

Professor Yiching Wu argues that the typical historiography of the Cultural Revolution as an "era of madness" is simpleminded but writes that such narratives have a "remarkably tenacious ideological power:"<ref name="Wu-2014" />{{Rp|page=3}}

{{Blockquote|text=Since the early 1980s, there have been concerted efforts to reduce the extraordinary complexity of the Cultural Revolution to the simplicity almost exclusively of barbarism, violence, and human suffering. Flattening historical memory of the Cultural Revolution through moralistic condemnation and exhortation, these narratives not only deprive an immensely important and complex episode of Chinese history of its multilayered historicity, but also provide the discursive ground for delegitimizing China's revolutionary history of the twentieth century.}}

==See also==
{{Portal|China|Communism|Socialism}}
* [[Burning of books and burying of scholars]], [[Qin dynasty]]
* [[Chinese Cultural Renaissance]]
* [[History of the Chinese Communist Party]]
* [[History of the People's Republic of China]]
* [[List of campaigns of the Chinese Communist Party]]
* [[List of massacres in China]]
* [[Maoism]]
* [[Marxism-Leninism]]
* [[Morning Sun (film)]]
* [[Neo-Stalinism]]
* [[Stalinism]]
* [[Total Westernization]]

'''International:'''
* [[Meiji Restoration#Destruction of cultural heritage|Mass destruction of Japanese cultural heritage by the Japanese government in the late 19th century Meiji restoration]]
* [[July Theses]], a mini–Cultural Revolution in the [[Socialist Republic of Romania]]
* [[Cultural and Ideological Revolution]], a mini–Cultural Revolution in the [[People's Socialist Republic of Albania]]
* [[Cultural Revolution in the Soviet Union]]

'''General:'''
* [[Iconoclasm]]
* [[List of destroyed heritage]]

== Notes ==
{{NoteFoot}}

== References ==
=== Citations ===
{{Reflist}}

=== Sources ===
{{refbegin}}
* "[http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Li-Peng,-the-%E2%80%9Cbutcher-of-Tiananmen,%E2%80%9D-was-%E2%80%9Cready-to-die%E2%80%9D-to-stop-the-student-turmoil-18592.html Li Peng, the 'Butcher of Tiananmen,' was 'Ready to Die' to Stop the Student Turmoil]." ''[[AsiaNews]].'' 2003. Retrieved August 21, 2011
* Barnouin, Barbara, and Yu Changgen. 2006. [https://books.google.com/books?id=NztlWQeXf2IC&q=zhou+enlai ''Zhou Enlai: A Political Life'']. Hong Kong: [[Chinese University of Hong Kong]]. {{ISBN|9629962802}}. Retrieved on March 12, 2011
* Ewing, Kent. June 4, 2011. "[https://web.archive.org/web/20110605024417/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MF04Ad01.html Mao's Army on the Attack]." ''[[Asia Times|Asia Times Online]]''. Retrieved on June 16, 2011
* Fong Tak-ho. May 19, 2006. "[https://web.archive.org/web/20060616144533/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HE19Ad01.html Cultural Revolution? What Revolution?]" ''Asia Times Online''. Retrieved on June 15, 2011
* Gao, Mobo. 2008. ''[https://web.archive.org/web/20121103094507/http://www.strongwindpress.com/pdfs/EBook/The_Battle_for_Chinas_Past.pdf The Battle for China's Past: Mao and the Cultural Revolution]''. London: [[Pluto Press]]. {{ISBN|978-0745327808}}. Retrieved on September 2, 2012.
* King, Richard, ed. 2010. ''Art in Turmoil: The Chinese Cultural Revolution, 1966–76''. [[University of British Columbia Press]]. {{ISBN|978-0774815437}}
* [[Roderick MacFarquhar|MacFarquhar, Roderick]], and [[Michael Schoenhals]]. 2006. ''[[Mao's Last Revolution]]''. [[Harvard University Press]]. {{ISBN|978-0674023321}}.
* [[Jonathan Spence|Spence, Jonathan D.]] 1999. ''The Search for Modern China''. New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company. {{ISBN|0393973514}}.
* [[Frederick Teiwes|Teiwes, Frederick C.]], and Warren Sun. 2004. "The First Tiananmen Incident Revisited: Elite Politics and Crisis Management at the End of the Maoist Era." ''[[Pacific Affairs]]'' 77(2):211–35. {{JSTOR|40022499}}.
* Thurston, Anne F. 1988. ''Enemies of the People: The Ordeal of Intellectuals in China's Great Cultural Revolution''. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
* [[Zhao Ziyang|Ziyang, Zhao]]. 2009. ''[[Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang]]'', translated and edited by B. Pu, R. Chiang, and [[Adi Ignatius|A. Ignatius]]. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. {{ISBN|1439149380}}.
{{refend}}

==Further reading==

===General===
{{Library resources box}}
* Richard Curt Kraus (2012). ''The Cultural Revolution: A Very Short Introduction''. New York: Oxford University Press, Very Short Introductions Series. xiv, 138 pp. {{ISBN|978-0199740550}}
* Morning Sun, "Bibliography," [http://www.morningsun.org/library Morningsun.org] Books and articles of General Readings and Selected Personal Narratives on the Cultural Revolution
* Yuan Gao, with Judith Polumbaum, ''[[Born Red: A Chronicle of the Cultural Revolution]]'' (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987), an autobiography that includes experiences during the Cultural Revolution
* [[Ji-li Jiang]], ''[[Red Scarf Girl|Red Scarf Girl: A Memoir of the Cultural Revolution]]'' (New York: HarperCollins, 1997)
* ''[[A Year In Upper Felicity]]'', book chronicling a year in a rural Chinese village during the Cultural Revolution

===Specific topics===
* Chan, Anit (1985). ''Children of Mao: Personality Development and Political Activism in the Red Guard Generation''. Seattle: University of Washington Press
* Chen, Lingchei Letty (2020). "The Great Leap Backward: Forgetting and Representing the Mao Years". New York: Cambria Press. Scholarly studies on memory writings and documentaries of the Mao years, victimhood narratives, perpetrator studies, ethics of bearing witness to atrocities
* Li, Jie and Enhua Zhang, eds. (2016). ''Red Legacies in China: Cultural Afterlives of the Communist Revolution'' Harvard University Asia Center, 409 pp.; Scholarly studies on cultural legacies and continuities from the Maoist era in art, architecture, literature, performance, film, etc.
* [[Fox Butterfield]] (1982, revised 2000). ''China: Alive in the Bitter Sea'', {{ISBN|0553342193}}, an oral history of some Chinese people's experience during the Cultural Revolution
* [[Ross Terrill]] (1992). ''The White-Boned Demon: A Biography of Madame Mao Zedong'' Stanford University Press, 1984 {{ISBN|0804729220}}; rpr. New York: Simon & Schuster, {{ISBN|0671744844}}
* Wu, Yiching (2014). ''The Cultural Revolution at the Margins: Chinese Socialism in Crisis''. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

===Commentaries===
* [[Pierre Ryckmans (writer)|Ryckmans, Pierre]] (1977). ''The Chairman's New Clothes: Mao and the Cultural Revolution.'' {{ISBN|0850312086}}
** (revised ed.) 1981. {{ISBN|0850314356}}
* —— 1978. ''[[Chinese Shadows (Ombres Chinoises)|Chinese Shadows]]''. {{ISBN|0670219185|0140047875}}
* —— 1979. ''Broken Images: Essays on Chinese Culture and Politics''. {{ISBN|0805280693}}
* —— 1986. ''The Burning Forest: Essays on Chinese Culture and Politics''. {{ISBN|0030050634|0586086307|0805003509|0805002421}}
* Liu, Guokai. 1987. ''A Brief Analysis of the Cultural Revolution''. edited by Anita Chan. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe

===Fictional treatments===
* [[Dai Sijie|Sijie, Dai]] (2001). ''Balzac and the Little Chinese Seamstress'', translated by [[Ina Rilke|I. Rilke]]. New York: [[Alfred A. Knopf|Knopf]] / [[Random House]]. 197 p. {{ISBN|037541309X}}
* Gao, Xingjian (2002). ''One Man's Bible: A Novel'', translated by [[Mabel Lee|M. Lee]]. New York: [[HarperCollins]]. 450 pp
* Gu, Hua (1983). ''A Small Town Called Hibiscus'', translated by [[Gladys Yang|G. Yang]]. Beijing: Chinese Literature / China Publications Centre. 260 p.
** Reprinted: San Francisco: China Books
* Yu, Hua (2003). ''To Live: A Novel'', translated by M. Berry. New York: [[Anchor Books]]. 250 pp
* [[Ying Chang Compestine|Compestine, Ying Chang]] (2007). [https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/77333486 ''Revolution Is Not a Dinner Party : A Novel.''] New York: [[Henry Holt and Company|Holt]]. {{ISBN|0805082077}}. Young adult novel
* [[Liu Cixin|Cixin, Liu]] (2014). ''[[The Three-Body Problem (novel)|The Three-Body Problem]]'', translated by [[Ken Liu|K. Liu]]. New York: [[Tor Books]]. {{isbn|0765377063}}

===Memoirs by Chinese participants===
* Liu Ping, ''My Chinese Dream – From Red Guard to CEO'' (San Francisco, 2012). 556 p. {{ISBN|978-0835100403}}
* [[Nien Cheng]], ''[[Life and Death in Shanghai]]'' (Grove, May 1987). 547 p. {{ISBN|0394555481}}
* [[Jung Chang]], ''[[Wild Swans: Three Daughters of China]]'' (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991). 524 p. {{LCCN|91020696}}
* Heng Liang Judith Shapiro, ''[[Son of the Revolution]]'' (New York: Knopf : Distributed by Random House, 1983).
* Jiang Yang Chu translated and annotated by Djang Chu, ''Six Chapters of Life in a Cadre School: Memoirs from China's Cultural Revolution'' [Translation of Ganxiao Liu Ji] (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986).
* [[Ma Bo]], ''Blood Red Sunset: A Memoir of the Chinese Cultural Revolution'' (New York: Viking, 1995). Translated by Howard Goldblatt.
* Guanlong Cao, ''The Attic: Memoir of a Chinese Landlord's Son'' (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).
* [[Anchee Min]], ''[[Red Azalea]]'' (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994). {{ISBN|1400096987}}.
* Rae Yang, ''Spider Eaters: A Memoir'' (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).
* Weili Ye, Xiaodong Ma, ''Growing up in the People's Republic: Conversations between Two Daughters of China's Revolution'' (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
* Lijia Zhang, ''Socialism Is Great": A Worker's Memoir of the New China'' (New York: Atlas & Co, Distributed by Norton, 2007).
* [[Emily Wu]], ''Feather in the Storm'' (Pantheon, 2006). {{ISBN|978-0375424281}}.
* Xinran Xue, ''The Good Women of China: Hidden Voices '' (Chatto & Windus, 2002). Translated by [[Esther Tyldesley]]. {{ISBN|0701173459}}
* [[Ting-Xing Ye]], ''[[Leaf In A Bitter Wind]]'' (England, 1997)
* Dongping Han, ''The Unknown Cultural Revolution: Life and Change in a Chinese Village,'' {{ISBN|978-1583671801}}
* Ken Ling, ''[[The Revenge of Heaven]]. Journal of a young Chinese.'' English text prepared by Miriam London and Ta-Ling Lee. [[G. P. Putnam's Sons]], [[New York City|New York]] 1972

===Films set in the Cultural Revolution===

* [[Xie Jin]], ''[[Hibiscus Town]]'' (1984)
* [[Zhang Yimou]], ''[[Red Sorghum (film)|Red Sorghum]]'' (1987)
* [[Chen Kaige]], ''[[Farewell My Concubine (film)|Farewell My Concubine]]'' (1992)
* Zhang Yimou, ''[[Story of Qiu Ju]]'' (1992)
* [[Tian Zhuangzhuang]] ''[[Blue Kite]]'' (1993)
* [[Zhang Yimou]], ''[[To Live (1994 film)|To Live]]'' (1993)
* [[Jiang Wen]], ''[[In the Heat of the Sun]]'' (1994)

==External links==
* [https://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9028164/Cultural-Revolution ''Encyclopædia Britannica''. The Cultural Revolution]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20070429003300/http://library.thinkquest.org/26469/cultural-revolution/history.html History of The Cultural Revolution]
* [http://www.sinohits.net/posters/index.htm Chinese propaganda posters gallery (Cultural Revolution, Mao, and others)]
* [http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64563/65449/4526439.html Hua Guofeng's speech to the 11th Party Congress, 1977]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20140517221258/http://morningsun.org/ Morning Sun – A Film and Website about Cultural Revolution] and the [https://web.archive.org/web/20170518113244/http://morningsun.org/images/index.html photographs] of the subject available from the film's site.
* [http://www.chinese-memorial.org/ Memorial for Victims of the Chinese Cultural Revolution]
* [http://www.monthlyreview.org/0305pugh.htm "William Hinton on the Cultural Revolution"] by Dave Pugh
* [http://www.cnd.org/CR/english/articles/violence.htm "Student Attacks Against Teachers: The Revolution of 1966"] by Youqin Wang
* [https://www.nytimes.com/1993/01/06/world/a-tale-of-red-guards-and-cannibals.html A Tale of Red Guards and Cannibals] by [[Nicholas D. Kristof]]. ''[[The New York Times]]'', January 6, 1993.

{{Cultural Revolution}}
{{Maoism}}
{{Religious persecution}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Cultural Revolution}}
[[Category:Cultural Revolution| ]]
[[Category:1960s in China]]
[[Category:1966 establishments in China]]
[[Category:1966 introductions]]
[[Category:1970s in China]]
[[Category:1976 disestablishments in China]]
[[Category:20th-century revolutions]]
[[Category:Campaigns of the Chinese Communist Party]]
[[Category:Cold War history of China]]
[[Category:Cultural history of China]]
[[Category:Man-made disasters in China]]
[[Category:Mao Zedong]]
[[Category:Maoist terminology]]
[[Category:Massacres in China]]
[[Category:Politicides]]
[[Category:Political and cultural purges]]
[[Category:Political controversies in China]]
[[Category:Revolutions in China]]
[[Category:Vandalized works of art]]

Shanti Party Nepal

2022-02-07T19:20:57Z

Aravindhvnp: Article shaped.

{{Cleanup bare URLs}}
{{Infobox Nepalese political party |
name = Shanti Party Nepal |
devanagari_name = शान्ति पार्टी नेपाल |
colorcode = {{party color|Shanti Party Nepal}} |
logo = |
president = Jhanak Prasad Dhungana<ref>[http://www.unmin.org.np/?d=activities&p=activity_detail&aid=69 United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) : Activities » Activities Update » Activity Details] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080506134021/http://www.unmin.org.np/?d=activities&p=activity_detail&aid=69 }}</ref> |
secretary = |
foundation = |
headquarters = |
ideology = |
international = |
electoral_symbol = [[Image:Shanti Party Nepal-electionsymbol2064.jpg]]|
website = |
}}
'''Shanti Party Nepal''' (Peace Party Nepal) is a [[political party]] in [[Nepal]]. The party contested the [[1999 Nepalese legislative election|1999 parliamentary election]].<ref>http://www.nepalhomepage.com/politics/elections/general2056/factsfig/partylist.html</ref> The party is registered with the [[Election Commission of Nepal]] ahead of the [[2008 Nepalese Constituent Assembly election|2008 Constituent Assembly election]].<ref>[http://www.election.gov.np/NP/legal/list.php पार्टीको सूची — Election Commission of Nepal] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131102124711/http://www.election.gov.np/NP/legal/list.php }}</ref> The party wants to proclaim Nepal as a [[Hindu]] state.<ref>[http://www.nepalitimes.com/issue/361/Nation/13840 Small is beautiful - Nepali Times]</ref>

==References==
{{reflist}}

{{Hindu Nationalism}}

[[Category:Nepalese Hindu political parties]]
[[Category:Hindu nationalism in Nepal]]