Democratic backsliding

From Bharatpedia, an open encyclopedia
Information red.svg
Scan the QR code to donate via UPI
Dear reader, We need your support to keep the flame of knowledge burning bright! Our hosting server bill is due on June 1st, and without your help, Bharatpedia faces the risk of shutdown. We've come a long way together in exploring and celebrating our rich heritage. Now, let's unite to ensure Bharatpedia continues to be a beacon of knowledge for generations to come. Every contribution, big or small, makes a difference. Together, let's preserve and share the essence of Bharat.

Thank you for being part of the Bharatpedia family!
Please scan the QR code on the right click here to donate.

0%

   

transparency: ₹0 raised out of ₹100,000 (0 supporter)



Since c. 2010, the number of countries autocratizing (blue) is higher than those democratizing (yellow).


Democratic backsliding, also called autocratization,[1][2][lower-alpha 1] is "a process of regime change towards autocracy that makes the exercise of political power more arbitrary and repressive and that restricts the space for public contestation and political participation in the process of government selection".[9][10] Democratic decline involves the weakening of democratic institutions, such as the peaceful transition of power or free and fair elections, or the violation of individual rights that underpin democracy, especially freedom of expression.[11][12]

Proposed causes of democratic backsliding include lack of public support for democracy, economic inequality, culturally conservative reactions to societal changes, populist or personalist politics, and external influence from great power politics. During crises, backsliding can occur when leaders impose autocratic rules during states of emergency that are either disproportionate to the severity of the crisis or remain in place after the situation has improved.[13]

While regime change through military coups has declined since the end of the Cold War, more subtle forms of backsliding have increased. During the third wave of democratization in the late twentieth century, many new, weakly institutionalized democracies were established; these regimes have been most vulnerable to democratic backsliding.[14][12] The third wave of autocratization has been ongoing since 2010, when the number of liberal democracies was at an all-time high.[15][16] One quarter of the world's population lives under democratically backsliding hybrid regimes as of 2021.[17]

Manifestations[edit]

Democratic backsliding occurs when essential components of democracy are threatened. Examples of democratic backsliding include:[18][19]

Forms[edit]

Further information: Hybrid regime

Democratic backsliding can occur in several common ways. Backsliding is often led by democratically elected leaders, who use "incremental rather than revolutionary" tactics.[22] As emphasized by Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, it is difficult to pinpoint a single specific moment at which a government is no longer democratic, given that this process of decline manifests "slowly, in barely visible steps".[23] Ozan Varol uses the phrase stealth authoritarianism to describe the practice of an authoritarian leader (or a potential authoritarian leader) using "seemingly legitimate legal mechanisms for anti-democratic ends ... concealing anti-democratic practices under the mask of law."[24] Together with Juan Linz (1996),[25] Levitsky and Ziblatt developed and agreed upon their "litmus test", which includes what they believe to be the four key indicators of authoritarian behavior. These four factors are: rejection (or weak commitment to) democratic rules of the game, denial of the legitimacy of political opponents, toleration or encouragement of violence, and readiness to curtail civil liberties of opponents, including media. Varol describes the manipulation of libel laws, electoral laws, or "terrorism" laws as tools to target or discredit political opponents, and the employment of democratic rhetoric as a distraction from anti-democratic practices, as manifestations of stealth authoritarianism.[24] In addition to these key signs derived from the behavior of leaders, Samuel P. Huntington also describes culture as a main contributor to democratic backsliding, and goes on to argue that certain cultures are particularly hostile to democracy, but they don’t necessarily prohibit democratization.[26]

Promissory coups[edit]

In a promissory coup, an incumbent elected government is deposed in a coup d'etat by coup leaders who claim to defend democracy and promise to hold elections to restore democracy. In these situations, coup-makers emphasize the temporary and necessary nature of their intervention in order to ensure democracy in the future.[14] This is unlike the more open-ended coups that occurred during the Cold War. Political scientist Nancy Bermeo says that "The share of successful coups that falls into the promissory category has risen significantly, from 35 percent before 1990 to 85 percent afterward."[14] Examining 12 promissory coups in democratic states between 1990 and 2012, Bermeo found that "Few promissory coups were followed quickly by competitive elections, and fewer still paved the way for improved democracies."[14]

Executive aggrandizement[edit]

This process contains a series of institutional changes by the elected executives, impairing the ability of the political opposition to challenge the government and hold it to account. The most important feature of executive aggrandizement is that the institutional changes are made through legal channels, making it seem as if the elected official has a democratic mandate.[14][23] Some examples of executive aggrandizement are the decline of media freedom and the weakening of the rule of law (i.e., judicial and bureaucratic restraints on the government), such as when judicial autonomy is threatened.[14]

Hitler gives a speech to the Reichstag in support of the Enabling Act. The collapse of the Weimar Republic into Nazi Germany is perhaps the most infamous example of democratic backsliding.[27]

Over time, there has been a decline in active coups (in which a power-seeking individual, or small group, seizes power through forcibly, violently removing an existing government) and self-coups (involving "a freely elected chief executive suspending the constitution outright in order to amass power in one swift sweep") and an increase in executive aggrandizement.[14] Political scientist Nancy Bermeo notes that executive aggrandizement occurs over time, through institutional changes legitimized through legal means, such as new constituent assemblies, referendums, or "existing courts or legislatures ... in cases where supporters of the executive gain majority control of such bodies."[14] Bermeo notes that these methods mean that the aggrandizement of the executive "can be framed as having resulted from a democratic mandate."[14] Executive aggrandizement is characterized by the presence of distress in axes of democracy, including institutional or horizontal accountability;[28] and executive or discursive accountability.[29]

Incremental election subversion[edit]

This form of democratic backsliding entails the subversion of free and fair elections by, for example, blocking media access, disqualifying opposition candidates and voter suppression. This form of backsliding typically takes place before Election Day and now tends to be done in a slower and more incremental way that the changes may even seem not urgent to counter, making it tougher for watchdogs like the media to find and broadcast the cumulative threat of all the mostly small, but significant misconducts.[14] While the accumulation of power is more likely to start with this slower linear progression, it can accelerate once voter power seems too divided or weakened to repair all the damage done to institutions.

Causes and characteristics[edit]

The V-Party Dataset demonstrates a statistically significantly greater probability of autocratization for victorious parties with very high populism, high anti-pluralism, lack of commitment to the democratic process, acceptance of political violence, far-right culturally or far-left economic characteristics.[30]

Populism[edit]

Pippa Norris of the Harvard Kennedy School and the University of Sydney argues that the two "twin forces" pose the largest threat to Western liberal democracies: "sporadic and random terrorist attacks on domestic soil, which damage feelings of security, and the rise of populist-authoritarian forces, which feed parasitically upon these fears."[31] Norris defines populism as "a governing style with three defining features":

  1. A rhetorical emphasis on the idea that "legitimate political authority is based on popular sovereignty and majority rule";
  2. Disapproval of, and challenges to the legitimacy of, established holders of "political, cultural, and economic power";
  3. Leadership by "maverick outsiders" who claim "to speak for the vox populi and to serve ordinary people."[31]

Some, but not all, populists are also authoritarian, emphasizing "the importance of protecting traditional lifestyles against perceived threats from 'outsiders', even at the expense of civil liberties and minority rights."[31] According to Norris, the reinforcement of the insecurities from the "twin forces" has led to more support for populist-authoritarian leaders, and this latter risk was especially pronounced in the United States during the presidency of Donald Trump. For example, Norris argues that Trump benefited from the mistrust of "the establishment" and that he continuously sought to undermine faith in the legitimacy of the media and the independence of the courts.[31]

In 2017, Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser wrote:

Populism does not have the same effect in each stage of the democratization process. In fact, we suggest that populism tends to play a positive role in the promotion of electoral or minimal democracy, but a negative role when it comes to fostering the development of a full-fledged liberal democratic regime. Consequently, while populism tends to favor the democratization of authoritarian regimes, it is prone to diminish the quality of liberal democracies. Populism supports popular sovereignty, but it is inclined to oppose any limitations on majority rule, such as judicial independence and minority rights. Populism-in-power has led to processes of de-democratization (e.g., [Viktor] Orbán in Hungary or [Hugo] Chávez in Venezuela) and, in some extreme cases, even to the breakdown of the democratic regime (e.g., [Alberto] Fujimori in Peru).[32]

A 2018 analysis by political scientists Yascha Mounk and Jordan Kyle links populism to democratic backsliding, showing that since 1990, "13 right-wing populist governments have been elected; of these, five brought about significant democratic backsliding. Over the same time period, 15 left-wing populist governments were elected; of these, the same number, five, brought about significant democratic backsliding."[33]

A December 2018 report by the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change concluded that populist rule, whether left- or right-wing, leads to a significant risk of democratic backsliding. The authors examine the effect of populism on three major aspects of democracy: the quality of democracy in general, checks and balances on executive power and citizens' right to politically participate in a meaningful way. They conclude that populist governments are four times more likely to cause harm to democratic institutions than non-populist governments. Also, more than half of populist leaders have amended or rewritten the countries' constitution, frequently in a way that eroded checks and balances on executive power. Lastly, populists attack individual rights such as freedom of the press, civil liberties, and political rights.[22]

In a 2018 journal article on democratic backsliding, scholars Licia Cianetti, James Dawson, and Seán Hanley argued that the emergence of populist movements in Central and Eastern Europe, such as Andrej Babiš's ANO in the Czech Republic, are "a potentially ambiguous phenomenon, articulating genuine societal demands for political reform and pushing issues of good governance centre stage, but further loosening the weak checks and balances that characterise post-communist democracy and embedding private interests at the core of the state."[34]

In a 2019 paper, presented to the International Society of Political Psychologists, Shawn Rosenberg argues that right-wing populism is exposing a vulnerability in democratic structures and that "democracy is likely to devour itself."[35]

Around the world, citizens are voting away the democracies they claim to cherish. Scholars present evidence that this behaviour is driven in part by the belief that their opponents will undermine democracy first. In experimental studies, they revealed to partisans that their opponents are more committed to democratic norms than they think. As a result, the partisans became more committed to upholding democratic norms themselves and less willing to vote for candidates who break these norms. These findings suggest that aspiring autocrats may instigate democratic backsliding by accusing their opponents of subverting democracy and that we can foster democratic stability by informing partisans about the other side’s commitment to democracy.[36]

Economic inequality and social discontent[edit]

Many political economy scholars, such as Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, have investigated the effect of income inequality on the democratic breakdown.[10] Studies of democratic collapse show that economic inequality is significantly higher in countries that eventually move towards a more authoritarian model.[37] Hungary is an example of a country where a large group of unemployed, low-educated people were dissatisfied with the high levels of inequality, especially after the financial crisis of 2007–2008. Viktor Orbán used this dissatisfaction of a relatively large segment of the population to his advantage, winning popular support by using national-populist rhetoric.[38]

Personalism[edit]

See also: Business-firm party

A 2019 study found that personalism had an adverse impact on democracy in Latin America: "presidents who dominate their own weakly organized parties are more likely to seek to concentrate power, undermine horizontal accountability, and trample the rule of law than presidents who preside over parties that have an independent leadership and an institutionalized bureaucracy."[39]

COVID-19[edit]

Main articles: Political impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and Impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on journalism

Many national governments worldwide delayed, postponed or canceled a variety of democratic elections at both national and subnational governmental levels resulting in the COVID-19 pandemic opening gaps in the action of democracy.[40][41]

According to the V-Dem Institute, only 39% of all countries have committed no or minor violations of democratic standards in response to COVID-19.[42] Regardless of the fact that liberal democracy was on the defensive and experiencing a rise of autocrats and authoritarian regimes in many parts of the world prior to the first coronavirus death in December 2019, the pandemic has had a major influence on democratic backsliding.[43]

Great power politics[edit]

Great power transitions have contributed to democratic backsliding and the spread of authoritarianism in two ways: "First, the sudden rise of autocratic Great Powers led to waves of autocracy driven by conquest but also by self-interest and even admiration, as in the fascist wave of the 1930s or the post-1945 communist wave. Second, the sudden rise of democratic hegemons led to waves of democratization, but these waves inevitably overextended and collapsed, leading to failed consolidation and rollback."[44]

Authoritarian values[edit]

Global variation in democracy is primarily explained by variance between popular adherence to authoritarian values vs. emancipative values, which explains around 70 percent of the variation of democracy between countries every year since 1960. Emancipative values, as measured by the World Values Survey, have been consistently rising over time in response to increasing economic prosperity.[45]

A 2020 study, which used World Values Survey data, found that cultural conservatism was the ideological group most open to authoritarian governance within Western democracies. Within English-speaking Western democracies, "protection-based" attitudes combining cultural conservatism and leftist economic attitudes were the strongest predictor of support for authoritarian modes of governance.[46]

Professor Jessica Stern and the political psychologist Karen Stenner write that international research finds that "perceptions of sociocultural threat" (such as rising ethnic diversity, tolerance for LGBT people) are more important in explaining how democracies turn authoritarian compared to economic inequality (though they include economic threats such as globalization and the rising prosperity of other ethnic groups).[47] Stern and Stenner say about a third of the population in Western countries is predisposed to favor homogeneity, obedience, and strong leaders over diversity and freedom. In their view, authoritarianism is only loosely correlated with conservatism, which may defend a liberal democracy as the status quo.

Political scientist Christian Welzel argues that the third wave of democratization overshot the demand for democracy in some countries. Therefore, Welzel sees the current autocratization trend as regression to the mean, but expects that it too will reverse in response to long-term changes in values.[45]

Polarization, misinformation, incrementalism, and multi-factor explanations[edit]

The 2019 Annual Democracy Report of the V-Dem Institute at the University of Gothenburg identified three challenges confronting global democracy: (1) "Government manipulation of media, civil society, rule of law, and elections"; (2) rising "toxic polarization", including "the division of society into distrustful, antagonistic camps"; diminishing "respect for opponents, factual reasoning, and engagement with society" among political elites; and increasing use of hate speech by political leaders; and (3) foreign disinformation campaigns, primarily digital, and mostly affecting Taiwan, the United States, and former Soviet bloc nations such as Latvia.[48]

According to Suzanne Mettler and Robert C. Lieberman, four characteristics have typically provided the conditions for democratic backsliding (alone or in combination): Political polarization, racism and nativism, economic inequality, and excessive executive power.[49][50][51] Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman highlight three key causes of backsliding: "the pernicious effects of polarization; realignments of party systems that enable elected autocrats to gain legislative power; and the incremental nature of derogations, which divides oppositions and keeps them off balance."[52] A 2022 study linked polarization to support for undemocratic politicians.[53]

Prevalence and trends[edit]

See also: Democratic backsliding by country
Countries autocratizing (red) or democratizing (blue) substantially and significantly (2010–2020), according to the V-Dem Democracy indices. Countries in grey are substantially unchanged.[54]

A study by the V-Dem Democracy indices by the V-Dem Institute at the University of Gothenburg, which contains more than eighteen-million data points relevant to democracy, measuring 350 highly specific indicators across 174 countries as of the end of 2016, found that the number of democracies in the world modestly declined from 100 in 2011 to 97 in 2017; some countries moved toward democracy, while other countries moved away from democracy.[55] V-Dem's 2019 Annual Democracy Report found that the trend of autocratization continued, while "24 countries are now severely affected by what is established as a 'third wave of autocratization'" including "populous countries such as Brazil, Bangladesh and the United States, as well as several Eastern European countries" (specifically Bulgaria and Serbia).[48] The report found that an increasing proportion of the world population lived in countries undergoing autocratization (2.3 billion in 2018).[48] The report found that while the majority of countries were democracies, the number of liberal democracies declined to 39 by 2018 (down from 44 a decade earlier).[48] The research group Freedom House, in reports in 2017 and 2019, identified democratic backsliding in a variety of regions across the world.[56][57] Freedom House's 2019 Freedom in the World report, titled Democracy in Retreat, showed freedom of expression declining each year over the preceding 13 years, with sharper drops since 2012.[58]

Global trend report Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2022 [59]

Scholarly work in the 2010s detailed democratic backsliding, in various forms and to various extents, in Hungary and Poland,[34] the Czech Republic,[60] Turkey,[61][62] Brazil, Venezuela,[63][64] and India.[65] The scholarly recognition of the concept of democratic backsliding reflects a reversal from older views, which held "that democracy, once attained in a fairly wealthy state, would become a permanent fixture."[18] This older view came to be realized as erroneous beginning in the mid-2000s, as multiple scholars acknowledged that some seemingly-stable democracies have recently faced a decline in the quality of their democracy.[37] Huq and Ginsburg identified in an academic paper "37 instances in 25 different countries in the postwar period in which democratic quality declined significantly (though a fully authoritarian regime didn't emerge)", including countries that were "seemingly stable, reasonably wealthy" democracies.[21]

The 2020 report of the Varieties of Democracy Institute found that the global share of democracies declined from 54% in 2009 to 49% in 2019, and that a greater share of the global population lived in autocratizing countries (6% in 2009, 34% in 2019).[66] The 10 countries with the highest degree of democratizing from 2009 to 2019 were Tunisia, Armenia, The Gambia, Sri Lanka, Madagascar, Myanmar, Fiji, Kyrgyzstan, Ecuador, and Niger; the 10 countries with the highest degree of autocratizing from 2009 to 2019 were Hungary, Turkey, Poland, Serbia, Brazil, Bangladesh, Mali, Thailand, Nicaragua, and Zambia.[66] However, the institute found that signs of hope in an "unprecedented degree of mobilization for democracy" as reflected in increases in pro-democracy mass mobilization; the proportion of countries with "substantial pro-democracy mass protests" increased to 44% in 2019 (from 27% in 2009).[66] According to a 2020 study, "Democratic backsliding does not necessarily see all democratic institutions erode in parallel fashion... we establish that elections are improving and rights are retracting in the same time period, and in many of the same cases."[67]

Central and Eastern Europe[edit]

See also: Democratic backsliding under Viktor Orbán

In the 2010s, a scholarly consensus developed that the Central and Eastern Europe region was experiencing democratic backsliding, most prominently in Hungary and Poland,[34] and the European Union (EU) failed to prevent democratic backsliding in some of its other member states.[68][69] Rutgers University political scientist R. Daniel Kelemen argues that EU membership has enabled an "authoritarian equilibrium" and may even make it easier for authoritarian-minded leaders to erode democracy due to the EU's system of party politics, a reluctance to interfere in domestic political matters; appropriation of EU funds by backsliding regimes; and free movement for dissatisfied citizens, which allows citizens to leave backsliding regimes and deplete the opposition while strengthening the regimes.[68] According to Dalia Research's 2020 poll, only 38 percent of Polish citizens and 36 percent of Hungarian citizens believe that their countries are democratic, while the rest say they would like their countries to be more democratic.[70]

United States[edit]

Page 'Democratic backsliding in the United States' not found

Effects of judicial independence[edit]

A 2011 study examined the effects of judicial independence in preventing democratic backsliding. The study, which analyzed 163 nations from 1960 to 2000, concluded that established independent judiciaries are successful at preventing democracies from drifting to authoritarianism, but that states with newly formed courts "are positively associated with regime collapses in both democracies and nondemocracies".[71]

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ↑ Other names include democratic decline,[3] de-democratization,[4] democratic erosion,[5] democratic decay,[6] democratic recession,[7] democratic regression,[3] and democratic deconsolidation.[8]
  1. ↑ Skaaning, Svend-Erik. "Waves of autocratization and democratization: a critical note on conceptualization and measurement" (PDF). Democratization. 27 (8): 1533–1542. doi:10.1080/13510347.2020.1799194. S2CID 225378571. Archived (PDF) from the original on 6 February 2023. Retrieved 7 November 2022.
  2. ↑ Lührmann, Anna; Lindberg, Staffan I. "A third wave of autocratization is here: what is new about it?". Democratization. 26 (7): 1095–1113. doi:10.1080/13510347.2019.1582029. S2CID 150992660. The decline of democratic regime attributes – autocratization
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 Mietzner, Marcus (2021). "Sources of resistance to democratic decline: Indonesian civil society and its trials". Democratization. 28 (1): 161–178. doi:10.1080/13510347.2020.1796649. S2CID 225475139.
  4. ↑ Mudde, Cas and Kaltwasser, Cristóbal Rovira (2017) Populism: a Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press. pp.86-96. ISBN 978-0-19-023487-4
  5. ↑ Laebens, Melis G.; Lührmann, Anna. "What halts democratic erosion? The changing role of accountability". Democratization. 28 (5): 908–928. doi:10.1080/13510347.2021.1897109. S2CID 234870008.
  6. ↑ Daly, Tom Gerald. "Democratic Decay: Conceptualising an Emerging Research Field". Hague Journal on the Rule of Law. 11: 9–36. doi:10.1007/s40803-019-00086-2. S2CID 159354232.
  7. ↑ Huq, Aziz Z. "How (not) to explain a democratic recession". International Journal of Constitutional Law. 19 (2): 723–737. doi:10.1093/icon/moab058.
  8. ↑ Chull Shin, Doh. "Democratic deconsolidation in East Asia: exploring system realignments in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan". Democratization. 28 (1): 142–160. doi:10.1080/13510347.2020.1826438. S2CID 228959708.
  9. ↑ Cassani, Andrea; Tomini, Luca. "What Autocratization Is". Autocratization in post-Cold War Political Regimes. Springer International Publishing. pp. 15–35. ISBN 978-3-030-03125-1.
  10. ↑ 10.0 10.1 Walder, D.; Lust, E. "Unwelcome Change: Coming to Terms with Democratic Backsliding". Annual Review of Political Science. 21 (1): 93–113. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-050517-114628. Backsliding entails a deterioration of qualities associated with democratic governance, within any regime. In democratic regimes, it is a decline in the quality of democracy; in autocracies, it is a decline in democratic qualities of governance.
  11. ↑ Lindberg, Staffan I. "The Nature of Democratic Backsliding in Europe". Carnegie Europe. Archived from the original on 13 April 2021. Retrieved 27 January 2021.
  12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 Rocha Menocal, Alina; Fritz, Verena; Rakner, Lise. "Hybrid regimes and the challenges of deepening and sustaining democracy in developing countries1". South African Journal of International Affairs. 15 (1): 29–40. doi:10.1080/10220460802217934. ISSN 1022-0461. S2CID 55589140. Archived from the original on 21 January 2020. Retrieved 27 January 2021.
  13. ↑ "Pandemic Backsliding". www.v-dem.net. V-Dem. Archived from the original on 21 December 2020. Retrieved 23 January 2021.
  14. ↑ 14.0 14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4 14.5 14.6 14.7 14.8 14.9 Bermeo, Nancy. "On Democratic Backsliding" (PDF). Journal of Democracy. 27 (1): 5–19. doi:10.1353/jod.2016.0012. ISSN 1086-3214. S2CID 155798358. Archived (PDF) from the original on 29 March 2021. Retrieved 26 April 2019.
  15. ↑ Maerz, Seraphine F.; Lührmann, Anna; Hellmeier, Sebastian; Grahn, Sandra; Lindberg, Staffan I. "State of the world 2019: autocratization surges – resistance grows". Democratization. 27 (6): 909–927. doi:10.1080/13510347.2020.1758670. ISSN 1351-0347.
  16. ↑ Boese, Vanessa A.; Lundstedt, Martin; Morrison, Kelly; Sato, Yuko; Lindberg, Staffan I. "State of the world 2021: autocratization changing its nature?". Democratization. 29 (6): 983–1013. doi:10.1080/13510347.2022.2069751. ISSN 1351-0347. S2CID 249031421.
  17. ↑ The Global State of Democracy 2021 Archived 2022-08-09 at the Wayback Machine, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
  18. ↑ 18.0 18.1 18.2 18.3 18.4 "How democratic backsliding happens". Democracy Digest. Archived from the original on 17 April 2020. Retrieved 23 June 2017.
  19. ↑ Waldner, David; Lust, Ellen. "Unwelcome Change: Coming to Terms with Democratic Backsliding". Annual Review of Political Science. 21 (1): 93–113. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-050517-114628. ISSN 1094-2939.
  20. ↑ 20.0 20.1 Diamond, Larry. "Democratic regression in comparative perspective: scope, methods, and causes". Democratization. 28: 22–42. doi:10.1080/13510347.2020.1807517. ISSN 1351-0347.
  21. ↑ 21.0 21.1 21.2 Huq, Aziz; Ginsburg, Tom. "How to lose a constitutional democracy". Vox'. Archived from the original on 16 February 2021. Retrieved 5 September 2017.
  22. ↑ 22.0 22.1 Kyle, Jordan; Mounk, Yascha. "The Populist Harm to Democracy: An Empirical Assessment" (PDF). Tony Blair Institute for Global Change. Archived (PDF) from the original on 30 January 2021. Retrieved 17 May 2019.
  23. ↑ 23.0 23.1 Levitsky, Steven; Ziblatt, Daniel (2018). How Democracies Die. United States: Crown. pp. 76–78.
  24. ↑ 24.0 24.1 Ozan O.Varol. Mark A. Graber; Sanford Levinson; Mark V. Tushnet (eds.). Stealth Authoritarianism in Turkey. pp. 339–354. ISBN 978-0-19-088898-5. OCLC 1030444422. Archived from the original on 17 March 2021. Retrieved 29 May 2020. {{cite encyclopedia}}: |work= ignored (help)
  25. ↑ "Linz, J. and Stepan, A., 1998. Problems of democratic transition and consolidation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, p.38."
  26. ↑ Huntington, Samuel P. Democracy's Third Wave. University of Oklahoma Press. p. 23. ISBN 9780806125169. Archived from the original on 17 March 2021. Retrieved 23 February 2021.
  27. ↑ Levitsky, Steven; Ziblatt, Daniel (2018). How Democracies Die. New York: Crown. p. 95. ISBN 978-1-5247-6293-3.
  28. ↑ Sadurski, Wojciech; Sevel, Michael; Walton, Kevin (eds.). Legitimacy: The State and Beyond. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-882526-5.
  29. ↑ Issacharoff, Samuel (2018). "III Factors, 25 Populism versus Democratic Governance". In Mark a, Graber; Sanford, Levinson; Mark, Tushnet (eds.). Constitutional Democracy in Crisis?. doi:10.1093/law/9780190888985.001.0001. ISBN 9780190888985. Archived from the original on 16 January 2021. Retrieved 15 May 2020. {{cite book}}: |website= ignored (help)
  30. ↑ Medzihorsky, Juraj; Lindberg, Staffan I. "Walking the Talk: How to Identify Anti-Pluralist Parties" (PDF). Party Politics. doi:10.1177/13540688231153092. hdl:2077/68137.
  31. ↑ 31.0 31.1 31.2 31.3 Norris, Pippa. "Is Western Democracy Backsliding? Diagnosing the Risks" (PDF). Journal of Democracy (Scholarly response to column published online). Online Exchange on "Democratic Deconsolidation". Johns Hopkins University Press. Archived from the original (PDF) on 11 April 2018. Retrieved 28 August 2018.
  32. ↑ Mudde, Cas and Kaltwasser, Cristóbal Rovira (2017) Populism: a Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press. pp.95-96. ISBN 978-0-19-023487-4
  33. ↑ Kyle, Yascha Mounk, Jordan. "What Populists Do to Democracies". The Atlantic. Archived from the original on 9 March 2021. Retrieved 27 December 2018.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  34. ↑ 34.0 34.1 34.2 Licia Cianetti; James Dawson; Seán Hanley. "Rethinking "democratic backsliding" in Central and Eastern Europe – looking beyond Hungary and Poland". East European Politics. 34 (3): 243–256. doi:10.1080/21599165.2018.1491401. Over the past decade, a scholarly consensus has emerged that that democracy in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is deteriorating, a trend often subsumed under the label 'backsliding'. ... the new dynamics of backsliding are best illustrated by the one-time democratic front-runners Hungary and Poland.
  35. ↑ Rosenberg, S. Democracy Devouring Itself: The Rise of the Incompetent Citizen and the Appeal of Right-Wing Populism. eScholarship, University of California. OCLC 1055900632.
  36. ↑ Braley, Alia; Lenz, Gabriel S.; Adjodah, Dhaval; Rahnama, Hossein; Pentland, Alex. "Why voters who value democracy participate in democratic backsliding". Nature Human Behaviour: 1–12. doi:10.1038/s41562-023-01594-w. PMID 37217740. S2CID 258842427.
  37. ↑ 37.0 37.1 Huq, Aziz; Ginsburg, Tom. "How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy". UCLA Law Review. 65: 78–169. Archived from the original on 15 May 2023. Retrieved 15 May 2023.
  38. ↑ Greskovitz, Béla. "The Hollowing and Backsliding of Democracy in East-Central Europe". Global Policy. 6 (1): 28–37. doi:10.1111/1758-5899.12225.
  39. ↑ Rhodes-Purdy, Matthew; Madrid, Raúl L. "The perils of personalism". Democratization. 27 (2): 321–339. doi:10.1080/13510347.2019.1696310. ISSN 1351-0347. S2CID 212974380.
  40. ↑ "Global overview of COVID-19: Impact on elections". www.idea.int. Archived from the original on 13 March 2021. Retrieved 28 January 2021.
  41. ↑ Lewkowicz, Jacek; Woźniak, Michał; Wrzesiński, Michał. "COVID-19 and erosion of democracy". Economic Modelling. 106 (vol. 106, 105682): 105682. doi:10.1016/j.econmod.2021.105682. PMC 8571542. PMID 34776576. Archived from the original on 26 November 2021. Retrieved 25 November 2021.
  42. ↑ B. Edgell, A., Grahn, S., Lachapelle, J., Lührmann, A. and F. Maerz, S. (2021). "An Update on Pandemic Backsliding: Democracy Four Months After the Beginning of the Covid-19 Pandemic". V-dem.net. Accessed 31 January 2021.
  43. ↑ Keilitz, Ingo. "Illiberalism Enabled by the Coronavirus Pandemic: An Existential Threat to Judicial Independence". International Journal for Court Administration. 11 (2): 2. doi:10.36745/ijca.339. S2CID 225514092.
  44. ↑ Gunitsky, Seva, Bartel, Fritz; Monteiro, Nuno P. (eds.), "Great Powers and the Spread of Autocracy Since the Cold War", Before and After the Fall: World Politics and the End of the Cold War, Cambridge University Press, pp. 225–243, doi:10.1017/9781108910194.014, ISBN 978-1-108-90677-7, S2CID 244851964, archived from the original on 11 January 2022, retrieved 17 December 2021
  45. ↑ 45.0 45.1 Welzel, Christian. "Why The Future Is Democratic". Journal of Democracy. 32 (2): 132–144. doi:10.1353/jod.2021.0024. ISSN 1086-3214. S2CID 234920048. Archived from the original on 28 February 2022. Retrieved 28 February 2022.
  46. ↑ Malka, Ariel; Lelkes, Yphtach; Bakker, Bert N.; Spivack, Eliyahu. "Who Is Open to Authoritarian Governance within Western Democracies?". Perspectives on Politics. 20 (3): 808–827. doi:10.1017/S1537592720002091. ISSN 1537-5927. S2CID 225207244. Archived from the original on 28 January 2021. Retrieved 9 September 2020.
  47. ↑ Karen Stenner; Jessica Stern. "How to Live With Authoritarians". Foreign Policy. Archived from the original on 12 January 2022. Retrieved 17 January 2022.
  48. ↑ 48.0 48.1 48.2 48.3 Democracy Facing Global Challenges: V-Dem Annual Democracy Report 2019 (PDF) (Report). V-Dem Institute at the University of Gothenburg. Archived (PDF) from the original on 5 June 2019. Retrieved 2 January 2020.
  49. ↑ Mettler, Suzanne (2020). Four Threats: The Recurring Crises of American Democracy. New York: St. Martin's Press. ISBN 978-1-250-24442-0. OCLC 1155487679. Archived from the original on 17 March 2021. Retrieved 14 August 2020.
  50. ↑ Farrell, Henry. "History tells us there are four key threats to U.S. democracy". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 18 January 2021. Retrieved 14 August 2020.
  51. ↑ Lieberman, By Suzanne Mettler and Robert C. "The Fragile Republic". Foreign Affairs. Archived from the original on 6 November 2020. Retrieved 15 August 2020.
  52. ↑ Haggard, Stephan; Kaufman, Robert. Backsliding: Democratic Regress in the Contemporary World. doi:10.1017/9781108957809. ISBN 9781108957809. S2CID 242013001. Archived from the original on 3 March 2021. Retrieved 21 January 2021. {{cite book}}: |website= ignored (help)
  53. ↑ Orhan, Yunus Emre. "The relationship between affective polarization and democratic backsliding: comparative evidence". Democratization. 29 (4): 714–735. doi:10.1080/13510347.2021.2008912. ISSN 1351-0347. S2CID 248304434.
  54. ↑ Nazifa Alizada, Rowan Cole, Lisa Gastaldi, Sandra Grahn, Sebastian Hellmeier, Palina Kolvani, Jean Lachapelle, Anna Lührmann, Seraphine F. Maerz, Shreeya Pillai, and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2021. Autocratization Turns Viral. Democracy Report 2021. University of Gothenburg: V-Dem Institute. https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/74/8c/748c68ad-f224-4cd7-87f9-8794add5c60f/dr_2021_updated.pdf Archived 2021-09-14 at the Wayback Machine
  55. ↑ Mechkova, Valeriya; Lührmann, Anna; Lindberg, Staffan I. "How Much Democratic Backsliding?". Journal of Democracy. 28 (4): 162–169. doi:10.1353/jod.2017.0075. ISSN 1086-3214. S2CID 158736288.
  56. ↑ Democracy in Retreat (Report). Freedom House. Archived from the original on 15 February 2019. Retrieved 17 May 2019.
  57. ↑ Esther King. "Democratic backsliding threatens international order". Politico. Archived from the original on 29 July 2017. Retrieved 23 June 2017.
  58. ↑ Democracy in Retreat: Freedom in the World 2019 (Report). Freedom House. 2020. Archived from the original on 15 February 2019. Retrieved 17 May 2019.
  59. ↑ "Global Dashboard". BTI 2022. Archived from the original on 17 April 2023. Retrieved 17 April 2023.
  60. ↑ Seán Hanley & Milada Anna Vachudova. "Understanding the illiberal turn: democratic backsliding in the Czech Republic". East European Politics. 34 (3): 276–296. doi:10.1080/21599165.2018.1493457.
  61. ↑ Cemal Burak Tansel. "Authoritarian Neoliberalism and Democratic Backsliding in Turkey: Beyond the Narratives of Progress". South European Society and Politics. 23 (2): 197–217. doi:10.1080/13608746.2018.1479945.
  62. ↑ Kadir Akyuz & Steve Hess. "Turkey Looks East: International Leverage and Democratic Backsliding in a Hybrid Regime". Mediterranean Quarterly. 29 (2): 1–26. doi:10.1215/10474552-6898075. S2CID 158084228.
  63. ↑ Laura Gamboa. "Opposition at the Margins: Strategies against the Erosion of Democracy in Colombia and Venezuela". Comparative Politics. 49 (4): 457–477. doi:10.5129/001041517821273044. S2CID 157426820.
  64. ↑ Sabatini, Christopher. "The Final Blow to Venezuela's Democracy: What Latin America Can Do About It". Foreign Affairs. ISSN 0015-7120. Archived from the original on 25 February 2021. Retrieved 27 May 2019.
  65. ↑ "Democratic Erosion in India: A Case Study". www.democratic-erosion.com. Archived from the original on 17 March 2021. Retrieved 14 March 2021.
  66. ↑ 66.0 66.1 66.2 Autocratization Surges–Resistance Grows: Democracy Report 2020 Archived 2020-03-30 at the Wayback Machine, V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg (March 2020).
  67. ↑ Ding, Iza; Slater, Dan. "Democratic decoupling". Democratization. 28: 63–80. doi:10.1080/13510347.2020.1842361. ISSN 1351-0347.
  68. ↑ 68.0 68.1 Kelemen, R. Daniel. "The European Union's Authoritarian Equilibrium". Journal of European Public Policy. 20 (3): 481–499. doi:10.1080/13501763.2020.1712455. S2CID 221055795. Archived from the original on 29 November 2020. Retrieved 25 August 2020.
  69. ↑ Kelemen, R. Daniel. "The E.U. is supposed to promote democracy. So why do anti-democratic politicians thrive within it?". Washington Post. Archived from the original on 2 March 2021. Retrieved 25 August 2020.
  70. ↑ "Most Poles, Hungarians don't think their countries are democratic: poll". Politico. Archived from the original on 17 March 2021. Retrieved 4 November 2020.
  71. ↑ Douglas M. Gibler; Kirk A. Randazzo. "Testing the Effects of Independent Judiciaries on the Likelihood of Democratic Backsliding". American Journal of Political Science. 55 (3): 696–709. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00504.x. JSTOR 23024945.

Further reading[edit]

External links[edit]

Retrieved from "https://en.bharatpedia.org/index.php?title=Democratic_backsliding&oldid=387828"